A Proposed Framework to Ending the Conflict in Libya

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2 A Proposed Framework to Ending the Conflict in Libya Many lay the blame on those who analyze the Libyan crisis for not offering proposals that could represent the pathways towards a way out for Libya from the reality of war, division, and signs of the State's collapse. This reality could lead to possibilities among which: - The break out of several long wars between Libyans. These wars are deepened due to foreign support; - The central and local authorities cease provision of basic services to citizens including; electricity, water, health and education services, due to the suffocating twofold financial crisis: the decline of State's financial resources and the decline of Libyan Dinar exchange rate against foreign currencies. - Factors maintaining the unity of Libya might fade away. This could further complicate the crisis and increase the ambitions of the conflicting demographic, ethnic, cultural, and regional groups, which are exhausted from the upcoming war (the potential possible war), to establish an entity that could later on gain recognition and become a State, especially amid the existence of border, ethnic and tribal span between Libya and several neighboring countries. 1 A Proposed Framework to Ending the Conflict in Libya

3 This "pessimistic" introduction and others alike, often urge the question on the solution to the ongoing crisis and its possible dark consequences? Where is the way out of the tunnel of war and division which Libya has entered for years? Many among those who raise the question are hoping for quick solutions to the extent that these solutions can be described as "magical" as they could quickly be implemented and engender the optimal results. Unfortunately, those hoping for magical solutions must be reassured that such solutions have no place in the Libyan crisis scene; but rather solutions will arise from Libya amid the continued fighting, widening of division, and fading away of the State's institutions shadows. The latter's retrograding impact is not only on citizens' daily lives, but even on the imagination of people who are living the reality of a widening gap between them and the State that is unable to communicate with them through its duties and services. Several initiatives managed to end civil wars, which are always supported by external parties of contradicting interests in the territories of conflict. The historical records of these initiatives clearly point out to what is like postulates which indicate that solutions always start with a general framework, then often take some time to be accepted by the warring parties and their external supporters. The latter, would ascertain that all their interests could be achieved through peace, as well as subside their fears that they would not be the price for this peace. It remains fundamental that all parties to civil war are aware of the original roots for the war and division. 2 A Proposed Framework to Ending the Conflict in Libya

4 It is important primarily for Libyans, then for all international mediators, such as the UN mission to Libya, Arab League, European Union, African Union, and several regional and international envoys to realize that the current crisis in Libya has historical roots related to the State's foundation negotiations in the late forties of the twentieth century. In "reality", these negotiations did not result in agreements and consensus over the existence of a State in the modern definition of the term as well as the contemporary definition that has relatively changed. The Libyan State was founded by the will of the major powers and under the impacts of the Cold War between the Socialist and Capitalists camps as well as the redefining of the international relations inside the European and Capitalist camps after the defeat of Germany and Italy in the World War II. Libya found itself a State before finalizing its "social contract." Demonstrations rejecting the Federal system and the hereditary monarchy in the district of Tripoli did not stop, even after declaring the independence that was announced from Benghazi in the district of Barga (Cyrenaica) at the end of The State of Libya was born while it did not possess the sufficient resources to manage its expenditure. Aids, which were based on agreements concluded with the United States and Britain in addition to the UN support related to education and heath sectors, were the funds that formed the first Libyan budget. The opposition to federal regime and hereditary monarchy had started in the district of Tripoli before Independence. The representatives of this opposition expressed their rejection in the Constituent Assembly meetings. Federal regime was abolished through constitutional amendments conducted in 1963, which are still subject of contestation by 3 A Proposed Framework to Ending the Conflict in Libya

5 many. Libyans did not resume negotiations over their "social contract, which has almost been repeated again after four decades, in February 2011 that ousted the previous rule. There is no doubt that issues within the "social contract" of Libyans could be described, "only metaphorically" as new issues such as those related to the rights of cultural identities of Amazigh, Tuareg, and Tubu. These problems are in addition to the outstanding ones of regional nature, which were an essential factor for tensions in the political and social history of Libya since the beginning of negotiations for founding the Libyan State in the forties of past century, the army movement in 1969, and February Revolution in These issues have clearly emerged during the "negotiations" of the Committee of sixty, which was elected in 2014 to prepare a permanent constitution proposal. The negotiations engendered division among members, as some of them representing Tripoli district boycotted the committee. The proposed framework for the solution in Libya could start with recognizing the structural "failures" of the ruling system, political administrative structure, and resources distribution. These "failures" continued, have been accumulated and have been increased as we pointed out to the demands of Libyan cultural identities, even after the fall of Colonel Muammar Gaddafi and the end of his rule. Moreover, there was a rush towards building a model of "democratization" that is based on choice. In reality, this choice has been founded on regional and cultural "constituent" disputes, without "realizing" the "importance" of going back to square one in order to open "national" discussions that do not exclude any party, but it also include the "defeated", in the eyes of the "victor". 4 A Proposed Framework to Ending the Conflict in Libya

6 These discussions would aim at creating consensuses on all historical "failures," in addition to them, the constituent issues related to the cultural identities. However, the victors of February Revolution in 2011 went on ruling Libya with more exclusion represented in adopting the political isolation law. This law created a rejection of the existence of February among Libyans inside and outside Libya. Furthermore, there has been a refusal of any invitation to go back to square one and launch the "first constituent" negotiations. Besides, the issues of the cultural identities have been addressed with contempt after the first implementation of the "democratization" model in The victors rushed to the last copy of State, left by the Colonel Muammar Gaddafi, as their starting point. This copy is represented in the political and financial centralization in Tripoli district, and the absence of equitable distribution of resources, notably the oil revenues in which the contributions of "Barga" and "Fazzan" districts exceed 80%. February 2011 failed as before that September 1969, and before both December 1951 in forming a "social contract" upon which all Libyans agree without exception or exclusion. Consequently, hundreds of armed groups have emerged. These groups do not recognize any state authority and some of which do not even recognize the "modern" concept of the State. The widespread of these groups was among expected results of: - The weakness of the "Central State" and not only the central authority, - The dissolving of Libya's sovereignty due to the weakness of its security institutions, especially the intelligence, 5 A Proposed Framework to Ending the Conflict in Libya

7 - The proliferation of arms and the flow of cross borders fighters to Libya, - The civil war in February 2011 which resulted in the fall of the Colonel Muammar Gaddafi. Following the emergence of these groups, other new armed groups have been established based on regional and cultural identities motives. They are demanding, -what they call their rights- which they did not obtain since the inception of Libya in Amid these cultural and regional shifts, the political process proposed by the constitutional declaration, which was called "transitional", tends to ignore the consequences of building a "democratization" model that does not focus primarily on filling the historical gap related to the consensus on "social contract". This model has to be based on addressing all historical as well as metaphorically "emerging" issues; despite the fact that the signs of regional and identity demands movements had appeared early and even before the fall of the previous rule, which ended with the death of Gaddafi in October Today the reality is emulated again, after wars and political "failures" following February Revolution in 2011, to reflect these regional and cultural disputes. The raging war since nearly three years has formed what could be described as the historical demands of regionalisms and identities, either in "Barga" (Cyrenaica) or "Tripoli", or "Fazzan". Today, we are living under three governments and several "armies" in a context imposed by regional and cultural identities, without overlooking the broad role of the regional and international war sponsors. However, on its basis, 6 A Proposed Framework to Ending the Conflict in Libya

8 the war was resulted from the "failure" of Libyans to address the historical "constituent failures". Surely, the consequences of the civil war, in which the blood of thousands of Libyans was shed, and what has been imposed by it cannot be canceled through a "pretense" political process led and imposed by the center and its social regional groups, without examining the shifts drawn by the violent fighting between Libyans. However, questions are expected to be raised about the true" reality of the existence of ideological conflicts in Libya of an intellectual nature, such as the conflict between Islamists and Liberals. The answer resides in the ideological conflicts, with the exception of those led by radical groups (ISIS and Al-Qaeda), that stand at a political level and that is not related to regionalism and identities. In fact, several ideological "political" movements are distributed based on regionalisms and identities. Hence, we find Islamists and Liberals among the Centralists, Federalists, Amazigh, Tubu and Tuareg. The politicized ideological conflicts (except for ISIS and Al-Qaeda) are of a political nature when "stripped" of their regional and identity-related tendencies, and are not of a constituent nature that is related to the historical failures. At this point, we are approaching the details of the proposed solution framework. If it is possible to agree on the previous analysis, the beginning of the solution will be through recognizing the new "demarcation" of the regionalisms and ethnocentrisms in Libya, without any attempt by local and external powers to change it in favor of any party in these regionalisms or identities. It is not meant here what is conducted by the violent movements such as ISIS and Al-Qaeda, which rely on cross- 7 A Proposed Framework to Ending the Conflict in Libya

9 borders fighters, because they basically do not believe in the State in its modern and contemporary concept and applications, for which the regionalisms and identities in Libya are fighting. Recognizing the new "demarcation" of a new social and identity reality in a way that reflects a part of the "imagined" Libyan reality. That means to re-recognize the importance of establishing a "social contract" which regulated the new "demarcation" and complete the creation of consensuses over the constituent issues through negotiation in which all regionalists and ethnocentric groups take part, with no exception or exclusion. These negotiations will result in consensus about the ruling system, which determines the power's features, the political administrative system of the State's structure that draws the regionalisms boundaries, and the basics of resources distribution to accompany the reality of the historical districts and cultural identities. This can be achieved through repositioning the current war leaders to become peace leaders as happened in many countries which succeeded in ending civil wars that were founded on regional and identity conflicts, such as in Lebanon, Bosnia, and Rwanda. There must be recognition of the leaders or "lords" of regional and identity- based wars, except for those who chose to exclude themselves as happened with the Serbs leader in Bosnia and the army Commander "Lahd" in Lebanon. Recognizing the "true" reality, which was engendered by wars and fighting after February 2011 and which reflects the regional and identitybased aspirations, leads to several consequences, among which: The end of war, replacing the political division by quotas and conflict over resources by sharing, exactly through recognizing the current 8 A Proposed Framework to Ending the Conflict in Libya

10 repositioning map which was the result of conflict and civil war. Regionalists and ethnocentric war leaders have to be convinced of the need to expand the constituent negotiations to cover, throughout time, the regionalisms and identities demands. All this in the aim to reach a framework agreement that will, later on, lead to a constitutions document without getting "involved" in bets related to importing a "democratization" model that depends on a "mobilized" choice that is attributed to the historical conflict and current civil war to eventually empower regionalism and identity-based majority. Therefore, the "mobilized choice" is turned into the fuel that will ignite civil wars to be extended in time and place. To reiterate, for the purpose of emphasizing, any solutions tend to find a traditional "democratization" model that is unusual to Libya for reasons related to the regional and identity-based conflicts and the nature of the social and cultural structure of Libya. The reasons also include influential religious interpretations along with the social group in the minds of the elite and the audience in Libya. These factors will not only complicate the political scene but, also will widen the scopes of regional and identitybased wars through drawing the ideological disagreements. This being said, the proposed framework for ending the conflict in Libya is related to the recognition of the importance of taking back the debate to square one, to address the failures of establishing a ruling system, political administrative system, and the equitable distribution of resources and wealth, adding to that the cultural identities demands. This will be achieved through recognizing the actual reality that is based on war and fighting; including the social and political divisions (the political division 9 A Proposed Framework to Ending the Conflict in Libya

11 is not the basis of conflict and war in Libya). Then, the social division and political division will be regulated through sharing, so that war leaders and warlords turn into peace leaders. All this being away from any attempts of imposing a transitional political process that seeks to demarcate the position of the State and authority in Libya since September 1969, meaning that demarcating the centralization in favor of the regional majority ("Tripoli district versus "Barga"(Cyrenaica) and "Fazzan") and the identities (Arabs versus Amazigh, Tubu and Tuareg) and the rejection of the regionalism and identity-based demands. It is noteworthy to point out that some of those who criticize -what they call- the "imported" solutions, especially the political solution that is backed by the United Nations, have to avoid presenting solutions that are not only imported, but also repeated in Libya itself, at least since the first "mobilized choice" elections in Several countries have not yet overcome their civil wars. All the "imported" solutions, whether the supplier was a UN envoy or a local group, ignore the basis of the crisis in Libya that is the historical "constituent" failures. The belief that bringing a "democratization" model would empower, through the "mobilized choice", the regionalism and identity-based majority without completing the debates which address the constituent failures and the identity-based demands for the cultural groups, is only legitimizing the continuity of war and division. 11 A Proposed Framework to Ending the Conflict in Libya

12 Briefly, and after an intentional prolonging and repetition, the proposed framework for the solution is founded on recognizing the consequences of war, fighting, and political conflict that accompanied them and, upon its basis peace, should be achieved. First, by transferring war leaders, from their trenches, to the political hallways, without any transitional justice, rather by means of a historical reconciliation. Second, at this fragile moment, justice consequently now means continuous encouragement of the ongoing war, which will not cease unless under certain conditions, amongst which; reassuring the war leaders and lords, and ensuring the sharing, and not the prosecution. After which, all parties who were forcefully absent, including those of cultural identity and displaced abroad, join the war leaders, who are now-turned peace leaders. These groups will now work together through a constituent debate that addresses past disagreements, and ensures the demands of the present. Third, and lastly, recognizing the results of the war and its leaders, will lead Libya to an acceptable sharing, and equitable distribution of resources, to put an end to the marginalization that has existed for decades until today towards the regions where these resources belong to. Then, it would be possible to establish in Libya a joint living where a fragile State is born due to the quotas and sharing, but it is a safe State in which the interests of all Libyans and their alliance abroad are formed based on peace rather than war. 11 A Proposed Framework to Ending the Conflict in Libya

13 Recent Publications 1. Priorities of National Reconciliation Government. 2. The Draft of Political Agreement: Review of the Content Audit Bureau Report and Rationalization of Public Spending. 4. A Framework for the Comprehensive Transitions (Translated to Arabic). 5. Social Impacts of the Political Division in Libya. 6. The Political and Security Scene in Libya an Analytical and Forward-Looking Vision. 7. The Economic Impacts of Political Division in Libya. 8. Is it Possible to Bring Peace to Libya? 9. Policies of Commodities Subsidy in Libya. 10. Libya 2015 Report: Year in Review. 11. Government Performance Evaluation in Libya for Year War on ISIS in Libya through the Accord. 13. The Libyan Constitution Drafting Assembly (CDA): Path, Outcomes and Reviews. 14. Consociational Democracies, Political Stability and External Intervention. 15. The Health Sector in Libya: Situation and Challenges. 16. Financial Corruption in the Libyan Economy. 17. The Situation of Higher Education in Libya. 18. Public Education in Libya: Problems, Challenges and Solutions. 19. The Impact of Geography and Demography on the Conflict and the Solution in Libya. 20. The Role of the Social Groups and Religion in the Conflict over Power in Libya. 21. Performance Evaluation of the Ministry of Interior in Libya. 22. War against ISIS. Till When? Assessment Report. 23. The Paths of War in Benghazi. Assessment Report. 24. The International Community and its Compliance with the Skhirat Agreement. Assessment Report. 12 A Proposed Framework to Ending the Conflict in Libya

14 25. Eight Months after Signing the Political Agreement. Assessment Report. 26. Tripoli and the Oil Crescent; Two Possible Pathways to War in Libya. Assessment Report. 27. Consequences of Voting No Confidence on Government of National Accord. Assessment Report. 28. The Role of the State in the Economic Activity in Libya. 29. The Libya Case. Monthly report, August The Libyan Political Dialogue (Skhirat). Obstacles or Closed Roads? Assessment Report. 31. The Shifts of the Conflict in the Oil Crescent. Assessment Report. 32. The Libyan Oil Sector during Year Repercussions of the Declarations of the State Council and the Mufti. Assessment Report. 34. Challenges Facing the Spatial Development in Libya. 35. The Libya Case. Monthly report, September The Russian Role in Libya. A Context of a New Cold War. Assessment Report. 37. Social Justice in Libya since The State of War in Libya What is it? And How to Dismantle it? 39. The Possibility of an Armed Clash in Tripoli after the Return of the Salvation Government. Assessment Report. 40. New Possible Scenarios for the War in the Oil Crescent. Assessment Report. 41. The Possibilities of the Libyan War: Monopoly - War - Division Negotiation. 42. The Absence of the State Movement in Libya. 43. The Libya Case. Monthly report, October A Vision for the Management of Antiquities and Heritage in Libya. 45. The Good Governance of the Libyan Investments and Funds Abroad. 13 A Proposed Framework to Ending the Conflict in Libya

15 About LOOPS The Libyan Organization Of Policies & Strategies (LOOPS) is an independent, nonprofit and nongovernmental institution founded in December 2014 in Tripoli, Libya. A representative branch was founded in Istanbul in January The organization carries out research and studies related to emerging policy and strategy issues with the aim of generating effective and successful policies and providing support to decision-makers. The organization devotes its efforts to improving the performance of Libyan institutions and advancing the economic and social welfare of the Libyan people. It seeks to spread the notions and concepts of quality, good governance, strategic planning and a culture of excellence so as to improve the performance of Libyan institutions. LOOPS aspires to promote and spread knowledge about public policies and strategies to the state through the dissemination of statistics, studies and periodic reports. It also organizes conferences, workshops and forums as platforms for discussion, the exchange of opinions and spreading knowledge. Tripoli Office Alnofliyin, Tripoli, Libya Tel: Istanbul Office Istanbul Vizyon Park Yenibosna Merkez MAH.29 Bahçelievler- Postal Code Ofis Plaz.A3 BLK K: 3/D28 Phone: Fax: Istanbul, Turkey 14 A Proposed Framework to Ending the Conflict in Libya