Czech and Slovak Presidents: Between Parliamentarism and Semi- Presidentialism?

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1 Czech and Slovak Presidents: Between Parliamentarism and Semi- Presidentialism? Petr Just Department of Political Science and Humanities Metropolitam University Prague (CZ) Presented at the 24th World Congress of Political Science, Poznań (PL), 28 July 2016.

2 INTRODUCTION aim of the presentation => NOT to discuss pros and cons of direct presidential elections aim of the presentation => to show how overall constitutional position of Czech and Slovak Presidents has changed since the electoral reform direct presidential elections => one of characteristics of semi-presidentialism, HOWEVER, not the only one (although there are authors for whom this is sufficient criterion to classify regime as semi-presidential, e.g. R. Elgie)

3 INTRODUCTION direct presidential elections often explained as strengthening the Presidents and their role in the political system although the way Presidents are elected determines their position in the system, if not accompanied by appropriate powers the strength can be only subjective, illusive or even danger mainly used by the office-holders for justification of their more active approach in political matters and acts

4 INTRODUCTION direct presidential elections > most visible and most discussed constitutional reforms in both CZ and SK since independence SK: change adopted in 1999 => mainly due to several consecutive failed attempts to elect the President by the Parliament during 1998 CZ: change adopted in 2012, first direct elections held in 2013 => no particular relevant reason (although advocates argued also by avoiding possible deadlocks if elected by Parliament)

5 CZ, SK: COMMON FEATURES adoption of direct presidential elections connected with either attempted or even successfully achieved limitation of presidential powers on the other hand there were not any relevant attempt to strengthen presidential powers during discussion on direct elections reflects the legislators intention to maintain parliamentarism and NOT to transform the systems to semi-presidentialism

6 SLOVAKIA changes in presidential powers passed in connection with the election change in 1999: no more power to preside over the Cabinet sessions (if attended by the President) => presiding over Cabinet sessions is more semi-presidential feature no more power to veto constitutional laws (CZ president has never had this power, also due to the existence of Senate and special procedure of passing constitutional laws in bicameral systems) co-signing of some of the president s decisions by the PM or assigned minister (was not in Constitution before)

7 CZECH REPUBLIC changes in presidential powers passed in connection with election change in 2012: limitation of awarding pardons (certain pardons were moved from exclusive presidential powers to powers where co-signature of PM or assigned minister is required) intensive discussion about presidential power to appoint members of the Czech National Bank Board (not passed, but the issue still on the agenda of any possible changes in future)

8 CZ, SK: DIFFERENT FEATURES in both countries => reform of the presidential removal Slovakia: loosening by adding one more way to remove the President => directly by voters (after such motion is initiated by the Parliament) impeachment by the Parliament for treason and serious violation of Constitution (trial before the Constitutional Court) remained

9 CZ, SK: DIFFERENT FEATURES Czech Republic only impeachment, no possibility of direct removal (although discussed during the legislative process, but only as minority and marginal issue, nobody really advocated such change) to impeach the President is even more difficult after the change as both chambers of the Parliament must pass the impeachment article (not just the Senate as it was before)

10 SK: CHANGES AFTERWARDS major change in President s position resulted from 2011 constitutional amendment that followed after failure of Iveta Radičová Cabinet amendment limits the powers of Cabinet that lost confidence, newly there are 3 groups of powers: powers that Cabinet is allowed to execute autonomously even without confidence (listed exhaustively) power that Cabinet can execute only after previous confirmation by the president (listed exhaustively) powers that Cabinet is forbidden to execute without confidence at all (not listed, remaining powers)

11 SK: CHANGES AFTERWARDS what are the powers where previous President s confirmation is required? powers to appoint and dismiss state officers and members of Judicial Council any powers that do not arise from the Constitution, but from other laws powers Cabinet is forbidden to execute include: strategic economic, social or foreign policy decisions asking Constitutional Court to review the compatibility of signed international treaties with constitutional system etc.

12 SK: CHANGES AFTERWARDS this change is contradictory with the parliamentary form of government SK president is politically irresponsible (that is why some of his acts must be co-signed by the PM) 2011 amendment => Cabinet is in some of its decisions dependent on co-signature of politically irresponsible president who is responsible for such decisions implementation of some kind of temporary (emergency) semi-presidentialism

13 CZ: CHANGES AFTERWARDS 2015 = after 2,5 years of experience with directly elected President > constitutional changes initiated one of the main features of proposed changes = to refine presidential powers (proposal does not operate with term limit ): appointment of the CNB Board members after Senate confirmation (same as Constitutional Court justices) impeachment proposal could be newly passed and submitted by any (one) parliamentary chamber (not just by the Senate or eve by both, but by any chamber) clarification of appointments of Supreme Court officials

14 CONCLUSION CZ, SK = both parliamentary systems with directly elected Presidents SK = generally lacks historic presidential tradition, on the other hand longer tradition of direct elections (1999), limited powers during implementation of direct elections, but later slightly strengthened CZ = rich presidential tradition, direct elections came late (2012) despite intensive discussions about its adoption in past, presidential powers limited only slightly during change of election form

15 Thank you for your attention!

PEOPLE VS POWER / TNP SUMMER 2011

PEOPLE VS POWER / TNP SUMMER 2011 What Can be Changed? The introduction of direct presidential elections is, from the perspective of standard constitutional engineering, a tool for solving or achieving