CHAPTER3 STATE AND MULTIPARTY SYSTEM IN RUSSIA

Transcription

1 CHAPTER3 STATE AND MULTIPARTY SYSTEM IN RUSSIA

2 State and Multiparty System in Russia Political parties do have a fundamental role to play in the development of modern representative democracy. They connect political and civil society and advance the perceived interests of individuals, groups and various social strata of the society. Political parties aim to develop these different entities and acts as a linkage between the civil society and the state. In Russian Federation though ideological diversity do exists, no particular ideology is considered as the state ideology or as a compulsory ideology (Article 13, Clause 2, Constitution of the Russian Federation 1993). Social associations are equal before the law, political diversity and a multiparty system do have their distinct recognition (Article 19, Clause 2). However, it has been ajjeged by various political experts and social scientists that in modern Russia, the already existing and newly emerging political parties and party system fulfiji these functions marginally. This chapter will deal with the party-state relationships that have arisen since Seeking to determine the extent to which political parties in Russia have been able to assert themselves vis-a-vis the state. This chapter deals with the relationship between the various political parties and the state. It focuses on the role of various heads of state and their role in the promotion and establishment of multiparty system in Russia. How political parties are part to various policies initiated by the government, how do they oppose and support these policies wijj also be dealt with in detail. Special attention has been given to the so-called "parties of power", as these parties reflect the extent to which, and the mechanisms by which the state manages party politics. In the former Soviet Union, communist party and the state overlapped. Decision making in all spheres of life was in effect done within the purview of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU). The Communist party was effectively above the law and accountable only to itself. Public offices were staffed through the CPSU's nomenklatura system. In 1991, the CPSU was banned by the Russian state. Since then, Russian state was alleged to be characterized as a dictatorial state. The state itself was, legitimized by the people's deputies and the President. The first genuine multiparty elections took place in December 1993(0versloot, Hans:2006: I). These elections gave different political parties although a limited but, meaningful, role in the newly emerged political system. It 80

3 has been observed that soon after the elections of December 1993, party-state relations have followed a markedly different path that diverged from the patterns that already existed in other post-communist states. Although it has been claimed that parties control the state, in the reality is just the opposite in Russia. In Russia, it is the state that is colonizing the parties. Due to the long heritage of the Russian political system it has been derived by various scholars that Russian political culture was inimical to liberalism, essentially dooming liberal parties to lasting irrelevance (Hale, Henry:2004:994). Another interpretation avers that the economic reforms carried out by Y eltsin a! ienated and to a large extent destroyed the Soviet-era 'middle class' comprising of doctors, teachers and other professionals that would have otherwise have become the natural base for a strong liberal party. Attitude of the Russian State towards the Political Parties: During the 90s the state held a monopoly on party building. The state was joined by new builders of parties-the oligopolies, or political and financial clans. Political pluralism took the form of harsh competition (within the elite) among these new actors in the political field. These financial clans were closed, self-sufficient, quasi-feudal organizations (mysl' Svobodnaia:2003:74). They had industrial and banking potential, media empires, informational and analytical services and security services (which successfully competed with the state analogues) and their own people in government agencies. These organizations had their own political parties as well. In this way the nature of monopoly changed, but not the monopoly itself, since the executive branch and the new oligopolies played the role of monopolists. For the citizens during the early post communist period, voting was entirely a new concept. Voting was nothing more than a sense of choosing for them. Under the Soviet system, there were frequent votes but no opportunity to choose, not just between parties but (in practice) whether to vote at all. It was the leadership that determined the composition of each new parliament and the constituencies in which they would themselves be nominated. Voters had only to drop the ballot paper, unmarked and possibly unread, into the ballot boxes. If they left the single name it was regarded as a vote in favor; if they wished to vote against, then they had to go to the screened-off booth 81

4 at the edge of the polling stations, where everyone could guess their intentions. The results were so predictable that newspapers used to prepare their front pages with pictures of successful candidates even before the elections and long before the Central Electoral Commission had declared the results (White, Stephen:2000:34). Peter Ordeshook believes that "Russia is unlikely to develop a stable or efficient electoral or federal system that matches the definition of federalism". Russia has been paving its long journey towards democracy, despite various flaws in its political and economic system. Socio-political reforms initiated at different period of time by different heads of state and rulers had their positive as well as negative impact on Russian society. However it was not an easy task to carry out these reforms (Ordershook.Peter.C: 1996: ). These reforms were carried out over a very short period of time. And the most interesting facts about these reforms were that they always came from the top i.e. from the dictates of the head of the state. Constitution of Russian Federation has been amended several times by several heads of government according to their necessity. Accordingly the democratic fabric changed its shape and color with the change of office of the presidency. Moser has aptly figured out one more problem which the electorate faces in Russia. According to Moser in Russia political parties keep changing. Candidates do not adhere to the same names, personnel and party platforms. In other words, these candidates keep defecting from one party to another. This adversely affects not only the parties as such but the whole political system of Russia. In 1993, out of the eight parties who surpassed the 5% threshold in the 1993 PR Duma elections, only three parties could managed to again surpass the threshold in 1995, And in 2007 it reduced to only two parties (Moser:200 I:). However, Russia is too vast a nation geographically which needs to be run by a single seat of power due to its past experiences. For its gradual refinement and transformation to a democratic state, Russia needs a strong centralized governmental apparatus. The reality however is that federal relations had always remained a vexing issue in Russia's transition to democracy. Following the dissolution of the Soviet Union, Russia emerged as a state wholly unfamiliar with the percepts of democratic federalism, and even today, despite constitutional amendments the Kremlin prefers to treat its federal regions as mere 82

5 administrative subdivisions. The Kremlin treats its ethnic republics as entities that must be dealt with using old imperialist policies and approaches. Where there is no sign of any status of equality amongst federal subjects and the central authority of Kremlin. In 1991, during the first Russian presidential election, despite the fact that Democratic Russia constituted his entire campaign organization, candidate Y eltsin betrayed the movement through deeds that ran counter to its goals (for example, signing the "nineplus-one" agreement and choosing Alexandr Rutskoi as his running mate). He adopted an aloof campaign stance that deprived Democratic Russia of the leadership it needed to prevent it from fragmenting along internal fault lines (Michael. Urban: 1992: 197). The movement was weakened by Yeltsin's strategy of enhancing his personal authority and neglecting the process of institution building of these parties. President Boris Yeltsin stayed away from party affiliations after he assumed his office. Y eltsin during his presidency did not support any democratic parties. He did not involve any party in the process of drafting the economic programmes. Parties were kept out of the process of drafting the constitution. To serve the loyalty of regional elites, Yeltsin made appointments in the regional and local administration from the old and established elite. Yeltsin's political tactics thus helped in further fragmenting these parties and weakening the formation of political parties. Yeltsin refrained from restructuring the state in a democratic fashion. Instead he relied on the concept of a charismatic leadership that always remained above the fray of party politics and avoided himself from being entangled in democratic institutions boundaries and rules of accountability (Hintergger, G:2004: 19-28). Having utilized the broad albeit Russia's presidential elections in June 1991 he quickly abandoned the most talented and gifted people from that camp immediately afterwards. He preferred to have the trusted nomenclature people around him. He utilized the nascent democratic movement to grab power, to take revenge against his former communist party fellows and to retaliate for the humiliations he had suffered by them. Russian electoral system is largely similar with that of the German electoral system. Procedure of selection of or choosing deputies for Duma elections are quite the same between the two countries (Ordershook. Peter: 1996:21 0). But when it comes to the 83

6 implementation of legislative bills and federalism it is completely different from its German counterpart. In Russia all the seats were allocated by proportional representation using regional lists, where the regions are exogenously defined and where the parties in them had full autonomy designing their lists. The Russian system encouraged an adversarial relationship between central and peripheral party structures by reserving the first set of party seats to be filled by election to a national list. Then too, Russia's system diminishes the representative role of Duma deputies by giving control over the geographic definition of the single member deputies who get elected to Moscow. This makes the deputies subservient to their party bosses positioned in Moscow who determine district boundaries at the expense of the voters who elect these deputies. Finally, Russia's electoral system further reduces the autonomy of the regions and regional political organizations by creating a Central Election Commission with virtual police power over the administration of the election and the registration of parties. During elections, the Duma played its role in determining party structures and functioning of various parties, thereby encouraging top-down party systems which ultimately lead to the growth of regional dominance. And in order to gain their influence party leaders placed at Moscow who struggled to command the allegiance of regional and local political bosses, used either threats of administrative sanctions or promised pecuniary gains for these delegates. In the December 1995 elections, (Taroslavi' oblast and Stavropol kray) local and regional candidates defeated the communist party candidates. This came as a surprise as local and regional party bosses neither had any party affiliations nor had party institutions, competed successfully against the national parties In March Direct elections of regional governors led to the encouragement of a bottom-up development of political parties. This had a negative impact on the regional electorate. The encouragement of such elections gave rise to the development of intra-regional competition thereby adversely affecting the region-wise elected positions. In Russia the state (the administration) produces the most important political leaders. Their career prospects depend largely upon their subordination to the state. It is because of this reason 84

7 party leaders after their election are much less inclined to set up or help sponsor electoral organizations of local parties of power (Oversloot, Hans:2006: 398).Filling up of only a single elected office-the governorship-on a region-wide basis provided little encouragement for the development of multiple power centers within each region. This encouraged autocratic rule within the regions. This was so because the heads of regional legislatures discouraged the rise of regional political personalities thereby encouraging an autocratic regional political system. At the same time, limiting elections to the offices of governors, mayor and deputies to regional and local legislatures subverted the value of party labels. This encouraged candidates to focus on personalities rather than on general party platforms or adhere to party ideology. Thereby discouraging and hampering the development of symbiotic relationship among local, regional and national political elites. The 'parties in power' faced a similar problem from their party bosses. By their very nature and goals, they expressed the interests of the group that concentrated power in their hands and pursued their own interests instead of the interests of the state. The problem with these parties created by party bosses was not lack of popular support from the people but their periodical replacement by party bosses. And when they left the political stage, they carried along with them the clientele, represented by the party apparatus. However, the election schedule imposed by the president precludes simultaneous presidential-legislative elections, thereby minimizing this unifying role of the president (Wessell. Nils:2003:73). Moreover, by empowering the president to suspend any regional administrative act he deems unconstitutional, the constitution renders the presidency a constant threat to each region and reinforces the dominating character of Russian federalism at the expense of political integration. The timings and procedures of these elections (both presidential and legislative during the same time) make the presidential elections more important. This encourages the proliferation of national parties instead of their consolidation. Further, electing half the representatives of the Duma on the basis of national party-lists proportional representation independently ofthe president allows both the President and the Duma to lay competing claims to an electoral mandate and thereby encouraging legislative-executive conflict. This feature of the Russian electoral system is one of the reasons for the political instability in presidential system. Federal Council is 85

8 the upper chamber of the Russian parliament. It represents its 89 federal regions and republics. Yeltsin during his tenure selected the members of the federation council on his own choice. This made the Duma the regions only independent voice in the national government. Further the constitutional authority of the Duma to override the Federation Council's veto reduced the Federation council to a mere second chamber of the Russian parliament and nothing more than that. This also has on several occasions raised questions on the relevance of the Federation Council's existence. The decision to form the Federation Council by seating regional governors and heads of regional legislatures as deputies rendered the Council as part time members of the legislature. The importance of the Federation Council in comparison to the Duma in all legislative matters (except the constitutional amendments and constitutional law) was not more than a symbolic pawn in the power struggle between the president and the Duma. Kremlin also played a role in Yabloko's woes. Yeltsin's presidential administration and forces close to it no doubt assisted certain parties (like the SPS and the Unity Bloc) and hindered others (like the Yabloko and the Communist Party) in 1999 (Hale, Henry:2004: ). In the year 2007 Duma elections, the threshold for forming a parliamentary faction was raised from earlier 5% to 7%. Yabloko therefore faced the challenge of whether to join a coalition with the anti-putin SPS breakaways, such as Irina Khaamada, or try to climb back into the Duma on its own. When Putin came to power he inherited the political impurities that had long accumulated since Yeltsin's period. He had a task to complete. And this was to solve the dilemma of whether to stay as a stabilizing leader of corrupt capitalism or to become a transformer and start building a new system that would allow Russia to become a full-fledged liberal democracy and enter the post-industrial world as equals. Vladimir Putin inherited a political system which was characterized by the verticality of power, the dictatorship of law, equidistance of oligarchs and managed democracy (Afanas'EV. 1:2006:5). Vladimir Putin followed the footsteps of his predecessor Boris Yeltsin when he came to power. He used his popularity to carry out an all round reform of Russian political system. In Putin began refashioning the Yeltsin regime by taking different policy altogether. Yeltsin's policy and principles consisted of mutual connivance, shadowy checks and 86

9 balances, tolerance for opposition and maintenance of power by redistributing and decentralizing it and provoking constant revolutionary shocks (Hintergger, G:2004: 19-28).. History has shown that the optimal path of development is not marked by the victory of a certain idea but by the creation and establishment of institutions that can make such ideas work. Thus, what Russia needs, as it needs air to breathe, is not democracy in general but the democratic institutions that underpin real democracy and its inalienable characteristics. It needs a true separation of powers, an independent judiciary, human rights that really mean something. Followed by a free press and accompanied by freedom of speech and ideas to make things tangible appropriate laws and institutions are also required. Once he became president, Putin adopted government reform, the consolidation of his political position and neutralization of alternative political forces as his main undertakings (Smyth, Regina:2006:211 ). Political reforms initiated by the Putin administration point towards more, rather than less, encroachment of the state in party politics. During his term the Kremlin turned on the oligarchs who were influential during President Yeltsin's time in office. Putin's government did not only confront the oligarchs, it also clipped the wings of regional governors, curtailed the freedom of the press, guaranteed 2/3 parliament support to the president by gerrymandering the election law and limited the possibilities of opposition parties and civic organizations. The most politically active oligarchs, Boris Berezovsky and Vladimir Gusinsky, went into exile to avoid litigation. Mikhail Khodorkovsky, one of the wealthiest men in Russia, was sentenced to jail for tax fraud. The resources of his Yukos Oil Company were mainly transferred to Rosneft, controlled by the FSB. The anti oligarch campaign continued till In August 2007 Mikhail Gutseriyev was forced to relinquish his ownership of the robustly expanding Rosneft oil company and hand it over to the Kremlin. President Putin's initiatives regarding Russia's federal legislative branch have been intended to solidify support for his administration. Changes to the way members of both the 87

10 Federation Council and the State Duma are selected make it easier for the current majority party, United Russia, to maintain control of the legislature 1 State and Political Parties of Russia: The potential efficacy and effectiveness of executive authority under the premises of the Russian constitution has been and is ever more so under Putin, characterized by a considerable lack of transparency and accountability of its decision-making process. Absence of effective laws on these unwarranted developments was considered as the root cause of political disorder. Long before the collapse of the Soviet Union informal political groups had started emerging in the form of small factions. With the collapse of the Soviet Union a multitude of political parties appeared in Russia. If the success of democratization was to be measured by the number of parties, Russia would certainly rank among the world's most democratically advanced countries. It is not merely the number of parties that determined whether or not the concept of 'multi-party democracy' or multi-party system applies to Russia. In a true multi-party system political parties select and train their candidates for elected public offices. In a multi-party system, it is, as a rule parties bring forward candidates for state leadership and for the office of prime minister or president or both (Overslot, Hans:2006:398). And as a rule, parties have a longer life span than the leaders of the people who lead them and acquire party of public offices. Parties are in short, real institutions. Whereas in a multi-party system access to the highest echelons of state power is provided via political process, in Russia access to the highest echelons of state power is achieved through a process of co-option by those who hold superior rank in the state apparatus. The problem, however, is that the efficacy of these parties is judged not by their profusion but by their ability to articulate the interests of significant social forces, to promote these interests by engaging in national politics, and thus shape the country's domestic and foreign policies. Measured by this yardstick, Russia is still lagging behind more advanced Western democracies. The condition of these parties became much worse 1 (See Ariel Cohen, Putin's Legacy and United Russia's New Ideology, The Heritage Foundation, June I, 2006, ( avai I able at / 88

11 when instead of getting support and help from the state, it got neither of them. Instead every possible measure was initiated by the state to hinder the growth of these newly emerging political parties. Prior to the collapse of the Soviet Union it was the Communist Party of Soviet Union which was the only party that existed. Gorbachev supported the growth and spread of these informal groups. It was believed that Gorbachev assisted the emergence of a multiparty system in Russia. However through this policy, Gorbachev apparently sought to create a nonparty support base for his reformist agenda. This enhanced his position visa-vis powerful competitors in the Communist Party leadership. Ideologically these political parties which emerged in the political environment of Russia during 1991 were practically indistinguishable from one another (Urban :1991 :). During this period ( ) a plethora of informal political groups and political parties emerged. Strong anticommunist ideologies were believed to be the reasons behind these emergences (Fish: 1995:88-93). During this transitional period ( ), Russian political system underwent drastic changes. Already existing political parties and newly emerging political parties of Russia during this period were not able to grow into full fledged political parties in real sense. Political parties had a minimal role both at the apex of the political system and within the society at large. Other than benefitting by occupying a seat in the parliament, these political parties did not achieved much success. The President of Russian Federation has so far been far beyond the reach of political parties (Oversloot, H, et a1.:2006: ). This type of political system has been ensured by the constitution itself. Appointments to and careers in the executive -government and state bureaucracy- were based on party affiliations rather than professional merit. In Russia, it had always been the President who selects and appoints the member of the government. Parliamentary approval is required only for the prime minister. The Duma can refuse to confirm the President's nominations, but at a high price: 'blocking three consecutive nominations would ultimately result to the dissolution of the Duma and new elections have to be conducted. The prime ministers of both Yeltsin and Vladimir Putin had remained non-political figures: technocrats, career bureaucrats and professional from large state enterprises. Both Yeltsin and Vladimir 89

12 Putin remained aloof from party politics throughout their tenure. The prime ministers of both Y eltsin and Vladimir Putin have so far been non-political figures: technocrats, career bureaucrats and professional from large state enterprises. While they both employed political parties as support vehicles and made several attempts to create "workable" majorities in parliament, their actual power base laid elsewhere. Given the Zero-sum nature of the Presidential contest, and the volatility of the Russian electorate, Y eltsin and Putin were careful enough not to be on one horse and tie their fate to any particular party. As Presidents of "all Russians" they claimed wide ranging legitimacy during their tenure. Table. 3.1 Political Leaders and their Party Affiliations Name Period Affiliated/involved Affiliated/involved with with party before party during/after term in appointment office Y egor Gaidar 1992 Demokraitcheskii vybor Rossii; Soyuz pravykh sil Viktor Nas Dom-Rossiya Chernomyrdin 1998 Sergei Kirienko 1998 Soyuz pravykh sil Viktor 1998 Chernomyrdin Yevegenii Otechestvo-Vya Rossiya Primakov 1999 Sergei Stepashin 1999 Valdimir Putin Planned to launch an 2000 "opposition party" Mikhail Nash Dom-Rossiya Kas'yanov 2004 Viktor 2004 Khristenko Mikhail Fradkov Source: Oversloot. Hans and Verheul Ruben, (2006), "Managmg Democracy: Political Parties and the State in Russia, Journal of Communist Studies and Transition Politics, Vol. 22, No.3, pp.385 The above table 3.1 illustrates this point. Listed above are the prime ministers who had served under Yeltsin and Putin, their involvement in a party organization, both at the time of 'arrival' and after their tenure. With the exception of Khristenko initially, none of 90

13 Russia's prime ministers had a party affiliation or political party background. Of the 19 ministers who staffed Mikhail Fradkov's core cabinet only five had political affiliations (ibid). The same goes for other government officials. According to government publications and several printed official sources only 35 percent of all deputy ministers appointed between 2000 and 2003 (are military or security officers), and 25 percent of the Russian political elite as a whole for the same period (compared to 11 percent for business elites), were from the military and security institutions. Two-thirds of Putin's presidential staffhad backgrounds in the security services. Autonomy of Russian Political Parties: In Russian political system, political parties are by no means fully autonomous actors. Status of any particular political party never remained the same (Oversloot, et.al:2006: 400). It depended on the changing political equation. If a political party was close with the president then, it was obvious of having an upper edge than the other parties. Political parties came into existence soon after the dissolution of the Soviet Union. They struggled hard for their mere existence. These political parties in order to exist in the Russian political system had on several occasions had to compromise on several grounds. They forged alliances, projected the interests of their party bosses, set aside their ideological values and replaced them with vested interests of their bosses. This is how parties in Russia, have managed to survive in the nascent political system of Russia. However the question which arises: Are the political parties of Russia autonomous in nature? Do they really act as independent political actors as political parties work in other democracies? Do they have a say in the government? This is where the role of state comes into picture. State and political parties of Russia are inseparable entities. However, it is not conducive for any democracy like Russia where the parties are controlled and managed by the state. This has hampered the political growth of political parties of Russia. Appointments to and careers in the executive -government and state bureaucracy- were based on party affiliations are the exceptions rather than the rule. In Russia, it is the President who selects and appoints the member of the government. Parliamentary approval is required only for the prime minister. The Duma can refuse to 91

14 confirm the President's nominations, but at a high price: 'blocking three consecutive nominations results in the dissolution of the Duma and new elections takes place. In real terms political parties in Russia do not act as independent entities in Russia. What sets Russia apart is that this logic in practice translates into an unusually fluid and unstable party system; party labels come and go with every election. Here it is worth quoting (Rose, 2000, pp ) who finds the nature of political parties as follows: "people cannot vote for a party that is not there. Nor can people vote against a party that has dissolved itself rather than give an account of its actions at the end of its term in office" Amongst the various reasons the most prominent is the constitution of the Russian Federation which itself defined a very minimal role to political parties (Medushevsky, Andrey.N:2006:61). The head of the state the President of the Russian Federation is above and beyond the reach of the political parties or any political institution. Historical legacy is also another reason for this kind of status of political parties. Like the Czar who never was questioned or was accountable, his main role was to command and the people had no other choice but to obey. During the communist regime the party politburo used to select from amongst itself the chairman of the party who inevitably used to become the President. He also enjoyed the privilege of unquestionable and unchallengeable authority. And at present democratic Russia also has the same traits of both the Czarist regime and the communist regime of Russian past. In democracy, one cannot expect a sudden change to get take place where the old system gets replaced with a new one. The process has to be a slow progress. To reach the Russian masses political parties have to lay a strong foundation. Presidential nominations at the regional level followed a similar pattern. Five of the seven presidential representatives who were appointed in the seven federal districts (North West, Central, Southern, Volga, Ural, Siberian and Far Eastern) had a background in either military or the security forces (KGB and FSB). This weakness in the regions' (sub'ektry) is also reflected in the fact that most heads ofthe regions (governors' as they 92

15 are informally called) are not party politicians (ibid). The reach of the parties are fairly limited; only a few of them have grassroots organizations and serious representation beyond Moscow. What mattered was not what the candidates could gain entirely or partly with the help ofthe party (i.e. party support and incumbency respectively) but something that candidates can gain mostly independently from the party. Policies of Yeltsin and Putin towards the Parties: The potential efficacy and effectiveness of executive authority under the premises of the Russian constitution had been undermined by the power calculations of the presidency. The Russian constitution has conferred considerable power in the presidential executive. Russia's I 993 constitution provided for a directly elected president who serves as a powerful unifying force for Russia's infant party system. This concentration of decision making authority combined with the interpretation of the office by the incumbents deinstitutionalized and over-personalized Russian politics. The role of institutions and procedures were weakened by an extremely personalistic interpretation of the office; personalism continues to outweigh procedural ism in Russian politics (Hill, et, a!: 1987:23-4 I). This personalistic and paternalistic interpretation of the offh;e ignore formal rules and procedural and institutional constraints on the office holder. It turned out into a form of rule in wh:ch H1~ leader waa rtot held accountable-formally, regularly, and frequently-to any institutions that could substantially construin his discretion. A very strong President has two competing effects on party formation. Party performance in the state (directly elected presidents) tend to promote less cohesive pari iamentary parties, while parliamentary regimes (indirectly elected presidents) tend to promote much more disciplined parties within the legislatures (Lowenhart. John: 1998:57-58). This is due to the separate electoral constituencies of executive and legislative power under presidential systems which fail to provide incentives for cohesive party discipline within the legislature. Conversely, in the parliamentary systems executive power emanates from and is contingent upon majority confidence, which further requires the formation of disciplined parties and coalitions in order to keep the executive in power. Thus, in the 93

16 governing sphere one can say that parliamentary systems tend to produce more cohesive parties than do presidential systems. During Y eltsin' s tenure ( ) power was hardly constrained by legal norms, legal norms were constrained by raw power equations. Legal norms were selectively and sometimes arbitrarily adjudicated (depending on power and business interests of the state authorities-particularly) by law enforcement agencies, the state bureaucracy and judiciary. It was for political/business reasons that legal norms were enforced against some actors, while others remained unpunished for the very same offence. Applying the same legal norms differently to different people depending on their power and social status was evident during this period. Yeltsin convinced to fulfill a historic mission as a charismatic leader, disregarded formal institutional and procedural constraints. The semi-presidential system thereby fostered tendencies in the personal character of Yeltsin. In situations of conflict with other institutions, the likelihood of Yeltsin not to abide with constitutional and legal norms and procedures were extremely high. Yeltsin relied on a maximalist interpretation of the authority of the presidency. The presidential administration had turned more into a czarist court than a democratic presidential administration. Y eltsin in order to strengthen his hold on the formal reins of power and to achieve his goals organized the office of the presidency according to his whims and manipulated the executive branch. This strategy of power preservation through a policy of factionalism also provided the old nomenklatura with the chance to block and undermine executive decisions (Volslenskii. M.S: 1991: 12). The distrust of the presidency in a more authoritative cabinet of ministers undermined the authority of the minister's vis-a-vis their own government as a collegiums. During Yeltsin's tenure legal norms were turned down, including the constitution to enforce the executive's preferences. This was particularly apparent in appointments (to the office of the General Procurator, the Head of the Central Bank and Constitutional Court judges) and in the military conflict in Chechnya when Yeltsin deliberately avoided declaring a state of emergency in the region in order to avoid the inclusion of the Federation Council in the decision-making process. During the tenure of Yeltsin, this was evident at times when Yeltsin was physically 94

17 unable to work (then) decisions were taken by a non transparent camarilla uncontrolled by any democratically legitimate institution. Y eltsin promoted factionalism in the executive (government, presidential apparatus) in order to enable him to act as an arbiter and mediator and to undermine any potential organized opposition to the president within the executive. This strategy of permanent turmoil, infighting and conflicts undermined the prospects of consolidating the democratic regime. These events led to an extremely high level of corruption which crept into the premises of public administration, the courts and law enforcement agencies. This seriously undermined the common man's right to rule based state action and administration. The most lacking feature of Russia's state institutions was its legal security. Russia during this period was characterized by the subversion of the bureaucratic apparatus of the state by rich criminal businessmen at all levels of government. Many bureaucrats were more loyal to the bribe-giving businessmen than to the Russian state. It was also true for the police, the ministries, custom offices etc. Corruption was used to further business interests and to defend them against other magnates (bribery and counter-bribery). This resulted in the privatization of the state institution and the public sector by influencing big business, the oligarchs. Things were expected to change when President Putin came to power in Putin created his own power base in Moscow. The Russian presidential regime had been and during the tenure of Putin even more was considerably characterized by a lack of transparency and accountability of its decision-making process (Sakwa, Richard: 1993: ). He relied on long-time companions from the security services and neo-liberal economists, most of whom he knew from his Leningrad/ St.Petersburg assignments as a KGB officer. In order to neutralize the structural constraints on the constitutionally powerful Russian presidency in the Yeltsin era, Putin moved aggressively against the regional fiefdoms by strengthening the unitary elements of the Russian Federation. He strengthened the Presidency within the dual executive and reshaped executive-legislative relations by reshaping the Federal Assembly. He worked hard to strengthen the role and the influence of the security structures in the federal and 95

18 regional government and moved decisively against media, certain oligarchs (like Gusinsky, Berezovsky, Chodorkovsky), NGO's, human rights groups and scientists. During his tenure he reasserted central state authority. According to him, the key to Russia's renewal was a strong state based on the centralized traditions and mentalities and expectations among Russian population. He renewed his efforts to obtain a strong vertical power axis which already Yeltsin had aimed to institutionalize during his tenure. He reformed the law ofthe Federation Council. Regional executive heads were no longer ex-officio members of the council, instead they got the right to delegate and recall representatives to the upper house of the Russian parliament. These reforms deprived the regional political elites of their immunity from prosecution that they had enjoyed previously as senator. Under Putin no comprehensive purge of corrupt elements in the bureaucratic apparatus emerged. However, the already over-sized bureaucratic apparatus continued to grow. Media independence of the early nineties has turned into magnate-based media pluralism dependent on the political and business interests of their owners. This pluralism during Putin's tenure was restricted, thereby resulting in the exclusive control of the electronic media by the ruling political elite. Putin moved aggressively against the competing power centers both on the federal and regional level in an effort to reassert the Kremlin's power and to marginalize any potential opposition. His goal was to eliminate any potentially obstructionist horizontal input that could challenge his vertical/hierarchical control. As a result, open opposition to the President virtually disappeared. The Russian political and business elite became compliant and submissive. However, the neutralization of undesirable opposition also destroyed the element of political innovation. Status of Political Parties: The level of development attained by a national party system can be measured by addressing two of its properties: first, whether political parties play an important role in the electorate and the second, whether they are important as agencies of democratic government. Political parties in the electorate are important if they coordinate voters, i.e. 96

19 they are useful tools for minimizing time and effort needed to make a meaningful choice at the polls. A party system's ability to perform this function declines if it is excessively fragmented, because numerous policy alternatives becomes too difficult to assess and translate into voting behavior, or excessively volatile, as this naturally would require the voters to process more information than when they have to deal with a stable set of policy alternatives or both. As early as 1987, informal groups had started emerging in the Russian political system. From 1987 through early 1989 informal groups remained a dominant form of independent political activism in Russia. This situation started to change with the arrival of electoral politics. In 1990 led by Travkin the second party next to Communist Party emerged. This party was called as the Democratic Party of Russia (DPR). It was due to the policies of perestroika and glasnost followed by Gorbachev that these small political factions came into existence (Golosov: 2004). In March 1989 elections to the Congress of Peoples' Deputies were held in which only the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) was the one and only officially recognized political party (Brovkin: 1990). Through these elections Gorbachev further strengthened his position. The new structures of opportunities available to independent political actors, was very limited due to the initial phase of elections. However, independent political associations did not even have the right to nominate candidates for their office. The three political parties who were registered by the Ministry of Justice for the first time in the history of Russian politics were: Communist Party of Soviet Union (CPSU), Socialist Democratic Party of Russia (SDPR) and Democratic Party of Russia (DPR). Democratic Russia also gained the status of political party in These three political parties Democratic Russia, SDPR and DPR collectively supported the democratic ideology however; in order to remain in power they supported the president Boris Yeltsin. In March 1990 elections to the Congress of Peoples' Deputies Democratic Russia emerged as a major challenger to the Communist Party (Remington: 1994). As a result of 97

20 the representative of the democrats, Y eltsin was elected as the chairman of the congress. This however, did not lead democratic Russia to organizational consolidation. In fact, the alliance effectively ceased to exist after the elections. The leaders of informal groups who gained election to legislative bodies acted without responsibility towards their organizations, and contributed little to sustain these political groups that had emerged during the elections (Fish: 1995: 134). Instead these elected candidates preferred to accommodate to their new institutional environment. These events created divisions within the party itself. Those deputies who were supported by Democratic Russia during their campaigns created several factions, including the Communists for Democracy and others. These included groups which supported the Communist Party and groups which opposed the Communist party. Those groups which opposed the communist party formed the party called as the Socialist Democratic Party of Russia (SDPR). Thus by 1991 three political parties had emerged in the Russian Political system. They were the Communist Party of Soviet Union (CPSU), Socialist Democratic Party of Russia (SDPR) and Democratic Party ofrussia (DPR). In 1989 the Inter Regional Group ofdeputies (IRDG) was formed (Brundy: 1993). Along with this IRDG, one more political faction also emerged; it was called as the Movement for Democratic Reforms. This also was followed by Democratic Russia which till 1991 remained a factional group. The Communist Party of Soviet Union also underwent splits within itself by One of the pro-reform groups which got itself separated from the CPSU was DPRC led by A.Rutskoi. Later it became People's Party Free Russia and then it became Russian Social Democratic People's Party. The attempted coup of 1991 changed the whole structure of opportunities available to major political parties. The leaders of the democratic movement came out in support of Yeltsin's decree of banning the CPSU. It was due to this coup that Yeltsin achieved extraordinary powers from the Congress of Peoples' Deputies. Yeltsin invited none of the leading democrats to participate in the drafting and implementation of several of his economic reforms. Yeltsin preferred to be accompanied by a team of individuals who owed their promotions exclusively to their connections and personal loyalties to Yeltsin (Sakwa: 1993:74). 98

21 Within the Russian legislature elected in March 1990, the role of parties remained modest if not negligible (Sobianin: 1992:11 ). Followed by these developments along with the emerging factionalism within the party, membership of parties diminished. Both leaders and activists were no more related to their party affiliations. The initially centralized structure of DPR disintegrated. Travkin concentrated his efforts primarily on coalition building on the elite level, by joining a coalition of the 'moderate opposition' to Yeltsin. This group was sponsored and effectively led by an influential representative to the military industrial complex of Arkadii Vol'skii of the Civic Union (Lohr: 1993). As a result of which local party organizations lost their identity, as they had neither any effective connection with the leaders of Moscow nor were represented in that leadership. The persistent existence of parties of power crucially contributed to the increasing level of fragmentation of party system in Russia. In 1993 the major differences between the ideologically identical VR and Yabloko was not even than the former was the party of Gaidar and the latter the party ofyavlinsky, but rather the former was the party of power while the later was in opposition (Kitschelt and Smyth:2002). Party of Power: The term "party of power" came into usage to describe those groups of political and business elites who became Kremlin's political establishment that Yeltsin informally presided over (Colton and McFaul:2000:202). Party of power acts both, as the executive branch's power base and its constituency. "Party of power" has both a less restrictive and more restrictive meaning: it can be referred to as the informal body of Kremlin insiders, as well as actual political parties formed by Kremlin insiders to act as the pro-government party. In past elections, Chubais' Russia's Choice Party in 1993 and Chernomirdin's Our Home Is Russia Party in 1995, both founded by the incumbent prime ministers, have been referred to as "parties of power."in simple terms we can say that those political parties, which got themselves closely affiliated to the Kremlin, thereby providing the new president to the office of the president were called as "party of power", who kept on changing with every elections in Russia. 99

22 In the mid-1990s, Following the establishment of the 'super-presidential republic', the ruling elite preferred to distance itself from the political forces associated with the idea of radical market reform and a one-sided orientation towards western values. This was partially explained by the failures of the reforms at the beginning of the 1990s, which were unable to improve the socio-economic situation of most Russians (Hintergger: 2004:34). In order to retain social and political stability in society and strengthening the position of the ruling elite, the presidential structures began to use new, subsequently long-term tactics of party building. It consisted of creating special political unions for the specific purpose of putting the decisions of the Russian President and government into practice. This type of union first arose in 1993 at the regional level on the initiative of the governors as election blocs used to render social support to the corresponding heads of the federation constituencies and their policy, including the local parliaments. These structures were called 'parties of power'. The first experience with creating a 'party of power' at the federal level was the 'Our Home is Russia' movement. According to the original intention, the functions of such a political union were to be limited to ensure unhindered passage through the various legislatures of the executive branch's legislative initiatives. A major difference between Russian parties in power and the institution of ruling parties in developed democratic countries was that the ruling party, having won the elections, became one of the main decision-making centers and forms the executive branch, while in Russia the 'party in power' was created by nonparty, essentially the political elite that had won the fight for executive power and was striving to ensure reliable support for itself in the legislature. Compared with the ruling party, the 'party in power' was not a decision-making center, but largely performed the functions of a support group. These parties come under the most interesting and quintessential element of Russia's party system and the political system as a whole. The 'party of power' comprises those parties who generally hold power or remain in power in the state Duma and the legislative organ of the Russian Federation (Oversloot, Hans: 1 ). It is essentially a broad coalition of national and regional political and economic interests. The 'party of power' defines Russia's political scene as it also generates the opposition parties as well. Here, 100