EU Enlargement Strategy Is It Still About the Enlargement?

Transcription

1 Adam Szymański, PhD University of Warsaw EU Enlargement Strategy Is It Still About the Enlargement? Paper for IPSA 23 rd World Congress of Political Science Montreal, July 2014 This text is a draft. Please, do not quote or cite without the author s permission. The enlargement policy of the EU is based to a large extent on the strategy developed in special documents during the Eastern enlargement. After 2004 this strategy was modified. Since 2005 the strategy documents have reflected a more cautious approach to the enlargement and the so called enlargement fatigue. They emphasize an open-ended nature of the current process and the role of the capacity of the EU to admit new member states the so called integration capacity (formerly referred to as absorption capacity). The goal of the paper is to analyse the changes of the EU enlargement strategy, using the theories of institutional change and to answer the question whether the current modified strategy still enables the EU to pursue effectively its policy in relation to the candidates. The author argues that the EU can retain with some difficulty - its function as a multidimensional stabilizer of candidates. However, it is less effective in maintaining the main paradigm of the enlargement policy the transformation of candidates into member states. The implementation of the strategy reflects increasingly poor EU membership prospects. This state justifies a claim that the enlargement policy is moving slowly into the direction of the European Neighbourhood Policy. Introduction The EU enlargement policy is based to a large extent on its strategy. Within the first enlargement rounds of the European Communities (EC) there was no enlargement strategy developed to be included in the special documents issued by the EC institutions. It did not mean that there was a lack of elements of a classical strategy such as the goals and tasks of the enlargement policy which, although, not codified in a single document, could be concluded from the political practice. The general goal and paradigm has been since the beginning to transform a candidate into a member state. During the Southern enlargement round the EC 1

2 function of stabilizer was developed - the enlargement policy became increasingly a tool to provide security to candidate countries and support their political and economic transformation processes. The appearance of the candidates from the former Soviet block required the development of the comprehensive EU enlargement policy and its progressive institutionalisation. It was reflected in the preparation of the strategy documents. Since 1998 the regular enlargement strategy documents have been prepared by the European Commission and accepted by the Council. They emphasised the open door policy of the EU and its role as a stabilizer of candidates. After 2004 this strategy was modified. Since 2005 the strategy documents have reflected a more cautious approach to the enlargement and the so called enlargement fatigue. They emphasize an open-ended nature of the current process and the role of the capacity of the EU to admit new member states. The goal of the paper is to analyse the changes of the EU enlargement strategy after 2004 using the theories of institutional change, and to answer the question whether the current modified strategy still enables the EU to pursue effectively its policy towards the candidates. In this context, the author intends to confirm the following hypotheses: H-1 with the current enlargement strategy the EU can retain with some difficulty - its function as a multidimensional stabilizer of candidates, H-2 the EU is at the same time less effective in maintaining the main paradigm of the enlargement policy the transformation of candidates into member states, H- 3 the implementation of the strategy shows that the enlargement policy is moving slowly into the direction of the European Neighbourhood Policy. The paper consists of three main sections. The first one is the outline of the changes of the EU enlargement strategy with particular emphasis on its modifications after In the second section the author explains the changes of the strategy. The third one is devoted to the analysis of the implementation of the current EU enlargement strategy and at the same time to the presentation of the arguments in support of the main hypotheses. Changes of the EU Enlargement Strategy Within the first enlargement rounds of the European Communities (EC) there was no developed enlargement strategy, included in the special documents issued by the EC institutions. It reflected the fact that there was rather an enlargement procedure than a 2

3 comprehensive policy, limited actually to the accession negotiations. 1 Until the Eastern enlargement, the European Commission prepared some documents in response to a request of member states which could really be only treated as the semblance of the later strategy documents. Their examples are: the so called Fresco report in 1977 concerning Greece, Spain and Portugal 2, later A Strategy for Enlargement in 1991 and Europe and the Challenge of Enlargement in 1992 as well as Agenda 2000 in These documents referred to the determinants of enlargement, requirements of the membership, impact on the member states and the future of the process. 3 It did not mean that there was a lack of certain elements of a classical strategy as the goals, principles and tasks of the enlargement policy which, although not codified in a single document could be concluded from the political practice. Since the beginning the general goal and paradigm has been to transform a candidate into a member state. In relation to it, Neil Nugent wrote about the prototype of the EC. 4 The task or rather function of the enlargement policy was during the first enlargement round the strengthening of the economic and political position both of the new member states and the EC. Later during the Southern enlargement round the EC developed a function of a stabilizer. The enlargement policy became increasingly clearly a tool to provide security to candidate countries (to the member states as well) and support their political and economic transformation processes. It established the geostrategic factor as the main principle of the enlargement policy, which later would be an essential part of the developed enlargement strategy. There were also some principles within the so called enlargement method which, however, were more of the rules of the enlargement procedure (first of all accession negotiations) than the principles of the comprehensive policy. 5 It is here about: a requirement of the full adjustment to the acquis communautaire, lack of substantial changes in EC policies as a result of enlargement, adding new elements to the existing institutional framework of the EC to adjust the Communities to the situation after the enlargement, adaptive and gradual integration of candidates with 1 U. Sedelmeier, Enlargement. From Rules for Accession to a Policy Towards Europe, in M. Cini, N. Perez- Solorzano Borragan (eds.), European Union Politics, Oxford University Press, Oxford 2009, pp Ch. Preston, Enlargement and Integration in the European Union, Routledge, London, New York 1997, pp For more, see: A Strategy for Enlargement, Brussels, 14 November 1991; European Commission, Europe and the Challenge of Enlargement, 24 June 1992, Prepared for the European Council in Lisbon, June 1992, Bull. EC, Supp ; Agenda 2000 of the European Commission: Summary and conclusions of the opinions of the Commission concerning the applications for accession, 15 July 1997, DOC/97/8. 4 N. Nugent, The Unfolding of the 10+2 Enlargement Round, in N. Nugent (ed.), European Union Enlargement, Palgrave Macmillan, Basingstoke, New York 2004, pp Ch. Hillion, The Copenhagen Criteria and their Progeny, in Ch. Hillion (ed.), EU Enlargement: A Legal Approach, Hart Publishing, Oxford, Portland 2004, pp

4 substantial changes after the accession and conducting negotiations with the group of countries instead of only one of them. 6 Within the Eastern enlargement round the first regular enlargement strategy documents started to be prepared. It was connected with the fact that big bang enlargement was a completely different stage of the process in comparison with the previous rounds. It was the time of the political Union with the aim to promote abroad the democratic values, which were recognized as its fundamental principles. The enlargement procedure was transformed into pro-active and meticulous policy of the EU, which correlated with the change of conditionality in terms of the time of implementation, scope, priority and procedures. 7 In the period the institutions and instruments of the association were developed (with the crucial role of the European Agreements). The conditionality was implemented gradually, becoming increasigly strong thanks to the development of 1993 of the pre-accession strategy and its instruments (introduced in two phases and ). 8 Starting from 1993 the conditions of membership were elaborated and codified as the Copenhagen criteria. 9 Then they were refined by the next European Council s summits and operationalized into various indicators for candidates in the instruments of the pre-accession strategy first in White Paper of 1995, later in Accession Partneships as well as in Commission s documents (avis in Agenda 2000). 10 All of this concerned ten Central and East European countries as well as Malta and Cyprus. However, Turkey was embraced by the pre-accession strategy, with some modifications (e.g. introduction of political dialogue) and started to be monitored with reference to fulfilment of the Copenhagen criteria shortly after big bang group i.e. in period. 11 The political conditions - first of all the requirement of the democratic system - began to be prioritised and more strictly enforced (original Copenhagen political criteria became a condition for opening the accession negotiations) as a result of the anxiety of the member states over the cohesion of the Union. Their significance increased thanks to 6 Ch. Preston, Enlargement and Integration, op.cit., pp Ch. Hillion, The Creeping Nationalisation of the EU Enlargement Policy, SIEPS, Report No.6, 2010, p. 11, ( ). 8 H. Grabbe, The EU s Transformative Power. Europeanization through Conditionality in Central and Eastern Europe, Palgrave Macmillan, Basingstoke, New York 2006, pp European Council in Copenhagen June Conclusions of the Presidency, ( ). 10 G. Pridham, Change and Continuity in the European Union s Political Conditionality: Aims, Approach, and Priorities, "Democratization, Vol. 14, No. 3, 2007, pp A.R. Usul, Democracy in Turkey. The Impact of EU political conditionality, Routledge, London, New York 2011, pp

5 the Amsterdam Treaty of 1997 whose provisions constituted a broad legal basis for the conditions, leading to their constitutionalization. 12 It was the time when the EU function of the stabilizer reached its peak. The Union started to be not only a part in the accession negotiations but also the structure that helps the candidates in preparations for the EU membership. That is why the aforementioned preaccession strategy was developed. The key role within it began to be played by the European Commission. It became a pivotal coordinating institution setting conditions to candidate states, monitoring and promoting their progress in fulfilling the membership criteria (having at its disposal such new monitoring instruments as regular reports and Accession Partnerships) as well as disbursing aid. The Commission had a proper potential to manage a more meritocratic and technical pre-accession process. However, the Council of the EU i.e. the member states still played a key role in the phase of accession negotiations (when the Commission had the facilitation tasks) and in the final decision about the enlargement, together with the European Council, which gave political guidelines to the Commission. 13 All these changes required the development of the comprehensive EU enlargement strategy. Since 1998 the regular enlargement strategy documents have been prepared by the European Commission and accepted by the Council. They included the aforementioned goals and functions as well as principles of the EU enlargement policy. They concerned the strategy in relation to the future actions within the EU enlargement policy, communication strategy and the complex pre-accession strategy with its elements. There were reports about the prospects of candidates and recommendations attached. 14 The key element emphasized in the enlargement strategy since the very beginning has been the geostrategic argument and the stabilizer function of the EU (in the documents after 2001 referred even to the whole neighbourhood of the Union). The open-door policy of the Union was reflected in their content. Every European country could be the member after fulfilling the criteria of accession. Although the historical opportunity to end the division of Europe was very important it created a kind of pressure to set a date of the accession of a candidate being at the advanced stage of preparations (which had been reflected in the strategy documents since 2000), the emphasis was put on the necessity for the candidates 12 Ch. Hillion, The Copenhagen Criteria, op.cit., pp Ch. Hillion, The Creeping Nationalisation, op.cit., p I. Bellier, The European Commission between the acquis communautaire and enlargement, in D. G. Dimitrakopoulos (ed.), The Changing European Commission, Manchester University Press, Manchester, New York 2004, pp

6 from the Central and Eastern Europe to fulfil all requirements. However, the strategy provided for the use of different tools, programmes, etc. to help the candidates to fulfil the accession requirements. Since the very beginning the conditionality, which entails linking, by a state or international organization, of benefits desired by another state to the fulfilment of certain conditions 15 and everything connected with it (criteria of accession and control of their assessment) has become the central mechanisms regulating the relations between the EU and candidates within the pre-accession process. 16 The strategy documents took into consideration also the need for preparations of the EU itself in order to keep the integration process on track (as it was before). However, this Copenhagen criterion on the EU side was not emphasized at this time. According to the strategy documents, problems with reforming the EU could not be the obstacle to enlarge the Union. The pressure on the successful pre-accession strategy was conspicuous. The most important issue was then the implementation of conditionality on the candidate state side. 17 The same concerned the call for the preparation and implementation of the communication strategy to inform the citizens of the EU and candidate states about the enlargement which was to be based on the principles of decentralization (adjustment to each state), flexibility (possibility to change the communication strategy) and synergy (cooperation between the Commission and member states). The provisions about it were included in the strategy documents at this time but it was not an absolute principle which was also reflected in rather ineffective implementation of the communication strategy. 18 During the Eastern enlargement round some of the principles of the enlargement method lost its validity. First of all, main problems of candidates had to be solved before, not after their accession. Because of this the pre-accession strategy was introduced. It made the whole pre-accession process much slower but this step was necessary to solve the dilemma 15 K.E. Smith, The Evolution and Application of EU Membership Conditionality, in M. Cremona (ed.), The Enlargement of the European Union, Oxford University Press, Oxford 2003, p Composite Paper. Reports on progress towards accession by each of the candidate countries, ( ); ( ). 17 Composite Paper (1999), op.cit. ( ). 18 Enlargement Strategy Paper. Report on progress towards accession by each of the candidate countries, ( ); Making a success of enlargement. Strategy Paper and Report of the European Commission on the progress towards accession by each of the candidate countries, strategy_en.pdf ( ); Communication Strategy for Enlargement, ec_737_2000_en.pdf ( ). Cf. N. Nugent, Distinctive and Recurring Features of Enlargement Rounds, in N. Nugent (ed.), European Union Enlargement, op.cit., pp

7 deepening vs. widening. The same difficulty was a reason for the introduction of some new principles of the enlargement method apart from conditionality it was: a differentiation of candidates, rising asymmetry between the EU and candidates and complexity of the preaccession process (more stages on the way to the EU and more instruments of the enlargement policy). 19 After the 2004 enlargement round more and more European politicians (e.g. from France, Germany or Austria) began to believe that the crisis over ratifying the Treaty Establishing a Constitution for Europe, associated with the 2004 enlargement not digested by societies of the old member states, showed the need for more prudence in admitting new members and taking into consideration the possibility that some states will not join the Union. This referred both to Turkey and the Western Balkans states all very difficult candidacies in the context of fulfilment of the EU membership criteria. The process of EU enlargement started to be accompanied by so called enlargement fatigue. 20 This fatigue led to the modification in of the EU enlargement strategy, included, as before, in the special documents. It is conducive to the present process that the geostrategic significance of enlargement (enlargement as stabilisation of admitted candidates) and the rule that commitments already made to candidates have to be met, i.e. pacta sunt servanda, remain at the heart of the strategy. Hence the strategy guarantees the continuation of the process despite an unfavourable atmosphere. The strategic document updated on an annual basis does not set limits to EU enlargement (such a demand began to be put forward after 2004), but it does contain provisions in support of reforms and regional cooperation of the EU candidate states on pre-accession aid for them. 21 Therefore, it seems that although some of the principles of the enlargement method have lost its validity again also as a result of the modification the strategy (first of all the group enlargement is not possible any more) 22, the main paradigm of the EU enlargement policy is still valid. Moreover, after the big bang enlargement the function of the EU as the multidimensional stabilizer of candidates has 19 K. Maniokas, The method of the European Union s enlargement to the east: a critical approach, in A. L. Dimitrova (ed.), Drive to Change, The European Union s Enlargement Viewed from the East, Manchester University Press, Manchester, New York 2004, pp H. Kramer, Wie erweiterungsmüde ist die EU?, SWP-Aktuell 16, März 2007, ( ). 21 For more, see e.g. Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council. Enlargement Strategy and Main Challenges , Brussels , COM (2007) 663 final, ( ). 22 On the other hand the principles that appeared within the big bang enlargement were strengthened after 2004, first of all the complexity that means nowadays the more complex and long-term pre-accession process with the increasing number of stages and differentiation that excludes the possibility of the admission of a group of candidate countries. 7

8 been maintained or in some cases even strengthened e.g. in the field of security with reference to the Western Balkans. 23 However, these enlargement strategy documents have reflected since 2005 a more cautious approach to the process. It is reflected in the main principles that were clearly codified in the strategy document, i.e. consolidation, conditionality and communication. 24 The principle of consolidation implies meeting commitments made to the present candidates, but it also provides for much restraint on further promises, especially in the case of new states which have ambitions to become the member states. The conditionality has been emphasized and strengthened. According to the enlargement strategy document of the principle of conditionality states that any progress in the accession process depends on the country s progress in conducting reforms and fulfilment of more rigorous membership conditions at present. It is said in the modified enlargement strategy that the problems of corruption as well as the current work of administration and the judiciary will be tackled by the European Commission already at an early stage of the accession process. 25 The EU is more strict in control of the fulfilment of the requirements to be met not only to become a member of the EU but just to go further in the integration process, e.g. to sign the association agreement, start the accession negotiations, etc. 26 Moreover, the system of benchmarks initial criteria of opening and closing of negotiation chapters was introduced to the accession talks. They were to be introduced after a unanimous decision of the member states. Thus, the Council strengthened its position vis-à-vis the Commission, the former being now the key player not only in negotiations and making accession decisions, but also in the whole pre-accession process, primarily in terms of defining and assessing the membership conditions. Futhermore, since the Lisbon Treaty became effective, the European Council has agreed to the conditions of eligibility. 27 The principle of communication was more emphasized and developed in comparison to the previous documents. It was not only about informing the citizens about the enlargement policy its goals, challenges and impact on the EU and member states, the current activities of the Union in this field as well as about the pre-accession process of 23 M. Braniff, Integrating the Balkans: Conflict Resolution and the Impact of EU Expansion (Library of European Studies), I.B.Tauris, London, New York 2011, pp Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council. EU Enlargement Strategy and Main Challenges (Including Annexed Special Report on the EU s Capacity to Integrate New Members), Brussels, , COM (2006) 649, ( ). 25 Ibid. 26 A.F. Tatham, Enlargement of the European Union, Kluwer Law International, Austin 2009, pp Consolidated version of the Treaty on European Union, OJ EU C 83 of 30 March

9 candidates. It was also about carrying out the dialogue with them about the policy and engaging them in the current activities. 28 However, two other principles which reflect the essence of the modified approach to EU enlargement are of the key importance. One with regard to giving priority to the Union s absorption, or integration capacity, i.e. the principle that decision-making on its further enlargement should take into account mainly the EU s capability to admit new members. A state s accession is possible if an appropriate pace of the European integration process is maintained, which is possible subject to the correct functioning of EU institutions, budget and policies. Integration capacity is one of the Copenhagen criteria, which was also taken into account before, but less emphasis was placed on them than after 1 May It gained even more importance during the economic crisis in the EU in The modified strategy emphasizes then the functionality of the enlargement policy for the EU. As a result, the geostrategic factor lost its previous dominant position within the strategy. The other principle, highlighted not only in the EU enlargement strategy documents but also in the negotiating frameworks, is that a positive completion of the pre-accession process and membership negotiations is not prejudged (open-ended process), which also makes the present EU enlargement stage different from the 2004 enlargement. 30 In case of the former candidates from the Central and Eastern Europe the beginning of the accession negotiations was equal with the EU obligation to its completion and adoption of the accession treaty. From the formal point of view the open-ended process was recognised. However, the mentioned tendency was a kind of informal rule initial yes from the member states side. Moreover, the advanced stage of negotiations meant de facto the certainty of the success of the pre-accession process which was reflected in setting the date of accession. 31 The enlargement strategy has been slightly modified since For instance, when it comes to the principle of conditionality, respecting the rule of law an enourmous problem for Turkey and the Balkan states started to be emphasised in the strategy documents after 28 Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council. EU Enlargement Strategy and Main Challenges , op.cit.; Cf. G. Pridham, Change and Continuity, op.cit., pp E. İçener, D. Phinnemore, Enlargement and the European Union s Absorption Capacity: oft-forgotten condition or additional obstacle to membership?, Insight Turkey, Vol. 8, No. 3, 2006, pp See e.g. Negotiating Framework (Turkey), Luxembourg, 3 October 2005, ( ). 31 K. Inglis, Evolving Practice in EU Enlargement with Case Studies in Agri-Food and Environment Law (Studies in EU External Relations, Volume 4), Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, Leiden 2010, pp

10 2010 among the issues being tackled by the Commission at an early stage of the pre-accession process. 32 Explanation of EU Enlargement Strategy Change after 2004 The question to be asked is what was the driving force of modifications of the EU enlargement strategy after The changes can be explained by the rational choice institutionalism. The rational choice approach is helpful to understand the reasons for the change of the EU enlargement strategy in a particular period of time because of focusing on micro-politics, i.e. reasons for the change made by particular subjects, usually in reaction to the so called external shock, which breaks the equilibrium. 33 Both the functional and distributional approach within the rational choice institutionalism can give an answer to the question posed at the beginning of this chapter. When it comes to the general assumptions, the functional approach stresses the shared concern of political actors with achieving common gains or efficiency through cooperation. Its general premise (and at the same time one of the main assumptions of the liberal intergovernmentalism) is that if, due to the external shock, the benefits of rule A have decreased, the rule will be changed, if the gains of the proposed altered rule B including the transaction costs will be higher. 34 The change is followed by a period of a relative stability. After the completion of the Eastern enlargement the external shock was connected with the presence of a group of countries with the European aspirations apart from Iceland all very difficult candidacies (particularly the most controversial candidate - Turkey) even more difficult than just admitted countries, which were already a kind of burden for the EU and the member states. The existing EU enlargement strategy was not sufficient to ensure the proper preparation of candidates followed by the accession which would bring more benefits than costs to the EU and its members or to keep the general integration process on track. There was a need to modify the enlargement strategy in the direction of strengthening the mechanism of conditionality and at the same time putting more emphasis on the capacities of the EU. Only then could the costs connected with the pre-accession support (too high and 32 Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council Enlargement Strategy and Main Challenges , Brussels, , COM (2009) 533, key_documents/2009/strategy_paper_2009_en.pdf ( ). 33 L. Eriksson, Rational Choice Theory. Potential and Limits, Palgrave Macmillan, Basingstoke, New York 2011, p A. Héritier, Explaining Institutional Change in Europe, Oxford University Press, Oxford, New York 2007, p

11 long lasting in the case of maintaining the previous enlargement policy) be accepted by the EU institutions and member states. The transaction costs of the modification of the EU enlargement strategy were at the same time relatively low. It was first of all about the shift of significance of the elements of the strategy the one accepted by all member states despite the different positions on the continuation of the enlargement process. There was a kind of consensus in the Union that these costs must be incurred for the sake of the efficiency of the policy. The need for efficiency was first of all in the interest of the Commission that proposed the provisions of the modified strategy. It can be said that from the functional perspective the modification of the EU enlargement strategy was necessary more from the technical than political point of view (which was reflected in the rise of the technical character of the enlargement process, e.g. through the introduction of the aforementioned benchmark system). In case of the major distributional perspective within the rational choice institutionalism, the existing rule can be renegotiated/changed to reflect the preferences of the powerful actors or the changed power balance. It emphasizes the political conflict and strategic bargaining among actors. 35 This perspective explains even more the development of a more cautious EU enlargement strategy after the 2004 enlargement round with the emphasis on the open-ended process and the integration capacity of the EU. In this case the modifications were connected with the progressive politicization of the enlargement process after For the powerful actors, first of all France and Germany, the maintenance of the existing enlargement strategy, while having as candidates such countries as Turkey, was too costly. As mentioned before, the new member states were already a burden for the old ones. It was about the economic and financial aspect but also about the political costs connected with the unsatisfied EU societies. The institutional framework of the whole enlargement policy to date has not been adjusted to Turkey and the Western Balkan states and would have brought too much cost for the EU and the member states in the pre-accession process, not to mention the costs connected with the admission (also political ones). The distribution of the costs among member states through bargaining to end the conflict between them and reach a consensus on enlargement, e.g. thanks to such instruments as the long existing transitional measures (which became more complex after 2004) appeared impossible. That is why the member states opted for new principles of the strategy (e.g. open-ended process) or for a greater significance of the already existing rules within it - mainly conditionality and integration capacity of the EU, which on the one hand would make the accession option for 35 J. Knight, Institutions and Social Conflict, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 1992, pp

12 the candidates (first of all Turkey) much more difficult to achieve, if possible at all, and on the other hand would enable the strengthening of the position of the Council/European Council, and consequently the member states as well. The reasons for changes of the EU enlargement strategy can be explained additionally with the use of more specific theoretical concept within the rational choice institutionalism referring to the two main approaches presented before. It is the learning process based on gaining new information. This is the concept developed with reference to the institutional change both in the economic and political dimension by Douglas North. The main premise here is that the new knowledge and information in the environment of the institutional rule leads to the gradual transformation of this rule. This is then a simple adaptation change to increase the effectiveness of an institution. 36 Within the EU enlargement policy the learning mechanism was a conspicuous reason for changes of the enlargement strategy after Member states and the European Commissions were gaining new knowledge concerning the deficits of effectiveness of the existing mechanisms of the EU enlargement policy and strategy within the Eastern enlargement. It explains the strengthening of the principle of conditionality for the candidates and paying more attention by the European Commission to control of such issues as the working of administration, judiciary and rule of law as well as fighting corruption and organized crime. These issues began to be more emphasized because of the negative experiences with candidates from 2004 enlargement round that were even deepened in case of Bulgaria and Romania who were just to join the EU, not being ready for the membership in the mentioned areas above. 37 These areas are at the same time crucial problems for the Western Balkan states and Turkey. When it comes to modifications of the enlargement strategy after 2007, the knowledge of the Bulgarian and Romanian case was used within the accession negotiations with Turkey as well as Croatia with a stricter benchmarking system in the judiciary and fundamental rights. 38 Interestingly, the introduction of benchmarks was also a result of gaining the knowledge of the 2004 enlargement round by the EU. Without the clear and concrete criteria for opening and closing the negotiation chapters it was difficult for such candidates as the 36 D. C. North, Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 1990, pp D. Phinnemore, From Negotiations to Accession: Lessons from the 2007 Enlargement, Perspectives on European Politics and Society, Vol.10, No. 2, 2009, pp A. L. Dimitrova, Speeding up or Slowing down? Lessons from the Last Enlargement on the Dynamics of Enlargement-Driven Reforms, South European Society and Politics, Vol. 16, No. 2, 2011, pp

13 Czech Republic, Hungary or Poland to know what the EU expectations were concerning each negotiating chapter and the EU members were not sure what they should require. The benchmark system was to improve the efficiency of the accession talks then. The benchmarks to the negotiating chapter in the mentioned area are even more rigorous in recent years, basing on the information from the negotiations with Croatia which ended in June The judiciary and human rights as well as justice, freedom and security chapters will probably be opened earlier in the case of Turkey according to the proposal from March so as to gain more time for this candidate to deliver on the commitments under this chapter. 39 In the case of Montenegro the two discussed areas were important already at the screening stage. 40 Implementation of the Current EU Enlargement Strategy As mentioned before the functions and main paradigm of the EU enlargement policy have been maintained since the modifications of the EU enlargement strategy after However, the implementation of the modified strategy shows that EU has lost its previous effectiveness in the EU enlargement policy - first of all the main paradigm has been weakened. The transformation of candidates into member states is not certain in all cases. The current enlargement strategy favours the tendency that the EU enlargement policy is approaching the European Neighbourhood Policy. The weakening of the main paradigm of the EU enlargement policy is connected first of all with the vagueness and uncertainty of the EU membership prospects after the Eastern enlargement. The increasingly vague EU membership prospects of the current candidates are reflected in the language and content of the enlargement strategy as well as in its implementation. The vague language of the strategy as well as other documents such as the conclusions of the Presidencies in the EU Council adopted during the European Council summits, reflects the ambiguous commitment of the EU to the eventual membership of new member states. There is a noticeable tendency to avoid such words as the accession or membership. The 39 European Parliament resolution of 29 March 2012 on the 2011 Progress Report on Turkey, Brussels, 29 March 2012, ( ). 40 Negotiating Framework, Brussels 27 June 2012, ( ). 13

14 European politicians use instead unclear expressions such as the European perspective, the fullest possible integration or integral part of the EU. 41 There is no denying that the modification of the EU enlargement strategy means clear deceleration of the process and an increased uncertainty about the future of the different candidates. In this context the content of the modified strategy, with often ambiguous principles, indicated the weakening the main paradigm of the EU enlargement policy as well. The transformation of candidates into member states is to be very long and without any certainty about a final success. The meticulous enforcement of the candidate s compliance with strict criteria related to the strengthened principle of conditionality mentioned above involves the extension of the period of the candidate country remaining at the same stage of the EU integration. The strengthened conditionality is, of course, intended to ensure better preparedness for membership, but the mechanism can also be used to stop a candidate s progress by member states reluctant to accept a given candidate. An effective enlargement dialogue with citizens would yield favourable results, e.g. due to the presentation of the true picture of the process and the candidates. However, if the principle of communication with citizens on the EU enlargement is interpreted as encouragement to hold an accession referendum in the member states, it may even contribute to the failure of the candidate s preaccession process at the last possible stage, i.e. within the ratification of the accession treaty. This would mean that a candidate cannot be sure about the accession until the last moment. 42 While the enlargement of the EU obviously cannot proceed at the expense of its functioning, the criterion of integration capacity may have an adverse effect on the pace of the pre-accession process. In connection with this criterion, the Commission prepares impact studies, i.e. documents assessing the impact of a state s accession on the EU s different policy areas. The first of such documents concerned the entry into the EU road cabotage sector and free movement of persons (for Croatia) and energy supply (for Turkey). 43 This may slow down the pre-accession process, as may the activities of states reluctant to see further enlargement, invoking the Union s integration capacity to block a candidate. They may take 41 D. Phinnemore, The Stabilization and Association Process. A framework for European Union enlargement? in A. Elbasani (ed.), European Integration and Transformation in the Western Balkans: Europeanization or Business as Usual, Routledge, London and New York 2013, pp A. Szymański, Rozszerzanie Unii Europejskiej współczesne uwarunkowania i perspektywy kontynuacji procesu/european Union Enlargement Contemporary Determinants and Prospects for the Continuation of the Process, ASPRA-JR, Warsaw 2012, pp Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council. Enlargement Strategy and Main Challenges , Brussels , COM (2007) 663 final, ( ). 14

15 advantage of the vagueness of the criterion. 44 Besides, by highlighting it, enthusiasm for reforms is weakened in candidate countries. Because there is a criterion beyond their control and it cannot be ruled out that while meeting all the criteria on their part, they may still remain outside the EU, because the Union itself will be unable to admit them for one reason or another. 45 The open-ended process is also disadvantageous for the current accession process in that it makes a state s EU membership prospects unclear. This has a negative impact on the operation of the conditionality principle as a mechanism supporting democratic reforms in an EU candidate country. The uncertainty of the accession prospects leads to the lack of a strong drive for reform and weakens enthusiasm in the candidate states. 46 The implementation of the strategy shows the uncertainty of the pre-accession process as well. The emphasis on the open-ended process leads to the practice that no accession date is given before the conclusion of the accession negotiations. It indicates that cautious approach to admiting new members, basing, again, on bad experiences with the previous candidates. What is even more important, as David Phinnemore put it, candidates get lost in a jungle of conditionality. 47 A noticeable lengthening of the the pre-accession process can be observed. There is an increasing number of stages on the way to the EU which is in accordance with the developed principle of complexity of the enlargement method. This is also connected with the progressive differentiation of candidates (another element of the enlargement method ) that are divided into potential and official candidates (Croatia after the conclusion of the accession treaty was called additionally the acceding state ). In order to move to the next stage some strictly controlled conditions must be fulfilled by candidates. This concerns also the accession negotiations with the benchmark system and more chapters to be open and closed. The tendency to open the difficult chapters at the early stages of the accession negotiations can also lead to the lenghtening of the process. The planned opening of chapter 23 and 24 in the case of Turkey can be equal with the opening of the Pandora box which will lengthen the accession negotiations for decades. 44 M. Emerson, S. Aydın, J. de Clerck-Sachsse, G. Noutcheva, Just what is this absorption capacity of the European Union?, CEPS Policy Brief, 113/2006, ( ). 45 N.Tocci, Report, Unpacking European Discourses: Conditionality, Impact and Prejudice in the EU-Turkey Relations, in N. Tocci (ed.) Conditionality, Impact and Prejudice in EU-Turkey Relations, IAI, Rome 2007, p M. Uğur, Open-Ended Membership Prospect and Commitment Credibility: Explaining the Deadlock in EU Turkey Accession Negotiations, Journal of Common Market Studies, Vol. 48, No. 4, 2010, p D. Phinnemore, The Stabilization and Association Process..., op.cit., p

16 Generally speaking, the demand side of the EU enlargement policy has been developed. In addition to it, the EU s response to the individual applications has generally been hesitant and more technocratic than before 48. It is proved very well by the Albanian case. This country had to wait for the submitting of the membership application to the Commission by the Council, then for the Commission s opinion and is still waiting for the status of an official candidate. However, another problem is that at the same time the supply side of the enlargement leaves a lot to be desired. In this case there is a substantial change in comparison to the Eastern enlargement. It is about the already mentioned internal changes within the EU, e.g. unfauvourable determinants for the continuation of the enlargement process. Different EU members preferences and negative attitude of many EU societies take a lead here. It is connected with the increasing politicization of the process that contributes very clearly to the weakening of the membership prospects of at least some current candidates. The political factor leads often to blocking and delaying the pre-accession process. It is not only about the aforementioned particular interpretation of ambiguous principles of the enlargement strategy that may lead to the delay of the pre-accession process. A meeting of the benchmarks may take much time and effort on the part of candidate countries, which extends the negotiation process. It will especially happen in such way when states sceptical about a country s accession demand that additional conditions be imposed for the opening and closing of different negotiation chapters or when they are against opening a given chapter, maintaining that benchmarks, usually defined in highly general terms, have not been met. Such a situation arose e.g. with Turkey, whose negotiation chapters were put on hold by France or Cyprus. Both Commission officials and representatives of candidate states unanimously admit that the introduction of that mechanism was intended to ensure better preparedness of the candidate. On the other hand, both groups criticise the possibility of political use of the technical benchmarking system, which impedes the pre-accession process. 49 While the more technocratic approach of the EU towards the candidates nowadays can be explained by the efficiency issue (mentioned in previous section) which was after 2004 in danger because of the rising costs of keeping the whole integration process on track, the 48 Ibid., p Note from the interviews conducted with the officials from the European Commission (DG Enlargement) in Brussels and the Ministries of Foreign Affairs or EU Affairs of the candidate countries Turkey, Croatia and Iceland, in Ankara, Zagreb and Reykjavik March-November

17 stregthening of the political factor within the enlargement policy and strategy is a result of already pointed out rising political costs of maintainig the existing framework intact. The increasing politicization is accompanied by the creeping nationalisation of EU enlargement policy - connected with the enlargement fatigue that appeared right after 2004 and intensified even more in the face of the economic crisis in the EU. It means that an even greater focus was being placed on furthering national interests and agenda in pursuing the enlargement policy. The governments of at least some of the EU member states no longer treated this Union s policy predominantly in terms of efforts towards political or economic stabilisation of candidates ( geostrategic factor) that undergo the transformation into member states. The EU states began addressing their own needs in the first place and focused more on the enlargement consequences for themselves - because of this they emphasize the role of the capacity of the EU to admit new member states 50. To sum up, the EU can help the candidate states to conduct reforms and develop close ties with the Union in many areas but it is not certain that all these activities will be finalised with the EU accession. In case of the ENP the situation is similar, although obviously not the same. Its main goals are exactly the development of tied relations in many fields and the help in the modernisation as well as political and economic transformation. A kind of ambiguity concerns the issue of the EU membership prospects. The EU membership of the neighbours is not the goal of the European Neighbourhood Policy but it is not excluded as well. 51 Apart from the uncertain membership prospects of current candidates there is also another issue that justifies the claim about the moving of the EU enlargement policy into the direction of the ENP. There are more and more similarities between the two EU policies within the institutional framework. The conditionality does not work properly within the EU enlargement policy due to the lack of the main incentive the clear EU membership prospects. However, it is still the main mechanism both of the enlargement and European Neighbourhood Policy 52. The general Copenhagen criteria are actually also the criteria whose fulfilment is necessary to make progress within the ENP. They must be fulfilled to a different degree with reference to the enlargement and neighbourhood policy. However, it is sometimes 50 Ch. Hillion, The Creeping Nationalisation, op.cit. 51 For more, see P. Kratochvil, Peter, The European Neighbourhood Policy: A Clash of Incompatible Interpretations, in P. Kratochvil (ed.), The European Union and Its Neighbourhood: Policies, Problems and Priorities, Institute of International Relations, Prague 2006, pp F. Schimmelfennig, Frank, Europeanization Beyond the Member States, manuscript_.pdf ( ). 17