EU Accession Process and Euroscepticism in Candidate Countries

Transcription

1 EU Accession Process and Euroscepticism in Candidate Countries Selim Erdem Aytaç Koç University Osman Sabri Kıratlı University of Massachusetts Paper presented at the Fourth Pan-European Conference on EU Politics ECPR Standing Group on the European Union University of Latvia, Riga, September 2008 This work is under progress. Please do not circulate, cite or quote without the permission of the authors. Comments, questions welcome. Corresponding author,

2 INTRODUCTION Given that the European Union (EU) is getting increasingly more demanding of candidate countries over the scope and degree of European policy implementation before membership can actually take place (Pridham, 2001), the impact of accession process on the domestic politics of applicant countries deserves considerable attention. Moreover, although the enlargement of the EU is possible only with the consent of the member states and the European Commission, the ratification process of the accession treaties in candidate countries may not be straightforward such that the enlargement also depends on the governing political parties in the candidate states and on their ability to win referendums (Taggart and Szczerbiak, 2002). Thus, a significant feature of the contemporary European integration process is the role of domestic politics in the candidate states. In this respect, Euroscepticism, a term that can be defined very broadly as the opposition towards European integration, comes to the fore as one of the core elements of domestic political agenda in candidate countries. Although it can represent a genuine political ideology allegedly defending sensitive concepts such as national sovereignty and identity, the proneness of accession negotiations for domestic politicization enables parties to exploit Euroscepticism for electoral and strategic advantage (Taggart and Szczerbiak, 2002). In turn, governments in candidate countries have to closely monitor trends of Euroscepticism in the society especially during the accession negotiations in order to maintain political consensus and public support for their membership bid. Keeping this perspective in mind, the purpose of this paper to fill a gap in the literature by analyzing the impact of the EU accession negotiations on the public support for EU membership in candidate countries via a cross-country comparison of three accession cases Finland, Poland and Malta. The existing studies on Euroscepticism mainly focus either on single-country studies (e.g. Szczerbiak, 2001; Arter, 1995; for Poland and Finland, 1

3 respectively) or on comparative studies involving cases of contiguous countries in the same enlargement wave only (e.g. Raunio, 2007; Archer, 2000; for the Nordic region, Kucia, 1999; Riishoj, 2007; for Czech Republic and Poland). The approach of this paper, however, differs from previous studies by the selection of countries from different enlargement waves and socioeconomic levels in order to investigate the validity of some causal dynamics suggested to be common to all countries undergoing the accession process and affecting the level of the Euroscepticism. Moreover, each country analyzed in this paper has a significant feature that makes it unique in its respective enlargement wave: The date of the Finnish EU referendum was deliberately fixed earlier than the other Nordic applicants in order to create a domino effect and thus given a special importance, Poland was the largest and most important country in the Eastern Enlargement, and Malta was the only state among the accession countries with an electorally strong Eurosceptic party actively campaigning against the EU membership. The results of the analysis indicate that there are clearly reinforcing effects of accession negotiations on the rise of Euroscepticism in candidate countries that can be attributed to the unique status of candidacy such that we generally observe a U-shaped curve representing support for EU membership: The start of accession negotiations is accompanied by a decline in support which reverses itself upon the successful conclusion of negotiations and/or the advent of the referendum date. Moreover, the same trend is observed in countries from different enlargement waves and socioeconomic development levels so that these factors do not seem to play a considerable role in the course of Euroscepticism. The approach of the candidate country s government to the negotiations, on the other hand, proved to be a significant factor in determining the level of public support for EU membership. In the three countries considered, for example, whereas Poland exhibits the strongest and clearest link between accession negotiations and rise of Euroscepticism due to the strong presence of an 2

4 initial, uninformed Euro-optimism and the difficult course of the accession negotiations, the case of Finland constitutes a more moderate example of rising Euroscepticism in the sense that although the initial public debates about membership cause a decline in the support for the EU, the fast pace of the negotiations involving concessions by the EU reverses this trend and abates the public support for the anti-membership camp. Malta, on the other hand, separates itself from the other cases in the sense that the government successfully checked the rise of Euroscepticism during the accession negotiations. We argue that two factors were crucial in this result: First, the Maltese government displayed a high level of interaction with the representatives of different sectors of society, giving them a voice in shaping Malta s negotiation stance. Second, Malta was able to obtain a significant number of concessions from the EU, thereby preempting the arguments of the Eurosceptics. Although all of the three cases are instructive in understanding the dynamics of Euroscepticism during the accession negotiations, we believe that especially the case of Malta can be helpful for the current accession countries of Turkey and Croatia, enabling their governments to maintain public support behind their bids for EU membership. The organization of the paper is as follows: The ensuing section will present a brief discussion of what Euroscepticism is all about as well as contending hypothesis about the link between the accession process and rise of Euroscepticism. Next, the case studies of Finland, Poland and Malta will be analyzed in order to identify factors that cause a trend change in public opinion support for EU membership. Lastly, conclusions will follow. EUROSCEPTICISM AND ITS LINK TO ACCESSION PROCESS What does Euroscepticism stand for? The most widely-cited definition of Euroscepticism has been put forward by Paul Taggart who asserts that the term expresses the idea of contingent or qualified opposition, 3

5 as well as incorporating outright and unqualified opposition to the process of European integration (Taggart, 1998: 366). Being aware of the broadness of this definition that can range from opposition to the very idea of European integration to the moderate position of supporting it while doubting whether the EU is the best form to achieve it, Taggart (1998) justified his position by arguing that since the current context is one of European integration, the term Euroscepticism should encompass all of those who have a stance outside the status quo. Later, however, the need to differentiate types of Euroscepticism has been acknowledged especially in the context of Eastern Europe between hard and soft types (Taggart and Szczerbiak, 2002). In this refinement, while hard Euroscepticism implies outright rejection of the entire project of European political and economic integration and opposition to their country joining or remaining members of the EU, soft Euroscepticism refers to the contingent or qualified opposition to European integration (Taggart and Szczerbiak, 2002: 27-28). An important disclaimer regarding hard Euroscepticism given by the authors is that since the theoretical position of hard Euroscepticism is too abstract to be applicable, in practice it can be identified only by the principled objection to the current form of European integration embodied as the EU. This approach to Euroscepticism is not immune from criticism, however. Kopecky and Mudde (2002), for example, argue that the definition of soft Euroscepticism is at such a broad level that any disagreement with a policy decision of the EU could be considered in this category. Moreover, although the theoretical distinction between the hard and soft types is relatively clear, the disclaimer about the practical identification of hard Euroscepticism blurs the difference between them. Most importantly, Kopecky and Mudde (2002) believe that this typology does not adequately emphasize the significant distinction between the idea of European integration and the EU as the current embodiment of this goal. To remedy this weakness, they propose an alternative typology along the two dimensions of diffuse and 4

6 specific support for European integration. While the first diffuse dimension refers to the support for the general idea of European integration and separates the Europhiles (prointegration) from the Europhobes (against integration), the second specific dimension of support for the European Union as it is and as it is developing separates EU-optimists (satisfied with the EU) from EU-pessimists (unsatisfied with the EU). This typology results in a 2X2 matrix of possible positions against the European integration with four ideal-type categories (Euroenthusiasts, Europragmatists, Eurosceptics and Eurorejects) where the Eurosceptics are considered to stand at the intersection of Europhiles and EU-pessimists (Kopecky and Mudde, 2002: ). A similar criticism to the typology developed by Taggart and Szczerbiak (2002) comes from Riishoj (2007: 507) who points to the danger of conceptual stretching, e.g. by including almost all EU-critical proclamations and articulation of normal interest under the notion scepticism. In turn, she develops a more elaborated classification of Euroscepticism that consists of nine different types. 1 A logical corollary research avenue to these specifications in the literature involves inquiries into the causes of Euroscepticism. The key explanatory factors offered include dissatisfaction with national government that is passed on to one s opinion of the EU, democratic deficit, concerns regarding the loss of national symbols and identity, personal costs resulting from the integration process, and the use of European issues by political parties for domestic power competition (Taggart, 1998; Taggart and Szczerbiak, 2002; Hooghe, 2007; McLaren, 2007). For the purpose of this paper, on the other hand, the focus will be on the connection between Euroscepticism and the accession negotiations of a candidate country rather than the general causes of the former. Indeed, in all of the typologies and causes of Euroscepticism offered above, there is not any distinction between member and candidate states and it has been assumed that they equally apply for the both group of countries. As 1 These types are: Identity-, cleavage-, policy-, institutionally-, national interest-, experience-, party-, Atlantic-, and practice-based Euroscepticism. Obviously, a discussion of these types would be out of the scope of this paper. 5

7 suggested by Pridham (2001), however, it should be reasonable to suppose that the Europeanization pressures are different in applicant states due to the rather extensive and abrupt integration effects. In the next subsection, the effects of candidate status on Euroscepticism that can be generalized to all candidate countries will be briefly discussed before moving on to the specific cases in the next section. The link between Euroscepticism and accession process to the EU The main contention about the effects of the accession process on the public opinion regarding EU membership is that it causes a rise in Euroscepticism 2 in candidate countries (Pridham, 2001; Riishoj, 2007; Rulikova, 2004; Szczerbiak, 2001). Rulikova (2004) asserts that Euroscepticism in candidate countries governs with its own logic due to three significant situational aspects that are broadly relevant to all candidate countries in different negotiation periods. These three candidate-unique conditions of externality, uncertainty and belatedness create an additional environment for the rise of Euroscepticism that is qualitatively different than those encountered in member states. The following discussion will be steered around these unique conditions together with their direct and indirect contributions towards the rise of Euroscepticism in candidate countries undergoing accession negotiations. The first situational factor the candidate countries face during the accession period is the context of externality. In essence, this condition arises from the perception that until accession is complete, the EU will remain as a primarily foreign body for the candidate country and its people. The resulting feeling of estrangement derives from the recognition that the current shape and functioning of the EU was achieved without the active contribution of the prospective participant who now has to tacitly adapt most, if not all, external outputs to its domestic legal order (Rulikova, 2004: 34). Furthermore, as the 2 Euroscepticism from now on will be used in line with Rulikova (2004) to imply both the opposition towards the project of European integration and accession to the EU as well as more moderate forms of irresolution, hesitation and doubt towards the process. 6

8 extensive integration effects touch people s daily lives at an increasing pace while negotiations continue, people s frustration grows stronger as they do not have an active voice in shaping their future due to being excluded from decision-making until full membership. A significant driver of this feeling of externality is the lack of knowledge about the realities of the EU before the start of negotiations accompanied by very little serious debate about the potential costs and benefits of EU accession (Szczerbiak, 2001; Rulikova, 2004). Pridham (2001) notes that it is usually the case that only when negotiations have begun does the media pay serious attention to EU matters and makes connection with sectoral interests about potential winners and losers. Paradoxically, the increased familiarity with the content of accession negotiations and the EU in general through an information campaign may exacerbate the level of Euroscepticism than that of before any campaign started, as the initial naïve perception of the EU as an association promoting prosperity and democracy wanes and gives way to a set of different and often contradictory political options informing people that not everyone will benefit from membership (Rulikova, 2004: 33). As a result, the attitudes towards the EU will become less symbolic and more practice- and policy related that are perceived to be externally imposed, which will cause crack in the initial pro- EU coalition (Riishoj, 2007). Another source of the perceived externality stems from the way accession negotiations are conducted. Pointing to the essentially one-sided nature of negotiations, Pridham (2001) notes that applicant states do not have much room for maneuver in playing off domestic pressures against EU requirements. While evaluating the experience of Finland during accession process, Nicolaides and Den Teuling (2001: 4) aptly describe the nature of the negotiations: It was pointed out that the negotiations between the EU and a candidate country do not constitute international negotiations in the normal sense of the word; reaching an agreement by compromise and through offers and requests, 7

9 with both the negotiating partners standing on an equal footing. Rather, it is much more a matter of the candidate countries adopting the Union acquis. Given the difficult issues that need to be tackled, the result of such a rigid negotiation structure is a public scrutiny on the continuous concessions to be made by the candidate country where Brussels is viewed as a source of conflict and hostility (Szczerbiak, 2001). This situation creates a significant opportunity for the nationalist voices in the country who can claim that they will struggle for national equality and do not permit the arrogant dictation of Brussels (Rulikova, 2004: 58). Thus, the nature of the accession negotiations itself can create a sense of unequal partnership on the side of candidate country and strengthen the Eurosceptic discourse. Moreover, being aware of how negotiations are perceived by the people, the government of the applicant state can use EU demands to justify the implementation of unpopular measures and shift the blame on to Brussels by claiming that these were required changes to conform with EU acquis; thereby causing painful economic and social reforms to be linked with EU membership in the popular consciousness and further exacerbating the feeling of externality (Pridham, 2001; Szczerbiak, 2001). The second situational factor unique to the candidate states is the context of uncertainty surrounding both the result of the negotiation process and potential membership. In principle, the successful conclusion of the accession process is not guaranteed since for accession a continuing political will on both of the negotiating sides is required. Especially the national referendums in the candidate countries for the approval of the accession treaties are prone to refusal as it was the case in Norway. Rulikova (2004) argues that the uncertainty about an eventual realization of the accession process gives politicians full legitimization for deliberations on alternatives, which in turn enables opportunistic Euroscepticism to be justified even in the center of the political spectrum. The second aspect of uncertainty, on the other hand, regards the estimations about the future performance of the country in the EU. 8

10 Since analyses about the actual benefits and costs of the membership will only be speculative in candidate countries, Eurosceptics will have ample opportunity to express their pessimistic scenarios. The warnings of the Eurosceptics about the negative consequences of the membership may resonate strongly in particular segments of the society like farmers and pensioners, fuelling their doubts against the EU. The context of belatedness is the third and last significant situational factor affecting Euroscepticism in candidate countries. This factor is especially visible in the late enlargement waves since it derives from the feeling of backwardness in the intensive inter-state coexistence experience of the candidate state compared to old members of the Union (Rulikova, 2004). The consequence of this feeling is the false belief on the part of the candidate state that Europe has already moved extensively towards European governance, evident in their tendency to overestimate the role of European institutions and in particular the Commission. Thus, the fears of losing state sovereignty and national identity are widely pronounced due to a distorted picture of how the current EU functions, giving Eurosceptics an important arena to exploit. CASE ANALYSES In the light of the preceding brief theoretical sketch about the relationship between the accession negotiations and Euroscepticism, this section will present the case analyses of Finland, Poland and Malta. At this point it should be noted that among the three candidateunique conditions suggested by Rulikova (2004) that affect Euroscepticism in accession countries (externality, uncertainty, and belatedness), the condition of externality turned out to be the most salient and important factor in our case analyses. Both the lack of knowledge about the EU before the start of accession negotiations and the domestic resentment stemming from the rigid negotiation structure the two main drivers of the feeling of externality play 9

11 crucial roles in fueling Euroscepticism in candidate countries as well as in abating it, if the corresponding issues are properly addressed (e.g. by obtaining concessions on issues of public concern). The other situational factors of uncertainty and belatedness, however, do not seem to be as important as the factor of externality, at least for the cases considered in this analysis. For example, although Rulikova (2004) argues that the factor of uncertainty gives politicians full legitimization for deliberations on alternatives to EU membership, the alternatives put forward by Eurosceptics both in Malta (a special partnership agreement with the EU) and Finland (the transformation of EFTA into a Nordic Community) were not considered seriously, primarily due to lack of credibility (Arter, 1995; Cini, 2003a). Finland Finland lodged its application for full membership in the EU 3 in March 1992, and the formal negotiations between the EU and Finland began in February For the most part, reaching agreement was expected to be relatively easy, and in line with expectations the negotiations were successfully concluded in March After the signing of the accession treaty in June 1994 and following an affirmative referendum in October 1994 where 57% of the voters supported EU membership, Finland became a full member of the EU effective January 1 st, As it can be seen, Finland s accession process to the EU has been a relatively quick one. Looking to the Figure 1 below depicting the support of the Finnish people for Finland s membership in the EU, one can make two important observations: First, the period of formal accession negotiations (from February 1993 to March 1994) is actually relatively stable in terms of support for EU membership compared with the period preceding the application of the Finnish government (from 1988 to 1992) where we observe a high 3 For simplicity, all references to the European Union and to the former European Community will be made as the EU. 10

12 fluctuation in opinions and a striking increase in the Against responses together with a decline of Undecided responses. Second, once the negotiations began in 1993, a deterioration of support for EU can still be discerned (in line with the examples of other candidate countries) where it takes its lowest level around December 1993, followed by an increase thereafter as the end of negotiations and referendum date approaches. So, although the time frame between the events is considerably short, the trend of Euroscepticism in Finland before the membership deserves an explanation where some important conclusions can be drawn. 70% 60% Figure 1: Support for EU membership in Finland SUPPORT FOR EU MEMBERSHIP IN FINLAND 50% 40% 30% 20% For Undecided Against 10% 0% March 1993 December 1994 March Source: Jenssen, Pesonen, Gilljam (1998) In order to analyze the Finnish public opinion about the EU throughout the late 1980s/early 1990s, one should first understand the nature of the Finland s foreign relations preceding and during that period. Archer (2000: 99) notes that during much of the post-1945 period Finland s foreign and security policies were dominated by its relations with the Soviet Union, and any cooperative move with Western countries had to be finessed in a way 11

13 that did not upset relations with Moscow. Similarly, Arter (1995) points out that Finland s European policy during this period was basically guided by two imperatives: An economic need for access to Western export markets and a political need for preserving the credibility of the country s neutrality and special relations with the Soviet Union where the latter took priority over the former. The implication of such a situation for Finland was that the question of membership of the EU was beyond discussion until early 1990s. As a result of this lack of interest, public opinion concerning Finland s membership in the EU was quite consistent from 1987 until early 1990s where the Finns were divided between general support (around 40%- 50%) and indifference (around 40%); only about 10% of the population being against membership (Archer, 2000). A striking indication of the lack of interest and knowledge of the Finnish public about the EU was reflected in the fact that as late as November 1990, 18% of the respondents believed that Finland was already an EU member (Arter, 1995). This picture, however, has dramatically changed in the early 1990s with the collapse of the Soviet Union and the Swedish application for EU membership. 4 Both of these developments indicated that the political imperative of preserving Finland s neutrality ceased to exist, and the issue of EU membership could now be seriously considered (Tiilikainen, 1996). Moreover, the collapse of the Finno-Soviet barter trade, which constituted roughly a fifth of the total Finnish trade, triggered a massive economic crisis in Finland that lasted until 1993 and shrank the economy by a significant 15 percent (Arter, 1995). The resulting economic woes and the urgent need to secure enhanced access to European markets further increased interest in the EU membership debate, and the issue was quickly and unexpectedly introduced into Finnish domestic politics (Tiilikainen, 1996). As a result of lively public debates and increased coverage of the issue by the media, the level of ignorance about the EU membership quickly diminished while Euroscepticism increased, reflected in a climb of anti- 4 Sweden announced its intention to submit an application for full membership in October 1990 and formally applied in July 1991 (Widfeldt, 1996). 12

14 membership group: Polls indicated that the percentage of Finns believing that Finland was already an EU member dropped to 7% in January 1992 (from 18% in November 1990), and nearly 35% of the respondents were negative about the EU membership (Arter, 1995). Tiilikainen (1996) notes that as the issue became more politicized, people s socio-political background played a significant role in determining support for the EU, and analyzing the composition of the Eurosceptic group, we can see that it mainly consisted of farmers, the unemployed and the pensioners (Archer, 2000; Arter, 1995). In short, the surge of Euroscepticism in Finland before the start of the actual negotiations can be attributed to the increased interest and knowledge of the public about the EU together with the mobilization of social groups that perceived the European integration as a threat to their interests. Moving to the accession negotiations period (February 1993 to March 1994), it can be argued that although there existed an initial euphoria among the Finnish citizens about the membership due to the swift and easy pace of the first phase of negotiations, it quickly vanished once the second phase of negotiations began which dealt with sensitive areas such as agriculture (Miles, 1996). In general, Miles (1996: 68) notes that before the accession negotiations the Nordic countries had four set of priorities: (i) maintaining the nature and level of support to agriculture and the component regions, (ii) preserving their generous social policies and welfare provisions, (iii) developing a stronger role for the EU in the Baltic region, and (iv) conserving their high environmental standards and principles of sustainable development. At this point, it is important to note that the Nordic countries had adopted a strategy according to which each country had stressed different issues during the negotiations making sure that any concession obtained by one would be offered to all. For Finland, the cardinal issue was agriculture, especially the transitional problems for Nordic agriculture and the associated need for EU financial support (Arter, 1995; Miles, 1996). The issue of agriculture was not only important for economic reasons but there was also a psychological 13

15 element in it: The rural landscape was considered to be the major source of patriotism (Miles, 1996). Furthermore, poll figures show that Finnish farmers were by far the most EU-active citizens among different socio-economic groups, mostly in the negative direction (Bennulf et al., 1998). Tiilikainen (1996: 121) notes that the farmers tried to use every possible channel in order to prevent Finland from joining the EU and the MTK, the farmers organization, was quite critical of the EU by arguing that membership would result in increasing rural unemployment and reduced prices for agricultural products (Archer, 2000). As stated before, it has been noted that the first phase of negotiations (February-June 1993) advanced without any major problems, mainly because the chapters negotiated were background issues and did not require a high level of bargaining on both sides (Miles, 1996). Things, however, have begun to change with the second phase of negotiations. As the sensitive issues such as agriculture and foreign policy come on the table, the differences at the positions of both sides started to surface and the pace of negotiations had decreased considerably together with a turn for the worse in opinion polls. In November 1993, the negotiations on agriculture were in a state of deadlock. Concomitantly, the December 1993 polls recorded the lowest support rate for EU membership where just 37% of the respondents were in favor of membership (See Figure 1). Interestingly, Miles (1996: 69) argues that it was at this point that the balance of power swung towards the [Nordic] applicants, where the negative opinion of the citizens were used an effective tool by the Finnish (and Nordic) negotiators to acquire concessions from the EU. In the same month of December 1993, the EU agreed that the Nordic countries could maintain their alcohol monopolies on retail sales, a concession that is considered to be essential to cut down Euroscepticism by creating a belief that the governments were protecting national interests in sensitive areas (Miles, 1996). From this point until March 1994 when the negotiations concluded, the Nordic states including Finland have gained a number of further concessions from the EU, including an extension of 14

16 CAP into arctic and sub-arctic agriculture with considerable financial EU support for the cost of transition, qualification for structural funds and budgetary rebates for adjustment to the EU policies. Not surprisingly, these concessions 5 from the EU had resulted in a dramatic change in public opinion of Finland: In just three months, the percentage of Yes votes increased to 46% from 37% while the No votes plunged to 28% from 40%. In short, although Finland (together with other Nordic countries and Austria) had a quite short period of accession negotiations of merely 13 months, one can still notice peaks and low points in the public attitude towards the EU. Arter (1995: 380) notes that despite the existence of a near-consensus among the Finnish elites on the pro-membership side, the accession negotiations and ensuing referendum debate has generated some sense of antielitism and a strong reluctance to acquiesce in the Yes canvassed by the establishment. Jakobson (1998) also argues that for many Finns the choice was some kind of a quandary: Although there was little enthusiasm for the EU as an institution even in the pro-membership camp, the alternative of staying out was perceived to be Finland s isolation next to Russia. The Finns also wanted to affirm their country s Western identity, enhance its security in the new world order, and address the challenges posed by the economic recession of early 1990s via the stimulus of the EU. Alongside such country-specific structural conditions, however, one should also note that the trend of Euroscepticism in Finland has been a function of two specific factors related to the accession negotiations. First, as the debates about the EU membership had been heated and knowledge about the EU increased preceding the negotiation process, the share of people who did not have any opinion about the issue decreased considerably together with a significant increase in the opposition camp. Second, when sensitive issues such as agriculture created frictions in the negotiations, Euroscepticism again increased mostly as a result of the negative campaigns of some interest groups, notably 5 Miles (1996: 69-70) argues that the ability of the Nordic countries to obtain concessions was a result of the EU s perception that the successful completion of the negotiations would serve as a...new beacon of achievement after the traumatic problems associated with the TEU s ratification. 15

17 the farmers organization. Yet, as the concession from the EU had overcome the deadlock, the support for the anti-membership camp among the public waned beginning from December 1993 and finally resulted in an affirmative referendum. Poland The accession negotiations with Poland, the biggest country in the fifth enlargement of the EU, started in March 1998 and lasted until the end of As a result of the successful completion of all negotiation chapters, the accession treaty was signed on April 16 th, 2003 in Athens, Greece. Following the membership referendum that took place in June 2003 in which 77.45% of the participants voted positively for the accession, Poland became a full member of the EU as of May 1 st, Figure 2: Support for EU membership in Poland SUPPORT FOR EU MEMBERSHIP IN POLAND 80% 70% 60% 50% 40% 30% 20% 10% 0% For Undecided Against Source: Candidate Countries Eurobarometers 2001, ; Szczerbiak (2001). Examining the public opinion polls regarding the standpoint of the Polish people for EU membership, we see a clearly declining trend of support from 1997 until 2001, followed by an increase as the referendum year of 2003 looms in the horizon (See Figure 2). As 16

18 expected, the opening of negotiations has been followed by a remarkable rise in Euroscepticism, only to abate in The observation that support for the membership has increased in 2002, however, can be attributed first to the upcoming closure of the negotiations in December 2002 which may have provided relief in the sense that the accession process is finally ending, and second to the efforts related to the preparations for the referendum in Thus, looking to the opinion polls alone, we can conclude that commence of the negotiations have caused a rise in Euroscepticism at least initially, as expected. The declining support for the EU membership has also been acknowledged in the literature (Skotnicka- Illasiewicz, 1998; Pridham, 2001; Szczerbiak, 2001; Rulikova, 2004; Riishoj, 2007). Indeed, a closer examination of the accession of Poland into the EU reveals that it bears most of the causes of rising Euroscepticism during negotiations that were discussed in the previous section. First and foremost, the years following the breakthrough revolution year of 1989 were marked by considerable Euro-enthusiasm, or an uninformed Euro-optimism without any concrete experience and knowledge about the EU (Riishoj, 2007). Szczerbiak (2001) notes that until the beginning of the actual accession negotiations the issue of European integration has been handled in the Polish public in very abstract and broad geopolitical or historical terms relating to general notions such as returning to Europe and ending the longstanding post-war division of Europe. Thus, one can safely claim that the initially high level of support for EU membership in Poland has been accompanied by widespread ignorance and lack of serious debate about the specific costs and benefits of joining. One of the few qualitative public opinion studies on European membership in Eastern Europe has been conducted by Kucia (1999) in April 1997, approximately one year before the start of accession negotiations of Poland. Aiming primarily to discover the reasons why the key large socio-professional groups (workers, pensioners, farmers, pupils, and teachers) in 17

19 Poland want their countries to join the EU, the result of the research confirms the hypothesis of lack of knowledge and unwarranted optimism in the Polish society. Kucia (1999) reports that responses like whatever else can we do?, there is no other option were typical views of all groups when asked why they were in favor of EU membership. Moreover, many discussants perceived the EU as some kind of mythical force that would change people s lot: in this united Europe we should live better and will solve our problems (pensioner) (Kucia, 1999: 146). Lastly, almost every group admitted their lack of knowledge about the EU and Poland s prospective membership and expressed a wish to be better informed. Kucia (1999: 147) concludes by stating that although the Polish groups were generally in favor of joining the EU, they had no very clear vision of what might happen as integration into the EU progressed. Their attitudes reflected mainly unrealistic expectations or even wishful thinking and were more emotional rather than rational. Given this initial shallow social consensus (Skotnicka-Illasiewicz, 1998: 243) on European integration, it would not be a surprise that the beginning of actual accession negotiations have reduced the level of support for Polish membership in the EU as the population and political leaders gained a more realistic picture regarding what the EU really is about. Moving from a symbolic and abstract debate towards a practice- and policy-based one, the costs of future EU membership became an important subject for discussion (Riishoj, 2007). Presenting polling evidence, Szczerbiak (2001) points that in May 1999 (a year after the start of negotiations), 61% of Poles said EU membership would have a negative effect on agriculture while 17% said that it will be positive compared to the analogous figures of 24% and 40% for June 1994, respectively. Even the private sector, which is usually thought to be the main beneficiary of the integration is not immune from the decrease in the support: The number of who believed that EU membership will have a positive effect on the private business sector has fallen from 67% in 1994 to 48% in 1999, while those who say it will have 18

20 a negative effect has increased from 6% to 21% over the same period. These numbers suggest that the fear that Poland would not be able to cope successfully with accession and have to pay a significant social cost constituted one of the key reasons of the rising Euroscepticism (Szczerbiak, 2001). Pridham (2001) and Rulikova (2004) suggest two additional factors that have fuelled the rise of Euroscepticism in the Polish case which was not present in other enlargement waves. First, given that the effects of the rapid transition from state controlled economy to capitalism were still present at the time of EU accession, there was a wider tendency in the Polish society to link one s perceived difficulties on the economic front with the responsibilities of the EU membership. This way of thinking evoked the notion of blaming the EU for economic ills which is further enhanced by Brussels pressure for satisfying conditions of a functioning market economy. Second, Pridham (2001) notes that the EU at the time of Eastern Enlargement was more demanding and interventionist towards the candidate countries than ever. Together with an augmented technical burden of implementing the acquis that included over 9000 pages of legislation (Rulikova, 2004), the EU was more insistent on the scope and degree of European policy implementation before membership took place. Both of these factors contribute to strengthen the feeling of externality that was discussed in the previous section. The last factor for the declining support of the EU membership in Poland to be considered here is suggested by Szczerbiak (2001) who points to the negative way the debate on Europe has been conducted among those political forces that are ostensibly pro-eu. Noting that since the beginning of the accession negotiations the debate on Polish EU membership has been not so much about whether or not the country should join the Union per se but about the terms on which it should join, he adds that the pro-eu camp has been divided into those who are allegedly soft and prepared to give in to Brussels and those who allegedly 19

21 favor a tough negotiation stance. Those who were advocating a tougher negotiation stance underlined the necessity of achieving certain essential pre-conditions such as the freedom to opt out of the Euro and derogations in sensitive areas such as the sale of land to foreigners. The importance of this tendency, Szczerbiak (2001: 113) argues, is: The overall effect of this kind of Eurorealist rhetoric that places numerous conditions upon and posits reservations concerning support for EU membership is likely to create the impression that Poland is negotiating with an enemy and that EU membership is a regrettable necessity rather than something to be sought positively. Again, this factor further reinforces the context of externality Poland is facing since the politicians are implicitly (as well as explicitly) arguing that the EU as a foreign body is attempting to undermine the Polish national interest. In short, Poland in the time of accession can be considered as a country that has provided all the necessary conditions for the rise of Euroscepticism. Malta Malta applied to join the EU as early as 1990 and although the European Council s reaction was cautiously positive such that the accession negotiations were expected to commence in early 1997, the return of the Malta Labour Party 6 (MLP) to power in 1996 led to a suspension of the application as well as the closure of the political dialogue with the EU (Cini, 2000; Pace, 2005). Later, when the Nationalist Party (PN) won the elections in 1998 they reactivated the application and the accession negotiations between the EU and Malta finally began on February 15 th, The negotiations have been successfully concluded in December 2002 and a referendum was held in March 2003 where 53.6% of the valid votes were in favor of the accession. The MLP which was starkly opposed to EU membership 6 The Maltese politics has long been dominated by two parties: The Nationalist Party (PN) which traditionally garners the support of the middle class, business and the Church, and the Malta Labour Party (MLP), Malta s class-based socialist party. Regarding the EU-Malta relationship, the PN has consistently advocated closer relations with the EU whereas the MLP has always been colder (and even opposed) to European integration (Cini, 2000). 20

22 during the referendum campaign, however, did not concede defeat and claimed that it would accept membership only if it was decided in a general election (Pace, 2005). Upon this, the general elections were held in April 2003 which resulted again in a success for the PN and paved the way for Malta to become a full member of the EU as of May 1 st, It is interesting to note that of the ten accession countries in the 2004 enlargement wave Malta was the only state with an electorally strong Eurosceptic party actively campaigning against EU membership, namely the MLP (Cini, 2003a; Henderson, 2004). Moreover, among the EU accession referendums of 2003 the Maltese referendum distinguishes itself both with the highest turnout (90.9%) and the highest percentage of rejection votes (46.4%). Indeed, the question of EU accession was the dominant issue on Malta s political agenda and divided the island into two blocs: The pro-eu group was led by the PN and included the tourism lobby, the Confederation of Malta Trade Unions, the Federation of Industry and the environmental NGOs whereas the anti-eu group led by the MLP contained the General Workers Union, the hunters and trapper s lobby, and the Progressive Farmers Union (Cini, 2003a). Analyzing the arguments put forward by the both camps, it can be seen that while the pro-eu camp emphasized the economic benefits of membership and the need for Malta to restructure its economy which would be realized more easily and effectively inside the EU, the anti-eu camp stressed the issues of employment and taxation, i.e. how the EU membership would hurt the domestic industry, cause job losses for Maltese people and increase the cost of living in various ways (increased food prices due to the Common Agricultural Policy, higher taxes, and a spike in property values due to foreign demand). Besides these specific points, more general-level arguments have also been made where the pro-eu bloc depicted Malta s future as a modern European state and the anti-eu bloc presented the EU membership as a threat both to the quiet Maltese way of life and its North African/Mediterranean heritage (Cini, 2003a: 137). 21

23 Figure 3: Support for EU membership in Malta SUPPORT FOR EU MEMBERSHIP IN MALTA 70% 60% 50% 40% 30% 20% 10% 0% For Undecided Against Winter 99/00 Autumn 01 Spring 02 Autumn 02 Spring 03 Autumn 03 Source: Candidate Countries Eurobarometer Against this background, an examination of Maltese public opinion regarding the support for EU membership suggests that although the opening of negotiations has been followed by a decline in support in line with the theory and examples from other candidate countries, the Maltese support for the EU speedily increased long before the approach of the referendum in the spring of 2003 (See Figure 3). This surprising situation deserves an explanation since given the presence of a major anti-eu party and already high levels of Euroscepticism in the country; one would expect that the opening of the accession negotiations would provide a fertile ground for the anti-eu block to exploit the mechanisms (e.g. externality, uncertainty, belatedness etc.) that cause a rise in Euroscepticism. On the contrary, we observe that there is a significant increase in the support for EU membership during the accession negotiations following an initial decline. 8 7 The original data from the Eurobarometer survey does not explicitly show the percentage of people without any response. In the graph, however, I have the distributed the no-response percentage to the three possible answers (for, undecided, against) proportionally so that in a given year the responses add to 1. This procedure does not affect the results in any meaningful way. 8 We should be skeptical about this initial decline in the support for the EU from the period of Winter 99/00 to Autumn 2001 since the Winter 99/00 survey was a pilot Eurobarometer conducted for test purposes. The 22

24 It can be argued that two features of the accession negotiations between the EU and Malta have played a critical role in preventing the rise of Euroscepticism in Malta during this period. First, there has been an increased level of interaction between the representatives of the Maltese government and bodies representing different sectors of society during the negotiations in the form of a consultative committee (Pace, 2002). In order to discuss and approve the negotiation position of the country the Malta-EU Action and Steering Committee (MEUSAC) was formed which included a total of 130 organizations (e.g. Malta Federation of Industries, Chamber of Commerce, trade unions etc.) representing various groups from the civil society. In this way, the EU accession was considered not solely as a foreign policy issue but something that encompassed the whole society. Remarkably, Pace (2002: 35) notes that MEUSAC has managed to introduce an unprecedented level of consultation into Malta s political system. Such an approach to the negotiations by the government obviously helps to prevent the rise of Euroscepticism: Important interest groups of the society at least feel that they have an active voice in shaping their future, they are informed about the possible benefits and drawbacks of the EU membership, and they do not conceive the process of EU accession simply externally, but have an opportunity to participate. A desired result of this approach reflected itself also on the level of awareness of the Maltese people about the accession process: During the negotiations the Candidate Countries Eurobarometer indicated that 48% of the Maltese society felt well or very well informed about their country s accession process, the second-highest level among the candidate countries after Slovenia. Moreover, it has been noted that in Malta the level of information about the accession process considerably exceeds that about the enlargement of the EU (European Commission, 2002: 127). methodology and full results of this pilot survey is not available on the European Commission website and therefore we cannot assess the reliability of the results. Moreover, the CCEB even does not show the data from Winter 99/00 survey when presenting up-to-date results of support of EU membership in Malta (it begins from Autumn 2001 p.75); however, we have decided to include the data here since it appears in the CCEB

25 The second interesting feature of the Maltese accession negotiations is the fact that Malta was able to obtain a significant number of concessions from the EU, culminating in a successfully negotiated deal with 77 derogations ranging from a protocol on abortion to a declaration on neutrality (Pace, 2002; Cini, 2004). Especially two issues were of utmost importance from the Maltese point of view and had been initially heavily exploited by the Eurosceptics: The fear that the right of purchase of property by the EU citizens in Malta would result in a burst of property speculation, making it extremely difficult for the ordinary Maltese to purchase property, and the influx of Sicilian and East European workers into the island, causing a rise in the unemployment figures of the Maltese nationals (Cini, 2003b). Both of these concerns about the EU membership turned out to be unimportant, however, since Malta managed to secure permanent derogations and transitional agreements on these important parts of the acquis communataire (Pace, 2002). On the issue of free movement of capital, Malta negotiated a permanent derogation restricting the purchase of property for EU nationals that have not resided on the island for at least five years. Similarly, while Maltese citizens enjoyed free movement across the EU immediately after the accession, the right of other EU citizens to seek employment in Malta has been restricted by a seven-year transitional arrangement. Pace (2002) puts forward two arguments for the success of Maltese negotiators: First, given that the winner party of elections in the bipartisan system of Malta has traditionally been determined by a very small electoral margin, the Maltese government cannot ignore opposition demands and therefore had to take a tough stance during the negotiations to avoid the risk of losing next elections. Second and more important, Malta s extremely small size enabled the Maltese government to argue that issues that are considered to be major points for Malta were unsubstantial for the EU, and therefore it was feasible and necessary to provide special treatments for Malta without disturbing the working of the single market (Pace, 2002; Cini, 2003b). 24