Change of the EU Enlargement Policy

Transcription

1 Adam Szymański, PhD Associate Professor Institute of Political Science University of Warsaw ad_ Change of the EU Enlargement Policy Paper for IPSA World Congress Madrid, 8-12 July 2012 This text is a draft. Please, do not quote or cite without the author s permission. Abstract. At the beginning of the 21st century such scholars as Frank Schimmelfennig or Ulrich Sedelmeier proposed a theoretical framework to analyse the EU enlargement process. It was used later by many political scientists trying to explain the reasons for the decisions about the admission of new member states, apart from the questions of EU conditionality, democratization or Europeanization of candidates. However, the theoretical works on the EU enlargement concern usually the particular enlargement round (especially 2004/2007 enlargement) and only rarely refer to the current stage of the EU enlargement which is more complex than ever before. The paper presents a part of research done for the habilitation thesis. It focuses on the EU enlargement policy in a longer period of time with particular emphasis on the period since the institutionalisation of its components at the beginning of the1990s - in order to analyse the phenomenon of change of this particular EU policy. The usefulness of theories of institutional change and policy process which take into consideration the time variable is analysed in the paper. The author answers the question to which extent these concepts are useful tools to explain the type of change of the EU enlargement policy and to analyse the reasons for the change of different components of this policy. Introduction The research on the enlargement of the European Union has been developed since At first there were a lot descriptive and empirical works. However, there was a lack of analyses based on the comprehensive theoretical framework explaining the process, first of all the reasons for its continuity. The theoretical deficits included e.g. the underspecification of dependent variables and the neglect of important dimensions of EU enlargement, the underspecification of explanatory factors or 1

2 independent variables. 1 At the beginning of the 21 st century the situation improved such scholars as Frank Schimmelfennig, Ulrich Sedelmeier, Helene Sjursen or John O Brennan proposed a theoretical framework on the basis of the research of the international institutions (IR theories) - the rationalist (cost-benefits) and constructivist (norms and values) approaches. 2 For instance, the first two mentioned researchers referred to the realist brand, liberal intergovernmentalism and supranational institutionalism as well as to the constructivism. These theoretical approaches help to answer primarily the question of reasons for acceptance by the member states, the candidate countries as well as the EU institutions of the next Union s enlargement. Let us consider the example of the position of member states. The realist school of thought assumes that for a EU member the chief consideration will be the consequences of accession for its security and influence within the EU. In other words, it will support the enlargement of the Union by the country in question if it judges that this will improve its own position inside the EU or bring about a more balanced distribution of power within the organisation and that it will enable greater control over developments in the candidate country. According to the liberal intergovernmentalist approach a member state is likely to be in favour of accession if meaningful gains are to accrue as a result. It will support the accession of a particular country to the EU if the subsequent gains derived by the member country from the candidate s contribution to the assets of the community are at least equal to the costs involved in the sharing of these assets. It is also important whether or not the candidate country has well-developed economic relations with the given member of the Union. Supranationalist institutionalism holds that a member country will support the accession of a candidate country if this spells benefits for the Union as a whole. Finally, constructivism postulates that a member state will be sympathetic towards enlargement if the candidate country in question identifies with the community represented by the EU (the identity question) and espouses the values and standards of the EU. In other words, the support is conditional on the European-ness of the candidate, its positive attitude to the European integration project and espousal of the principles of democracy and respect for human rights. 3 This theoretical framework was used later by many other scholars trying to explain the reasons behind the decisions about the admission of new member states (apart from the questions of EU conditionality, democratization or Europeanization of candidates). For instance, Christina Schneider developed the rational choice perspective with the focus on the issue of conflict and negotiations about the 1 Frank Schimmelfenning, Ulrich Sedelmeier, The Study of EU Enlargement: Theoretical Approaches and Empirical Findings in M. Cini, A. K. Bourne (eds.), Palgrave Advances in European Union Studies (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006), See more: Frank Schimmelfennig, Ulrich Sedelmeier, Theorising EU Enlargement: research, focus, hypotheses and the state of research, Journal of European Public Policy 9, no. 4 (2002): ; John O Brennan, The Eastern Enlargement of the European Union (New York, London; Routledge, 2006), ; Helen Sjursen, Enlargement and the Nature of the EU Polity, in Helen Sjursen (ed.), Questioning EU Enlargement. Europe in Search of Identity (London, New York: Routledge, 2006), Schimmelfennig, Sedelmeier, The Study of EU Enlargement, Other scholars presented similar concepts, e.g. Sjursen identifies three types of reasoning: pragmatic, in which the interests of EU states are the prime consideration (equivalent to realist perspectives), as well as ethical/political and moral, in which pride of place is given to, respectively, values or rights (equivalent to constructivism). See Sjursen, Enlargement and the nature of the EU policy,

3 distribution of costs and benefits resulting from enlargement, referring to theories of political economy. 4 However, all these theoretical works concern usually the particular enlargement round, first of all 2004 enlargement round and only rarely refer to the current stage of the EU enlargement which is more complex than ever before among others because of the diversity of difficult candidates (with some exceptions) and the developed formal-institutional aspect of the process. In this paper, being a part of the research done for the habilitation thesis, the author would like to present some ideas about the theoretical approaches that help to explain the EU enlargement process in a longer period of time from the first to the last round (taking into consideration also its current stage), with a particular emphasis on the question of a change in the EU enlargement policy. Therefore, on the one hand, the scope of analysis is narrower in comparison with the aforementioned theoretical studies it is limited to one of four main research areas in reference to the EU enlargement, namely the policy of the European Union. The other areas are: 1) the policy of candidates for EU membership; 2) the policy of member states towards EU enlargement; 3) the consequences of this process. 5 On the other hand, the time perspective is much broader than in the case of previous studies this is a condition to analyse the phenomenon of change. The major questions are how to explain the type of change of the EU enlargement policy as well as how to analyse its reasons. The author of the paper argues that useful tools can be found within the theories of institutional change, developed in the framework of different types of the new institutionalism (particularly the rational choice institutionalism and the historical institutionalism together with the critical approach to it). 6 They can be particularly helpful by emphasizing the formalinstitutional perspective of the EU enlargement policy (see below). The question of change of the EU enlargement policy requires an in-depth analysis, taking into consideration its various actors and relations between them. The useful theoretical tools can be found then also within the theories of policy process although they can be used only in addition to more helpful theories of institutional change. 7 These theoretical approaches were primarily developed with reference to a state. This is another difference from the theoretical framework outlined above which is based first of all on the IR theories. The enlargement policy of the European Union is a part of the external relations of the EU and the theoretical framework should be naturally searched first of all within the IR theories. However, the European Union is a hybrid, having both characteristics of a state as well as international organization, what is reflected also in the EU enlargement policy. The process of sharing the theoretical approaches in comparative politics and international relations (connected with long tradition of cross-level international-domestic analysis) is particularly advanced in the case of the EU. The new institutionalism should be mentioned at the 4 Christina J. Schneider, Conflict, Negotiation and European Union Enlargement (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009). 5 Classification of EU enlargement studies according to: Schimmelfennig, Sedelmeier, The Study of EU Enlargement, For more, see Adrienne Héritier, Explaining Institutional Change in Europe (Oxford, New York: Oxford University Press, 2007), For more, see Paul A. Sabatier (ed.), Theories of the Policy Process (Boulder: Westview Press, 2007). 3

4 first place in this context. 8 This is also confirmed by the examples of theories of institutional change and policy process, used increasingly in the European studies to analyse particular EU policies. 9 The next sections of the paper will show that many presented theoretical approaches can be easily identified also in the IR theories, especially within the liberal intergovernmentalism. However, what is common for the proposal of this paper and the theoretical framework to date is the pluralistic approach. The phenomenon of change can be explained by the use of different approaches that can be complementary. This will be the case presented in this paper various approaches will be useful to explain different aspects of the issue of change of the EU enlargement policy. EU Enlargement Policy and Its Change Before presenting the usefulness of the aforementioned theories that explain a change in politics, the issue of change of the EU enlargement must be elaborated. The term EU enlargement policy embraces both the polity (norms and institutions) and policy (programs, strategies) dimension. 10 In the context of the analysed question it means that the theories which will be pointed out below can be helpful in explaining: the changing role of different EU institutions in conducting the EU enlargement policy; the change of the legal establishment of this policy, including the modification of treaty provisions and amendments to the treaties; the development of rules, procedures and mechanisms of the EU enlargement process included among others in the pre-accession strategy and in such major documents as a negotiating framework; the development of the EU enlargement strategy; the change of the formal principles of the EU enlargement strategy with the particular focus on the crucial EU conditionality and issues connected with it like membership criteria and their execution. What is common for all of these changes of the EU enlargement policy is the domination of rather incremental, evolutionary characteristics which is an important factor influencing the choice of the useful theoretical tools to analyze it. 11 Although the analysis of the change of the EU enlargement policy should include the whole process, starting from the first enlargement round in the 1970s when the United Kingdom, Ireland and Denmark joined the European Economic Community (EEC), the particular attention must be paid to the period started in the 1990s when the institutionalization of the components of the enlargement policy took place as the reaction to the specific candidatures from the Central and Eastern Europe. The 8 Cf. Joseph Jupille, James A. Caporaso, Institutionalism and the European Union: Beyond International Relations and Comparative Politics, Annual Review of Political Science 2 (1999): The example is the Advocacy Coalition Framework which has been used already since 1999 in reference to the EU in case of the tax policy, steel policy or later economic/development policy. See Appendix 7.1 and 7.2 in Paul A. Sabatier, Christopher M. Weible, The Advocacy Coalition Framework. Innovations and Clarifications in Sabatier (ed.), Theories of the Policy Process, Klaus Schubert, Nils C. Bandelow, Politikfeldanalyse: Dimensionen und Fragestellungen in Klaus Schubert, Nils C. Bandelow (eds.), Lehrbuch der Politikfeldanalyse 2.0 (München: Oldenbourg Verlag, 2009), According to Adrienne Héritier and Christoph Knill this kind of change is rather of medium degree and is characterized by a mixture of old and new policy elements. See Adrienne Héritier, Christoph Knill, Differential Responses to European Policies: A Comparison in Adrienne Héritier (ed.), Differential Europe: New Opportunities and Restrictions for Member-State Policies (Lanham: Rowman&Littlefield, 2001), 259f. 4

5 author of this paper agrees with the opinion of Christophe Hillion that the first enlargement rounds - in the 1970s and 1980s - were accompanied with enlargement procedure rather than policy and the developed enlargement strategy did not exist at this time. 12 However, even this process of institutionalisation of the EU enlargement policy was evolutionary. This is to be proved by the outline below. The EU enlargement policy has been constantly developed all the time. During the first wave of enlargement of the EEC in the 1970s and the Southern round of enlargement in the 1980s there was no political union with extensive foreign policy goals and aspirations to become a normative power. At this time the crucial principle of conditionality was at a preliminary phase. The democratic conditions which started to be more emphasized with reference to southern candidates - Greece, Portugal and Spain who were making a transition from the authoritarian rule to democracy - were limited to a few procedural principles. 13 Economic and administrative capacities were still more important (as in case of the first enlargement round). The monitoring mechanisms checking the progress made by candidates did not exist. The passive leverage prevailed and the most common measure was the pressure exerted on candidates. 14 The 2004/2007 enlargement round was a completely different stage of the process. It was the time of the political Union with the aim to promote abroad the democratic values, which were recognized as its fundamental principles. The enlargement procedure was transformed into pro-active and meticulous policy of the EU which correlated with the change of conditionality in terms of the time of implementation, scope, priority and procedures. 15 In the period the institutions and instruments of the association were developed (with the crucial role of the European Agreements). The conditionality was implemented gradually, becoming increasigly strong thanks to the development from 1993 of the pre-accession strategy and its instruments (introduced in two phases and ). 16 Starting from 1993 the conditions of membership were elaborated and codified as the Copenhagen criteria. 17 Then they were refined by the next European Council s summits and operationalized into various indicators for candidates in the instruments of the pre-accession strategy first in White Paper of 1995, later in Accession Partneships as well as in Commission s documents (avis in Agenda 2000). 18 The political conditions - first of all the requirement of the democratic system - began to be prioritised and more strictly enforced (original Copenhagen political criteria became a condition for opening the accession negotiations) as a result of the anxiety of the member states over the cohesion of the Union. Their significance 12 Christophe Hillion, The Creeping Nationalisation of the EU Enlargement Policy, SIEPS, Report no.6, < Geoffrey Pridham, Change and Continuity in the European Union s Political Conditionality: Aims, Approach, and Priorities, Democratization 14, no. 3 (2007): Ali Resul Usul, Democracy in Turkey. The Impact of EU political conditionality (London, New York: Routledge, 2011), 45; Karen E. Smith, The Evolution and Application of EU Membership Conditionality in Marise Cremona (ed.), The Enlargement of the European Union (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003), Hillion, The Creeping Nationalisation, Heather Grabbe, The EU s Transformative Power. Europeanization through Conditionality in Central and Eastern Europe (Basingstoke, New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006), European Council in Copenhagen June Conclusions of the Presidency, < 18 Pridham, Change and Continuity,

6 increased thanks to the Amsterdam Treaty of 1997 whose provisions constituted a broad legal basis for the conditions, leading to their constitutionalization. 19 The role of the European Commission was strengthened as well. It became a pivotal coordinating institution setting conditions to candidate states, monitoring and promoting their progress in fulfilling the membership criteria (at its disposal having such new monitoring instruments as regular reports and Accession Partnerships) as well as disbursing aid. The Commission had the proper potential to manage a more meritocratic and technical pre-accession process. However, the Council of the European Union i.e. the member states still played a key role in the phase of accession negotiations (when the Commission had the facilitation tasks) and in the final decision about the enlargement, together with the European Council that gave political guidelines to the Commission. 20 After the 2004 enlargement round more and more European politicians (e.g. from France, Germany or Austria) began to believe that the crisis over ratifying the Treaty Establishing a Constitution for Europe, associated with the 2004 enlargement not digested by societies of the old member states, showed the need for more prudence in admitting new members and taking into consideration the possibility that some states will not join the Union. This did not refer only to Turkey who applied to be the member of the European Community already in 1987, but also to candidates from the Western Balkans all very difficult candidacies in the context of fulfilment of the Copenhagen criteria of the EU membership. The current EU enlargement round (embracing in 2012 apart from Turkey and Western Balkan states also Iceland) was accompanied with the development of the EU enlargement strategy in 2005, included since then in the special documents. These documents have reflected since 2005 this more cautious approach to the enlargement and the so called enlargement fatigue. They emphasize the openended nature of the current process and the role of the capacity of the EU to admit new member states. The so called integration capacity (formerly absorption capacity) the Copenhagen criterion on the EU side, is not quite clear, only basing on the idea that the admission of new states cannot be harmful to the Union s institutions, budget and policies. 21 More emphasis has been laid then on the criteria on the part of the EU, not that of the candidate state as it was before, which does not mean that the latter have lost their significance. On the contrary, the EU conditionality, an important pillar of the enlargement strategy, has been strengthened, proving its dynamic nature and capacity to adjust conditionality to the enlargement strategy at a certain time. According to the enlargement strategy document of the principle of conditionality states that any progress in the accession process depends on the country s progress in conducting reforms and fulfilment of more rigorous membership conditions at present. The 2004/2007 enlargement taught the EU some lessons. It is said in the modified enlargement strategy that the problems of corruption as well as the current work of administration and the judiciary will be tackled by the European 19 Christophe Hillion, The Copenhagen Criteria and their Progeny, in Christophe Hillion (ed.), EU Enlargement: A Legal Approach (Oxford, Portland: Hart Publishing, 2004), Hillion, The Creeping Nationalisation, Erhan İçener, David Phinnemore, Enlargement and the European Union s Absorption Capacity: oftforgotten condition or additional obstacle to membership?, Insight Turkey 8, no. 3 (2006);

7 Commission already at an early stage of the accession process. 22 These issues began to be emphasized because of the negative experiences with Bulgaria and Romania who joined the EU, not being ready for the membership in these areas. 23 Moreover, the benchmark system was introduced to the accession negotiations process to provisionally close and also to open the negotiation chapters - after a unanimous decision of the member states. Thus, the Council strengthened its position vis-à-vis the Commission, the former being now the key player not only in negotiations and making accession decisions, but also in the whole pre-accession process, primarily in terms of defining and assessing the membership conditions. 24 Futhermore, since the Lisbon Treaty became effective, the European Council has agreed to the conditions of eligibility. 25 Theories of Institutional Change The rational choice, historical and sociological institutionalism as well as some critical approaches to these types of new institutionalism provide the researchers with many possible explanations of the phenomenon of change in politics within the institutional dimension. It is not possible to present all possible perspectives in this paper. The author wishes to focus on the explanations which best suit the analysis of the change of different aspects of the EU enlargement policy. They were developed first of all within the rational choice institutionalism and to the certain extent within the historical institutionalism and the critical approach to it. Various aspects of the change of the EU enlargement policy need to be explained by different theoretical concepts due to the policy complexity which is on a constant increase. One type of institutionalism provides researchers with different perspectives (with the exogenous or endogenous source of change) that enable them to understand the dynamics of many aspect of the Union s policy. The scope of the article allows the author to present only some examples of these explanations. Moreover, each type of new institutionalism is a useful tool to answer different questions concerning the change of the EU enlargement policy. The rational choice institutionalism and historical institutionalism take a different time perspective into consideration. Although the claim that the time factor is not considered at all by the former type of the new institutionalism is not justified, the rational choice approach puts aside the long-term perspective in comparison with the historical 22 For more, see Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council. EU Enlargement Strategy and Main Challenges (Including Annexed Special Report on the EU s Capacity to Integrate New Members), Brussels, 8 November 2006, Com (2006) 649, < 23 David Phinnemore, From Negotiations to Accession: Lessons from the 2007 Enlargement, Perspectives on European Politics and Society 10, no. 2 (2009): Hillion points out in this context the interesting legal issue. After 2004/2007 enlargement the application procedure, included in Article 49 of the Treaty on the EU, started to be interpreted and implemented (case of Albania) in such way that the Council decides at early stage if the membership application will be submitted to the Commission for preparation of avis. For more, see Hillion, The Creeping Nationalisation, Consolidated version of the Treaty on European Union, Official Journal C 83 of , 43. The same article 49 of the Treaty on the EU gave after entering into force of the Lisbon Treaty new competences to the national parliaments which should be informed on the equal foot with the European Parliament about further membership applications. 7

8 institutionalism. 26 Therefore, the former is more helpful to understand the reasons for the change of the EU enlargement in a particular time period, less often some longterm processes within this policy. The last issue is better explained both by the historical institutionalism and the critical approach to it. However, they actually enable a researcher to answer the question about the reasons for the prevailing type of the change characterizing this EU policy, not the reasons for the change. The case of EU enlargement policy is another example of possible partial complementarity of different kinds of new institutionalism despite their clear differences. 27 When it comes to the general assumptions within the rational choice institutionalism (benefits-costs analysis), both its functional and distributional perspective help to explain the reasons for the substantial changes of the EU enlargement policy (being, however, introduced gradually). The best example in the first case is the changes within 2004 enlargement round leading to the creation of policy instead of procedure through the codification of the EU membership criteria as well as the development of the EU conditionality and the whole pre-accession strategy with the aim to help the candidates but also to monitor their progress. The general premise of the functional perspective, stressing the shared concern of political actors with achieving common gains or efficiency through cooperation is that if, due to the external shock, the benefits of rule A have decreased, the rule will be changed, if the gains of the proposed altered rule B including the transaction costs will be higher. 28 The change is followed by a period of a relative stability. The external shock in the case of the 2004 enlargement round was the appearance of big group of candidate countries from Central and Eastern Europe that had to conduct many reforms before joining the EU. The existing rules of the EU enlargement policy at the beginning of the 1990s were not enough to ensure the proper preparation of candidates that would be followed by the accession bringing more benefits than costs to the EU and its members. There was a need to codify the membership criteria and develop the mechanism of conditionality and the whole preaccession strategy to monitor the progress of the candidates. Only then the costs connected with the pre-accession aid (too high and long lasting in the case of maintaining the previous enlargement procedure) in addition to these connected with the admission itself could be accepted by the member states. The transaction costs of the development of the institutional framework of the EU enlargement policy were at the same time relatively low. There was a consensus in the Union that they must be beard for the sake of the efficiency of the policy and the Union. This is the explanation that corresponds to the liberal intergovernmentalism within the IR theories. In case of the major distributional perspective, the existing rule can be renegotiated/changed to reflect the preferences of the powerful actors or the changed power balance. It emphasises the political conflict and strategic bargaining among actors. 29 This perspective with already mentioned additional aspect taken from the political economy theory and presented by Schneider (conflict and 26 Paul Pierson, The Limits of Design: Explaining Institutional Origins and Change, Governance: An International Journal of Policy and Administration 13, no. 4 (2000): Peter A. Hall, Rosemary C.R. Taylor, Political Science and the Three New Institutionalisms, Political Studies XLIV, (1996): ; Kathleen Thelen, Historical Institutionalism in Comparative Politics, Annual Review of Political Science, no. 2 (1999): Héritier, Explaining Institutional Change, Ibid., 40. 8

9 negotiations about the distribution of costs and benefits resulting from enlargement) explains the development of a more cautious EU enlargement strategy after the 2004 enlargement round with the emphasis on the open-ended process and the integration capacity of the EU. For the powerful actors France and Germany the maintenance of the existing institutional framework of the EU enlargement policy while having as candidates such countries as Turkey and Western Balkan countries was too costly. The framework to date has not been adjusted to the these candidates and would have brought too much costs for the EU and the member states in the pre-accession process, not to mention the costs connected with the admission (also political ones). The distribution of the costs among member states through bargaining to end the conflict between them and reach a consensus on enlargement, e.g. thanks to such instruments as the long existing transitional measures appeared impossible. That is why member states opted for new mechanisms in the institutional framework of the EU enlargement policy (or for a greater significance of the already existing rules) that on the one hand would make the accession option for some candidates (first of all Turkey) much more difficult to achieve, if possible at all, and on the other hand would enable the strengthening of the position of the Council. The reasons for some changes of the EU enlargement policy can be explained also with the use of more specific theoretical concepts within the rational choice institutionalism. The first example, also with the exogenous source of change, concerns the learning process based on gaining new information. This is the concept developed both in the economic and political dimension by Douglas North. 30 The main premise is here that the new knowledge and information in the environment of the institutional rule leads to the gradual transformation of this rule. Within the EU enlargement policy the learning mechanism was a noticeable reason for changes e.g. after 2007 enlargement. Member states and the European Commission were gaining new knowledge concerning the deficits of effectiveness of the existing mechanisms of the EU enlargement policy basing on the aforementioned case of Romania and Bulgaria. It explains the strengthening of the principle of conditionality for current candidate states. This concept is an example to prove that the rational choice institutionalism sometimes explains the long term process of incremental changes, although with exogenous source of change in comparison to the perspectives which will be presented below. North s concept is based on the assumption that the process of gaining new information is a continuous process. This is reflected with reference to the EU enlargement policy. The knowledge of the Bulgarian and Romanian case was used within the accession negotiations with Croatia with a stricter benchmarking system (which, by the way, was introduced basing on the knowledge of the 2004 enlargement round) in the justice and home affairs area. It is very probable that the benchmarks to the negotiating chapters in the mentioned area will be even more rigorous in the future, basing on the information from the negotiations with Croatia that ended in June Another aspect of the change of the EU enlargement policy can be explained by the principal-agent theory, developed in the context of the institutional change 30 For more, see Douglas North, Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990). 31 Antoaneta L. Dimitrova, Speeding up or Slowing down? Lessons from the Last Enlargement on the Dynamics of Enlargement-Driven Reforms, South European Society and Politics 16, no. 2 (2011):

10 among others by Jack Knight. 32 In this case the endogenous factor is the source of change. The basic assumption is that if the divergence between the principal s and the agent s preferences has become too large, the principal will redesign the contract, i.e. change the institutional rule in order to rein in the agent. 33 This theoretical concept explains the reasons for the change of the positions of the EU institutions within the EU enlargement policy. The European Commission had strengthened its role in conducting this policy as an expert and monitoring institution. However, as it was outlined above, after the 2004 enlargement round the member states took measures to strengthen the position of the Council of the EU and the European Council as well as of the national parliaments. The result was the provisions of the Lisbon Treaty or the negotiating frameworks giving the member states more competences in the institutional framework of the EU enlargement policy. All these concepts within the rational choice institutionalism help to explain better the reasons for the change of the EU enlargement policy rather than to answer the question why the particular kind of change is taking place in a long time perspective namely, the aforementioned incremental, gradual and evolutionary change of the EU enlargement policy. Some useful tools in this case can be found in the historical institutionalism with the concept of path dependency but only in connection with the critical approach to it presented by Kathleen Thelen who has developed together with James Mahoney the theory of the gradual institutional change. 34 The author of this paper agrees with Paul Pierson and other researchers sharing his opinion that in order to explain in a comprehensive way why the institutional change occurs it is important to analyse the institutional constraints to the change. 35 The historical institutionalism with the concept of path dependency, together with the Thelen and Mahoney theory, helps to explain why the gradual, evolutionary change of the EU enlargement policy prevails throughout its development. There are two main assumptions of the concept of path dependency. Firstly, there are crucial founding moments of institutional formation (critical junctures) that determine their further development. Secondly, institutions continue to evolve in response to changing environmental conditions and ongoing political maneuvering but in ways that are constrained by past trajectories. 36 According to Pierson, these constraints are connected among others with the institutional barriers to embarking on major reforms, excessive costs of reinstatement of the situation existing prior to change, and the resistance of supranational institutions. 37 The critical juncture in case of the EU enlargement policy seems to be the institutionalization of the policy at the beginning of the 1990s. As it was mentioned above, it started the process of the development of all mechanisms and instruments 32 For more, see Jack Knight, Models, Interpretations and Theories: Constructing Explanations of Institutional Emergence and Change, in Jack Knight, Itai Sened (eds.), Explaining Social Institutions (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press,1995), Héritier, Explaining Institutional Change, For more, see: Paul Pierson, Politics in Time. History, Institutions and Social Analysis (Princeton and Oxford; Princeton University Press, 2004); James Mahoney, Kathleen Thelen, A Theory of Gradual Institutional Change in James Mahoney, Kathleen Thelen (eds.), Explaining Institutional Change. Ambiguity, Agency, and Power (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2010), Pierson, Politics in Time, Thelen, Historical Institutionalism, Paul Pierson, The Path to European Integration: A Historical Institutionalist Analysis, Comparative Political Studies 29, no. 2 (1996),

11 of this policy. A consequent stage of this development was determined by its previous phase. This is e.g. the case of the rules and mechanisms of the preaccession procedure (mainly the principle of conditionality) that have been developed basing on the solutions to date. 38 The changes of the EU policy have been gradual and evolutionary due to certain constraints, having a lot to do with past trajectories. When it comes to the institutional barriers to reforms, revolutionary changes of the EU enlargement policy are out of question because of the nature not only of this policy but also of all other EU policies. The main rules and institutional frameworks have the legal basis including the treaties and agreements that are not easy to be revised. 39 This concerns in the case of the analysed policy primarily the accession criteria and procedure of article 49 of the Treaty on the EU as well as the substance of the accession treaties, being also part of acquis communautaire. The characteristics of the institutional framework of EU enlargement policy also creates some barriers to big reforms. It concerns subsequent candidate countries in different time periods. The modifications of requirements for candidates are justified by the time factor and the specificity of a candidate. However, they concern the detailed issues. The framework must remain the intact otherwise the basis not only of the enlargement policy but also of the Union itself (the Copenhagen criteria are at the same time the basic EU values) would be undermined. Changing or renouncing some parts of the institutional framework of the EU enlargement policy can be also too costly for the Union and its members to take such measures. The best example is the current EU enlargement strategy reflected in the special documents. They are modified every year. However, the main principles remain intact. The reason is that the EU enlargement strategy is an outcome of a difficult compromise between the member states and at the same time of the efforts of the European Commission - first to prepare the document that can be accepted by the member states having different positions on the enlargement and then to convince them to do adopt it. It is then very difficult to depart from the strategy because it would mean the beginning of the whole process from the beginning, including negotiation and bargaining with the participation of the member states and the EU institutions. The same refers to the components of the pre-accession strategy or the EU conditionality. They have been operating for a long time, carrying with them the commitments from the EU and member states side and contributing to the effectiveness of the enlargement policy. Therefore, the departure from them and the introduction of alternative instruments and mechanisms would be too costly, especially when the new solutions would appear to be not so effective as the previous ones. The last issue is the resistance of the supranational institutions. The European Commission, apart from opposing the changes due to its commitment to the whole institutional framework of the EU enlargement policy, is the institution that very often resists the policy of the EU members leading to the increasing politicisation of the enlargement process. It is first of all about the states skeptical about the EU enlargement and their call for more substantial changes of the EU enlargement policy and introduction of the alternative solutions. The Commission, supported by some member states (a frequent need for the unanimous decisions within this policy 38 Grabbe, The EU s Transformative Power, Pierson, The Path to European Integration,

12 constitutes another institutional barrier to change) resists e.g. the ideas of the development of alternative concepts to the EU membership or the establishment of the borders of the EU which would mean a revolutionary change of the enlargement strategy. 40 Moreover, the Commission prevents the politicisation of the EU enlargement process to sustain the balance between the position of the institutions mainly the Commission and the Council. The former seeks to take advantage of the expansion of the technical/expert component of the pre-accession procedure and its agenda-setting powers. 41 Otherwise, the change of the role of the EU institutions in the policy in favour of the Council would be substantial especially as far as the current enlargement process is concerned. These arguments show clearly that the concept of the path dependency helps to answer rather the question of stability, i.e. the lack of change than why the incremental, gradual change takes place and what kind of change it is exactly. 42 In this sense, it presents counter-mechanisms to the ones proposed by the rational choice institutionalism. The author of this paper agrees here with Thelen who together with Mahoney has developed the theory of the gradual institutional change to fill the gap within the concept of path dependence. Thanks to their proposals of four modal types of the gradual institutional change, it is possible to explain better this kind of change in the case of the EU enlargement policy. This theory is useful in the identification of the change of this policy. The modal type, which is a helpful tool, is the so called layering, i.e. in general terms the attachment of new rules to existing ones. These rules are not completely new there are numerous amendments or revisions of the existing rules. According to this model the challengers of these rules are not able to change them but they work within the system adding the new solutions on the top of old ones. The defenders of the status quo can prevent the substantial change but they cannot resist its modifications. 43 A modification of the EU enlargement policy involves mainly adding new elements to an existing institutional backbone. This was the case of the expansion (until the 1990s) and subsequent codification and operationalisation (from the 1990s) of the enlargement criteria and the development and enhancement of the the pre-accession strategy. However, some of the incremental changes of the EU enlargement policy resemble another modal type, presented by Thelen and Mahoney, namely the conversion. It means generally that old rules remain the same but they begin to be interpreted or enacted in different ways, also because of their ambiguities. 44 When the layering in the case of the analysed policy concerns its framework, the conversion refers rather to individual rules within this framework. The best example is the EU integration capacity, i.e. the capacity of the Union to admit new member states. At the beginning it was just one of the Copenhagen criteria, a little bit neglected, which became after 2004 one of the main pillars of the enlargement strategy. Its ambiguity can lead to a new interpretation in the future. It may mean not only that the enlargement should not be detrimental to the EU institutions, budget and politicians. The capacity to integrate new states may include aspects relating to the member states; hence, EU enlargements must not have an adverse impact on their political, 40 For more, see Adam Szymański, Alternatives to EU Membership. The Case of Turkey, The Polish Quarterly of International Affairs 16, no. 4 (2007): Pierson, The Path to European Integration, Heritier, Explaining Institutional Change, Mahoney, Thelen, A Theory of Gradual Institutional Change, Ibid.,

13 economic or social situation. This would be a result of the nationalisation of the EU enlargement policy. 45 Thelen and Mahoney go further and analyse the premises of the operation of each of the presented modal types of the gradual institutional change, including the layering and conversion. There are two factors taken into consideration veto possibilities (characteristic of the political context) and discretion in interpretation/enforcement of the rules (characteristic of the targeted institution). The layering takes place when there are strong veto possibilities and a low level of discretion in interpretation or enforcement of the rules. This is the case of the incremental change of the general framework of the EU enlargement policy. There is a strong veto possibility from one of 27 member states (due to the aforementioned frequent need for the unanimous decision-making) and the lack of flexibility in the enforcement of the basic policy rules. The conversion means weak veto possibilities but high level of discretion in the interpretation or enforcement of the rules. This concerns the cases of individual rules of the EU enlargement policy whose modification is not connected with a high risk of veto of one of member states but there is some space for the new interpretation due to ambiguities of these rules. 46 To recapitulate, the change of various parts of the institutional framework of the EU enlargement policy can be explained by relevant theories of institutional change within the rational choice institutionalism and to some extent by the historical institutionalism or better to say more critical approach to the concept of path dependence. This policy is then another example of the possible partial complementarity of different kinds of institutionalism and their combined usefulness in explaining the phenomenon of change. Theories of Policy Process/Change The author of this paper follows the example of works of Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier and goes beyond one theoretical perspective that explains the EU enlargement policy. 47 There are also other theories apart from the new institutionalism that explain the change of the EU enlargement policy. These are the theories of policy process that in comparison with the new institutionalism focus more on the policy actors and relations between them. Of course, there are some theories of the policy process that cannot be used with reference to the EU enlargement policy due to different kinds of change they try to explain (e.g. the theory of multiple streams or punctuated equilibrium framework) or the actors they focus on (e.g. social constructions theory). 48 Although all theories of the policy process are too general to explain in a satisfactory way the phenomenon of change of this EU policy 49, some of them can be useful in addition to the new institutionalism. 45 Hillion, The Creeping Nationalisation, Mahoney, Thelen, A Theory of Gradual Institutional Change, For instance, Sedelmeier developed the constructivist approach to the 2004 enlargement round that goes beyond the rationalist approach to date. For more, see Ulrich Sedelmeier, Constructing the Path to Eastern Enlargement. The uneven policy impact of EU identity (Manchester, New York: Manchester University Press, 2005), For more, see: John W. Kingdon, Agendas, Alternatives and Public Policies (New York: Harper Collins, 1995); Frank M. Baumgartner, Bryan D. Jones, Agendas and Instability in American Politics (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1993); Helen Ingram, Anne L. Schneider, and Peter deleon, Social Construction and Policy Design in Sabatier (ed.), Theories of the Policy Process, The author of this paper would like to thank Frank Schimmelfennig for this valuable remark. 13

14 The examples of such theories can be the aforementioned advocacy coalition framework as well as Lindblom s incrementalism and the network approach. 50 Many issues raised by these theories that can explain the change of the EU enlargement policy correspond to the explanations of the new institutionalisms. In many cases like this they only develop the arguments of institutionalists, presenting different perspective on an issue. The advocacy coalition framework sheds more light on the process whose result is the change of the EU enlargement policy and the contribution of the actors of this process. It argues that policy participants seek actors with the same core beliefs who form the coalition to achieve similar policy objectives. 51 Although the proposals of changes in the EU enlargement policy are worked out by the European Commission, it is a broad coalition of different actors that is often built to call for the change. The best example is the modification of the EU enlargement strategy after It was the period between 2005 and 2006 when the governments (France, Austria) or some coalition partners within the governments (German Christian Democrats) began a kind of campaign for the modifications of the EU enlargement policy. They built a coalition composed primarily of deputies from the national parliaments but also from the European Parliament. It was in this EU institution that, as early as 2006 (March), the need was identified for the consideration of the EU s absorption capacity and the debate about the EU limits or the development of concepts alternative to the membership for states that will not be able to join the Union. In the text of the resolution the MEPs appealed to the Commission and the Council to work out some proposals. 52 What is more, when it comes to the alternative concepts, the German CDU and CSU built the coalition with scientific authorities the first group developed the theoretical concept, the second introduced it to the political agenda. 53 It must be added that the scientific authorities played a role in policy change in other concepts, e.g. the aforementioned social constructions theory. 54 The coalition of the EU supporters (some member states, e.g. United Kingdom, Spain or Poland as well as the European Commission) negotiated a kind of agreement with the coalition calling for change. The result was the enlargement strategy document. 55 Obviously, in this case the external shock (2004 enlargement) initiated the change of the EU enlargement which is identified by the 1999 version of the advocacy coalition framework as one of two main paths of policy change (the revised version adds also the internal shocks). 56 However, there are more common points with new institutionalism approaches in this context. The learning process was 50 See Paul A. Sabatier, Hank Jenkins-Smith, Policy Change and Learning: An Advocacy Coalition Approach (Boulder: Westview Press, 1993); Charles E. Lindblom, The Science of Muddling Through, Public Administration Review 19, no. 2 (1959): 79-88; Hanspeter Kriesi, Adam Silke, Margit Jochum, Comparative Analysis of Policy Networks in Western Europe, Journal of European Public Policy 13, no. 3, Sabatier, Weible, The Advocacy Coalition Framework, European Parliament resolution on the Commission s 2005 enlargement strategy paper, P6_TA (2006) 0096, 16 March 2006, < 53 Szymański, Alternatives to EU Membership, Ingram, Schneider, and deleon, Social Construction and Policy Design, In the revised version of the advocacy coalition framework negotiated agreements constitute one of two alternative paths to policy change. See Sabatier, Weible, The Advocacy Coalition Framework, Ibid., and