Concurrence of Rights and Changes in the Hierarchy of the Rights to property The Case of the Public Lands of Spain

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1 XIV INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC HISTORY CONGRESS SESSION 21 Property Rights, Land Markets and Economic Growth in Europe (13th-19th Centuries) Concurrence of Rights and Changes in the Hierarchy of the Rights to property The Case of the Public Lands of Spain Iñaki Iriarte-Goñi (Universidad de Zaragoza) José Miguel Lana (Universidad Pública de Navarra) Frequently in Western Europe, the expansion of a capitalist system over an agricultural sector is accounted for by, among other factors, changes in property rights. Such changes culminate in the triumph of a free, individual and exclusive ownership of land. The evolution of these kinds of property rights has been apparent since at least the nineteenth century, but the question arises: was this the only possible course this process could have taken? Many empirical investigations have shown that, in some cases, the capitalist system can coexist with hybrid kinds of property that do not fit the liberal paradigm. This gives rise to further questions: are those kinds of property rights a rarity in capitalist development? Are property rights imperfectly defined? Are the areas where concurrence of rights exists condemned to underdevelopment? Our point is that changes in property rights do not follow a predestined trajectory that allows for no variation. We propose that there is a range of social, economic and environmental factors, which can operate in different directions. In order to make some progress on this subject, this paper looks at the case of the public lands in Spain from the middle of the nineteenth century to 1936, studying the evolution of the property rights established over them, and trying to explain different outcomes by region. In Spain, the concept of public lands arose in the middle of the nineteenth century to designate lands of different origin (church, lordship or common lands) affected by the so-called Liberal Agrarian Reform, which henceforth would be administered by village councils and/or by the State. Beginning in the 1850s, the State initiated a programme of public lands - following what can be considered an orthodox methodology - approving a body of law that stimulated the sale of public lands (acts reducing transaction costs for the buyer). But not all public lands were sold. Many of them remained public and the important factor, for us, is that all those public lands continue within a property system based on the concurrence of public (State/council), commons (community) and private (individuals) rights of use. Nevertheless, concurrence of rights did not necessarily mean unalterable rights; far from it changes in the economic and social conditions of those areas (or of the whole country) promoted changes in the status of the property rights, enhancing some and restricting others. In other words, the hierarchy of property rights was subject to change in order to adapt the use of public lands to new circumstances. 1

2 In this framework, we think that the concepts concurrence of rights and changes in the hierarchy of the rights could be useful for historical analysis of changes in property rights, and perhaps not only in the Spanish case. The tables and graph following show the evolution of some importants items related to property rights on public lands. Table 1 collects information about the area of public lands, by region, in 1859 and 1926, so it`s a clear measure of the degree of privatisation. Also included, as a percentage, is the expansion of crop-land which, in some regions, was directly related to the privatisation process. The most important conclusion could be that, although laws regulating sales were the same in all regions, results were very different, depending on environmental, economic and social factors. Generally speaking, privatisation rises in those areas with environmental features suitable for enlargement of the crop-land, in those areas with the appropriate market stimulus, and in those where distribution of wealth was more unequal. In any case, concurrence of rights could extend to some kinds of sales when they affected only a single use of the land (for example, grazing or crop production) but not to others, or when several members of a community bought the land and retained the right of collective use of it. Table 1 Evolutión of the area of public lands and crop-land Public Lands Public Lands % area privatised Extension of crop land (% a) (% a) (% b) (% c) Cornisa Cantábrica 27,2 22,6 16,8-10,5 Valle del Ebro 46,2 20,6 55,4 42,6 Pirineos 19,8 15,8 20,4 23,7 Sistema ibérico 21,1 13,4 36,2 55,8 Mediterráneo 22,3 12,6 43,4 55,0 Andalucía oriental 21,0 12,7 39,3 43,9 Andalucía occidental 13,2 4,2 68,1 16,7 Meseta norte 21,2 16,3 23,1 16,2 Meseta sur 22,8 5,7 74,9 100,2 Total Spain 23,1 13,0 43,8 42,2 % a: montes públicos sobre total superficie censada; % b: superficie de montes privatizada sobre total montes públicos en 1859; % c: incremento (o decremento) porcentual de la superficie cultivada entre 1859 y Fuente: GEHR 1994 Tables two and three focus on lands that remained public, trying to discover in which ways changes in the hierarchy of rights evolved. To do so, Table two shows the effects of the harvesting control initiated by the State over public lands from

3 Table 2 Evolutión of the production of lands under harvesting control Commercial Commercial Community Community (% 1) (% 1) (% 2) (% 3) Cornisa Cantábrica 11,2 8,6 88,8 91,4 Valle del Ebro 15,4 21,9 84,6 78,1 Pirineos 23,8 21,0 76,2 79,0 Sistema ibérico 28,0 37,4 72,0 62,6 Mediterráneo 38,1 77,3 61,9 22,7 Andalucía oriental 13,3 68,6 86,7 31,4 Andalucía occidental 49,4 61,7 50,6 38,3 Meseta norte 22,1 21,3 77,9 78,7 Meseta sur 66,0 45,8 34,0 54,2 Total Spain 32,1 35,1 67,9 64,9 Fuente: Estadísticas de la producción de los montes públicos Harvesting control was an attempt by the State to administer public lands by imposing taxes, reducing community rights and promoting commercial use by public auctions in which the highest bidder would acquire temporary (normally for one year) exploitation rights to the single use of public lands (pasture, timber, charcoal). Again, results varied by region, which tell us that changes in hierarchy depended on different forms of social and economic organization. Table three analyzes some effects of the forest management plans introduced by the State from the beginning of the twentieth century over some public lands. The main difference between harvesting control and forest management plans was that, in the latter, individuals or, more frequently, firms, acquired rights of exploitation over the whole use of a forest for a long period (normally twenty years, with the possibility of renewal). So, it seems to be a step forward in terms of changes in the hierarchy of rights. Table three shows how these changes in hierarchy affected especially some regions, where the privatisation process or the effects of harvesting control have been low; how these changes favoured the extraction of products linked to industrial and urban activities (wood, resin and cork), to the detriment of activities linked to local economies; and how these changes were adjusted to the environmental conditions of the forest in the different regions. The productive success of these new rules is shown in chart one. Table 3 Area and production of the public lands under the forest management plan (1928) Surface area wood resin cork remainder %1 %2 %2 %2 %2 Cornisa Cantábrica 1,0 80,1 19,9 Valle del Ebro 8,0 63,0 4,7 32,3 Pirineos 11,1 66,6 33,4 Sistema ibérico 15,9 67,3 18,2 14,5 Mediterráneo 1,8 99,0 1,0 Andalucía oriental 8,4 69,2 30,8 Andalucía occidental 16,9 25,8 22,1 52,1 Meseta norte 32,9 27,8 62,8 9,4 Meseta sur 4,0 41,1 31,2 27,7 Total Spain ,7 41,8 2,6 17,9 3

4 Chart 1: Area and production in state lands under forest management Plans s %superficie %producción Concluding remarks The Staple Theory of Property Rights is fundamentally correct: historical changes in markets (demand, prices, etc) caused changes in property rights. Thus, the case of public lands in Spain shows that those changes did not always have to evolve in the same direction, ending in a free, individual and exclusive ownership. The orthodox way to transform property rights (privatisation) was prevalent in Spain, but the spread of privatisation depended not only on political issues (laws promoting and regulating sales) but also on environmental factors and different economic and social forms of organization. Even more, in some cases new rights stablished over sold lands could continue to possess concurrence of rights. Concurrence of rights applies, above all, to all those lands that remained public. Taking into account that this kind of property survived to a greater or lesser extent in all regions, and that in some regions it comprised more than one fifth of the total area, it is inappropriate to speak of those cases as rare exceptions. Furthermore, it is difficult to speak about ill-defined property rights. After all, property rights are social agreements and, within some limits, every society makes different arrangements. So, in this case, the important thing for historians is not to talk about property rights as being well- or ill-defined, but to attempt to explain how concurrence of rights works, and what were its results. In previous pages, we have shown how concurrence did not necessarily mean unalterable rights over time. Changes in the hierarchy of rights could have a major role in adapting the uses of public lands to new economic contexts. In fact, it would be quite 4

5 wrong to say that those areas where concurrence of rights attained a higher level became underdeveloped; and it would be equally wrong to say that higher levels of privatisation led to higher levels of development. The next phase in our investigation will be to try to understand, in greater detail, exactly how concurrence of rights and changes in the hierarchy of rights worked, what were the social, economic and environmental conflicts that manifested themselves as a result and, finally, to determine how these conflicts were resolved. 5