Power Structure in the Danish Parliament - An analysis of Power Relations and Incentives

Transcription

1 Power Structure in the Danish Parliament - An analysis of Power Relations and Incentives Henriette Bjørn Nielsen Research Fellow, Institute of Political Science, University of Copenhagen. Abstract This article is based on the ph.d.-dissertation Power Relations on the Parliamentary Arena - Performing politics in an apolitical society. The article has two main purposes. First to present an analytical framework within which it will be possible to uncover the relationship between the composition and power structure of a parliament and the strategies of the political parties in a series of western European parliaments - in order thereby to establish the fact that strategies and goals of political parties constitute dependent factors relative to the composition of parliament. Second to demonstrate at method to unveil the power structure and as a derivative of the latter the incentive structure in a concrete parliament within the established analytical framework in order to test its validity and be able to evaluate the political actors' concrete balancing of strategies and goals and thus the changes, if any, of the democratic norms within a specific context, and furthermore to highlight some of the important results of the thesis in regard to the themes mentioned above. Introduction This article takes its starting point in the following basic assumptions and the problems derived from it: "The Danish political system has changed its character and modus operandi during the latest three decades due to a long series of minority governments and the large number of parties represented in parliament. This development has influenced patterns of relations and contacting in parliament. The above causality may be demonstrated by analyzing during a certain amount of time the changes in the selection of strategies and goals and the political parties' wishes for positions in parliament." And thus the statement of problems is: What possible goals,strategies and positions can the political actors in the parliamentary arena chose from? How are changes in these choices analyzed theoretically? How are the changes and their causes in a concrete political system - that of Denmark - demonstrated? And lastly: What are the changes and what have been their consequences? And what further consequences will they entail? 1

2 An analytical framework for uncovering the relationship between the composition and power structure of a parliament and the strategies of the political parties in parliament. Below will at first a comparative theoretical framework for the arguments be presented. In order to deal with the question: How are changes in the political actors' selection of goals and strategies as well as their wishes for positions in parliament analyzed? The framework is intended to meet two demands. First the focus of the analysis must be limited and well defined as being the arena of parliament. Second the analysis conducted should be of both a general comparative value and describe one specific parliamentaty arena as a case. Those ambitions have caused both the introduction of a strictly defined methodical starting point and the discussion of a series of methodical and substantial limitations and definitions as well of, as within, the area. The methodical starting point It is assumed in advance: 1) That the parliamentary arena contains a series of given actors - namely the political parties which appoints candidates at general elections. 2) That a series of situations and positions in regard to these actors will be given in advance, and that it is possible to identify a series of central situations and describe these formally and detailed. 3) That the relevant actors can chose between some aforehand given strategies and incentives which they have to balance when deciding the desirability in achieving specific goals and positions 4) That there exist a series of conditions which are variable - namely the conceptions of what the consequences will be when chosing a specific position, conceptions of which positions are desirable to obtain, conceptions of how the relations will be to other actors in given positions and finally the conceptions of the potential of being in given situations and positions. Dependent on these different conceptions the given actors choose between a series of strategies to obtain specifik positions. And that exactly makes the analysis of conceptions relevant. The 2

3 variables within the actors conceptions of a series of conditions will be dependent on a series of structural factors - what in this article is described collectively as the structure of incentives. If this structure of incentives can be revealed the number of different conceptions can be reduced considerably in the cases of the specific parliaments. The concrete structure of incentives in a given case (a given power structure) can be revealed by a historical/empirical analysis and furthermore substantiated by asking representatives for the given actors. It should be possible on basis of the assumptions mentioned above to construct an apparatus for analysis of simular parliaments, that covers point 1,2 and 3, while point 4 must stand alone as an analysis that only applies on one specifik parliament at a time 1. Analysis of the parliamentary control of the executives The analysis of the relation between the executive and the legislative in Demark will be discussed under five headlines subtracted from research on Nordic parliaments 2 : 1 Party cohesion - can the parties been seen as unitary actors on the parliamentary arena 2 Numerical strenght 3 Possible relations between parties in minority government systems 4 Institutional structure of the parliament 5 Focus of the parliament - explanations on and consequences of the working parliaments 6 Focus of the parties - explanations on and consequences of the working parliaments Party cohesion 1 The methodical starting point is based on Abells model. Abell, Peter (ed): Rational Choice Theory, Edward Elgar Publishing Limited., Upleadon, Cambridge, pp. X (introduction). 2 Sannerstedt, Anders: Förhandlingar i riksdagen, Lund University Press, Lund, 1992; Mattson, I.: Förhandlingsparlamentarism - En jämförande studie af Riksdagen och Folketinget, Lund, University Press, Lund, 1996; Arter,D: Scandinavian Politics today, Manchester University Press, 1999; Nielsen, Henriette Bjørn: Power relations on the parliamentary Arena - Performing politics in an apolitical society (ph.d-thesis forthcoming). 3

4 In the following three arguments are presented based on theory as well as empirical findings 3, which support the assumption that: In Denmark parties act like unitary actors. First argument: With a few exceptions 4 members of the political parties in the Danish Parliament traditionally votes together within the parties. This is expected and exceptions are often explicitly explained and discussed. As an example could be mentioned a law, which was debated in the summer of The rules of artificial insemination were discussed, and Socialdemokratiet with a strong reputation for being an unitary actor decided that since this debate touched upon some very moral and ethic areas which were not determined in the official policy program it would be fair to let the single members stand free without any bindings 5. Likewise a new party was formed this year - namely The Democracy Renewed (Demokratisk Fornyelse), which as a moral principle wanted to set the members free in every election, which did not concern the EEC, because that the party`s main (and only) objective was to terminate Danish membership of The European Union. How far the party would have followed this line in parliament is hard to determine since they didn t even come close to be elected. Furthermore there have been a few independents in the Danish Parliament. And there has also been some open conflicts within the parties (probably because of the increased attention from the media). But altogether it would be wrong to conclude that the Danish parties are factional. 3 Jensen, Henrik: Arenaer eller aktører - en analyse af Folketingets stående udvalg, Samfundslitteratur, København, For exampel left wing Socialistisk Folkeparti with 13 seats in parliament. They have chosen a horizontal party organization, which has rubbed off on the parliamentary group of the party. Hence they are not being forced to agree on single subjects in parliament. But instead they must obey all dictats from the executive committee of the party and confer with this committee on every political agreement made in parliament. of argument. 5 Using terms like setting members free in specific single subjects I would claim substantiates my line 4

5 At this point it could be relevant to discuss types of issues. Using Stokes there are two kinds of political issues: Valence-issues and Position-issues 6. A Valence-issue touches upon some basic and common shared values, while Position-issues could be defined as issues which just like standpoints can be placed on one or several dimensions. On that basis I would say that a further criterion for factionalisation in a party is that the disagreements should be manifest as Positionissues, since these issues are the ones which count and can be defined as a gauge on conflict in the political system 7. A structural explanation on the lack of factionalisation within the parties could be based on a discussion of the party types in Denmark. The country is characterized by having a multitude of parties. During the last 25 years 8 to 10 parties have been represented in the Parliament (to give some credit to Mairs defence on the freezing hypothesis it shall be stressed that the 5 old parties have been the most stabile base throughout the years 8 ). The parties are placed rather closely to each other on the important political dimensions, and this leaves hardly any space for the ones who wants to be independent and make their own platform. They will almost immediately run into another party since the space is crowded 9. The situation would probably be different if the parties were bigger and fewer, which logically would create a higher degree of heterogeneity on the internal party arenas. Second argument: The type of government in Denmark also makes it necessary for the parties to act like unitary actors. For instance Tony Blair`s government does not have to do a great lot to satisfy their party members in parliament. If one goes it is not a catastrophe - and besides where should they go to? This is not the case in Denmark. Very often the government can t bear to lose 6 Stokes, Donald E.: Spatial Models of Party Competition, The American Political Science Review, Vol. LVII No. 2, June 1963, pp The annual law program on fiscal politics is an example of a highly aggregated Position-issue. In this case not only the political parties in Denmark are homogenous but rather the political system as a whole, as the law on fiscal politics is mostly passed unaminously. 8 Mair, Peter: Myths of electoral change and the survival of traditional parties, European Journal of Political Research, Vol. 24, No. 2, August 1993, pp One could of course chose to seek the extremes and maybe even expand the political space - a strategy that Dansk Folkeparti has chosen. But the question is how far they can go before they will be shut out of political influence entirely. And the attraction of finding ones own platform is limited if this platform is placed outside the sphere of political influence. As an alternative one could chose to concentrate on a single issue. This is very difficult for a party represented in parliament and, further it would require an extremely important and divise issue to be found to obtain sufficient votes to gain seats in parliament in spite of the relatively low threshold of 2 percent in Denmark. 5

6 one single member without losing the power - and it can be tempting to leave after ordinary disagreements, when there are other parties which are not too far away. This is ceteris paribus a motivating factor for making the party member s stay in the parliamentary group, even though the price can be unsatisfying compromises. Third argument: The election method also plays an important roll. Denmark has chosen a system with proportional representation and listing. Opposite for example the Irish system - Single transferable Vote - the Danish system makes it less profitable for single politicians to appeal directly to the voters since the party members decide on the ranking of candidates, and votes cannot be transferred without paying respect to the ranking. In short: Danish politicians need a party and a policy program as well as a personal profile. It shall be stressed that these three arguments are supporting a specific point of wiev and position, which means that they are not to be seen as showing the whole truth and nothing but the truth 10. Of course every party contains a multitude of different actors. But the main point is, that in Denmark most conflicts are being solved internally at the meetings of the parliamentary group (gruppemøderne), and they are as a rule closed gatherings. At these meetings unity is reached. And if it is a party in government the ministers often have got the power potential to force the opinion of the government coalition through, even though - as already mentioned - this opinion far from always matches the one of the party program. And this is of course why there is a picture of harmony and unity when one analyses the policy making and the coalitions formations in parliament. In this analyse it is the actions of the parties, after unity has been reached, which are displayed. What has been said so far leads to the conclusion that in this analysis it will be fruitfully and indeed reasonable to take a theoretical standpoint in which the political parties are being seen as unitary actors. From this point on I will stand on this assumption and treat it as a stable factor in my further discussion. The numerical strenght of the political executives vis á vis the legislature In Denmark in the period from 1953 and until present day March 2000 there has only been 3 majority government, while there has been 19 real minority governments. From that one can 10 Interviews with parliamentary politicians shows - though as a very weak tendency - a difference between the younger mp`s (under 35 years) and the older mp`s (35 years or older), where the young ones are more anarchic in regard to the party`s politics. Nothing can be concluded on this since it is not clear if the difference has to do with young age or with a generel change over time in regard to party cohesion. 6

7 conclude that the Danish parliamentary system has been dominated by minority-parliamentarism from 1953 and onwards - and furthermore before 1953 minority governments were not an unfamiliar phenomena. From 1945 and onwards to % of the Danish government have been minority government and they have been in government for 75% of the time. Minority governments occur in party systems where parties are well-developed and integrated in large parts of the society - thus invalidating the holding of governmental seats as the only mean for political actors of obtaining their goals irrespectively of the nature of these goals. Furthermore in this system participation in government can be wieved as costly indeed due to the threats of: devaluation of policy program, party splits, dwindeling support from traditional friendly organizations who feel ill-favoured. In such systems minority governments will be accepted and may very well be the consequence of a highly developed and stable political system based on social and cultural homogenity making the question of disagreement on issues on inter- and intra party lines less determining due to the shared and common goals 11. In my further analysis I will wiev minority governments in the above mentioned way. I realize that I in no way has given proof of this assumption. However numerous studies indicate that this will be a fertile starting point for the analysis. Evenmore, this type of minority government is historically characteristic for Scandinavia, where both Sweden and Norway have as high a rate of minority government as does Denmark. Possible relations between parties in minority government systems Party strategic cost/benefit-analysis When a political party considers whether or not to participate in government, this is supposed to be done on the basis of a party strategic calculus. The party seeks to identify all costs and benefits by participation vs non-participation, then estimating the importance of each, and thus determining the most beneficial course: To participate in government to take upon one self the responsibility and gaining the benefits that come here with, or: Choosing the oppositional role unleashing one from responsibility but simulteanously running the risk of losing visibility in the eyes of the voters, and diminishing the agenda-setting potential. 11 See Thomsen, Niels: Det politiske Rodnet, kap 2 i Goul Andersen, Jørgen et.al.: Vi og vore politikere, Spektrum,

8 Below a typology will be outlined, incorporating the positions a party may consider when faced with the option to participate in a coalition minority government, as well as the major points of consideration a party must take in regarding strategy. The model presupposes that it is not possible to reach agreement to form a majority government. The model distinquishes between government and opposition positions. The government position are self explanatory. The opposition positions are divided into two subcategories dependend on their relationship to the government. Thus a party which has confirmed an agreement with the government is in formal opposition, while a party which has confirmed no such agreement is in real opposition. This distinction is constructed as a logical consequence of the Kåre Strøm - model of real and formal minority government 12. In order to be complete the typology ought to include an additional 12 possible positions. However for reasons of clarity these have been omited (they are briefly discussed when relevant). In the following the term government will indicate a minority government. According to Sjöblom political parties have got four basic goals: 1. Programme realization, 2. Vote maximization, 3. Maximization of parliamentary influence, 4. Party cohesion 13. Since in this analysis the parties are considered unitary actors the question of party cohesion disappears. The combination of the goals of the political parties and the types of government and opposition is illustrated in the typology: Minority government One-party Multi-party Oppo- sition Real Formal Real Formal Real Formal Vote maximization Maximiza- 12 Strom, Kaare: "Minority Government and Majority Rule", Cambridge University, Cambridge 1990, 13 Sjöblom, Gunnar: Party Strategies in a multiparty System, Studentlitteratur, Lund,

9 tion of parliamentary influence Programme realization This model does only in a simplified way take the aspect of time into account. I have chosen only to consider the party strategies as short term if they relate to the government formation at hand, and long term if they relate to formations beyond this election period. I shall shortly return to the time perspective later. 1. Real One-party Minority government/ Vote maximization. When a party chooses to form government alone without the support of other parties it entails certain advantages. The party will have a high degree of visibility, since the attention of the media will be constant and massive. The party will be very well known by the electorate giving it the edge at the coming election. However this visibility may be advantageous or disadvantageous - since both succes and failure will be clearly manifest for all to see. Of course the implemented policies are also important in gaining the edge in regard to future elections. Generally parties in government have difficulties in succeding at the next election 14. Of course history has shown examples of the opposite - after having formed a one party real minority government 1973 to 1975 Venstre succeded at the 1975-election by doubling its votes but subsequently loosing office Real One-party Minority government/ Maximization of parliamentary influence. It often requires a very pragmatic behaviour by a party in order to find the balance between holding on to office and control the implementation of policies. A one party minority government can not always be certain that its proposals can find a majority in the parliament. And the majority may be changing with every issue. Furthermore there is a possibility that such a government will be faced with alternative majorities as did the Danish Four-leaf clover-government during the period 1982 to This is somewhat controversial and there is no certain connection. Often parties do not lose more at an election than what was measured in polls before the election. The discussions and conclusions are however very relevant, as this is often a matter of expected results and actions based on these expectations. 15 Damgaard, Erik and Svensson, Palle: Who governs? Parties and policies in Denmark, European Journal of Political Research, vol. 17, no. 6, 1989, pp Also the two party government in 1990 faced this situation. 9

10 3. Real One-party Minority government/ Programme realization. All political parties have a platform, a program, a formation of values by which real life issues are measured and determined. In this context the concept of program is defined as all explicit and implicit policy goals the party may express either verbally or in writing 17. It is tempting to assume a correlation between programme realization and vote maximization however this is not necessary the case as the electorate is not always ideologically inclined. Reality has shown that the ideologically consistency of party policy is not determining for the manner in which the electorate cast their votes 18. Empirical studies have shown that the voters seldomly classify and identify political parties by ideology as they do not to the same degree as the politicians comprehend ideological divides beyond the left/right-scale 19. A real one party government faces a difficult task when trying to realize its program; in order to obtain office and maximize influence in parliament the party will often be forced in to adopting policies which will only enable partial programme realization. The alternative however is not a high degree of programme realization as an opposition party. Parties therfore often faces the choice between limited or no programme realization. Also the rules and traditions concerning the rule of government ministers is important. If frame-work laws are frequently used they give the ministers a great opportunity for influence - as does the use of government circulars and statuary instruments, all easing the burden of programme realization 20. If such a government succeds in implementing policies based on changing majorities it may be able to realize the greater parts of its programme, as the government may gain support for some parts of its programme by some parties and for other parts of its programme by other parties. Since an opposition often will try to block such a strategy of shifting majorities it may prove to be a extremely difficult course to chart. 4. Formal One-party Minority government/ Vote maximization. 17 For a thorough discussion of the problem of programme see Sjöblom, See also: Andersen, Johannes m.fl.: "Medborgerskab", Systime, Ålborg And Nielsen, Henriette Bjørn, Anders Bøgebjerg Hansen & Jens Hjul-Nielsen: Dimensioner i politik - afstandsmodellen og dens applikation på danske vælgeres holdningsstruktur, IFS, Specialeserien, København, 1996, Concerning this also see Nielsen et.al Espersen, Ole: "Elementær Statsforfatningsret", Akademisk Forlag, København

11 Due to the nature of a formal one party government its support from one or more parties of the opposition with which it- namely the government party - forms a majority it is able to act as a majority government a situation that can prove to be close to optimal. On the one hand the government can be sure of realizing its proposals. On the other hand the formal government party still holds office alone thus securing a high degree of visibility in the eyes of the electorate. In such a situation the possibility for retaininig a government leader - effect known as a coat tail effect will be good 21. It is not always an advantage to hold office. In a situation like the one Denmark was in spring this year where a referendum on the Amsterdam Treaty divided the electorate almost in halfes, the prime minister had to prepare for legitimizing the outcome knowing that close to half of the voters would be in opposition to the result on this clear cut yes/no issue. In such a situation the opposition parties can choose not to participate in this legitimization process thereby avoiding the danger of losing support from a sceptic electorate. 5. Formal One-party Minority government / Maximization of parliamentary influence. As above this is a optimal situation for the government party: It can be sure of having every law passed as long as it fulfills the agreement it has made during government formation with its supporting party or parties. 6. Formal One-party Minority government/ Programme realization. To secure a permanent support from other parties in parliament the government party must participate in an ongoing bargaining process 22. Besides the issue of securing seats in boards and committees the formation of a common political platform is the most important issues. Such a platform represents the many compromises the parties involved have reached. It is therefore in no way certain that the possibilities for programme realization in this situation is higher than in other types of minority government formation, of course it is the opinion of the party that the platform is the best retainable result. The relationship between formal and real one party governments may in reality be a question of priorities: A certainty for realizing part of the party programme or uncertainty but with a chance of realizing a larger part of the programme. In reality it is a question 21 As mentioned in situation 1 a government often will suffer from setbacks at elections. This is not contraditionary since a coat tail effect which is related to individuals can be present even in a situation of setbacks. 22 On this subject it is somewhat refreshing to read the controversiel analysist Marcus Schmidt, Schmidt, Marcus: "Direkte demokrati i Danmark - Om indførelse af et elektronisk andetkammer", Nyt Nordisk Forlag, København

12 of choosing between a risk-loving and a risk-averse strategy Real Multi-party Minority government/ Vote maximization. 23 Begg, Fischer & Dornbusch: "Economics" (3rd. ed.), McGraw-Hill, London 1991, pp

13 Vote maximization may dictate the participation in a real multiparty minority government. Participation in government will always, as mentioned afore secure the increased visibility 24. Sharing this visibility may be advantageous if the coalition partners recruit their supporters from different parts of the electorate, but this may however rarely be the case as coalition partners tend to have close ideological positions 25. Insofar the next election period is expected to be characterized by a number of unpleasant and unpopular but necessary decisions it may be a benefit for the government to be a coalition of the parties that are most similar in order to prevent the voters of each of the coalition parties from changing their loyalties Real Multi-party Minority government/ Maximization of parliamentary influence. Eventhough a party joining a minority government is always dependent on the opposition, this dependency may vary. In choosing between a one party minority goverment and a multi-party minority government the latter may have the effect of splitting the opposition an hence make it easier for the government to create majorities for its own policy. Besides, the possibility of creating a majority will always increase with the the number of members in government Real Multi-party Minority government / Programme realization. As already mentioned the programme realization is closely connected to the formal structure of rules for government actions. In addition in this situation the coalition partners may have given in on a series of policy making wishes as a necessity in the formation process, and they may be forced to continue this line in parliament in order to realize any part of their programme at all. On the other hand the above mentioned split of the opposition may result in opportunities for 24 To take this visibility too much into account can be problematic, as e.g. in the situation described in 1, where the media chosen structure of the election campaign caused that only the two parties with the presidential profiles obtained the desired visibility. The small government party Radikale Venstre experienced a setback at the election March 1998 probably mainly due to the lack of visibility during the campaign. 25 See a description of "connected coalitions" in Axelrod, Robert: "The evolution of cooperation", Basic Books Inc. Publishers, New York See also Laver, Michael and Schofield, Norman: "Multiparty Government - The politics of coalitions in Europe", Oxford University Press, Oxford 1991, and Downs, Anthony: An Economic Theory of Democracy, Harper & Row, New York, 1957, pp. 122 on integrity and stability. 26 If one supposes that a minority government contains one large and one or several small parties, the small parties may experience difficulties. Although they have a great influence on policy making they may run the risk due to ideologically closeness that their voters will feel that they might as well vote for the large party in the coalition. government. 27 Unless the rising number of members increase the risk of polarising and conflict within the 13

14 implementing and realizing the major part of the governments policy programme with changing majorities. 10. Formal Multi-party Minority government/ Vote maximization. From a vote maximizing point of wiev it can hardly be advantageous to invite additional parties to participate in a formal multi party minority government rather than a formal one party minority government, and it is from this very point of wiev highly unlikely that such a situation will occure if there is a possibility for forming a formal one party government. One advantage however could be the afore mentioned desire to secure a high degree of visibility for ones partners in a period of unpopular decisions, as exemplified by the discussion of the Amsterdam Treaty. Furthermore it may be argued that such a government indicates a slide towards a consensus democracy calling for a need of creating legitimacy by expanding support in the parliament in order to implement policies. Besides, gaining expanded support in the parliament could be a policy goal in it self. 11. Formal Multi-party Minority government / Maximization of parliamentary influence. As in the case of all formal minority governments it is true that the influence on the parliamentary arena is high as a majority consisting of a number of government parties and their supporters always will be manifest. 12. Formal Multi-party Minority government / Programme realization. The difference between this type and type number 6 is not significant, assuming that real supporting parties and coalition partners calls for the same degreee of compromization with regard to party programme. One advantage can be indentified - namely that a supporting party lacks the executive power which is situated in the government, which can rule by circulars and statutory instruments. 13. Real Opposition / Vote maximization. If a party does not chose - or does not have the possibility to enter government it will be part of the opposition - since the government and opposition are countervailing and all-embracing. From a vote maximizing angle the role of the opposition contains a series of benefits as well as costs. Amongst the costs of being in a real opposition role is lower visibility. Opposition parties have more space in a debate wiht regard to proposals than the government parties. Free of the responsibility facing formal government`s it is less costly to make promises or demands knowing that it will only be hold responsible for non-implemented policies which makes 14

15 by far more easy to suggest what the electorate wants to hear. 14. Real Opposition / Maximization of parliamentary influence. Being a real opposition party ones parliamentary influence is to a high degree determined by the type of government one is facing and the structure and tradition of the system in question. If it is a formal minority government the apparent parliamentary influence is zero, as the government will almost always have a majority. The reason for adding the word almost is that constitutional garanties may secure a certain influence. As an example a third of the members of the Danish parliament may demand a referendum on a law passed 28. An aggressive opposition which continously are able to muster one third of the members of parliament will thus in principle be able to obstruct or at least delay all parliamentary work, even if such a behaviour will hardly be rewarded by the electorat. If on the other hand the government is a real minority government the opportunities of negotiations and maybe even - with luck and cunning - bring ones party into a position where it is determining for whether government proposals will be passed or fall. Hence the role of the individual party is to a large degree dependent on its ideological distance to the government. 15. Real Opposition / Programme realization. As mentioned above the oppositions are left with no power at all when facing a formal government and the programme realization potential is thus minimalized. On the other hand the chances for partial programme realization may be substantiel if the minority government is real rather than formal. But as in all situations where no party has a majority on its own, parties which seek programme realization must be prepared to compromise. 16. Formal Opposition /Vote maximization. In the case of formal opposition parties, things are different. Their role as supporters for the government make them less visible. In fact this is the potentially least visible situation of all. But on the other hand these parties may cash in at a coming election if they are able to present themselves as responsible parties securing cooperation and stability in the democratic system. Supporting parties will probably not be held accountable for their policies to the same degree as the more visible government parties. In other words it is a combination of influence, invisibility and freedom from responsibility. In this situation one should take into serious consideration the wishes and priorities of party members as well as voters.if my thesis is correct, that the ability to 28 Danmarks Riges Grundlov af

16 cooperate is more important in the eyes of the electorate than the ability to implement specific policies, then this could be a strategic advantageous position. 17. Formal Opposition / Maximization of parliamentary influence. As a regular supporting party for a minority government the party has maximized its parliamentary influence at least during the government formation process. Once it is finished it is supposed to be bounded by the agreements already made; however much depend upon the form of these agreements, and also on new issues developed during the coalition period. 18. Formal Opposition / Programme realization. The programme realization potential is also large, as the party determines the fate of the government and therefore have a very strong position when negotiation the government platform. Still with the above mentioned reservations concerning the skills of the negotiators and general behaviour concerning compromises. As it should be expected there is no single ideal situation among the above mentioned, no matter what position one obtains in the minority government formation game. There may be positions both in time and in space which - with regard to one or more points will be preferable to the present position - on the other hand these positions will typically be less preferable with regard to other points. The time and space discussion will briefly be outlined below. Shortterm versus longterm goals A variable very difficult to include in the evaluation of the strategies of political parties is whether these are shorttermed or longtermed. Political strategies can contain goals which reach beyond the present government formation situation and even beyond the period following the next election. In real life most parties will place themselves at different points on a continuum defined by respectively shortterm and longterm goals. The implications for minority governments will to a certain degree depend upon the different degrees of the time perspective by the different parties. One could imagine that a party with a longterm strategy would be more willing to accept minority governments in which the party itself does not participate as it would prefer slowly but surely to build up a basis for its continuing acting on the parlamentary arena, whereas a party with a very shortterm strategy would fight hard to obtain instant influence even though this might mean the alienation of future potential coalition 16

17 partners and voters. Kåre Strøm states: "Hence, future electoral succes may be a more important consideration than immediate access to policy making when governments are formed in multipartisystems. If this is correct, then it would have profound implications for coalition theory, which have tended to ignore future electoral considerations." 29 (my underlining) And furthermore: "Coalition theories must take into account the time perspectives of the actor and the role of prospective elections as democratic constraints on political parties. It is this responsivness to the anticipated reactions of the electorate that makes democracy special." 30 Axelrod states that the longer the distance is in time to the benefit the less is its value at present. This means that when Strøm claims that future succes can be used as a measurement it will be necessary to take into consideration the decreasing value of benefits over time 31. Generally it can be said of the above discussion, that it is characterized by many shades of gray partly due to its intangibleness, which is among other things shown by the consideration by Axelrod. A lesson to be learned from the considerations introduced in the model is, that no situation is a choice between good and bad; on the contrary it is often between degrees of maximizing votes and parliamentary influence and programme realization. When the several feasible goals, positions and strategies have been identified, it is assumed that it is possible to analyze changes of the political actors' preferences for those. Institutional structure of the Danish Parliament Types of parliamentary systems - considering the relation between the executive and the 29 Regarding my underlining: Strøm is not quite right in this consideration. Downs as well as Riker were pioneers within this research, and have made rather accurate descriptions on future electoral considerations/ longterm goals, Downs, 1957, pp. 49, Riker, William H: The Theory of Political Coalitions, Yale University Press, New Haven, , pp Strøm, in Lijphart, Arend (Issue Editor): CPS, Comparative Political Studies, vol. 17, no. 2, 31 Axelrod,

18 legislators. One can identify four categories of systems- namely: 1 The real oppositionel parties do have influence before the government formation in the negotiation process and furthermore do they have influence while the government is in function. 2 The real oppositionel parties do have influence before the government formation in the negotiation process but they do not have any influence while the government is in function. 3 The real oppositionel parties do not have influence before the government formation in the negotiation process but they do have influence while the government is in function. 4 The real oppositionel parties do not have influence neither before the government formation in the negotiation process nor while the government is in function Furthermore a scheme can be constructed that illustrates the connection between position and influence for the single parties and the type of government at the parliamentary arena. Connection between position and influence for the single parties and the type of government at the parliamentary arena. Type of government Position of the single party A Majority governments B Minority governments Column 1 A Column 2 A Column 3 B Column 4 B One party Multi party Formal government Real government - government government - one or more one or more parties parties As a real Maximum Shared Shared Shared influence government party influence influence influence As a real No No No Shared influence opposition party influence influence influence (dependent on potential) As a formal (left out) (left out) Shared (left out) 18

19 opposition party influence These different types of influence that parties can have on policy making can be explained as: Categories in bold: The real influence lies in the government parties as well as in the formal opposition parties - and not in the parliament besides that. Whether influence is administrated by the ministry cabinets or by the whole party/parties together depends on the structure of the internal arena in the different parties. Where influence is shared it is between government parties and in some cases government parties and the formal opposition parties - internally. Categories in italic: The whole parliament have real influence - but in a varying degree. I.e. all negotiation in the parliament matters, but some parties will due to their potentials have more influence than others. And this degree of influence can be expected to vary with the policy area that is actually being negotiated. It will be rather easy to place in the different parliaments in the scheme as well as in one of the four categories mentioned above the scheme and after that make a comparison. At first one can determine whether the government is minority or majority, next determine if it is a one party or multi party government, and finally if it is a minority government by analysing bills and resolutions find out who wins the bills one can find out if the government are working on the basis of alternative majorities or stabile supporters with whom the have made a real - if not formal - majority bloc. In other words is the government a formal or a real minority. The Danish system can be placed in the scheme in column 4B and in category 1: The real oppositionel parties do have influence before the government formation in the negotiation process and furthermore do they have influence while the government is in function. Two concluding remarks on the theoretical framework are: 1. In a theoretical comparative analysis it is possible to determine the type of minority government system and specify certain collaborational relationships between the political parties that act within the systems; but it is not possible to determine a concrete power structure and the political parties' view of that structure, neither is it possible to unveil their incentives for seeking certain positions in parliament. 2. Likewise it is possible by a theoretical comparative analysis where the actors in question are the political parties, to determine which goals they attempt to attain, which strategies 19

20 they are employing and which positions they may choose to strive for; but it is not possible by means of said results to consider exactly how goals and strategies combine and how they are balanced relatively to one another. And therefore it is not reasonable to assume that the theoretically defined strategies appear in concrete systems in the shapes of their ideal types. To sum up by now is presented the framework theoretically as well as in substance. Furthermore is introduced the link to the next part by narrowing the focus by revealing what must further be done in order to answer the next question of the set of problems: How to indicate the causes for changes within a concrete political system - namely that of Denmark. The thesis is that "the choice of position and the type of cooperation relationships depend on the political actors' concrete views of incentives in the given space - the power structure - within which they act. And so, if the power structure is not mapped out the dependent specific incentive structure cannot be understood." In consequence of this it becomes necessary to find a method for unveiling the power structure in the Danish parliament and then perform the uncovering. Focus of the parliament - Explanations on and consequences of the working parliaments Consequences within the parliament of the described features - measured on five themes. The main purpose in this part is to reveal the concrete Danish power structure and to demonstrate changes inside it 32. The revelation is based on an analysis design which hold a series of limitations. It has been decided to employ one conception of power amongst many conceptions possible, and a certain theme setting of subjects without any guarantee aforehand that other theme settings might not be possible. It must be stressed that the aim of this part is merely to illustrate which findings are possible to obtain using this type of analysis, since it will go much to far to present the intervening variables in the analysis in an article The main argument is that it is not possible to analyze a concept as power relations in a dynamic perspective unless some phases are defined and some themes are identified in advance inside which the power structure can be revealed. Furthermore one have to identifie the actors important within the power structure and their relations. Above has been identified the important actors - i.e. 32 It was assumed aforehand that there would be changes since the structure of the Danish political system has been changed during the period selected and those two conditions were connected in the basic assumptions 20

21 the political parties and their possible relations - i.e. their possible positions. By historical and empirical research five themes been have identified to structure the analysis of power relations dynamically: 1 Committee practice 33 2 Sectorizing 3 Technocracizing 4 Internationalization 5 Number of Bills and resolutions 34 The method chosen to perform the analysis on the concrete power structure - i.e. The Danish Parliament - works in two ways. First the themes and changes within them has been discussed in a development perspective, they have been analysed and discussed in a period from 1953 to The discussion has been symmetrically in the way that all themes has been dealt with in relation to the four phases of the decision process i.e. Agenda setting, Policy making / formulation, Decision making, Policy implementation. Second the lessons drawn from the historical analysis of the five themes lead to the phrasing of a series of questions based on the conclusions and assumptions concerning relationships between the actors. These questions then constituted a questionaire presented for a series of parliamentary politicians in qualitative interviews 35. In the following will be presented First: the design of the study of Danish politicians in parliament. Second: an illustration of the changes in the power structure of the Danish parliament. Third some of the most important findings connected with demonstration, discussion and analysis 33 In Denmark Committee practice in parliament has been strong and influential especially after a large reform in 1972 which lead to the present structure with standing committees on all important resorts. These committees - which include members of all parties in parliament - are able to control parliament decisions in all areas by asking questions and demanding minister meetings. Furthermore the committees play an important role in the policy making phase. 34 Among other things due to the standing committees and rising levels of bureaucratic support to the parliament up till 1995 there has been an increase in laws and resolutions proposed by parliament parties and members weakening the governemts ability to stress their preferred interests in the decision process in parliament. Furthermore is has become more common that parliament demands the government to formulate laws on issues the government members have not chosen themselves. 35 The respondents were treated more like witnesses and actors performing a role at the parliamentatary game than like neutral informants. 21

22 of the relevance and significance of the five selected themes are briefly summed up. The design of the study of Danish politicians in parliament A series of interviews were performed in spring/summer 1999 including 15 politicians. These were chosen on the basis of a row of criterias for representation. The ambition was to include a spread primarily in the following categories: 1. Belonging to parties in different positions - there was distinguished between smaller and larger parties, oppositions and government parties as well as central and pheriferery opposition parties. 2. Degree of experience in the work in parliament and government - there was distinguished between newly elected and re-elected, and between younger and older Belonging to political parties - all present political parties in the Folketing were represented. 4. Membership of different commitees in parliament. 5. Experience from different positions. Fifteen interviews were carried out on the ground of a identical questionaire. Every interview lasted between one and three hours. An illustration of the changes in the power structure of the Danish parliament. Model over magstrukturen på den parlamentariske arena CHOSEN THEMES Committee Sectorizing Technocra- Internatio- Bills and practice cizing nalization resolutions 36 The youngest interviewed were 28 years old. 22