Economic Pressures and Democratization in Mexico

Transcription

1 Economic Pressures and Democratization in Mexico Dale Story Professor, Political Science University of Texas at Arlington 2010 Annual Meeting of the Southwest Conference of Latin American Studies Santa Fe, New Mexico March 24-27, 2010

2 Economic Pressures and Democratization in Mexico On July 2, 2000, Vicente Fox Quesada was elected President of Mexico for the next six year term (sexenio). The obvious significance of this event was that Fox was the first president elected from an opposition party since Francisco I. Madero in Fox was the candidate of the National Action Party, which some have argued had links in its early years to the Madero movement (Von Sauer, 1974, pp. 15, 45-60). The irony of replicating Francisco Madero s election in the PAN s 2000 victory was further fore-shadowed by the Panista nominee in 1983, Pablo Emilio Madero, who was a nephew of Francisco. Furthermore, Fox was also the first candidate to defeat the Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI) since the inception of the hegemonic party (some 71 years earlier). Needless to say, this election was the most significant event in Mexican history since the Revolution of In the eyes of many, Mexico had made the shift from an authoritarian regime to a democratic government almost overnight. The human rights organization Freedom House classifies all countries as to whether or not they are electoral democracies. Mexico had always been classified as not being an electoral democracy until Freedom House promptly re-classified Mexico as an electoral democracy after the election of Fox as president. In this perspective, the 2000 election was a perfect storm that brought democracy finally to Mexico. Obviously, the history of Mexico s rebirth as a democracy is not as simple as the election of one president. A variety of issues deserve considerably more examination. First, the question of precursors to the 2000 election is critical. While the defeat of the PRI in the 2

3 presidential contest marked an enormous qualitative shift, other important events preceded the Fox victory and established critical precedents. Second, the multi-dimensionality of democracy must be recognized. At a minimum, issues of pluralism vs. corporatism could be just as salient as the evolution of political competitition. Finally, other correlates (both causes and effrects) of any shift toward democracy are critical to understanding and explaining the process of democratization. The purpose of this paper is to examine these three topics in light of a deeper understanding of both how extensive the shift toward democracy has been in Mexico and what have been the critical variables related to this phenomenon. I. Historical Precursors to the 2000 Election. Essentially, throughout the 20 th Century, Mexico could be variously described as a benign authoritarian regime, a hegemonic state, or a one-party political system. Plutarco Calles created as the National Revolutionary Party (PNR) in 1929 in an effort to consolidate and stabilize the central government. From its inception, the PNR was envisioned as a dominant institution almost an official, government party. In the words of Emilio Portes Gil, party President at that time (Rodriguez Araujo, 1983, pp ): The PNR is frankly a government party The Government has the program of the Revolution; the party has the program of the Revolution and of the Government The Party will be a sincere collaborator of the administration This is the mission of the PNR and for this I say that the PNR is a government party. The PNR was re-constituted as the Party of the Mexican Revolution (PRM) in 1938 by Lazaro Cardenas as it established its corporatist base in the interest group system. And in 1946, President Manuel Avila Camacho officially recognized the moderation and institutionalization 3

4 of the party by changing its name again to the Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI). Essentially, these three reincarnations are the same party. And for the sake of simplicity, this paper will simply refer to the party as the PRI. Beginning with the first presidential election under the new system in 1929 through the Fox ascendancy in 2000, the PRI won every presidency by significant (sometimes overwhelming) margins as well as the vast majority of federal, congressional seats and even state and local political posts. Table 1 summarizes the presidential vote by party since that first election in The PRI total vote averaged over 87 percent between 1929 and No formal opposition party even contested presidential elections prior to The non-pri votes in 1946 and 1952 were independent candidates whose movements did not last longer than those particular elections. Table 1 Presidential Vote, by Party Percentages PRI* PAN PRD** other * And its successors (National Revolutionary Party and the Party of the Mexican Revolution) 4

5 ** And its various successors on the left Source: Story, 1986, p. 52. The strategies for PRI hegemony have been numerous. One of the earliest approaches was the incorporation of the myth of the Revolution into the fabric of the PRI. While the claim of the PAN to linkages with Francisco Madero are noted above, the PRI was much more successful at associating its image with the Revolutionary and its heroes, including Madero, Villa, Zapata, Carranza, Obregon, and Calles. Every President up to 1946 had been a leading military figure in the Revolution. And the tradition of the PRI representing the Revolutionary Family continued for decades. The colors of the PRI were the colors of the Mexican flag. And the Party seized every opportunity to utilize other patriotic symbols of Mexican history. The effort clearly was to associate the PRI with la patria in the minds of the Mexican populace. The PRI was also organized as an inclusive party meant to coalesce all the major divisions in Mexican society. Most of the significant interest groups were officially represented in the Party structure (and thus also dominated by the Party elite). These sectors included organized labor (both urban and rural) and much of the middle-class (essentially teachers and government bureaucrats). Particularly through its control of the unions, the Party established a bureaucratic apparatus that permeated all facets of Mexican life. Even basic necessities, from employment to social security, could be tied to affiliation with and loyalty to the PRI. Essentially, this system has been the epitome of a party machine an organized and allinclusive apparatus that maintained electoral dominance by providing and monopolizing essentially services. Whereas other examples of party machines have been concentrated at 5

6 local levels and associated with specific ethnic politics with limited tenures, the PRI has been a national party apparatus that was able to persevere for over 70 years. The PRI has also utilized tactics to achieve a political balance in order to maintain and solidify its dominance. Centrist politics have been the objectives of the Party since its inception. A position in the middle of the ideological spectrum have enabled it to dominate the center while variously appealing to both the right-of-center and the left-of-center. Specifically, this political balance can be seen in (1) a pendulum effect between presidential sexenios, and (2) a more conservative domestic policy and a generally leftist foreign policy (Story, 1985; Story, 1986). Empirical analysis has demonstrated a predictable shift in policy across presidential terms (each president is limited to one, six-year term). That is, a president who has skewed their policies to the right will be followed by a president that will shift their priorities to the left. Thus, no one group is permanently relegated to an inferior position. The swings in policy are designed to mollify the different spectrums as they may have become disillusioned with the ideology of a previous president. This pendulum is generally swinging between favoritism toward either labor (and other populist sectors) and the entrepreneurial sector. One of the best examples is the transition from Gustavo Diaz Ordaz to Luis Echeverria in The administration of Diaz Ordaz is widely recognized as one of the most conservative in 20 th century Mexico particularly in the arena of political repression. Diaz Ordaz took action to stymie democratization trends within the PRI as well as to further weaken the opposition. And the most significant and tragic example of political repression under Diaz Ordaz was the instance of students protests in 1968 culminating in the so-called Tlatelolco Massacre. Clashes 6

7 between student protestors and the police had been escalating since The conflict escalated further in 1968 as Mexico neared the date of the Summer Olympics which it was hosting (the first Third World nation to host the games). On October 2, 1968, the antigovernment protestors called for another outdoor rally to be held at the Plaza of Three Cultures (or Tlatelolco) a well-known focal point in Mexico City and also the home of many lower-income citizens. Apparently reaching the conclusion that this protest movement on the eve of the Olympics (with international attention focused on Mexico), the government decided to strongly and violently repress the student movement. Army and police personnel entered the Plaza at sunset in tanks and other armed vehicles. The protestors were ordered to disperse. Tear gas was first used, but soon the armed forces (with helicopters and automatic weapons) fired into the crowds, killing hundreds of un-armed citizens. The hand-picked successor to Diaz Ordaz was Luis Echeverria, the Secretary of Gobernacion. Echeverria was a close associate of Diaz Ordaz, had a conservative reputation, and was seen by many as the architect of the October, 1968 massacre. However, Echeverria surprised many by moving sharply to the left as President and attempting to replicate the populist policies of Lazaro Cardenas. Specifically, his agenda stressed income redistribution, an enlarged economic role for the state, limits on foreign investment, and a hostile relationship with the private sector. This unexpected shift in ideological direction is one of the best examples of the pendulum effect. Wanting to restore both his own credibility as well as that of the regime, Echeverria changed positions after Tlatelolco in order to mollify precisely those segments that had led the protests. One significant example is the case of the well-known intellectual and writer, Carlos Fuentes. Fuentes was a vocal sympathizer of the student 7

8 protestors in 1968 and, as a result, was exiled to Paris. However, Echeverria appointed him ambassador to France in 1974, in an obvious effort to appease not only the criticism of Fuentes but the leftist, intellectual community. While there have been examples of populist economic policies in post-revolutionary Mexico (particularly during the presidencies of Cardenas and Echeverria), the predominant emphasis of fiscal and monetary policies has been to benefit the entrepreneurial class. Such conservative policies have been a reflection of the strength and autonomy of the business interest groups. On the other hand, Mexico s foreign policy has generally followed a path of sympathy to other revolutionary regimes and to left-leaning countries in general. Two examples have been relations with Cuba under Castro and Nicaragua during the period of their revolution. Mexico was alone in the Americas to defend the Cuba s right to self-determination in the aftermath of the 1959 Revolution. Notably, Mexico was the only country to vote against the 1964 OAS Resolution to break diplomatic relations with Castro s Cuba. And Mexico was also one of the strongest supporters of the Sandinistas and the goals of their revolution in Nicaragua. Finally, there is no questioning the fact that the hegemonic regime has utilized fraud and manipulation of the electoral system to its advantage. As aptly summarized by Daniel Levy and Gabriel Szekely (Levy and Szekely, 1983, p. 64): That many of the electoral results have been based on fraud, as is often charged, is almost uncontestable, although we may never know the specifics of each case. One of the most frequently cited examples is the historical control of the electoral apparatus by the PRI and the lag-time before election results are officially announced. The significant election of 1988 serves as an excellent illustration. Despite 8

9 considerable technological gains in terms of tabulating electoral results, the government delayed a week before releasing the final tallies of the presidential election. In the view of many, the regime was engaged in an internal debate about how to doctor the official numbers. Ironically, it is also seen by many that the reformers won as they prevailed in establishing a relatively low total of 50% for the PRI (versus the traditionalists who lobbied for a PRI outcome in the range of 60%). The legal structure of the electoral system has even been manipulated by the PRI to both sustain its dominance while also perpetuating its legitimacy. The result was the creation in 1977 of a unique hybrid of both a proportional representational system and a majority rule system in the election of the members of the Chamber of Deputies (the lower-house of the Mexican legislature). Prior to 1977, all deputies were elected by majority rule in singlemember districts. However, in the electoral reform of 1977 the size of the Chamber was increased to 400 by adding 100 proportional representation seats to 300 majority rule districts. And the 100 additional seats were reserved for the opposition (or minority) parties. Thus, the non-pri parties were guaranteed 25% representation. But, in reality, they were also limited to 25% representation, as the PRI would win over 95% of the 300 single-member districts. Obviously, the PRI was attempting to establish an aura of legitimacy and democracy in the context of a multi-party system. The 1988 Election and the Onset of Democratization. Contrary to the perfect storm perspective of the very rapid (if not revolutionary) onset of democracy in Mexico, the thesis in this paper is that the process of democratization had been evolving and percolating for well over a decade. The data for the electoral dominance of 9

10 the PRI throughout the bulk of the 20 th century is undeniable. But just as obvious is the gradual decline in the political successes of the dominant party, and conversely the rise of the opposition parties. A long-standing approach to documenting political competition has been the party fractionalization concept (Rae, 1971; Sartori, 2005). Essentially, this effort compares the margin of victory (or different percentages among all parties). The lower the margins, the more competitive the system. The higher the margins, the less competitive. I have created a simplified Party Competition Index which simply compares the percentage of the vote for the winning party to the percentage for the party in second-place. These results are summarized in Figure 1 beginning with the congressional election of This index utilizes presidential results in presidential election years, and the congressional election results in the off-years. With a few exceptions, the index declines continuously from 1961 until But the most significant drop occurs not with the election of 2000, but rather with the presidential election of The margin of victory for the PRI fell 30 percentage points between 1982 and 1988 (from just over 50% in 1982 to just under 20% in 1988). If a perfect storm election existed, it would have been the election of Carlos Salinas in 1988 not that of The PRI s dominance did temporarily rebound in the off-year elections of 1991, but the decline of the PRI resumed after that. Still, the biggest drop-off was in the tumultuous election of Even when the PRI lost in 2000, its total percent of the national vote was not terribly different from that of the congressional elections in 1997 (just over a 1% drop). It appears that the victory for the PAN came more from a decrease in support from the leftist PRD than from the PRI. 10

11 % Figure 1 Party Competition Index What happened in the 1988 election? For a few years prior to the 1988 electoral period, dissident elements within the PRI had been calling for an internal democratization of the Party essentially demanding a free and fair direct primary for selecting the presidential candidate. While the PRI s candidate had always been rubber-stamped by the national party congress, the actual selection was done unilaterally by the incumbent president in a very secretive process. The Party s elites, however, refused to alter their authoritarian practices; and, in protest, the left-wing of the Party (led by Porfirio Munoz Ledo and Cuauhtémoc Cárdenas) left the PRI to form their own opposition party. Ironically, Munoz Ledo would support the successful candidacy of the Panista Fox in Cardenas became the presidential candidate of the new party (actually a very unstructured coalition of smaller parties), initially labeled the National Democratic Front (FDN). The FDN evolved into the more organized Party of the Democratic Revolution (PRD) in With Cardenas as its candidate, other prominent leftist politicians and important organized 11

12 groups in support, and growing disillusionment with the PRI; the FDN performed remarkably well in the presidential contest. The greatest appeal for Cardenas was his name recognition. He was the son of the venerated President Lazaro Cardenas. And his first name was that of the admired Aztec leader, Cuauhtemoc, who fought valiantly against Cortes in the Spanish conquest of Mexico. As a member of the PRI, Cardenas had served as a senator from the state of Michoacan and also the governor of that same state. On the other hand, the PRI s candidate in 1988 was Carlos Salinas the classical technocrat and economist who had never even run for an elected office prior to His government service had come exclusively within the bureaucracy, essentially in Budgets and Planning. Officially, Salinas won the election with 50% of the vote, versus 31% for Cardenas, and some 17% for the Panista candidate Manuel Clouthier. There were widespread impressions that Cardenas had actually won, and that the election had been stolen by the PRI. Many of the suspicions were catalyzed by the proclaimed caida del sistema ( crash of the system ) in which the official results were delayed a week. In any case, the results and controversy served notice to Mexico that the PRI was truly vulnerable for the first time in its history. In many ways, the leftist split from the PRI was more significant in the evolution of electoral democracy than the PAN victory of In fact, the election of Fox was influenced more by a shift in votes from the PRD to the PAN. Joseph Klesner has demonstrated two additional factors that preceded the loss of the presidency by the PRI in 2000: greater competition at the local level and increased antiincumbency (essentially anti-pri) behavior by the electorate (Klesner, 2005). The increase in competition at the local level began in the early-1980s and escalated in the 1990s. Most of the enhanced competition was bi-party rather than multi-party (essentially either PRI-PAN or PRI- 12

13 PRD). Yet, the result was still a steady deterioration in the total electoral support for the PRI. And a host of surveys over several years have indicated a rise in the inclination of the voters to be more hostile toward the PRI and less ideological in their voting decisions. Finally, numerous electoral reforms after the 1988 presidential election aided in transforming even the majority-rule seats into open (more competitive) elections. Public financing of elections helped level the field of play among the parties. The regulatory agencies responsible for elections were given more both more authority and more independence. Even the long-ignored court system was provided more power to rule on civil cases involving alleged electoral violations. II. The Multi-Dimensionality of Democracy Political competitition is only one element in the conceptualization of democracy. This paper is not the appropriate venue for a complete discussion of the multi-dimensions of democracy. However, it is important to at least recognize and to attempt to operationalize other facets of this regime type: autonomy of interest groups (corporatism vs. pluralism), basic freedoms, and governability. Succinctly, a nation could have significant electoral competition but could be lacking in terms of a full range of human rights, a pluralistic system of free and voluntary interest groups, and an efficient, accountable, and honest government. Rather than attempt to document these characteristics across time in Mexico, this paper will utilize a variety of longitudinal measures to examine trends. Unfortunately, the availability of such measures over a long period of time is a problem. Some are very short-term (less than 10 year spans). Still, they should provide us with some sense of how much these other variables have changed. 13

14 The The Fitzgibbon Survey of Scholarly Images of Latin America is probably the oldest attempt to measure many of the non-electoral dimensions of democracy. Every 5 years since 1945, upwards of 200 scholars of Latin American politics have rated 20 Latin American countries on 15 indicators of such concepts as education, standard of living, self-determination, basic freedoms, accountability, and professionalism in government. Unfortunately, only the rankings and not the raw scores are currently available. Figure 2 shows the trend for Mexico. And the problem with utilizing rankings in a case study is obvious. The highest rankings for Mexico occurred in the 1970s. And no follower of Mexico would argue that this decade was a high-point for the protection of the rights of interest groups and individuals. The obvious explanation for this apparent anomaly is that the relatively benign authoritarianism of Mexico did rank higher than the many other very repressive military dictatorships in the region at that time. Still, these data do not suggest an immensely qualitative change with the 2000 election. Mexico did move from 8 th in 1995 to 6 th in 2000 and to 5 th in But an upswing of three places (out of 20 countries) is not a major shift. 10 Figure 2 Fitzgibbon Rank for Mexico Source: 14

15 The non-governmental organization (NGO) Freedom House has produced ratings for over 200 countries since 1972 for two distinct variables: Political Rights and Civil Liberties. To quote from their Methodological Notes ( Political rights enable people to participate freely in the political process, including the right to vote freely for distinct alternatives in legitimate elections, compete for public office, join political parties and organizations, and elect representatives who have a decisive impact on public policies and are accountable to the electorate. Civil liberties allow for the freedoms of expression and belief, associational and organizational rights, rule of law, and personal autonomy without interference from the state. According to Freedom House, the criteria are grounded in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. The ultimate scores are based on digitized conclusions from a panel of experts and analysts, who utilize considerable crosschecking and inter-coder reliability Figure 3 Freedom House Civil Liberties and Political Rights Ratings Civil Liberties Political Rights Source: 15

16 Figure 3 provides these scores for Mexico. The scale is an inverse one, with a score of 1 representing the highest degree of either political rights or civil liberties and a score of 7 representing the lowest degree. Obviously, Mexico s ratings have been oscillating between 3 and 4 for most of this period. Improvements in political rights began to show in 1997, and by 2002 both variables had been reduced to the level of 2. These numbers provide some additional justification for concluding that the democratization trend in Mexico since at least 1996 can be found in the arena of human rights as well as in electoral competition. A very contrary and current report comes from another NGO Reporters Without Borders, which not only documents changes in press freedom around the globe but is an action-oriented human rights organization. They also have produced an annual Press Freedom Index (at least since 2002) that measures freedom of the press on a scale from 0 (most freedom) to 100 (worst freedom again, an inverse scale). I have standardized the values for Mexico, which are shown in Figure 4. While, we do not have data prior to the victory of Fox (or even the first year or two of his sexenio), the trend is very negative especially between 2003 and If we assume this scale to be a ratio measure, we could conclude that the lack of freedom of the press in Mexico almost tripled during this period. Mexico s ranking in the world fell from 75 th in 2002 to 140 th by According to The National Commission for Human Rights, 46 journalists have been murdered in Mexico since 2000, and eight have disappeared since Though many of these killings and disappearances are related to the drug cartels, the government is faulted for seldom arresting or bringing to trial anyone for such crimes. 16

17 1.50 Figure 4 Press Freedom Score Mexico Standardized Value Source: One of the most robust and aggregate scales measuring basic human rights is the Voice and Accountability indicator from the ongoing World Bank project Worldwide Governance Indicators Project (for information on methodology, see and Specifically, this variable measures the extent to which country s citizens are able to participate in selecting their government, as well as freedom of expression, freedom of association, and a free media ( The standardized values for the available years (roughly 1996 to 2008) are shown in Figure 5. As with the Press Freedom Scores, this indicator actually provides some negative conclusions regarding the protection of 17

18 human rights during this democratic period of Mexico s recent history. While the data do suggest positive improvement from 1996 through 2004, there is also a precipitious decline over the next three years. The level of human rights as indicated here in 2008 is actually lower than the level at the time of the election of President Fox in Figure 5 Voice and Accountability Score Mexico Standardized Value The final dimension to be examined here is that of Governability. The abovementioned World Bank project on governance provides the very best indicators, including stability, effectiveness, regulatory quality, rule of law, and others (a total of 6 different variables). I have computed an average score of all six variables, and the results are graphed in Figure 6. Again there was some initial improvement, but this measure of governance has been declining steadily since

19 2.00 Figure 6 Average Governance Score Mexico Standardized Values III. Correlates of Democracy One of the longest-standing theories regarding regime change is the importance of socio-economic prerequisites for democratic development. Seymour Martin Lipset and Ralf Dahrendorf were among the initiators of the argument that economic development (modernization, industrialization, education, and general economic progress) were necessary for the establishment and institutionalization of democratic institutions (Lipset, 1959; Dahrendorf, 1967). Of course, those theories were challenged by the empirical reality of the military dictatorships (so-called bureaucratic-authoritarianism) arising amongst the most developed nations in Latin America in the 1960s and 1970s (O Donnell, 1988). The military coups in Brazil (1964), Argentina (1966), and Chile (1973) seemed a reversal of the trend of economic advancement producing democratic development. However, the revival of 19

20 democratic regimes in the region in recent decades has resurrected the validity of the socioeconomic prerequisites argument. This data analysis briefly examines this relationship in the context of a time-series analysis of Mexico. The United Nations has provided a detailed compilation of human development indices to produce a Human Development Index. I have utilized three of the most significant variables (Life Expectancy, Literacy, and GDP Growth) to reproduce this index here. The correlations between this Human Development Index and certain indicators of democratic outcomes are summarized in Table 2. Note that the Party Competition, Civil Liberties, and Political Rights variables are actually inverse indices, in that the lower values indicate higher levels of competition and human rights. So the negative relationships for Mexico involving these variables do substantiate the hypothesized relationship between economic progress and democratic development. Two of these relationships are significant at the.05 level. On the other hand, the two indicators from the World Bank (Voice and Accountability and Governance) do show a true negative relationship with the Human Development Indicator. As those socio-economic indicators have risen (even if slightly) in Mexico in recent years, those World Bank political measures of political development have declined. One reason could be the rise in violence related to the War on Drugs declared by President Calderon in recent years. Another important caveat is the small number of cases currently available for this analysis. Several of the variables have somewhat spotty coverage of the relevant years. Eliminating the missing values reduces the sample size significantly. 20

21 Table 2. Correlation Coefficients between Human Development and Democratic Outcomes Party Competition Index Civil Liberties -0.7 Political Rights Voice and Accountability Governance Human Development Index Correlations significant at the.05 level are in bold Party Competition is an "inverse" index (lower the value, greater the competition) Civil Liberties is an "inverse" index (lower the value, greater the liberty) Political Rights is an "inverse" index (lower the value, greater the liberty) Sources: Human Development Index, See above for others. IV. Democracy and Stability The previously-mentioned War on Drugs presently being waged in Mexico segues to our final topic: the relationship between democracy and stability (or instability). Particularly in Mexico, a compelling argument can be made that as the nation has become more democratic, more transparent, less corrupt, and more competitive politically, the level of civil stability has actually declined (Kurtzman, 2009). In the eyes of some, Mexico is even viewed as a possible failed state ( Phrases such as chaos and spinning out of control (especially along the border) are frequently heard. Those concerns were heightened recently by the murders of three individuals working for the U.S. Consulate in Juarez. The murders are alleged to have been committed by gang members working for the Juarez drug cartel. Also in Juarez, sixteen 21

22 Mexican youth were massacred in January, 2010 at a birthday party. It is estimated that 4,500 people have been killed in Juarez since January, 2008 in drug-related violence. Conversely, Jorge Castaneda (2010) has maintained that violence was not at a terribly high level before Calderon initiated his War on Drugs. The national murder rate in Mexico seems to validate this conclusion. UN statistics show that the Mexican murder rate per 100,000 inhabitants has dropped from 14.9 annually in 1998 to 10 in This figure is considerably lower than several other Latin American countries, such as El Salvador (58), Venezuela (48), and Colombia (37). One hypothesis is that the violence is concentrated in certain regions of Mexico (particularly along the border), while the national figures actually show improvement. Table 3 shows the correlations between three indicators of stability and three indicators of democracy. These findings would appear to corroborate the argument that as Mexico has become more transparent and open it has also become more unstable. However, the major caveat is whether Mexico is actually becoming more transparent. A perusal of the data would suggest that while the relation is positive (the variables move in the same direction), they have all been moving downward in the last decade or so. The negative values for the coefficients involving Party Competition are again due to the inverse nature of that variable. While those statistics are not significant, the negative value does indicate that more party competition has been somewhat equated with political stability. 22

23 Table 3. Correlation Coefficients Between Indicators of Stability and Democratic Outcomes Political Stability Rule of Law Control of Corruption Party Competition Index Voice and Accountability Governance Party Competition is an "inverse" index (lower the value, greater the competition) Correlations significant at the.05 level are in bold V. Conclusion Several tentative conclusions can be reached from this analysis. 1. The 2000 presidential election of President Fox did not represent a qualitative and revolutionary jump to democracy for Mexico. Rather it was the culmination of an evolutionary process that one can trace empirically and substantively several decades. 2. Other dimensions of democracy do not show as significant an improvement post as that of electoral competition. Specifically, freedom of the press, the Voice and Accountability indicator, and the index of Governance actually exhibit declines after the Fox election. 3. The relationships between (1) economic correlates and democracy and (2) stability and democracy are not clear. While political competition and some measures of human rights show a positive relationship with the development index, the 23

24 indicators of governance suggest the opposite. In terms of stability, both the political competition variable and the governance indicators demonstrate a positive relationship with measures of stability, rule of law, and political stability. However, Mexico appears to have been moving in a negative direction in terms of the governance and stability measures recently. 24

25 List of References Castaneda, Jorge G. What s Spanish for Quagmire? Foreign Policy. Jan./Feb., Dahrendorf, Ralf. Society and Democracy in Germany. New York: Doubleday, Klesner, Joseph L. Electoral Competition and the New Party System in Mexico. Latin American Politics and Society. 47, 2, (Summer, 2005): Kurtzman, Joel. Mexico s Instability is a Real Problem. Wall Street Journal. January 16, Levy, Daniel and Szekely, Gabriel. Mexico: Paradoxes of Stability and Change. Boulder, CO: Westview Press, Lipset, Seymour Martin. Some Social Requisites of Democracy: Economic Development and Political Legitimacy. American Political Science Review. 53, 1 (March, 1959): O Donnell, Guillermo. Bureaucratic Authoritarianism: Argentina, , In Comparative Perspective. Los Angeles: University of California Press, Rae, Douglas W. The Political Consequences of Electoral Laws. New Haven: Yale University Press, Rodriguez Araujo, Octavio. La Reforma Politica y los Partidos en Mexico. Mexico: Siglo Veintiuno Editores, Sartori, Giovanni. Parties and Party Systems: A Framework for Analysis. United Kingdom: ECPR Press,

26 Story, Dale. The Mexican Ruling Party: Stability and Authority. New York: Praeger, Story, Dale. Policy Cycles in Mexican Presidential Politics. Latin American Research Review. 20, 3 (1985): Von Sauer, Franz A. The Alienated Loyal Opposition: Mexico s Partido Accion Nacional. Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press,