Plato I PHIL301 The Task Prof. Oakes updated: 2/27/14 1:44 PM

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1 Plat I PHIL301 The Task Prf. Oakes updated: 2/27/14 1:44 PM Republic I-II: The Task pp (327a-367e) - In this sectin, the subject f justice is brached; we see a Scratic-style elenctic exchange with Thrasymachus and thers end in impasse; Glaucn and Adeimantus prevail upn Scrates t advance a psitive accunt f justice. - This sectin is significant fr its presentatin f the traditinal Scratic style and fr a general sense f disappintment with that methd and subsequent intentin t prvide a psitive accunt f justice. Nte, as always, Plat s skill as a dramatist, and in particular the differences in Scrates respnses t his interlcutrs as their attitudes twards him and justice vary. Initial Discussin Cephalus and Plemarchus - Plainly, neither Cephalus nr Plemarchus knws what justice is. Mrever, their ignrance and, we might say, their ignrance f their ignrance makes them vulnerable t mral failing. 1 - Scrates gets Cephalus t say that justice is paying debts and telling the truth. But Cephalus is evidently ignrant f mral truth r indifferent t it. He has little interest in a serius discussin f it, and excuses himself by saying, untruthfully, that he must attend t a religius ceremny. (Anther interpretatin: Cephalus isn t willing t underg a Scratic examinatin, and wisely, plitely, excuses himself. Questin: is Cephalus a sympathetic character, r nt?) - Plemarchus is at least willing t examine his wn beliefs, thugh whether frm a prper understanding f the value f ding s, r frm a sense f filial duty, is unclear. (As usual, Plat is making claims by means f subtle dramatic exchanges: prperly cgnizant f mral truth, ne wuld knw perfectly well that ne shuld investigate such matters. In this, Plat agrees with Scrates.) - Plemarchus accunt f justice is wrth examining fr several reasns: it is relatively cmmn, but trivial and unstable, and cnsequently liable t put ne in the wrng. His first frmulatin (331e): Justice is giving t each what is wed. But this frmulatin is trivial, since what is wed has the same frce as what is just. His secnd frmulatin (332a): Justice is giving what is wed, where the gd is wed t ne s friends, and the bad is wed t ne s enemies. Prblems encuntered by Plemarchus here, include: It s cmpatible with saying that Justice invlves knwledge f larceny (332c-334b); If ne mistakes ne s friends/enemies, then justice entails harming ne s actual enemies and benefiting ne s actual enemies (r, t avid this, benefiting perceived enemies and harming perceived friends 334b-e); it matters, in ther wrds, t be precise. This prmpts the (third) refrmulatin, believed and actual friends r enemies (334e). 1 Cmpare Scrates view f mral risk expressed in Euthyphr and Aplgy. Plat evidently hlds a similar view

2 In ther wrds, Plemarchus knwledge is s weak as t permit his being led by the nse int simple cnfusins. See e.g. 334b, 335d. Once equipped with a relatively cherent definitin (the third), Scrates advances a cunter-argument. He argues as fllws (335b-e): 1. T harm a thing is t make it wrse. 2. Harm t humans is harm in respect f their characteristic excellence mral quality. S, t harm a human is t make him/her less just An actin resulting in greater injustice (less justice) is nt a just act. 4. Hence, it cannt be just t harm a human. Perhaps Plemarchus culd bject that harm t an enemy might mean t reduce the enemy s virtue in respect f being an enemy, rather than in respect f being a human. It s mre likely, hwever, that he wuld have meant harm in respect f being human, Plemarchus nt being ntable fr the precisin f his thinking. Nte, in any case, the failure f Plemarchus t defend his psitin, indicating the instability f his views in the face f his ignrance abut them. If Scrates argues unfairly, Plemarchus is nnetheless culpable fr failure t recgnize and defend prper justice. Part f Scrates traditinal rle, after all, is t demnstrate t his interlcutrs their ignrance. Thrasymachus - Thrasymachus is an imprtant and vivid character in Republic. He is imprtant fr prmting mral skepticism, which prmpts the later call (Bk II) fr Scrates t develp a psitive accunt f justice, ne demnstrating that justice is nt nly finest but als mst beneficial (prudent). Mral skepticism: there are n mral truths (r, in any case, we have n reasn t believe that there are skepticism prper). Prudence: as distinct frm mral gd, that which is f benefit, satisfying sme interest (desire, need, wish, etc.); e.g., it is gd (prudent) t lk bth ways befre crssing the street. Mral skeptics typically maintain that the nly kind f gd is prudential. Mral Realism: there are mral truths i.e., beynd the merely prudential. (Scrates and Plat s psitin.) - Thrasymachus bursts n the scene t denunce Scrates tactics against Cephalus and Plemarchus. (But as abve, Scrates has his reasns fr his tactics. Where Scrates is mre gentle if remnstrating with Cephalus and Plemarchus, he shws little mercy fr thse like Thrasymachus wh disdain mral life.) Thrasymachus was evidently a sphist, smething like a prfessinal philspher fr hire. He will be a mre skilled ppnent fr Scrates than are Cephalus and Plemarchus. - Thrasymachus ffers this definitin f justice: Justice is the advantage f the strnger (338c). He develps this view in several ways. First, Thrasymachus calls attentin t the evident fact that systems f (civil) justice have beneficiaries. Where a state r scial structure has a system f justice, there will be sme plitical pwer benefitting frm the maintenance f that system. See 338d-e, where Thrasymachus refers t different plitical systems. 3 In this sense, justice implies the interest f sme party the plitical 2 Nte again the accrd with Scrates views in Aplgy. 3 Cmpare, e.g., the justice f laws prtecting the rights f crpratins t make unlimited plitical cntributins. What entity r rganizatin des this make strnger? 2

3 pwer and is thus a frm f prudence, cnfirming Thrasymachus mral skeptical view. Secnd, Justice appears t be a kind f zer-sum game, as Thrasymachus understands it. 4 Where human interests are cncerned, they ften invlve the cmpetitin fr resurces fd, materials, mating privileges, etc. And typically the acquisitin by ne f such gds entails their lss by anther either utright r by lss f pprtunity. See 343d-e: the just man gets less than the unjust in cmmercial exchanges, etc. The ptimal state, then, n Thrasymachus view, is that f the tyrant, wh defines justice as that which benefits himself and wh has the advantage f all thers in access t gds. See 344a-c. - It is thus in ne s best-interest (i.e., prudent) t be unjust (if ne can get away with it) in terms f bth f these themes. In plitical terms, it is in ne s interest t be unjust, and a vilatin f ne s interests t be just, fr in being just, ne weakens ne s scial psitin relative t the ruler/s and in being unjust, ne strengthens that psitin. Thrasymachus can thus refer t a cmplete frm f injustice in which ne exerts his/her cntrl ver all thers in the sciety. This is best fr ne s interests; anything less grants authrity ver neself t anther. Of curse, nce ne gains ascendancy ver the whle f sciety, then ne s interests (advantage) re-define justice that set f rules prmting ne s wn benefit. Scrates tries t trip up Thrasymachus ver these different, relative meanings f justice, but Thrasymachus is generally able t avid these traps. And mre generally, justice will be a disadvantage and injustice an advantage in this sense: Being just i.e., fair, hnest, etc. prevents ne frm taking ptimal advantage f thers. I.e., in strict terms f self-interest, the mre ne can get ut f ne s material interactins with thers (business deals, affairs f the heart, etc.) the better. It is better t cheat. Best f all, ntice, is t cheat withut being caught; fr sciety punishes and is in any case wary f the unjust (thse vilating its rules f fairness). If ne can maintain a reputatin fr justice, ne will gain the benefits f gd-scial standing alng with the benefits f cheating thers. - Thrasymachus thus identifies injustice as a virtue, since it imprves ne s life; justice, he calls high-minded flishness (348c). Scrates argument against Thrasymachus - In general, while Thrasymachus falls int varius minr traps laid by Scrates, he is better able t defend his psitin, and cries ful when Scrates miscnstrues his claims. Scrates des trick Thrasymachus, in the end, hwever, much t Thrasymachus chagrin (350d). - Scrates primary argument against Thrasymachus accunt f justice may be understd as fllws: 1. The unjust seek t utd the just and the unjust alike; the just seek t utd the unjust but nt the just. 5 (349b-c) 2. If we think f injustice and justice as kinds f expertise, then (1) implies that the injustice expert seeks t utd bth thse wh are expert at injustice and thse wh are less than expert at injustice, while the justice expert seeks t utd thse wh are nt expert at justice but nt thse wh are expert at justice. (350a-b) 4 A zer-sum game is an interactin between tw r mre parties in which any benefit t ne entails a cst t anther, and vice versa. 5 See plenexia, belw. 3

4 3. But in general, the expert in a given field is ne wh seeks t utd thse wh are inexpert, but nt thse wh are expert in that given field. (See Scrates musician example, 349e.) 4. This implies, fr Scrates, that the expert at injustice is really n expert at all. (This makes a certain sense, given that justice and injustice are cntraries. If injustice is simply the negatin f justice, then it is justice that is the psitive field f knwledge. It wuld thus make sense t speak f experts in respect f justice, but nt in respect f injustice: justice wuld be a field f knwledge, injustice a field f ignrance, s t speak. The expert at injustice will simply be smene wh is ignrant abut justice cmpare being an expert in musical ignrance. 6 As we shall see, hwever, this begs an imprtant questin against Thrasymachus.) 5. T be expert is t be knwledgeable, and t be knwledgeable is t be wise. (350b) 6. T be wise is t be gd. (350b) 7. S, if the unjust seek t utd bth just and unjust alike, then they are nt experts; they are unwise and bad. (350c) - The mistake in Scrates reasning lies in the fact that Thrasymachus cncept f injustice desn t cnfrm t the craft analgy fr knwledge. Typically, a craft can be practiced equally by multiple practitiners, because the practice f the craft by ne craftsman is independent f its practice by anther. The typical craft can admit f cperatin amng practitiners. But Thrasymachus cncept f injustice is precisely the cncept f a practice in which ne practitiner s success entails anther s failure. It s a zer-sum game; cperatin isn t pssible. Of curse, Thrasymachus fails t defend his psitin effectively, allwing Scrates t get away with the misrepresentatin. Scrates argument fr the prudence f mrality - Scrates argument fr the prudence f mrality is characteristic f the histrical Scrates. - His argument: 1. Living is the functin f the sul. (353d) 2. The excellence f the sul is that which enables it t perfrm its functin well. (353d) 3. The bad sul rules (lives) prly; the gd sul lives well. (353e) 4. Justice is the excellence f the sul. (Frm abve: it is the wise and gd, 350bc) 5. Hence, the just live well, the unjust live prly. (353e) - Nte, hwever, that this argument can scarcely be said t be cnvincing. I.e., as an argument t the effect that it is better t be just than unjust, it will hardly cnvince anyne wh shares Thrasymachus views. - Mrever, this accunt fails t identify the nature f justice. It culd equally apply t Thrasymachus definitin f justice (where it wuld be injustice that is the excellence f the sul). Glaucn and Adeimantus - Glaucn revives Thrasymachus argument. This is warranted, given the weakness f Scrates argument against Thrasymachus and f his argument fr the prudence f 6 Cnceiving justice as a frm f knwledge and injustice as a frm f ignrance is a cnsequence f Scrates craft analgy. Craft is a translatin f techne, which has the significance f ur cntemprary term science. See p. 336, n. 6. 4

5 justice. See 358b, 367b, and 367e fr statements f dissatisfactin with Scrates arguments in Bk I. - Glaucn expresses the pint mre elegantly: justice is a necessary evil, a middle grund between the mst desirable (cmplete freedm t act as ne chses) and least desirable (cmplete submissin t the will f thers). It is welcmed, respected, nly fr its capacity t secure us frm the harms f thers. - Glaucn advances the thesis that we are naturally inclined t wrng thers: wrnging thers is naturally gd (prudential); and being wrnged is what is bad (fr us). Since suffering wrng exceeds in badness the lst gd f harming thers, we accept the middle psitin f civil and scietal mral law justice. But, in fact, justice is a sacrifice f ur best interests; injustice is in ur best interests. - Glaucn relates the stry f the Ring f Gyges in rder t substantiate his claim that we are naturally unjust. (359c-360d) - Nte, t, Adeimantus reminders that even the gds seem t admire and reward injustice, as represented by the pets (Hmer, Hesid). Virtue is difficult t achieve (Hesid) and the gds may be swayed t favr the unjust (Hmer; 364d-e, 365e). 7 - Glaucn and Adeimantus s challenge t Scrates: t shw that it is better (mre prudent) t be just than unjust. In rder t make clear that this is s, they ask Scrates t shw that the just man wh appears t be unjust is happier than the unjust man wh appears t be just. Withut these appearances, it will nt be clear that the just man s happiness is nt wing t the scial prfit f a just reputatin, nr the unjust man unhappy because f the scial cst f injustice. (367a-e) - We shuld cnsider, when we have the whle f Plat s accunt befre us, whether it meets this strict cnditin. 7 This f curse is part f the reasn why Plat, like Scrates befre him, is dubius f these tales f the gds. 5