Po land and Czech Re pu b lic Fields of Co o pe ra tion

Transcription

1 Po land and Czech Re pu b lic Fields of Co o pe ra tion

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3 CENTRUM STOSUNKÓW MIÊDZYNARODOWYCH CENTER FOR INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS Po land and Czech Re pu b lic Fields of Co o pe ra tion Wa r saw 2010

4 Acknowledgements The Center for International Relations is pleased to announce that the present publication is part of the project funded by the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Poland in the framework of the contest Supporting the Development of Polish Czech relations. Published by: Center for International Relations Editor: Aleksander Szpor Proofreading: Cathal Flynn (articles 1, 2, 3 and 5) Translation: Micha³ Piotrowski (articles 1, 4, introduction and recommendations) ISBN: Copyright by Fundacja Centrum Stosunków Miêdzynarodowych, Wy dane przez: Fun dac ja Cen trum Sto sunków Miê dzynarodowych ul. Emil ii Pla ter War szawa tel fax info@csm.org.pl Sk³ad, pro jekt ok³adki, ³aman ie, druk i oprawa: WEMA Wy dawn ictwo-po lig rafia Sp. z o.o War szawa, ul. Dani³owic zowska 18a tel , fax wema@wp-wema.pl dioctp.pl

5 Contents In tro du c tion Ja kub Gro sz ko wski Po li ti cal Fa c tors and the ir In flu en ce on Po lish and Czech Com mon In te rests in the Con text of Cen tral Eu ro pe an Re la tions Vit Do stal Czech Fo re ign Po li cy ; The Cur rent De ba te be twe en the Po li ti cal Parties, its Re sults and Pro spects for the Fu tu re Jiøí Schne i der Po land and the Czech Re pu b lic: Our Com mon In te rest in Ma king NATO and the EU a Real Stra te gic An chor Ale ksan der Szpor Po land and the Czech Re pu b lic in the Eu ro pe an Union Com mon Chal len ges Fi lip Èernoch, Petr Oce lik Cze ch - Po lish Co -o pe ra tion in the Field of Ene r gy: The Po ten tial of LNG for Ene r gy Se cu ri ty in Cen tral Eu ro pe Jiøí Schne i der, Eu ge niusz Smo lar Sum ma ry of Re com men da tions

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7 In trod ucti on Ac cor ding to the una ni mo us opi nion of the au t hors of the pre sent pu b li ca tion, Poli s h - Czech re la tions are cur ren t ly wi t nes sing one of the best pe riods in the ir hi sto ry. A lack of ma jor di spu tes has co in ci ded with both the re cen t ly te r mi na ted Czech pre si den cy of the Co un cil of the Eu ro pe an Union, and the pre pa ra tions for the Po lish pre si den cy. The se cir cu m stan ces are con du ci ve to a mu tu al rap pro che ment, but fu l fil ling the ir full po ten tial is still a task to be performed. This task was un de r ta ken jo in t ly by the Cen ter for In ter na tio nal Re la tions and the Pra gue Se cu ri ty Stu dies In sti tu te, which or ga ni zed two se mi nars in the se cond half of 2009, de vo ted to dra f ting a stra te gy for co o pe ra tion be twe en our two co un tries. The com pre hen si ve de scri p tion of Poli s h - Czech re la tions con sti tu tes a new, bro a der ap pro ach to the se re la tions. The se mi nars iden ti fied the most ac ti ve pla y ers in Poli s h - Czech re la tions in the pu b lic, pri va te and in cre a sin gly im po r tant NGO se c tors. Va rio us fields of co o pe ra tion were di s cus sed, the aims of in di vi du al en ti ties were exa mi ned, and, fi nal ly, me a su res for their implementation were laid out. The present publication mainly constitutes a background for the ongoing discussion, but also summarizes and describes the most important motions that were raised during the project. The first article is devoted to Polish-Czech relations in terms of the ir ro ots in re la tions with ot her co un tries of the re gion. The fol lo wing text examines the current political situation in the Czech Republic and presents possible scenarios for the development of Czech foreign policy. The next article outlines the main pre sent and fu tu re chal len ges for the Eu ro pe an Union, which the Czech Re pu b lic and Po land will also have to face. It is worth pa y ing spe cial at ten tion to the article devoted to the key strategic aspects of Polish and Czech membership within NATO and the EU. The last text discusses Polish-Czech cooperation in the energy sector, as an especially topical, but also symptomatic example of both countries common interests. The final section of the publication includes conclusions summarizing the key points raised during the project, which also constitute the im po r tant and practical recommendations of the entire publication. The Cen ter for In ter na tio nal Re la tions is ple a sed to an no un ce that the pre sent pu b li ca tion is part of the pro ject fun ded by the Mi ni stry of Fo re ign Af fa irs of the Re pu b lic of Po land in the fra me work of the con test Sup po r ting the De ve lo p ment of Po lish Czech re la tions.

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9 Jakub Groszkowski Political Factors and their Influence on Po lish and Czech Com mon In ter ests in the Con text of Cen tral Eu rop ean Relations Poli s h - Czech re la tions are cur ren t ly wi t nes sing one of the best pe riods in the ir hi sto ry. Whi le our co un tries are in the fi nal sta ges of a trans fo r ma tion pro cess, they are also un de r ta king ever bo l der fo re ign po li cy go als, and are be co ming in cre a sin gly ac ti ve in se e king to in flu en ce the ir geo po li ti cal en vi ron ment. Unfo rtu na te ly, the chan ces of im p le men ting spe ci fic in te rests are sub ject to the cur rent po li ti cal con fi gu ra tion in each re spe c ti ve co un try. The aim of the pre sent text is to tra ce the po ten tial chan ges in Poli s h - Czech common interests with regard to the results of Czech parliamentary elections planned for May The ro ots of the cur rent boom in Poli s h - Czech re la tions may be tra ced back to the pe riod of de mo c ra tic op po si tion in Po land and Cze chos lo va kia. Thus, it is not su r pri sing that they re a ched the ir high po int at the time when key fun c tions in both the Po lish and Czech go ve r n ments were held by pe o p le co ming from the se po li ti cal en vi ron ments. Di rect con tacts be twe en dis si dents not only he l ped to cre a te the Vi se grad Trian gle in 1991, but also fo r med the ba sis for fu r t her pro jects lin king the po li ti cal right in Cen tral Eu ro pe (1999, 2006). Gro ups which con ti nue to keep with this tra di tion such as the Ci vic Pla t form and Law and Ju sti ce pa r ties in Po land, and the Ci vic De mo c ra tic Party (ODS) and representatives previously associated with Václav Havel (e.g. Ka rel Schwa rzen berg) in the Czech Re pu b lic are uni ted pri ma ri ly by the ir si mi lar ou t lo ok to wards re la tions with Rus sia and the Uni ted Sta tes. Both gro ups see the Ame ri cans as the only fo r ce ca pa b le of en su ring Cen tral and Ea stern Eu ro pe an se cu ri ty. At the same time, both con si der Rus sia as a co un try which may lead to de -sta bili sa tion in the re gion. Too much in flu en ce by

10 10 Jakub Groszkowski Mo s cow in Cen tral and Ea stern Eu ro pe is seen by con ser va ti ves as a thre at. The ove r lap ping views of the po li ti cal right in both Po land and the Czech Re pu b lic thus fa ci li ta tes the re a li sa tion of a se ries of jo int ac ti vi ties be twe en both co un tries. This is the case with re gard to the trans at lan tic po li cies pu r su ed by Prague and Warsaw, and particularly in respect of defense-related issues (fo re ign mis sions, mis si le de fen se, mi li ta ry modernization, NATO reform), and is used the greater or lesser effect. Another de rivat ive of the conver gent appro ach cha ract eri stic of Po lish and Czech re lat ions with the U.S. and Rus sia are the views of the po lit ical ri ght in both co unt ries on energy se cur ity is sues. Both si des stron gly support effor ts aimed at re duc ing energy de pend ence on Rus sia. Hen ce the support for the con struct ion of the gas con nector be tween Po land and the Czech Re pub lic, a gas port in Swi nou jsc ie, the Na bucco gas pi pel ine, and the si mult ane ous aver sion to the com pet iti ve So uth St ream pro ject. For the se same re asons, the Czechs have ta ken steps aimed at strengthe ning the ca pac ity of do mes tic nuc lear po wer plants. The on goi ng ten der pro cess to expand the po wer plant in the Czech town of Te mel in inc lud es com pan ies from the Unit ed Sta tes, Rus sia and Fran ce. The de cis ion re gard ing the win ner of the ten der pro ced ure will be of stra teg ic po lit ical im port ance. Investm ents in nuc lear energy are also plan ned in Po land, and it is the ref ore wor th con sid ering the various methods of cooperation which Warsaw and Prague could undertake in this respect. The per cept ion which Po lish and Czech con ser vati ves have of Rus sia also has an im pact on the ir po licy to wards Eas tern Eu rope. It is they who shap ed the form of the Eas tern Part nersh ip. From the per spect ive of War saw one of the init iato rs of the pro ject the part nersh ip is aimed not only at hel ping to mo dern ise the EU s eas tern ne ighb ours, but also at strengthe ning the po sit ion of Po land as a co unt ry ca pab le of con trib uti ng to EU fo rei gn po licy. For this re ason, War saw is stron gly in ter est ed in the suc cess of the Part nersh ip. Pra gue has ful ly ad opt ed the pro ject, and has been en gag ed in its in aug ura tion du ring the Czech EU pre sid ency. Im port antly, after the end of the pre sid ency, the Czech govern ment has re tai ned the part nersh ip on its list of fo rei gn po licy prio rit ies and con tin ues to play an act ive part in it, espec ially in the domain of civil society in the countries covered by the program. Po lish-czech co oper ati on in the above-men tion ed areas the strengthe ning of re lat ions with the Unit ed Sta tes, espec ially with re spect to de fense, and the re duct ion of Rus sian in flue nce in the re gion in the form of pro mot ing energy se cur ity and the Eas tern Part nersh ip was cre ated wi thin a very spe cif ic po lit ical con fig ura tion. The po lit ical ri ght, which has been ru ling Po land sin ce the end of 2005, fo und a se lect part ner among Czech con ser vati ves, who for med a govern ment the re be tween 2006 and April The in ter im govern ment set up afterw ards in Pra gue as a re sult of a com prom ise be tween the left and ri ght fo cus ed on econ omic is sues, vir tua lly

11 Po lit ical Fac tors and the ir In flue nce on Po lish and Czech con fin ing fo rei gn po licy to EU-re lat ed mat ters. Whi le in Po land, two ri ght-wing par ties have do min ated the po lit ical sce ne, it is no neth ele ss po ssib le that left-wing par ties will come to po wer over the co ming num ber of years in the Czech Re pub lic. This is even the case no twit hst anding next year s par liam enta ry elect ions. Over the past half year, the polls have given the ri ght and left an equ al chan ce of victo ry in the se elect ions. A govern ment for med un der the le adersh ip of the ODS would si gnify the con tin uat ion of the po lic ies which are cha ract eri sed by a strong trans atlant ic elem ent and li mit ed trust to wards Rus sia. If, ho wever, the Czech So cial De moc ratic Par ty (CSSD) will turn out to be the main ru ling par ty after the elect ions, it is expect ed that pres sure will be di strib uted in a sli ghtly diffe rent ly man ner. In the li ght of the fact that, sin ce May 2009 the po sit ion of Fo rei gn Mi nis ter has been occu pied by Jan Ko hout a di plom at tru sted among the so cial-de moc rats who, for a pe riod of almost one and half years, had previously served as deputy Minister under the former head of diplomacy, Karel Schwarzenberg we should not expect a revolution. In con trast to the con ser vati ves, the Czech So cial De moc rats un dou bte dly con sid er re lat ions with the ir Eu rop ean part ners as pri mar ily im port ant, thus re gard ing the trans atlant ic re lat ionsh ip as less cru cial. The left also has a diffe rent at tit ude to wards Rus sia. Whi le ri ght-wing po lit ici ans have sought act ively to li mit the in flue nce of Mo scow in the Czech Re pub lic, we should not expect the same from the CSSD. Eve ryt hing se ems to in dic ate that, in con trast to the con ser vati ves, a so cial-de moc ratic govern ment will treat Rus sia as an equ al play er in glo bal po lit ics, which must be en gag ed in di scuss ion as is the case with the USA. Acc ordi ng to left-wing po lit ici ans, Rus sia ne eds to be involved in glo bal se cur ity struc tur es, be cause lar ge in tern ati onal pro jects un dert aken wi thout Rus sian par tic ipa tion, such as the mis sile shield, may lead to an un nec essa ry in crea se in ten sions which could re kind le Cold War sentiments. Moreover, according to Czech Social Democrats, NATO and the EU should play a gre ater role in init iati ves re gard ing col lect ive se cur ity. The cri sis-rid den Unit ed Sta tes can no lon ger func tion as a lone play mak er. The po lit ical left thus calls for a more ba lanc ed but no less act ive po licy. The re is no in dic ati on ho wever that any fu ture left-wing govern ment shall aband on any of the act iviti es cur rent ly per form ed wi thin the fra mew ork of the Eas tern Part nersh ip. Mi nis ter Ko hou t s de cis ion to inc lude this pro ject on the list of Czech foreign policy priorities raises the hope that the Eastern Partnership will also be granted an important status by a future left-wing government. Apart from the above-men tion ed fo rei gn po licy is sues, which may be in flue nced by the po lit ical af fil iati on of the ru ling par ties, one may easily draw up a list of Po lish-czech com mon in ter ests (par tic ula rly with re gard to the EU) which remain separate from ideological issues. Primarily, these include issues con cern ing EU mar ket bar riers, which were im pos ed on the new Mem ber

12 12 Jakub Groszkowski Sta tes in the ir acc ession trea ties, such as re strict ions on acc ess to the EU la bour mar ket. Po lit ical af fil iati ons also play a les ser role in the fi ght for EU fun ding. Czech and Po lish po lit ici ans of all po lit ical sor ts should seek the lar gest po ssib le fun ding from the fu ture EU bud get for re gion al po licy and in fras tructu re pro grams. We should be just as strong in our support for re pres enta tiv es from our re gion to ob tain the hi ghest po sit ions, and for EU bo dies and in stit uti ons to be he adquart ered in our re spect ive co unt ries. After the Rus sia-ukrai ne gas cri sis in early 2009, energy se cur ity is also be com ing a to pic which gar ners suppor ts among the re pres enta tiv es of va rious po lit ical gro ups. Ma jor par ties on both the Po lish and Czech po lit ical sce nes are in favor of diver sif ying sup ply routes and energy sources, with their main objective being the successful implementation of the EU Nabucco project. Many of the above in ter ests are com mon not only to Po land and the Czech Re pub lic, but to all co unt ries in our re gion. The ref ore, if we want our vo ice in the EU to be acc ordi ngly strong, we should em pow er it by for ming bro ad er al lianc es. Slova kia and Hun gary, our part ners in the Vi seg rad Gro up, seem to be na tur al part ners for di scuss ing such to pics. Re moving bar riers wi thin the EU, pro mot ing re gion al re pres enta tiv es, as well as ra ising EU support for the Bal kans and Eas tern Eu rope re main in the in ter est of all four mem bers of the Gro up. Mo reo ver, it is not un lik ely that the num ber of is sues will in crea se after next year s par liam enta ry elect ions. Whi le the June elect ions in Slova kia are not li kely to si gnif ica ntly affect the shape of the lo cal po lit ical sce ne, the April elect ions in Hun gary will chan ge it dra mat ica lly. The ri ght-wing Fi desz, which is favo red to win, suppor ts a fo rei gn po licy outlook in re lat ion to Rus sia and the U.S. which is si mil ar to that of the Po lish and Czech con ser vati ves. The cho ice of a ri ght wing govern ment in the Czech elect ions in May could thus lead to a plat form for bro ad Po lish-czech-hun gar ian co oper ati on. The va lue of such co oper ati on is acc entu ated by the fact that, during the first half of 2011, Budapest will take over the EU Council presidency for a six month period. EU ne ighb orhood po licy and en larg eme nt is sues seem to be par tic ula rly im port ant for both Po lish-czech co oper ati on and the en tire Vi seg rad Gro up. Ta king into acc ount the we aken ing We stern Eu rop ean support for ad mitt ing new mem bers into the EU, one may as sume that after the acc ession of Cro atia, this to pic shall be come a mar gin al one. In or der to avo id this, it is wor th ta king steps to pro mote this is sue wi thin the EU, in co oper ati on with the new Czech Com miss ioner Šte fan Füle, re spons ible for en larg eme nt and ne ighb orhood po licy. It is in our in ter est to involve the EU in both the post-soviet bloc, and in the Bal kans. All the whi le, we must re memb er that the EU s po ssib le eastward en larg eme nt will not take pla ce be fore all of the Bal kan sta tes be come EU mem bers. The ref ore, whi le not for gett ing about Eas tern Eu rope, we should at tach more im port ance to hel ping the We stern Bal kans, by shar ing our exper ience from twen ty years of trans form ati on in our co unt ries. So-cal led

13 Po lit ical Fac tors and the ir In flue nce on Po lish and Czech twin ning pro jects may be used to this effect. The in trod ucti on of visa-free travel in the Schen gen area for ci tiz ens of Ser bia, Mon ten egro and Ma ced onia in De cemb er 2009 was an im port ant step by the We stern Bal kans to wards Eu rop ean struc tur es. No neth ele ss, Al ban ia and Bo snia and He rzeg ovina still re main out si de this gro up, which is why Central European countries should support these governments in the implementation of EU visa-free travel for their citizens. Our po lit ici ans, either as re pres enta tiv es of the ir co unt ries, or as re pres enta tiv es of the Vi seg rad Gro up, should be vi sib le in the Bal kans, and should pro mote econ omic ex chang es be tween our two re gions. It is thus wor th con sid ering the po ssib ili ties of po licy co ord ina tion be tween Po land and the Czech Re pub lic, or the en tire Vi seg rad Gro up, in the Bal kans, par tic ula rly in the econ omic sphe re. It is pre cis ely this aspect which re lies on the me ans given to us by the Vi seg rad Gro up and the Eu rop ean Union that gives Po land and the Czech Re pub lic the po ssib ili ty to not only im prove the ir po sit ion in Eu rope, but also po sit ively affect the sta bil ity of our re gion. A con sis tent po licy un dert aken by our le aders in this direc tion will lead to a si tua tion whe re, once the Western Balkan states become UE members, they will be among our closest allies. Clo se co oper ati on with Cen tral Eu rop ean co unt ries plays an espec ially im port ant role for Po land. Whi le such co oper ati on not only im proves War saw s po sit ion wi thin the Eu rop ean Union and helps Po land in pre sent ing its own in ter ests, it is equ ally im port ant in that it al lows po lit ici ans to en rich the tra dit ional East-West per spect ive with a Nor th-so uth one. Ty pic ally, Po lish di scuss ions on in tern ati onal is sues are con duct ed in acc orda nce with the fol low ing rule: Po land is a co unt ry be tween Rus sia and Ger many. Such an appro ach does not al ways al low us to no tice the po tent ial which can stem from the co oper ati on be tween Nor thern and So uthern Eu rop ean co unt ries. The exam ple of the suc cess of the Po lish-swe dish Eas tern Part nersh ip de mons trates how bro ad the po tent ial po ssib ili ties in this re spect are. To the So uth of our bor ders, Ro man ia may prove to be an im port ant in terl ocu tor. Fo rem ost ly, Po lish, Czech and Ro man ian con ser vati ves would have the oppor tun ity to find com mon to pics, as the Ro man ian ri ght views re lat ions with Rus sia as well as co oper ati on with the Unit ed Sta tes in a very si mil ar man ner. Ro man ia is also a key co unt ry for the suc cess of pro jects aimed at diver sif ying gas sup plies to Eu rope. Moreover, as shown by the European trip of U.S. Vice-President Joe Biden, Romania is also an important partner for the United States. En ric hing po licy on the East-West front with an act ive re gion al co oper ati on is espec ially im port ant now, with a po ssib ili ty of cre ating a new open ing in re lat ions with Ger many. The in trod ucti on of the provi sion on Po lish-ger man co oper ati on into the CDU-CSU-FDP co alit ion agree ment and

14 14 Jakub Groszkowski the cho ice of War saw as the first fo rei gn de stin ati on of Ger man y s new di plom acy chief, Gu ido We sterw elle, a vi sit which took pla ce on 31 Octo ber 2009 (the mi nis ter vi sit ed Pra gue five weeks la ter) con stit uted very im port ant po lit ical ge stur es. Never thel ess, ne ither Po land, nor any other Cen tral Eu rop ean co unt ry has suf fic ient po lit ical, econ omic, or de mog raph ic po tent ial to be come a real part ner for Ger many in its fo rei gn po licy. The si tua tion in our mu tual re lat ions is not fa cil ita ted by hi stor ical di sp utes or con flict ing EU in ter ests (e.g. on the in tern al mar ket or cli mate and energy po licy). The most po werf ul EU co unt ries, inc lud ing Ger many, will be more inc lin ed to appre ciate the va lue of Po land and the Czech Re pub lic on the EU arena only when our standpoints will be supported by other European Union members. The easiest place to find such allies is Central Europe.

15 Vít Dostál Association for International Affairs Czech Fo re ign Po li cy ; The cur rent de ba te be twe en the Political Parties, its Results and Pro spects for the fu tu re Introduction Thro u g ho ut the 1990 s, Czech fo re ign po li cy was dri ven by cle ar objectives which were, sooner or later, successfully realised. These goals se e med to be so me how na tu ral and, al t ho ugh they were oc ca sio nal ly con te sted with re gard to the man ner and spe ed wi t hin which they were ad dres sed, the re was no ne t he less a bro ad con sen sus among de mo c ra tic po li ti cal pa r ties on the di re c tion of Czech fo re ign po li cy. 1 In De ce m ber 1989, Jiøí Dien st bier took up re si den ce in the Cze r nin Pa la ce, whi le Václav Ha vel simu lta neou s ly took up re si den ce in Pra gue Ca st le. Both men fun da men tal ly re- ca li bra ted the fo re ign po li cy di re c tion and go als of Cze cho s lo vak/czech fo re ign po li cy. At first, the po li cy pu r su ed by both Dien st bier and Ha vel set abo ut re-e stab li s hing Czech na tio nal so ve rei gn ty by ex pel ling the Red Army from Cze chos lo va kia, and by di s man t ling the Mos co w - led eco no mi cal and se cu ri ty or ga ni sa tions formerly in exi sten ce such as the Warsaw Pact Treaty and the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance. A se cond lo gi cal ob je c ti ve con ce r ned the esta bli s h ment of frien d ly re la tions with the Eu ro pe an Com mu ni ties and NATO, which was la ter trans fo r med into the ob je c ti ve of at ta i ning full mem be r s hips of both or ga ni sa tions. Whi le the re 1 Whi le the an ti - sy stem pa r ties of the far left and far right opposed the prevailing direction of fore ign- po li cy, the Com mu nist Pa r ty vi r tu al ly ac ce pted the reality of EU membership. In fact, a ma r gi nal semi - fa c tion wi t hin the pa r ty ad vo ca tes a less do gma tic eu ro com mu nist ap pro ach of the far left.

16 16 Vít Dostál were many by - pro ducts of the Czech ac ces sion pro cess to both or ga ni sa tions (such as Czech-German reconciliation) which required a creative resolution, Czech deci sion - ma kers were not fa ced with im po r tant qu e stions regarding the strategic orientation of their country s foreign policy in the 1990 s. The Czech Republic finally released itself from Moscow s cold embrace in 1991, be co ming a me m ber of NATO in 1999, and then ac ce ding to the Eu ro pe an Union (EU) in Im por tan t ly, Czech ac ces sion to the EU on the 1 st May 2004 ope ned a com p le te ly new cha p ter in Czech fo re ign po li cy. Czech po li ti cal eli tes were thus re qu i red to ad dress new tasks and ob je c ti ves in terms of foreign policy. This pa per fo cu ses on how the in ter nal de ba te con ce r ning Czech fo re ign po li cy has con ti nu ed and de ve lo ped in the ye ars be twe en , a pe riod wi t hin which the Czech Re pu b lic was re qu i red to ad dress se ve ral new chal len ges. Cur rent po li ti cal pa r ty orien ta tions in the field of fo re ign po li cy will thus be ana ly sed, whi le the man ner in which the fo re ign po li cy pro grams of the se pa r ties have been con stru c ted and de ve lo ped will also be ad dres sed, and how firm are the parties fo re ign po li cy pro grams. Se con d ly, in a sum ma ry, po ssi b le stru c tu ral chan ges in fu tu re Czech fo re ign po li cy in the light of next year s ge ne ral ele c tions are also ad dres sed in the spe ci fic con text of va ry ing po ssi b le post -e le c tion governmental coalition combinations. Czech Foreign policy a broadening debate and a narrowing consensus The ye ars be twe en were qu iet ye ars with re gard to the de ba te con ce r ning the fu tu re di re c tion of Czech fo re ign po li cy. In ter na lly, the prio ri ty fo cu sed on the smo oth ad ap ta tion to the new re a li ty of EU mem be r s hip. This was an extremely important period, especially considering the fact that the Czech Re pu b lic was due to take on the EU Co un cil Pre si den cy in On the ot her hand, this pro spect stun ted any po ssi b le cre a ti vi ty in this re gard. Nevertheless, the Czech political parties (and mainly those present in the go ve r n ment) did not have any pre- con ce i ved spe ci fic ini tia ti ve which co uld be presented on Czech accession to the EU. Therefore, the governmental strategic do cu ment ou t li ning the fo re ign po li cy tasks for the ye ars , which was ad op ted in March 2003 af ter the suc ces s ful con c lu sion of the ne go tia tion pro cess with the EU, may be con si de red to be very mo dest and fo cu sing on ad ap ta tion. 2 2 Kon ce pce zahranièní po li ti ky Èeské re pu b li ky na léta , Government of the Czech Re pu b lic, 2003.

17 Czech Foreign Policy ; The current debate Ho we ver, the ab sen ce of any fresh ide as and po li ti cal con cepts which was cha rac te ri stic of the first two ye ars fol lo wing Czech ac ces sion to the EU was also sym pto ma tic of the sta te of in ter na tio nal po li tics at that time. If the then international political scene is compared to the years which were following this pe riod, the Czech Re pu b lic did not play a si g ni fi cant role in the in ter na tio nal arena. Notwithstanding this, there were particular instances where Prague was re qu i red to make a stra te gic cho i ce. A strong exa m p le of this is the Iraq War. Yet, the Czech government s re spon se in this re gard was (in con trast to the Polish one) rather hesitant. Nevertheless, no urgent issues existed at that time (such as the U.S. Mis si le De fen ce plan, the Li s bon Tre a ty or a re su r gent Rus sia) which would have provoked deep debate concerning the strategic direction of Czech foreign policy during that period. 3 Conversely, such challenging issues and con di tions have only ap pe a red over the past three ye ars. The stan ce which the particular Czech political parties have taken in respect of, inter alia, these policy questions must therefore be determined, while the manner in which this response has been formulated must also be considered. 4 The Ci vic De mo c ra tic Pa r ty: The June 2006 ele c tions bro ught the Ci vic De mo c ra tic Pa r ty (Obèanská demokratická stra na ODS) into go ve r n ment. This pa r ty had spent the pre vio us eight ye ars in op po si tion, a pe riod which was cha rac te ri sed by spe ci fic non - po pu list euro -sce p ti cism, 5 stem ming from the ide as and phi lo so p hy of the fo r mer pa r ty le a der and Pre si dent of the Czech Re pu b lic, Václav Klaus. This eurosceptic faction in the ODS was represented mainly by Jan Za hra dil, who dra f ted the first po li cy do cu ments op po sing a fu r t her 3 It should be noted that the then governments were already in consultation with regard to the possible installation of elements of a U.S. Defence Shield in Europe. However, this process was not made public. Similarly, there was continuous debate about EU institutional reform. Yet, these talks mellowed out following the French and Dutch referenda on the EU Constitutional Treaty, and the Czech position was not, in any case, strong in these debates (although the Czech centre-left government voiced its support for the Treaty, it stopped the preparations of the referendum and waited for new development). 4 Six political parties will be dealt with in the context of this discussion. As each of these parties are currently present in the Czech lower house, they have each influenced Czech foreign policy to some degree in the past number of years, and they will probably continue to do so after 2010 as it is likely that each party will satisfy the 5% voters support threshold required to enter the Czech parliament. 5 The euroscepticism of the ODS is not a result of voter utilisation; therefore, it cannot be explained as populism (see Braun, M. (2009), Understanding Klaus: The Story of Czech Eurorealism, EPIN working paper nr. 26, November 2009 (on-line:

18 18 Vít Dostál de epe ning of Eu ro pe an in te gra tion. 6 Zahradil became a Member of the Eu ro pe an Pa r lia ment (MEP) in 2004, and was Fo re ign Mi ni ster in the ODS sha dow go ve r n ment. The re fo re, it was wi de ly ex pe c ted that he wo uld be ca me the new Mi ni ster for Fo re ign af fa irs in the OD S-led go ve r n ment which was fo r med af ter Neve r t he less, this is sue was not so cle ar. As the ODS was una b le to form a co a li tion go ve r n ment with a ma jo ri ty in the Cha m ber of De pu ties, the Czech lo wer ho u se, it thus de ci ded to bu i l d -up a mi no ri ty go ve r n ment which was also co m po sed of non - pa r ty me m bers. Con sequ en t ly, fu r t her can di da tes for the po si tion of Mi ni ster for Fo re ign Af fa irs eme r ged, and the ODS fi nal ly no mi na ted Ale xan der Von dra for the po si tion. 7 In the light of Vondra s per so nal pro fi le, his no mi na tion to this post was ra t her su r pri sing. Von dra was a clo se ally of Václav Ha vel, and had wor ked in the latter s of fi ce at the be gin ning of the 1990 s. Havel s fo re ign po li cy objectives were frequently criticised by Václav Klaus, who always had a large nu m ber of sup po r ters in the ODS, even af ter he left the po si tion of pa r ty cha i r man in Al t ho ugh Von dra agre es with core ODS po li cy with re gard to the importance of a transatlantic link for Czech foreign and security policy, he pre sen ted a dif fe rent list of prio ri ties to tho se of Za hra dil. 8 In particular, Vondra provided a very positive programme with regard to European integration. Moreover, he highlighted the European neighbourhood programme 9 as one of five cru cial pro gram mes for Czech fo re ign po li cy. Fi nal ly, he also stres sed the importance of issues such as human rights protection, democratisation and transformation assistance, as well as development aid, which was definitely not compatible with the policy or approach of the old ODS. Whi le this dis c re pan cy has ne ver di mi ni s hed, this new and more euro -pra g ma tic (which is Vondra s most im po r tant as set) ap pro ach of the ODS soon ga i ned con side ra b le sup port. Thus, tho se pu r su ing such a euro -pra g ma tic ap pro ach be gan to do mi na te the ODS lea de r s hip be twe en the ye ars , thus le a ving Klaus s (i.e. Zahradil s) fol lo wers asi de. It is po ssi b le to iden ti fy two re a sons for this de ve lo p ment: Fi r st ly, thro u g ho ut the pre pa ra tions for the Czech EU Co un cil Pre si den cy (CZ PRES), many Mi ni sters who had ori gi nal ly vie wed the EU in a ne ga ti ve sen se chan ged the ir 6 Zahradil, J. Plecitý, P. Adrián, P. Bednáø, M. (2001), Manifest èeského eurorealismu (dokument k ideové konferenci ODS) (on-line: 7 Apart from Vondra, Petr Gandaloviè was also considered as a possible candidate for this position. Gandaloviè was an ODS member who spent nine years at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and in as a diplomat prior to becoming the Mayor of the city of Ústí nad Labem. 8 Vondra, A (2006), Èeská zahranièní politika: tøi principy, trojí smìøování a tøi témata, Meznárodní politika, year XXX, 11/ Vondra understood this term to encompass both the Balkans and Eastern Europe. The term later developed, and in euro jargon is understood to mean the European neighbourhood, which differs from Vondra s original concept.

19 Czech Foreign Policy ; The current debate mind-set, as they became part of the EU political system. Secondly, several im po r tant fi gu res from va ry ing ba c k gro unds jo i ned the ODS at aro und that time, e.g. the abo ve men tio ned Ale xan der Von dra, or Tomáš Pojar, who became the first Deputy Foreign Minister. This in ter nal ide o lo gi cal di cho to my in the ODS cu l mi na ted in the de ba te con ce r ning the ra ti fi ca tion of the Li s bon Tre a ty. The par lia men ta ry sup po r ters of Pre si dent Kla us, who had left the po si tion of pa r ty cha i r men, at te m p ted to halt the Treaty ratification process. However, they were never supported by the parties lea de r s hip, and were thus mar gi na li sed wi t hin the pa r ty stru c tu re it self. The stan ce of Jan Za hra dil was very spe ci fic in this con text. Im por tan t ly, Za hra dil re ma i ned so me w he re in the mid d le gro und be twe en both con fli c ting camps. In pa r ti cu lar, Za hra dil ar gu ed that the ODS par lia men ta rians sho uld ratify the Lisbon Treaty, since ratification was both necessary for gove r n men tal su r vi val, and for con fi den ce in the CZ PRES. Mo re o ver, he was personally engaged in the Lisbon Treaty negotiations. No twit h stan ding the even tu al ra ti fi ca tion of the Li s bon Tre a ty, the di spu te wi t hin the ODS con ce r ning its ap pro ach and po li cy to wards the EU re ma ins un re so l ved. The re are two im po r tant is su es which sug gest that the in ter nal ide o lo gi cal con flict wi t hin the pa r ty in this re spect may re turn. Fi r st ly, de spi te an ini tial ly more po si ti ve at ti tu de to wards the EU, the ODS has sin ce ini tia ted the cre a tion of a new EU- c ri ti cal po li ti cal gro u ping wi t hin the Eu ro pe an Pa r lia ment it self. 10 Se con d ly, Vondra s po si tion is no lon ger strong and we ll-ro o ted wi t hin the pa r ty stru c tu re, whi le Tomáš Po jar is ex pe c ted to be po sted to Is ra el as Czech am bas sa dor. In con trast, many of Pre si dent Klaus sup po r ters re ma in in the ODS, al be it in ba c k bench po si tions. Thus, the pro po nents of this new di re c tion in ODS po li cy may lose the ir po si tions and in flu en ce qu i te qu i c kly. 11 The cho i ce of can di da tes for key gove r n men tal po si tions is thus of gre at im po r tan ce in this re gard sho uld the ODS win the for t h co ming 2010 na tio nal ele c tions. The cho i ce of any o ne from Zahradil s en to u ra ge is less pro ba b le sin ce it wo uld be hardly acceptable for smaller political parties, possible coalition partners. In te re stin gly, the Eu ro pe an agen da is the only po int of con flict wi t hin the ODS. The pa r ty una ni mou s ly ba c ked the in stal la tion of ele ments of the U.S. Mis si le De fen ce on Czech ter ri to ry, and is he si tant abo ut fo r ming clo ser re la tions with Rus sia, 12 or sup po r ting Ea stern Par tne r s hip, as well as fu r t her EU enlargement. 10 The European Conservatives and Reformist Group is the creation of Jan Zahradil. 11 It should be noted, that the new Minister for European affairs in the provisional government nominated by the ODS is Juraj Chmiel, who is regarded as being closely connected to Zahradil. 12 This position differs to the one taken by president Klaus, who is open towards further and deeper cooperation with Moscow.

20 20 Vít Dostál The Czech Social Democratic Party: The So cial de mo c rats (Èeská stra na sociálnì demokratická ÈSSD) have been in op po si tion sin ce The se ye ars were mar ked with sub stan ti ve op po si tion to the fo re ign po li cy di re c tion pu r su ed by the go ve r ning co a li tion at that time. Mo re o ver, the ÈSSD was una b le to have any in flu en ce in the fo r mu la tion and imp le men ta tion of fo re ign po li cy du ring this pe riod. This fact to ge t her with the fe e ling that the co a li tion was ig no ring the views and opi nions of the main op po si tion pa r ty and was un wil ling to en ga ge in any form of dia lo gue pro mpted the ÈSSD to bre ak two taboos in Czech politics. Fi r st ly, the ÈSSD made Czech fo re ign po li cy the sub ject of voters uti li za tion. Whi le the ad ju st ment of po li cies to suit the re sults of va rio us opi nion polls is cha rac te ri stic of the new sty le of ÈSSD lea de r s hip ad vo ca ted by Jiøí Pa ro u bek, in the bro a der po li ti cal field, it is very spe ci fic in the fo re ign and se cu ri ty po li cy. This po int may be il lu stra ted with re spect to the pro po sed installation of certain elements of a U.S. Missile Defence programme on Czech ter ri to ry. In the be gin ning, the ÈSSD put this is sue to a pa r ty vote in the sum mer of This vote re su l ted in a re je c tion by the ÈSSD of the plan ned in stal la tions. Con sequ en t ly, the rhe to ric of the ÈSSD in the na tio nal de ba te on the in stal la tion of the U.S. Mis si le De fen ce in the Czech Re pu b lic of ten re lied upon the unfa vou ra b le mood among the po pu la tion with re gard to the se plans. Mo re o ver, the pa r ty also ad vo ca ted the holding of a national referendum on this issue. Se con d ly, the ÈSSD be gan to link fo re ign and do me stic po li cy is su es in an at tempt to tra de the se po li cy are as off aga inst one ano t her. This was par ticu la r ly the case in re spect of fo re ign mi li ta ry mis sions, an ar mi sti ce for the pe riod of the CZ PRES, and, most no ta b ly, the fall of the go ve r n ment du ring the CZ PRES. Hen ce, it can be said that the So cial de mo c rats pla y ed a very hard po li ti cal game. It must ho we ver be de te r mi ned whe re the ÈSSD stands in re spect of the de ba te con ce r ning the fo re ign po li cy orien ta tion of the Czech Re pu b lic. The 2006 ge ne ral ele c tions co m p le ted the ge ne ra tion chan ge among the ÈSSD spe cia lists on fo re ign po li cy. Jan Ka van, the fo r mer Mi ni ster of Fo re ign Af fa irs be twe en the ye ars , and Jan Laštùvka, the cha i r man of the Fo re ign Po li cy Com mit tee of the Cha m ber of De pu ties be twe en the ye ars , left ac ti ve po li tics and were re p la ced by the mid d le -a ged Lubomír Zaorálek and the yo un ger Jan Hamáèek. In te re stin gly, both in di vi du als do not have any experience in an executive office. The ÈSSD fo re ign po li cy pro gram me sug gests that the re might be a sub stan ti ve chan ge in the at ti tu de to wards the prio ri ty pro jects which were ad vo ca ted by the Topolanek s go ve r n ments, sho uld the So cial De mo c rats find the m se l ves in a po si tion to form a go ve r n ment fol lo wing the 2010 ge ne ral

21 Czech Foreign Policy ; The current debate elections. 13 Firstly, the ÈSSD has rejected the U.S. Missile Defence basis in the Czech Republic. Currently, their stance towards its renewed architecture is very in dif fe rent. Se con d ly, the So cial De mo c rats pro mo te the gra du al withdrawal of Czech military forces from Afghanistan, as well as the imp le men ta tion of sub stan ti ve chan ges with re gard to the na tu re of the ir mis sion the re. Thir d ly, the ÈSSD is op po sed to the fu r t her en la r ge ment of NATO. Fo u r t hly, it re com mends gre a ter en ga ge ment with Rus sia with re gard to Euro -A t lan tic se cu ri ty. 14 Fi nal ly, the ÈSSD does not re gard the cur rent mo del of Ea stern Par tne r s hip as the ide al way in which the EU sho uld ap pro ach the post -So viet re gion. 15 The views of key pla y ers wi t hin the ÈSSD on Czech fo re ign po li cy dif fer sli g h t ly in some are as (e.g. Hamáèek is less cri ti cal to wards NATO en ga ge ment in Af g ha ni stan, whi le some ar gue that he is es sen tial ly a strong trans at lan ti cist at he art). No twit h stan ding this, the key pla y ers wi t hin the pa r ty it self agree on the cru cial di re c tion which Czech fo re ign po li cy sho uld take. Un dou bte d ly, the ÈSSD pre fers a Eu ro - cen tric Czech fo re ign po li cy as op po sed to a fo re ign po li cy which wo uld fo cus ra t her on trans at lan tic re la tions. Neve r t he less, sho uld the So cial De mo c rats form a go ve r n ment af ter the 2010 ele c tions, they will have to mo de ra te some of the ir ob je c ti ves which appear somewhat radical at the moment by means of administrative socialisation and coalition concessions. TOP 09: The sum mer of 2009 saw the eme r gen ce of a new and qu i te strong fo r ce in the Czech po li ti cal pa r ty sy stem TOP 09 (Tra di ce, odpovìdnost, pro spe ri ta [Tra di tion, re spon sibi li ty, pro spe ri ty]). 16 Importantly, there are three key ele ments con sti tu ting the parties iden ti ty. The first ele ment is co m pri sed of fo r mer Chri stian de mo c rats, such as the pa r ty vi ce - cha ir and its fo un ding me m ber Mi ro s lav Ka lo u sek. The se cond ele ment is co m po sed of lo cal po li ti cians, who, in some re gions, have fo r med strong mo ve ments Starostové [Ma y ors]. Fi nal ly, the third ele ment is made up of re spe c ted personalities from political, economic and academic circles that have joined the project (e.g. Karel Schwarzenberg). 13 See Zaorálek, L. (2009), Oranžová kniha zahranièní politiky (on-line: 14 See also Hamáèek, J., Mehr Sicherheit von Vancouver bis Wladiwostok v Süddeutsche Zeitung, Süddeutsche Zeitung, Hamáèek, J. Kulhánek J. (2009), The politics of neighbors: the EU s role in the future of Eastern Europe, Harvard International Review, Vol. 39, Issue 3, p TOP 09 is normally accorded around 10% of national support in opinions polls.

22 22 Vít Dostál Al t ho ugh Ka rel Schwa rzen berg is the cha i r man of the pa r ty, its fo re ign po li cy is ill- for mu la ted, and, with pa r ti cu lar re gard to its ele c tion pro gram, remains extremely vague. 17 Whi le TOP 09 s fo re ign po li cy is ma in ly fo cu sed on stres sing the im po r tan ce of ce r ta in va lu es and prin ci p les, it does not of fer any t hing con c re te. No twit h stan ding this, an in ter nal con flict wi t hin the pa r ty with re gard to fo re ign po li cy is not ex pe c ted, and the party s fo re ign po li cy orien ta tion is li ke ly to co m bi ne both the trans at lan tic and Eu ro pe an ve c tor. The pa r ty sho uld the re fo re be we lco med as a po ten tial co a li tion pa r t ner for all of the de mo c ra tic po li ti cal pa r ties, ta king into ac co unt po ssi b le fu tu re di spu tes over the fo re ign po li cy. Re gret ta b ly, in the ab sen ce of more com pre hen si ve po li cy do cu ments and ac tions, it is im pos si b le to pre ci se ly determine TOP 09 s foreign policy priorities at this point in time. The Green Party: The Czech Gre en Pa r ty (Stra na zelených SZ) has per haps un de r go ne the most ex ci ting de ve lo p ment in the field of fo re ign po li cy orien ta tion. Prior to 2006, the Gre en Pa r ty was not an im po r tant fo r ce in Czech pa r ty po li tics. Ho we ver, on se cu ring the 5% thre s hold re qu i red to en ter the Czech Cha m ber of De pu ties, and on be co ming a ju nior co a li tion pa r t ner in Go ve r n ment, the Gre en Pa r ty has be gan to de ve lop a con c re te ap pro ach and stra te gy towards Czech foreign policy. De spi te the fact that he is not a me m ber of the pa r ty, the SZ no mi na ted Ka rel Schwa rzen berg as a me m ber of the co a li tion go ve r n ment. Im por tan t ly, Schwa rzen berg sha red a si g ni fi cant part of the Gre en Party s po li ti cal ob je c ti ves, which he suc ces s ful ly ad vo ca ted at na tio nal le vel thanks to his skill and di p lo ma cy. No twit h stan ding this, the most con tro ve r sial is su es were agre ed upon at the me e tings of the co a li tion pa r ty cha irs and vi ce - cha irs. Con sequ en t ly, Schwarzenberg s per so nal im pact in key are as was so me w hat li mi ted. As men tio ned abo ve, Schwa rzen berg la ter left the SZ to join TOP 09, and thus his co o pe ra tion with the Czech Green party was rather short lived. Schwarzenberg s role as the SZ no mi nee to the co a li tion go ve r n ment pro vo ked a sto r my de ba te wi t hin the pa r ty with re gard to the fo re ign po li cy ob je c ti ves which he sho uld pu r sue at gove r n men tal le vel. Con sequ en t ly, three di stinct fa c tions may cur ren t ly be fo und in the SZ, with each fa c tion ad vo ca ting a sli g h t ly dif fe rent ap pro ach to wards Czech fo re ign po li cy. Whi le the re are se ve ral po ints of con flict be twe en the se three gro ups (e.g. the Czech 17 Volební program TOP 09 pro parlamentní volby, 2009 (on-line:

23 Czech Foreign Policy ; The current debate fo re ign mi li ta ry mis sion), the main is sue of di s cord con cerns con tem po ra ry at ti tu des to wards the po ssi b le in stal la tion of ele ments of the U.S. Mis si le Defence within the territory of the Czech Republic. 18 The first gro u ping is con cen tra ted aro und the lea de r s hip of the pa r ty it self. The pre do mi nant fi gu re is the pa r ty cha ir, Ma r tin Bursík, who se thin king is pro ba b ly clo sest to Ka rel Schwarzenberg s. Bursík was one of the fo un ding me m bers of the Ci vic Fo rum and, as is the case with re gard to the ma jo ri ty of such political veterans, never questioned the transatlantic element of Czech Fo re ign po li cy. Con sequ en t ly, Bursík sup po r ted the tre a ty pro vi ding for a per ma nent U.S. mi li ta ry pre sen ce in the Czech Republic. The sec ond group might be la belled by the cur rent party chair man Ondøej Liška. Liška s for eign pol icy prin ci ples re sem ble pos tu lates of Ger man or Aus trian prag matic Greens. While Liška did not re ject the ra dar base per se, he strictly in sisted on the in te gra tion of the U.S. mis sile shield into the NATO frame work, and in sisted on the con sent of the Coun cil of the EU on the is sue. He ab stained when vot ing on the ne go ti ated deal with Amer i cans, and openly wel comed Obama s de ci sion to re-shape the whole sys tem. Al though of ten crit i cal of the Bush ad min is tra tion, Liška is a pro po nent of vivid and functioning transatlantic relations. The last po lit i cal fac tion is rep re sented mainly by Matìj Stropnický, whose po lit i cal ideas are sim i lar to those of the West-Eu ro pean Green-Left move ments. Stropnický s views on for eign pol icy com bine anti-amer i can ism, anti-bushism and pac i fism. He has par tic i pated in pop u lar ral lies against the U.S. Mis sile De fence, and has re peat edly criti cised Amer i can for eign pol icy with re gard to Iraq, Af ghan i stan, the Mid dle East peace pro cess and even Latin Amer ica. Stropnický was de feated at the last party con gress, where he was a Liška s op po nent dur ing the elec tion of the party chair man. There are no doubts that Stropnický would like to steer the SZ more towards the left. It is still un clear as to which for eign pol icy ap proach the Greens will even tu ally pur sue, and their cur rent di lemma re sem bles the di lemma which many west ern-eu ro pean Green par ties have for merly faced. At the mo ment, the SZ s for eign pol icy ap proach ap pears to be sta ble, and their elec tion programme for 2009, planned yet not re al ized, fit ted mostly to Liška s vi sions. 19 How ever, in ter nal in sta bil ity may re turn, to the party as each of the 18 The Greens are united with respect to other classical political principles, such as development aid, environmental friendly foreign policy, or the support of deeper European integration, etc. 19 Volební program Strany zelených pro pøedèasné parlamentní volby, 2009 (on-line:

24 24 Vít Dostál three po lit i cal fac tions dis cussed above can still rely on sub stan tive sup port from within the party struc ture it self. 20 The Christian Democrats: The foreign policy objectives of the Czech Christian Democratic Party (Køes anská demokratická stra na Èeskoslovenský stra na lidová KDU-ÈSL) are clo se to tho se of the ma in stre am Eu ro pe an people s pa r ties. KDU-ÈSL was, along with the Gre ens, a ju nior co a li tion pa r t ner in Topolanek s se cond go ve r n ment. The ir pro gram pla t form was so me w he re be twe en the po li ti cal pla t forms of the Gre ens and ODS, and stres sed the im po r tan ce of both the trans at lan tic and Eu ro pe an di men sions of Czech fo re ign po li cy. The re are no ma jor con flicts wi t hin the pa r ty with re gard to fo re ign po li cy orien ta tion, as all pa r ty ex perts share the same views on most topics. KDU-ÈSL me m bers oc cu pied the po si tions of Fo re ign Mi ni ster be twe en (Cy ril Svo bo da) and the De fen ce Mi ni ster be twe en (Vlasta Parkanová). The former period was characterised by preparation for Czech ac ces sion to the EU, whi le the lat ter pe riod in vo l ved two main se cu ri ty is su es: (a.) the ra dar base and, (b.) Czech fo re ign mi li ta ry mis sions. In both ca ses, the KDU-ÈSL pro ved it self to be a coo pe ra ti ve pa r t ner thanks to the com mon ap pro ach which it sha res with the ot her parties political programmes. The Chri stian de mo c rats will pro ba b ly re ma in a sta b le pla y er in the fo re ign policy debate. Their expert capacity has been enhanced by their political me r ger with the mi nor Eu ro pe an De mo c ra tic Pa r ty. Im por tan t ly, the lat ter pa r ty is re pre sen ted by one of the most ac ti ve Czech MEP s in the ele c tion pe riod, the fo r mer diplomat Jana Hybášková. The Communist Party: Whi le the Com mu nist party s (Komunistická stra na Èech a Mo ra vy KSÈM) im pact on Czech fo re ign po li cy af ter 1989 has been ne gli gi b le, this pa r ty is no ne t he less pre sent in the Czech Pa r lia ment. Con sequ en t ly, it has de ve lo ped fo r mal chan nels ai med at in flu en cing Czech fo re ign po li cy. In the ye ars be twe en , the KSÈM was op po sed to the U.S. ra dar base, vo ted aga inst the Czech par ti ci pa tion in fo re ign mi li ta ry mis sions, fa vo u red 20 That is the case mainly with regard to Liška s and Stropnický s supporters, since Bursík s openly pro-american approach disregarding administration in office has always enjoyed the support of the party leadership itself.

25 Czech Foreign Policy ; The current debate clo ser re la tions with Rus sia and ad vo ca ted le a ving NATO, or at le ast its mi li ta ry stru c tu res. Mo re o ver, the Com mu nists op po se the cur rent di re c tion ta ken with regard to European integration. It wo uld be naïve to ex pect any chan ges in the KSÈM s fo re ign po li cy orien ta tion. In or der for this to hap pen, the pa r ty wo uld fi r st ly have to trans form it self from an an ti - sy stem or pro test pa r ty, into a pro -sy stem ma in - stre am po li ti cal gro u ping with re gard to ot her po li cy are as. Ta king into ac co unt KSÈM s ac ti vi ties in the Czech po li ti cal sy stem fol lo wing 1990, it can be con c lu ded that any such de ve lo p ments will not be for t h co ming, se e ing as the pa r ty lacks a key fi gu re(s) who co uld ad vo ca te a sub stan ti ve re form in KSÈM s political program. Summary: The he a ted de ba te con ce r ning the orien ta tion of Czech fo re ign po li cy which com men ced af ter 2006 will de fi ni te ly not dis si pa te un til af ter the for t h co ming na tio nal ele c tions in Whi le none of the de mo c ra tic po li ti cal pa r ties con test the Czech mem be r s hip of NATO or the EU, they no ne t he less re ma in di vi ded with re gard to the role which the Czech Re pu b lic sho uld play in the se in ter na tio nal or ga ni sa tions, as well as with re gard to how both the EU and NATO sho uld trans form themselves in the future. Mo re o ver, se ve ral vi vid de ba tes are also ta king pla ce wi t hin the po li ti cal pa r ties the m se l ves, no twit h stan ding the fact that some of the se pa r ties have ra t her con si stent fo re ign po li cy go als. In pa r ti cu lar, the Chri stian De mo c rats, Com mu nists, TOP 09, and to a ce r ta in ex tent the So cial De mo c rats, may be re gar ded as ha ving con si stent ap pro a ches in this re spect. On the ot her hand, it is li ke ly that the re cent in ter nal di spu tes con ce r ning ce r ta in fo re ign po li cy is su es will re pea te d ly re turn to the Ci vic Democratic Party, and to the Greens. Ta king into ac co unt po ssi b le co a li tion ma t ches fol lo wing the 2010 ge ne ral ele c tion, it is po ssi b le to make the fol lo wing con c lu sions and ob se r va tions: Fi r st ly, if the re is a co a li tion of one of the two ca t ch -all pa r ties (ODS or ÈSSD) with one, two or three of the cen tre pa r ties, the re will not be any sub stan ti ve chan ge in the cur rent Czech fo re ign po li cy ali g n ment. This is be ca u se the ju nior co a li tion pa r t ner(s) wo uld es sen tial ly block the main go ve r ning pa r ty from pu r su ing a fo re ign po li cy which is (a.) too eu ro - cen tric or (b.) which is too fo cu sed on trans at lan tic re la tions. No twit h stan ding this, the ju nior pa r t ners will no ne t he less sha re a gre at part of the fo re ign po li cy pro gram me with the main go ve r ning pa r ty. Mo re o ver, in a co a li tion government, at least some parties which were active in shaping Czech foreign po li cy in the ye ars be tween will almost certainly be present.

26 26 Vít Dostál A se cond po ssi b le sce na rio is a grand co a li tion be twe en the ODS and the ÈSSD. This po ssi bi li ty wo uld ho we ver re sult in the pu r su it of a very am bi gu o us fo re ign po li cy. Most pro ba b ly, such a con stel la tion wo uld only se r ve to block any sub stan ti ve fo re ign po li cy con duct, as well as any strong Czech par ti ci pa tion in va rio us avan t - gar de ini tia ti ves. This is ma in ly be ca u se both pa r ties fun da men tal ly di sa gree on many fo re ign po li cy ob je c ti ves, and each pa r ty po sses ses a strong con vi c tion in its abi li ty and right to car ry out its respective foreign policy objectives. The third, and pro ba b ly the most ra di cal sce na rio, in vo l ves the So cial De mo c ra tic fo r ming a mi no ri ty go ve r n ment, whi le re ly ing on the si lent sup port of the Com mu nists in the Cha m ber of De pu ties. 21 Such a go ve r n ment wo uld ena b le the ÈSSD to re - s ha pe some ele ments of Czech fo re ign po li cy. Mo re o ver, the KSÈM, which is cru cial for the su r vi val of the go ve r n ment, wo uld de fi ni te ly encourage them to do so. To con c lu de, it sho uld be no ted that the de ba te which has cha rac te ri sed Czech fo re ign po li cy over the past nu m ber of ye ars ne i t her si g ni fies a lack of con ti nu i ty, nor the po ssi bi li ty that the go ve r n ment will take any une x pe c ted de ci sion in this re gard. Mo re o ver, ac cor ding to the post 2010 sce na rios which are ou t li ned abo ve, only the le ast pro ba b le sce na rio would result in a change in Czech foreign policy. 21 The Social Democrats have refused to cooperate with the KSÈM at governmental level since 1995 in accordance with the then approved so called Bohumín Declaration.

27 Jiøí Schneider Poland and the Czech Republic: Our Common Interest in Making NATO and the EU a Real Strategic Anchor Undoing the Cold War : After the fall of the Iron Curtain, Central Europeans set about undoing the Cold War, and rejoining Europe. This agenda was, by default, negative towards the East and positive towards the West. In 1990, the main uniting element fostering cooperation among former Soviet bloc countries in Central Europe was their common interest in the withdrawal of Soviet troops from their respective territories. Czechoslovakia, Hungary and Poland played a prominent role in dismantling the Warsaw Pact in The Eastern policy of these countries was defined in negative terms. When the Warsaw Pact was dismantled, the Visegrad countries continued to compete to earn the goodwill of the West, and to integrate into Euro-Atlantic institutions with the strategic goal of EU and NATO membership. Therefore, NATO enlargement with the accession of Hungary, Poland and the Czech Republic in 1999 was the greatest political and security success wrought by the mutual cooperation of these countries. After Slovakia s belated accession to NATO, and the EU big-bang enlargement in 2004, all Visegrad countries ceased to be a grey zone between Germany and Russia. With successful accession to both NATO and the EU, the main strategic goals of Central European States have essentially been achieved. Relations with Russia: After the withdrawal of Soviet troops, and their emancipation from the Soviet/Russian zone of influence, it has proven to be much more difficult for

28 28 Jiøí Schneider Central Europeans to define a common policy towards Russia in positive terms. In a recent study on EU-Russian relations, Mark Leonard and Nicu Popescu 1 attempted to define EU Member States attitudes towards Russia: Poland was entitled the New Cold-Warrior, whereas the other Visegrad countries were considered more pragmatic. In this regard, Hungary and Slovakia were considered as friendly pragmatists, while the Czech Republic was considered as a frosty pragmatist. Unlike Poland and the Baltic states however, other (Visegrad) countries wish to maintain good relations with Russia, and are sometimes even willing to sacrifice their ties with other East European countries in order to do so. 2 Regardless of these differences however, a policy towards our Eastern neighbours and Russia could be a potential focal point of convergence between the Czech Republic and Poland, as well as serving as a focal point for the broader convergence of other Central European countries. The mainstream European view holds that, in the long term, Russian and EU interests will naturally converge, particularly with regard to the rest of the world. In the short term however, interests within the EU as a whole should possibly converge. There is an obvious obstacle to this objective however: this will not be easy as long as levels of Russian influence in Europe vary. In relative terms, the influence of/dependence on Russia in Central and Eastern European countries is much greater than in the rest of Europe. The key argument of Central Europeans should be that Russia ought to be treated equally, as is the case with the EU s other partners. In terms of the enforcement of EU legal rules and procedures the acquis communautaire the US and Russia should thus be put on an equal footing. What kind of NATO? 1999 NATO Accession: The loyalty of the new Allies was tested immediately after their accession to NATO: a decision to launch an attack on Serbia (a neighbour of Hungary!) and Kosovo in the form of an air campaign was taken together with the newly acceded members. In the absence of an explicit UN Security Council resolution, that decision was particularly difficult for the then socialist government of the Czech Republic. Following 9/11, NATO has invoked 1 Leonard, Mark; Popescu, Nicu (2007), A Power Audit of EU-Russia Relations. European Council on Foreign Relations, accessed at: 2 Kratochvíl, Petr (2007) New EU Members and the ENP: Different Agendas, Different Strategies, in: INTERECONOMICS Review of European Economic Policy, Volume 42, Number 4, July/August 2007, pp

29 Poland and the Czech Republic: Our Common Interest Article V, but has not taken any active steps to implement this provision. The US operation in Afghanistan (in the framework of Operation Enduring Freedom) has not been conducted through, and by, NATO however, but by a coalition of the willing. NATO has thus, in this case, been bypassed. Article V: NATO s policy towards Poland (and to lesser extent towards the Czech Republic) has been largely determined by the traditional emphasis on hard security guarantees (Article V of the Washington Treaty). This is the case, notwithstanding the very low credibility associated with NATO s commitment to defend its new members. Even during the ratification process in the US Senate, the US public did not give any special commitment to defend its new Central European allies (one could have expected it then, following of grass-root mobilization of their compatriots in the US). According to a survey carried out before the first wave of NATO enlargement in autumn 1998, 3 only 31 percent of the US public agreed that the United States had a vital interest in Poland (in contrast to 87 percent with respect to Japan), while only 28 percent were in favour of the use of U.S. troops in response to a Russian invasion of Poland. In contrast, the level of public confidence with regard to the security of the Czech Republic in NATO has been steadily growing since this countries accession to the Alliance: the feeling of full security has grown from an average of 30 percent in , to 60 percent upon membership of NATO. Although Russian military power no longer poses a threat to the whole of Europe, it nonetheless presents a disruptive and destabilising influence on its neighbours. Russia is capable, and willing, to escalate military conflicts in its proximity. The war in Georgia in August 2008 is striking proof of this fact. The new Strategic Concept of NATO currently under preparation should address not only NATO s transformation regarding new threats, but also the fundamental concerns of the new allies regarding NATO s core collective defense mission. Contingency planning for possible conflict scenarios should be thus supported by credible measures in all aspects of NATO activities (planning, exercising, and infrastructure). It is a common interest of Central and Eastern European allies to make NATO operational on the territory of all of its members. 3 John E. Reilly, American Public Opinion and Foreign Policy, 1999 (Chicago: Chicago Council on Foreign Relations, 1999).

30 30 Jiøí Schneider Missions Abroad: Most of the foreign missions have been planned and implemented on a national basis, and have not reflected ambitions with regard to regional cooperation. The joint Czech-Slovak battalion in KFOR (from ) was a notable exception to this. The fact that, from 2004 to 2006, the Czech unit in the Multinational Forces in Iraq (MNFI) operated within the British sector, and not together with the Polish contingent/sector, can be seen as an illustration that one should not take the close cooperation of neighboring countries for granted. Missile Defense: From the commencement of negotiations concerning the establishment of a third site for the US missile defense system, both Poland and Czech Republic were seen as particularly important allies of the United States in this region. The decision by the US administration to modify its plans has increased the role of European NATO members in the construction of a missile defense for, and in, Europe. Both countries should now take part in a NATO-anchored European missile defense shield. What kind of EU? 2004 EU Membership: What kind of political impact have the new Member States exerted after their accession to the EU? To what extent have the new Member States been regarded as troublemakers? It has been generally assumed that the accession of new Member States to the EU would make decision-making more problematic. Notwithstanding this, rhetorical positioning and posturing has rarely transformed into legislative action. It can be shown that the EU legislative process has not been slowed down by the participation of representatives of the new Member States, although the impact of these Member States on decision making can be best described as reluctant, in-active and mostly reactive. Even MEP coalitions in the European Parliament have been formed in accordance with party politics and ideology along a left-right axis, rather than on national lines. While the MEPs from some of the new Member States have appeared more cohesive along national lines than those from the old Member States, this trend could be ascribed to the fact that smaller States generally are more cohesive in expressing their national interests.

31 Poland and the Czech Republic: Our Common Interest The New Member States have not blocked any EU decision with the exception of a singular case concerning the Polish veto on the EU s mandate to negotiate a new partnership agreement with Russia in November 2006 following the Russian import ban on Polish meat and food products. While the Polish veto in this regard provoked sharp criticism by some, it has nonetheless been defended and supported by others as an exercise of the right of any Member State to raise an issue concerning its national interest. The lessons learned from the promotion of the Eastern dimension of the ENP, and from the exercise of the Polish veto, demonstrate that the position of the new Members States vis-à-vis Russia, as well as towards the Eastern neighbourhood policy, can be best asserted through the pursuit of a common approach by the EU as a whole. Although we (especially the Poles, and to a lesser extent the Czechs) may still be seen by others as historically prejudiced against Russia, we should not be seen as troublemakers who want to prevent reaching out to Russia, irrespective of the circumstances. The achievement of the long term goal that the EU will speak with one voice, requires the building of mutual trust and solidarity among all EU Member States. Based on their role in setting and shaping the Eastern European agenda, Central Europeans are expected to contribute to the EU s Eastern policies, with particular focus on the Eastern Partnership. The obvious way to achieve this would be to establish an open advocacy group, Friends of the East within the EU, and more specifically, the Eastern Caucus in the European Parliament. Recommendations Possible Areas of Czech-Polish Cooperation: Relationship with Russia: It is in the interest of Poland and the Czech Republic to strengthen the unity of NATO members, and EU Member States, and particularly the countries of Central Europe, with regard to the Russian Federation. The Czech Republic and Poland should clarify that they endorse coherent NATO and EU policies vis-à-vis Russia and its neighbours. It is thus is in their interest to free up EU (ESDP) NATO relations. We should not seek to prevent either NATO or the EU from reaching out to Russia. However, on the other hand, they should care about NATO and the EU states and maintain firm red lines vis-à-vis Russia in terms of the latter s relations towards its neighbours, as well as its energy policy.

32 32 Jiøí Schneider CFSP under Lisbon: In respect of foreign policy (CFSP) following the ratification of the Lisbon Treaty, it will be equally important for Poland, and the Czech Republic, to play an active role within the newly established European External Action Service (EEAS). It will also be important for these Member States to establish channels of influence with regard to the rotating EU presidencies, and to provide the Commission, Council and future EU presidencies with adequate expertise on Eastern policy. Driving regional cooperation in the ESDP: Poland and the Czech Republic should foster mutual solidarity and interdependence in security through enhanced defense cooperation and specialisation. Thus, both Member States could become a kernel of regional security cooperation (which could be further enhanced in various wider formats V4, V4+, etc). In this respect, Poland and the Czech Republic should: strengthen the parliamentary dimension of security dialogue (e.g. ensure regular meetings of the Chairmen of the Defense and European Integration Committees), seek optimal cooperation within the EU common market (joint security/ defense procurement/acquisitions), build various levels of military cooperation from joint training and exercises, through multinational units (e.g. battle groups) to joint operations and missions abroad. Summary: The purpose of this paper is to provide, within the Czech-Polish Forum, recommendations on how to increase Czech-Polish cooperation within NATO and the European Union. Methods of strengthening the overall strategic assurances stemming from Czech and Polish membership of these organizations are also addressed, as is the manner in which we can provide an efficient tool for the promotion of the foreign policy interests of the Czech Republic, Poland, and indeed the whole Central European region where possible. The key challenge for both the Czech and Polish foreign policies is how they can alone or combined influence the future policies of NATO and the EU.

33 Aleksander Szpor Poland and the Czech Republic in the European Union Common Challenges Among the broad horizon of problems and challenges to be discussed in the coming years within the European Union, there are three which top the political agenda: combating the effects of the crisis as the axis for EU economic and social priorities; climate policy, which sets a new direction for EU activities on the global stage; and the implementation of the Lisbon Treaty in such a way as to deepen integration and strengthen the European Union. These topics are multidimensional and in many ways mutually connected, but each of them is reflected in the strategic documents of the European Commission and European Parliament, as well as in the programs of upcoming EU presidencies. 1 The aim of the present article is to outline these three issues from the perspective of Poland and the Czech Republic, and to identify possible areas for cooperation. The Effects of the Economic Crisis for Poland and the Czech Republic The collapse of the U.S. financial market in 2008 depicted the extent to which the world economy including the European economy is interconnected. While 1 Compare the inauguration speech by European Parliament President Jerzy Buzek available at: July/speeches-2009-July-1.html as of , Jose M. Barroso s action programme available at: as of , as well as the Draft 18 Month Programme of The Spanish, Belgian and Hungarian Presidencies available at: as of and the Commission Working Document: Consultation on the Future EU 2020 Strategy available at: as of

34 34 Aleksander Szpor fighting the downturn on the European stage, it became visible that the crisis was only an ignition fuse with regard to the flammable structure of the individual state economies. It also turned out that the European Union, along with its institutions, is but a secondary player, and that recovering from the crisis is a job left to national governments. Many questions resurfaced as to the opportunities for a further deepening of European economic integration, in particular with regard to the future of the monetary union and the chances of broadening it. In the initial phase of the crisis, the main threat stemmed from protectionism, which was present, for example, in France, Germany, Ireland and the Netherlands. Despite the rapid reaction of the European Commission and European Central Bank, the mutual trust of member states was strained. In the next phase, the now uncovered debts of some countries Portugal, Italy, Ireland, Greece and Spain became the primary problem. This resulted in a strengthening of voices which undermined the idea of solidarity within the Eurozone with regard to bearing the costs of mismanagement of individual governments in the face of a threat to the stability of the remaining countries. As part of the defensive reaction to the particularly dramatic case of Greece, the EU has accelerated work on creating new, specialized monitoring institutions, which possess the necessary tools to raise discipline among member states. 2 These ambitious ideas, proposed by a trio of Spanish-Belgian-Hungarian presidencies, will nonetheless have to gain the acceptance of the governments of France, Britain and Germany, which for the time being are rather skeptical towards changing the status quo. With regard to the eastern part of the European Union, however, many experts felt that the crisis in the region will be much more difficult to overcome. This is exemplified not only by the dramatic economic situation in Latvia or Estonia (and, to a lesser extent, in Hungary and Romania), but above all, dependence on foreign investment and Western European markets. 3 Improving the economic situation in Central and Eastern Europe will therefore only be possible after the crisis has been dealt with in Western Europe. 4 Compared to other countries in the region, Poland proved to be a green island, which was quite lucky to avoid the worst effects of crisis. Poland is the only EU member state not to record negative growth, as well as the most 2 Communication from the Commission on the European financial supervision, available at: ay2009/c-2009_715_en.pdf as of EU10. Regular Economic Report, The World Bank, Main Report: From Stabilization to Recovery, October 2009, available at: Resources/RER_Oct09_report.pdf as of If it were true that we have passed the apex of the economic crisis, it would be worth concentrating on finding new strategies for the European economy aimed at raising its stability. If, however, it were true that the crisis will return within several months, it may turn out that creating member state solidarity mechanisms is of far greater importance.

35 Poland and the Czech Republic in the European Union immune country in Central and Eastern Europe. This was mainly due to a large internal market, low dependence on Western loans and private investment, as well as amortization in the form of EU funds. Despite recording negative GDP growth, the Czech Republic also fared favorably when compared to other countries in the region. In the initial phase of the crisis, the main factor hurting the Czech economy was the fall of exports, followed by a rise in unemployment. 5 However, the collapse of the Czech government, so disadvantageous in terms of the perception of the country abroad, proved to have a stabilizing effect in economic terms. The most serious problem facing the new prime minister were the limited possibilities of carrying out public finance cuts, which resulted from the high share of recurrent expenditure in the budget. However, the proposed rescue plan, despite possessing high social costs, won the support of the Czechs, thanks mainly to the apolitical attitude of the new prime minister and the ability to convince of the public opinion as to the global roots of the crisis. In 2010, the Czechs will grapple with the most serious effects of the crisis, all the while determining the method of fighting it. If the new Czech Prime Minister, chosen as a result of the June elections, shall continue to implement the current government s plan, the country has a good chance to heal and stabilize the economic situation within three years. In Poland, however, even though the situation does not require such drastic intervention measures, the opportunities for major reform are also much smaller, due to the forthcoming Polish presidential and parliamentary elections, which could postpone the necessary decisions until Both Poland and the Czech Republic are trying to adopt the common currency. However, due to the recent turbulence within the eurozone, neither the countries belonging to it, nor the countries wishing to enter it are rushing with the decision to enter ERM 2. Perspectives agreed by Poland and the Czech Republic with the European Central Bank foresee the postponement of accession until 2015, at the earliest. For both countries the main challenge on the path to entering ERM 2 is the steadily growing budget deficit. Moreover, Poland must also deal with excessive inflation and very high long-term interest rates. 6 Attaining these objectives, however, is beneficial not only in the context of eurozone accession, but also in constituting the most necessary steps for overcoming the crisis. Each country must do its homework, but coordination and cooperation in preparing the Euro adoption strategy is certainly to be desired. 5 For a broader description of factors influencing the crisis in the Czech Republic and Poland, see: as of In order to achieve this, it will be necessary to move away from stimulating economic growth as the main strategy for combatting the crisis.

36 36 Aleksander Szpor Economic cooperation is an important factor in terms of Polish-Czech common actions undertaken to fight the crisis. With regard to trade, Poland is the Czech Republic s third largest partner, while the Czech Republic is Poland s fifth largest partner. 7 The steady increase of this trade balance accurately reflects the potential for economic cooperation between both countries. In addition, Poland is planning large spending on transport infrastructure in the coming years, which shall create an opening for the shrinking Czech labor market. The local dimension of the cooperation, concerning investment in border regions 8 using European funds, in particular from the Poland-Czech Republic Cross-border Cooperation Operational Program , is especially significant. Support for small and medium-sized enterprises by facilitating credit remains a key element of this cooperation. On the regional level, promoting market leaders, in particular among small and medium-sized enterprises, would constitute an additional stimulus to help strengthen Polish-Czech economic cooperation. Regardless of the decisions regarding the possible enlargement of the eurozone to include the Czech Republic and Poland, the governments of both countries should focus on enhancing the attractiveness and flexibility of the domestic market, as well as balancing the quality of life of citizens. In the slightly longer term, there will also be a need to move from the position of gross payer to net payer, in connection with the transformation from a cheap labour economy into a hi-tech and knowledge-based economy. To this effect, both countries must implement economic development strategies that will allow them in future to obtain a comparative advantage in selected areas of the European market. Maintaining the EU s social and economic cohesion and its further integration lies in the interests of both the Czech Republic and Poland. However, the Czech Republic, with GDP per capita amounting to 80% of the European average, leaves Poland at the level of 57% far behind. 9 This signifies that the objectives of both countries in creating the future cohesion and regional policy may vary. This issue, however, is certainly not yet closed and will be monitored based on progress made in EU negotiations over the future financial perspective. 7 For more see: gospodarcza+polski+z+krajami+ue+i+efta/czechy.htm as of Polish-Czech regional cooperation takes place in six Euroregions: Neisse, Cieszyn Silesia, Silesia, Pradziad, Glacensis, Beskidy. 9 Statisctics for 2008 according to: as of

37 Poland and the Czech Republic in the European Union Climate Policy Climate policy is increasingly reflected in national legislation and strategies, both in Poland and the Czech Republic. 10 The main motor for change is the strategy, which obliges countries to reduce greenhouse gas emissions, increase usage of renewable energy sources and improve energy efficiency. Despite the economic crisis, which has reduced the ambitious targets set out by European green policy leaders, there is still a clearly visible gap between old and new EU countries. The obsolete and high-emission industrial framework and the lack of funds for investing in renewable energy sources are common issues in Central and Eastern European states. EU budget negotiations - starting under the Hungarian Presidency in the first half of 2011 and continuing under Poland - will constitute an opportunity to strengthen the voice of the region in postulating the need to maintain climate policy cohesion. Obtaining a broader agreement within the EU with regard to EU climate policy mechanisms and the tasks facing individual member states will allow for effective interaction on the international arena. The negotiations on the new Energy Action Plan for , scheduled for March, will constitute an occasion to develop this cooperation. Drafting an agreement on such issues as energy security, broadening the common energy market and instituting a just partition of the implementation costs of the strategy would help obtain a stronger position in the COP 16 negotiations in Mexico. In the debate over climate policy, one cannot ignore the achievements of the Copenhagen summit, dubious as they may be. The lack of convincing arguments in the climate debate has undermined the credibility of the EU as a leader in this domain. This may result in the reduction of competitiveness of EU economies on the global market, in particular with regard to Central and Eastern European countries. Therefore, in the longer term, it is in the Polish, Czech and European interest to ensure adequate funding in future EU budgets (in the future financial perspective), in order to stimulate the research and development of new technologies and to incorporate them in strategic documents, in particular EU 2020, as well as to develop entrepreneurship related, among other things, to the use of new technologies. 10 More information available at the Webpage of the International Energy Agency as for the Czech Republic: and as for Poland: as for

38 38 Aleksander Szpor After the Treaty In the debate on the new, post-lisbon Treaty institutional structure of the European Union, the most attention is placed on two new positions: the President of the European Council and High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy. 11 The stance and actions of these officials were to be crucial not only in solving everyday issues, but also in accordance with the practice developed in the course of subsequent treaty amendments in creating important cases of precedence, which will serve as a reference for their successors. However, the appointment of Herman Van Rompuy and Catherine Ashton, candidates with little European experience, is rather an indication that EU member states wish to maintain control over the shaping of competences of these two positions. Even if the decision taken by these countries stemmed mainly from the fear of a threat to European integration, it does not foresee an easy start for the President of the European Council and the High Representative, who were meant to be the EU s new driving force. The weak position of both posts means that the institutional triangle Commission, Parliament and Council will remain of primary importance. As a result of Treaty changes, the Council will cooperate more closely with the European Council. In the ongoing competition to exert influence on the shape of the Union, the time it takes the Commission and Parliament to gain momentum in performing their duties works in favour of the Council and the European Council. Therefore, in the short term, it is the Council, under the direction of the European Council, which will take the major decisions. In this competition, member states should support the strengthening of the Community institutions, i.e. the Commission and the Parliament, but not without certain conditions. In the case of the Commission, there is a need for actions aimed at increasing the transparency of the decision-making process within the institution s framework and the respect for national parities in the employment structure. Simultaneously, Poland and the Czech Republic should not only actively support the Commission in all initiatives beneficial from the point of view of the community, but also precede them with their own proposals. The 11 The innovations relating to the competence of the President of the European Council include the provision of the TEU according to which the President shall ensure the Union s external representation in matters concerning the common foreign and security policy. This creates a potential conflict with the competence of the High Representative, who shall contribute through his proposals towards the preparation of the common foreign and security policy and shall ensure implementation of the decisions adopted by the European Council and the Council. In practical terms, a further fragment of the provision stating that the President shall perform this task without prejudice to the powers of the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, is of little significance.

39 Poland and the Czech Republic in the European Union Eastern Partnership project has so far been the most spectacular success of this type, but there is also a need for smaller initiatives, in which a group of leaders takes responsibility for implementing innovations in a particular field. In conjunction with the ability to cooperate with more experienced countries, such actions may contribute to strengthening the position of these countries. In the case of the European Parliament, it is necessary to strengthen Polish and Czech activities in undertaking political and legislative initiatives. This applies primarily to the broadly understood EU eastern policy, including the Eastern Partnership project, relations with Russia and energy security, since on these issues, MEPs from Poland and the Czech Republic represent particularly similar positions, with only minor variations arising from party lines. It is also important, however, to act in less strategic areas, such as education and culture. A very important issue from both the Polish and Czech perspective is the functioning of the European External Action Service. With the entry into force of the new treaty, the European Union has gained a single diplomatic corps and structure, which will include about five thousand civil servants arriving from the European Commission, the European Council and member state government administrations. The extent of External Action Service s diplomatic functions is not yet fully clear. Apart from exercising tasks currently performed by EC Delegations, will they also focus on other activities, such as representing the EU s economic interests or collecting security information for EU usage. 12 Developing the Community s esprit de corps within this institution, composed largely of employees who had previously represented national interests, may represent a challenge. There is no established EEAS share of expenditure on implementing external policies, nor a budget for this institution. The institution will possess a strong, Community-based character only if it will take into account the diplomatic experience of all member states. The appeal by Estonian President Toomas Ilves regarding the fair representation of Central and Eastern Europeans in the diplomatic corps was heard by Brussels. Together with other countries in the region, Poland and the Czech Republic should consistently strive to strengthen that voice, but also offer modern solutions which take into account the new challenges facing diplomacy in the 21st century According to the Treaty on European Union, the organization and functioning of the European External Action Service shall be determined by way of Council decision. The Council shall act on this matter at the request of the High Representative after consulting the European Parliament and obtaining the Commission s consent. 13 Carne Ross presented an interesting view on the matter, noting the lack of democratic legitimacy of these services, the separation of diplomats from the reality of multi-level decision making in international relations and the partial replacement of the hitherto existing state domination by the private sector and civil society. It s time to scrap ambassadors and their embassies in: Europe s World, Spring 2009, No. 11, p

40 40 Aleksander Szpor The project regarding the creation of joint diplomatic missions was a positive signal sent by the Visegrad countries with regard to this issue. The project to exchange officials and diplomats between Poland and the Czech Republic, based on French-German model of diplomatic cooperation, is an equally valuable, albeit smaller, initiative. Neither project, however, should remain closed to other countries in the future. Conclusions Despite some discrepancies in the Polish and Czech government position with regard to certain EU policies, and despite the differences in political and economic considerations of both countries, for the past several years Polish-Czech bilateral relations have been experiencing one of the best periods in their history. The economic cooperation of both countries still remains at a high level, even despite the crisis. Maintaining this trend in the long run requires the efficient use of aid offered by the EU, as well as proper promotion on the regional level. On the government level, the main strategy should be aimed at increasing market flexibility. Climate policy currently constitutes the axis of European economic policies, but also requires large investments. By entering this framework, Poland and the Czech Republic cannot remain complacent with regard to the possibility of changes in these priorities in the coming years. At the same time, they must ensure that climate policy does not just constitute an investment in modernization, but also an opportunity to develop research and gradually evolve into a knowledge-based economy. In the new institutional order, both Poland and the Czech Republic should aim to increase the transparency of decision-making processes and the integration of national parities (in the case of the Commission, the External Services, and the Council Secretariat). It is worth noting that both countries have received key positions in the College of Commissioners. The Czech Commissioner for Enlargement will work closely with both the President of the European Council and the High Representative. Moreover, he will constitute an important voice in eastern policy matters, which hold great importance for Poland and the Czech Republic. In turn, the position of the Polish Budget Commissioner will be of particular significance in the upcoming negotiations on the new financial perspective for

41 Filip Èernoch Petr Ocelík Czech-Polish co-operation in the field of energy: The potential of LNG for energy security in Central Europe The International Institute of Political Science of Masaryk University, Brno While functional, it lacks dynamic. This statement accurately summarises the mutual co-operation which exists between the Czech and Polish republics in the field of energy and energy security. It must however be noted that the above-referred to stagnation is only characteristic of the diplomatic and intergovernmental relations between both countries, while the energy business between the Czech Republic and Poland on the other hand is flourishing. Poland acquired (albeit with certain problems) and currently manages the strategic Czech refinery and petrochemical conglomerate Unipetrol, while the Czech ÈEZ Group successfully operates the upper Selsian power companies Elektrociep³ownia Chorzów Elcho Sp. z o.o. and Elektrownia Skawina S.A. Recently the ÈEZ Group submitted an offer with regard to the privatisation of the heating plants in the Polish towns of Bytom and Zabrze. Along with the German company RWE, it is also interested in participating in a tender for the purchase of shares in the Enea energy company. The planned bi-directional natural gas pipeline Moravia, which would connect the distribution systems of Poland and the Czech Republic in the Cieszyn region, is of strategic importance. The recent natural gas crisis serves to emphasise its significance. It is therefore regrettable that mutual energy co-operation at intergovernmental level between both countries is only limited to short-term activities, such as the Czech-Polish common approach towards modifying the

42 42 Filip Èernoch, Petr Ocelík emission trading system which was adapted during the negotiations on the energy and climate package. The fact that not even last January s natural gas crisis (which had a considerable impact on Central and South-eastern Europe), prompted the establishment of strong diplomatic ties in the field of energy supply and security between both countries is further exemplary of this unfortunate predicament. This paper will therefore focus on a particular area within which the co-operation of the Czech Republic and Poland, as well as the entire Central European region, could yield results in the form of increased energy security for all the parties involved. The area referred to concerns the supply of liquefied natural gas (LNG), and the so-called North-South connection project aimed at interconnecting the planned LNG terminals in Poland and Croatia. Notwithstanding that these are of course private projects which are financed predominantly from corporate resources, the role of States and individual governments should not be overlooked. This point is all the more prevalent considering the important security issues which are linked to energy security and planned infrastructure, as well as the fact that the States themselves hold shares in the majority of the energy companies operating in the various countries of this region. That is also why the LNG question, and the aforementioned connection, merits the attention and potential co-operation of individual governments, starting with Czech-Polish co-operation. LNG and the countries of the Visegrad Group: It is no exaggeration that liquefied natural gas can be regarded as one of the fastest developing markets in the global energy industry. Liquefied natural gas which does not depend on a fixed transit pipeline allows for the connection of the consumer to the majority of world producers. It introduces a significant element of competition into natural gas trade, while also allowing for the more flexible overall management of world natural gas transfers. In simplified terms, where there was once a long-term connection between the producer and the consumer provided through an expensive natural gas pipeline, a new market is emerging today, which is similar to the oil market. In this emerging market, liquefied natural gas is loaded onto a tanker and ideally unloaded at any LNG terminal anywhere in the world. Thus, LNG is becoming an interesting energy source for some European countries as it offers the possibility of decreased dependence on Russian supplies. LNG is also an interesting source because it offers the possibility of supplying Europe with energy supplies from previously inaccessible producer regions. Notwithstanding this, the large scale exploitation of liquefied natural gas has, until recently, been hindered by objective economic and technical

43 Czech-Polish co-operation in the field of energy reasons, including the high costs related to the entire LNG process, and the subsequent inability of LNG to compete with traditional pipeline supplies and high prices coupled with insufficient and low efficiency infrastructure. However, in the past number of years this situation has changed considerably. Due to rising world prices and the increasing consumption of energy, it now seems that, for the first time, LNG is becoming a real alternative to pipeline natural gas. That is why today, its import into the EU already represents approximately one third of the volume of Russian supply. This factor has also sparked a heated debate as to whether or not LNG could be the miraculous agent which could deliver Europe from ever more frequent energy disputes with Moscow by providing Europe with sufficient natural gas at a reasonable cost in the future. LNG is thus becoming an essential part of almost every debate on natural gas on the European continent. The governments of costal States, along with their energy companies are now considering investing massive amounts of money into re-gasification terminals. Moreover, liquefied natural gas has also made its way into the documents of the European Union, and its grant schemes. Map n. 1 source: Oœrodek Studiów Wschodnich,

44 44 Filip Èernoch, Petr Ocelík Liquefied natural gas can also be a useful instrument in energy security in light of its problem-free operation even at regional level. The situation of the Visegrad Group countries (V4) Czech Republic, Poland, Slovakia, and Hungary can serve as a typical contemporary example. In natural gas terms, these countries share two fundamental characteristics. The first such shared characteristic concerns the high dependency these countries have on supplies from the Russian Federation stemming from their former adherence to the Soviet bloc, and their role as transit countries for Russian natural gas flowing to Western Europe. The first supplies from the east arrived in Poland in 1966, and a year later the Brotherhood pipeline leading to the CSSR was constructed. This development was followed by the gradual construction of the current transit system connecting Russia and Western Europe. That is why, today, the vast majority of Russian natural gas flows through the V4 countries through the Svaz and Brotherhood natural gas pipelines which run through Slovakia and the Czech Republic and the Yamal natural gas pipeline which traverses Poland. For the Visegrad countries, this represented a long-term connection to a massive, and previously problem-free, supply of natural gas flowing through their territories. The flaws of this arrangement became apparent in the context of the new security environment in which the V4 States found themselves after the dissolution of the Soviet bloc, and their integration into contemporary western structures. Due to the stable supply of natural gas, the V4 countries were not forced to diversify their suppliers, which is why today their natural gas imports are predominantly linked with Russian supply; see Table 1. 1 While Poland, Hungary, and in a very limited manner also the Czech Republic, are able to cover a small part of their domestic consumption from their own resources, these resources are, in reality, very limited and insufficient to satisfy the long-term requirements of these countries. Table 1 also highlights the second aforementioned common characteristic of the Visegrad countries, which is shared by all EU Member States; the overall increase in the consumption of natural gas. While this factor is related to the preference of natural gas as an environmentally friendly energy source, it is also related to the relatively short time period necessary for the commencement of power generation which compares favourably to other energy sources. Importantly, the drop in the consumption of natural gas visible 1 In the case of the Czech Republic, the connection to the Norwegian supply through the North German natural gas pipeline NETRA, which opened in 1995, represents a certain diversification of suppliers. This pipeline is connected to a pre-existing connection between Berlin and North Bohemia (the VNG Leipzig pipeline system). Overall, this network provides the CR with approximately 20 25% of our total consumption. Norwegian natural gas started to flow into the CR in 1997, and the 20-year contract with the Norwegian consortium group of Statoil, Norsk Hydro, and Saga Petroleum stipulates a supply of 53 bcm/y.

45 Czech-Polish co-operation in the field of energy in the year 2008 may be attributed to the impact of the economic crisis, and it is very likely that this drop is only temporary and does not represent a long-term change in usage trends. LNG could be the means of resolving the current problem whereby the import of natural gas is under increasing pressure, and there are limited possibilities for geographical and transit diversification in its supply. Table 1. Situation of the V4 countries in natural gas supply from the Russian Federation bcm Domestic (billion cubic production. metres Year ) Consumption Import from Russia 08/overall import Russian import share in imports. Year 2008 Russian import share in consumption Year 2008 Czech R. 8,7 9,1 9,6 8,7 6,6/8,61 77% 76% Poland 4,1 bcm 11,1 13,1 13,7 13,9 7,2/9,8 73% 52% Slovakia 6,5 6,1 6,0 5,7 5,6/5,6 100% 98% Hungary 11,8 13,0 13,4 12,0 8,9/11,5 77% 74% So u r ce: BP Sta ti sti cal Re view of World Ene r gy. June On - li ne at: ve as sets/bp_in ter net/glo balbp/glo balbp_uk_en glish/re ports_and_pu b li ca tions/sta ti sti cal_ene r - gy_re view_2008/staging/lo cal_as sets/2009_do wnlo ads/na tu ral_gas_se c tion_2009.pdf. As of The first plans are on the table : The proposed use of liquefied natural gas in order to satisfy the needs of Central Europe rests in the finalisation of the planned LNG terminals in Poland and Croatia, and in their interconnection via the so-called North-South connection. The Œwinoujœcie terminal should become the cornerstone of the entire project. The construction of this terminal is planned in the port of Œwinoujœcie which is situated close to Szczecin. In the first phase, the terminal should be able to process approximately 2.5 bcm annually with a realistic expansion of its re-gasification capacity of up to 7.5 bcm. As in the case of most projects with a similar scope, the finalisation of the Œwinoujœcie terminal is also under delay. The originally planned opening of the terminal in 2011 has thus been postponed to 2014 or However, there are some positive developments in this respect in Poland. In mid-summer 2009, the Polish company PGNiG, which is the main guarantor of the construction, signed a Sales and Purchase Agreement with the Qatar Quatargas Operating Company Ltd. for the future supply of approximately 1.5 bcm of natural gas annually for a period of

46 46 Filip Èernoch, Petr Ocelík 20 years. 2 The selection of the project s main construction company has also been finalised by the selection of the Canadian SNC Lavalin, while the total cost of the project has been estimated at between million euro. If we compare the projected maximum capacity of the Polish terminal 7.5 bcm annually with the domestic consumption of approximately 14 bcm and the production of 4 bcm, coupled with imports from other countries, the Œwinoujœcie terminal demonstrates significant potential for natural gas re-export to Europe. This remains the case even if one considers the standard utilisation of re-gasification terminals, which differs greatly from the nominal capacity (in the case of the EU the average utilisation is 54%). On the other hand, the export potential of Œwinoujœcie may be limited by the anticipated steep increase in Poland s natural gas consumption which stems from the fact that today more than 90% of Poland s power is generated from coal. A massive dependence on natural gas can be expected in the future due, for example, to the introduction of the second generation of the European Emission Trading System (ETS) as of 2013, as well as the technical status of Poland s thermal power plants. The natural gas Nord Stream pipeline which is currently under construction, and which will connect Russian Vyborg with the German town of Greifswald through the Baltic Sea, may also affect natural gas consumption in Poland. The finalisation of this natural gas pipeline could lower the volume of gas flowing to Germany through pipelines in Poland, and could thus eventually lead to a decrease in Russian energy exports to Poland. At the moment, it is hard to quantify the consequences of these individual trends. It can however be concluded that, when Œwinoujœcie is finished, the European continent will gain a significant amount of natural gas in the form of LNG which Poland can further export. In fact, Poland may be forced to export LNG due to the high cost of the terminal s construction. These high costs could partially be recovered by revenue gained from re-export. The Adria terminal on the Croatian island of Krk should develop as the Southern European counterpart of the Polish terminal. This terminal is a joint venture between E.ON Ruhrgas with 31.15%, OMV with 25.58%, Total and Geoplin with 1% and previously RWE with 16.69% of the shares. However, the latter shareholder announced its withdrawal from the project on 20 October 2009, and its shares will probably be divided between the remaining companies. There is also a long-term ongoing debate about the participation of Croatian companies INA, HEP, and Plinarco. After the finalisation of the second construction phase, the terminal should be capable of 2 Umowa na dostawy LNG podpisana. Oficiální portál PGNIG. On-line text at As of

47 Czech-Polish co-operation in the field of energy processing up to 15 bcm of natural gas annually. The terminal opening is planned for Total costs will reach 800 million euro. From the perspective of Central and Southeast Europe, the most interesting aspect of the terminal is its fairly large capacity (up to 15 bcm/y) when compared to Croatian domestic natural gas consumption which stood at 3.2 bcm in The export potential from the terminal is thus evident, as stressed in the official documentation of the project: (The project) will not only satisfy gas demand in Croatia, but will also secure alternative natural gas supply routes for markets in Central and Southern Europe In this way, Croatia becomes an important player on the fast-growing European Union energy market. 3 This very promising first impression of the Adria project is however somewhat clouded by one fundamental problem the long-term delay in the commencement of the terminal s construction. While the first construction plans date from as far back as 1995, the feasibility study was only concluded in Moreover, the terminal still requires a building permit and approval for its location, both of which should be issued in Notwithstanding that the construction of the LNG terminal is strongly supported by the Croatian government, and in light of the fact that the ever growing debate concerning the energy security of the country prompts its quick completion, the credibility of the project along with the perspectives for its finalisation are impeded. This situation has only been compounded by the aforementioned withdrawal of RWE a financially and politically strong actor on the European energy market with its own LNG portfolio. While the reasons for this withdrawal remain unknown at the time of the writing of this text, the official position of RWE states its withdrawal was the result of the restructuring of the Company s policy concerning its LNG projects in Europe. Table 2 Capacity State Operating since: Adriatic LNG 8.3 bcm/y Italy Rovigo-North Adriatic 2008 Trieste 8.0 bcm/y Italy Zaula 2009, Offshore 2010 Revithoussa 4.2 bcm/y Greece 2000 Marmara 6.0 bcm/y Turkey 1994 Aliaga 7.4 bcm/y Turkey 2009 The conundrum concerning the construction of key LNG terminals which could have a dramatic influence on energy security and supply in Central 3 Adria LNG. On-line text at: As of

48 48 Filip Èernoch, Petr Ocelík Europe is accentuated by the planned German Wilhelmshaven terminal. This terminal is currently being constructed by E.ON, which is also participating in the Nord Stream project, in order to meet seasonal demand. The completion of the Wilhelmshaven terminal will therefore probably not be critical insignificantly decreasing the dependence of European countries on Russian supply. Moreover, the terminals in Italy (Adria, Trieste), Greece (Tevithoussa), or Turkey (Marmasa, Aliaga) bear an even more limited potential. While all of these facilities are beyond the direct reach of the region under analysis for the purpose of this paper, their activities are also focused on, and contracted to, other customers. Table 3. Import terminals with potential for V4 countries Adria (CH) Œwinoujœcie (POL) Wilhelmshav en (GER) Total Investor OMW, Total, RWE, PGNIG E.on Geoplin, E.on Capacity/expansion / /35 (bcm/y) Finalisation 2014 Q Cost (milion euro) The North-South connection: Up until this point, the situation looks quite promising, with at least two large LNG terminals, both with significant export potential, awaiting construction. At a very basic estimate, the maximum projected capacity of both terminals is 22.5 bcm/y, with a typical utilisation of 54%. This adds up to more than 10 billion cubic metres, which represents more than two thirds of the combined consumption of natural gas in the Czech Republic and Slovakia. Notwithstanding this, the problem lies in the missing transit infrastructure which would facilitate the transport of these supplies. As mentioned before, major high capacity natural gas pipelines in Central Europe run East-West. No North-South interconnection exists as such a transit route was not necessitated in the Soviet era. Without this infrastructure, the potential of both LNG terminals to contribute to the energy security of the V4 region, as well as the broader Central European region, is minimal. The gravity of the situation was best demonstrated by the natural gas crisis in January 2009, when disputes between Russia and Ukraine led to the temporary cessation in the supply of natural gas to Europe. This had a significant impact on, among other countries, Slovakia. As Slovakia is

49 Czech-Polish co-operation in the field of energy Map n. 2 source: Petržílka, O., Kastl, J.: Jaký vliv bude mít plynová krize a ekonomická recese na budoucnost dodávek zemního plynu pro Èeskou republiku? Pro-Energy 3/2009 completely dependent on Russian natural gas imports, it was thus forced to restrict supply to approximately one thousand of its large companies (with a consumption of more than 60 thousand m 3 daily), and was also faced with the possibility of a natural gas shortage for domestic use. At that time, Zsolt Hernádi, the Chairman of the Board of Directors of the local refinery and petrochemical company MOL Hungary, offered assistance. 4 However, due to the absence of a relatively short interconnection between the Slovakian and Hungarian networks, at least a portion of the required natural gas had to be routed through a system of Czech pipelines from Germany. In fact, the afore-described crises allowed Germany the opportunity to test its reverse operation for the first time. The cost of the natural gas shortage thus was 4 Slovensko je pripravené èerpa maïarský plyn. On-line news 24. hodín. On-line text at: As of

50 50 Filip Èernoch, Petr Ocelík estimated by the Slovak Prime Minister Robert Fico at one hundred million euro daily. 5 There is no doubt that a good interconnection system between Central European countries would be capable of minimising these costs, as well as the costs of other countries suffering from similar supply shortages. The problems relating to the incomplete energy infrastructure in Central European countries have, however, been evident for a long time. Consequently, various alternatives to the so-called North-South connection similar to the one in pic. 2 are being discussed, at at least at expert level. Ideally, a network of interconnectors should link producers like Denmark (in the case of an LNG terminal) or Poland with Central Europe and the Balkans, with the supply terminating in Croatia. It is necessary to understand that, at the moment, this plan only represents a vague concept, which is shared by some experts and politicians in order to address the demand for alternative transit routes to the existing connection between Russia Western Europe. The issue of the North-South connections is thus more generally regarded as one of the energy priorities in a number of documents and strategies produced by the EU institutions. However, this does not represent the existence of a classic project concerning one natural gas pipeline with a clear route, specific schedule, construction consortium, and budget. New and planned interconnectors: The fact that the North-South connection project is not yet specified is not, however, commensurate to an absence of progress in this area. Individual States in the region, as well as natural gas companies, realise the advantages of a more integrated gas network and invest in this field without a direct link to the construction of terminals in Poland and Croatia. The annual Russian-Ukrainian disputes represent a strong incentive for cooperation in this regard. The effort to maximise the number of transit routes is also supported by the growing consumption of natural gas, and thus the need for an increase in supply volume. The joint development agreement between the Hungarian transit company and operator FGSZ Ltd. and its Croatian counterpart Plinarco on the interconnection of their transit systems by the Városfold Slobodnica pipeline from 3 March 2009 serves as a typical example. The future pipeline is due to be finished by 2011, and is intended to cover a distance of 296 km at a capacity of 6,5 bcm annually. Also relevant in this context is the projected interconnection 5 SR stále bez ruského plynu, dodávky prúdia z Èeska. On-line news 24. hodín. On-line text at: Ceska.html. As of

51 Czech-Polish co-operation in the field of energy of the Hungarian and Slovakian networks. This project is aimed at covering a distance of 115 km between the towns of Ve¾ký Krtíš and Vecsec on the outskirts of Budapest, and should be operational by When commenting on the project, 6 Andreas Rau, who is one of the Chairmen of the Board of Directors of the shareholder company Eustream Ltd. (the second shareholder company is the Hungarian FGSZ Ltd.) stated that: the concept behind the project is simple. Sufficient cross-border capacities will increase the liquidity of the natural gas market as well as increase the security of natural gas supply to this region. Map n. 3 source: Zpracováno na základì Plánu evropské hospodáøské obnovy, IP/09/142 Both aforementioned projects basically form a part of the North-South connection concept, along with a number of other planned or constructed interconnectors depicted in pic. 3. The original uncertainty surrounding the potential benefits of developing LNG terminals for the Central European market is also gradually dissipating, largely due to the fact that the European Union has allocated resources in order to support the construction of these 6 Slovensko s Maïarskom prepojí nový plynovod. On-line text at: As of