Strong Leaders in Large Institutions: Reflecting on U.S. Space Policy s Past

Transcription

1 1 Strong Leaders in Large Institutions: Reflecting on U.S. Space Policy s Past This brief paper examines how the contention between primary and ancillary policies shaped the early development of the U.S. space program, as well as the unique domestic and international conditions that allowed the Apollo program to become primary policy during the Kennedy administration. When the public reflects on the Space Age, one of the first images that come to mind is John F. Kennedy standing behind a podium at Rice University in 1962 delivering his famous Moon Speech. More captivating and exciting than science fiction itself, the Apollo missions and the U.S. race against the Soviet Union inspired the hearts and imaginations of individuals in engineering, science, education, and business. As Judy Estrin reflect in her recent book, Closing the Innovation Gap: Reigniting the Spark of Creativity in a Global Economy, NASA s legendary achievements during this period were made possible by the support of national leaders such as Kennedy (Estrin pg. 59). Disappointed by the loss of budgetary support for NASA, Estrin notes that such leadership is an essential ingredient for the U.S. to once again become the leading innovative nation. However, although Presidential leadership is an important factor in supporting and shaping space programs, another Apollo era is not likely to occur due to changes in the international relations environment since the 1960s as well as varying perspectives and objectives among NASA, the White House, and Congress that has influenced but not in equal proportion perspectives on how the direction of U.S. Space Policy should unfold. The following brief paper examines the domestic and international contexts in which NASA, the White House, and Congress determined space policy approaches during 1) Apollo program supported by the Kennedy and Johnson administrations in the 1960s, 2) the Shuttle program advocated by Nixon in the 1970s, 3) the International Space Station (ISS) promoted by Reagan in the 1980s, and 4) the current multi-polar dynamics of international relations in the post-cold War era. Before proceeding to assess the ebb and flow of space support during these administrations, it will be helpful to invoke a distinction Lyn Ragsdale makes between primary and ancillary policies, which is useful for understanding the evolving and conflicting approaches among the White House, Congress, and NASA. Primary policy departs from previous decisions and approaches to meet the top priorities of a nation. It addresses a problem to solve. As such, this type of policy establishes long-term goals and sets in motion organized efforts to achieve them (Ragsdale pg. 135). In contrast, ancillary policy does not seek to solve an identifiable problem. Rather, it has a tendency to reflect a continuing government commitment through incremental funding: The established base is last year s budget, because the ongoing governmental commitment,

2 2 which is at the heart of such policy, mandates continued resources (Ragsdale pg. 137). It does not, though, solve a current problem, even though the bureaucracy it maintains may have been set for that purpose long ago (Ragsdale pg. 135). The evolution of U.S. space policy is characterized by its transition from a primary to an ancillary policy approach. The climate of the Space Race was a period when the U.S. and Russia competed to demonstrate which nation could exercise the greatest amount of space power. As Krige notes, [T]he White House and the Kremlin wanted to show Third World countries the superiority of their ideology, the efficiency of their political institutions, the capacity of their high technology industry, and the strength of their armed forces (Krige pg. 25). In particular, Kennedy was motivated by two international events: 1) Russian cosmonaut Yuri Gagarin becoming the first human to orbit earth on 12 April 1961, and 2) the Bay of Pigs Fiasco on April While scholars including Michael Beschloss and John M. Logsdon have concluded the latter to be a contributing factor, it still remains to be debated among the academic community. However, noting the Bay of Pigs incident helps provide some context of the international dynamics of the time. At the very least, the Soviet Union s achievement of being the first to orbit the earth had stung the U.S. s national self-image and international standing, and thus Kennedy saw Apollo as a means of restoring American pride and self-confidence (Logsdon pg. 142). Logsdon also suggests that while the success of Gargarin was manageable for Kennedy, the Bay of Pigs invasion was less so because it occurred only three months into his presidency: after the collapse of the Bay of Pigs invasion he was desperately in need of something that would divert attention of the public and identify him with a cause that would unify them behind his administration (Logsdon pg. 426). Avoiding these issues, however, during intense consensus building among House and Senate members, Kennedy was able to achieve unanimous support from members of congress, many of whom were initially price shocked, for his proposal that $20 billion should be dedicated to landing a man on the Moon before the end of the decade (Beschloss pg. 60). In Ragsdale s terms, the Apollo program served as a primary policy for the U.S. to re-establish its technological presence and beat the Soviet Union. In turn, because of his success, Kennedy s speech took on mythical qualities illustrating the president s power to determine the national space agenda and garner bipartisan support for space programs (Launius & McCurdy pg. 223). At the same time, although NASA s Administrator, James Webb, was enthusiastic about Kennedy and Vice President Johnson s interest in landing a man on the Moon, he was concerned that the scientific and technological advancements for which NASA had been created not be eclipsed by the political necessities of international rivalries (Beschloss pg. 59). McDougall, though, observes that [t]he real motive in space was prestige, but the excuse for action would be the presumed military implications (McDougall pg. 204). Thus, the Kennedy administration set the stage for three conflicting

3 3 approaches to space policy: the White House s focus on international competition and security, Congress s position on budget concerns, and NASA s perspective on long-term space development. Because NASA was still in its infant stages of development within the burgeoning space race, Kennedy did not have to contend with the opposing views of NASA and Congress to the degree that later presidents would. Due to these unique conditions, the Apollo decision was an anomaly in the history of the U.S. space program (Launius & McCurdy pg. 224). Spoiled by ready political support, autonomy, and access to flowing funds, NASA officials came to believe this as the norm when in fact [p]rogram success was predicated upon a set of conditions that could hardly be restored (Lanuius & McCurdy pg. 224). This reality started to become evident during Johnson s term as President. NASA achieved Kennedy s goal of landing a man on the Moon on 20 July 1969, during Johnson s administration. While the accomplishment emboldened the U.S. s image as a leader in the international community, the post-apollo period left many observers wondering what NASA s future would hold. This sense of disorientation can be traced back to 1966 when NASA s funding reached its peak at 4% of the federal budget (NASA History Site). Starting at this time, much of NASA s planning was focused on identifying new programs and projects to follow the lunar missions. However, President Johnson s only priority in regard to space programs was to fulfill Kennedy s goal of reaching the Moon before the end of the decade (Dallek pg. 80). Beyond this objective, Johnson avoided significant post-apollo commitments largely due to Congress s concern over the costs of the Vietnam War and Great Society programs (Dallek pg. 81). The Johnson administration endorsed Voyager in 1967, but Congress denied money for it not only because it was prioritizing funds for the Vietnam War but also because it had heard conflicting testimonies from scientists (Lanuius & McCurdy pg. 230). Based on this experience, NASA learned that the appearance of scientific consensus was an important element in order to secure government funding. However, realizing this lesson was not enough as Congress later significantly reduced funds for the Apollo Applications Program, which was designed to keep the U.S. in space after reaching the Moon (Lanuius & McCurdy pg. 230). Even though Johnson was interested in space programs and was a strong advocate in the beginning of his presidency, his concern, that Soviet advances in space might undermine America s national security and prestige in the Soviet-U.S. competition for global influence steadily faded (Dallek pg. 80). Essentially, Johnson changed focus because, as Newsweek noted at the time, The Viet Nam war and the desperate conditions of the nation s poor and its cities [makes] space flight seem, in comparison, like an embarrassing selfindulgence (Dallek pg. 83). Sustaining national prestige in space was pointless if it cost Johnson the war and the U.S. s stature in the international community. Whereas the

4 4 initial U.S.-Soviet space race during Kennedy s administration served as the catalyst for Congress to fund the Apollo missions, domestic poverty issues and a war abroad caused the House and Senate to limit funding for further space programs during Johnson s terms. In other words, presidential backing is not necessarily a guarantee of congressional support, especially when there are other domestic and international issues at risk of being financially overlooked. Because the U.S. had achieved its goal of beating the Russians to the Moon, an ancillary policy had come to replace primary policy in the space arena (Ragsdale pg. 136). However, decisions to ensure that some NASA programs would remain ongoing via incremental funding became more apparent during the Nixon administration. Constrained by the boundaries of the budget, in 1969 NASA devised the idea of a shuttle providing low cost transportation to near-earth orbit and later that year they proposed a Mars mission in the 1980s; to support both missions, they also proposed the construction of a space station (Logsdon pg. 145). Nixon was open to the possibility of a Space Transportation System (STS) but not a space station because for both Congress and the White House the space program no longer had adequate priority to justify such costs (Logsdon pg. 145). Public support for extensive space programs reached an all-time low as only 14 percent of Americans polled favored increased spending on space, a figure that fell to 7 percent as the Moon landings multiplied (Ragsdale pg. 137). Thus, due to pressure from the White House, NASA proposed a shuttle design that was low in development cost but its high operating costs would be the responsibility of future administrations (Logsdon pg. 146). Nixon approved the STS proposal not only on the grounds of economics and scientific exploration but also because rejecting any plan, as he put it, would be confirming in some respects, a belief that I fear is gaining credence at home and abroad: That our best years are behind us and voluntarily starting to give up our super power status, and our desire to maintain world superiority (Logsdon pg. 50). Hence, Nixon s decision to proceed was also partly based on reinvigorating national prestige, as he did not want to be remembered in history as the President who relinquished the nation s leadership in exploration of space (Logsdon pg. 51). By supporting STS, Nixon moved space technology away from the purpose of being a political and military weapon as it had been during Johnson s administration and downplayed the Cold War tensions that had propelled the Apollo missions (Hoff pg. 93). instead of funding more competition with the Soviets, Nixon s policy of détente focused more on international cooperation and cooptation of the Soviet Union. For instance, William Rogers, Secretary of State during Nixon s term, emphasized an approach in which the U.S. reached out to the Soviet Union for cooperation in order to gain more detailed knowledge about their programs while also maintaining a competitive position so that the U.S. would not be taken by surprise by advancements in space technology (Rogers pg. 5). Because of the symmetric relationship that characterized the era, Rogers hoped that collaboration would serve as a strategic opportunity to learn from Soviet space

5 5 technology, lead to possible arms verification and control, as well as improve the tense political climate (Rogers pg. 6). The 1980s was a decade in which political patterns of space technology were in greater flux than at any time since 1961 (McDougall pg. 434). President Reagan made two significant announcements that altered the momentum of the U.S. s space program at the time. First, in 1983 Reagan announced an emphasis on the development of technology for ballistic missile defense (BMD). As Reagan increased funding for research on space-based ABM systems under his Strategic Defense Initiative (also known as Star Wars ), the military budget surpassed that of NASA in 1981 for the first time since the 1950s (McDougall pg. 434). Second, because NASA was aware that the space shuttle development program was coming to an end and that a new project would be needed if NASA was to maintain its identity as a developer of new space technology, in 1984 Reagan announced in JFK-like fashion the construction of a civil space station within the coming decade and invited other countries participation in the program (Logsdon pg. 149). Serving as an impulse for competition, Reagan s decision was partly influenced by the Soviets new Mir space station, the planning for which had already begun in 1976 and was completed in 1986 (McDougall pg. 439). The International Space Station not only preserved America s space leadership by becoming the true successor to the Apollo program but also extended America s space power via its focus as the largest international technological cooperation undertaken. Due to the combination of these two decisions supporting NASA, Reagan demonstrated a degree of presidential commitment to a strong national space program that had not been seen since Kennedy in 1961 (Ragsdale pg. 133). However, despite a strong commitment, there was no national space policy as congressional committees and White House councils could not agree on a long-term plan of action. As Congress had become an equal player with the presidency on the space agenda, many issues were left unresolved and planning projects by the yard with the hope that they would transform into large commitments (Ragsdale pg. 134). The year-byyear politics of bargaining, compromise, and coalition eventually took its toll as the 1986 Challenger and 2003 Columbia accidents surfaced not only weaknesses of the shuttle and general space program, but also the inefficiencies in decision-making among the White House, Congress, and NASA. Ragsdale notes that institutional conflict within and among Congress, the White House, and NASA was at the source of these problems especially during the Reagan years. Institutional conflicts arose because Congress, the presidency, and NASA are inherently plural organizations. Each body has a decentralized system where committees, offices, or field centers may disagree with one another. While dialogue is an important process of ideation, rivalry between big science and small policy within an ancillary policy context forced science to be accomplished cheaply and incrementally (Ragsdale pg ).

6 6 In conjunction, Logsdon adds that, NASA allowed itself to be trapped into making the primary public and congressional justification of the shuttle its cost effectiveness (Logsdon pg. 232). In other words, NASA was trying to do too much with too little (Mindell pg. 7). Nixon did not originally approve STS on the basis of scientific discovery. After all, only four of the initial twenty-five initial flights were focused on science (Mindell pg. 6). Rather the shuttle program was approved on the basis of U.S. leadership in manned space flight and advances in technological capabilities with both military and civilian implications (Logsdon pg. 232). The downfall of the program was that it was not given high enough priority, and to be effective [it] must be accompanied by a political commitment to provide the resources required over the lifetime of the program (Logsdon pg. 233). The Columbia Accident Investigation Board (CAIB) report highlights that, a constrained policy context, management failures, and inadequate funding contributed to the deaths of American astronauts (Logsdon pg. 7). Despite the collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of a bipolar world, U.S. space policy continues to be shaped by ongoing institutional conflicts among the presidency, Congress, and NASA. However, unlike in the Cold War era, all three institutions are faced with the challenges of augmented commercial services to other nations and in turn, multiple countries maintaining space programs. The change in the international dynamics is largely due to the accelerated integration of commercial space services into military operations, which stems from the U.S. s declining defense spending after the Cold War. Because the government could no longer sustain the satellite industrial base that had been created during the Cold War, satellite manufacturers applied the same skills and technologies that had been used for the military and commercialized them (Lewis pg. 17). The availability of commercial space technology means that it is no longer a unique source of U.S. advantage. Unlike the symmetric war strategy that defined the U.S. s competition with Russia, post Cold War competition in space came to be asymmetric due to nations not having to rely on dedicated military platforms. Alternatively, the growth in availability of commercial space services provided other nations the opportunity to mimic the space capabilities of larger powers without the expense of launching a large satellite fleet (Lewis pg. 13). Whereas it was easy for the U.S. to gauge the degree of its space power against a single opponent during the Cold War, suddenly many nations have been able to augment their military and intelligence capabilities by buying commercial services (Lewis pg. 17). For example, international cooperation between the U.S. and Russia has been mutually beneficial as the partnership has reduced costs of the International Space Station (ISS) for both sides, and engagement with Russia has served as an incentive to discourage Russian companies from selling technology to countries such as Iran (Mindell pg. 25). In contrast, however, U.S. collaboration with China is not likely to happen in the short term, even though the nation is the third in the world to develop indigenous capability for human spaceflight (Mindell pg. 27). China claims its programs have been

7 7 pursued primarily for the benefit of scientific discovery and economic benefits. However, the U.S. is wary of such public announcements because the development of their programs raises concerns about China s national power and military motivations. As a result, the Indian Space Research Organization (ISRO), has shifted from domestic development to a costly human spaceflight program (Mindell pg. 35). ISRO officials elaborate that this is largely due to the success of China s Shenzhou spacecraft, which shadows India s aspirations in the Asia-Pacific region (Mindell pg. 35). Neither the European Space Agency (ESA) nor the Japan Aerospace Exploration Agency (JAXA), has independent human spaceflight capability and thus both rely on the U.S. and Russia for access to the ISS (Mindell pg. 41). Unlike Russia, China, and India, ESA and JAXA have historically been more defined by their relationship with the U.S. and thus emphasize science, social benefits, and industrial competitiveness in their space programs (Mindell pg. 46). Recently, however, Japan has expressed a stronger desire to commit to a human spaceflight due to the ascendancy of China s space program. Much like in the Cold War, shifts in geopolitical power are being partly articulated in space policy. Thus, due to the current international dynamics of space technology being used for military and intelligence purposes as well as commercial benefits, Pace notes that the reasons to why we are engaged in spaceflight are much, much clearer and more numerous today than in 1962 (Pace pg. 1). However, the vision of future space programs still remains unclear. Simberg observes that [I]f it had not been for the Columbia disaster in 2003, NASA would have continued to launch space shuttles and to build space stations [but] even the staunchest defenders of the shuttle had to admit that time had come for a major change in the space program (Simberg pg. 7). Nevertheless, the White House, Congress, and NASA still face the risk of operating in the ancillary policies of the past. NASA continues to confront the obstacle of balancing the national security and international cooperation objectives of the White House as well as Congress budgetary pressures with the agency s actual need to build and run adequate programs. The space shuttle and ISS programs are products of incrementalism and ancillary policy because congressional and White House debates never addressed the ultimate purpose of these undertakings (Ragsdale pg. 159). To avoid the mistakes and failures of the shuttle program, NASA needs to be able to follow a long-term vision and purpose, similar to the goals outlined in Obama s National Space Policy, without being placed in a position to compromise necessary resources for programs in order to satisfy and gain political support. To a degree JFK-like leadership may be needed to overcome these obstacles but not necessarily within the international environment that accompanied it. In part, Kennedy s leadership was built upon on the unique circumstances of the Cold War period, and thus these sets of conditions are unlikely to occur again. As Simberg highlights, Apollo was not a methodical space program; it was an anomalous race in the Cold

8 8 War It turned out be to unsustainable, which is why it boggles the mind that over three decades later Apollo was chosen as a model for a program that was supposed to be affordable and sustainable (Simberg pg. 17). However, suggesting that space program should be guided by more of a primary policy approach to solve problems, as in the Apollo era, is more of an effective approach than the ancillary practices that have stalled the U.S. s ability to effectively progress beyond a closed Earth system perspective. How much would be needed is an issue beyond the scope of this paper. However, as evident during the Nixon and Reagan administrations, presidential leadership is required to facilitate the conflicting internal discussions among the plural institutions of NASA, the White House, and Congress regarding the underlying purpose of space programs and to ensure that NASA is able to fulfill its long-terms goals. In summary, this brief paper examines the unique domestic and international conditions that allowed the Apollo program to become primary policy during the Kennedy administration. Since NASA was still in its early stages of development within the burgeoning space race, Kennedy did not have to contend with the opposing views of NASA and Congress to the degree that later presidents would. These sorts of conditions are what caused the Apollo missions to be an anomaly in history. Nevertheless, the period laid the foundation for the debates on national security, budget priorities, and long-term objectives that would persist among the White House, Congress, and NASA to the present day. Although the paper did not fully detail the myth of bipartisan support in Congress or the shift in support for space programs among Republicans and Democrats in the Cold War period, the brief essay focused on a historical overview of the conflicting approaches among government institutions in order to understand the shortcomings of ancillary policies in space program development. Beginning in the Johnson administration, primary policy came to be gradually replaced by the incremental nature of ancillary policy due to the U.S. s accomplishment of beating the Soviet Union to the Moon. The U.S. space program was without a clear purpose to provide direction, and disagreements among the plural institutions of the presidency, Congress, and White House never allowed the government to reach an agreement on the long-term objective of NASA s space programs in a post-apollo period. Instead incremental solutions were proposed on a year-to-year like basis in order to appease the competing demands of national security and international cooperation, budget constraints, and program development. Despite the sincere intentions of Nixon not wanting to end the space program, the momentum of ancillary policy produced projects that were likely to fail such as the shuttle program and later the ISS during Reagan s administration. Even though Reagan s advocacy for NASA programming was reminiscent of Kennedy, his term illustrates that developing an effective space program requires more than just presidential support, but also the type of leadership that can engage the White House, Congress, and NASA to address the difficult unanswered questions regarding long-term strategy.

9 9 Ending the shuttle program following the Columbia disaster in 2003 may have been the best option for NASA because it created the opportunity for all parties to stop and reassess the content and direction of the U.S. s space programs. Although the U.S. may not get another opportunity to garner the political support and direct the sort of funding that characterized the Apollo missions, at the very least the plural institutions of the White House, Congress, and NASA need to produce leaders who are willing to address the long-term objectives of U.S. space programs and reach a workable agreement on how to solve problems. By creating a primary policy approach, as Kennedy had done, such discussion and planning will avoid placing NASA in a position to compromise necessary resources for projects in order to satisfy and gain political support.

10 10. Bibliography Robert Dallek, Johnson, Project Apollo, and the Politics of Space Program Planning in Roger D. Launius and Howard E. McCurdy, Spaceflight and the Myth of Presidential Leadership (1997) Global Exploration Strategy: The Framework for Coordination, May 31, 2007 Commission of the European Communities, Communications from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament, European Space Policy, Brussels, April 26, Michael Griffin, Space Exploration: Real Reasons and Acceptable Reasons, January 19, 2007 John Krige and A. Russo, A History of the European Space Agency. European Space Agency, April Roger Launius, Perceptions of Apollo: Myth, Nostalgia or All of the Above? Space Policy, May Roger D. Launius, Compelling Rationales for Spaceflight: History and the Search for Relevance in Steven Dick and Roger Launius, Eds. Critical Issues in the History of Spaceflight (2006). John M. Logsdon, John F. Kennedy and the Race to the Moon (2011), Chap. 14 John M. Logsdon, The Decision to Go to the Moon: Project Apollo and the National Interest (1970), Chaps. 2-4, 6. John M. Logsdon, "Choosing Big Technologies: Examples from the U.S. Space Program," in John Krige, ed., Choosing Big Technologies (1993), pp Walter J. McDougall, The Heavens and the Earth: A Political History of the Space Age (1985). National Research Council, America s Future in Space Aligning the Civil Space Program with National Needs (2009) Scott Pace, Challenges to U.S. Space Sustainability, Space Policy, June 2009 Scott Pace, Strengthening Space Security: Advancing US Interests in Outer Space, Harvard International Review, pp , Spring 2012

11 11 Brent Sherwood, Mars: On the Path or in the Way? presentation to the Global Exploration Conference, Washington, D.C., May 2012 Rand Simberg, A Space Program for the Rest of Us, The New Atlantis, Summer 2009, pp James Vedda, Chapter 7 in Choice, Not Fate: Shaping a Sustainable Future in the Space Age (2009)