REPORT. Human Security, Climate Change and Environmentally Induced Migration

Transcription

1 REPORT Human Security, Climate Change and Environmentally Induced Migration United Nations University - Institute for Environment and Human Security 30 June 2008

2 Authors This report was written by: Dr. Koko Warner, Dr.Tamer Afifi, Olivia Dun, Marc Stal, and Sophia Schmidl. Prof. Dr. Janos Bogardi, Director of UNU-EHS and Vice Rector in Europe, a.i. oversaw this report. The report is a product of the UNU-EHS Section on Environmental Migration, Social Vulnerability, and Adaptation. Acknowledgements This paper supports the Greek chairmanship of the Human Security Network in raising political awareness on the human security impact of climate change on vulnerable groups, including less known consequences on these population groups like environmentally induced migration. We appreciate the opportunity to work with Hellenic Foundation for European and Foreign Policy (ELIAMEP) and the Hellenic Republic Ministry of Foreign Affairs in producing this report. We wish to thank all those who contributed to and promoted the progress of this report through comments, interviews, and review: Philippe Boncour, Frank Laczko, Jobst Koehler (International Organization for Migration, Geneva), Tanja Dedovic, International Organization for Migration (Vienna), Andrew Morton (United Nations Environment Program, Geneva), Anthony Oliver-Smith ( Munich Re Foundation Chair on Social Vulnerability, University of Florida), Tom Downing (Stockholm Environment Institute, Oxford Office and Munich Re Foundation Chair on Social Vulnerability), Mohammed Hamza (Stockholm Environment Institute, Oxford Office), Thomas Loster (Munich Re Foundation), Richard Black and Dominique Kniveton (University of Sussex), Fabrice Renaud and Joern Birkmann (UNU-EHS). Thanks go to Simone Albrecht, Michael Zissener and Denise Loga for help with copy editing. We thank our collaborating EACH-FOR partners and the European Commission s support for this empirical research. Our research was invaluably supported by colleagues in partner institutions: International Organization for Migration (IOM) (Geneva), International Organization for Migration (Vienna) for assistance in coordinating fieldwork and contact with regional IOM offices. We thank the regional IOM offices in Vietnam, Mozambique, and Egypt as well as the many interview partners in study countries for the invaluable fieldwork support. We thank the German Advisory Council on Global Change (WBGU) for helpful discussions and for a map illustrating environmental hotspots and migration. We appreciate the ongoing collaboration with the Munich Re Foundation in exploring the links between environmental stressors, migration, and the interactions with social vulnerability. We also thank the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), the Rockefeller Foundation, UNEP, UNFCCC, UNCCD, and the ACP for ongoing discussions in this emerging thematic area. Contact: Koko Warner warner@ehs.unu.edu 2

3 Table of Contents AUTHORS...2 ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS...2 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY...5 Keywords...8 SECTION 1. MIGRATION: A NEXUS OF CLIMATE CHANGE AND HUMAN SECURITY INTRODUCTION HUMAN SECURITY DIMENSIONS OF ENVIRONMENTALLY INDUCED MIGRATION Human security: A paradigm shift Defining the migration-environment phenomenon Does environmentally induced migration threaten human security? SECTION 2: CLIMATE CHANGE AND HUMAN MOVEMENT TIPPING POINTS AND MASS MIGRATION? SLOW ONSET CHANGE INCREASES THE ENVIRONMENTAL SIGNAL IN MIGRATION PATTERNS SECTION 3: CURRENT RESEARCH ON ENVIRONMENTAL CHANGE AND MIGRATION RESEARCH METHODS GRAVITY MODEL COMPLEMENTS FIELDWORK ON IMPACT OF ENVIRONMENTAL FACTORS ON MIGRATION DESERTIFICATION IN EGYPT Short Overview: Migration and Environmental Challenges in Egypt Links between environmental hot spots and migration in Egypt Conclusions FLOODING AND RELOCATION IN MOZAMBIQUE Mozambique: Environment and displacement processes Links between flooding and displacement in Mozambique Conclusions about environment and displacement along the Zambezi River valley in Mozambique FLOODING IN THE MEKONG RIVER DELTA IN VIETNAM Mekong Delta Overview: Environment and Migration Processes Links between flooding and migration in the Mekong Delta Conclusions about environmentally induced migration in Vietnam CASE STUDY ANALYSIS Environment interacts with other factors to influence migration Migration occurs after environmental tipping points are exceeded Public responses Research methods and call for more in-depth empirical research SECTION 4. LOOKING FORWARD: SCENARIOS AND POLICY RESPONSES PATTERN OF ENVIRONMENTALLY INDUCED MIGRATION Degree to which environmental change affects livelihoods Degree to which relative affluence and asset ownership affects migration Severity and extent of environmental change now and in the future CLIMATE CHANGE MIGRATION SCENARIOS Migration impacts on the environment Migration impacts on human security WHAT ACTIONS MUST BE TAKEN? A FIVE-PRONGED POLICY APPROACH Building a strong scientific basis Increasing Awareness Improving legislation Contact: Koko Warner warner@ehs.unu.edu 3

4 4.3.4 Adequate humanitarian responses Strengthening institutions and policies SECTION 5. CONCLUSIONS ANNEX 1: DEFINITIONS AND DEBATES SURROUNDING ENVIRONMENTALLY INDUCED MIGRATION REFERENCES List of Figures Figure 1: Evolution of the security paradigm Figure 2: Displacement pattern after Hurricane Katrina (2005) Figure 3: A map of conflict and migration induced by environmental stressors Figure 4: EACH-FOR project case study research locations Figure 5: Distribution of arid and fertile lands in Egypt Figure 6: Limpopo Basin before and during the flooding ( ) Figure 7: Mozambique flood affected areas Figure 8: Simplified connection model of environmental triggers for displacement and migration along the Zambezi River valley Figure 9: 1 metre sea-level rise scenario % of Vietnam s population would be affected Figure 10: The Mekong River Basin Catchment Figure 11: Population Density in the Lower Mekong Basin Figure 12: Envisat image of the Mekong Delta in Vietnam, 6 February Figure 13: Duration and extents of major floods in the Lower Mekong Basin Figure 14: Conceptual framework to map the environmental signal in migration decisions Contact: Koko Warner warner@ehs.unu.edu 4

5 Human Security, Climate Change, and Environmentally Induced Migration Executive Summary Migration whether permanent or temporary, internal or international has always been a possible coping strategy for people facing environmental changes. Pre-history and history are marked by (episodic and localised) human movement from one climate zone to another, as people have sought out environments that would support survival as well as aspirations to a more stable existence. Some waves of migration have been associated with cultural collapse, as familiar landscapes no longer provided safe or supporting habitats and livelihoods for people. In geologic time Earth has experienced profound changes in climate, massive extinction of species, and even shifts in poles. What appears to be different this time is one species own role in contributing to the change, and the effects of climate change on itself and ecosystems upon which it depends. Environmentally induced migration has the potential to become a phenomenon of a scale and scope not experienced in human memory. Its effects on the global economy, international development, and national budgets could have significant implications for almost all dimensions of human security, in addition to political and state security. Today, environmental change including climate change presents a new threat to human security and a new situation for migration. By 2050 when human population is projected to peak, some 9 billion people will live on Earth. The majority of them will live in urban areas with crushing environmental footprints. Many megacities are located in areas prone to sea level rise. Climate change will visit urban and rural areas alike with increasingly frequent and violent hazard events. Flooding, intense storms, or droughts, or more gradual but similarly intense changes in regional climates place great stress on livelihood systems. Faced with an unconceivable scale of environmental change, migration may be an adjustment mechanism of first resort, or a survival mechanism of last resort. Mitigation of greenhouse gases will likely be insufficient to avoid global temperature increases of 2 C or more, making adaptation a necessity at all scales. Migration may be an adaptation mechanism for those with the resources to move early and far enough away from danger. However, in extreme cases and for those with fewer means to move, migration may be an expression of failed adaptation an attempt to escape from imminent suffering or even death. This study explores the relevant dimensions of human security and the challenges posed by climate change and environmentally induced migration. The authors assess how environmental factors including climate change affect vulnerable groups, and how environmental pressures may force people to flee their homes currently and in the future. This study claims to be the first to quantify with help of a gravity model the potential impacts of environmental factors on global human migration stocks. While the question of environmentally induced migration has been addressed by scholars for three decades, no targeted field research has been reported on this subject. This report helps fill that gap by reporting on part of an empirical global study of environmental change and forced migration scenarios. Presenting three recent country case studies, the paper looks at current patterns of environmental degradation and migration in: Egypt (desertification and sea level rise), Mozambique (government-sponsored resettlement and humanitarian assistance to flood victims) Vietnam (flooding and displacement) Contact: Koko Warner warner@ehs.unu.edu 5

6 These case studies result from fieldwork in which expert interviews, a survey of migrants, and a related survey of non-migrants living in areas with documented environmental degradation were carried out by UNU-EHS within the framework of the European Commission supported Environmental Change and Forced Migration Scenarios (EACH-FOR) project, and implemented in cooperation with the International Organization for Migration (IOM). The approach provides an evidence-based analysis of the challenges posed by climate change to human security and migration. A comparative analysis of field studies points towards three main results: Environmental factors currently contribute to migration in cases observed. These environmental factors interact with many other factors to influence migration. The environmental signal is stronger than perceived by migrants themselves: The principle current pathway through which environmental change affects migration is through livelihoods. Livelihoods deteriorate due to changing climatic conditions and land degradation over time. The more direct the link between environmental quality and livelihoods, the stronger the role of environmental push factor in migration choices. Migration occurs after a certain environmental tipping point is exceeded. Fieldwork with non-migrants living in areas facing documented environmental degradation indicated that people feel that if environmental conditions worsen, at some point they will choose to migrate. The ability to earn a livelihood in a given climate and environment is one of the determining factors that potential migrants are concerned about for the future. What is unknown is how mounting environmental pressures affect migration. Government responses vary from offering mobility incentives to mandatory resettlement programmes, with mixed results. For example, the Egyptian government designed a program to fight desertification by offering land ownership to those willing to migrate to desert reclamation project areas in the Western Desert. However, groundwater salinity threatens the sustainability of the scheme. Few immigrants remain in the land reclamation areas, some others move to other reclamation areas that have not been exploited and where the water salinity problem has not yet appeared. Many of these migrants join a flux of internal and even cross-border migrants seeking secure livelihoods. The governments of Mozambique and Vietnam have taken more direct regulatory control of environmentally-related migration. After a decade of increasingly frequent and devastating flooding, the government of Mozambique initiated mandatory resettlement of people living in the flood plains to relocation centers in high lying areas. Similarly in Vietnam the government has relocated people living in areas threatened by riverbank erosion, flooding and storm surges to higher ground. In both cases the benefits of relocating people include moving them out of harm s way. Though understandable and commendable humanitarian actions, resettlement imply high costs: exposing displaced people to the loss of livelihoods, debt, and disintegration of communities without addressing the environmental stressor itself. The report bases its policy recommendations on empirical research, which has been carried out as part of the EACH-FOR project. The report suggests that the pattern of environmentally induced migration is affected by at least three major factors: The degree to which environmental change affects livelihoods. Livelihoods are affected by environmental change, especially in rural areas. The fieldwork in this study found a detectable environmental signal linked to a home country environment that is degraded to the point where livelihood pressures emerge. In Vietnam, for example, survey respondents indicated that following flooding, and when government or other forms of humanitarian aid were not available, people migrated to look for work. In some extreme and likely limited cases, experts and survey respondents noted that people, especially children and women, became more vulnerable to human trafficking due to livelihood stress caused by annual flooding in some areas of the Mekong Delta. If environmental conditions change to the extent that certain regions experience systematic collapse in livelihood chains, then environmentally induced migration could affect a wider Contact: Koko Warner warner@ehs.unu.edu 6

7 swath of people and come at a time when tipping points have been crossed for critical ecosystem services. The degree to which relative wealth (affluence) and asset ownership affects migration. It is not yet known whether those who migrate first are relatively well off ( those who can migrate, will migrate ) or those who migrate first are those with the greatest direct dependence on environmental quality. Development literature suggests that relatively affluent households have a stronger ability than very poor households to secure their standards of living in the face of change (UNDP 2006). Empirical research is needed to establish the degree to which migration is a coping mechanism and how migration helps households to secure desired standards of living. Research has documented the pattern of remittances from rural-to-urban migrants. Such migrants often leave home in response to environmental factors like severe drought or other natural hazards. After migration, they send remittances back home to help support a larger number of family members still living in rural areas. Some urban migrants also noted that sending one or two children away to cities to earn a living was a form of risk management for families whose livelihoods depended heavily on the environment. Steady remittance income for those interviewed in Vietnam was a way to balance variations in environmental cycles that affected harvests. Households with fewer assets and less coping capacity vis-à-vis environmental change may have to accept worsening standards of living if they cannot afford to migrate. The severity and extent of environmental change now and in the future. The current environmental signal in migration in those case studies analysed so far is detectable, even among the more prominent economic or political factors. In addition, due to migrant network connections, environmental degradation unleashes processes that perpetuate existing migration patterns. Empirical study suggests that the severity and extent of environmental change will drive migration; yet it remains difficult to estimate the number or pace of this kind of environmental exodus. A challenge of environmentally induced migration is potentially larger movements of people in zones between different countries or regions. Such flows of (poor) migrants could occur in already-resource stressed environments potential tinderboxes for conflict and with implications for the need for large scale humanitarian assistance. Environmentally induced migration is an issue of increasing policy relevance, because of inherent uncertainties and the potential magnitude and scope of this phenomenon. Climate-related stressors combined with ecosystem change - such as sea level rise - and rapid-onset events - such as flooding - have the potential to drive migration or prompt national governments to plan for the relocation and resettlement of affected populations. This study concludes with five policy recommendations and a call to promote international synergies and identify solutions for migration related to climate change. Likewise, it strongly recommends that the environmental dimension should be considered in the ongoing high level international dialogue on migration. These recommendations include: Building a strong scientific basis. As the window for identifying appropriate adaptation pathways for climate change narrows, it is imperative to address how changing environmental conditions affects individual and group decisions to migrate. Robust definitions are needed for environmentally induced migrants and people displaced by environmental push factors. These definitions can facilitate identification, measurement, characterization, and appropriate policy responses. A new level of policy and scientific attention to this issue is required to identify the policy alternatives which smooth the way forward and avoid tensions or even conflict over natural and social resources. Increasing awareness. Knowledge about environmental degradation and climate change can arm governments, migrants, and potential migrants against losses in human security. At the national level, countries must understand how environmental processes and environmental quality affect living standards of their populations. As some environments become inhospitable to people, people will be pushed to move elsewhere where their locally specific knowledge may no longer apply to the places where they Contact: Koko Warner warner@ehs.unu.edu 7

8 migrate. Displaced people may not always receive the support they need in places of destination. For those displaced to locations where adequate infrastructure is not available and where they are directly dependent on the environment for survival, there can be an over-exploitation of natural resources leading to a lack of potable water, soil degradation, cutting of trees and clearing of land, but also to pollution and potential epidemics. Under such circumstances, a range of maladaptive activities can drive migrants to further stress ecosystems, and may unleash a number of secondary environmental catastrophes. Awareness can help avoid maladaptation. Improving legal frameworks. At the regional level, multilateral dialogue may be necessary about how to address, coordinate, and ease environmental pressures as well as migration that results in part because of climate change. Policy and legal frameworks need to address environmentally induced migration. Frameworks must be established for dealing with individuals and groups induced to migrate because of environmental change. There is still active debate about including environmentally induced migrants within international treaties or developing a new international convention that would recognize individuals or communities whose displacement is mainly by environmental factors. Adequate humanitarian response. Gradual and sudden environmental changes will result in substantial human movements and displacements, and these situations will require sufficient and timely humanitarian efforts to avoid escalating crises. It is essential to enable organizations such as the UNHCR, the IFRCRC, and the IOM to effectively fulfill their mandates in helping different parts of the population of people on the move. Natural disasters may displace larger numbers of people for relatively short periods of time, while the steady and continuous impact of climatic drivers are likely to permanently displace many more people in a less visible way. In the face of environmental stressors, people in Egypt Mozambique and the Mekong Delta have already adapted by migration and will do so in the future. Strengthening institutions and policies. Institutions in both source and receiving countries should work together to ensure safe, non-criminal, and orderly migration relations. The magnitude of future environmentally induced migration depends in part on longer term environmental and development policies. Scenarios might estimate a large range: from a very large amount of environmentally induced migrants if both environmental and development policies fail massively, such as a failure to meet the Millennium Development Goals and a simultaneous failure to reduce greenhouse gas emissions contributing to climate change to a small number of environmentally induced migrants if favourable intervening variables such as improved risk management ameliorate the necessity of moving. The time to address the effects of dangerous environmental change including climate change is now. Action must be concerted and swift: Policy makers, the scientific community, civil society and other actors must seek solutions for those people who are currently migrating and who may be induced to migrate in order to seek safe and sustainable existences. Human security requires freedom from fear, freedom from want, and freedom from hazard impact. Most importantly, achieving human security in the face of environmental change requires urgent policy attention and action today. Keywords Human security, climate change, environmentally induced migration, humanitarian assistance, Egypt, Vietnam, Mozambique, scenarios for the future. Contact: Koko Warner warner@ehs.unu.edu 8

9 Section 1. Migration: A nexus of climate change and human security 1.1 Introduction Migration whether permanent or temporary, internal or international has always been a possible coping strategy for people facing environmental changes. Pre-history and history are marked by (episodic and localised) human movement from one climate zone to another, as people have sought out environments that would support survival as well as aspirations to a more stable existence. Some waves of migration have been associated with cultural collapse, as familiar landscapes no longer provided safe or supporting habitats and livelihoods for people. In geologic time Earth has experienced profound changes in climate, massive extinction of species, and even shifts in poles. What appears to be different this time is one species own role in contributing to the change, and the effects of climate change on itself and ecosystems upon which it depends. Environmentally induced migration has the potential to become a phenomenon of a scale and scope not experienced in human memory. Its effects on the global economy, international development, and national budgets could have significant implications for almost all dimensions of human security, in addition to political and state security. Today, environmental change including climate change presents a new threat to human security and a new situation for migration. By 2050 when human population is projected to peak, some 9 billion people will live on Earth. The majority of them will live in urban areas with crushing environmental footprints. Many megacities are located in areas prone to sea level rise. Climate change will visit urban and rural areas alike with increasingly frequent and violent hazard events. Flooding, intense storms, or droughts, or more gradual but similarly intense changes in regional climates place great stress on livelihood systems. Faced with an unconceivable scale of environmental change, migration may be an adjustment mechanism of first resort, or a survival mechanism of last resort. Mitigation of greenhouse gases will likely be insufficient to avoid global temperature increases of 2 C or more, making adaptation a necessity at all scales. Migration may be an adaptation mechanism for those with the resources to move early and far enough away from danger. However, in extreme cases and for those with fewer means to move, migration may be an expression of failed adaptation an attempt to escape from imminent suffering or even death. Climate-related stressors, combined with ecosystem change, have the potential to drive migration or prompt national governments to plan for the relocation and resettlement of affected populations. As some environments become inhospitable, these people move elsewhere where their locally specific knowledge may no longer apply. Displaced people may not receive the sustained support they need in places of destination. Such people may find themselves in locations where adequate infrastructure is not available and where they are directly dependent on the environment for survival. Newly migrated people can over-exploit natural resources leading to a lack of potable water, soil degradation, and deforestation. Under such circumstances, a range of maladaptive activities can drive migrants to further stress ecosystems, and may unleash a number of secondary environmental catastrophes. Brauch noted that global environmental change deals with changes in nature and society that have affected humankind as a whole and will increasingly affect human beings who are both a cause of this change and often also a victim. However, those who have caused it and those who are most vulnerable to and affected by it are not always identical. (Brauch 2005: 13). Contact: Koko Warner warner@ehs.unu.edu 9

10 Thus, beyond preliminary indications of the magnitude and patterns of environmentally induced migration, this study explores the effects of climate change on migration and human security. The report first makes the link between human security and environmentally induced migration. Next, the report reviews the state of scientific knowledge about climate change and broad geographical patterns, and lays out a conceptual framework for environmentally induced migration. In the third section, the study introduces the first global scoping project on environmentally induced migration (EACH-FOR), the methodology, and main findings. Section three also examines results from a gravity model which underscores evidence of the causal relationship between environmental change and migration. The case studies in Egypt, Mozambique, and Vietnam complete the section and offer additional insights to the literature about environmentally induced migration. These case studies are part of a first-time ever systematic examination of the links between environmental degradation and migration worldwide, and represent the single most important contribution of this study. Section four examines possible future scenarios of environmental change and migration. The section presents a five-point policy strategy to move forward thinking and action on environmentally induced migration related to climate change. Finally, the report draws conclusions about the links today and tomorrow between climate change, migration, and human security. 1.2 Human security dimensions of environmentally induced migration It is useful to review what is known to date about the relationship between climate change, human security, and environmentally induced migration. This section first notes the paradigm shift from traditional concepts of security towards a perspective centered on freedom from fear, from hazard impacts, and from want. The section then examines whether climate change poses a threat to human security through the pathway of migration Human security: A paradigm shift Environmentally induced migration has emerged as a compelling policy-relevant research area. This is in part due to improved understanding and public dialogue about the effects of climate change, as well as the widening economic and social gaps between already-developed and less developed countries. As signals of environmental degradation, natural hazards, migration, and a wide spectrum of other stressors have increased, experts seek a new concept of human security and development to guide policy. Since the 1970s and 1980s, policy discussions of human welfare have been closely linked to discussions of environmental quality. Nascent within this concept was the idea of vulnerability, reflected in early publications by ecologists and social scientists (Holling 1973; Timmerman 1981). Research on the effects of specific stressors like environmental degradation on society grew during this time period. Environmental issues have been seen in the broader context of human security since the end of the Cold War, which marked the end of political bipolarity and the narrow, mainly military notion of security that predominated the discourse at that time (Brauch 2005). The Brundtland report (1987) introduced the concept of sustainable development, followed by broad public discussion and a series of United Nations summits on environment and sustainable development (World Conferences in Rio 1992 and Johannesburg 2002). In this respect, the United Nations Conference on Environment and Development (UNCED), informally known as the Earth Summit, held in Rio de Janeiro in 1992 was a critical point in mainstreaming environmental issues at the international level. The event heralded the development of various UN Conventions dealing with environmental issues, for example, the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), the Convention on Biological Diversity and the United Nations Convention to Combat Contact: Koko Warner warner@ehs.unu.edu 10

11 Desertification (UNCCD). These conventions and conferences directly and specifically address environmental issues that affect human security. By the beginning of the 21 st century, climate change and harrowing effects of extended drought or extreme hurricanes (Hoeppe and Pielke 2006; IPCC 2007), crushing economic inequality, disease, lack of natural resources and resulting migration have all shaped a new reality for the human security paradigm (Warner 2007).The paradigm inseparably links humans, their social systems, and their environments and strives to achieve freedom from fear, freedom from hazard impact, and freedom from want (Holzmann and Jorgenson 2000; UNDP 2004; Annan 2005, Brauch 2005). The paradigm has been shaped in part by a recognition of the need to achieve greater societal resilience and improved environmental conditions among the world s most vulnerable people (UN 2006a). Figure 1 illustrates how the concept of security and development has shifted away from statecentric models with a focus on sovereign states and the military notion of security, to a more encompassing idea of human development as freedom. This freedom to achieve sustainable development implies security from natural and social disruptions. Traditiona Sovereign states, national and political dimensions, peace, etc. Emergenc Dimensions of human security: Political Environmental Economic Food Health Freedom from fear Freedom from hazard impact Freedom from want Sustainable Development Figure 1: Evolution of the security paradigm Defining the migration-environment phenomenon The links between environmental change and migration causes much public and scientific debate. Many terms are used to refer to this phenomenon. These terms include environmental migrants, environmental refugees, environmentally forced migrants, and a number of other variations. Yet there is no full consensus about how to define the issue. This paper refers to people who have an environmental signal in their reason for migration as environmentally induced migration, in line with the 2007 working definition provided by the International Organization for Migration (IOM 2007). This working definition allows discussions to Contact: Koko Warner warner@ehs.unu.edu 11

12 continue in spite of the lack of an agreed-upon international definition of environmental migration. The working definition also allows enough flexibility for early empirical work such as this study to capture the complex blend of factors relevant to policy makers today. Thus, a pragmatic approach was taken to use the IOM working definition of environmentally induced migration: Environmental migrants are persons or groups of persons who, for compelling reasons of sudden or progressive change in the environment that adversely affects their lives or living conditions, are obliged to leave their habitual homes, or choose to do so, either temporarily or permanently, and who move either within their country or abroad (IOM 2007a). Annex 1, based on a 2007 paper by Renaud et al., provides a discussion of the main definitions and debates surrounding terms such as climate refugee, environmental refugee, environmental migrant and so forth. Annex 1 focuses particularly on the debate of whether environmentally induced migrants are refugees. The annex also provides an example of how policy makers can differentiate among environmentally induced migrants Does environmentally induced migration threaten human security? Security, climate change, and migration are the three topics that currently dominate international and national political discussions. But the links between the three are not yet clear. Nor is it clear to policy makers what the consequences of failure to ensure human security might be. In the past few decades environmental degradation has become a recognized threat to human security. The new paradigm of security, discussed above, implies greater international awareness of the importance of sustainable development for all people including an intact environment and the ability of all people to enjoy health and decent work. The international community has implemented numerous programs to reduce poverty, improve environmental conditions, and fight threats to human security like desertification and climate change. Processes such as desertification and climate change have received widespread international attention, and the United Nations established secretariats to address these threats at the Rio Conference in For migration in particular, the publication of a paper by El-Hinnawi (1985) on environmental refugees (in e.g. Castles 2002) spawned debate about whether environmental degradation is a major cause of migration throughout the world. The United Nations is currently re-thinking its strategy with respect to the theme of migration through the High-Level Dialogue on Migration and Development. But in spite of attempts to deal with environmental problems and limit their socio-economic consequences, the world s ecosystems have continued to degrade and decline (Millennium Ecosystem Assessment (MA) 2005). As a result migration may emerge as a coping capacity or adaptation mechanism in response to worsening environmental conditions. With the exception of an immediate and life threatening situation, the decision to migrate is often made in the context of a variety of push and pull factors. Rarely is the decision to migrate made due to a single reason. Among the root causes of migration are economic factors (poverty, unemployment), social factors (poor welfare or education), environmental factors (degradation of ecosystems, environmental disasters), degraded security conditions (disrespect for human rights, persecution of minority groups, armed conflicts, etc. Boswell and Crisp 2004). Migration is often also in response to perceived or actual differentials and disparities between regions or countries (GCIM 2005), although other factors such as demography, and the level of poverty also play pivotal roles (Hatton and Williamson 2003). The September 2006 UN High- Contact: Koko Warner warner@ehs.unu.edu 12

13 Level Dialogue on Migration and Development 1 (UN 2006b,c) highlighted that poverty is one of several factors forcing or encouraging people to migrate and that it is essential to address the root causes of international migration to ensure that people migrated out of choice rather than necessity (UN 2006c: 2). While it is important to understand the root causes of international migration, it is also necessary to understand the root causes of internal migration. Internal migration can sometimes be an intermediary step leading to international migration. Internal migration can particularly affect the poorest people, who may not have the means to migrate internationally. It is possible that environmentally induced migration (people displaced by environmental factors) may be detected in the first instance within the boundaries of a country rather than abroad. Statistics from the International Organisation for Migration (IOM) show that in 2005 there were an estimated 191 million migrants worldwide, up from 176 million in 2000 and representing roughly 3 percent of the global population (IOM 2007). Of these, the IOM estimated that percent were undocumented or illegal migrants (approximately 7 to 8 million in Europe and just over 10 million in the USA). The global number of refugees in 2005 reached an estimated 8.4 million persons (UNHCR 2006a). Migration and issues related to asylum seeking remain high on the political and policy agenda of many countries, particularly during election periods. Commonly, security policies focus on international issues, including migration, as security threats, whereas environmental migration/displacement is often -at least at the beginning- internal. These internal movements could lead to instability as well. For example, land degradation can lead to resource conflicts and local tension. But superimposed with migration, possibly of groups already competing for scarce land and productive assets, these tensions can escalate into political and even military conflicts. The regions facing the greatest challenges in achieving UN s Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) overlap largely with those facing the greatest risks related to both abrupt tipping points and slower onset change. If vulnerability to climate change is not reduced, poverty is likely to increase and the prospects of achieving the Millennium Development Goals deteriorate, making environmental change and migration human security issues. Section 2: Climate change and human movement The medium and long-term global implications of continuous environmental degradation have been evident to experts for some time. The point of departure for most climate change literature related to human population movement is to note the threat of rapidly changing weather patterns, the threat of ecosystem collapse, and sea level rise. These phenomena are useful to investigate because they highlight the complex interactions among climate-related phenomena and humanenvironment interactions such as land degradation, desertification, and natural resource exploitation. The forces that shape environmentally induced migration today are not solely external to human systems rather, as the 2007 Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) fourth assessment reports suggest, societies themselves drive some of the environmental change that in turn affects environmentally induced migration. This study discusses each of these environmental change issues and their relation to migration. These trends involve rapid-onset events and tipping points and slow-onset changes that contribute to migration pressures as climate change advances. 1 In its resolution 58/208 of 23 December 2003, the General Assembly decided to devote a highlevel dialogue to international migration and development during its sixty-first session in The purpose of the high-level dialogue is to discuss the multidimensional aspects of international migration and development in order to identify appropriate ways and means to maximize its development benefits and minimize its negative impacts. Additionally, the high-level dialogue should have a strong focus on policy issues, including the challenge of achieving the internationally agreed development goals, including the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs). (UN Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Population Division 2007, International Migration and Development Section). Contact: Koko Warner warner@ehs.unu.edu 13

14 2.1 Tipping points and mass migration? Human and environmental systems do not respond to change in a smooth fashion. Change sometimes happens in these systems during catastrophic shifts or tipping points. Tipping points occur when the cumulative effects of both slow and abrupt environmental changes and disturbances reach thresholds that result in dramatic and often rapid negative changes in environmental systems (Galaz et al. 2008). Small events such as droughts, floods, or pest outbreaks, might trigger environmental changes which are difficult or even impossible to reverse. This phenomenon has been observed for ecosystems such as coral reefs, freshwater resources, coastal seas, forest systems, savannah and grasslands, and even the global climate regime (Epstein and Mills 2005). As the world approaches the year 2050, scientists expect that tipping points will be exceeded and rapid onset events will increase (IPCC 2007). These developments could move migration to a new magnitude (Myers 2002, ChristianAid 2006). Recent cyclones in Burma and earthquakes in China have displaced together over 7 million people temporarily. Temporary displacement from natural catastrophes can further lead to permanent migration, as illustrated by the 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami and the 2005 Hurricane Katrina. The Indian Ocean Tsunami in late 2004, displaced over 2 million people (AidWatch 2006). The U.N. Office of the Special Envoy for Tsunami Recovery estimates that 1.5 million people lost their livelihoods in the aftermath of the tsunami, further complicating resettlement of migrants (ibid). Another devastating natural catastrophe, Hurricane Katrina resulted in the largest displacement of Americans in the country s history, dwarfing the impacts of the Dust Bowl another case of environmental degradation and migration. Hurricane Katrina ultimately caused about 1.5 million people to be displaced temporarily, and an estimated 300,000 people permanently (Grier 2005). Of the 1.5 million displaced people, an estimated 107,000 illegal immigrants and temporary guest workers experienced secondary displacement due to Katrina these affected people were already migrants when Katrina forced them to move again (Castillo 2005). As the number of economic and other forms of migrants grows worldwide, the potential for displacing people who are already uprooted grows. This presents a new challenge for humanitarian assistance, emergency and evacuation planning, and post-disaster rehabilitation programs. Figure 2 shows the distribution of Katrina refugees, showing that most of the 40,000 respondents that participated in this particular survey remained within the region. Contact: Koko Warner warner@ehs.unu.edu 14

15 Figure 2: Displacement pattern after Hurricane Katrina (2005) Figure 2: Displacement pattern after Hurricane Katrina (2005) (Reprinted with permission from Epodunk, Source: Figure 3, prepared by the German Advisory Council on Global Change (WBGU), identifies hotspots where environmental problems, conflict, and migration pressures overlap. These are areas that may face serious environmentally induced migration in the future. The map indicates that arid and semi-arid areas manifest particular tendencies towards migration, conflict, and water and food shortages. Research suggests that certain regions of the world will experience migration-related impacts of climate change more dramatically than others. The devastating impact of climate change will be most acute in vulnerable regions and among groups that face multiple stresses at the same time - - pre-existing conflict, poverty and unequal access to resources, weak institutions, food insecurity and incidence of disease. Figure 3 suggests that environmentally induced migration could be felt most dramatically in the already arid and semi-arid areas in developing countries around the globe Africa, the middle East, the mountainous areas of the far East including India, Pakistan, Afghanistan. Many of these areas already host large populations and struggle with conflict. Contact: Koko Warner warner@ehs.unu.edu 15

16 Figure 3: A map of conflict and migration induced by environmental stressors (Source: German Advisory Council on Global Change WBGU (2007): Climate Change as a Security Risk) Estimates of environmental migration fluxes have been published, and there is a growing consensus that migration will increase substantially in the future (e.g. Myers 2005). Estimates of potential environmentally displaced people range widely, from 17 million (Leighton 2006) and 24 million (UNHCR 2005) currently. The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR 2002: 12) for example, estimates there are approximately 24 million people around the world who have fled because of floods, famine and other environmental factors. In 1994, the Almeria Statement (see Almeria Statement 1994) mentioned that 135 million people could be at risk of being displaced as a consequence of severe desertification. In a 2002 paper by MEP Jean Lambert, a Green Party member of the European Parliament, the author estimated that the number of people displaced by climate change in China alone was 30 million (Lambert 2002). Myers (2002, 2005) estimated that 25 million people in 1995 had migrated with a possible doubling of that number by 2010 to 50 million. A widely-cited projection for the period leading up to the year 2050 is 200 million environmentally induced migrants (Brown 2008). By 2050, one estimate reaches almost to 700 million people on the move because of environmental factors, or almost 1 in every 11 people living on the Earth at that time (Christian Aid 2007). All of these estimates, including their underlying methods and assumptions subject to debate. Patterns of migration and displacement will evolve and intermingle differently with social, economic and political factors depending on whether the environmental hazard is a slow-onset event or fast-onset event. The complexity of interactions makes reliable estimations of environmentally induced migrants challenging (Döös 1997). Quantification is further complicated by the fact that environmentally induced migration is mostly internal (at least in the initial phase).. Few authors contest that environmentally induced migration falls much below 20 million environmentally induced migrants today. Even the most widely cited estimate of 200 million Contact: Koko Warner warner@ehs.unu.edu 16

17 migrants by 2050 (Brown 2008) suggests that environmentally induced migration could soon involve up to 3 percent of the current world population (CIA 2008) in just four decades from now. The social and economic costs of this uprooting, accounting for both losses and responses, have not been calculated. Drought, desertification, and other forms of water scarcity are estimated to affect as much as one-third of the world s human population and could contribute to people leaving these areas to secure their livelihoods. 2.2 Slow onset change increases the environmental signal in migration patterns Slow onset change will over time give environmental push factors an increasingly important position in the migration decision. Some slow onset changes are attributable to climate change and the global carbon emissions paradigm. Current projections of temperature and sea level rise, and increased intensity of droughts and storms suggest that population displacement at significant scales will take place within the next years, particularly for populations in coastal zones. Although constituting only 2 percent of the total land surface of the earth, these regions contain 10 percent of the current world population and 13 percent of the urban population. About 75 percent of all the people residing in low-lying areas are in Asia, and the most vulnerable are the poor. One of the world s poorest countries, Bangladesh may lose up to one quarter of its surface area due to rising sea levels. Migration is anticipated to result from this negative spiral. Egypt s Nile Delta is home to about one-third of the country s population. A World Bank study (see Dasgupta et al. 2007) estimates that a one metre rise in sea levels would force about 10.5 percent of Egypt s population to leave their homes. With population projected to double to 160 million by 2050, environmentally-induced migration may be staggering in the densely populated Nile Delta. Other parts of slow onset change that affect migration are interactions with human land use. Widespread environmental degradation and climate change magnify the pressures of population growth, rapid urbanization and globalization on migration. Changes in land use for example, have enabled humans to consume an increasing share of the planet's resources. However, some land use practices also undermine the capacity of ecosystems to sustain food production, maintain freshwater and forest resources, regulate climate and air quality, and control infectious diseases. Ecosystem services are environmental functions that benefit humans, like water and air purification, flood control, erosion control, generation of fertile soils, detoxification of wastes, regulation of climate, pollination, and aesthetic and cultural benefits. Biodiversity plays a crucial role in sustaining the capacity of ecosystems to cope with disturbance and change as species can replace or compensate for one another in times of disturbance and insure against loss of ecosystem functions. When ecosystems and biodiversity are compromised, the carrying capacity for human population is diminished and migration can result as further degradation occurs. Human populations rely at the fundamental level on natural systems referred to in this paper as ecosystem services for survival and for the more complex systems including livelihoods, production, and organized civil structures. As widely documented, the resilience of many ecosystems during the course of this century is likely to be exceeded by an unprecedented combination of change in climate, associated disturbances (e.g. flooding, drought, wildfire, insects, and ocean acidification) and other global change drivers such as land-use change and pollution. Human impacts have over the past few hundred years, increased the species extinction rate by as much as 1,000 times background rates typical over the planet s history. This is alarming as biodiversity plays a crucial role in sustaining the capacity of ecosystems to cope with disturbance and change. Forestry practices also affect the ability of ecosystems to support livelihoods. Deforestation reduces plant evapotranspiration, which in turn can constrain regional rainfall and increase the occurrence of drought, crop failure, and livelihood pressures as push factors in migration. Fragmented forests are also more prone than intact forests to periodic damage from Contact: Koko Warner warner@ehs.unu.edu 17

18 climate variability and change such as droughts. The clearance for forested land and its subsequent use for cattle and crop production depletes fragile soils. Erosion often follows, reducing the capacity of the land to support cattle or crops. People move on to less exploited lands and then repeat this pattern. The contributions of biodiversity dependent ecosystem services to national economies are substantial, yet are generally ignored or underestimated at decision and policy making levels. The costs associated with loss of ecosystem services tend to be considerable. Estimates of the cost of mangrove destruction in Pakistan for example, indicate a loss of US20$ million in fishing losses, US$ in timber losses, and US$ 1.5 million in feed and pasture losses. The cost of the Newfoundland cod fisheries collapse has been estimated to US2$ billion and tens of thousands of jobs. These losses directly impact the livelihoods of poor people engaged in fishing, farming and herding, and other environment-intensive primary activities. When environment-dependent livelihoods are lost, migration pressures grow. Many of the ecosystems under greatest pressure are precisely in those areas with either large concentrations of people, or where the carrying capacity of ecosystems are fragile (such as in arid or semi-arid areas). Research in Egypt, Brazil, Niger, and many other locations, indicates that soil degradation combines with greater climate variability to become a detectable element in migration patterns. Poor and marginalised people, such as farm labourers and fishermen, are directly dependent on ecosystem services for their livelihood activities, and are therefore particularly vulnerable to changes in environmental conditions and factors which may limit their access to such resources. More than 90 per cent of the people exposed to disasters live in the developing world and more than half of disaster deaths occur in countries with a low human development index. Within communities affected by hazards, certain social groups and individuals are generally considered to be more vulnerable than others. The most vulnerable people tend to be women, the elderly, children, ethnic and religious minorities, single-headed households; people engaged in marginal livelihoods; socially excluded groups such as illegal settlers and others who s rights and claims to resources are not officially recognized. These vulnerable groups make up a new face of migration; anecdotal evidence from the field, reported in section three, point towards cases of human trafficking and forced labor among migrants who also have an environmental signal in their decision to move. Section 3: Current research on environmental change and migration Academic research has addressed environmentally induced migration since at least the early 1990s (IOM 1992), but has received particular attention more recently. Notably, the Environmental Change and Forced Migration Scenarios (EACH-FOR) project is a systematic attempt to detect the degree to which and the pathways through which environmental stressors affect migration. The European Commission s Sixth Framework Program funds this two-year scoping project. The project was designed to assess the impact of environmental change on migration at local, national, regional and international level. The United Nations University Institute for Environment and Human Security (UNU-EHS) which produced the current study is one out of seven partners of the project. 3.1 Research methods EACH-FOR was designed as an empirical research project to generate original, global information about the links between environmental change and migration. Figure 4 shows the Contact: Koko Warner warner@ehs.unu.edu 18

19 UNU-EHS Report areas where EACH-FOR fieldwork is conducted. EACH-FOR covers a sampling distribution covering most of the hot spots areas in Figure 3. EACH-FOR conducted some two dozen case studies to compare and contrast experience with environmentally induced migration. Spain Russia Kazakhstan The Balkans Kyrgyzstan Tajikistan Dominican Republic, Haiti Morocco Western Sahara China Niger Mexico Vietnam Turkey Senegal Bangladesh Ghana Ecuador Mozambique Egypt Argentina Tuvalu Figure 4: EACH-FOR project case study research locations The countries were selected for in-depth analysis because of four factors: the presence of documented environmental degradation, the sensitivity of social and political processes to these environmental changes, the dependence of people on the environment for their livelihood and documented migration dynamics. The kinds of environmental degradation considered in the case studies include rapid-onset environmental stressors (such as extreme weather events like floods and cyclones) and slowonset environmental stressors (such as water scarcity, desertification, soil degradation, deforestation). This paper reports on findings from Egypt, Mozambique, and Vietnam. The EACH-FOR project conducted fieldwork highlighted in Figure 4 to address the following eight research questions: 1. To find out who has been migrating away from situations of environmental degradation/change 2. To find out where migrants are coming from and where are they going to, 3. To find out why people have migrated 4. To find out how environmental degradation interplays with other social, economic and political factors in making migration decisions 5. Obstacles that prevent migration. To find out what might have prevented people from migrating in the first place (i.e. what assistance was needed, what was lacking?) Contact: Koko Warner warner@ehs.unu.edu 19

20 6. Coping capacity/adaptation To find out why people who remained in areas of environmental degradation/ change remained in their location while others migrated (Why did some remain?) 7. To find out how the migration activities occurred (choice of destination, what networks were used to facilitate migration?) 8. To identify the perception of environmental degradation that triggers people to move. NOTE: Originally the wording included level of environmental damage, which indicates thresholds or sensitivity that is different from perception so this paper excludes it. In order to address these research questions, researchers carried out expert interviews with NGO representatives, government officials, representatives from international organizations and academics from the migration, environment, disaster relief and agriculture sectors. Researchers also conducted a questionnaire and interviews with migrants to identify whether there were any underlying environmental factors underlying migration decisions. A comparable questionnaire and interviews were also conducted with people living in areas with documented environmental problems to assess the degree to which these groups were affected by environmental problems and whether migration is an option in the future. Case study sites within Egypt, Mozambique and Vietnam were identified by pin-pointing those locations facing environmental stressors such as flooding or desertification and hence were areas were people were most vulnerable to environmental stressors. Findings from a gravity model approach, presented below) complemented the EACH-FOR fieldwork, assessing the degree to which environmental factors affect international migration. The model findings corroborate with preliminary field results; namely, that environmental factors do affect migration today. 3.2 Gravity model complements fieldwork on impact of environmental factors on migration In order to detect a causal link between environmental degradation and migration, a gravity regression model that assesses the impact of global environmental factors on migration across 172 countries of the world was developed by Afifi and Warner (2008). The model includes 26 independent variables, 13 of them environmental, and consists of 29,756 data points. The dependent variable of the regression is migration 2 between different countries pairwise. The main aim of the model is to test whether environmental factors drive migration not necessarily as the main factor, but as part of a larger context. The gravity model approach shows that environmental variables are causal factors in migration, i.e. in they have a statistically significant impact on international migration. The model equation included two sets of variables those which are established causes of migration between countries such as GDP, distance, etc., and a second set of variables which Afifi and Warner (2008) hypothesized to have an impact on migration, focusing particularly on environmental factors. The model showed the expected signs for the first set of variables. For example, the GDP per capita coefficients in the sending as well as the receiving countries have a positive sign, which indicates the positive relationship between the relative wealth of the two countries and migration between them. However, the distance between any two countries has a significant negative 2 The global data base of the Development Research Centre on Migration, Globalisation and Poverty (Global Migrant Origin Database, 2007) consists of a 226x226 matrix of origin-destination stocks by country and economy. The data are generated by disaggregating the information on migrant stock in each destination country or economy as given in its census. The reference period is the 2000 round of population censuses, so the data do not refer to precisely the same time period. They are population stocks not population flows in a strict sense but are, for international migration, the equivalent of lifetime migration in studies of internal migration. Contact: Koko Warner warner@ehs.unu.edu 20

21 impact on migration between them. Since many authors agree on the fact that there are no pure environmentally induced migrants, and that most of them would in parallel be influenced by other economic, social or political factors, Afifi and Warner (2008) also test other factors in their model which could be considered as push factors in these countries, such as unemployment rate, and the number of ethnic groups as an indicator for potential political conflicts and disorders in the sending countries of migrants. In addition, other geographic, cultural and historical factors such as border contingency among the countries pairwise, common official language, common spoken language, having been colonized by a common colonizer, having a former colonial relationship, and having been the same country at a certain time of history, which are all independent variables that could have a certain influence on migration between the different countries, are included in the model. As for the environmental factors - which are the main concern of this paper, all of them -except for the floods - have a significant positive impact on the migration. The t statistics 3 indicate that there is a good fit between the signs of the independent variables and the dependent variable of pair wise migration between countries. The most significant environmental factors are soil quality and availability of suitable water. Flooding did not show a significant relationship with migration, mostly because of the scale at which data were collected and available, and the time period captured in the modelling. Floods are expected to cause internal displacement rather than international migration. These findings support the hypothesis that environmental variables are push factors in migration. For future studies using a gravity model approach, if appropriate data were available it would be possible to use this procedure for internal movement. The approach by Afifi and Warner (2008) considered only international migration 4 due to data availability. After controlling for the most important factors other than environment, the latter has a positive significant impact on the migration across countries, which would suggest a similar relationship for migration across areas within a country. Future research, both theoretical and empirical, is expected to corroborate with the findings of this model. As environmental change becomes a more prominent issue, nationally and internationally, and as migration pressures continue to rank as the top national concern for many industrialized countries, research must rapidly move forward to assess the links between the two variables which until recently have been considered unrelated. 3.3 Desertification in Egypt Within the project Environmental Change and Forced Migration Scenarios (EACH-FOR), Egypt was one of the three countries selected in the Middle East sub-package as a case study for environmental migration. Egypt represents a unique case that covers significant gradual-onset environmental events associated with climate change: desertification and water shortage. The Nile Delta is projected to be one of the worst-affected areas by sea level rise, but this process is discussed in detail in other literature and is not the focus of the fieldwork. The total area of the Arab Republic of Egypt is about one million km², most of which has an arid and hyper-arid climate. The main agro-ecological zones in Egypt are the Nile Delta and Nile 3 The t-statistic is a measure of how significant a statistical estimate is. Usually, the value of the t- statistic that corresponds to a certain coefficient (measuring the relationship between the dependent and independent variable) is compared to a fixed figure in absolute terms (1.96). If the t-statistic is greater than this value, this indicates that the relationship is significant. 4 The latitudes, longitudes and population data of main agglomerations of all the countries included in the analysis and calculations of CEPII are available in the World Gazetteer Website. Contact: Koko Warner warner@ehs.unu.edu 21

22 Valley region, the reclaimed desert areas, the North Coastal zone, the Inland Sinai and the Eastern Desert, and the Western Desert. The most productive zones in Egypt are the Nile Delta and Nile Valley (3 percent of the total land) including the fertile alluvial land of Middle and Upper Egypt, where the main source of irrigation water is the Nile River. Agriculture production of Egypt is mainly concentrated in this zone in addition to the Delta. The powerful Nile River nourishes a slim column of Egyptian territory, but the remaining part of the country faces extreme water scarcity. A rapidly growing population in Egypt uses the Nile as the main source for water and the vast desert hinterlands rely on deep aquifers for potable and irrigation water. Although the Nile brings rich soil deposits to the Delta, land degradation is a widespread and growing problem in the country. Figure 5: Distribution of arid and fertile lands in Egypt (Source: Geology.com Figure 5 points to a compelling situation for migration and displacement in Egypt: Projected increases in sea levels will pressure a quickly growing population into more concentrated areas. Ironically, these areas tend to be the scarce fertile lands also needed to feed and employ the population. Meanwhile the processes of desertification and soil degradation continue to claim more territory at the periphery of Egypt s narrow strip of productive land. Desertification and water and soil problems already induce rural populations to migrate. Desertification processes examined in the field work in Egypt included land degradation, soil pollution, sand encroachments, and sand dunes. These processes were chosen, because they are rapid enough that the inhabitants can detect them and design an active response to the environmental stressor. Also water shortage is a critical challenge in Egypt and was therefore addressed in the fieldwork. The lack of sufficient precipitation influences crops, cattle, and/or other rural livelihoods as well as water pollution and salinity strongly. Therefore, water issues also affect the migration patterns and decisions of the affected people. Contact: Koko Warner warner@ehs.unu.edu 22

23 3.3.1 Short Overview: Migration and Environmental Challenges in Egypt In this section, the general migration patterns in Egypt are discussed to provide context. The environmental hot spots that were investigated in the field trip in Egypt are introduced. In this case study of Egypt this report uses the broad sense of desertification to include processes like land degradation, urbanization, soil pollution, sand dunes and all other factors that severely reduce land productivity General migration patterns in Egypt Migration can be seen as a development policy in Egypt. By granting various basic rights to the Egyptian citizens (Article 15 of Law 111 of the constitution) (Egyptian Ministry of Manpower and Migration), the Egyptian government creates incentives for its surplus people to leave the country, while simultaneously keeping the ties with their home country. People crossing the borders of Egypt are monitored and documented quite well. In contrast, internal migration in Egypt, including the numerous Egyptians who move on a regular basis from one region/city to the other - mostly for work reasons - is not. The majority of Egyptian labour migrants are expected to return home eventually, but thousands leave their country each year with the intention of permanently resettling in various Arab countries, Europe, or North America. According to the official estimates of the Central Agency for Public Mobilization and Statistics (CAPMAS), the total number of Egyptian temporary migrant labourers (in Arab countries) is about 1.9 million (CAPMAS 2001) and the total number of permanent Egyptian migrants in non-arab countries is slightly more than 0.8 million. These emigrants tend to be well-educated professionals, mostly doctors, engineers, and teachers (CAPMAS 2000). Additionally, European immigration authorities have caught tens - if not hundreds - of Egyptians in the past years after they illegally attempted to cross the Mediterranean to reach Italy, Malta and Spain. When arrested, most of these migrants mention poverty and unemployment as the main reasons for migrating. More clarification is needed about how environmental factors contribute to these attempts. This is especially true for those people whose livelihoods directly depend on environmental conditions Water shortage and land degradation in Egypt Water shortage Egypt has signed different agreements 5 on controlled Nile water consumption with neighboring countries throughout history, in order to secure its share of the Nile water. Nevertheless, and as much as the Nile River has been a generous water resource for Egypt, the Egyptians are suffering from water shortage as well as from a rapid population growth. Taking the expression water shortage more broadly, it would also encompass irrigation and potable water. Egypt has struggled with water pollution since the Nile and its canals have been subject to industrial, agricultural and communal wastes. Poor water management due to inefficiency of the traditional gravity irrigation system, inadequate maintenance of irrigation and drainage networks and overextraction of ground water, especially in the newly reclaimed desert areas, are all factors that magnify the problem. Another natural factor that diminishes the available fresh water is water salinity, a phenomenon that largely exists in newly reclaimed desert lands that rely on ground water. Land degradation 5 See for example Ouda (1999) and Stroh (2004). Contact: Koko Warner warner@ehs.unu.edu 23

24 About 30 percent of the irrigated farmlands in Egypt suffer from soil salinity. Of the Northern Delta and both the Middle and Southern Delta regions, 60 percent and 20 percent, respectively, are considered to be salt-affected soils. Wind erosion affects about 90 percent of the total country area. The estimations of soil loss due to wind erosion in the Western desert oases vary from 4.5 to 66.9 tons/ha/year (Desert Research Center et al. 2002). The overall area influenced by the active encroachment of sand and sand dunes is estimated to be 1.6 million hectares. Land productivity has diminished by about 25 percent compared to its original productivity (Arab Centre for Dry and Arid Area Studies 2000). The annual erosion rate has been estimated between 0.8 and 5.3 ton/ha/year (Desert Research Center et al. 2005). Soil scrapping for manufacturing red bricks was nearly abandoned as a result of the legislation issued in 1983 and amended in 1985 (Desert Research Center et al. 2002). There are no figures about the total loss of topsoil. Urban encroachments started during the 1950s and caused the loss of 15,000 hectares annually (Institute of Lands, Water and Environment 2000). A military order was issued to eliminate such encroachments in 1996, significantly limiting such phenomena, but probably too late, since the urbanization had already taken place and harmed lots of fertile lands. It is also found that the losses of plant nutrients; nitrogen, phosphorus and potassium are linearly proportional to soil loss (Desert Research Center et al. 2005) Links between environmental hot spots and migration in Egypt Research Process and Approach The field work in Egypt encompassed expert interviews and questionnaires with migrants who might be affected by environmental problems in their original regions and/or regions of destination. The field research in Egypt focused on the degree to which desertification and water shortage influence migration in particular areas in Egypt: the deserts in the West and East of Egypt, land reclamation areas in the Nile Delta and valley, the Northern Lakes, and Cairo slums Field work findings and analysis Expert interviews In the course of the study, Egyptian government officials and United Nations officials in Egypt, as well as representatives from non-profit organizations and universities were interviewed. Academics of Egyptian universities noted that environmental problems are combined with other intervening factors; combined, these factors make up a complex mix of motivations for migration. Most of the experts noted such a link and provided the researcher with information as will be shown in the following sections classified according to the different regions affected by environmental problems 6. All the expert interviewees recognized the sea level rise as a problem, but most of them, especially interviewees at the United Nations Information Center (UNIC) and in the Egyptian Ministry of Environment, remarked that it is too early to run field studies on this issue, since sea level rise has not taken place yet. Furthermore, the people who might be mostly affected in the future are not fully aware that the deteriorating environment could make it increasingly difficult for them to stay in their original homes (i.e. migration pressures will likely grow). Western and Eastern Deserts 6 As much as the research budget allowed, the researcher visited most of the regions, based on these interviews, in order to meet environmental migrants on the site and fill out questionnaires. Contact: Koko Warner warner@ehs.unu.edu 24

25 Desertification is a major problem in Egypt, with sands advancing gradually over thousands of square hectares per year. Desertification is a push factor in migration, through both livelihoods and the sheer vanishing of habitable areas. An expert interviewee in the Desert Research Centre highlighted the effect of the sand dunes - as an aspect of desertification - in the Western Desert, leading to the complete disappearance of some villages, such as the old Ganah and the Moschée village within the Kharga Oasis. To escape advancing desert sands, these inhabitants are forced to move. The same phenomenon occurs in the Eastern Desert, where an Egyptian NGO runs a study with a tribe called Ababda. This group left their homes in the Eastern zone, due to sand dunes and droughts. Eastern and Western Delta Desertification is also an issue at the edges of the fertile Nile Delta. The government of Egypt actively combats desertification through an internal immigration scheme. According to interviewees from UNDP Cairo, many people migrate to two different regions in the Western and Eastern Delta because of the Mobarak National Project. The latter was initially designed to alleviate unemployment, poverty, and overpopulation in cities principally Cairo, Beheira, Kafr El- Sheikh and Qalioubia. This project aims at resettling people in the Eastern and Western Delta of Egypt to relieve population pressures and urban poverty, and to create an internal urban-to-rural migration flow towards the edges of the Delta. People who were resettled in the Eastern Delta were mainly young men and their families who were suffering from unemployment or low income in their original regions. In contrast, the people who moved to the Western Delta were mainly farmers affected by a law released in This law favored land owners who could easily drive away share croppers from desirable agricultural areas. Hereby, the owners did no longer have to share their lands and were able to hire new farmers - rather than share croppers - on their own conditions. After eviction, the share croppers remained landless and stripped of their livelihoods were moved (displaced) by the government to the Western Delta (also called Western Nobaria). The program allocated each sharecropper/farmer in the Eastern and Western Delta a land parcel of 10,500 m². The new immigrants received assistance from the International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD). IFAD provided houses and infrastructure, as well as agricultural extension services. The fund further provides migrants in Western Nobaria on the Delta with pesticides and artificial crop pollination. In addition, IFAD sends medical and veterinary teams to encourage migrants to settle in these areas. Initial investments and incentives to encourage poor people to migrate to new areas have tapered off with time. This support system, however, has proved difficult to sustain. Government-constructed houses that were built one decade ago already need rehabilitation and restoration. The Western and Eastern Delta lack access to potable water, proper infrastructure, public facilities, schools, health care and well functioning sewage systems. Consequently many migrants to the Western and Eastern Delta did not stay and others are expected to leave either to other regions or to return to their original regions. Today, only 50 percent of designated resettlement land has been utilized. Overall infrastructure and sanitary conditions (water pollution) are poor, further discouraging migrants to stay. People in these areas suffer from environmental problems, especially the lack of clean water. The Eastern boundary of the Delta obtains its water from the Salam Canal, which is extremely polluted. Immigrants to the Eastern and Western Delta are forced to irrigate their lands using the water of Bahr El-Bakar channel, which carries enormous quantities of factory and human wastes from Cairo. According to one expert, some of the resettled people use the water of Bahr El-Bakar in fish breeding. The environmental situation has deteriorated to the extent that water is now imported and bought from other villages and harbours such as Port Said. IFAD is currently constructing a water treatment station that is expected to serve consumers. Contact: Koko Warner warner@ehs.unu.edu 25

26 Northern Lakes UNU-EHS Report An interview with an environmental analyst at UNDP Cairo shed light on the fisheries in the Northern Lakes (Manzala, Maryout, Edkou and Borollos) that are polluted from outlets of agricultural wastes and sewage water. Accordingly, the quality and quantity of the fish has deteriorated severely; only the fish that can survive water pollution remain. Since these fish do not fetch high prices on the market, the revenues of the fishermen diminish and they are forced to seek better livelihoods or better quality fish in the Nasser Lake (Southern Egypt). Some leave for Cairo and change their income activities. Others seek new livelihoods along the regional waters in Eritrea, Somalia, Ethiopia and Sudan and are subject to arrest by the border police. Some fishermen try to escape to Europe (mainly Malta and Italy) via boat across the Mediterranean. Many drown, and most of these environmentally induced migrants are detained and sent back to Egypt. Nile Delta and Valley One other challenging environmental concern highlighted by the UNDP office as well as the Desert Research Centre in Cairo is the water shortage, particularly in the Nile Delta and Nile Valley Regions, where most of the population resides. Due to the enormous population growth in Egypt, the yearly constant quota of the Nile water is no longer sufficient for the rapidly increasing population that uses old and highly water consuming irrigation methods. Due to the pressure on the resources caused by population growth, the soil quality of the fertile lands has deteriorated, especially after the Aswan Dam was constructed and the permanent irrigation has replaced the seasonal irrigation system, which further harmed the soil through the exaggerated use of chemical fertilizers. This practice increased soil salinity. In line with the general strategy in Egypt, covering the drinking water needs takes the first priority, followed by industry and agricultural needs in the second and third priorities, respectively. Therefore, the agricultural sector suffers most from water shortage, leading again to migration flows towards Cairo, where farmers change their livelihoods in order to survive. Cairo slums Officials at the Ministry of Migration as well as the Ministry of Environment believe that economic factors that are influenced by environmental conditions drive the migration decision. These ministries explain the pattern of migration flows; people leave rural areas due to the declining yields caused by soil degradation and water shortage. Internal migrants move to the Cairo slums suffering from severe environmental problems, such as limited access to potable water, air pollution, in addition to other infrastructure and social problems, including no or low quality of schooling. Slum areas encroach on surrounding, countryside, contribute to water pollution and continue the cycles of negative environmental impacts. Questionnaires Fieldwork in Egypt aimed at migrants who left their home to live in other regions within Egypt 7, in an attempt to explore whether environmental problems influenced their migration decision. Questionnaires were distributed mainly in the centre of the Nile Delta, the Nile Valley (South and North), Eastern and Western Nile Delta, newly reclaimed desert lands and slums of Old Cairo. Answering the question whether at any point of time environmental problems affected one s decision to move, 72 percent of the interviewed migrants had a positive answer, 69 percent of which made the decision themselves. Most of the rest just followed their parents in their childhood. 7 The field trip did not cover migrants who left the country, due to financial constraints. Contact: Koko Warner warner@ehs.unu.edu 26

27 Almost one half (48 percent) of the migrants expect environmental problems in the future to make them and their families migrate, 63 percent of which are planning indeed to leave due to environmental problems. Interviewees who are not willing to leave as well as people who did not leave in first place are either attached to their regions or adapted to the environmental problems they are facing. Most of the people who left the relatively fertile lands in the Nile Valley and Nile Delta and moved to Cairo were mainly induced by unemployment and poverty problems. Even if the migrants did not mention it explicitly, their answers indicated, that land degradation and water shortage were actually the causes for most of these problems. The interviewees who mentioned that they left their Oasis in the Western Desert mainly to seek better livelihoods and standards of living in Cairo implicitly referred to the sand dunes that hindered them from planting and shepherding properly in their original home areas. Unfortunately, the migrants who left for the slum of Old Cairo were shocked by the fact that they were running harder lives than they had expected. All of them were hoping to find the means to move to richer districts in Cairo, since at the time of the interviews they were suffering from environmental problems as well, such as low access to clean water and other sanitary problems. For example, Cairo uses the Bahr-El-Bakar Canal as an outlet for its sewage. Moreover, they claim that the infrastructure and housing in these areas are insufficient for a decent life. In addition, the available schools are mainly only primary ones. Another interviewed group were the people who moved to the newly reclaimed desert lands, since they were unemployed in their home towns and were promised to work as peasants in these lands. However, most of them were suffering from soil and water salinity problems. Some of them even already moved to different areas within the newly reclaimed desert lands mainly because the owners of the lands decided to sell them when they did not have enough financial means to dig for new ground water. Some owners of these lands did not make their living from the crops planted there, but used to live in Cairo and preferred to spend the rest of their lives now away from the air polluted Cairo. Hence, they built their farms in the newly reclaimed desert lands and relied financially on their savings that they gained when they used to work in the capital. When the salinity problem occurs in the ground water, they would not have a problem in digging for new ground water, since they are relatively well off. Last but not least, a group of interviewees in the Nile Valley and Delta were suffering from water shortage and land degradation. However, since they own the land and feel emotionally attached to it, they would not leave, even if the pull factors in the city or elsewhere were very strong. As long as they could survive, even if the situation worsened in the past years, they would stay Conclusions Environmental problems, such as water shortage and land degradation, are important challenges facing the Egyptians, also due to population pressures. From the results of the field work in Egypt it can be concluded that several environmental factors affect migration decisions in Egypt: Water shortage and land degradation drive people to move from one place to the other within the country, particularly if they do not own the land they work on or have other forms of wealth. Social and financial assets affect whether people can afford to leave their place of origin. Some people have been forced or incentivised to move by government programs (land reclamation) or landowners seeking to increase control of land use management in rural areas. The water shortage and land degradation factors in Egypt are rarely strong enough to make people decide to leave the country altogether. International migration appears to require additional pull factors in the receiving countries such as a large expected financial return and higher living standards on the pull side, and an ability through financial means, social networks, etc. to attempt the Contact: Koko Warner warner@ehs.unu.edu 27

28 international emigration to escape poverty or unemployment. The general sentiment among people who live in environmentally degraded areas was that they would resist migration unless they were immediately threatened by some natural hazard, such as earthquakes or floods. Neither do most poor people have the ability to migrate, even internally. Thus coping with environmental degradation and environmental change is the preferred strategy for those groups interviewed. 3.4 Flooding and relocation in Mozambique Heavy rain in south eastern Africa in early 2008 flooded the low lying river areas along the Zambezi River in Central Mozambique and displaced up to 80,000 people the second such occurrence within two years. This number adds to the tens of thousands of people already displaced from floods and cyclones during 2000, 2001 and The issue of flooding in Mozambique provides a picture of the vulnerability many developing countries experience vis-àvis extreme climate events. Resettlement has become a policy of last resort for a government trying to ensure safety in a populated area. Mozambique has in recent years become a prominent example of environmentally induced displacement/migration caused by flooding, and the efforts of a government to balance the safety of threatened people with the need to earn livelihoods on floodplains Mozambique: Environment and displacement processes A major factor for current and potential displacement of people in Mozambique is global warming with its effect on increase in extreme weather events. Increased heavy rain has led to increasing problems for the people of Mozambique, who have been particularly affected by extreme floods of the Limpopo River in the south of the country during 2000, and by the extreme floods of the Zambezi River in the central region during 2001, 2007 and The floods in 2000 were the worst to hit Mozambique for 150 years, making millions of people temporarily homeless. They caused the Limpopo River to swell up to 80km wide (Figure 6) affecting 4.5 million people during the three months of inundation along the lowland reaches of the river (EM-DAT 2007).The floods were followed in 2000 by tropical cyclone Eline which caused further devastation. Figure 6: Limpopo Basin before and during the flooding ( ) (Source: NASA 2007) In 2001, 2007 and 2008 heavy rains caused flooding along the Zambezi River in central Mozambique and in 2007 another tropical cyclone, Cyclone Favio, increased the number of Contact: Koko Warner warner@ehs.unu.edu 28

29 homeless people in Mozambique following the flooding of the Zambezi River. In particular, the magnitude and recurrence of the flooding events in the Zambezi river valley have displaced millions of people over the last decade. The floods of 2007 alone displaced over 100,000 people. An estimated 50,000 people were evacuated to accommodation centres. Affected people lost their homes and livelihoods as well access to medical facilities, sanitation and safe drinking water (WHO 2007). Figure 7 shows a map of the flood affected areas of the 2007 floods in the Zambezi valley where a total population of approximately 1 million people live. The people living along the Mozambique coast that lost their houses due to the tropical cyclones in both 2000 and 2007 managed to stay in their places of origin and rebuild their houses with basic improvements in construction for storm resistance. On the other hand, the floods in Mozambique resulted in the displacement of thousands of people that had been living in the low lying areas along the watercourses. Floods and cyclones are not the only natural hazards to affect the people of Mozambique; droughts, coastal soil erosion and future rising sea levels can also be connected to climate change and affect a large number of people in Mozambique. The river delta regions and the 2,700km long coastline are particularly at high risk of inundation and erosion. In particular, the Zambezi River valley has its river delta in Mozambique; sea level rise is therefore pushing the magnitude of a flooding event further inland and will do so even more in the future. However, not only the increase in precipitation and sea-level rise is involved in flooding events. Global warming and its contribution to drought is also a factor that increases Mozambique s vulnerability and the increased risk of frequent flooding events. The dry soil, as a result of heat waves and general global warming seals the ground, reduces water infiltration and increases surface run-off once the rains arrive. Deforestation and land use change, caused by wild fires, logging or compounded by climate change also have increased and, continue to increase, the likelihood of droughts and flooding events in Mozambique. Figure 7: Mozambique flood affected areas Contact: Koko Warner warner@ehs.unu.edu 29

30 (Source: WFP 2007) UNU-EHS Report Links between flooding and displacement in Mozambique Fieldwork findings and analysis Expert Interviews The majority of migration experts consider that in Mozambique environmental factors were a major cause for internal migration. They noted that the main international migration drivers are labour migration to mines and plantations in South Africa, and to urban areas within Mozambique where youth seek an improvement in livelihoods. Migration experts furthermore pointed out that environmental problems will contribute to increased migration pressures in the future especially if flooding and droughts continue to increase in frequency and magnitude. Similar responses came from environmental experts. All experts mentioned the displacement that occurred along the Zambezi River valley caused by floods in recent years. Particularly representatives from NGOs, international agencies and the government who have been working on disaster relief efforts, mentioned the floods as a major cause for internal displacement and resettlement in Mozambique. Interviews with displaced people Interviews with displaced people living in resettlement centres (discussed below) following the 2007 flooding of the Zambezi River indicated that the floods caused them to move for the first time; before the flooding the respondents had never been migrants. Most respondents indicated that they had lived in low lying river areas that flooded frequently during the rainy seasons. Their decision to migrate was in order to move to a flood-safe area or, they had been evacuated by the government. Most of the respondents furthermore indicated that flood-safe areas are prone to drought, but subsequent onward migration is not likely for them, because they are connected to their land and do not want to leave it. Questionnaires The questionnaire results suggested that environmentally induced migration was most often linked to droughts and floods, with floods being the most named cause of environmentally-related movement (Box 1). 40 percent of the migrants to urban areas highlighted that they moved from their original rural home in part because of environmental problems, and the environment affected their initial decision to migrate. Another 40 percent of the urban migrants indicated that they expect environmental problems in the future to make them migrate to yet a different place, and of these, 70 percent are already planning to move away from their current place of residence. Contact: Koko Warner warner@ehs.unu.edu 30

31 Box 1: Environmental Reasons given by questionnaire respondents who had decided to leave their places of origin. I was affected by the 2001 floods, and I lost everything and after that the government moved us to this place. My family and I were displaced in the 2001 floods. The Government moved us to this place were it is safe. We have lost everything. I moved from my area because of the floods in 2000/2001. We could not sleep inside the house because there was water everywhere and our beds were all wet, so I decided to take my family and rent a place in Maputo city I was living in a risk area and water destroyed all my farms and houses I was living in a lower area and the rainy season started flooding areas near my place and once we were notified by the government not to build houses in that area because of the floods. So I decided to move to a safe area. And now I will move to another area due to drought. Climate change, resettlement and environmentally induced migration Based on the expert interviews and the interviews conducted in the resettlement centres, the reoccurring extreme flooding events along the Zambezi River valley during 2000, 2001 and 2007 have led to specific internal displacement patterns. Figure 8 presents a simplified model of environmental triggers that cause displacement and possible migration along the Zambezi River valley in Mozambique. The people living along the Mozambique coast line that lost their houses due to tropical cyclones in both 2000 and 2007 managed to stay in their places of origin and rebuild their houses with basic improvements in construction for storm resistance. On the other hand, the floods which resulted in part from the cyclones led to the displacement of thousands of people who had been living in the low lying river areas. These low lying river areas are not only high risk areas for flooding, but are also the most fertile areas for agriculture. This entailed that people not only lost their houses and belongings during the flooding; they also lost their harvest and, therefore their means of livelihood. In an immediate response to the flooding situation in 2001 and 2007, the Government moved displaced people to accommodation centres. These accommodation centres provided floodaffected people with basic infrastructure, essential health services and donations of food. These people faced further displacement with the Government s response of attempting to relocate the displaced people within the accommodation centres to resettlement centres. The Government planned and provided funding for the more-permanent resettlement centres, which were built and continue to be built - in flood-safe areas, close to schools, health centres and the low lying fertile fields, with enough space for further expansion if required. These flood-safe areas suffer however, from water scarcity and drought. As a consequence many people in 2001 returned to the low lying river areas following the floods, because they could not grow crops at the dry resettlement centres. Contact: Koko Warner warner@ehs.unu.edu 31

32 climate change Increasing: >extreme weather events >sea level rise Exposure of people land use change drought FLOODING Inundation & destruction of houses, land & crops deforestation Increased surface run off RESETTLEMENT govermental /international aid DISPLACEMENT temporary or permanent RETURN following temporary evacuation/resettlement w/o govermental /international aid MIGRATION Figure 8: Simplified connection model of environmental triggers for displacement and migration along the Zambezi River valley However, the interviews with resettled people following the 2007 flood indicates that the majority of the people do not want to return to live in the low lying river areas. They want to stay in the flood safe areas and would rather travel to the low lying river areas to grow their crops. Depending on the distance to their fields, some of the farmers travel daily to the fertile grounds; others stay 4-5 days during the week, and some stay there for several months. Mainly young women and men travel from the resettlement centres to work in the fields and leave their children and elders behind. It is not yet clear whether people will continue to remain in these resettlement areas. Nevertheless the people interviewed people at the resettlement areas point out that they do not want to return to their places of origin because of the recurring floods that destroy their livelihoods. As an inhabitant of a resettlement centre comments on October 2007: The main environmental problem in the resettlement centre is drought. We cannot grow anything here. We have to go back to the river to grow crops...after the floods in 2001 a lot of people returned to the river to live, but after the 2007 flood no one wants to go back. It is safe in the resettlement centre and we can travel to the river to do the farming. After the 2007 flooding events, the governmental resettlement programme offered brick houses to environmental displacees as an incentive to stay in the resettlement centres. Resettled people state that they like their new safe places of residence and that they do not want to go back to the low lying river areas. However, the brick production includes wood fire burning of the hand-made mud bricks. These bricks are produced by the inhabitants of the resettlement centres without any regional planning or coordination. The wood burning leads to an increase in deforestation and the excavated soil increases soil erosion. This environmental impact, caused by the resettlement process, results in an increase in the risk of new flooding events (refer to Figure 8). Even though people have been resettled from the 2007 floods, the floods of January 2008 reveal another reality. Over 80,000 people were displaced to resettlement centres as a result of the 2008 floods of the Zambezi River once again (WFP 2008). These numbers indicate that the Contact: Koko Warner warner@ehs.unu.edu 32

33 people are still dependent on their land, and despite being displaced in 2001 and 2007, they still returned to the low lying areas, only to be displaced in 2008 again. Those people that stayed in the resettlement centres but continued to rely on the use of floodprone areas to grow crops have lost their machambas (fields) and their harvest to the floods as well. Now these people are also dependent on governmental and international aid. This is despite not being categorised as the most vulnerable, because they have not lost their houses. The dependence on the low lying river areas, of both the resettled and the returnees, is highlighted by the statement of a displaced person of the 2008 floods (BBC 14 January 2008): "We lost our crops and our farms in the floods last year [2007]. Now, it's happened again, and I don't know how we'll survive where else can we go? This place is our home. It gives us crops and fish. We don't know anywhere else." Flooding in Mozambique drives periodic, semi-permanent displacement. People do not want to move away from their places of origin they are dependent on. They do not view migration as a coping strategy. However, the recent floods highlight the argument that without governmental and international aid, the people along the Zambezi River valley are not able to survive on their own because floods destroyed their livelihoods for two consecutive years. If the trend continues, people may be forced to migrate again if no governmental or international aid is available to keep them in the resettlement centres. In the future, it is uncertain whether people living in floodaffected areas would be able to survive without external support, especially in light of predictions of heavily increasing precipitation and extreme events in Mozambique (cp. Ashton, 2002; UNESCO-WWAP, 2006 in Boko et al., 2007). The flooding events resulted in movement patterns that vary from temporary and long-term seasonal circular movements that are mainly internal to Mozambique. Nevertheless, according to several representatives along the Zambezi River, there is no reason for them to leave the resettlement centres and move to a town or abroad.. Statements like the following were made: are you dreaming? Moving away from here? Never ;..no I do not want to move, I like it here. ; moving destroys culture, social networks and rips families apart, no, we are not moving away from here These statements and outlooks do not change with future scenarios like reoccurring floods and droughts with a higher magnitude. Elderly people and community leaders mainly made these comments, claiming not to know about any younger community members or children that are planning to move back to live on the flood-prone areas. A few responded that they had tried to go to urban areas, in order to find a job, but returned after failing. The people living along the Zambezi River valley have been able to withstand the external shock of flooding events up until the last decade. Recently however, floods have occurred at a higher magnitude and on more frequent basis, meaning that withstanding these shocks is no longer possible. Between the 2007 floods and January 2008 floods people did not have a chance to recover. The 2007 floods destroyed crops, and now the same loss of livelihood has happened again. Without governmental or international aid, there would be no chance of survival for these people, who would starve until the next harvesting season and migration could be an option for survival (cp. Migration in Figure 8). Contact: Koko Warner warner@ehs.unu.edu 33

34 3.4.3 Conclusions about environment and displacement along the Zambezi River valley in Mozambique Particularly in poor countries where people are often directly dependent on the environment, people commonly settle in vulnerable areas susceptible to the force of environmental impacts as these are commonly the most productive and fertile areas for agriculture. Therefore there is a need to focus on environmentally supportive programmes in those vulnerable areas, especially when the impacts of climate change are increasing. A central question for Mozambique, but relevant to other countries facing environmentally induced migration, is the degree to which environmental factors contribute to displacement or migration today and the potential for migration in the future. Environmental degradation is currently not a major cause for international migration in Mozambique but drives large scale internal displacement in Mozambique. Following re-occurring flooding events, people are relocated on a permanent or semi-permanent basis. Along the Zambezi River valley, temporary mass displacement that is taking on permanent characteristics can be observed. The Government of Mozambique is trying to develop rural areas by providing the essential infrastructure and giving people incentives to produce more solid houses within the resettlement process. Nevertheless, resettlement does not seem to be the best option to deal with the existing and upcoming impacts of climate change in Mozambique. As it was shown, resettlement causes further problems like deforestation, soil erosion or water scarcity and is not solving the problems of the people. Even after the resettlement process people are still dependent on governmental and international aid and remain very vulnerable to upcoming flooding events. If extreme weather events continue to impact Mozambique in the future, the environment will further increase its role as a push factor for people s decision to leave their places of origin. 3.5 Flooding in the Mekong River Delta in Vietnam Vietnam was selected as a case study because a large portion of the country s population is directly dependent on the environment for their livelihood (Adger et al. 2001) and it is a country prone to water or water-related disasters (Sternin 2003). Some of these water stressors are thought to be increasing due to the influence of climate change. According to the results of a World Bank study released in February 2007, Vietnam will be one of the countries most severely impacted due to potential sea-level rise (Dasgupta et al. 2007). For a one metre sea-level rise, some experts predict that Vietnam will be the worst impacted developing country in terms of percentage of population affected (10.8%), percentage of GDP affected (approx 10%), urban extent affected (approx 10%), and percentage of wetlands inundated (approx 28%). These impacts would be mostly felt in the Mekong River delta and Red River delta with Vietnam ranking second worst impacted developing country for the percentage of land area inundated (approx 5%) and agricultural extent affected (approx 7%) by a one metre sea-level rise (Dasgupta et al. 2007) (see Figure 9). To examine the issue of climate change and migration in the Vietnamese context, the research examines current linkages between regular flooding events, migration and population resettlement in the Mekong Delta. These factors help pinpoint issues for migration management which require attention in the future given current climate change predictions. Leading scholars on climate change adaptation and resilience state that, migration may be one response of people whose livelihoods are undermined by climate change (Barnett and Adger 2007: 643). However, the authors note that climate is unlikely to be the sole push factor in migration decisions (Barnett and Adger 2007). Contact: Koko Warner warner@ehs.unu.edu 34

35 Figure 9: 1 metre sea-level rise scenario % of Vietnam s population would be affected (red indicates inundated areas). Source: Dasgupta et al. 2007: Mekong Delta Overview: Environment and Migration Processes The Mekong Delta Environment The Mekong Delta is one of the most densely populated areas on earth (MRC 2005) and stretches southwards from Kratie in south-eastern Cambodia into southern Vietnam. The Delta drains the 4400km long main stream of the Mekong River which originates mainly from snow-melt in the Tanghla Mountains on the Tibetan Plateau in China and passes through Myanmar, Lao PDR, Thailand and Cambodia before finally draining out into the South China Sea through nine channels located in Vietnam (see Figure 10). The Delta covers a total area of 49,520km² with Vietnam accounting for 74% of this area (White 2002). In Vietnam, the Mekong Delta occupies approximately 12 percent of the total land area but accounts for almost 40 percent of the cultivated land and nearly 20 percent of the total Vietnamese population. Eighteen million people (UNDP/AusAID 2004) live in the thirteen provinces 8 of the Vietnamese portion of the Mekong Delta (see Figure 11). The elevation of these thirteen provinces ranges between metres above sea-level with the exception of a small mountainous area in the northern part of the Delta (White 2002). Statistics from the Mekong River Commission (2001: 3) indicate two-thirds of the Delta is under cultivation, providing more than 8 Until recently there were 12 provinces but in 2004 Can Tho Province was split and Hau Giang Province was formed. Contact: Koko Warner warner@ehs.unu.edu 35

36 half of the food consumed in Vietnam. The Mekong Delta is often called the rice bowl of the country (Figure 12 shows the fertile Mekong Delta with its rice fields). Many of the advances in recent years in Vietnam have been due to rapid intensification of agriculture as well as the development of industry, for example in the Mekong River Delta. While the pursuit of economic development has seen positive impacts in terms of socio-economic trends and reduction of the national poverty rate, there are concerns that the rapid rate of development is unsustainable in terms of the demands it places on the environment and that there is a greater need to focus on environmental protection (e.g. Pham et al. 1995; Adger et al. 2001; Lindskog et al. 2005; Nguyen et al. 2007). Figure 10: The Mekong River Basin Catchment (Source: VNMC 2005) Contact: Koko Warner warner@ehs.unu.edu 36

37 Figure 11: Population Density in the Lower Mekong Basin (Source: Hook et al : 24) Contact: Koko Warner warner@ehs.unu.edu 37

38 Figure 12: Envisat image of the Mekong Delta in Vietnam, 6 February 2007 (Source: ESA 2007) The Mekong Delta: Migration Trends Vietnam has a history of both government-initiated settlement and spontaneous migration towards the Mekong Delta area. The period since 1986 has been marked by increased urbanization and rural to rural migration mainly due to dismantling of agricultural collectives, land tenure changes and changes to household registration regulations (Zhang et al. 2006). Income and employment are cited as the primary factors for migration in Vietnam (GSO/UNFPA 2006). A high population to land ratio in the delta areas has also played a role. Overall the Mekong Delta is currently witnessing a net outflow of migrants from the region (UNDP/AusAID 2004). In addition to outward migration, there is a large amount of seasonal migration within the Mekong Delta region. Many poor agriculture-based households seek to work as hired labourers during harvest seasons UNDP/AusAID 2004). Trends show that migration, both within and outside of the Delta, is driven by economic and/or social factors The Mekong Delta: Flooding trends The regular flooding of the Vietnam portion of the Mekong Delta affects 40 percent (16000 km 2 ) of the land area in 9 provinces, constituting approximately 53 percent of the population (9 million people) of the Mekong Delta (Pham 2007 pers. comm.). The flood depth during the flooding season ranges between metres and is known as the nice flood. Every year, floods carry sediments from far upstream, enriching the Delta soils and providing important breeding habitats for fish. Flood levels reaching approximately 4.5 metres or higher are considered to be disaster floods. The flooding season is between late July and the beginning of November with the peak flood period between late September and beginning October. Figure 13 shows the duration and extent of major floods in the Lower Mekong Basin based on the maximum extent of inundation during a major flood, (a 1 in 20 year event) as well as the estimated duration of inundation during a medium intensity flood (a 1 in 5 year event). (Hook et al. 2003: 133) Contact: Koko Warner warner@ehs.unu.edu 38

39 Over the past four decades the frequency of 1 in 50 year floods has been a major concern and has led to increasing calls for regulation of Mekong River flows, as experts expect an increase in frequency of extreme events but with overall lower mean river flows for the Mekong (Lettenmaier in White 2002: 11). The Southern Region Hydro-Meteorological Centre in Ho Chi Minh City indicated that typhoons impacting Vietnam are increasing in frequency, magnitude, intensity as well as unpredictability in terms of the track that the typhoons follow (Le 2007 pers. comm.). An increase in the magnitude and intensity of tropical storms has also been observed and attributed to climate change processes (Nguyen et al. 2007). Typhoons and tropical storms impacting the south-eastern coastline of Vietnam influence the amount of precipitation in the Mekong River catchment area and can influence flooding levels in the Mekong Delta. Human-induced changes both within the Delta and in upstream countries also contribute to altering the flooding regime of the Mekong River (Hirsch 2006). Currently the rise of sea level in coastal areas of Asia is reported to be between 1 and 3 mm annually. This value is slightly higher than the global average (IPCC 2007). In particular, the UN Country Team in Vietnam highlight that estimates of a one metre sea level rise would subject 40000km 2 of the plain and 17 km 2 coastal areas in the Mekong Delta to unprecedented flooding (UN Country Team Vietnam 2007). This damage would lead the country to face losses totaling US$17billion per year (UN Country Team Vietnam 2007). Figure 13: Duration and extents of major floods in the Lower Mekong Basin. Source: Hook et al. 2003: 132 Contact: Koko Warner warner@ehs.unu.edu 39