Yemen: Drivers of Conflict and Peace

Transcription

1 Middle East and North Africa Programme Workshop Summary Yemen: Drivers of Conflict and Peace Held in partnership with the Clingendael Institute 7 8 November 2016 The views expressed in this document are the sole responsibility of the speaker(s) and participants, and do not necessarily reflect the view of Chatham House, its staff, associates or Council. Chatham House is independent and owes no allegiance to any government or to any political body. It does not take institutional positions on policy issues. This document is issued on the understanding that if any extract is used, the author(s)/speaker(s) and Chatham House should be credited, preferably with the date of the publication or details of the event. Where this document refers to or reports statements made by speakers at an event, every effort has been made to provide a fair representation of their views and opinions. The published text of speeches and presentations may differ from delivery. The Royal Institute of International Affairs, St James s Square, London SW1Y 4LE T +44 (0) F +44 (0) Patron: Her Majesty The Queen Chairman: Stuart Popham QC Director: Dr Robin Niblett Charity Registration Number:

2 2 Yemen: Drivers of Conflict and Peace Introduction This is a summary of discussions that took place during a workshop, held at The Hague on 7 8 November 2016, examining the drivers of conflict and peace in Yemen. Analysts, policymakers, academics and journalists came together to assess the underlying domestic and international political-economy drivers of conflict in Yemen, and to discuss practical solutions to some of the problems facing the country. The workshop was organized by Chatham House s Middle East and North Africa Programme in partnership with the Clingendael Institute s Conflict Research Unit, as part of the broader Chatham House Future Dynamics in the Gulf Region project. The workshop was held under the Chatham House Rule. 1 Key points that emerged from the discussion included: Yemen s civil war has deeper roots than the 2011 uprising that unseated President Ali Abdullah Saleh. A mismatch in priorities between the international community and the Yemeni people with the state all too often seen as a conduit for counterterrorism and security, rather than a mechanism for development and inclusion compounded many of the issues at root of the conflict by reinforcing popular perceptions of an out-of-touch elite and diplomatic community. The effects of the ongoing starvation crisis, and the militarization and empowerment of militant ideological groups, with a resulting increase in violence that perpetrators justify on religious grounds, threaten the country s future. A notable emergent force has been the armed Salafi groups supported by external actors, particularly the UAE; these are unlikely to disappear once the conflict has ended. Although there have been no local elections since 2006, local councils remain a potential stabilizing force, and continue to deal with people s local concerns on a daily basis. The current approach of waiting for a post-conflict context is not helpful: international support for Yemenis working at the local level must be increased. Session 1 Drivers of Conflict in Yemen Background to the current conflict Yemen s political system was under severe strain in the run-up to the country s 2011 uprising. There was an armed insurrection in Sa dah, in the north, a growing secessionist movement in the south, and an expanding local Al-Qaeda franchise. The economy was under mounting pressure. Tensions between President Saleh and his inner circle were growing. Foreign diplomats and policymakers broadly recognized these issues, but they were not a priority: there was rhetoric around the need for domestic reform, but counterterror initiatives were the focus. When people took to the streets demanding political change in 2011 the regime splintered. Diplomats focused on ending infighting and restructuring the security to ensure the fight against Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) continued. These concerns led to an imperfect peace deal, the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) initiative, which prioritized elite-level power-balancing. During the transitional period that followed, many Yemenis became increasingly disillusioned with the political process. The international community largely pinned its hopes on the 10-month National Dialogue Conference (NDC) process to solve the country s many problems. 1 When a meeting, or part thereof, is held under the Chatham House Rule, participants are free to use the information received, but neither the identity nor the affiliation of the speaker(s), nor that of any other participant, may be revealed.

3 3 Yemen: Drivers of Conflict and Peace Standards of living, security and basic governance continued to decline, and the appeal of identity groups the Houthis, Hirak in the south, and AQAP grew. Rival elite groups entered into a cold war, as part of which there were a large number of assassinations. Diplomats, foreign advisers and Yemeni politicians devoted more energy to selling utopian long-term solutions than to addressing a deteriorating political, economic, security and humanitarian environment. 2 In 2014 the Houthis began to expand their territorial reach, with considerable help from the ousted Saleh, their former rival, energizing many with a message of change. Prospects for peacebuilding and state-building Peace processes are usually ad hoc, late and inadequate. This was a factor in Yemen, where the international community raised expectations from 2012 onwards. Many Yemenis then became increasingly disillusioned by the trajectory of the transition, weakening state services and worsening economic prospects. Speakers at the workshop questioned the capacity of the international community to effect change in a meaningful, sustainable manner, or to understand the dynamics that support sustainable peace and the institutions that underpin a functioning society. One panellist argued that the international community is overly focused on political processes and does not recognize the importance of planning for what happens after deals have been signed. They also ignore the importance of local dynamics. The UN Security Council assumes that countries it deals with are formal states as it understands them, but Sana a no longer controls the country nor does the Adenbased government of Abd Rabbu Mansour Hadi. What control is exercised happens at the local level, yet local leaders are not present at UN-negotiated talks. Workshop participants emphasized the need for an inclusive peace process, and it was also argued that women should be included as a matter of course. One speaker noted that women and southerners are represented on paper, but in reality this is merely box-ticking. Government delegations to the talks have not included anyone from the crucial province of Mareb. Some participants raised concerns that a new peace process would be similar to the GCC deal of 2011, in that it would repeat the mistake of investing in elite power structures. There is a particular risk that external actors will fixate on identifying a single person to lead Yemen, only to find that this individual is unable to manage the country s many rival interests, one speaker cautioned. Peacebuilding requires an understanding of who is who on the ground, and identifying the people who can help build peace at a societal level. Security-sector reform and local governance Security-sector reform was regarded by workshop participants as a crucial component of a meaningful peace process, although it was noted that it would be a challenge. Yemen s previous security apparatus was bloated by patronage networks and ghost soldiers, a situation compounded by the number of militias that have emerged since the war began. European countries and the US contributed to the multiplication of security institutions, creating parallel ones within the existing services and making the security sector a site of elite rivalry. Reform of the formal 2 Salisbury, P. (2015), Federalism, conflict and fragmentation in Yemen, London: Saferworld,

4 4 Yemen: Drivers of Conflict and Peace security sector is likely to be stymied by foreign powers prioritizing counterterror capacity. Reform would need to account for parastatal and non-state armed groups, in the view of many participants. The security sector is not the only area where international donors and the UN have historically focused on working with the central government. When the civil war began, almost all US governance programmes were suspended, even though some would have been able to continue at a local level. While there have been no local elections since 2006, several participants made the case that, compared with other institutions, local councils have sustained a degree of legitimacy, dealing with citizens concerns on a daily basis. Some local governors for example in Mareb and Aden are trusted by their constituents because they are perceived as having a genuine interest in providing governance. Local councils are by no means unproblematic they are often filled by local elites and are part of local and national patronage networks but they tend to be more responsive than national institutions. In some areas, such as Aden and Hadramawt, there is also a case for local elections to be held, although in other areas elections could easily lead to further unrest. Session 2 Local Drivers of Conflict: The Long View Tribes and mediation in Yemen While it is often assumed that tribes are an impediment to the rule of law and state-building, this is not the case. One speaker noted that at least 80 per cent of Yemenis use the tribal system to resolve conflicts, and that, particularly since 2011, many depend on tribes to provide security. Yemen s tribes are often viewed in the context of specific, troublemaking sheikhs, rather being seen as social institutions. But in reality tribal leaders do not rule their tribe; nor do they control their members. Tribal order relies mainly on collective responsibility. Leaders gain legitimacy through conflict resolution or providing jobs. Individual Yemenis choose which leaders to go to resolve conflicts, based on their track record. However, the tribal system is eroding. It is unable to deal with land disputes or revenge killings, which are criminal rather than tribal issues. Tribes are strong where former president Saleh chose not to have the state present, and thus where there is a lack of courts. The war has also undermined the tribes ability to contain AQAP s presence. Some tribes have fought alongside AQAP, following the logic that the enemy of my enemy [the Houthis] is my friend. Others, however, have disowned some of their members for joining extremist groups, meaning that they are no longer eligible for tribal protection. Civil society responses to conflict Local communities are extremely active despite the prevailing conditions, one speaker said. Community activists are working extremely hard to fill the vacuum left by the collapse in the provision of state services and the almost complete withdrawal of external funding. Large numbers of internally displaced persons (IDPs) are hosted by families who are themselves often food-insecure. Community groups provide services such as food and water distribution, street cleaning, public health, and civil safety awareness and training. Local groups also run projects that provide psychosocial support to their communities, including educational projects, providing safe spaces for

5 5 Yemen: Drivers of Conflict and Peace women and even some informal reintegration of child soldiers. Youth groups are working to salvage community cohesion, pushing peace messaging through videos, street art, songs, festivals and theatre, as well as training people in conflict-sensitive, non-inflammatory use of social media. Community activists face a number of difficulties and dangers in dealing with Houthis and operating in Houthi-controlled areas, including questioning, office raids, arbitrary detention and forced disappearances. AQAP has played a similar role in Mukalla in the east, and elsewhere, in terms of shrinking civil society. Many foreigners talk about Yemeni resilience. But this phrase can be misleading. Middle-class households hosting IDPs are losing income. Communities and activists can do little to improve access to medicine and adequate healthcare. Informal systems of governance and rule of law have positive sides but also huge drawbacks. In one city in Yemen, an NGO has for the past five years been working with the local community in a small area of the old city in an effort to address underlying drivers of conflict and build relationships with formal and informal security providers. Pre-existing issues economic insecurity, falling levels of education, and practicalities such as refuse collection have all been exacerbated by the conflict. The international community should increase its support for Yemenis. It was argued that donors must be flexible and willing to take some risks in their programming. Some donors have funding methodologies that allow them to implement pilot activities and to learn and adapt as necessary from these. It is also important not to abandon gender programming just because it does not seem pertinent to the wider conflict. Participants discussed whether there were areas where the situation had stabilized enough to allow peacebuilding and development work. The case was made, however, that such work already happens in many parts of the country. One panellist noted that it is important not to focus all resources on one area: not only could this lead to partisan programming, but the stability of an area can change very quickly. Salafi militias One panellist emphasized that the effects of the starvation crisis, as well as the militarization and empowerment of religiously motivated armed groups, will haunt Yemen for many years to come. It became clear during 2015 that Salafi groups 3 were emerging as a significant fighting force in Yemen, and that their principal external sponsor was the United Arab Emirates (UAE). In 2014 a group of Salafists was run out of Dammaj, in the Houthi heartland in Sa dah, where they had established a religious centre. Having been forced to leave the area under an agreement brokered by the Houthis and President Hadi, many of them regrouped in Aden, where they formed an integral part of the defence of the city from the Houthi Saleh alliance in The UAE has essentially created a whole new patronage network in Yemen and militarized the Salafist movement, in the view of the speaker. The speaker noted that the boundary between Salafist groups and AQAP is deliberately blurred by the latter, but the two should not be conflated. Salafist fighters are in open conflict with AQAP in some areas; and the Salafists themselves are not one coherent group. There is also competition between groups that 3 The Salafist movement in Yemen was founded in the 1980s at the Dar Al-Hadith institute in northern Yemen, with Saudi funding.

6 6 Yemen: Drivers of Conflict and Peace benefit from Emirati and Saudi patronage networks, with Saudi Arabia generally seen as lending support to Islah, Yemen s main Sunni Islamist party, in the north. One of the dangers posed by the Salafi groups is that they promote violence justified on religious grounds. This obscures the original political roots of this conflict and divides people through sectarianism. Groups on both sides are using similar sectarian rhetoric, a phenomenon that is relatively new in Yemen. Another danger is that Salafi fighters are financially dependent on the Saudi-led coalition, the speaker said, which raises questions as to what might happen when the war is over. There needs to be a plan for what to do about these groups after the conflict, and the longer the conflict goes on the more difficult it will be to extract them from their entrenched position. Lines of communication should be established with the Salafi groups, and there needs to be better communication with the coalition about what its plan is for dealing with the Salafis after the war. The Houthis and legitimacy In 2014 the Houthis were apparently able to gain enough popular support to enter Sana a with very little resistance, one speaker said. They appeared to share the grievances of many Yemenis, and presented themselves as an oppressed group that was not part of the elite. Because they did not participate in the unity government of , they were not responsible for failures in governance. They could present themselves as a legitimate grassroots movement. When they overran the stronghold of the Al Ahmar family in the north, a core component of the pre-2011 regime elite, the Houthis sent a signal that they were a political force that could get rid of elites. Exploiting the legitimacy deficit of the Hadi government, the Houthis used the removal of fuel subsidies in mid-2014 as a rallying point for their cause. They started to mobilize aggressively, as did Saleh supporters. The Houthis also used pro-southern rhetoric to convey that they cared about the wider population, the speaker said. While their aims for the south remained unclear, they repeatedly called for its inclusion in a new government. Some in the south felt this presented a good alternative, but others saw the Houthis as yet another untrustworthy northern group that hoped to instrumentalize their cause. The Houthis rise took place in a context of shifting of elite alliances and a distracted international community. Saleh forged an alliance with the Houthis, who moved to take over Sana a at a time when the international community was still celebrating the successful conclusion of the NDC, despite a continued deterioration in governance and the provision of basic services. The NDC and the Southern Question In the course of the NDC, trust-building measures were proposed to encourage participation among southerners, based on a 20-point programme drafted by a preparatory committee ahead of the NDC. Many discussions of the best way to restore trust between different factions are centred on the notion of a federal state. Yet, according to the speaker on this topic, each party proposed a system that would benefit it politically, while ignoring the grievances and needs of other groups. Until 2014, the speaker said, many in Sana a saw the Houthis as potential southern allies. The Houthis made overtures to the southerners during the NDC, arguing that unification should be voluntary. The

7 7 Yemen: Drivers of Conflict and Peace Houthis wanted to follow the dialogue with a new transitional period including a parliament made up of a 50:50 split of northerners and southerners. Southerners proposed a three-year transitional period and a constitutional referendum for a new state, as well as negotiations with the north. Southern socialists supported the idea of federalism, but worried about what the specific federal provinces would mean for the south. A widely discussed transitional justice law was not passed, and the trust-building measures were not implemented. The committee that decided on the new federal system proposed six federal regions. The south was to receive 50 per cent of parliamentary seats in a first round of elections, despite being home to a much smaller number of people than the north. (Those working on a new draft constitution later expanded this to apply to the first two rounds of national elections.) The speaker stated that the south has continued to be marginalized since the war began, receiving little in terms of humanitarian, peacebuilding or security support. International donors have a tendency to ignore civil society in the south, for fear that it will push for independence. Saudi Arabia, the UAE and the UN have not yet figured out how to work together to provide a humanitarian response. The UN has been inactive in the south, while Saudi Arabia lacks the know-how and technical capacity to implement humanitarian plans. Session 3 Regional and International Aspects of the Yemen War Saudi Arabia On the role of Saudi Arabia, the case was made that Saudi Arabia had not wanted to enter Yemen militarily. Riyadh, one participant said, offered the Houthis a deal in return for border guarantees: if they agreed to abandon Saleh and disengage from Iran, they would be offered a place in a presidential council. Saudi Arabia also agreed that the south could be given the opportunity for independence through a UNmandated referendum. But this changed after the death of King Abdullah in early The Houthis began military exercises on the border, and Iran announced 27 flights a week from Tehran to Sana a. Saudi Arabia found itself pushed to the edge and had to go to war, the speaker argued. According to the speaker, it is not in Saudi Arabia s interests to win militarily and the kingdom supports political dialogue. Similarly, while Saudi Arabia has direct access to the Houthis, discussions with them are not straightforward. Allowing Saleh to stay in the country and to use his resources to maintain an active role, as part of the GCC initiative, was a mistake, in the view of the speaker. Saudi Arabia also made a mistake following its 2009 intervention in Yemen when it backed the Saleh regime against the Houthis in not calling for political inclusion for the moment. Saudi Arabia has been criticized for its lack of support for humanitarian efforts. In reality, hundreds of landing permissions have been granted to NGOs, together with a large number of licences for NGOs to operate. Saudi Arabia estimates that post-conflict reconstruction will cost around $30 billion (the World Bank estimate is $19 billion), and it is willing to assist with this once Yemen has stabilized. Participants asked whether Saudi Arabia would consider limiting airstrikes to the front lines, given the current military stalemate, and allowing Sana a airport to reopen. Questions were also raised around how much the war is affected by internal political dynamics within Saudi Arabia, and about how much popular support there is in Saudi Arabia for the coalition.

8 8 Yemen: Drivers of Conflict and Peace Iran One speaker noted that Iran s security doctrine comes from a particular mindset: the people who developed Iran s current strategy participated in the 1979 revolution, and lived through the Iran Iraq war and the US-led invasion of Iraq and its aftermath. Their perception is of an environment hostile to the Islamic Republic, and of an Arab world that has started a ruthless war against Iran with Western backing. The regional priorities that come out of this mindset include securing the border with Iraq and that with Afghanistan, keeping a front line in Syria and Lebanon to prevent any threat from Israel, and minimizing any threat against Iranian territory as well as threats to its economic and cultural interests. In the Iranian public discourse, Yemen has played a very marginal role. It is too far away to be of real relevance and for the conflict there to be regarded as a threat. Iran perceives Yemen to be the Afghanistan of the Arabian Peninsula i.e. a quagmire. It has no real stake there, with the exception of its interest in maintaining safe shipping routes. Iran has also reached the limits of its capacity as regards involvement in Syria and Iraq. Iran s links with the Houthis intensified during , but to what extent is difficult to say. The Iranian political elites agree that Saudi Arabia is in a state of crisis, faced with economic problems, a legitimacy crisis and security difficulties. However, while Iran is happy to see Riyadh experiencing problems, it does not want to see its rival collapse. Iran does not perceive it as a threat, and a military adviser to the Supreme Leader has been saying that Iran should not seek further tensions with Saudi Arabia. Iranian public sentiment towards Saudi Arabia is highly negative, most recently due to the Mecca disaster of 2015, Prince Turki s visit to the Iranian Mujahedeen in mid-2016, and Riyadh s reputed rapprochement with Israel. The UAE A speaker argued that the UAE considers its involvement in Yemen to be part of a broader GCC strategy. Its main goals are to help prevent further instability, combat ideological radicalism, and avoid being saddled with a chronic financial burden. As such, it wants to help establish a sovereign security system in Yemen; combat ISIS, the Muslim Brotherhood and the Shia radicalism of the Houthis; and get the economic cycle moving and begin investing in economic diversification. The strategy was described as a future-facing approach. In Hadramawt, the UAE is the only actor on the ground in the post-aqap context. Immediately after the operation to retake Mukalla in April 2016, uniformed personnel were on the streets and at checkpoints to demonstrate that the state was present. The UAE uses its armed forces for security and logistics, and its Red Crescent also operates as a stabilization force. The UAE also gives support to the police force supplying equipment and vehicles as well as to education, health and food distribution. Water tanks are being distributed to 11 directorates. As part of the plan to get the economic cycle moving, it makes improvements to infrastructure, including building a new strip of road, revitalizing Seyyun airport (which now has daily flights to Cairo and Amman), working on internationalizing Rayyan airport and rehabilitating Mukalla port. Investments are also being made in local radio. A participant noted that there is a lot of resentment in Mukalla against the Saudi-led coalition, both because the airstrikes have left a lot of destruction and because the Emiratis have arbitrarily arrested

9 9 Yemen: Drivers of Conflict and Peace people and reportedly tortured citizens for political reasons (such as even for a very loose affiliation with Islah). Questions were raised about what would happen when the UAE withdraws. While there are uniformed security forces in Mukalla, there are thousands of unaccountable Salafi fighters across the south. The U and the coalition need a plan for what will happen when they depart. Oman Oman is in a holding pattern. It faces a change of power in the short-to-medium term, and wants to defuse any external issue. With low oil prices and fiscal consolidation, its capacity to exert power is minimal, a speaker said. Oman would like to defuse and de-escalate the conflict. While it does not have much convening power to bring belligerents to the negotiating table, it does have some mediating power. In , Oman was centrally involved in the GCC initiative. It saw the GCC as the right forum then, but this is no longer the case. Oman s ministry of foreign affairs recently stated that there needs to be an international forum, as GCC members involved in the coalition are not neutral actors. Session 4 Scenario Planning Participants were divided into three working groups to make detailed projections of the economic, political and regional implications of three different scenarios for Yemen in the following 12 months: Imperfect Peace; Continued Quagmire; and Regional Fragmentation. Imperfect Peace scenario Under this scenario, expanded offensives by the Saudi-led coalition largely fail, leading to talks and a peace deal that is mostly cosmetic. A vice-president is nominated and there is a short-term decrease in tensions. Violence continues but becomes more localized, with militias growing in strength and assassinations by AQAP increasing. There is a nominal transfer of power to a new government (with the vice-president appointing an interim government or appointing himself prime minister). Southern leaders do not accept this new administration, and the south attempts to operate autonomously. Sana a airport reopens, humanitarian access increases, and international donors hold a conference at which the World Bank and the Gulf states pledge funds. The Gulf states continue to give money to certain actors, and the funds going into Yemen are lopsided. The donors support the local institutions, but the militias still hold power. It was noted that this scenario would likely be a temporary fix, and that the peace deal would collapse over time. Regional Fragmentation scenario A nominal unity government is formed but does not function or Hadi prevents the formation of a government. There is increased recruitment into different militias, and increasing regional support for local factions. The alliance between Saleh and the Houthis continues, along with increasingly sectarian rhetoric and frozen front lines. Iranian support increases.

10 10 Yemen: Drivers of Conflict and Peace Fighting increases in Taiz, where the balance of power depends largely on the level of external support from the Gulf states. In Aden local politicians are empowered by a peace deal, and benefit from the presence of the central bank in the city. The Gulf states take advantage of prospects for reconstruction in Aden. The black and grey economies in the north are sustained, but the country continues to suffer huge problems of malnutrition. Hadramawt becomes more politically independent, and continues to stabilize. Institutions suffer, or disintegrate entirely. The central bank continues to function, although with limited cooperation between the regional branches; Mareb and Hadramawt refuse to send revenue to Aden, for example, thus driving the further fragmentation of the country. Continued Quagmire scenario A major assault by the Saudi-led coalition puts more pressure on the west coast, possibly through the seizure of Hodeidah. Militias enter Sa dah from across the Saudi border, but coalition forces are not able to penetrate the north. The coalition pushes Hadi to take his government back to Aden permanently, and the president attempts to gain control over the interim capital. Non-payment of salaries continues to be a problem, and the move of the central bank to Aden has already created overblown and unmet expectations. Smuggling routes largely remain intact, and the northern alliance is able to maintain enough of a network and income to function. The humanitarian situation continues to deteriorate, with malnutrition rising. Medical supplies run dry, leading to unnecessary deaths from treatable diseases. More IDPs attempt to flee to the Horn of Africa. There is increasing international pressure for a new UN approach. Wildcard events affect the scenario, including the Houthis firing more missiles into Saudi Arabia and the possibility of a major attack hitting Jeddah leading to a serious escalation. Public support for the war in Saudi Arabia gradually ebbs, unless a missile attack by Houthis changes sentiment. Session 5 Prospects and Policies for Peacebuilding and Reconstruction Participants at the meeting agreed on the urgency of the situation, and the need to balance long-term solutions against immediate concerns. Yemen s capacity for service delivery is crumbling, and there is an urgent need to expand the humanitarian response with a focus on improving local delivery. The importance of livelihoods and social cohesion was emphasized by participants, as was working with women and on issues of gender-based violence. Donors can maintain and strengthen structures that are still functioning, such as the social welfare fund and the post office. The private sector needs to seen as a potential driver of stability. There is also the need for investment in infrastructure that will enable the economy such as the electricity grid and energy generation. It will be important for the peace process to involve local actors. Local reconciliation is important because the conflicts that have resulted from the war have the potential to create long-term security problems and violence. There is an argument to be made for Track Three engagement with civil society groups normally left out of peace processes. Working with local NGO leaders and governors in Mukalla, Taiz and Mareb is recommended; and localized initiatives will have to be planned in tandem with national mediation.

11 11 Yemen: Drivers of Conflict and Peace Given the scale of the civilian casualties caused by its airstrikes, the Saudi-led coalition should limit its attacks to front lines. It is crucial that Western governments support an independent UN investigation into war crimes, and that the UK places an embargo on arms sales to Saudi Arabia. There is very little US policy beyond the peace process, and while US priorities on Yemen will largely remain the same under President Donald Trump, he lacks an advisory team on the region to navigate the process. The idea of an internationally mediated process that brings in key regional and international players including those involved not just in Yemen but in conflicts across the region is also attractive. However, the priority should be national-level rather than international mediation.