History and Analysis of Conflict in the Bangsamoro. History and Analysis of Conflict in the Bangsamoro

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1 History and Analysis of Conflict in the Bangsamoro C H A P T E R 2 2 History and Analysis of Conflict in the Bangsamoro 5

2 Bangsamoro Development Plan History and Analysis of 2Conflict in the Bangsamoro A. A Brief History of the Bangsamoro Struggle The history of conflict in Mindanao can be traced back to Spanish colonization in the 16 th century. By then, Islam had already taken root in Mindanao, 9 having been introduced in the 13 th century by Arab traders and promoted by missionaries from Indonesia and Malaysia in the 15 th and early 16 th centuries. In line with Islamic tradition, a governance structure was in place in the form of Sultanates. 10 The ability of the Muslims to thwart successive attempts of the Spanish colonial forces to subjugate them set their people apart from the northern inhabitants of the Philippine archipelago, most of whom were conquered and converted to Christianity. Deep distrust and suspicion 11 were cultivated by the colonizers among the Christian converts against their Muslim brothers as a way of ensuring their control of most of the country and its inhabitants. Intermittent wars were fought between the Spanish invaders and their local Christian allies and Muslim fighters throughout three centuries of Spanish colonial rule. The advent of American colonial rule did little to change the situation. The American regime passed a series of land laws 12 that favored settlers and private corporations at the expense of the Moros. This, along with the implementation of land titling programs in Mindanao anchored in a property rights 13 regime alien to the customs and traditions of the Moros, led to massive dispossession of Moro lands by settlers and private investors. After the Philippines gained independence from the United States, a series of land resettlement programs in Mindanao in the 1950s and 1960s further accelerated this dispossession. The resettlement programs were undertaken to ease the social unrest spawned by the Communist-led Huk rebellion in the islands of Luzon and the Visayas and, purportedly, to further develop Mindanao by exploiting its vast natural resources. 14 In the late 1960s and early 1970s, tension increased between the settlers and Moros as land scarcity grew and centuries-old distrust continued between the two groups. The contemporary armed conflict between the government in Manila and the Moros was triggered by the Jabidah massacre in 1968, 15 which led to the establishment of the first Moro separatist groups initially with the founding of the Moro Independence Movement (MIM) and eventually the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF). The declaration of martial law by President Ferdinand Marcos in 1972 transformed the conflict from a simmering rebellion into a full-blown war. Ultimately realizing that he could not achieve total victory against 6

3 History and Analysis of Conflict in the Bangsamoro C H A P T E R 2 the Moro combatants, Marcos initiated the signing of the 1976 Tripoli Agreement with the MNLF. Under this agreement, the MNLF would drop its separatist goal in favor of creating an autonomous government for the Moros. In the years that followed, the conflict returned to being a low-intensity rebellion, with the Central Government in Manila implementing its own definition of autonomy for the Moros. Dissatisfied with the outcome of the Tripoli Agreement, the MILF led by Chairman Salamat Hashim, formally broke away from the MNLF in the signing of instrument December 30, Chairman Salamat distinguished the MILF from the MNLF by stressing not only a nationalist but also an Islamic agenda. Following the fall of the Marcos dictatorship in 1986, under the government of President Corazon Aquino, a new Philippine Constitution was enacted in 1987 that included provisions for autonomy in Muslim Mindanao and the Cordillera Region. This opened further negotiations between the GRP and the MNLF and led to the signing of the 1996 Final Peace Agreement between the GRP and MNLF during the administration of President Fidel V. Ramos. The agreement provided for the creation of the Southern Philippines Council for Peace and Development (SPCPD) as a transitory institution before the establishment of an expanded region to be known as ARMM. The MILF distanced itself from the agreement but committed to not standing in the way of peace. However, noncompliance by both sides to the peace agreement and failure to deliver the peace and economic growth promised to MNLF constituents resulted in increased support across the region for the MILF. The MNLF s credibility was further eroded in 1998 when the new administration of President Joseph Estrada did not give full support to the peace agreement. In 2000, concerned about the MILF s growing strength, the Estrada regime declared an all-out war, resulting in the displacement of more than a million people, with high human and physical costs to the entire country. Following Estrada s impeachment and ouster in 2001, President Gloria Arroyo reversed her predecessor s aggressive policy and declared an all-out peace stance toward the MILF. Peace negotiations began but broke down when the government unilaterally attacked MILF positions in 2003, resulting in the displacement of more than a half a million people. Later that year, the signing of a ceasefire agreement with the MILF paved the way for resumed negotiations, which culminated in the 2008 Memorandum of Agreement on Ancestral Domain (MOA-AD). The MOA-AD provided for greater autonomy for the Bangsamoro to govern their affairs and an expanded ARMM territory. However, it was challenged in the Philippine Supreme Court and was ruled unconstitutional. There followed another major outbreak of armed violence between some MILF forces and government troops, displacing some 700,000 people. It was not until mid-2010, with the newly elected government of President Benigno Aquino III, that negotiations resumed. In early 2011, President Aquino personally met Chairman Murad in Tokyo to assure him of his government s sincerity in seeking lasting peace with the MILF. In October 2012, the GPH and MILF peace negotiating panels, through mediation by the Malaysian Government, reached a breakthrough and signed the Framework Agreement on the Bangsamoro (FAB). A series of negotiations provided the details of the FAB, which are contained in four annexes pertaining to: (1) Transitional Arrangements and Modalities; (2) Wealth Sharing and Revenue Generation; (3) Power Sharing; 16 and (4) Normalization. The signing of the Comprehensive Agreement on the Bangsamoro signaled the start of a new phase in the relationship between the MILF and the GPH and the difficult task of implementing the peace accord as embodied in the proposed BBL. 7

4 Bangsamoro Development Plan B. Conflict and Development Analysis of the Bangsamoro Conservative estimates of deaths due to wars in Mindanao put the fatalities at nearly 120,000 from 1970 to 1996, with even higher figures for protracted and cyclical displacement. 17 Purely economic assessments of the costs of conflict range from a conservative USD 2 to 3 billion for the period from 1970 to to USD 10 billion for the period from 1975 to The latter considers not only direct output losses but also other factors, such as forgone investments and capital flight. Using USD 10 billion as the reference figure and based on the average exchange rate between 1975 and 2002 of PhP 22.5 to the US dollar, this amounts to PhP 225 billion or around PhP 8.3 billion per year losses that have translated to profound social and economic impacts and forgone opportunities for both the Bangsamoro and the Philippines as a whole. 20 As a development plan for a conflict-affected area, the BDP is anchored in an understanding of the complex security, justice, and economic factors that drive and perpetuate conflict and its corresponding development costs. The 2005 Joint Needs Assessment (JNA) for Reconstruction and Development of Conflict-Affected Areas in Mindanao 21 illustrates how injustice in its various manifestations underpins the historical conflict in the Bangsamoro. These forms of injustice escalate into structural violence and armed confrontation because of certain key triggers, including competition for scarce natural and mineral resources, crime (e.g., cattle rustling, kidnapping), local election disputes, and government policies, such as the declaration of all-out war against the MILF by the Estrada administration, among others. commits the parties to three interlocking aspects of the peace process: (1) Security Aspect (2) Rehabilitation, Humanitarian and Development Aspect, and (3) Ancestral Domain Aspect. While much work remains to be done in support of structural and security sector reform, particularly in the transition period, the full implementation of the CAB will require targeted socioeconomic responses that will enable the Bangsamoro to immediately feel the benefits of the peace dividends and improve their overall welfare. The signing of the CAB is a significant step in reducing incidences of state-minority contestation, or vertical conflict, which pits non-state armed groups against government forces. Data from the GPH Coordinating Committee on the Cessation of Hostilities (CCCH) (see Figure 1) show no armed skirmishes between the GPH and MILF since the breakthrough in peace negotiations in 2012, which provided an enabling environment for stable communities and continuous socioeconomic delivery. 22 Other drivers of conflict in the Bangsamoro area take the form of inter-communal (between political and ethnolinguistic groups) and inter-elite violence (rido or local clan feuds, such as over political posts and control over Figure 1: Annual Trend of GPH-MILF Armed Skirmishes ( ) In response to the cycles of violence and insecurity driven by widespread economic marginalization and political disenfranchisement in the Bangsamoro, the CAB, specifically the Tripoli Agreement of 2001, Source: GPH-CCCH Info Brief (March 2012) 8

5 History and Analysis of Conflict in the Bangsamoro C H A P T E R 2 resources). 23 While distinct, these horizontal conflicts are often closely related to the vertical conflict, and one spills over into the other. 24 Another driver of conflict is the prevalence of the shadow economy, or nonconformist economic activities 25 such as the illicit weapons and drug trade, kidnap-for-ransom activities, informal credit and land markets, and crossborder trade, as it intersects with the prevalence of warlordism and clan-based violence. Economic rents from the shadow economy are used to consolidate political influence and patronage, reinforcing overall insecurity and further undermining weak institutions. 26 Injustice and insecurity are central to the narrative of failed development in the Bangsamoro. Economic development by itself cannot address the historical grievances of the Bangsamoro or the insecurity that affects large parts of the Bangsamoro territories. But development can play a part in supporting the political and security transitions that will play out in the coming period. Accordingly, the BDP is a peacebuilding plan that analyzes and addresses development issues through the lens of conflict. It is driven by a strong intention to address injustice and directly tackle sources of discontent that drive conflict. The priorities in this Plan are therefore different from those in the parts of the Philippines that are not affected by conflict. For the short term, the Plan recommends actions and interventions that will promote stabilization and strengthen the legitimacy of the Bangsamoro Government. The Plan recognizes that how development is implemented in the Bangsamoro matters as much as how much is spent. Based on the principles described in the next chapter, the BDP promotes distribution of resources based on need and equity, to ensuring fair and equal access to development opportunities for all in the Bangsamoro. The Plan gives priority to development approaches that are people-centered and that bring communities together for joint planning and decisionmaking, as these have been proven to build the necessary social cohesion. As a conflict-sensitive and peacebuilding plan, the BDP is ultimately built around developing stronger institutions that will deliver better services, more effective justice, and decent jobs and livelihood for the Bangsamoro people. Such institutions will require open and transparent governance, partnerships between government and civil society, and a willingness to openly engage with citizens. 9

6 Bangsamoro Development Plan NOTES 9 See Rodil (2009), Houben (2003), and Abubakar (2005). 10 There were four sultanates, namely: the Sultanate of Sulu, which was based in Sulu but also ruled the neighboring islands and coastal areas of what is now known as the Zamboanga Peninsula; the Sultanate of Maguindanao, which covered the south-central portion of Mindanao Islands; the Four Principalities of Lanao, which ruled the eastern and central portion of Mindanao; and the Sultanate of Kabuntalan in Maguindanao. For historical accounts of the rise and fall of the Sultanates in Mindanao, refer to Majul (1973 and 1985), Tan (1977, 1989 and 1993), Muslim (1994), Tanggol (1993), and Rodil (2009). 11 In fact, the Spaniards used the term Moros to refer to the Islamized inhabitants of Mindanao to distinguish them from the Christian inhabitants of Luzon and the Visayas. 12 Refer to the 1902 Philippine Bill, which effectively upheld Spanish cadastral laws; the 1902 Land Registration Act, which established the requirement of a Torrens title as proof of land ownership; and the 1905 and 1918 Public Land Acts, which determined all unregistered and untitled lands to be owned by the State, and that such public lands may be claimed and registered through the free patent system. 13 This is the Regalian doctrine, which was first introduced during the Spanish colonial period and became the basis for all land laws as established in the 1935, 1973 and 1987 Philippine Constitutions. It stipulates that all lands of the public domain and other natural resources belong to the King of Spain and later to the State as the natural successor. 14 See Majul (1973 and 1985), Tan (1977, 1989, and 1993), and Mastura (2004). 15 This involved the killing of at least 28 young Moro military trainees by their superiors to prevent a leak of the Philippine Government s intent of fomenting unrest in Sabah, to which the Sulu Sultanate has a claim. 16 An Addendum on Bangsamoro Waters complements the Annex on Power Sharing. 17 See World Food Programme and World Bank (2010). 18 Using an exchange rate then of PhP 54.5 to USD 1, this will amount to PhP 108 to PhP 158 billion for the entire period or around PhP billion per year. See Barandiaran (2002). 19 See Schiavo-Campo and Judd (2005). This is further supported by the United Nations Development Programme (2005). 20 Average exchange rate calculated using data from World Bank World Development Indicators ( ). 21 See World Bank et.al (2005). The 5-volume report is divided into sectoral concerns, namely: human development, rural development, finance and private sector development, local governance and institutions, and an integrative report which serves as the fifth volume. Each sectoral report rendered a discussion of the current situation in their sector, identified the problems, formulated recommendations to address these problems, and identified the menu of activities that need to be undertaken and their funding requirements. The recommended activities were divided into three implementation periods: immediate term (start at year 1 but implementation can go beyond year 1); short term (start in year 2 but implementation can go beyond 1 or 2 years); and medium term (start in year 4 and 5 but implementation can go beyond 2 or 3 years). To obtain the data for the needs assessment, the study employed key informant interviews, focus group discussions, and analysis of secondary data. More than 3,000 individuals and representatives of institutions served as respondents of the study coming from 19 municipalities in 7 provinces considered as Conflict-Affected Areas (CAAs). 22 See the GPH-CCCH Update Report (2012). 23 State-minority contestation is also known as vertical conflict in conflict literature; inter-elite and inter-communal contestations are classified as horizontal conflict. 24 See Adriano and Parks (2013) for additional information on the typology of conflict in the Bangsamoro. 25 Lara and Schoofs (2013). 26 Ibid. 10