International Approaches to Conflict Resolution in Libya

Transcription

1 Middle East and North Africa Programme Meeting Summary International Approaches to Conflict Resolution in Libya Libya Working Group 15 April 2015 The views expressed in this document are the sole responsibility of the speaker(s) and participants, and do not necessarily reflect the view of Chatham House, its staff, associates or Council. Chatham House is independent and owes no allegiance to any government or to any political body. It does not take institutional positions on policy issues. This document is issued on the understanding that if any extract is used, the author(s)/speaker(s) and Chatham House should be credited, preferably with the date of the publication or details of the event. Where this document refers to or reports statements made by speakers at an event, every effort has been made to provide a fair representation of their views and opinions. The published text of speeches and presentations may differ from delivery. 10 St James s Square, London SW1Y 4LE T +44 (0) F +44 (0) Patron: Her Majesty The Queen Chairman: Stuart Popham QC Director: Dr Robin Niblett Charity Registration Number:

2 2 International Approaches to Conflict Resolution in Libya Introduction This is a summary of discussions that took place during a Libya Working Group meeting on International Approaches to Conflict Resolution in Libya, held at Chatham House on 15 April The discussion reflected on how the international community can support the UN-led negotiations for resolution in Libya, and what frameworks should be put in place to hold actors accountable in the country. The meeting was held under the Chatham House Rule 1, and the views expressed are those of the participants. The following summary is intended to serve as an aide-memoire for those who took part, and to provide a general summary of the discussions for those who did not Main points 1. Participants said that the focus for all domestic actors should be reaching a ceasefire on a broader strategy and vision for the country, and for the establishment of a regional government. 2. Support for both governments in Libya from various regional actors serves to create more incentives for further conflict in the country. 3. Libya is too important to be allowed to become a failed state, especially given its geographical position at the centre of the Mediterranean and proximity to Europe. 4. In order to stop further damage to Libyan society, there is a need to begin implementing local security plans without waiting for national agreement. 5. Alongside creating the right incentives and disincentives for negotiations to succeed, the international community should be preparing for scenarios where talks fail and conflict continues. 6. Lack of justice and accountability in Libya was one of the drivers of the revolution in 2011, and is a reason for the continued conflict across Libya. 7. Alongside political transitional justice, there must also be a collective focus on the application of civil and criminal justice in Libyan society to increase confidence in the rule of law. 8. Public awareness on the issue of justice and accountability is essential as increased awareness in society can only strengthen the rule of law. The role of domestic political actors Fighting continues in Libya between the militias affiliated with two competing governments in Tripoli and Tobruk. The dialogue that has been established between the two governments by the UN Special Mission in Libya is missing some key actors, and does not fully represent the factions that are armed and continue fighting, as both of these governments are based on loose alliances. Political actors at the table may have leverage one day and not the next. A two-party agreement will not work if the two groupings have no internal agreement. A participant said the concept of two distinct, 1 When a meeting, or part thereof, is held under the Chatham House Rule, participants are free to use the information received, but neither the identity nor the affiliation of the speaker(s), nor that of any other participant, may be revealed.

3 3 International Approaches to Conflict Resolution in Libya unified sides was misleading; there were multiple players, with some 400 different militias operating in the country. Political agreements were more likely to be accepted on the ground if they brought tangible benefits for citizens. Political leaders were likely to ask for personal gains, such as jobs in government, in line with the traditions of patronage politics. But in the fast moving and uncertain political environment of Libya, they could easily lose support if not seen to be delivering benefits to their supporters. On a security level, talks have not made any progress because of difficulties in being able to bring any of the military actors to the negotiating table they are harder to engage than the political actors. The threat of Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) in Libya should be understood at the root of its causes. ISIS supporters are mostly local Libyans with local grievances and objectives, rather than ideological. Role of regional actors Both the Tripoli and Tobruk governments have been lobbying regional governments the UAE, Egypt, Turkey, Jordan, Qatar, Sudan for support and to influence their policies towards Libya in their favour. Support for both governments in Libya from various regional actors serves to create more incentives for further conflict in the country. It was argued that the influence of regional actors in Libya reflects a wider regional struggle that has spilled over into Libya. There was disagreement among participants as to the degree to which regional actors dictated the agenda on the ground. One participant maintained that regional intervention in Libya will be further influenced by the current military campaign led by Saudi Arabia in Yemen. If it is deemed successful, Egypt will seek support from Saudi Arabia for intervention in Libya. Conversely, it was argued that although the Egyptian President Abdel Fattah el-sissi s domestic success is important to Saudi Arabia, the Saudis do not see Egyptian foreign policy as being of equivalent importance. Additionally, since surrounding North African countries are not keen on taking part in a joint Arab military force to intervene in Libya, direct intervention by the armies of regional powers is seen as unlikely. Role of international actors Libya is too important to be allowed to become a failed state, especially given its geographical position at the centre of the Mediterranean. The issue if migration has increased the European Union s (EU) sense of urgency in dealing with the Libyan issue. Border security is essential for the EU. Migration across the Mediterranean is often instrumentalized by Libyan actors to gain the attention of the EU, particularly on security issues. As well as engaging with political actors to reach an agreement, it was said there should be increased impetus to engage militia groups to ensure increased stability and security in Libya to establish a platform for political progress. Stability is of utmost importance to Libyan citizens, and engaging with militia groups is critical in establishing this stability.

4 4 International Approaches to Conflict Resolution in Libya It was discussed whether the international community should establish a system of incentives and disincentives. The interests of domestic actors in Libya must first be understood before it can be determined what the disincentives are for conflict. Various areas of incentives and disincentives were discussed by participants, such as the role of international and regional actors in Libya. Some participants argued that the current climate of regional dynamics encourages the continuation of conflict in Libya. For the international community, it was outlined that the priority was to create the right incentives and disincentives for UN-led negotiations to succeed. The issue of a migration spillover into European countries across the Mediterranean was also discussed, as this is seen by some as a potential threat to Europe. Migration across the Mediterranean from Libya is lucrative, and one possible means that was discussed to disincentivize this is to create a naval blockade on the Mediterranean. The international community must also understand the social factors and dynamics in Libya in order to help address the deep social roots of the conflict and get the right individuals and groups around the table. A platform for political progress should focus on a ceasefire that seeks to preserve key elements of the infrastructures around Libya. This would include airports, roads, hospitals and economic institutions. Justice and accountability Lack of justice and accountability in Libya was one of the drivers of the revolution in 2011, and is a reason for the continued conflict across Libya. Often in transitional periods, the international community tends to focus on political transitional justice, and does not concentrate much on general civil and criminal justice, although the latter is often of more direct relevance to ordinary citizens. In determining whether an act is criminal, there is too much focus on the perpetrator of the act and the victim, rather than the act itself. There must be a renewal of the universality of justice and the rule of law in Libyan society. Public awareness of the issue of justice and accountability is essential as increased awareness in society can only strengthen the rule of law. Libyans must debate how they see the topic of justice fitting into the future of their country, and a precedent and platform must be set for that. Libya currently has a highly active legislative branch, but there is no effective executive able to apply and enforce legislation across the country. And each time a weak law is adopted, it undermines the credibility of the rule of law: the constitution could become the biggest example of this. In the current set of draft recommendations for the constitution, sovereignty is defined as residing with God. This means that when it comes to legal issues, senior religious actors (such as the Grand Mufti of Libya) and religious institutions, which are unelected, have the decision-making powers. This is comparable to a certain degree with Iran, where the vilayat-e faqih has overarching powers. The role played by the International Criminal Court (ICC) in Libya has been limited because of seeming political compromise, as is seen in the ruling of the ICC on the acceptability of Libyan jurisdiction over Abdullah El-Senussi but not over Saif al-islam Gaddafi.

5 5 International Approaches to Conflict Resolution in Libya It seems as though the ICC has chosen to focus its future investigations on suspects who are outside Libya; part of the reason for this is the difficult security situation inside Libya. Dialogue and negotiations The most crucial step for Libya is to promote dialogue with a clearly defined purpose and with objectives upon which all parties agree. The situation on the ground is still at the stage where it is plausible to open negotiations with hard-line Islamists. There was significant disagreement between participants on this point, but the argument was made that most of the members of ISIS in Libya were Libyans with primarily local grievances, which still have a chance of being resolved locally. However, others questioned whether such groups could be part of a dialogue when they were seen as rejecting any compromise and as representing an extreme, and extraterritorial, ideology. Any notions of being able to disarm armed groups and of restoring the central government s monopoly of power are unrealistic. The initial focus for all domestic actors should be reaching a ceasefire on a broader strategy and vision for the country. A ceasefire should be accompanied by a comprehensive, grassroots reconciliation process, which will have to involve families, tribes, armed groups and any other warring actors on the ground. Any such reconciliation process should include accountability measures. The international community should consider what incentives and disincentives should be put in place to help a unity government establish itself and succeed. However, the international community must also take into account that the UN-led negotiations may not succeed. This means that an alternative plan B must be in place as a contingency. Much of the justice in Libya is highly politicized. For progress to be made, and for the rule of law to be strengthened and respected, the politicization of justice must be avoided and prevented. The obstacles to progress include: resistance from vested interests who fear that a successful dialogue would reduce their influence; an enduring belief on the part of supporters of both governments that they can win through force of arms; the difficulty in determining who should be invited to participate in negotiations; and the absence of convincing incentives and disincentives to participation.

6 6 International Approaches to Conflict Resolution in Libya The Libya Working Group The Chatham House Libya Working Group aims to identify, analyse and discuss scenarios for political transition, state-building and economic reconstruction in Libya. The group facilitates timely discussion and analysis, and offers a forum for the sharing of expertise and debate of new ideas. Meetings take the form of multidisciplinary roundtable discussions, held under the Chatham House Rule, bringing together experts from a wide range of backgrounds and sectors for a free and frank exchange of ideas. This project seeks to widen the framework of political debate on Libya, leading to innovative policy recommendations that influence policy decisions. About the MENA Programme The Middle East and North Africa Programme undertakes research and projects on political, economic and security issues affecting the Middle East and North Africa (MENA). To complement our research, the MENA Programme runs a variety of discussion groups, roundtable meetings, workshops and public events which seek to inform and broaden current debates about the region and about UK and international policy. We also produce a range of publicly available reports, books and papers.