When Autocracies play Democracy Clan (and) Politics in the Philippines

Transcription

1 When Autocracies play Democracy Clan (and) Politics in the Philippines Paper prepared for the 6 th ECPR General Conference at the University of Iceland; August Section 84: Democracy, History, Universality: Beyond the Decline of the West Panel 226: The Future of (Liberal) Democracy: An Asian Perspective Presenter and Author: Hannah Neumann (FU Berlin) Contact: Hannah.neumann@gmail.com Abstract: Democracy seems to be lively and stable in the Philippines, if compared to its neighbors. National elections take place every five years, the changes in presidency were peaceful, there have only been few cases of election fraud and election related violence, press laws are liberal as is the constitution and many women are to be found in powerful positions. Compared to Burma, Thailand, Indonesia, Cambodia or Vietnam, the country has become one of the role models within ASEAN. But digging beyond the surface and looking at daily social practices, this democracy can easily be deconstructed as an agglomerate of autocracies interacting within (and sometimes beyond) a democratic constitution. The century-old concept of the clan as immediate political unit has survived Colonialism, Democratisation, Martial Law, Peoples Power and revolutionary movements. It translated to nowadays politics, law making, economy and security structures. Across all political parties, within all religious groupings and on all islands, the clan provides the central element of social categorisation and organisation. What looks like a democracy to the outside, are numerous elaborate bargaining processes and shifting alliances between local clans and their representatives on national level. 1 Working Paper, please do not cite without contacting the author

2 When Autocracies play Democracy Clan (and) Politics in the Philippines Sure enough, we now have free elections, free speech, free assembly. But these are the empty shells of democratic institutions, because the real essence of democracy does not exist here. True to her oligarchic class she turned EDSA 1 into a restoration of the old oligarchy. (Sionil 2004, 50) Since the end of Marcos dictatorship, Filipino democracy seems to be lively and stable at first glance. Regular elections are conducted every five years, the change in presidency at minimum every ten years has been peaceful, only a few accounts of election fraud and election related violence have called international attention, the press laws and the overall constitution are liberal and many women are to be found in powerful positions. Popular Policy Indices, such as the Bertelsmann Transformation Index or the Freedom House Index acknowledge these developments and rank the Philippines in the top bracket of South-East Asian Countries. 2 Compared to Burma, Thailand, Indonesia, Cambodia or Vietnam, the country has once more become one of the role models within ASEAN. But this appearance is deceiving and the Philippines are an illustrative case for how much more important it is to look at actual social practices rather than at institutional organs and constitutional provisions. Autocratically ruled clans have widely managed to transfer their hierarchical system based on unconditional loyalty in exchange for security and resources to today s democracy. What seems liberal to the outside is an elaborate system of bargaining and shifting alliances between autocratically ruled elite families at the inside. Neither Colonialism, nor the Commonwealth 3, World War Two, final Independence, Martial 4 Law or revolutionary unrest 5 brought an end to such rule. Rather a closer look at 1 EDSA refers to the People Power Revolution which led to a non-violent and of Marcos dictatorship in 1986) 2 For such a comparison, see the Bertelsmann data: < and the Freedom House data, where the Philippines have been rated as Free from 1996 to 2005, during the allout wars, online: < Scores_Countries.xls>. 3 The Commonwealth period in the Philippines lasted from 1935 to 1946, where the country was a commonwealth of the United States. 4 The Philippines were under Martial Law from 1972 to 1981 under the rule of Ferdinand Marcos. 5 The most prominent and wide-spread revolutionary movements, active today are the MILF in Muslim Mindanao (a Muslim group fighting for self-determination) and the NPA (a communist group fighting for regime change). 2 Working Paper, please do not cite without contacting the author

3 those historical periods shows elite rule gaining an increased momentum. Autocratic clan structures have survived democracy and regular elections. A small group of powerful families continues to rule the masses. Loyalty to ones clan serves as the common denominator unifying all Filipinos, regardless of regional, ethnic, religious or linguistic origin. Personalized rule and control persists and the social order is best described as a coexistence of concurring clans. Each historical period introduced new ways and means to safeguard resources and legitimise such elite rule. The paper seeks to explore this ambivalent relationship between changing systems and stable structures and thus provides an historical explanation for the persistence of clan rule. It is based on historical and analytical literature of which most is cited in the following paper, complemented by the authors own experiences while living and researching in Manila, Cebu, Davao, Butuan, Cotabato and Pikit. 6 The focus of the following paper is on Mindanao, but many of the findings are transferable to other regions of the Philippines, and as some might realize, to a number of other postcolonial states. Early Settlements where clan equaled community The clan runs through Filipino history like a scarlet threat, like the only scarlet threat it seems. Clan and residential community had been congruent during early settlement periods. Members of a clan and their offspring settled close to each other (Zialcita 1998). Ownership of the surrounding lands was community based, with the head of the clan as custodian of the land (Filipinas Foundation 1975, 58). Land belonged to the kin group which started using it and members of the family received rights to use parcels of the land; but not to own it (Abreu 2005; Arumpac 1998). Strangers were temporarily allocated plots. The mechanisms underlying distribution of land as well as political power were based on clan custom, as well as Adat Law, the Mindanaon customary law. Both sets of rules were neither formalized nor universal, but provided general guidelines for social interaction surprisingly consistent across Mindanao (CPRM 2004, 51). Power, for example has widely rested on a mix of genealogy, age and social hierarchy. 6 The author was exchanged student at Ateneo de Manila University in 2004 and She was further intern with the German Development Service in Cebu in 2005 and documenting on various projects of World Vision in Mindanao. She later on returned for research in 2006 and 2009 and remained in close contact with many of her informants until now. 3 Working Paper, please do not cite without contacting the author

4 Islamisation the origin of datuship and personal loyalty The arrival of Islam, mostly through trade, starting in the 15 th century changed little (Abubakar 1983, 7). Most communities converted to Islam and Islam slowly melted into local custom, but without fundamentally challenging any of the underlying mechanisms. The family remained the main organizing principle, with the head now called datu 7. All persons in a district considered themselves allied to a datu organizing them into innumerable petty states, basically reflecting the indigenous structure of settlements. The datu was a combination of political leader, landlord, judge and religious functionary. His power was not measured in terms of land or wealth, but by the number of followers, meaning people upon whose loyalty he could count. Power rested on the person s ability to sustain his constituents and on his personal charisma (Lebar 1972, 23; Jocano 1983, 3). In return for their loyalty, the datu had to provide aid in emergency and advocacy in disputes with other clans or chiefs (Dolan 1991). The number of followers thus became a selection criterion besides genealogy. This was necessary, as in the Philippines status can be inherited from both paternal as well as maternal lines, generating a number of potential datus (Damaso 1983, 81). 8 The local datu again, was embedded into a bigger hierarchy through alliances with other datus and subordinated to the sultan. Those Sultanates united the scattered and autonomous communities into a political community, called bangsa (nation) (Jocano 1983, 4). Despite the introduction of the sultanates, power and authorities rested on the local datus and was and distributed upwards based on a precarious system of alliances (Kiefer 1967, 23). Although the sultan occupied the highest social, political and religious status in society (Jocano 1983, 3), he depended on personal loyalties and his own finesse in building and securing alliances (Kiefer 1967: 24}. The sultan had to rely on the loyalty of the datus to secure his power. If he would lose the loyalty of 7 Historians dispute the usage and origin of the term datu as it may have existed already before the introduction of Islam and is also used among the non-islamized communities in Mindanao (Damaso 1983). In either case, the English equivalent used most often is that of ruler or descendant of rulers which gives the term a combined sociological and genealogical significance (Beckett 1977, 50). 8 The number of followers could be increased following different mechanism. Whereas distributing resources downwards surely was one, others more normative have been mentioned in literature: (1) Bansawan belonging to the royal core lineage, or a pidtaylan (2) Ilmawan knowledgeable in adat and Shariah to be a fitting viceregent of Allah (3) Rupawan personable, with good features (nonawan) and charisma (4) Hartawan affluent to lend prestige and dignity to the exercise of the office. 4 Working Paper, please do not cite without contacting the author

5 one datu, he would at the same time loose the loyalty of all his followers (Kreuzer 2011, 8). Securing the loyalty of the datu, thus was his main objective. The judicial system provided means to stabilize this system of loyalties and ensure the dependency of the individual on the clan. The codes only made gross distinctions between ranks (Islamic law distinguishes only between free persons and slaves). In practice, however, these rules were applied with great attention to rank differences (Bentley 1992, 103). Islamic law was understood and applied through the rank sensitive lens of customary law which specified, with striking finesse, the behavior expected of persons of different ranks. Especially the traditional bang-on (or maratabat) system of raising one s life and dignity was one of the social pressures imposed through the elders to maintain adherence to the informal body of laws. maratabat, a term usually translated as rank honor also carried the connotations of self-esteem and self-respect. The idea was that each Filipino Muslim, as well as his clan, possessed maratabat in proportion to his or her rank in the traditional hierarchy, 9 which combines genealogical elements with actual lifetime achievements. Such dignity and prestige are seen as exclusive meaning one person can only gain if another looses (Bentley 1985) until today leading to bloody feuds and long-lasting violence if an offence on maratabat is not resolved. The logic was and is: If honor is not restored in a non-violent mechanism of conflict resolution, it needs to be restored by violent means. 10 And such a restoration is only possible through the help of the clan and the approval of its datu. Naturally, those clans with most followers were in a better position than those less powerful. Thus, often inferior clans refrained from taking such action and members of the more powerful lineages got away with their offences cementing genealogical hierarchies between the clans The maratabat system is best described for the Maranao (Bentley 1985), but compatible, though less elaborately described systems exist for the other ethnic groups in Mindanao. 10 For many, justice is a matter of honor and restoring ones maratabat it the only way to reach justice. Thus described for the Tausug: They do not teach their children to fight. They teach them not to fight. Violence itself, however it is expressed, is considered morally wrong by the Tausug. To be shamed with-out taking revenge is, however, as great a wrong. (Kiefer 1972, 5) 11 This was not only true in the case of clan feud, but according to some accounts even for judicial processes following customary rule. Here, the number of witnesses was reported to be the key criterion for the decision of the datu. Those clans with more followers and resources to secure witnesses thus were in better position (Kreuzer 2011, 11) 5 Working Paper, please do not cite without contacting the author

6 Colonialism strengthening patronage Spanish colonialism from 1521 to 1898 had little impact on Mindanao and its power structures. Aside a few minor wars, Mindanao was widely left on its own. The only legacy left by the Spanish was the introduction of private land ownership as a central pillar to their concept of feudalism (Zialcita 1998, 54). In the Northern islands the effects of this system were felt soon and increased the power of clans. The promotion of an agrarian, hacienda based society and economy and absentee landlordism resulted in the concentration of land in the hands of a few, mostly the old elites who collaborated with the Spaniards. In Mindanao, land continued to be allocated by the datu and handled as if it were owned by the clan, but this changed towards the end of American colonialism. American colonialism started under a more powerful approach, providing a mix of military force and incentives. The initial policy of the US towards the rulers of Mindanao was, to rule the different clans and regions by accommodating their leaders (Tan 1983, 124). The idea was to look for important families through whom they could control a people they did not understand (Beckett 2009, 291). Although Provincial offices were subject to election according to the constitution, this never was implemented in Mindanao (Beckett 2009, ). In the Bates Treaty between the Sultan of Sulu and the United States in 1899, the colonialists even promised not to interfere in Sulu religion, law and commerce in exchange for the sultan s acknowledgement of United States sovereignty (The Bates Treaty of ). 12 Sultans and datus were paid a monthly salary for their administrative support, as long as they ensured an end to piracy raids and accepted the US flag to be used. The US representatives widely cooperated with the old datus loyal towards the United States and provided them with incentives such as pilgrimages to Mecca, a share in revenue or scholarships for their children(beckett 2009, 291). The loyalty paid off. Pilgrimages were increasing prestige, revenue could be distributed downwards to increase loyalty and the number of followers and scholarships increased the chances of their offspring in competing against alternative rulers. The American system provided the datus with extended the means to build up and secure a clan based patronage system, based on the pre-existing family system as a means to distribute 12 Elsewhere in Mindanao, the United States entered into similar, though less formal agreements with local power holders (Holbrook 2009, 12) 6 Working Paper, please do not cite without contacting the author

7 wealth and power downwards. And the same pattern was valid for Filipino-American relations in the northern islands. 13 Earlier practices of decision-making remained largely intact and clan politics was strengthened during early American colonization. The situation started to shift after the Public Land Act of 1903 and the abrogation of the Bates Treaty in Both challenged the power of Mindanaon sultans and datus. The Public Land Act (nos. 718, 926 and 496) introduced the homestead system and allowed individuals to acquire lots in the same time declaring null and void all lands rights granted by datus, sultans or traditional chiefs without authority of the State. This measure, of which Muslims and Indigenous were widely ignorant, legally ensured the concentration of land ownership in the hands of a few big landlords (Gomez and Mercado 2001). Naturally the most educated Christian settlers, coming from the Northern islands and educated Moro elites benefited most. Whereas some of the incoming Christian settlers could improve their position, land reform cemented established power structures among the Muslim Mindanoans, but as they had to compete with the settlers, decreased their overall power. Those who opposed US American domination and the concept of private land ownership, or just had no knowledge of the system, failed to title their land. Many small farmland owners saw their land occupied by these corporations and became farm workers instead (Ocampo 2011). Christian lowland Filipinos were more adept at using the modern law for their end and applied for individual titles to various tracts of state land and, after becoming the legal owners of these tracts, enforced eviction of the original inhabitants (Kreuzer 2006, 41). The same did many Muslim elites apply for land titles in the names of their clan members and later on rent it out to them. Land reform, in the whole of the Philippines strengthened elite rule, and until today no solution to this problem has been found. Cooperation once more paid off. Those who owned farmland, were able to increase their production of rice, corn, coconuts and cattle and some of the earlier subsistence farmers turned into big landlords. Business was made mostly by those owning huge areas of land predominantly the Christian and in some cases the Muslim elites linking land ownership to commercial ownership and through a huge number of dependants and tenants, to political patronage. Land ownership equalled richness, equalled a high number of dependants, equalled political posts, equalled funds, equalled patronage and strengthening of 13 This is described along the example of Sergio Osmena and the Osmena family in (Cullinane 1989). 7 Working Paper, please do not cite without contacting the author

8 patronage network. The landlord as custodian, distributing lands among his dependants in return for loyalty and in many cases tenure, has become the modern datu; translating the century old concept to Colonialism, throughout the Commonwealth period, and as further remarks will show, to today s Filipino democracy. The abrogation of the Bates Treaty, putting an end to legal pluralism had comparable strengthening effects on clan rule. The Bates Treaty was unilaterally abrogated in 1904 and replaced legal pluralism in favor for integration, or put bluntly, assimilation (Holbrook 2009, 12). The resulting Moro 14 -American war from 1902 to 1913 led to a defeat of the sultans and their final subordination to American power, which did by no means decrease their power on regional and local level. In 1914 US administration imposed a uniform law that disregarded Muslim and customary law (McKenna 1998, 91). Local law was only allowed, as long as it was in accordance with the laws of the United States of America, a restriction widely ignored on the ground. Most issues, even those dealing with murder and homicide, were dealt along customary law and processes. Those permit even the most serious offenses to be settled by the payments of fines or debt servitude (Scott 1984, 133). The public is not seen as an aggrieved party. An act is not right or wrong in itself. Offences committed to outsiders of the kin group usually do not affect the relation between kin-members and can be negotiated with the aggrieved party (Zialcita 1998, 46). Not punishment, but compensation and restoration of the loss in resources, prestige or power are the main motives of the victim. Cases are dealt with based on negotiations between victim and offender, both represented by elders of their clan. Local datus are facilitating such negotiations, but compensations have to be debated by the parties in conflict. Their hierarchical relation to each other, not some formal law serves as benchmark (Kreuzer 2011, 11). 15 Being a member of an inferior clan meant having less loss in prestige to be compensated for. Not being member of a clan meant not having any advocacy in these disputes. In a system based on amicable settlement, this meant not having any rights at all. 14 The term Moro is a political label for all Muslim Mindanaons. It serves to unify the different ethnic groups of Muslim belief and to distinguish them from the Christian settlers living in Mindanao. Introduced as a pejorative term by the Spanish, it now serves as unifying term, used by the Moro revolutionary movements. 15 A number of explanations and legal matters concerning the Muslim Legal System in the Philippines can be found on this website: 8 Working Paper, please do not cite without contacting the author

9 Colonialism might have challenged the authority of the sultans by introducing a higher level authority on national level and integrating them into national level politics, but it changed little of the power structures on the ground. Even more so, by allocating funds and incentives to the former sultans and datus, colonial powers strengthened their kinship networks. From the beginning of the Commonwealth, democratic institutions were manipulated not to uplift the humble commoner but to serve the Filipino directing class and American policy (Cullinane 1989, 105). Land reform cemented elite leadership as it allocated land to those already in power, widely denying access to the common Mindanaon and Filipino in general. Justice reform installed a system widely unacceptable to Muslim Mindanaons, thus increasing the power of informal and customary structures, once more safe-guarding hierarchies within and between the clans. Independence increasing funds, competition and violence There are a number of post-colonial countries in which the fight for independence provided some unifying elements between its citizens. This was not the case in the Philippines. For one, there was no revolutionary upraise against the American, but a rather slow transition of power to the Commonwealth government and later on the independent Philippines. The little revolution against the Spanish was an elite project, taking place nearly exclusively in Manila and led to the 1898 Declaration of Philippine Independence from Spain and continues to be celebrated today. But as that struggle was a predominantly Christian and Tagalog 16 one, the nation-building project was patterned along this Christian, Tagalog image (Coronel-Ferrer 2005, 7), culminating in the American-derived values of democracy and individual freedom (Bankoff and Weekley 2002, 95), coupled with the Spanish legacy of Christianity. Christianity became the corner-stone of the nation, symbolically excluding religious minorities (approximately 15 per cent of Filipinos). What remained as smallest common denominator between all religious, ethnic and linguistic groups of the Philippines, and thus as only base for national level interaction was there adherence to the clan. Safe-guarding clan rule and increasing the outlook of the personal clan was the common interest unifying the Filipinos, thus it comes as no surprise that clan identity 16 Tagalog, the ethnic group living in the region in and around Manila, led the national resistance. Their vernacular was later on made the national language (Tagalog), although most Filipinos speak Visayan. 9 Working Paper, please do not cite without contacting the author

10 ranks much higher than any other loyalty. Asking Filipino Muslims about their identity, a clear and surprisingly consistent hierarchy appears: 17 The most important level of identification is that of clan affiliation or kinship ties. Second is ethnic group (being a Maguindanaoan, a Maranao or a Tausug), third is religious identity (being a Muslim), fourth, closely interwoven with third, is being a Moro, based on political activity as a Muslim, and in fifth place finally comes being a Filipino (Guilal 1998, 161). The same hierarchy is valid for Christian Filipinos. They are foremost members of a family and clan. Asked the question Who are you? the answer most often is I am the son/daughter of..., followed by an indication to the village / area they live in, their ethnic group and only lastly their religion 18. Thus, the clan continued to exist as primary organizing principle after independence, throughout the years of Marcos dictatorship, until today. Democracy, the way it is practiced in the Philippines, served to strengthen the power of the clans rather than to diversify power and increase participation. This can be demonstrated along three sectors key to a state: Security, Land Ownership/Economy and Political Power, all three closely related to each other in the Philippines to ensure the perpetuity of clan leadership. Electoral democracy opened state resources for privatization by established and emerging families, which knitted themselves, during the middle decades of the twentieth century, into a national oligarchy. The state remained weak, making it difficult, obviously impossible, to formulate and implement policies independently of the powerful vested interest groups, especially the powerful families, clans, and kinship networks (Rivera 1994, 32). As no real political parties existed at the end of the Commonwealth, voting became a mere objectification of clan loyalty, especially on the local and regional levels. Being voted into office served as a further base of legitimacy for continuing elite dominance and the resources allocated to those in office as additional means to secure the loyalty of followers. The Philippines as a whole became a distinctly American patterned of 17 The following data is based on research by Wahab Ibrahim Guilal in 1998 entitled Perceptions on Democracy and Citizenship in Muslim Mindanao, based on key informant interviews, focus group discussions, and a review of literature. 18 This is based on my own experience in the Philippines and confirmed by a presentation of Carolyn Anonuevo, as quoted in (Grabowski 2006, 67). 10 Working Paper, please do not cite without contacting the author

11 decentralized democracy 19 in which regular and competitive elections are of high importance. Until today, local agencies of the state are subordinate to elected municipal mayors and provincial governors, a hierarchy, which guarantees that the accumulation and mobilization of local personal followers remains a key source of political power, just as it had been in pre-colonial and throughout colonial times (Hedman and Sidel 2000, 170). Political office assumed greater importance as the rewards and powers of these formal political positions increased mayors had funds to spend, jobs to allocate, police to command and the courtship of big politicians at election time (Beckett 2009, 292) The strong reliance on local power holders largely translated to the electoral system. What had been the datu was the mayor, what had been the sultan was the governor. Political parties were loose and unstable coalitions of local power holders with their followers, based on family or other loyalties rather than on shared ideology or class consciousness (Beckett 2009, 288). Just as with the rural Christian Filipino, the concept of democracy and citizenship enshrined in most Muslims is reduced to mere participation in elections (Guilal 1998, 171); although actual choosing of candidates is usually done in a collective manner where command votes are a widely accepted phenomenon (Kreuzer 2005, 20, 31). Electoral democracy had increased the competition between the clans, but not challenged the logic of clan rule per se. Ruling a certain area or community has become equal to securing political and economical resources. Especially the so-called pork-barrel funds (Priority Development Assistance Funds) are widely used as a means to reward followers for their loyalty: By the president to reward the parliamentarian for voting him or her into office, and by the parliamentarian to reword his followers for voting him or her into office. 1,2 Million Euros are allocated to each parliamentarian which he can distribute rather freely on projects of his choice. In a region with 70% living below the poverty line, this is an immense amount. The system of electoral democracy has imposed a new structure on the traditional and Islamic region of Mindanao, but old elites could to a large extent use these new structures for their own means (Kreuzer 2011, 14). What was new, was the definite subordination to a national level. Those datus who finally succeeded, had learned to 19 It is decentralized in so far as the district/ municipality has a strong basis, but on the other hand, it is directly dependent on the national government. What is lacking in the case of the Philippines is an intermediate/ regional level of political organization. 11 Working Paper, please do not cite without contacting the author

12 play the game of democracy. They entered in a wheeling-and-dealing (Coronel- Ferrer 2005, 11 12) of funds and resources against loyalty, meaning votes, across all levels. Datus secured the votes of their followers to either the governor or the president, and in return could basically rule their regions ad libitum (Kreuzer 2011). 20 Implication in kidnappings, coups, fraud, venality, and murder do a (...) datu s reputation no harm, so long as he gets away with it (Bentley 2009, 277). But this situation is not unique to Mindanao. The whole of Filipino politics is characteristically described as kinship politics of an oligarchic nature (Kreuzer 2006: 31), a collection of clan alliances (Abinales 2002, 613), or an anarchy of families (McCoy 2009). Political families randomly try to convert the state and its institutions into hangers-on of the family (Kreuzer 2006, 55). The pervasiveness of family rule all over the country is increasing its persistence. Political families prefer other families or family-like organizations as political opponents since they, too, have a vital interest in stabilizing the order in which families have a key political position (Kreuzer 2006, 55). Coalitions are unstable, formed between different elite families, oriented along the need for the smallest-needed majority and usually bought together by particular deals (Kreuzer 2008b, 49). Even the metaphors used in political communication reflect this notion of family ruling. An often used metaphor for the Philippine nation-state and its local units is that of a family. All Filipinos are then supposed to be brothers and sisters and the executive being the father (Zialcita 1998). Marcos was playing on this metaphor with him, being the father and his wife being the mother of the nation. Cory Aquino and Fidel Ramos did not continue using these metaphors, but today s president Benigno Aquino, who likes to be called by his nickname NoyNoy is again introducing a notion of informality and closeness. On local level, such terms as Ama (father), Ina (mother) or Atte (bigger sister) continue to be used widely. 20 The most prominent example of such an alliance is that between the Ampatuan clan and Gloria Macapagal Arroyo, the former president of the Philippines. Andal Ampatuan, the clan leader secured the vote of all twelve senatorial posts in his region to go to Arroyo supporters in 2007, and 100% of the votes during presidential election in 2004 to Gloria Macapagal Arroyo. In turn, he had never been charged for any of the many irregularities under his rule, such as a killed rival candidate for regional elections, executed prisoners, and suppressed human rights activists (Kreuzer 2011, 16 17). Only the Maguindanao massacre in 2009, killing 57 people gained international attention; but so far neither he nor any member of his clan has served a sentence. 12 Working Paper, please do not cite without contacting the author

13 But not only had the clan as political entity with its head counting on utmost loyalty translated to electoral democracy. The same did the private armies of former datus and sultans, today under the disguise of fully legal paramilitary forces or state forces protecting important politicians. Elite politicians are buying protection of the Filipino Army and the National Police. Legal para-military organizations serve as private army. Political killings are common and some datus command private armies of as much as armed men (Kreuzer 2011). Both, police and military, as well as para-military forces serve as the armed faction of elite politicians. Their loyalty remains with the clan and they are perceived as representatives of the clan, not of the state (Kreuzer 2011). Economic violence mingles with political violence, private violence, ethnic violence, criminal activities and terrorism; constituting a highly systemized and ironically pretty stable arrangement down to community level. To start with exploring the systems of violence in brief, economic violence figures most prominent when it comes to enforcing logging or mining concessions or to developing farm land for plantation. Stavenhagen, the UN special rapporteur on the implementation of the Indigenous Peoples Rights Act precisely describes quite common practices of development aggression: dispossession, forced displacement, physical abuse, torture ( ) summary executions, destruction of houses, including the bombing of an indigenous village, as well as the practice of hamleting 21 (Stavenhagen 2002, 43) in which even high-level politicians are involved. 22 Such practices are often connected to political violence. High-level politicians are closely connected to such corporations and thus targeted by political activists opposing economic violence and challenging those behind it. Especially political activists and parties from the left, as well as critical journalists see themselves faced with numerous death threats. The number of extra-judicial killings has by no means decreased since the return to democracy in 1986 (Kreuzer 2007). Rather, the number of killed activists has become an impact indicator for the work of such groups 23. Safe- 21 Hamleting is the forced re-organization of rural residents into special camps 22 The case of the press secretary of the president, Jesus Dureza, was a popular one at the time of field work in He had held a mountain resort without undergoing the proper legal process of land acquisition. 23 When I asked a human rights activist whether their human rights work had an impact on the regional and national level, his short answer was revealing: yes, our organization has lost 35 members due to extra-judicial killings This answer was given by Hilao Enriquez, from Karatapan during the Conference Human Rights in the Philippines Trends and Challenges under the Aquino Government, June 29 and 30 in Berlin. 13 Working Paper, please do not cite without contacting the author

14 guarding political and economic interest against Communist or Moro claims for change has become a daily routine for local politicians, even if this means to challenge the authority of the Filipino government (Kreuzer 2008a). 24 The border to private violence is fluent. Political and economic interests are by no means separate of private enrichment. This spills over to clan conflict on local level. Where resources can only be secured by the family in political office, competition for such office is high and means to secure it sometimes drastic. The latest incident of clan-related violence, linked to political competition seemed to have opened a new dimension. The so-called Maguindanao Massacre in which 57 men and women, approximately half of them journalists, were killed and buried by a roadside in Mindanao on 23 November 2009 is part of a long-lasting feud between the Ampatuan and the Mangudaddatu clan (Gutierrez 2009). 25 The conflict between the Filipino Army and the MILF is part of this mix of violence and is often used by the different clans as a means to either disguise or further their personal agenda. It is hard to say, to what extent the escalation of private violence is a reaction to the protractedness of ethnic conflict and to what extend the ethnic conflict is used to disguise private violence on both sides. For sure, the latest outbreak of supposedly ethnic violence between the government of the Philippines and the MILF in 2008 can be seen as an indicator for mixing economic, private and ethnic issues. The situation escalated after the MoA-AD (Memorandum of Agreement on Ancestral Domains) was not ratified by the national government, and the conflict is still ongoing on at low intensity today. This memorandum was the result of a joint panel of representatives of the MILF and the national government as well as academic experts. It summarized all previous agreements between the two warring groups and should have served as a roadmap to peace. Shortly before the designated signing date of the document in Malaysia, two Christian governors from Mindanao appealed to the Supreme Court to declare the whole process unconstitutional and discourage the president from signing it (Bernas 2008; Jurand 2008). The Supreme Court ruled in 24 One such case is the reaction of Governor Emanuel Pinol to the MoA-AD. He issued a statement replicated on his website as well as numerous local newspapers where he announced to take up arms against the MILF in case the government would be no longer willing or able to do so. 25 Esmael Mangudadatu was challenging Andal Ampatuan Jr., son of the Maguindanao governor Andal Ampatuan Sr., as mayor of Buluan town. When Mangudadatus wife was on her way to filing a certificate for his candidacy, she and her escort were kidnapped and brutally killed. 14 Working Paper, please do not cite without contacting the author

15 accordance with their appeal and criticized the MoA-AD as having departed too far from the constitution (Bernas 2008). 26 But this intervention was by no means free of self-interest. One of the two governors who appealed to the Supreme Court, Emanuel Pinol, owns vast tracts of land in Mindanao, which might have been redistributed if the MoA had been implemented (Neumann 2010). When Pinol was trying to safeguard his plantations by appealing as governor to the Supreme Court, this made economic violence political. Because he was doing so to safe-guard his very own benefit, it had a private connotation. When he called on all Christians in his province to get prepared for self-defense it spilled over to a mix of privatized and ethnic violence. And openly insulting a local military commander, who was pursuing a strategy of de-escalation that he wouldn t have the guts to fight the MILF, was actively escalating the situation. Many in Mindanao have a very fine knowledge of how to play this game. They are keeping violence at a certain level where it remains generally acceptable but ensures for all those involved to secure further resources to their clan. Peter Kreuzer, a sharp and prominent analyst of the situation in Mindanao, goes as far as to see the continuing violence in Mindanao not as a failure of the government in securing its monopoly of power, but as a necessary constituent of a social and political order aiming towards stabilizing the authority of a few over the many (Kreuzer 2007). Violence is incorporating democracy. The daily practices of violence have little in common with the formal character of the democracy written into the Filipino constitution. But the structures of violence have been there before, they have always had a stabilizing function and they seem to be surviving democracy. Formal democracy is incorporated into violent structures in many aspects. Where the state is still in control of the monopoly of power, it is just because those who have the monopoly of power have become representatives of the state. If such monopolies are challenged, as in the case of Pinol or Ampatuan, it is common to revert to, or at least threaten to revert to, violence. Guns seem to be the only means to be respected: "In areas like this (...) you have to be like a warlord to be respected. (...) It's a very feudal system. (...) you have to exact fear from your constituents. It gets you respect. Number two it's again economic power. (...) So it's guns, gold and goons. The three 26 Especially the powers envisioned for the Bangsamoro Juridical Entity go beyond those of local governments or even the ARMM, making it, according to the Supreme Court, a quasi-autonomous state. 15 Working Paper, please do not cite without contacting the author

16 Gs." (leading representative of an international aid organization, working in Mindanao. Cited according to: (Kreuzer 2008b, 51) And here we can close the circle to the clan. The clan remains the underlying structure of this system and only as member of a clan, there is a chance to succeed in it. Land is given to members of the clan, security is provided for members of the clan and resources are allocated to members of the clan in return for unconditional loyalty. Political leaders have remained, what Gonzales calls sultans of a violent land 27 : Moro Revolution: challenging clan authority in Mindanao Translating the idea of family to democratic politics, or better, familialistic structures incorporating democracy, lead to defunct structures. Loyalty without questioning, the translation of inner-familial hierarchies to decision-making processes, the little interest for a public good, the strong link between economic, political and military branches and the exclusion of alternative ways of group alignment, such as ethnicity, has led to a failure of democracy on the ground; in turn once more strengthening the importance of the clan as organizing principle. Even ethnic protest, as powerful as it might be voiced in Mindanao, has little impact on actual decisions and structures. The clan system in Mindanao increased marginalization on the national level. Oligarchic politics working through shifting alliances with the main power concentrated in the presidency in Manila clustered power among elites outside of the Moro ethnic communities. In the national parliament, Moros remained politically marginalized. Muslim elites managed to gain resources for their region, but their motivation was simply to strengthen their own paternalistic network. They worked not to improve the fundamental interests of their ethnic and/or religious group, but rather to distribute their financial means along paternalistic structures, strengthening their own positions within this kinship network. (Kreuzer 2008b, 49). Ethnic protest was without representation in the political sphere. When Marcos further eroded the political power of Muslim representatives at the national level, it became evident to many of the traditional as well as Islamic leaders that it would not be possible to regain independence through political means or institutional mechanisms (Lingga 2007, 43). The Bangsamoro Liberation Organization (BMLO) soon became the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF) and rapidly grew to tenth of thousands of 27 This is the title of his paper (Gonzales 2000) 16 Working Paper, please do not cite without contacting the author

17 members in the mid 1970s. This led to a split within the Moro societies. In the 1960s, a young Moro elite, educated in Libya, Egypt and Saudi Arabia or at the University of the Philippines in Manila, challenged the traditional authority of the datus. This new elite used their Islamic teachings and the notion of equality inscribed in the Quran to counter the hierarchical system of datuship and install a new system of leadership. The upraise was personified by Nur Misuari, the leader of the MNLF, promoting Islam as the base for political organisation instead of the clan (McKenna 1998, 133). It was the first time, the traditional datuship had been challenged in an attempt to unify all Muslims of Mindanaons as Moros and connect them to the bigger community of believers in Islam, the ummah. Whereas the logic of the clans always has been one of cooptation into the national system in return for funds to be handed down the kinship network, Nur Misuaris network was based on a revolutionary spirit, aiming towards radically changing the Muslim societies and liberating them from Filipino domination. But by most, the clans continued to be seen as the bird in the hand, securing economic safety based on kinship loyalty, whereas the revolutionary movement symbolized the two in the bush. Both needed each other, to secure resources. Until today, the revolutionary movement relies on the datus to secure the constituents for whom it claims to speak. And the clans need the revolutionary movements as they increase pressure on the government to allocate funds to the Muslim regions, which are then handled through the clan structures. 28 The old MNLF cadres are now incorporated into the clan system. To what extend the MILF, their successors, will be able to overcome clan rule remains to be seen. So far, clan rule has proofed to be the strongest among all alternative organising principles. The family, deeply enshrined in social practices Making a shift from political and public life, to private values and relationships changes little. The family is the strongest unit of society, demanding the deepest loyalties and coloring all social activity with its own set of demands (Grossholtz 1964, 86 87). It doesn t matter whether it is about school funding, a new job, a problem with the boss, a guy one admires or an offence one has committed Filipinos usually seek and get support from close family members rather than state agencies, co-workers or advise centers (Zialcita 1998, 46). The moral universe of many Filipinos is defined by their obligation to their kin, especially to their parents. Such 28 The most prominent example for this unsacred alliance is the ARMM 17 Working Paper, please do not cite without contacting the author

18 kin-bonds are based on and reinforced by highly reciprocal relationships. Among the Filipinos in the northern islands, Utang na loob (an unpayable debt of gratitude ) defines the lasting moral obligation created when one accepts a voluntary gift or service. Hiya refers to a complicated concept of shame, where an individual loses his/her hiya, when he/she fails to repay his/her debt of gratitude and is then considered a shameless person (walang hiya). As a result, another major value is the avoidance of conflict, or pakikisama (getting along). In Muslim Mindanao, authority and cohesion manifested themselves, just as in general Filipino society, along a complex system of personal, family, and clan loyalties (Guilal 1998, ). The loob/ hiya system finds its reflection in the indigenous bangon (or maratabat) system. Social existence among Muslim, as well as Christian Filipinos, is much concerned with intragroup (= intra-family) cohesion. Alternative support networks (such as unions, peers, co-workers etc.) are rather weak (Abad 2005). Not only do the datus subordinate their followers; they themselves willingly accept such subordination for the good of their kin. The datu is seen as the father, who knows best what is good for his children. Conclusion In a weak nation state, such as the Filipino one, the clan provides the only means to secure social and economic survival. The family has to allocate what the state fails to provide for: capital, livelihood, education and formation and medicare. And it provides stability, as it is based on proven and reciprocal loyalties anxious to transfer name, prestige and values to the following generations (McCoy 1994, 7). In the Philippines, authority and voting behaviour are until today following a complex system of personal, family and clan loyalties (Guilal 1998, ) and the decentralized political system encourages such. Partaking in politics in the Philippines is understood as a necessity for any family or clan to reach its maximum profit and increase the assets of its kin. 29. These familial alliances form a crucial link between average citizens and the country s elites. In societies where personal ties are 29 In a 2009 survey by Transparency International, Filipinos see their political parties and public officials as the most corrupt aspects of society scoring a 4 on a scale from 1 (not corrupt) to 5 (extremely corrupt) and 77% of the interviewed judge their government to be ineffective in fighting corruption. Online: < Adding the data of the Asian Barometer, the picture becomes even more consistent. Here, only 10% of Filipinos are consistent democrats, the lowest rate in Southeast Asia, pointing to a very thin cultural legitimization for democracy (Chu and Huang 2009, 13). 18 Working Paper, please do not cite without contacting the author

19 traditionally most important, citizens are often suspicious of politicians or officials unknown to them personally. As a result, the system seems to lack order and is instead characterized by randomness and chaos, with the only operative force being social ties underlying privilege (Chikiamco 1998, 17) privilege being constantly reproduced through licit and illicit practices of familial relationships. This makes such cultural behaviour of complex transactions of debt and obligation among extended family or clan members a rational economic strategy (Bankoff and Weekley 2002, 77). The problem here is two-fold. (1) Such social patterns undermine any notion of nationhood or political organization, as well as (2) democratic procedures, which go beyond family ties and personal relationships. The slow pace of change (in anything having to do with political processes) often bemoaned by international analysts, enables elites to adapt to the necessary social change (Kreuzer 2006, 50). Islamisation in Mindanao failed to change the traditional system of datuship based on genealogy and prestige. Colonialism provided further incentives for clan leaders and means to secure their dominance. These funds increased during democracy and popular vote added an additional criterion of legitimacy. Moral integrity might have declined, but political power of those in office increased. Especially in regions of war, the usual civilian was occupied with surviving instead of challenging clan rule. Where national systems of order weakened or broke down, clan loyalty was the only stable structure they could count upon. The competitiveness of the American-patterned democracy stabilized an exchange system of bottom-up, personalized loyalties against top-down funds with a highly contagious outcome. The structures of Liberalism don t pay off, where the notion of a public good doesn t exist. Democracy in the Philippines has given those few in power additional means to secure their dominance, in economics, politics and media. The results are ambivalent: Stability and predictability despite a weak nation state, at the expense of participation and equality. A Christian farmer, living in Maguindanao put it quite pointedly after Ampatuan Sr. was put into jail: The Ampatuans have been good to us. They protected civilians. They never did anything to us. I think this thing about the massacre is just due to politics. When they were in power, we felt safe. Now we don t know who to go to, for help".(local 19 Working Paper, please do not cite without contacting the author