STRATEGIC ANALYSIS: PERSIAN OR ARABIAN GULF? Comparing presence at the Gulf.

Transcription

1 STRATEGIC ANALYSIS: PERSIAN OR ARABIAN GULF? Comparing presence at the Gulf. By Javier Bordón Osorio. Dispute s origin and the traditional approach of the international community and Spain. Strategic significance of the Strait of Hormuz. In the past October, the U.S. president Donald J. Trump sparked the protests among Persian nationals, when referring to the geographical space between the southern coast of Iran and the member States of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) and Iraq as the Arabian Gulf. This maritime area, spanning km2 and with an average depth of 50 metres which display it as a unique continental platform [1], is traditionally known by the designation Persian Gulf. Its strategic value is such, that even the controversy for determining its name represents one of the pillars inside Saudi Arabia-Iran s conflict. Each side hoists the Arab or Persian identity respectively, in the race for the regional leadership. The origin in the usage of one or the other term in order to set forth power projections and claim, as clarified by the expert Frederic Wehrey, the Gulf s property [2], goes back to the mid-twentieth century when several convergent factors led to the Arab/Persian geopolitical rivalry which, in general terms and accompanied by a remarkable pragmatism, has endured until nowadays. 1) According to Iran s Foreign Affairs Ministry employee Reza Dehghani, the main characteristic of the Gulf is the presence of huge deposits of oil and gas along the seabed [3]. Facing a decolonisation process in the Arab territories of the basin whose borders had yet to be drafted, Iran rapidly identified the Persian Gulf as an area of natural priority [4] for its interests and the regional security, expecting to legitimate the exploitation of the resources while defending a historical bond between the Gulf and Iran s national imaginary. This would lead to an additional geopolitical advantage over its Arab neighbours, due to its victory in guaranteeing the highest percentage of territorial waters in the only shared border with them.

2 2) In contrast to the previous statement, the debate actually emerged with the growing popularity of the name Arabian Gulf in the 1950s. As assessed in a United Nations report published in 2006, the British colonial power encouraged its use in the Arab protectorates, sowing the grounds for the dispute [5]. Parallel to the boom of Panarabism headed by figures like Nasser or Qassim, this nationalist movement embraced the concept and, by the beginning of the 60s, it was being widely used with political and securitarian goals. Something that intensified after Great Britain s departure from the Middle East. The same U.N. document on behalf of creating consensus within the international community- provides crossed arguments endorsing the validity of the name Persian Gulf, paying attention to its historical legacy and usage by ancient civilisations; in international law agreements and modern maps and to the geographic and demographic stretch that the Islamic Republic represents at the Gulf, bigger than any other Arab State. Regarding the U.S., although it attaches to the official designation, the close cooperation with the Arab regimes drives the military staff to understand that it is a friendly gesture of solidarity and support [...] towards our allies from GCC to use the term that they prefer, as mentioned by major Kevin Stephens from the Navy 5th Fleet for the New York Times. In the case of Spain, whose relation with the region is mainly based on commercial exchanges concerning Spanish energy external dependence. [6], it joins to U.N. s approach, however, there exists a tendency to emulate English-speaking simplication the Gulf. According to ex-ambassador in Iran José Mª Sierra Nava, for avoiding the problem on how to call it [7]. Beyond the regional antagonism, the Gulf has a global strategic importance that could largely be summarised in the exceptional position of the Strait of Hormuz, located between the Gulf and the Arabian Sea and embodying the most relevant oil transit chokepoint in the world, due to its daily flow of almost 17 million barrels a day in 2011, [representing] the 35% of all seaborne traded oil or almost 20% of oil traded worldwide [8]. The Gulf States economic dependence on this transit point, its significance for global energy and the high level of conflict due to its uncleared possession are factors in the centre of the name s dispute. Therefore, what designation would be the most suitable for the Gulf Persian or Arabian-, in terms of the level of presence and the capability of influence on the

3 geoestratregic space? We are going to analyse three different factors: 1) ethnic/ demographic; 2) economic/ commercial and 3) military. Comparing Arab/Persian presence at the Gulf, we will be able to assess which identity rules the regional balance of power. Ethnic/demographic factor 90,000,000 80,000,000 70,000,000 60,000,000 50,000,000 40,000,000 30,000,000 20,000,000 10,000,000 0 Saudi Arabia Population by Country (2017) Iraq Iran UAE Oman Kuwait Bahrain Qatar Source: CIA World Factbook, Julio 2017 [9]. Infografía propia. In 2017, Iranian demographic values hugely exceed every population from the Gulf States with Arab majority. Nevertheless, if we added the numbers of those plus Iraq, the total population would be closely equal to the Persian demographic domain. Consequently, it is enlightening to comprehend that Iran faces a vast majority of Gulf regimes who stress an Arab origin, deriving into an advantage in terms of the number of political actors enhancing the gepolitical claim, independent of the relative intensity that they devote to it in their foreign policy narratives. Furthermore, the ethnical composition in the Gulf is transforming at a high pace, evidenced by the large and seemingly semi-permanent population of South Asian and South East Asian workers [10], having a fundamental impact on the linguistic and cultural spectrum in the region, gradually more fluid. But even more important, as argued by the Gulf expert Lawrence G. Potter, is the role that the ports play and the mix of population within them [...] reflect what society in the Persian Gulf always has

4 been- part of the Indian Ocean world in terms of people, trade, culture and outlook [11]. Against an ethnic and cultural diversity existing before the establishment of borders, the regional States enforce identity policies targetting the construction of shared past national imaginaries, which equally imply building the difference in respect to the Other in order to legitimise assertive behaviours in their intergovernmental relations. Despite the growing outreach of those policies, the vast Arab and Farsi-speaking diasporas on each side of the Gulf, together with the continuous immigration during the last years mainly, towards the Arab states-, turn it into a transnational space where does not prevail any ethnic group by its own. Therefore, the demographic factor is not decisive when assessing the Arab/Persian influence in the Gulf. Economic/ commercial factor The regional actors are implementing two major courses of action that illustrate the strategic dilemma posed by the Gulf: 1) investment and improvement of the commercial and productive infrastructure within the geographical formation and 2) economic diversification in search of new trading routes. On one hand, it depicts the for nowinevitably dependent character towards the Gulf transit. For instance, Saudi Arabia, in 2012, exported 75% of national oil through its limits [12]. On the other, it shows the economic weakness implied by that same dependence. Therefore, preparing themselves for unpromising risk scenarios like the hypothetical Hormuz s closure by Iran, the Arab States strengthen new alternatives in order to lay out a solution for their constantly growing economies. Nevertheless, due to the region s tremendous potential for consolidating as international financial and logistic center and the limited options for avoiding Hormuz, it is logical to assume that competition will remain in these waters. In this sense, Arab States are clearly leading the way in the race for carrying out policies stimulating economic activity at the Gulf. Oil Barrells by Country crossing the Strait of Hormuz, 2011.

5 Nº of ports related to economic activity at the Gulf, 2017 República de Irán Iraq CCG Source: U.S. Energy Information Administration. Graphic : Stephen Rountree and Sam Forman, Source: Ports.com. Infografía Propia. According to the latest collected data by the World Bank in 2015, Iran s GDP only counts as much as Saudi Arabia s 60% of GDP, and barely 25% if all Gulf Arab States GDPs were added. Moreover, their is an obvious Saudi Arabia and UAE supremacy in energy exports, whether hydrocarbons or in the emerging renewable energy market, in which Abu Dhabi stands out with the objective of satisfying 24% of national energy needs by 2020 [14]. Meanwhile, the Persian State possesses the second largest regional oil reserves and the largest gas deposits in the world but it is forced to consume most of its gas production and some is imported as well, as explained by researcher Amal Abu-Warda Pérez, due to production shortcomes and lacking infrastructure. Iranian exports are highly allocated in the Gulf, together with its wishes in consolidating as privileged economic focal point inside a macrorregional network connecting the Asian giants China and India [15]. Iranian Roads and Urban Development Ministry stimates that Shahid Rajaee Port, at the northern Gulf, welcomes approximately the half of total national trade. [16]. It is closely followed by port city Bandar Abbas, whose refinery has remarkably increased its daily capacity thanks to new investments accounting $445 millions. Apart from a few significant programmes backed by foreign investment, like Chabahar port, Iranian commercial interests stay subordinate to the Gulf s future. However, the amount of traffic, international outreach and means at the Arab ports of the Gulf widely surpass those of the Persian enemy. The undeniable example is

6 represented by Jebel Ali macrostructure in Dubai, the only Middle Eastern port in the top ten worlwide ports in volume and capacity. In spite of making it the regional sea trade leader, the UAE keeps introducing new additions and improvements that set the its total capacity in 15 million T.E.U., according to data from the Middle East Institute [17]. Kizad and Zayed ports in Abu Dhabi also excel with 1.5 million T.E.U. and they have an increasing importance in UAE s diversification strategy towards non-energy exports and the third sector. In the case of Saudi Arabia, enhancing activity at the Gulf positions is essential for fulfilling the objective of raising non-oil exports from 16% to 50% in the next 15 years [18]. Confronting Arab economic predominance, the Islamic Republic deploys a deterrence strategic advantage that allows -to some point- to apply an increasing prices policy and even blockade at the Gulf: the threat of Strait of Hormuz s closure. Still, as shown by a CSIS (Center for Strategic and International Studies) study, closing the Gulf would trigger a fatal war for Iran because it would be probably followed by an international military intervention and severe effects for its own trade [19]. Consequently, it represents more a deterrence gesture than a feasible scenario. Military factor SWOT Analysis Military Balance at the Gulf. Strenghts Arab States -Leadership in weaponry, technological and military expenditure race. -Stable weapons supply. -Military presence of U.S. hegemony and support from France, Great Britain and Turkey: strong power proyection capabilities (air-precision strikes). -Solid internal security resources(gcc) -Better defence systems. -Air advantage: combat aircraft. Naval advantage: U.S. dominance and modern surface warships. -Scarce military personnel, low quality and sustainability. -De facto dependence on U.S. and allies. -Lack of coordination and interoperability among Arab States. Iran -8th largest army in the world: manpower supremacy. -Wide capabilities and experience in assymetric warfare. -Favourable geography for strategic depth: better artillery positions, but not accurate enough. -Great deployment for deterrence strategy at the Gulf: antiship missile systems, mines, submarines and submersibles but limited firepower. -State control of national weapon industry. -Outdated weaponry and systems and technological obsolescence. -No access to modern and high profile arms imports. -Majority of military personnel is

7 Weaknesses Opportunities Amenazas - Dependence on civilian contractors. -Limited adaptation to assymetric warfare doctrine. -Geographical disadvantage: exposure to Iranian missiles. -No capabilites for large-manoeuvre conflicts. -Progress in consolidating military professionalism: better quality, specialisation and efficiency. -Better cooperation, coordination and timing among Arab States: aerial defence and missile systems integration. -Defence infrastructure innovations: minimising exposure to Iranian missiles. -If an scalation of the armed conflict happened, it would rapidly become an aerial and land conflict: Arab States and allies dominance. -Estrangement in the alliance with the U.S. and Europe. -Intimidation/deterrence through assymetric attacks by irregular forces. -Attrition war with low intensity. -Raids in allies bases and facilities. -Iranian nuclear programme with military purposes: unlikely scenario. poorly qualified and trained. -Real improvement but exaggerated in asymmetric warfare. -Weak land-air, air-land and air-water capabilities. -Limited power projection through deterrence strategy. -No capabilities for large-manoeuvre conflicts. -Greater effectiveness in influencing proxy wars at the region. -Development of resources for threating sea trade. -Balancing of limited conventional capabilities with more precise and larger range missiles. -Growing support from China and Russia. -Permanent risk of military intervention by U.S. and allies. -Arab mindset in change: from conflict avoidance to facing Iranian influence and defending the region. -Arab air and technological supremacy: destruction of critical infrastructure in few days. -Large scale conflict at the Gulf: questionable national economy survival. Sources: William O. Beeman, Huffington Post; Marianne Lavelle, National Geographic News; Al-Waght News and Analysis; Firas Elias, Fikra Forum; Cordesman y Toukan, CSIS; Michael Knights, Original Graphic. Regarding Iran, its main apparent asset is the number of forces, however, this is generally a secondary element in modern conflicts with high-profile technology. Furthermore, there are serious doubts about the level of professionalism that can be deployed by Iranian troops. Additionally, the State has the geographical advantage in unfolding heavy artillery along the Gulf with efectiveness, nevertheless, its deadliness is appeased due to an obvious deficiency in precision. In this sense, the most favourable

8 scenario for Iran would imply the reproduction of a low intensity conflict, where assymetric warfare would bring positive results in the form of partial victories. Among the Gulf Arab States, the small forces and the lack of cooperation are widely overcome by technological and arms predominance, as well as the presence and power projection of international allies. Morever, they possess better and more opportunities than Iran in bending the balance in their favour. However, their military dominance depends on an external factor likely changing: the strategic alliance with the Western powers. Conclusion and Prospective In view of the persistent nature of Arab/Persian antagonism, it is appropiate to assume that the designation of the Gulf will continue to be an element of discord and a tactical rhetoric for claiming the regional leadership in the next years. But accomplishing negotiated and accepted equations between the factions, whose essence would disregard the negative effects of sectarism, could become an strategic resource for influencing in cooling the conflict. On this direction has Lawrence G. Potter conducted his research, with the aim of proving the transnational and multicultural Gulf s nature, instead of its simplified understanding as an adjacent territory to the Arab or Persian world [20]. Consequently, a will for building a shared and mutual knowledge is needed, which would also comprise ethnic minorities and the plurality of geographical scales in which the Gulf plays a relevant role. Promoting a conciliatory vision, agreed by the actors, would definitely contribute to ending the dispute about the Gulf s name.