Astana Talks: Paves the Way for a New Reference for Political Transition. Policy Studying Unit

Transcription

1 Astana Talks: Paves the Way for a New Reference for Political Transition Policy Studying Unit 01 Apr 2017

2

3 HARMOON CENTER FOR CONTEMPORARY STUDIES Harmoon Centre for Contemporary Studies is an independent, nonprofit, research, cultural and media institution. Its main focus is to conduct studies and researches about the Arab region, especially Syria. It also works towards cultural and media development, enhancing the civil society performance, and spreading democratic awareness and values of dialogue, as well as respect for human rights. The Centre also provides consultation and training services in political and media fields to all Syrians on the basis of Syrian national identity. To achieve its objectives, the Centre conducts its activities through five specialized units, (1) Policy Studies Unit, (2) Social Researches Unit, (3) Books Review Unit, (4) Translation and Arabization Unit, and (5) Legal Unit. A set of action programs are also adopted, such as the program for Political Consultations and Initiatives; Program for Services, Media Campaigns, and Public Opinion Making Program; Program for Dialogue Support and Civil and Cultural Development Program; Syria Future Program. The Centre may add new programs depending on the actual needs of Syria and the region. In implementing its programs, the Centre deploys multiple mechanisms, including lectures, workshops, seminars, conferences, training courses, as well as paper and electronic press.

4 Contents INTRODUCTION... 2 First: Conditions leading to Astana... 2 Second: Critical reading of the Astana statement... 4 Third: Features of the Russian road map... 5 Fourth: Available options after Astana... 8 Fifth: Risks after Astana Conclusion

5 INTRODUCTION Once the curtains went down on the Astana conference, it seemed that the chances of ending the Syrian slaughter, and opening the horizon towards a political transition process were instantly weak, with the regime and its Iranians allies tending to attempt achieving a decisive military victory, and follow-up on forced reconciliations and systemic displacements, threatening both Moscow s and Astana s declarations. Astana s meetings have come out with a triple statement, killing any talk about a "transitional phase" in Syria, and representing a new political reference for the launch of the Geneva 3 negotiations of next month, especially after Russia s talks about forming a unified delegation from the platforms of Riyadh, Moscow, Humaimam, Cairo and some military factions who participated in the Astana conference, to negotiate with the regime delegation in Geneva under the reference of Astana s statement, which reflected the military power balance in Syria after Aleppo. First: Conditions leading to Astana Although the sponsoring parties of the conference were discrete about its agenda, its desired goals, and the participants they had invited, it became clear that the conference aimed to achieve four key objectives: first, to install a cease-fire agreement in Syria, legally and politically guaranteed by the directly involved parties with the continued guarantee of Moscow and Turkey; and second is to devote individual reconciliation policies and truces with the opposition areas, and legitimize this policy, based on getting militants out of these areas, similar to what happened in Homs, Darya, Moadamieh, Aleppo, Wadi Barada and other areas; and third, to prepare to launch a new political negotiation path based on the Astana statement, where Moscow will represent the cornerstone, leading to implement its perception of a solution in Syria as a fait accompli, taking into consideration the Security Council resolutions 2336 and 2254, and their traits, including performing a political settlement between the parties to recognize each other and share a "national unity government" for a transitional period, investing in what it had achieved by direct military intervention, and rehabilitating the Assad regime with limited changes, enabling the opposition to participate 2

6 in power, which means a return to square one, and shattering the dream of a regime change, and putting off the issue of discussing Assad's survival or departure indeterminately; Fourth, completing a formula for joint cooperation between the three guarantors representing a political, security and military umbrella for the Astana stage, to create the main decisionmaking circle, which imposes a political situation that requires the full attention of the international community, and reshapes the map of strategic balance in the region. Unlike previous negotiations in Geneva and other cities, it is the first time in a negotiation that is sponsored by Turkey who supports the opposition factions, and Iran and Russia who support the Syrian regime, to have a majority of military delegations. That means that the main objective of the talks is to consolidate the ceasefire between the two parties, which is constantly violated by the regime forces and its allied militias in Aleppo, Daraa, Eastern Ghouta, Wadi Barada and other areas. Indeed, the head of the regime, in his remarks to a Japanese newspaper, said he is negotiating terrorists in Astana to persuade them to lay down their arms, which means he still insists on refusing to recognize the opposition. While the military factions have made some gains, including establishing themselves as a legitimate opposition force, recognized by Moscow, who had previously refused to recognize it and dealt with it as a rebel force and a terrorist threat. This reflects Moscow's desire to work for a political way out of the war, unlike its allies in Tehran and Damascus. It was clear that the Iranians wouldn t give up easily on their project, after having succeeded in penetrating the regime and invaded its institutions from within, in an effort to undermine any basis for the restoration of the Syrian society s unity, cohesion and continuity. Similarly, there is still a lot of officials in the Assad regime who still think they could manoeuvre and play games with Russia, as they did previously with all their allies, and the way they violated their obligations at the right moment, to buy time and regain the initiative to reclaim their position in a state they inherited by force and war. In the meantime, the Russian Foreign Minister, Sergey Lavrov, said on 20 January that Moscow considered the upcoming talks in Astana as "an important contribution in the development of a comprehensive standard for political settlement in Syria, which will 3

7 continue within a broader frame in Geneva early February, based on the decisions of the UN Security Council". But not to include the active regional and international parties involved the Syrian issue in the conference, weakened the conference environment, and made it appear as a show platform of which the organizers won t gain a lot, and additionally, the conference with its location and timing, would be nothing but a passing event in the context of an international regional crisis that required a lot of conditions to move towards a promising solution. Two indicators of prospective meagre outcomes emerged before the conference in 21 January: the first, signs of Iranian-Russian agenda differences appeared, translated into an unprecedented statement from the Kremlin, considering the Iranian position of the US participation in the talks contributed to the complexity of the scheduled meetings ; and second, that the United States decided to reduce the level of their participation in the conference, by declaring that the State Department would not send a delegation to participate in the talks, but would be represented through its ambassador in Kazakhstan, meaning their participation would be diplomatically frail. This international absence carried a clear message to the Russians, that it would not be allowed for the Astana conference to be an alternative reference to Geneva s. Second: Critical reading of the Astana statement It was interesting to see the terms included in the final statement, most notably the provisions on the military level as "all participating delegations reaffirmed their determination that everyone should fight against the organisations of " Daesh "and" Fateh Al-Sham", given that armed opposition groups should be separated from them; Politically, the closing statement "expressed the conviction of (Turkey, Russia, and Iran) that there was no military solution to the Syrian conflict, and that the conflict could only be resolved through a political process based on the implementation of Security Council resolution 2254 as a whole." The statement also reaffirmed the commitment to preserve the sovereignty of the Syrian Arab Republic, independence and unity, as a democratic, multi-ethnic, multi-religious, and nonsectarian state, as the Security Council affirmed in the United Nations previously. 4

8 However, the Astana statement lacked any reference to "the Geneva statement" issued in 2012, which provided for the establishment of a "transitional governing body with full executive authority between the government and the opposition, based on mutual acceptance." The Russian and Iranian sides also has succeeded in deleting the phrase "transitional process", and talked about a "political process" to carry out all of resolution 2254, which was issued at the end of 2015, and provided for the formation of "representative and non-sectarian rule to amend the constitution and hold elections." And another phrase form the statement was also deleted, which dealt with the resolution 2118, and provided in two paragraphs the "Statement of Geneva", pointing out that this statement was stated in the preamble of resolution Opposition requests to adopt the phrase "to prevent breaches of the" cease-fire were not met, but the phrases "reduce violations and reduce violence" in Syria were maintained, without reference to the "comprehensive cease-fire" as the factions was hoping, particularly with respect to Assad's forces and Hezbollah continuing their offensive on the Barada valley between Damascus and the borders of Lebanon, in addition to the sponsors of the Astana conference ignoring another demand about "stopping the systemic displacement" and "forced reconciliations." Third: Features of the Russian road map Successive Russian declarations and moves after the Astana conference suggested the existence of a plan by Moscow to invest the results of the conference to the maximum. The Russian "marketing" appeared in the statements of President Vladimir Putin in 25 January, confirming the importance of Astana Conference for the settlement of the Syrian issue, and being the basis for the Geneva negotiations scheduled for next February, as well as inviting personalities and forces related to the opposition to meet with the Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov, on 27 January, with a view to market the statement and adopt a reference to the Geneva negotiations under the auspices of the United Nations. Moscow has worked at the meeting to detach itself from the regime, and Iran, which is something that was pointed out by the chief opposition negotiator, Mohamed Alloush, and 5

9 others. This is not a sudden change in the position of Moscow, but only the normal completion of a course it had sketched long ago, probably with a tacit understanding with Washington, or at least a Russian attempt to provide a resolution vision and rules accepted by the Trump management. The Russian negotiator in Astana, Alexander Lavrentiev, revealed at a press conference after the end of the talks, what could be described as broad headlines to a new Russian road map, some of its clauses were included in the final statement, and it appeared that some of these items had actually started to take shape, considering the clashes between armed opposition factions represented in Astana, with the "Fateh Al-Sham" and allied factions, such as "Jund Al-Aqsa" in northern Syria, under the banner of "isolating Al-Nusra Front" to make the opposition zones free of such organisation, as a preliminary procedure for political and military developments. If this was really achieved, it could be a gateway for a political solution. Apart from that, lavrentiev announced that all "opposition" platforms will take part in the Geneva negotiations in February, and that the talks in Astana were not an alternative to the negotiations in Geneva, and that "everyone fully understands that Astana s process is a very good supplement to the framework of the Geneva". Thus, there is a clear political formula which is pushing Russia not to submit to the wishes of Assad completely, due to its responsibility as a major power in its eagerness not to be drawn into an exhausting long war, that could be very costly economically and politically at home and with the major powers, and above all, not to appear as an adverse enemy to the "Sunni Muslim world" without justification. In the outcome, Russia is asking the Syrian regime for four obligations to maintain the strength of their relationship: first, the Assad regime should acknowledge that the war is comprehensive, and the pursuit of military and security control on Syria is not possible, and that what is being controlled now is the best within the circumstances, and any effort towards another direction is a military risk, and a serious threat to regional peace. Second, the partial geographic control of Syria, should prompt the Syrian regime to accept that its political control on the country's future is necessarily partial. This acceptance is the essence to start a genuine political process, in which the opponents of Assad could participate in Syria s governance and management. The third of these obligations, according to the Russian strategy is to reduce 6

10 the security and military ties with Iran and militias belonging to them; and fourth is Russia s effort to make Bashar al-assad accept to limit his reign to Syria to six months or up to a year, that Moscow wants to convince its ally that being a governor for an indefinite period is not possible. Certainly, Moscow knows that this is not purely a detailed demand that could be negotiated in the future, but a creational essence for what could be achieved by the Russian strategy in its new endeavour, and that nothing would be achieved without this commitment, both with the Syrian opposition forces or with regional backers, or even with the major powers. It appears that, the Astana talks, for the Russians, is a psychological process, in order to break the barrier, this is why they insisted on the broad participation of the military leading the factions in the fight against the regime, and the process of putting such a large number of them in front of the regime delegation and the Iranian side, is like a new page in the Syrian issue, where the regime and its ally Iran, want to continue fighting to erase all those who raise arms against Iran's project to extend its hegemony over Syria. It is clear today that Russia is determined to walk in the path set by the map, and that any protest from any party will not affect the general course. So, all parties were loaded on the same train, and the driver was ordered to go on full speed, in order to prevent anyone from jumping off the train. Russia will re-shuffle the cards again, as Astana was a shift in form and content, Geneva is nominated to cause a powerful shock, with great repercussions at home and abroad. Thus, the Syrian issue, after nearly six years from the start, is about to enter a new phase, different than previously, which requires the opposition forces to re-read the regional and international scenes, and act accordingly, whether on the ground, or on the political path pushed by both Russia and Turkey from Astana, hoping to reach Geneva. 7

11 Fourth: Available options after Astana Astana talks could turn the military defeat in Aleppo, invested by the Syrian regime and its allies, into a political victory for the opposition, if the military opposition delegation dealt professionally towards all issues on the negotiating Turkish-Russian table, according to the political opposition s vision of a comprehensive political solution to rearrange priorities in the transitional phase, in a way that conforms to the objectives of the Syrian revolution, which requires research into the causes of Russia's turn to accept to negotiate with the armed factions, having previously made such an effort to classify these groups as "terrorist", refusing along with the regime and its made up opposition, to sit with in Geneva. It is no doubt that the recognition of these factions in Ankara s negotiations, and then in Astana, is an important change in the Russian position, compared to what it was in talks with the United States in Vienna, and the formation of "the international community to support Syria" and establishing a cease of hostilities in February last year. Turkey has also succeeded in introducing the Iranian militias file in Syria to the political solution program, even went to raise the issue of the demographic changes that Iran was seeking to establish as a fait accompli in northern Syria and Damascus, being an obstacle to any Russian-Turkish cooperation, and this is what led Russia to a confrontation with the Iranian ambitions in Syria, and to take practical measures in Aleppo after a period of turning a blind eye. From here, talks of vision conflicts between Russia and Iran increased, and began to take its place in the field this time, with a bid of increasing the rift between them. The political section in the final statement of the Astana talks adopted this basic requirement itself, which Washington and Moscow had agreed upon in the last two years, and it was adopted by several international resolutions, as this statement confirmed: "that the only possible solution to the Syrian conflict is through a political process based on the implementation of Security Council resolution No in full. " This decision determines a clear road map to achieve a political transition into a new pluralistic Syrian regime. The meetings of Astana coincided with the first public new US policy in the region, as the Russians would like the new American president to cover their proposed political solution based on the formation of a transitional military council, which enjoys the confidence of the 8

12 parties, and has the military powers to oversee the cease-fire, and the mobilization of forces to fight "Daesh ", and the exit of all Lebanese and Iraqi and Afghan militias, backed by Iran, from Syria. The United States plans to establish "safe areas" in Syria, is may be an indication of the US involvement, and the storming of the path charted by Moscow in the road map to the Syrian issue. And what the opposition hopes, in all its wings, that the two leaders, the American and Russian, will not be content only with the understanding to fight "Daesh," but that Washington joins the duo effort Turkish-Russian- to reach a satisfactory solution to lift the heavy hand of Iran from Damascus, and frustrate its strategy in the Levant, and also as an introduction to enrol other parties, such as the Gulf states, to draw the future of Syria. Unless this broad regional understanding takes place, the settlement will remain quite a dilemma and exactly like the impossible military takeover. It is difficult now to predict the position of the new US administration about the Syrian issue, Trump s signal to delay the lifting of sanctions imposed by his predecessor on Russia, and calling on the members of his team to consider the establishment of safe havens in Syria, do not indicate an ease of understanding between the Kremlin and the White House. The announcement by the Russian Foreign Minister, Sergey Lavrov, of postponing the international meeting on the Syrian issue of 8 February in Geneva to the end of the same month, came as a sign of hesitation in moving forward in the Russian project, after the bomb was dropped by the US president Donald Trump when he asserted that " we will certainly establish safe areas for the Syrians ", accompanied by a British completion, translated in London by not excluding sending peacekeepers to Syria, as if the Kremlin sensed a British- American return to the region in general, and especially to the Syrian issue. If that is the case, it will re-mix the Russian papers that they were happy about the European-American absent from the area, to appear as if a new US path is being established for the Syrian solution, in parallel, or perhaps integrated with Moscow s, and Astana s path. The United Nations amazement towards Moscow's throwing the responsibility to postpone the deadline, to show -to a great degree- the Russian confusion, and the understandable delay only in the context of awaiting a new US project in Syria, which raises a number of questions about the path that the US policy is going to take regarding the subject of the solution in Syria, whether a 9

13 supportive path of the Russian effort, or that the new administration is considering to play a more active role in the Syrian issue, in coordination with its European partners after the previous administration became a pure broker between the parties. The marginalization of the European role and that of the Gulf and the Arab world to highlight the role of Iran, and Russian s attempt to market Iran as a neutral party and a guarantor in the formulation of a solution, could prompt the United States to cooperate with those parties on an alternative to the Russian plan for a political solution, and to exercise pressure on the Russian side in order to reduce the Iranian role in the solution, ranging from a project to establish safe zones in Syria and walk in the direction of a political solution with more effective role of those countries. These data may have pushed Russia to postpone the Geneva negotiations, pending identification of the nature of US policy towards the region and conducting more talks with the new administration. Any opportunity for the return of safety for the Syrians is simultaneously an opportunity for the Syrian revolution to regain mobility for freedom and the establishment of the national state that preserve the rights of its citizens, individually and collectively, and end the predominance of the security and the army in politics and interference in the lives of citizens. Fifth: Risks after Astana Russia succeeded in imposing its approach to divide the opposition, especially in its focus on military factions, and adopting a prime party to the cease-fire agreement, and then turning it into a political negotiator, with whatever that means to bring about cracks in the body of the opposition, especially its accredited institutions (National Coalition of Revolution and the Opposition Forces, and the High Body for the negotiations). It must be mentioned here that the transformation of the tasks of military factions to political bargaining is loaded with dangerous implications, given that those factions are supposed to have nothing with the political affairs of negotiating, and that they have no relevant experience and competence of the path of negotiation, and the obstacles of Geneva 1 negotiations, and Geneva 2, and the circumstances of the misinterpretation of the UN resolutions, which means that there is an intention to destabilise the opposition organizations 10

14 and favour the military over the political; or it could indicate an international turn towards the installation of military opposition factions, and give priority to military conflict, which the regime had often sought to export to the public, to escape the benefits of a political solution, or the benefits of a revolution that broke out for political and human rights reasons in the first place. In addition to that, Astana s meeting tried to perform a solo dance outside the international community circle, through another parallel line, though it followed the initiative by mentioning the United Nations authority and international resolutions, reflecting the dissatisfaction of the European countries and the United States, as well as the United Nations envoy de Mistura, and their attempts to weaken the meeting, or thwarting it, especially as it took place in the early days of the new American president receiving the duties of his office, and he, and his team, had no chance to actually deal with the Syrian issue. It was clear that the delegates of the opposition and the regime has both failed in the convergence of views on the application mechanisms of the ceasefire and guarantees required by each party, prompting the three sponsoring parties to issue a final statement without the signature of the parties attending it. The head of the regime delegation, Bashar al- Jaafari, confirmed that the Astana negotiations "have succeeded in achieving the goal of installing a cessation of hostilities for a specified period, setting the stage for dialogue between Syrians", while the president of the opposition delegation, Mohammad Alloush, declared that the Syrian opposition "will go to Geneva only if the cease-fire was confirmed by the government and to ensure the monitoring mechanism". Al-Jaafari said, in response to a question about the situation in the Valley of Barada, that "all valley areas were liberated, where Al-Nusra Front existed." The head of the regime, Bashar al-assad said in an interview with Japanese TBS channel, of which some excerpts were published on 19 January: "so far, we believe that the conference will be in the form of talks between the government and terrorist groups in order to reach a cease-fire and to allow these groups to join the reconciliation process in Syria, which means giving up their weapons and receiving a pardon from the government. " If the regime, in responding to Moscow s urging, is trying to regain some credibility before the world, and to avoid the appearance of rejecting the settlement effort, in Astana, it kept 11

15 repeating the consumed the old mantra of "fighting terrorism" and the need to distinguish between organizations, and invoked the water problem in Damascus to continue the sectarian cleansing campaign, ongoing leaps and bounds by the hands of Hezbollah and other Iranian militias. Assad's regime still considers the military solution as the only way to end the conflict, in other words, getting its opponents gradually out off their strongholds, and preventing any real change. An opinion that is shared by Iran, which believes that the survival of the Syrian regime ensures the continuation of the Tehran regime itself. Another risk is that the Russians, following Astana, want to compose an entity of platforms, that are accepted by the regime, to participate in the Geneva talks, which are scheduled for 20 of this February. The Russian Foreign Minister, Sergey Lavrov s meetings with these platforms representatives, in the Russian capital, on 27 January, to confirm that the path that Russia is leading to reach an agreement in their own way to solve the Syrian issue, is still far from a happy ending. Neither Moscow s visitors succeeded in their mission, nor the Russian proposed Constitution to Syria had been accepted, nor the Geneva meeting, which was scheduled on the eighth of February was held accordingly, nor the cease-fire is as good as portrayed by the Russian media. Conclusion Despite the presence of many question marks around the fortunes of Astana talks in achieving comprehensive ceasefire, they reflect a disillusionment of the military solution, which stood over the past years, in the face of the crystallization of a political solution, to stop the Syrian fighting, and reduce the high price paid by the Syrians. The Astana conference represents a tough test for the understanding between Turkey and Russia, in their capacity as guarantors of the cease-fire, the extent of their ability to impose a commitment on the conflicting parties in the light of Iran's refusal, and the regime s unaccepting a political solution at all, and it will represent a test for the Iranian-Russian understandings on the Syrian issue. But the hardest test will be for the Russian ambitions to acquire US and Western acceptance to its achievements, to open a door to negotiate its tricky 12

16 files with them, but no sign of that yet, the West missed Astana, and the American presence was frail and as if just to avoid blame. Apart from the nature of the conference, and those invited to it, and its outcomes, it is difficult to build big hopes on it as a tactical station, some of the parties will use it, to improve the conditions of subsequent negotiation in Geneva s planned meetings. In the outcome, Astana conference represents a small and marginal station in the Syrian issue path, waiting for the new US administration transitional phase to end, which may last for a few months. Whether the Russians succeeded in their political rout, to reach a solution they are looking forward to, or did not succeed at all, this issue, most likely will remain intractable and sustains for a considerable period of time, which in light of available facts, we cannot forecast how long. The Russian solution, if it succeeds through an international consensus, and this is not unlikely, would not meet the minimum aspirations of the Syrians and the demands they expressed by the revolution, and Syria s face will not be any different from the face the Syrians knew and lived for decades, and then rebelled against, and the effects of the revolution will remain intact and continue in other forms, determined by the emerging facts that will occur, and possibly by other tools as well. In all cases, a solution that keeps Bashar al-assad guarded by Iran and Russia cannot be a permanent solution because it is unfair and irrational. After the death of half a million people, and disabling a million and a half, and the displacement of twelve million people, at home and abroad, and destruction of more than half of the Syria s structure, any regime that caused all of that cannot be part of the solution, apart from being a regime that is capable to rule in the future. 13

17

18 harmoon.org