Kenya after the Elections

Transcription

1 Africa Summary Kenya after the Elections Bryan Kahumbura Horn of Africa Analyst, International Crisis Group Discussant: Daniel Branch Associate Professor, University of Warwick Chair: Russell Pickard Deputy Director, Open Society Foundations 20 May 2013 The views expressed in this document are the sole responsibility of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the view of Chatham House, its staff, associates or Council. Chatham House is independent and owes no allegiance to any government or to any political body. It does not take institutional positions on policy issues. This document is issued on the understanding that if any extract is used, the author(s)/ speaker(s) and Chatham House should be credited, preferably with the date of the publication or details of the event. Where this document refers to or reports statements made by speakers at an event every effort has been made to provide a fair representation of their views and opinions, but the ultimate responsibility for accuracy lies with this document s author(s). The published text of speeches and presentations may differ from delivery.

2 INTRODUCTION This document provides a summary of a meeting held at Chatham House on 20 May The meeting looked at Kenya after the 2013 general elections and launched a report by the International Crisis Group (ICG). Kenya's March 2013 elections were the most complex it has ever faced, and the country must now navigate new political relationships following the process of devolution and Uhuru Kenyatta's presidential victory. Bryan Kahumbura, ICG s Analyst on the Horn of Africa, discussed Kenya's 2013 election process, and identified the key post-election scenarios that will define the country's economic, social and political outlook in years to come. The meeting consisted of a presentation followed by discussant s remarks and a question and answer panel. The session was held on the record. The following summary is intended to serve as an aide-mémoire for those who took part and to provide a general summary of discussions for those who did not. 2

3 BRYAN KAHUMBURA Mr Kahumbura gave an overview of the ICG report Kenya after the Elections. The report used in-depth field research to look at the most recent election period in Kenya, with a focus on devolution and the International Criminal Court (ICC) cases against President Uhuru Kenyatta and Deputy President William Ruto. According to the report, the election period in 2013 was the least violent since the 1992 elections, although there were some clashes preceding the vote and after the Supreme Court declared Kenyatta president. The speaker felt that there was enough discrepancy in the outcome of the elections to have occasioned more consideration of the results, given the narrow margin of 8,400 votes securing Kenyatta s presidency. However, Raila Odinga s petition challenging the election results was weak and gradual acceptance of the results has followed the Supreme Court s ruling. Mr Kahumbura stated that he was optimistic following Kenya s elections, and that overall the constitution had worked for the betterment of Kenyans. A cabinet of 16 officials has been nominated by Kenyatta and Ruto, comprised of competent technocrats and only two politicians. The majority of these ministers are seen as acceptable by Kenyans on both sides of the political divide. This shift indicates a progression from previous political practice in Kenya, as now debate is increasingly centred on devolution in the light of the new constitution. Yet there is still a lack of expertise in government, and political wrangles remain. The Jubilee Coalition s political manifesto has taken a back seat. Emphasis is now on Vision 2030, which was not part of Kenyatta s manifesto. The Jubilee Alliance holds a majority in parliament and has shown cohesion in its policies, but there is also a lack of strong opposition in parliament. The Orange Democratic Movement (ODM) has threatened to walk out of parliament owing to its minority position, and there is no legislation to force the party to stay in parliament. The ICC remains the biggest problem for Kenyatta and Ruto as the future of the Jubilee Alliance rests on the outcomes of the cases. Kenyatta s case is weaker than Ruto s; prosecution of one and not the other would cause a split in the coalition and lead to a rift in the National Assembly with three distinct groups: The National Alliance (TNA), the United Republican Party (URP) and Odinga s Coalition for Reforms and Democracy (CORD) Alliance. Kenyatta is 3

4 a good strategist and might be able to steer clear of ICC controversy, but many are too cautious to speak about the cases in parliament. Altogether, the report concluded that the elections were largely peaceful, but that a follow-through of political progress was needed. The two main challenges for the new government are devolution and the ICC. Both partnership in the Jubilee Coalition and peace and democracy in Kenya rest on the outcome of the ICC cases and government adherence to the decisions. DANIEL BRANCH Dr Branch stated that the greatest strength of the ICG report was that it evaluated the campaigning process as well as the elections themselves, and looked at the need for reforms in the electoral process including improving capacity, personnel and management practices. He drew some key observations from the report, which examined opposition politics during the elections, highlighting Odinga s mismanaged campaign. It noted that without Odinga, the opposition would be rudderless as the CORD Alliance was formed to win elections. Dr Branch questioned where the next viable opposition voice would come from. He suggested that disaffected governors from the Jubilee Alliance might constitute a forceful political opposition, but also highlighted the importance of informal opposition, which could stem from civil society and others isolated from the political process. There may be some support for the ICC from such groups. In his view, the prevailing attitude of Kenyan people is that there needs to be more understanding about the ICC process. However, it remains unclear whether funding for opposition groups and civil society is readily available. Dr Branch spoke about the future of the government. He noted that the Jubilee Alliance is stronger than it appears. This Kikuyu-Kalenjin alliance is rooted in previous political alliances. Yet there could be disagreement between Kenyatta and Ruto. They hold differing attitudes towards devolution in Kenya, and Ruto may hold presidential ambitions for the future. According to the county electoral results, there was support for devolution around the Tanzania border area. These are areas targeted in the development projects of Vision There is tension between central government plans for development in these areas and high local expectations. 4

5 Inequality remains an issue; economic growth has led to a widening gap between rich and poor. The question therefore is whether Kenyatta and Ruto can manage grassroots politics, especially given Kenyatta s wealth. On the other hand, a weak and incoherent opposition keeps the balance in the Jubilee Alliance s favour. 5

6 Q&A QUESTIONS Do you think the ICC charges will lead to an increase or a reduction of aid from donor countries? What role could civil society groups play in the post-election scenario? How will international partners find a balance between respecting the wishes of Kenyans in terms of ICC support, and maintaining essential contact? The recent elections were less violent than elections in previous years. Will this trend continue? BRYAN KAHUMBURA Mr Kahumbura stated that Kenyans did not want to experience the same levels of violence that had occurred during the last elections. However although the elections were relatively peaceful, many issues have still not been addressed. There was a media blackout on certain issues and politicians were banned from talking about some topics. While there may not be a repeat of 2007 if these problems are not addressed, they will not necessarily go away. He said that the Jubilee Alliance s manifesto and Vision 2030 were well presented, but there needed to be follow-through. Mr Kahumbura noted that there is no exact definition for essential contact. Contact between international partners and the Kenyan presidency occurs as and when it is needed. One recent example was the Somalia conference held in London this year, to which President Kenyatta was invited by the British government. In terms of the ICC cases, no one has so far breached the Rome Statute. Mr Kahumbura stated that civil society groups were not strategic in their campaigning during the elections. They would have been more effective if they had targeted individuals. Civil society will find it hard to find the space to engage with politicians, particularly as the ICC cases take up time that could be used to lead the country. QUESTIONS When President Kenyatta spoke recently in London, he mentioned the Jubilee Manifesto more than Vision Is the president focusing more on the 6

7 manifesto? Vision 2030 sold well during the time of Kibaki: does it just need the right leadership? Is the Kenyan government taking on too much too soon when it comes to devolution? How will the government tackle the practicalities of implementing devolution? BRYAN KAHUMBURA Mr Kahumbura answered that President Kenyatta s speech in London was based on both the Jubilee Manifesto and Vision However, he noted that this sends a mixed message: are Kenyatta s policies based on the manifesto, on Vision 2030 or both? He argued that Vision 2030 would continue to grow, but it would be unfortunate if Kenyatta piggybacked on the anticipated success of Vision 2030 and got distracted from focusing on Kenya s political needs. Mr Kahumbura noted that the outcome of devolution was unlikely to be seen in our lifetimes. He noted that there would be challenges at the national level as new policies are implemented, including those mentioned in the constitution such as the sharing of resources nationally. However, he said that county administrative centres are progressive. He argued that private companies looking to work in Kenya should study the changes and start working on the ground. QUESTIONS What does the ICC mean to the international community, especially given that the United States is not a member? Is the ICC against African states? Is there any concern in Kenya about the appointment of a technocrat team to the cabinet? Does this make the executive more powerful? BRYAN KAHUMBURA Mr Kahumbura stated that the ICC is conducting the two cases at the invitation of Kenya. The Kenyan authorities had had the option of local investigation and resolution, which they had declined. His view was that a technocratic team was better than a political team. Kenya is transitioning faster than happened after the 2002 elections, when previous 7

8 ministers were re-elected to the cabinet. For the first time, technocrats who are experts in their own right have been appointed to run the country. There may be difficulties involved for the civil service, but civil servants are also writing their own mandate. The cabinet has close relations with the president and the deputy president, but so far none of the 16 has shown political inclinations. He was hopeful that this cabinet would be successful. 8