International Political Science Association 23rd World Congress of Political Science Montreal, Canada, July 2014

Transcription

1 Party Systems and Coalitions in South America: The Challenges of Governance and Democratic Stability Lucas Cunha Ph.D. Candidate in Political Science at Federal University of Minas Gerais (UFMG) and Professor at State University of Minas Gerais (UEMG), Brazil and researcher at Legislative Center Studies (UFMG) Victor Araújo Master's degree in Political Science at São Paulo University and researcher at the Center for International and Comparative Studies (NECI/USP), Brazil Introduction Is political stability alone a sufficient condition for permitting governments to enact policies that improve quality of life for their citizens? Based on an analysis of fourteen Leftist governments in nine South American countries, we argue that it is not. In the context of South America, countries with less-structured party systems are also those with the lowest perception of stability. However, even in these cases, the rise of Leftist governments is linked to improvements in living conditions for their citizens. Democracies generally institutionalize themselves through democratic processes such as periodic, fair and free elections, with incentives for expanding mechanisms of political participation. The assumption is that electoral competition produces conditions for institutionalization and stabilization of one of the important variables related to the democratic game: the political party system. In the case of Latin America, the "turn to the left" movement at the beginning of the 21st century represented a new alignment of political agendas proposed by elected presidents, a result of dissatisfaction with the promarket policies implemented in the 1980 s and 1990 s (Seligson, 2006; Madrid, 2010; Nunes, 2014). Nationalism, constitutional processes, strengthening of the mechanisms of political participation and neo-populist trends appeared in the South American scenario in a way that rekindled discussions about the quality of democracy in the region. The arrival of these Leftists to power, in what is called the "pink tide" (Lieveslay and Ludlam, 2009), sparked a new debate about their governments discourses and political agendas. New democratic procedures began to be used by these elected governments withreform platforms in social, economic, foreign, and regional cooperation policies. New mechanisms for direct participation, such as plebiscites and referendums, were included in these new procedures (Seligson, 2006; Altman, 2010). Furthermore, even if

2 rooted in distinct economic platforms, these governments increased social spending in order to provide for the poorest and most excluded citizens(la Torre, 2013). This scenario obviously differs in the countries analyzed in South America. Political instability in some countries continues to run high, as in the case of Venezuela, while in others, the democratic political environment maintains stability without compromising democracy, as is the case with Chile. The size of legislative coalitions is related to the variations in stability between these countries, given that government majorities balance the potential for instability generated by a fragmented political party system. In Latin America, generally speaking, the combination of quasi-majorities and presidential prerogatives that give the president the authority to veto congressional initiatives has been favorable for the emergence of minority governments (Forbes, et al., 2012). It is not by chance that the most politically unstable countries are often also those with minority governments. The Left in Power in South America at the Beginning of the 21st Century Country President Party or Coalition Period Brazil Luis Inácio Lula da Silva PT ( ) DilmaRousseff PT (2011-Present) Uruguay Tabaré Vasquez FrenteAmplio ( ) José Mujica FrenteAmplio (2010-Present) Chile Ricardo Lagos PS (Concertación) ( ) Michelle Bachelet PS (Concertación) ( ) Bolivia Evo Morales MAS (2006-Present) Venezuela Hugo Chávez PSUV ( ) Ecuador Rafael Correa Alianza PAIS (2006-Present) Argentina Nestor Kirchner PJ ( ) Cristina Kirchner PJ (2007-Present) Peru Alan García PAP ( ) Ollanta Humala PNP (2011-Present) Paraguay Fernando Lugo Guasú Front ( ) Source: Own Compilation We propose two points of focus for analysis that that are inter-related, and, in our view, provide a partial explanation for regional instability. The first point of focus separates the countries studied into two different groups of political party systems: (a) structured and (b) unstructured. This division is based on the argument that the party systems can

3 be separated into those which are stable and institutionalized (a) and those which are unstable and un-institutionalized (b). The second focal point groups the countries analyzed by the type of Leftists that have ascended to power since the end of the 1990 s. The governments are separated based on the origin of the Leftist system of the countries, where the Leftists could be characterized as being anti-systemic. In the case of the Pro-systemic Left, once they are in power, they don't break from the legacy of a liberal economy and the classic format of representative democracy. In contrast, the main characteristics of Anti-systemic Leftist parties are an aversion to neoliberal trends in the running of the economy and a strong inclination towards government economic intervention. The combination of these two associated factors explains part of the instability seen in some South American countries. Why is there less stability in countries where the party system is less-structured and the Leftists are anti-systemics? Are unstable democracies incapable of promoting political, economic and social development? Contrary to what has been noted in literature, despite the lack of stability found in some of the countries (especially those with an unstructured partisan system and with left-wing governments that tend towards being anti-system), their governments have been successful in significantly improving the standard of living of their citizens. In other words, the argument that democracies with poorly institutionalized party systems are not capable of good governance is not empirically supported. As we will show in this paper, in even the most unstable South American countries, the level of per capita growth and the increase in social spending has remained constant since the New Leftist governments have come into power. This paper will be divided into five parts. Following this introduction, the second part will introduce a debate about the nature of the Leftist governments that ascended to power in the region and the changes to the "rules of the game". The third section discusses to what extent variable stability is sufficient for the South American democracies to adopt policies that promote better living conditions for their citizens. The fourth part is dedicated to a case study of each country describing the political and institutional dimensions of each one, the context of the rise of the government to power, and the agendas of elected Leftist presidents. In the fifth and final section, conclusions are presented. Partisan Identification, Leftists in Power and Changes Made to the "Rules of the Game": Three Dimensions of Recent South American Political Policy With the arrival of the Leftists to power in South America, a controversial issue arises about how to classify the heterogeneity of the political platforms of these elected governments. There are significant differences between the elected presidents. While on one hand, there is the social-democratic Left such as in Brazil, Chile and Uruguay, there is also the Left that is often accused of having a "neo-populist" character because of its restructuring platforms. Some cases in point are the leadership of Hugo Chávez, which

4 challenged legitimacy of the Venezuelan State under the aegis of Bolivarianism 1, Rafael Correa in Ecuador, and Evo Morales in Bolivia 2. One could consider these classifications somewhat arbitrary, yet they help to distinguish the difference between the political platforms of President Lula of Brazil and President Michelle Bachelet of Chile, and the leadership and political-ideological platforms of Hugo Chavez and Rafael Correa of Ecuador. Recent analyses of the Leftists in South America point to distinct denominations that exhibit the same type of results. The names used for classification are: Contestatory Left, Anti-System Left, Anti-Capitalist Left and Interventionist Left or Neopopulist Left on one side. On the other end of the spectrum are: Social Democrat Left, Moderate Left, Light-Left, Capitalist Left and the Pro-system Left. These classifications find common ground in the fact that there are significant differences in the political agendas of the elected presidents in terms of preserving the legacy of the recent political history. For Madrid (2010), the liberal Left is composed of relatively well-institutionalized parties while the interventionist Left is composed of new movements that are dynamic and personalized. These Left have an emphasis on nationalistic elements in common and in some cases attempts to reconstruct the nation, both in terms of creation of a plurinational State as well as in relation to more justice and social inclusion. In addition, the Leftist liberals were the opposition in the 1990 s, and in order to win elections needed to migrate to the center or create coalitions with parties outside of the Leftist camp. The author qualifies this discussion by stressing the fact that the liberal Left came to power at a time when the population had benefited from the stabilization of inflation. This kept the Leftists from disassociating themselves from the economic changes implemented in the 1990 s. In the case of the interventionist Left, given the failure of pro-market reforms in those countries, it was possible to implement an agenda of complete change in political direction. Lanzaro (2007) called this process the "third wave of the Leftists in Latin America". This wave includes all, from the reforms based on the classical representative model (Brazil, Chile and Uruguay),to presidents willing to profoundly transform the foundations of State legitimacy (Bolivia, Venezuela and Ecuador). The following table seeks to summarize these different factions of the Leftwhen present- in South America and their relationship to the political party system. 1 Bolivarianism is inspired by the political and military leadership of Simon Bolívar, considered a hero of Venezuelan independence. The Chávez government associated Bolivarianism with social justice and a Socialist platform. During this period, according to Buxton (2009), there was a significant redistribution of economic and political power from the elite minority to the politically excluded and economically marginalized majority. Bolivarianism redefined the narrative of regional policy by introducing a new language of citizenship, participation, cultural pride and sovereignty. 2 For more on the differences between the social-democrat left and the neopopulista Left, see Castaneda, (2006) "Latin America's Left Turn".

5 Typology of the Left-wing Political Party Systems in South America Left-wing type Party System Structured Unstructured Source: Own Compilation Systemic Uruguay Chile Brazil Peru Paraguay Argentina Anti-Systemic - Ecuador Venezuela Bolivia In this framework, the dismantling of the political party system is not due to the rise of Leftist presidents, but rather their rise to power might have exacerbated party systems that were already greatly destabilized. It should be observed that this ascension process of the distinct Left-wing types did not occur immediately after the end of the military regimes. After the transition to democracy, there was a period (the early 1990 s) of ascendance of presidents with political platforms more clearly identified with precepts of the so-called Washington Consensus 3. Menem in Argentina, Collor in Brazil and Fujimori in Peru promoted pro-market reforms in the early 1990 s that had very different consequences for the economies of each one of these countries. In this sense, there was continuity in the political platforms in Brazil, Chile and Uruguay, examples where the presidents did not separate themselves from the country s political legacy. We argue that there is a relationship between the process of dismantling the party systems and the kind of Left that characterizes these governments. That does not mean to say that the governments classified as anti-system caused the dismantling of the political party systems of their countries, but they did contribute to the acceleration of the process that was already underway, even before the election of these political players. These presidents are frequently accused of establishing their governments based on charisma and personality, and of identifying directly with the masses. These characteristics rekindle the debate about "neo populist" trends in the presidentialism of Latin America. However, this version deals with changes led by leaders of populist origins and legitimized by a discourse of total political reform. Populism appears as a specifically-political phenomenon, which should be defined as such, that rises on the Latin American horizon at successive historical moments and that is associated with distinct political-economic guidelines (Lanzaro, 2007). Since the late 1990 s to early 2000 sone can observe constitutional processes or reforms of political rules that changed the institutional structure of the region. In all of these 3 The Washington consensus is the term from economists at financial institutions located in Washington D.C. in the United States that denotes a set of recommendations for achieving macroeconomic balance. The Latin American countries received a prescription of economic rules and liberal reforms that the State should apply in order to adapt to the realities of the globalized market.

6 changes there is a common point: the diffusion of participatory democracy - an increase in political participation mechanisms in the broader sense. Nevertheless, such changes also differ in the way they are conducted and in their content. There are a range of examples: from small electoral reforms and inclusion of new social programs (Brazil under Lula's mandate, Uruguay under Tabare Vasquez and Chile under Michelle Bachelet), to radical constitutional processes (Venezuela under Chavez, Bolivia under Evo Morales and Ecuador under Rafael Correa). Such changes interfere in distinct ways with the classical institutions of representative democracy and have consequences not yet widely nor consensually discussed by analysts. Recent approaches have even come to question the democratic nature of these regimes, considering that they cannot really be considered part of the family of democracy. Rather, they have fallen into the category of semi-democracies, partial democracies, virtual democracies, non-liberal democracies, semi-authoritarian or even softauthoritarianism. At any rate, these new regimes can be considered, by Diamond (2002) and Morlino (2008), to be "hybrids", i.e. regimes that mix authoritarian and democratic elements. In other words, these new regimes would be a new type of governance no longer considered to be democratic. Instead they would be considered competitive authoritarianism (Levitzky and Way, 2002).There is also the consideration of Gereffi, Hartlyn, Garreton,Cavarozzi, Cleaves (2007), of these cases of countries with incomplete democratic consolidation, i.e. those processes of re-democratization whereby authoritarian institutions consolidate alongside democratic democracies in such a way that there is no possibility, at least in theory, for these governments to return to authoritarianism, yet the consolidation of democracy is seen as incomplete. In the next section we will discuss how these processes of institutional change are linked to different levels of stability. Is political stability alone a sufficient condition for good governance? Governance Patterns in South America: Political Stability, a Sufficient or a Necessary Condition? The Latin American presidencies are characterized by presidents who possess broad powers, particularly in regard to legislative powers. There is an inclination to believe that excess power in the hands of the president is detrimental to democracy and may lead to attempted usurpation of power by the President, allowing him to bypass or even ignore the National Congress. These arguments are made in the context of broader criticism of presidential systems (Shugart and Carey, 1992; Linz, 1994; Mainwaring, 1993; O'Donnell, 1994; Lijphart, 1999). Shugart and Carey (1992) and Mainwaring and Shugart (1997) argue that there are differences between the presidential systems, and that their performance depends primarily on factors related to the president s partisan power, the electoral system and the president's constitutionally-defined legislative powers. The authors argue that if the president has too much legislative power, this would tend to bring instability to the presidential system, given the incentives created

7 for the executive branch to be able to rule unilaterally. Presidentialism would lean towards greater stability in systems where the president is more dependent on the political parties. According to this reasoning, it would be necessary to have an institutionalized political party system, given that partisan competition would create conditions for more balance between the branches. Mainwaring and Scully (1995) put forward four conditions for political party system institutionalization, which are: a) relatively stable inter-party competition; b) low electoral volatility c) recognition of the legitimacy of parties by the population and d) requirement of some level of party institutionalization. These conditions vary greatly in South America and we see systems where inter-political party competition is quite high and others where it is moderate. That electoral competition has not contributed to the stabilization of political party systems in South America is evidence of this. As asserted by Roberts (2012), the average volatility of both the legislative and the majority party elections increased in the period from 1980 and In the case of legislative elections, the rate of volatility was 17.4% in 1980, 27.2% in 1990 and reached its peak in the year 2000 at 31.1%. For the majority elections, in 1980 the rate was 19.6%, increasing to 22.8% in 1990 and 26.7% in the year As shown in the chart below, the level of confidence in the political parties of the region is also low, in accordance with data from the Latinobarómetro for 1995 through When we add responses from those who have no confidence at all and those who place little faith in political parties, the percentage reaches an alarming number. About 70% of citizens have little or no confidence in political parties. Trust in political parties in nine countries of South America 70,0 60,0 % 50,0 40,0 30,0 20,0 10,0 Much Some Little None, Ano Source: Latino Barometer 4 The data clearly shows the image of the lack of public confidence in political parties in South America. It was observed after the "pink tide" of the year 2000that there was a 4 The question asked is: Please look at this card and tell me, for each of the groups, institutions or persons mentioned in the list how much confidence you have in them: a lot (1), some (2) little (3) none (4) confidence in...? (The National Congress, Judicial branch, political parties, Armed Forces, public administration, local government, The church, Electoral Tribunal, The state).

8 slight increase of those who have some confidence in political parties and a slight decrease of those who have no confidence. Still the data is worrisome, because the cognitive dimension of faith in political parties is a key element for consolidation of the political party system. With data from the Latino Barometer, it is possible to make an evaluation of the relationship between democracy and political parties. When asked if it is possible to have democracy without political parties, on average 34.9% of respondents answered "yes" in reference to the countries surveyed. This complements the diagnosis of political party crisis in the region. It can be noted, however, that there is substantial variation between the countries analyzed. Coincidentally in countries where the party system is less structured, there is a higher rate of respondents who believe that democracy can function without parties. Ecuador, Bolivia, Paraguay, for example, have higher response rates to this question. Is it possible to have democracy without political parties? Annual average ( ) Latino Barometer * Country Without political parties there can be no democracy Democracy can function without political parties Ecuador 36,16 51,42 Bolivia 47,26 40,71 Paraguay 49,64 40,69 Brazil 45,22 38,54 Peru 53,98 31,91 Chile 56,46 30,53 Venezuela 62,14 29,52 Argentina 65,33 27,63 Uruguay 76,08 15,79 *Average of responses for the years: 2000, 2001, 2002, 2005, 2006, 2008, 2009 and (With the exception of 2003, 2004 and 2007, when the question was not asked.) One must also consider the countries where political parties do not monopolize representation. In these countries, (Ecuador, Bolivia, Paraguay, Venezuela and Peru) candidates unaffiliated with a political party may present their candidature and be voted in. In summary, the data permits us to say that conditions for political party institutionalization have not been favorable in these countries and the cognitive perception of a significant portion of the population is that political parties are not the primary instruments required for democracy to exist. Furthermore, the recent changes in South America s political landscape have created consequences relevant to the stability and quality of democracy in the region. It is worth remembering that after the re-democratization of the countries, not every elected president was able to complete their mandate, even though there is no uniformity in regards to the causes of these interruptions (Marsteintredet, 2014). Collor in 1992 in Brazil, Fernando de La Rua in Argentina in 2001 and Alberto Fujimori in Peru in 2001 were presidents who failed to complete their mandates. Similarly, there was the

9 controversial dismissal of Fernando Lugo, in Paraguay in 2012, which could be considered a coup by the State. These incidents incite suspicion that these regimes could be moving away from liberal representative democracy and becoming "hybrid regimes", or a combination of electoral democracy and authoritarianism in the governance process of the countries (Diamond, 2002). In regards to the conditions for political party system structuration, two arguments have been accepted with some level of consensus. The first argument, defended by Roberts and Wibbels(1999),associates electoral volatility with institutional debility and economic crises. The second argument, presented by Maiwaring and Scully (1995, 2009), defends an association between weakly-institutionalized party systems and the emergence of populist governments. According to the authors, the uncertainty produced by high rates of electoral volatility creates room for the consolidation of political outsiders with authoritarian tendencies. Furthermore, in these contexts, there would be no space for democratic governance. With the exception of Chile, Uruguay and Costa Rica, Latin America would be a sum of competitive administrations with little possibility of producing fruitful public policies. In other words, in politically unstable countries, governments would be unable to promote the improvement of the population s standard of living. List of Presidents who have had their mandates cut short in the South American Democracies Country Name of the President Year Argentina Bolivia Raul Alfonsín Fernando de La Rúa Adolfo Rodríguez Saá Gonzalo Sánchez de Lozada Carlos Diego Mesa Gisbert Brazil Fernando Collor de Mello 1992 Ecuador Jamil Mahuad Abdalá Bucaram Ortiz 5 Lucio Gutiérrez Paraguay Raul Cubas Fernando Lugo Peru Alberto Fujimori 2000 Venezuela Hugo Chávez 2002 Source: Own Compilation We argue that although stability is a necessary condition for a democratic government to be effective, this condition alone is not sufficient, at least as seen in the cases reviewed in this study. In other words, it is possible to improve the living conditions of the population even in the context of low stability. Before we proceed to the study of the data, we will discuss the concept of governance and how it is used by these authors. 5 President Abdalá Bucaram Ortiz was ousted by Congress on the grounds of "mental incapacity".

10 In the words of Mainwaring and Scully (2009), governance can be defined as the capacity of a democratic government to implement policies that contribute to the political, social and economic development of the country. It can be further argued that this concept is related to the manner in which power is used to manage and promote political, economic and social resources or the ability of a certain government to formulate and implement its policies (Kaufmann et al., 2010). These definitions are based on the idea that democratic administrations have patterns of social expenditures that are higher than those of authoritarian regimes (Brown and Hunter 1999), and are better providers of public services (Lake and Baum, 2001). In the specific case of South America, some of the literature has used the institutional deficiencies of these democracies to infer the complete incapacity of these governments to provide better quality of life for their populations. Thus, hybrid administrations such as Venezuela, Ecuador and Bolivia would not make good examples of democratic governance, sentencing these nations to all manner of crises be they economic, political or social in nature. If we use this definition of governance and the relationship between this concept and the conditions of political party system institutionalization, we must assume that all the unstable South American democracies are incapable of implementing good public policies for their citizens. However, we argue that although desirable, political stability alone is not a sufficient condition for developing policies that have a positive impact on the population's quality of life. In this study, we use a political stability indicator and a governance indicator, contrasting these measures with economic and social development indicators. Our political stability indicator classifies all presidents analyzed in relationship to the political stability experienced during their mandates. The governance indicator ranks the presidents analyzed by their ability to implement public policy. To test our theory we use indicators of economic development (GDP per capita) and social development (percent of GDP allocated to social spending, the unemployment rate and the percentage of the population living on less than two dollars a day, in addition to the Human Development Index-HDI). The objective is to determine if these indicators accompany the measurement of stability. In other words, we analyze whether the countries classified as unstable are, in fact, able to provide improvements in the quality of life for their citizens during the period studied 6. 6 GDP per capita % of GDP on Social spending % of Population living on less than $ 2 a day HDI Unemployment rate

11 The political stability indicator 7 is formed from the opinion of experts consulted in each country, and reflects the weighted average of impressions about political stability in each case. The bars of the chart reflect the average stability for each year of the mandate analyzed. Political stability index of Leftist Presidents in South America Analysis of the chart suggests that, in accordance with the two analytical categories adopted in this work, the countries with "unstructured" party systems and Leftist "antisystem" governments, showed the lowest indexes of stability on the continent. On the other hand, the countries with structured party systems and Leftist, pro-system governments are more stable. 7 The Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI) is a World Bank project aimed at aggregating governance indicators. The WGI compiles and summarizes information from 31 existing data sources that express the view points and experiences of citizens, businessmen and specialists in the public, private and non-profit sectors around the world, about the quality of various aspects of governance. It consists of six elements: voice and accountability, political stability and the absence of violence, government effectiveness, regulatory quality, rule of law, and control of corruption. The data presented in the chart above refers to the second element of the indicator: political stability and absence of violence. Next, we present data on the extent of government effectiveness. The concept of governance used is as follows: "traditions and institutions through which authority is exercised in a country. This includes the process by which governments are selected, monitored and replaced; the ability of the government to formulate and effectively implement sound policies; and the respect of citizens and the State for the institutions that regulate economic and social interactions between them. These facts refer to the second element of the indicator: political stability and the absence of violence.

12 The second indicator relates the effective ability of governments to formulate and implement public policies. It reflects the view of experts on the quality of the creation and implementation of public services, as well as government credibility in relation to providing services in general. Similarly, an average was taken for the years of government for each term analyzed. Governance Effectiveness Index of Leftist Presidents in South America The graph shows that the perception of government effectiveness is lower in democracies where the political party systems are "unstructured" and where the "antisystem" Left are in power. In democracies where the party system is "structured" and the governing Left has a "pro-system" government platform, the perception of government policy effectiveness is greater. In light of the arguments of Mainwaring and Scully (2008), governments like those of Hugo Chávez (Venezuela), Fernando Lugo (Paraguay), Rafael Correa (Ecuador), Evo Morales (Bolivia) and Alan García (Peru) would not be able to implement high-impact public policies. In other words, these governments should not be able to stimulate the economic, social and political development of their citizens in comparison to South American governments with average stability: Brazil (Lula and Dilma) and Argentina (Nestor and Cristina Kirchner) or high stability: Chile (Lagos and Bachelet) and Uruguay (Vásquez and Mujica). Using the data, the first observation to be made is that all three categories of countries (high-, medium-, and low-stability) have improved their economic and social indicators

13 over the past three decades. The chart below reveals that even in the unstable countries, the Left was able to promote economic growth South American % of GDP Allocated to Social Spending South American GDP Per Capita year year Argentina Bolivia Ecuador Peru Venezuela Brazil Chile Paraguay Uruguay Argentina Brazil Ecuador Peru Venezuela Bolivia Chile Paraguay Uruguay Based on CEPAL data Based on United Nations Data However, economic growth, when not accompanied by redistribution of income and/or investment-oriented policy in the social area, does not lead to an improvement in the quality of life for the most vulnerable members of the population. With that in mind, we present below a set of indicators of social development. The first of these shows the percentage of GDP of each country in the social area. The chart above shows a trend of growth in investment by left-wing governments in the social area. This signifies that economic growth has been accompanied by efforts aiming to decrease the conditions of inequality and misery present, in different degrees, in the countries studied. However, it is necessary to consider whether such efforts have achieved some measure of success. In the chart below, we present data on the percentage of the population in each of the countries that lives on less than two dollars a day. The data is presented into two sets: those countries with high or medium political stability and countries with low political stability. The goal is to observe, over time, this indicator in each of these sets. The same was done with the other indicators presented below.

14 % the population lives on less Dollars 2 per day Countries with Low Political Stability year Argentina Chile Brazil Uruguay Countries with Medium and High Political Stability year Bolivia Paraguay Venezuela Ecuador Peru Based on WorldBarnk Data In the two sets of countries, (high/medium and low political stability) there is a drop in the percentage of the population living on less than two dollars a day. Furthermore, even in cases where this tendency has been observed since the beginning of the period studied, there is also the verified coincidence of the rise of Leftist governments and improvement in this indicator. We argue that these numbers can be interpreted as the result of policies of increased social spending and poverty reduction implemented by the elected Leftist governments of the "pink tide" in South America. The trend of consistent improvement in the Human Development Index reinforces this argument. Tendency of South American Human Development Index Countries with Low Political Stability year Bolivia Paraguay Venezuela Ecuador Peru Countries with Medium and High Political Stability year Argentina Chile Brazil Uruguay Based on CEPAL data

15 Even though the improvement trend of this indicator had begun before the Leftist governments came power, these rulers have been able to maintain and, in some cases, maximize this tendency. Finally, we present data on unemployment rates for the countries analyzed in South America. For many of the countries observed, the unemployment rates recorded during the Leftist government administrations are the lowest in the series. This is true in countries with high and medium stability (Chile, Uruguay and Argentina), as well as in countries with low stability (Bolivia, Peru and Ecuador). South American Unemployment Rate Countries with Medium and High Political Stability Countries with low Political Stability year year Argentina Chile Brazil Uruguay Bolivia Paraguay Venezuela Ecuador Peru Based on CEPAL data It is interesting to note that in both groups, there is a trend of economic growth and increased social spending. Furthermore, in almost every case, with regard to social spending, the improvement in the rates of poverty and the reduction in the rates of unemployment, the turning point is the arrival of the Left to power. Despite variations in the perception of political stability depending on the level of structuring of the political party systems, and the kind of Leftist platform that each president represents, even in countries where low political stability is a rule, these governments have managed to ensure greater growth than in prior periods, this accompanied by policies that invest in the social area. In the next section, we will examine the political systems of each of the countries in South America where the left has come to power. We will examine the characteristics of the political system and the organization of the political party systems, as well as give a

16 brief analysis of the political agenda proposed by elected presidents. It is important to note that this analysis of government agendas is not exhaustive, but is merely to point out the principal issues that have structured the political game of the Left in power, in each country. Brazil: Political Stability through Coalition Presidentialism Brazil is one of the countries in the region with an average level of stability. The country is characterized by having a multi-party system, proportional representation with open candidate lists, incongruent bicameralism, federalism and a monopoly of representation by political parties. As for the actual number of parties, Brazil is among those countries that have the greatest level of partisan fragmentation with more than ten active parties in their House of Representatives. 8. The Brazilian political system is characterized by having multiple veto points and high rates of presidential success in the National Congress. Brazil is also one of the cases where the president has broad powers in the national policy agenda, among which it is worth mentioning the power to issue decrees backed by the force of law (provisional measures). Such power, however, does not take away the prerogative of the National Congress to monitor the actions of the executive branch through a governing coalition. In 2003, the Workers' Party (PT) came to power for the first time under the leadership of Luiz Inacio Lula da Silva. This was a typical case of the population s dissatisfaction with the government s support of pro-market policies. With a strongly social platform, the Lula administration expanded social programs with an emphasis on a conditional income transfer policy: the "Bolsa Família" (Family Allowance). This agenda of social programs, however, shook the pillars of the macroeconomic stabilization policy achieved back in the 1990's. Under the Lula administration, there was also a change in the role of the State in the economy, which expanded lending policies to large companies through the National Bank of Economic and Social Development (BNDES), and managed to increase the rates of economic growth with income distribution 9. During Lula's mandate, there was also a ruling coalition that included parties from the right of the political-ideology spectrum such as the Progressive Party (PP) and the Brazilian Labor Party (PTB), as well as center parties such as the Brazilian Democratic Mobilization Party (PMDB) and Leftist parties such as the Brazilian Communist Party (PCdoB). Lula s political platform did not compromise democratic stability in Brazil. Commitments to the market and respect for space for democratic disputes were maintained. Even after being shaken in 2005 by the corruption scandal involving leaders at high levels of government, Lula was re-elected in 2006 and maintained the political 8 According to the data of Anastasia, Melo and Santos (2007). 9 The Gini Coefficient under the Lula Government fell from 0.58 at the beginning of the first Lula administration in 2003 to 0.53 in 2010, according to data from the Brazilian Institute of Geography and Statistics (IBGE).

17 rules, providing for his succession by Dilma Rousseff (PT), who was elected democratically. Argentina Caught Between Crisis and Stabilization: A Controversial Case Argentina is arguably the most controversial of the countries analyzed here. The Argentinian political system contains stabilizing elements, but also has unstable structural elements. Argentina is a bicameral, multiparty Republic with proportional representation and a strong federative character. This highly federalist characteristic allows local politicians the ability to establish local political agendas and to reward their constituents, independently of the national leaders (Benton, 2002). In addition, the characteristics of federalism strengthen regional players, since the survival of national politicians depend on the capacity of regional party leaders to garner support for their parties at the polls (ibid, 2002). The Argentinian party system is not highly structured and has its party machines concentrated in the provinces. The system is centered around the following parties: President Cristina Kirchner s Justicialista (Peronist) Party (PJ), the Radical Civic Union (UCR), Civil Coalition for the Affirmation of a Equalitarian Republic (CC-ARI),and the Country Solidarity Front (FREPASO). Coalitions in Argentina are extremely unstable, a fact that requires the president to continually negotiate with the congress, due to the volatility and scattered nature of political party loyalties in the legislature. The aftermath of Peronism still predominates as a political movement with a strong nationalist character. After the neoliberal wave led by President Menem in 1990, Fernando de La Rua was elected by the URC. During the De La Rua government, an economic downturn was foreshadowed by a political crisis, in December It was a crisis that shook up the Argentinian political system. In 2003, Nestor Kirchner came to power with little legitimacy, given that his opponent Carlos Menem withdrew his candidacy in the second round 10 During Kirchner s terms, there were nationalist policies with a focus on social policies that resulted in a relative redistribution of wealth (Moreira and Barbosa, 2010). The main obstacle for the Kirchner government was the agrarian sector, since the government had decided in 2008 to increase taxes on soy and sunflowers (idem, 2010), and the information technology sector. The Media Law, approved in 2012, brought a shock to Cristina Kirchner s government regarding the communications sector, in particular the Clarín Group, which owned more than 70% of the country's media. During this episode, in which there was judicial contestation, rumors arose that Argentina was trying to strangle the Clarín Group, which was in opposition to the government. 10 Nestor Kirchner's Justicialist Party won the elections with 22 percent of the vote. In this extremely fragmented election, three Peronist candidates competed for the presidency.

18 Ecuador: Instability and the "Costa-Serra" Partisan Divide Since its return to democratic rule, the Ecuadorian Political System has been permeated by great instability. Using the presidential office, unicameral legislature and a unitary power organization as institutional references, the Andean country's democracy can be characterized by three main elements: a) dispersal of power, b) highly-fragmented political parties and, c) a very volatile electoral process. Between 1997 and 2008, Ecuador underwent two reform cycles. The first began in 1997 with the convening of a constituent assembly and the subsequent promulgation of a new Constitutional Charter in The second cycle began in 2006 and was inaugurated through a drastic constitutional reform championed by Rafael Correa. The 1998 Constitution introduced significant changes to the scope of elections and political parties. The goal was to broaden the choices beyond the traditional parties and to provide more room for participation of indigenous minorities. However, once significant changes were introduced into the sphere of elections and political parties, unexpected results were produced, complicating the process of consolidating democratization and the guarantee of governability (Pachano, 2004). Just as in the cases of Venezuela and Bolivia, the Constitution of 2008 was the result of the complete dismantling of the party system and of citizens' lack of faith in the institutions and the political elite. Intense protests marked the beginning of the 2000s, the majority of them directed towards neoliberal reforms implemented during the 1980 s and 1990 s. Thus, the new constitutional model sought to incorporate new demands such as: minority representation in public agencies and parties, the ability to revoke mandates and the ability to create referendums for constitutional changes, in addition to popular mechanisms for control and accountability (Pérez Flores et al, 2010). With regard solely for political parties, one cannot speak of a political party system with national political parties. The existence of different political cultures in the country, each with their own agendas and demands, comes together to create party territorialization and as a consequence, vote territorialization. In this sense, Ecuadorian political competition is permeated by a divide, the "Costa-Serra". Some parties are strong in the provinces along the coast or costa (PSC and PRE), while others are strong in the provinces of the sierra or mountains (ID and DP). In other words, the parties are controlled at the regional level and rarely do they achieve votes throughout the whole national territory. Chile: Stability and Ideological Blocks Defined The Chilean Political System is characterized by being presidentialist and multi-party, with partisan groups that are very ideologically distinct. Since democratization in 1990, Chile has had a very stable political experience, characterized by disputes between the

19 two coalitions, the Concertación, which ruled the country for almost all of the recent democratic period, and the Alliance for Chile. It is important to note that despite the strong ideological difference that separates these two political groups, the Chilean political system has not been marked by extreme polarization, which would impose severe obstacles to presidential performance. At first glance, it might seem that the success of the Chilean president in approving projects is directly related to the fact that, like Brazil, the Chilean political system grants many powers to the President. However, it is important to note that the key to understanding the functioning of the Chilean Government, more important than the broad presidential powers, is the way the president retains his united support base and, even more importantly, negotiates to gain the support of members of the opposition (Maureira, 2007). The opposition, in turn, despite being composed of parties that are very similar ideologically, has not been able to maintain the same discipline and cohesion of an allied party base. It is precisely due to this lesser discipline and cohesion of the opposition that the Concertación governments have managed to run the country without the president needing to make constant use of certain powers. The main parties that make up the Chilean party system are: Socialist Party (PS), Party for Democracy (PPD), Radical Social Democratic Party (PRSD) on the left; the Christian Democratic Party (PDC) in the center; and the National Renovation (RN) and Independent Democratic Union (UDI) on the right. These parties are quite ideologically distinct, since the political party system is more structured around program issues (Altman, Luna, Piñeiro, Toro, 2009). It is worth remembering that the extent of support for the government, on the democracy-dictatorship scale, is also a strong structuring element of the Chilean party system, because of the partisan legacy of the Pinochet Dictatorship. In Michelle Bachelet's government, there was relative economic stability with increments in social policy. During her mandate, Bachelet experienced a period of relative economic prosperity in Chile, mainly due to the increase in the price of copper, an important product of exportfor the Chilean economy. The Chilean Government under Bachelet had high rates of popular approval, ending the term with approval ratings greater than 80%. The Concertación was unable to elect her successor in 2010, however, and the moderate right-wing candidate, Sebastian Piñera, won for the first time since re-democratization. Then, in 2013,Bachelet was re-elected President of Chile. Uruguay: Advances in the Social Agenda In the context of South America, Uruguay experiences high political stability and a structured political party system. The country is a presidential Republic, Unitary and with proportional representation. The multi-party system is moderate with the Colorado Party (PC), the National Party (NP) and the Frente Ampla(FA). The Uruguayan partisan framework is quite similar to that of the period before the military dictatorship of the 1970 s. The novelty of the Uruguayan party system is the gradual rise of the Frente

20 Amplain the electoral scenario. Previously, it was the third main party, but it now ranks as the largest party in Parliament, surpassing both the National Party and the Colorado Party. The election of Tabaré Vasquez in 2005 brought the first left-wing president in the history of the country to power. In 2009, Tabaré Vasquez ssuccessor was elected, President Jose Mujica, also a member of the Frente Ampla. The main issues of the Vasquez government were: "Establishment of wage-bargaining by the Council of Wages; implementation of the Social Emergency Plan (PANES); tax reform and the implementation of income tax for individuals (IRPF); establishment of the National Integrated Health System (SNIS); an increase in financial resources for education, which reached 4.5% of GDP by the end of his term, and the human rights policy, which was strongly focused on investigating the crimes committed by the military during the dictatorship"(rodríguez and Vairo, 2010).In addition, there was economic growth during this period of about 6% per year and a reduction in poverty and unemployment. The Finance Minister of the Vásquez government, José Mujica, was considered one of the most popular members of the government. This contributed greatly to his later electoral success. The political agendas of Presidents Vásquez and Mujica were supported by the legislature, reaching high levels of presidential success in Congress. This was only possible because the presidents could count on a strong and cohesive legislative coalition. Bolivia, the Pluri-National State and the Question of Indigenous Peoples Bolivia is characterized by being a multi-party, bicameral and unitary presidential republic. To elect a president and vice president in Bolivia, it is necessary for candidates to obtain an absolute majority in the first round of elections, or a minimum of 40 percent of the valid votes cast and a difference of at least 10% between the two top candidates. If this is not possible, the dispute goes to a second round of elections. As for the electoral system, Bolivia has a mixed election system for the Lower House and a proportional election representation for the Upper House (Anastasia, et al, 2009). The Bolivian political party system is constituted principally by the Socialist Movement Party (MAS), the Revolutionary Nationalist Movement Party (MNR), the Revolutionary Leftist Movement Party (MIR) and the New Republican Force Party (NFR). After 2002, there was major restructuring of the competitive parties in Bolivia such that parties that had controlled on average 25% of Congress in 1990 simply disappeared from the political scene in This was the case of Homeland Consciousness (CONDEPA) and The Civic Solidarity Union (UCS) parties. The rise of Bolivian President Evo Morales, of MAS-Movement Towards Socialism party, occurred after a crisis in the country between 2003 and President Sanchez de Lozada fell in 2003, after protests, and Carlos Mesa became president. In 2005, there a great social upheaval that forced Carlos Mesa to resign. He was replaced by the head