ALLEGHENY COLLEGE POLITICAL SCIENCE 610 SENIOR PROJECT. Department of Political Science. Chad Shokrollahzadeh 4/07/10

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1 ALLEGHENY COLLEGE POLITICAL SCIENCE 610 SENIOR PROJECT Chad Shokrollahzadeh Comparing Revolutionary Theory: A Critical Analysis of John Foran s and Theda Skocpol s Theory of Revolution. Department of Political Science 4/07/10

2 Chad Shokrollahzadeh Comparing Revolutionary Theory: A Critical Analysis of John Foran s and Theda Skocpol s Theory of Revolution. Submitted to the Department of Political Science of Allegheny College in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Bachelor of Arts. I hereby recognize and pledge to fulfill my responsibilities as defined in the Honor Code and to maintain the integrity of both myself and the College community as a whole. (NAME PRINTED HERE) (HONOR CODE SIGNATURE)

3 Approved by: (1 st Reader s Name) (2 nd Reader s Name)

4 Acknowledgments I would like to thank my parents Mostafa (who really sparked my interest in politics) and Susan Shokrollahzadeh (who has always encouraged me to follow my dreams) for their moral, financial, and emotional support. Without them making it this far would not have been possible! I would also like to thank my advisor Professor Howard Tamashiro, for his patience, guidance, and assistance throughout the course of this project. Furthermore, I would like to thank all of the brothers of the Theta Chi Fraternity for their friendship, companionship, and support throughout these four years of college. Last but not least, I would like to thank God for all that he has granted me throughout my life and throughout college and for the promises that he has for my future. I dedicate this project to the courageous people of Iran, whose struggle for justice and freedom has yet to be completed and to oppressed people all over the world who still long to have a voice.

5 Table of Contents Introduction, Revolutions: The Evolution of a Concept.1 Chapter 1: Past Legacies and Current Developments of Revolutionary Theory 7 Chapter 2: Criteria For Evaluating Revolutionary Theory...46 Chapter 3: The Iranian Revolution and Establishment of the Islamic Republic..74 Chapter 4: Implications for Future Revolutionary Theorizing 109 Conclusion, Foran Plus: A Theory Revisited.133 Bibliography...141

6 Introduction- Revolutions: The Evolution of a Concept Revolutions have ushered in the age of modernity. From the French Revolution to the opposition to the era of global capitalism occurring in Mexico and throughout the global South, individuals have come together to oppose the existing political and social order. However, certain dynamics go into the making of a successful revolution, which in and of itself is a rare occurrence. The attempt to understand the dynamics that go into the revolutionary process has been the aim of scholars since at least the past one hundred years. During this time, there has been an evolution of thought from the historicist account of the early 20 th century to the structuralist analyses of the 1970 s to an eventual focus on how culture influence the trajectory of the revolutionary process. In short, the study of revolution is a continuously evolving field with different perspectives and biases all attempting to explain how and why individuals can overthrow a government, usually the most powerful entity in society and replace it with another. Inevitably the process by which revolutions occur is infinitely complex and involves understanding the causes state weakness, the means by which the masses are mobilized and how new power elites consolidate state power. This is no easy task. Indeed this is the essence of why the scholarship of the revolutionary process lends itself to continuous evolution. With each revolution, new questions are asked and new perspectives emerge as to how regimes are overthrow and new ones are established. This has led some scholars to resign themselves to the notion that it is impossible to understand how revolutions occur in general and that revolutionary transitions can only be understood from a case to case basis. 1

7 While it is true that revolutions have their own nuances, broad patterns do exist as to how regimes are overthrown and new ones established. Understanding the workings of these patterns and how they can be applied to various cases is at the heart of revolutionary theory. The relative explanatory power between different theories depends upon their ability to explain in broad terms how revolutions occur and what kinds of changes happen as a result of the revolutionary process. In other words, a successful revolutionary theory can be applied to various cases that have their own unique circumstances but that share similar patterns. For example, although the Chinese and Iranian Revolutions occurred in separate times and both had separate circumstances, they both shared broad patterns. Both revolutions occurred in exclusive, repressive regimes, both occurred in times of economic distress and international pressure. Finally, both involved the formation of multiclass coalitions that advocated the overthrow of the existing regime and its replacement with a new political and social order. However, both are different in that the Chinese Revolution involved large scale peasant revolts, an event that did not occur in Iran. Furthermore, the Chinese Revolution came as a result of careful planning and execution by a revolutionary mass-mobilizing party. The Iranian Revolution did not have clear leadership until the later stage of the revolution after the fall of the Shah s regime. However, one thing remains clear; both revolutions shared broad patterns behind the revolutionary mobilization of the masses and the overthrow of the regime even if the means by which this occurred appear strikingly different. Therefore, the ability of one theory over another to explain the revolutionary process makes it superior or inferior to another theory of revolutionary transition. 2

8 This is what makes the Iranian Revolution such a valuable case for comparison. The Iranian Revolution has often been called the last great social revolution and for good reason. The Iranian Revolution was the last political upheaval that resulted in drastic restructuring of the economic, political, and social structures of a country. For this reason, the Iranian Revolution plays a very important role for revolutionary scholarship. The ability of any given theory to explain the Iranian Revolution, along with the revolutions that have occurred in the past signifies that the theory has great explanatory power - not just for revolutions that have occurred in the past, but ones that could occur in the future. Since one theory can explain a wide array of revolutions that have occurred in the past, the ability of a theory to explain revolutions that could happen in the future should at least be considered. However, even if the theory itself does not account for all of the revolutions that may occur, it does provide a good starting point for the very reason that revolutionary theory is constantly evolving with ever-changing world circumstances. The theories studied in this project attempt to articulate the causes, processes, and outcomes of revolution with varying degrees of success. The first theory studied, Theda Skocpol 's States and Social Revolutions attempts to explain revolutions in terms of how inter and intra elite conflicts along with international military competition and peasant rebellions causes the overthrow of the regime. Therefore, she takes a structuralist approach that emphasizes how the relationship between different classes in society influences the economic, political and social system. As Skocpol (1979) puts it her structural analysis consists of the nexes of state/state, state/economy, and state/class relationships (Skocpol, 1979, p. 11). As these classes and entities come into conflict, the regimes in power face a dual threat of peasant rebellions and upper class resistance. As a result of this conflict, new leaders who previously consisted of marginal elites 3

9 emerge and change the political and social arrangements. Furthermore, She argues that states are part of an international system of competing states which means that governments have an obligation to build up their coercive apparatus in order to deal with real or imagined international threats. However, the attempt of states to build their armed forces creates conflicts with the landed elites because the extraction of resources that this requires is antithetical to their interests. At the same time, peasant rebellions spring up as a result of the instability that this conflict creates. The peasantry, which has long standing grievances with the present order finally, has the opportunity to rebel. In terms of outcomes, Skocpol argues that the principal outcome of revolutions is the increasing power of the state. This is a result of the revolutionary leadership's propensity to use state power to accomplish their ends. This power becomes institutionalized either through a mass mobilizing party state, as what happened in China and Russia or through the rise of charismatic leadership of Napoleon Bonaparte in France. In the second theory studied, John Foran argues that revolutions occur as a result of a personalist, exclusionary regime with a superpower patron facing an economic downturn as a result of this relationship of dependency. This allows for the excluded classes to form a multiclass coalition, mobilized by what he calls cultures of resistance. After the regime collapses, new power elites take control and begin a process of great social and political change. The scope of Foran's theory is much broader than Skocpol's and can be applied to many more cases, including Iran. For example, Skcopol stresses that peasant rebellions are a necessary precondition for the overthrow of the old regime. Foran does not deny the importance of these rebellions in some cases, such as Nicaragua. On the other hand, his theory does not articulate peasant rebellions as necessary. In Iran for example, the peasantry played little to no role in the overthrow of the Shah. 4

10 Furthermore, Foran notes that culture plays an important role in the mobilizing of the masses against the regime. In other words, cultural elements allow for the opposition to find common ground in their grievances against the regime. A culture of opposition, in other words emerges because of repressive and exclusive nature of the regime and the economic problems that these types of regimes tend to face. It seems as if Foran argues that people look to stories, myths, and their historical circumstances for inspiration. For example, the story of Sandino's resistance to foreign interference and repression by domestic political elites inspired the Sandinistas, a movement named after Sandino, to fight against the repression of the Somoza regime in Nicaragua during the late 1970's. This element of culture, largely ignored by Skocpol played an important role in the mobilization of the Iranian masses against the repressive regime of the Shah. Finally, the theory that best explains the Iranian case will be studied in light of the changes in world historical circumstances that have occurred since the last great social revolution. Does this theory take into account the changes that have occurred as a result of globalization? How will mobilization patterns change? What will be the aim of new revolutionary actors and what will be the result of these new aims? These questions will be examined in the final chapter of this project. The method used throughout the course of this project is a comparative analysis of the Foran and Skocpol theories of revolution using criteria for analysis outlined in the second chapter. Using these criteria, the explanatory power of the theories will be outlined in light of the Iranian case presented in the third chapter. The theory that best fits the Iranian case will also be examined in terms of its explanatory power of revolutions that may occur in the future. 5

11 Therefore, this project does not attempt to construct a new theory. Rather, this project consists of a comparative analysis of two distinct theories by means of a case study. The results of this analysis will determine the explanatory power of each individual theory. The aim of this project, therefore, is to examine how the theory of revolution should evolve. Should it take Skocpol's structural approach or Foran's emphasis on how structural weaknesses and exclusive regimes give individuals the opportunity to act against the regimes that oppress them? Structure refers to refers to the recurrent patterned arrangements which seem to influence or limit the choices and opportunities that individuals possess. From this perspective Foran and Skocpol seem to view structure differently. Skocpol appears to view structure as constraining while Foran seems to view structure as influencing the actions taken by individuals. In any case the perspectives of these two authors will be studied in light of the Iranian case in order to determine the trajectory that revolutionary theory should go. Should future scholars take Skocpol s focus on structural constraints or Foran s focus on how structural conditions are necessary but not sufficient for a revolution? This project will attempt to attempt to address this issue in terms of how they explain the 1979 Iranian Revolution and revolutions that may occur in the future. 6

12 Chapter 1- Past Legacies and Current Developments of Revolutionary Theorizing By definition a revolution consists of basic transformations of a society s state and class structures; and they are accompanied and in part carried through by class-based revolts from below (Skocpol, 1979, p. 4). In its various manifestations, the revolutionary struggle of the masses against their often oppressive rules has greatly shaken the halls of power from Paris to Tehran in a violent wave of social transformation. Although exceedingly rare, revolutions have their place in the modern political lexicon as events of hope, yet unfortunately fail to establish justice in the countries, empires, and nations that experience them. However, although the inherent good of the outcomes of any particular revolution are always up for debate, one truism still remains. Revolutions have and remain a source of curiosity for the academic community, so much so that an entire literature dedicated to explaining the causal patterns and the outcomes of revolutions has proliferated over the past century. This literature, often taken from such diverse fields as history, political science, sociology, and psychology attempts to explain how and why revolutions occur and the role that revolutionary elites and the masses play in constructing a post-revolutionary political, economic, and social order. Jack Goldstone, a student and analyst of revolutions himself, has described these developments as generations of revolutionary theory, each with its own emphasis on different causal patterns and modes of post-revolutionary institutionalization. According to Goldstone, the first, second, third, and the emerging fourth generation of revolutionary theory all share general attributes in terms of their intellectual scope and theoretical disposition. Furthermore, the development of each subsequent generation of revolutionary theory serves as an evaluation of the apparent shortcomings of the preceding generation of revolutionary theory. According to 7

13 Jack Goldstone an influential revolutionary theorist, these different generations of revolutionary theory fall within specific time frames starting around 1900 with the first generation until the fourth generation of the present. The first generation falling around 1900 and 1940 primarily consisted of thinkers such the psychologists Gustave LeBon and Charles Ellwood, and the sociologist Pitrim A. Sorokin as well as historian Crane Brinton, author of The Anatomy of Revolution. Although these theorists developed many notions and insights that still prove useful to those that study revolutions, their analyses presented many major flaws. According to Goldstone many of these theorists, including Brinton, attempted to provide an explanation of the various stages of the revolutionary process (Goldstone, 1980, p. 426). Others tried to simply describe the social and demographic changes that revolutions produced. In addition, the psychological analysis that some of the thinkers during this period provided appeared ad hoc and weakly specified (Goldstone, 1980, p. 426). These theories such as LeBon s mob psychology, Ellwood s breakdown of social habits and Sorokin s repression of basic instinctual needs lacked the broad explanatory power necessary for analyzing the complex political and social phenomenon of the modern revolution (Goldstone, 1980, p. 427). In essence, these theories attempted to describe how a revolution occurred in a particular place and time not why and when revolutionary situations occur. Therefore, as the 1940 s came to a close, a new set of thinkers attempted to formulate explicit theories of the revolutionary process, each coming from a different disciplinary perspective ranging from cognitive psychology, the structuralist-functionalist theory of sociology and the pluralist, interest group conflict theory of political science (Goldstone, 1980, p. 427). 8

14 The first class of these theories, the analysis based on cognitive psychology and frustration-aggression theory, appears in the work of Ted Gurr among others. The root of revolution to these theorists was a product of the state of mind of the masses. They believed that the masses, because their aspirations could not be realized through present political, social, and economic arrangements entered a cognitive state of frustration and aggression (Goldstone, 1980, p. 428). The sources of frustration varied from the long-term effects of modernization and urbanization, short-term economic strife, and the closure of political and economic opportunity to selected economic or ethnic groups (Goldstone, 1980, p. 428). In any case, each perspective agreed with the notion that the emergence of a revolutionary situation sprang from frustration with the current political-economic arraignments and that the primary task for revolutionary theory was to uncover why the masses reacted to these arrangements. The second camp that emerged during this time period was analyses based on sociological structural-functionalist theory. These theorists viewed societies as systems that depended on equilibrium between the system and its environment. Namely, in any given society at any given time the total flow of demands and resources between the system and its environment, and between the various subsystems-polity, economy, status, and culture (values)- that make up the social system must be in balance (Goldstone, 1980, p. 428). Thus, any disequilibrium or dysfunction in this balance leaves society unstable and prone to revolution. Changes in the subsystem such as shifting power relations of subsystem elites, and the growth of new ideologies and religions are cited as examples of instability in this literature (Goldstone, 428). Therefore, the study of what causes this unbalance became the defining factor for this school of thought during the 1960 s. 9

15 The third camp of the second generation consisted of analyses of revolutions based on political science theories such as the interest-group competition theory. Authors such as Samuel Huntington and Charles Tilly fall into this tradition (Goldstone, 1980, p. 428). These authors contend that political outcomes are the product of the conflict between competing interest groups (Goldstone, 1980, p. 429). The conflict between these groups becomes so intense before a revolution that normal political processes cannot resolve the conflict, leading to the collapse of the incumbent system entirely. Furthermore, these competing groups must possess the adequate resources- political, financial or otherwise to establish sovereignty over a political or military base that will allow them to achieve their goal through violence (Goldstone, 1980, p. 429). According to these authors, any given series of events can allow for these conditions to arise. Conditions such as war, economic modernization, and urbanization give rise to new interest groups and distributions of these resources between the various interest groups, thus leading to conflict (Goldstone, 1980, p. 429). The theories of the second generation, although varied in their approach and academic discipline all shared the same premise that revolution was a two-step process. First, a set of conditions or patterns must arise that differ from current patterns. Second, a critical variable of some sort (relative depravation, modernization etc.) must rise to a magnitude that will allow for a revolutionary situation to take place (Goldstone, 1980, p. 431). These two facets of second generation theory received much criticism during the mid-1970s. This criticism eventually led to the development of third generation theory with works by Skocpol, Eisenstadt, and others. The major criticisms of second generation will be given fuller attention when Skocpol s theory is introduced. 10

16 However novel these ideas appeared, many doubts concerning their analytical scope emerged in the decade or so after they were introduced. The criticism of third generation revolutionary theory came from scholars who doubted that structural vulnerabilities of regimes constituted the major reason why revolutionary struggle both appeared in certain countries and certain times, and why these regimes were powerless to prevent their own downfall. Furthermore, criticism began to emerge concerning these theories use of a limited number of test cases. In other words, the revolutionary process in France and Russia had a completely different character than in countries such as Nicaragua during the Cold War and post-colonial polities such as Angola during the 1970 s. Therefore, the conclusions of third generation scholars based on the study of a limited number of cases did not seem to apply to revolutions during the late 20 th century. Taking these short-comings into consideration fourth generation scholars began to reevaluate the direction that the study of revolutions had taken. What they discovered by studying newer cases from the 1970 s and 80 s shook the foundations of the intellectual tradition of studying the revolutionary process. For one, the notion that revolutions consisted primarily of inter and intra elite conflicts and agrarian upheaval became seriously doubted. Observation demonstrated to fourth generation scholars that revolutions did not emerge simply from elite struggles for power, structural weaknesses of incumbent regimes, or agrarian conflicts. Rather, Goldstone asserts that scholars claimed that most revolutions that took place in the 20 th century had taken on an urban character with multi-class coalitions as the driving force for revolutionary change (Goldstone, 2001, p. 141). 11

17 Since revolutions seemed to have taken a different character than they did in the past, the scholarship that studies revolutions also changed, in two major ways. First, some scholars tried to apply third generation precepts to more recent revolutions such as those that took place in Latin America during the 1970s and 1980s (Goldstone, 2001, p. 141). Some scholars on the other hand had taken a different approach. To them, the rule of culture, ideology, contingency, multiclass coalitions, and conscious action by the participants of revolution became areas of analysis (Goldstone, 2001, p. 141). No longer did the study of revolutions entail the study of how elites, peasants, and regimes interacted with each other. In its place, scholars began to study how cultural and ideological dispositions among the participants in the revolutionary struggle influenced the onset, course, and conclusion of that struggle. Furthermore, these scholars examined the different types of revolutions that had taken place during the 20 th century. Third generation theorists concentrated their focus on so-called great revolutions in which the overthrow of the regime was followed by changes in economic and social struggles (Goldstone, 2001, p. 143). The 20 th century witnesses revolutions of a different type such as political revolutions that consist of violent regime change, abortive revolutions that consist of a temporary victories by revolutionaries, and rebellions in which violent struggle is concentrated in a limited area (Goldstone, 2001, p.143). However different these revolutionary events may be they all feature similar characteristics and dynamics that make them possible, such as the presence of repressive regimes, a world systematic opening, and the formation multi-class coalitions. Concurrently, the fourth generation also changed its focus on the role that the international system played in fostering revolutionary change. Although third generation 12

18 theorists introduced the idea that international military and economic competition affected regime stability, fourth generation theorists expanded upon this by examining how ideological influences, international support of incumbent regimes and direct military and diplomatic intervention can influence popular perceptions of regime legitimacy (Goldstone, 2001, p. 145). The absence of legitimacy because of international influence has proven to be a powerful driver in popular mobilization against the regime in power. Fourth generation theorists also studied how formal and informal networks, organizations, and identities shape revolutionary mobilization. Therefore, these theorists contend that the mobilization of the masses does not necessarily occur only through the formation of organizations such as unions and parties. Rather, informal organizations like the family and community are crucial in building protest identities. These identities in turn are built through ideological and cultural frameworks that utilize symbols and beliefs endemic to any given society. These symbols, stories, and ideas undermine the current regime because they suggest a more just way of leadership than currently constitutes the norm (Goldstone, 2001, p. 155). The two theories examined throughout the course of this project exemplify some of the major dispositions, analytical frameworks, and at times biases of the different generations of revolutionary theory. The first, Theda Skocpol s States and Social Revolutions explores the relationship between the state, elites, and the peasantry and how a breakdown in these relationships led to revolutionary upheavel. The second, John Foran s Taking Power: On the Origins of Third World Revolutions studies how the formation of cultures of opposition allows for multi-class coalitions to emerge and overthrow the repressive, personalist regimes that have 13

19 dominated Third World politics. According to Foran, these regimes, either colonial or national all have similar characteristics and weaknesses that invite popular discontent against them. This discontent coupled with a tradition of protest and opposition, the culture of opposition eventually leads to demands for justice from the incumbent regime. Eventually, the regime collapses through the efforts of a multi-class coalition whose components have grievances against the regime. In the intellectual world of revolutionary theory, few works had the impact or as strong a reaction as States and Social Revolutions by Theda Skocpol. Skocpol s analysis, methods, and conclusions provided both rave reviews and a backlash of criticism. The main premises that Skocpol emphasizes, the autonomy of the state, how structural weaknesses which lead to state/ society conflicts and peasant insurrections seems to consist of a coalescence of the major trends that have taken place during the evolution of third generation revolutionary theory. Or as Goldstone (2001) states Skocpol effectively capped the third generation of revolutionary theory Furthermore, as stated, Skocpol s theory sparked much interest and criticism in the academic community. This interest and criticism sparked interest in the study of revolutions and led to further developments in revolutionary theory. Thus, Skocpol s theory is important not only because it provides fresh insights to the causal patterns and post-revolutionary consolidation of regimes, it also ushered in the beginning of a transition to a new era of scholarship, the fourth generation. Skocpol, admittedly a student of revolution, offers fresh insight to the causes, processes and outcomes of revolutions. According to Skocpol, other schools of thought such as the Marxist school do not have the same historical analysis that she presents in her work. Therefore, 14

20 Skocpol contends that revolutionary theory up until the late 1970 s when she published her work seemed woefully inadequate in explanatory power because they lacked a profound depth of historical scholarship (Skocpol, 1979, pg. 5). Therefore, Skocpol s method of comparative historical analysis seemed to her a more logical method of study because it would allow for different causal patters to be compared and contrasted within their respective historical circumstances. This in turn would allow for a better understanding of what caused revolutions within a varying array of complex contexts (Skocpol, 1979, p. 5). For instance, although the French and Chinese Revolutions occurred in very different places and times, both shared some similar causal patterns. Therefore, by studying these revolutions historically, one may arrive at a better sense of how revolutions occur and conclude in various places during various historical eras. In addition to her historical scholarship, Skocpol emphasizes the role of how the behavior of the pre-revolutionary state and its relations with societal elites and the peasantry shape the revolutionary process. Therefore, Skocpol (1979) contends that class analysis should be coupled with the ideas of political conflict theorists in order to fully understand why and exactly how these overt class conflicts developed during the Revolution [France, Russia, and China] (p.5). In essence, although Skocpol provides a fresh perspective on how revolutions should be analyzed she does not construct an entirely new theory. However, this fresh perspective remains significant because it calls out the inherent weaknesses of many of the previous theories that attempt to explain the causes, processes, and outcomes of revolutions. However, Skocpol breaks from the second generation in one important regard, her emphasis on the non-voluntarist structural analysis of the revolutionary struggle. According to 15

21 Skocpol, the theorists of the past (i.e. the second generation) emphasize the social displacement (Johnson) or relative depravation (Gurr) all emphasize how personal discontent leads individuals to collectively organize against the old regime through personal choice (Skocpol, 1979, p. 15). According to this premise, the masses organize through purposive movements of discontented and disoriented individuals realizing the Marxian notion of consciousness. Skocpol contends that these voluntarist analyses of revolutions do not take into account how structures such as international and intra-national political and economic institutions influence how individuals behave and interact (Skocpol, 1979, p. 17). Skocpol contends that revolutions are born and not made (Skocpol, 1979, p. 17). Therefore, unlike earlier scholars such as Johnson, Gurr, and the Marxists, Skocpol contends that the groups that oppose the old regime do not do so with the intention of overthrowing that regime at the outset. Rather, the emergence of ever intensifying political-military struggles within the state creates the necessary conditions for revolutionary mobilization (Skocpol, 1979, p. 17). Therefore, Skocpol contends that previous theories viewed societal order as based upon the consensus of the majority. She views this as completely flawed because of the lack of historical precedent, no matter what form social revolutions conceivably might take in the future the fact is that historically no successful social revolution has ever been made by a massmobilizing, avowedly revolutionary movement (Skocpol, 1979, p. 17). Thus revolutions come through conflicts result from differently situated and motivated groups have become participants in complex unfolding of multiple conflicts (Skocpol, 1979, p. 17). These conflicts, carefully limited and shaped by existing socioeconomic and international conditions act as the primers of the explosive and volatile mix of political, economic, and social energy unleashed by revolutionary violence. 16

22 Furthermore, Skocpol argues that revolution occurs in nations that are part of the international system of competing states. These states are in a constant struggle for influence and because of constant warfare had to continually modernize their armies and economies to ensure that one nation in particular dominated the international system. Furthermore, because of these international conflicts leaders from the French Revolution used patriotic appeals to the masses in order to mobilize the citizen masses (Skocpol, 1979, p. 21). Developments in the international system of states brought two distinct changes to the domestic order, the attempt by incumbent elites to administer industrialization from above and the harnessing of mass involvement by revolutionary regimes. Furthermore, states going through or potentially going through social revolutions do so within a particular context. For example, weaker states tend to undergo revolutions because international military, economic, and political competition have invariably undermined state control and existing state authorities in light of the state s own relative structural weaknesses (Skocpol, 1979, p. 23). Skocpol also contents that revolutions happen within the context of world time (Skocpol, 1979, p. 23). Revolutions do not happen within a historical vacuum. Developments such as the industrial revolution and Leninist organization all influence how a revolution takes place. For example, the Russian Revolution influenced how the Chinese Revolution took place because the development of Leninism as a mass mobilizing framework influenced how the Chinese revolutionary leadership organized the masses and consolidated the post revolutionary regime (Skocpol, 1979, p. 24). Therefore, not only does revolution occur within the context of an international competitive states system it also takes place within a system of intellectual and economic development which molds the trajectory of the revolutionary struggle within the international states system. 17

23 Furthermore, Skocpol s analysis of revolutions views the state as an autonomous entity in society. Previous analysts viewed the state as an arena in which struggles of a more socioeconomic nature take place. To these analysts, the political struggle during a revolution was merely incidental and that political struggle merely expressed larger and more fundamental structural strains in the regime (Skocpol, 1979, p. 25). This understanding follows in the footsteps of the liberal understanding of the state in which denotes state legitimacy as an embodiment of fundamentally consensually based legitimate authority (Skocpol, 1979, p. 25). When this authority loses its legitimacy through relative depravation, social dislocation, or by revolutionary ideology, the state will face a revolution. Skocpol argues that the state plays an autonomous role in society, that the state does not exist to serve the interest of any dominant class. Rather, the state, as a manifestation of coercion, exists for the sole purpose of serving its own interests and increasing its own power for its own purposes (Skocpol, 1979, p. 27). In essence the state extracts resources from society to build administrative and coercive institutions. While true that the state operates within a class-divided society and institutions which includes the participation of non-state actors in the policymaking arena the basis of the state s power is its own coercive apparatus (Skocpol, 1979, p. 29). This apparatus throughout its daily life can potentially come into conflict with the dominant classes of society even if these classes interests and the interests of the state are similar vis-à-vis more subordinate classes (Skocpol, 1979, p. 30). Beyond autonomy from national class interests, the state also exists in a particular geopolitical environment. This environment determines what actions a particular state can take in dealing with its domestic crises. International military conflict sets and changes the priorities 18

24 of states. For example, a state that undergoes intense military competition from the outside must take steps (building arsenals, armies etc) that potentially come into conflict with the interests of the dominant class (Skocpol, 1979, p. 31). State led economic growth in the face of fears of domination by other states also influences the policies pursued by these states (Skocpol, 1979, p. 31). The extraction of resources to accomplish fundamental economic reforms in light of international competition will at times hinder the interests of the dominant class (Skocpol, 1979, p. 31). These two examples employed by Skocpol demonstrate that legitimacy as such does not rely on the acquiescence of one group or another to the state s authority. Rather, legitimacy relies on the states coercive apparatus and cadres to remain cohesive and confident in the state to perform its duties (Skocpol, 1979, p. 32). The resources needed to build and maintain this apparatus and the distribution of these resources play a fundamental role in intra-elite conflicts which can create political contradictions leading to regime instability and disintegration. The state, in essence is Janus faced with an intrinsically dual anchorage in class-divided socioeconomic structures and an international system of states (Skocpol, 1979, p. 32). To Skocpol, understanding the relationship between these two and the conflicts that states face within this context prove instrumental in understanding their weaknesses and likelihood of collapse when faced with challenges from these two spheres. In order to methodically understand how all of these elements come together in a variety of contexts, Skocpol utilizes what she calls the comparative historical method of analysis. She claims that this method departs from first generation theorists who provide broad generalizations of revolutions and later theorists who utilize a multitude of cases and subsume them within much 19

25 broader categories (Skocpol, 1979, p. 33). For example, historical analysis of the second generation included structure-functionalist social system categories of Johnson and categories such as political violence utilized by Gurr (Skocpol, 1979, p. 34). However, these theories that attempt to avoid overly historicized descriptions tend to only emphasize one or two aspects that go into the revolutionary process. For example, Gurr maintains that relative depravation is the main cause for discontent in any given society and eventual revolution. Isn t this true for any given society? This means that while relative depravation does favor other factors over others it only points out one factor that exists in any given society in the pre-revolutionary struggle (Skocpol, 1979, p. 34). Furthermore, this method does not require large amounts of statistical data and cases. Rather, comparative historical analysis compares the national and international trajectories of countries undergoing social revolution at different times and explains the causal patterns of revolutions in light of the analysis of the comparison. In order to effectively use this method, Skocpol compares the factors that made revolution successful in a variety of contexts (Skocpol, 1979, p. 37). In doing this Skocpol points out that the causal patterns of revolution can be understood by comparing what does and does not allow for a successful social revolution. Skocpol has reservations concerning this method of analysis however. First, strategic guesses have to be made to understand how the various factors operate within each of the cases. This means that some contextual features of the historical cases that interact with the causes being explicitly examined in ways the comparative historical analysis either does not reveal, or must simply assume to be irrelevant (Skocpol, 1979, p. 39). Second, this method of analysis assumes each factor as independent of the other (Skocpol, 1979, p. 39). However, Skocpol gets 20

26 around this by pointing out how the various factors can overlap and influence each other especially in the international context. For example, intellectual developments in Russia, in regards to how the Russian experience led to communist party organization through the Comintern that help the Chinese Communists in their revolutionary struggle (Skocpol, 1979, p. 39). Related to her methodology are her choices of cases to study. Skocpol chooses to study specifically China, Russia, and France because these three countries shared very specific characteristics during the time in which all three underwent social revolution. First, the state structures had existed for long periods of time and had not been altered by colonial arrangements (Skocpol, 1979, p. 40). Second, each of these three nations experienced complete revolutionary transformation in a long enough period of time in the past to consider that transformation complete (Skocpol, 1979, p. 40). In addition, despite the differences that these countries faced prior to revolution all shared other and perhaps more important features. Primarily each of these countries was a proto-bureaucratic autocracy suddenly faced with competition from more developed countries (Skocpol, 1979, p. 41). This led to the incapacitation of the central state machinery of the old regime, widespread peasant rebellions and attempts by mass-mobilizing political leaderships to consolidate revolutionary state power (Skocpol, 1979, p. 41). For the sake of brevity only Skocpol s analysis of China will be introduced in great detail, however passing references to Russian and France will be employed to demonstrate how she employs the historical-comparative analysis to substantiate her claims. China faced different circumstances than either Russia or France. Unlike the French or Russian nobility the Chinese gentry wielded considerably more power in the peasant community. Not only did the gentry 21

27 collect money from land rents but also through the collection of taxes and interest rates on loans. The gentry in China also had a preponderant organizational position within peasant communities (Skocpol, 1979, p. 148). Peasants did not live in independent villages, but rather in clusters of villages centered on a marketing community (Skocpol, 1979, p. 149). Since the gentry essentially ran the social life of the marketing community they were effectively able to co-opt the peasantry and take a more decisive role in their daily lives (Skocpol, 1979, p. 149). Furthermore, peasants in China did not live on communal lands, but rather on individual plots ran by individual families. This kept each individual peasant family in competition for more land and resources thereby decreasing peasant solidarity. When resistance did emerge, the gentry were usually the leaders of the rebellions against Imperial authority. Furthermore, orthodox Confucian elements would often hijack the leadership of peasant movements and change the goals and direction of these movements (Skocpol, 1979, p. 151). Therefore, the lack of peasant autonomy made the chances peasant revolt extremely slim in Imperial China. This did not mean the Chinese gentry were invulnerable to peasant uprisings. The peasants, the majority of which were small land holders stood to gain if the gentry were pushed aside (Skocpol, 1979, p. 151). Additionally, the state that had ensured the gentry s survival came into increasing conflict with the gentry. When the Imperial system did collapse in 1911, the gentry became more vulnerable to outside forces that wanted to undermine their authority (Skocpol, 1979, p. 152). The rise of social banditry during this period of disorder sowed the seeds of future conflict because it demonstrated the development of nascent class struggle. The Chinese Communist party provided cohesion and direction to these outcasts under the aegis of a revolutionary movement (Skocpol, 1979, p. 153). 22

28 In terms of outcomes, Skocpol emphasizes the role that political changes brought by the revolution in all three cases have on the socioeconomic changes wrought by the new regime, the structure and function of particular states, and how these changes can influence the social order. In order to accomplish this Skocpol emphasizes the role the revolutionary leadership plays in the development of the state. The leaders of these revolutions, being marginal elites who in one way or another were involved with the administration of the old regime, understood the value of the state in creating a stronger and more robust polity nationally and internationally (Skocpol, 1979, p. 170). Therefore, these groups more than any other, felt that changes in the state were necessary to make this possible (Skocpol, 1979, p. 170). She also sees ideology as important, although not in the sense that ideology serves as a blueprint for action. Instead, Skcopol (1979) sees ideology as a force that allows for revolutionary leaders to build and hold state power by encouraging people from diverse backgrounds to work together for change (p. 170). Also, ideologies help leaders to encourage the masses to engage in politico-military struggles against the regime. Finally, the totalitarian outlook of revolutionary ideology helps justify the actions of revolutionary leaders to use state power to achieve their ultimate political ends. Constrained by structural conditions, international restraints, and legacies of the old regime revolutionary ideologies create states far different than ideologically envisioned (Skocpol, 1979, p. 170). Unlike Russia and France, the destruction of the Imperial system did not lead to the emergence of revolutionary elites that mobilized the masses to build new state machinery. Instead, the warlords that helped bring down the Chin g dynasty competed with each other on a regional basis for more resources (Skocpol, 1979, p. 238). Skocpol (1979) asserts that not only 23

29 did this drive the peasantry from their land but also increased the opportunism and repressive nature of some segments of the local gentry against the peasantry (p. 241). Although the gentry faced new pressures related to the breakdown of the Imperial authorities, once the gentry aligned with the warlords their power increased (Skocpol, 1979, p. 240). However, this system allowed for the maneuvering of potential revolutionary elements because of the disorganizing effects of the collapse of Imperial power, namely, the difficulty of communication between local elites, between local elites and the national government, and the decrease of Confucian-educated elements which increased the power of the local dominant class (Skocpol, 1979, p. 241). These three conditions in concert both increased the potential of revolutionary action because the increased exploitation of the peasantry coupled with the increasing isolation of the gentry created more opportunities for revolutionary action. The struggle against the warlords finally came in 1926 when the nationalist Kuomintang (KMT) and the Communist Party with Soviet insistence joined forces and formed the National Revolutionary Army (Skocpol, 1979, p. 243). This army financed and trained with Soviet support had more financial resources and ideological legitimacy than the warlords (Skocpol, 1979, p. 243). Therefore, Chiang Kai-shek leader of the KMT was able to defeat the warlords that controlled the northern portion of the country thereby nominally reuniting China under a nationalist government (Skocpol, 1979, p. 241). The KMT ultimately failed to effectively unite the country and centralize political authority because it lacked the industrial and political resources to do so. More specifically, because the KMT based its power on urban support and commercial activity, the KMT could not and would not take a foothold in the countryside where socioeconomic conditions remained the 24

30 same as they did before the nationalist takeover (Skocpol, 1979, p. 247). Furthermore, Chiang Kai Shek s authority solely based upon arms and subsidies to local leaders did not have effective administration of large areas of the country (Skocpol, 1979, p. 248). In other words, Nanking s authority was primarily based upon the old warlord style of governance of reliance on local armed elites, albeit on a national scale. The KMT became considerably weakened because of the military encroachments from Japan and the inability of the regime to collect revenues and effectively administer a central government (Skocpol, 1979, p. 250). This, coupled with the KMT s retreat from the coastal areas further decreased the financial resources of the Nationalist government creating political and economic stagnation (Skocpol, 1979, p. 250). Furthermore, the regimes military base consisted of a loose collection of armies backed by Chiang s personal resources that because of a lack of central administration could not effectively fight against a foreign invasion or against the better organized guerrilla force of the Chinese Communist Party (Skocpol, 1979, p. 251). On the other hand the communists, by reaching out to peasant communities in areas under little control by the KMT or the warlords, were able to slowly build a revolutionary army consisting of peasants under the direction of party commissars (Skocpol, 1979, p. 253). This would take time since the communist party had limited contact with the settled peasantry. However, the tactic of communist banditry in which small groups of communist led bandits infiltrated peasant communities eventually led to increased contact and mobilization of the peasant base, eventually leading to the establishment of the Kiangsi Soviet in 1931 (Skocpol, 1979, p. 255). Although the KMT successfully defeated the soviet by 1935, the communists strengthened their presence in the northwest (Skocpol, 1979, p. 255). 25