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1 Title: The European Union s Foreign Policy Ambivalence Author: Caroline Ritter Date: April 16, 2013 Institution name/journal where submitted: McGill University The use of this database indicates agreement to the terms and conditions Academia is a database that promotes the free exchange of exceptional ideas and scholarly work, setting a platform on which to foment and improve student discourse

2 Research Paper POLI 451 Politics of the European Union Tuesday, 16 th April 2013 The European Union's Foreign Policy Ambivalence How and why is the European Union's foreign policy ambivalent? RITTER, Caroline POLI 451 Winter 2013 Dr. Laurie Beaudonnet 2

3 Outline I. Introduction... p.4 II. The European Union's Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP)... p.4 III. Ambivalent aspects of the European Union's Security and Defence policy...p.7 IV. Ambivalent aspects of the European Union's Security and Defence policy... p.9 i. Theory of integration I: Intergovernmentalism...p.10 ii. Theory of integration II: Neo-functionalism...p.12 iii. Theory of integration III: Realism...p.13 iv. Theory of integration IV: Normative Institutionalism...p.16 V. Conclusion...p.18 VI. Appendices...p.20 VII. Bibliography...p.23 3

4 I. Introduction II. The European Union's foreign policy is mainly represented through the Common Foreign and Security Policy, and subsequently by the European Defence and Security Policy. Yet within this area of European policy, there has been an omnipresent development of ambivalent issues on a multitude of levels. The decision to base this paper on the European Union's foreign and security policy is defined by the underlying differences the latter presents with regards to other policy areas within the European Union's decision-making processes. More specifically, within common market or currency policies, member states have proven to be on identical levels in compliance with the approved rules and regulations. However, foreign policy diverges in the sense that comprise and policy process coordination are finalized based on the lowest common denominator in order to minimize diverging preferences to the lowest possible level. It is through this realization that we ask ourselves, how and why is the European Union foreign policy ambivalent? In the first part, the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), and subsequently the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) will be thoroughly defined, and the unsteady foundations will be emphasized as a means to provide an underlying justification for its ambivalent nature. In the second part, different ambivalent aspects of the European Union's foreign policy will be identified, in order to conceptualize the extent of this policy ambivalence. In the third part, different theories of integrations will be utilized as a way to provide an in-depth explanation to this ambivalent nature. These include the intergovernmentalist, neo-functionalist, realist and normative institutionalist approaches. I. I. The European Union's Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) In the first part, the European Union's Common Foreign and Security Policy will 4

5 be clearly introduced and thoroughly defined. There is a necessity to illustrate the ineffective foundations on which the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and consequently the European Defence and Security (EDSP) were both built upon, with respect to the subject of the European Union's foreign and security policy ambivalence. The European Union's foreign and security policy is strongly defined by the establishment of the Common Foreign and Security Policy by negotiators at the Maastricht Intergovernmental Conference (IGC) of The CFSP is defined as the agreed upon foreign policy of the European Union, mainly for security and defence, diplomacy and actions. Established in the Maastricht Treaty (Article 11), and reaffirmed in the Amsterdam and Lisbon Treaties, the objectives of the CFSP are numerous (Cini and Borragan, 2010): It is set to safeguard the common values, fundamental interests, independence, and integrity of the Union in conformity with the principle of the United Nations Charter; to strengthen the security of the Union; to preserve peace and strengthen international security, in accordance with the principles of the United Nations Charter; to promote international cooperation; to develop and consolidate democracy and the rule of law, and respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms. However, even with such an important establishment, there are several aspects within the Common Foreign and Security Policy that underline the unstable foundations upon which it was built. In a first aspect, there had proven to be a strong and general tendency towards an inter-governmentalist approach applied to decision-making processes. The Common Foreign and Security Policy was set to consolidate the second pillar of the newly founded European Union, which was more specifically set to be intergovernmental thus involving minimal input from the European Commission and the European Parliament (Cini and Borragan, 2010). It is thus important to note the important presence of intergovernmentalism in European foreign policy in such instances, conceptualized in diversified ways. As an example, the CFSP's decision-making framework was mainly 5

6 defined by member state unanimity in the Council, thus allowing each government the choice to veto any policy initiative. Consequently, EU foreign and security policy resulted in the lowest common denominator process, and this in turn created conservative results. In a second aspect, coordinating all three pillars proved to be a difficult task. As a stated objective of the CFSP, it had an established responsibility of assisting EU governments in formulating common foreign policy positions (Cini and Borragan, 2010). However, this specific objective had proven hard to achieve given that the CFSP decision-making process was positioned outside of the Community decision-making structures. There was a general issue of coordination between the three pillars, mainly because there were many economic issues within pillar 1 that generated an impact on the EU's external relations. Additionally, pillar 3 utilized decision-making procedures that varied from those of CFSP and also conceptualized external dimensions making coordination difficult. Even given efforts to strengthen coordination, the Commission and the Parliament were nevertheless excluded of CFSP policy making procedures to ensure that the member states sovereignty in the policy was maintained. In a third aspect, cooperation between the different member governments proved difficult to establish, as the British and French governments disagreed at Amsterdam regarding specific policy development (Cini and Borragan, 2010). On one side, the British government considered that the EU was incapable of establishing a common foreign policy given the unfortunate result of the Yugoslav situation. On another side, the French government affirmed the opposite, stating that the specific experience underlined the strong need for a common policy. Thus, amongst national governments, there had proven to be very minimal cooperation and collaborative behaviours. Even with the establishment of the Amsterdam Treaty, national governments were thus strongly adamant to continue inter-governmentalist decision-making procedures. The lack of cooperation and common positions between national governments can only emphasize the unstable foundations of the CFSP. 6

7 Additionally, even after several policy proposals and amendments led to the establishment of the European Defence and Security Policy, a strong presence of intergovernmentalist tendencies still dominated the political environment. With the development of European Council meetings in Cologne, Helsinki and Sintra through 1999 to 2000, proposals were amended and finalized into a capabilities catalogue ; defined as a combination of personnel, expertise, and military equipment pledged by member governments that could be possibly utilized EU-sponsored military actions (Cini and Borragan, 2010). However, member states proved to be incapable of meeting the targets within this specific catalogue, which also included the Petersberg tasks and the Headline Goal for the EU (Cini and Borragan, 2010). The inability by member states is strongly justified by the internal pressures to direct expenditures on more electorally attractive domains, such as health and education. In the same time, foreign and security financial budgets were dominated by defence equipment inflation, as well as Middle-Eastern conflicts present in Afghanistan and Iraq. The participation of the Petersburg tasks in ESDP concretizes the argument that the ESDP underlines the EU's strong absence in contributing substantial resources or acting in peacekeeping and peace-enforcement activities. There was also a general consideration that the threats to the European Union come from non-state military actors in the medium to long term (Smith, 2001). Thus, even with the establishment of several proposals, the ESDP still maintained unstable foundations. The political environment of the European Union is strongly characterized by an omnipresent demand for collective EU actions in both foreign and security policy from national governments, as well as the Parliament and Commission. Yet, the European Union has conceptually failed to meet these demands and has therefore produced ineffective and ambivalent foreign policies. The presence of an ambivalent foreign and security policy stance can therefore be justified through the unstable and ineffective foundations of the Common Security and Defence Policy, from an absence of member state cooperation, to an overarching tendency towards inter-governmental decisionmaking processes. Following this, it is thus important to underline the numerous ambivalent aspects within European Union's foreign and security policy. 7

8 I. Ambivalent aspects of the European Union's Security and Defence policy In a second part, such ambivalence in the European Union's foreign and security policy is starkly represented in the omnipresent divide between the EU's 'words and deeds', as thoroughly stated by Thomas Risse, accredited doctor and professor at Freie Universitat Berlin. Firstly, it can be seen that the European Union advocates its identity as a 'civilian power' through encouraging inter-governmental cooperation as well as establishing an omnipresent need for European integration. There exists a general argument that establishing a European foreign policy identity is the ultimate objective of the EU's modern and enlightenment identity (Anderson, 2008). However, it is important to note that even if the EU openly solidifies a particular foreign policy, the latter cannot be fully defined by the EU's collective identity. More so, the EU's foreign policies often prioritizes geo-strategic and security interests over human rights and democracy concerns (Risse, 2012), thus strongly conceptualizing the ambivalent aspects of the EU's foreign and security policies. More specifically, this can be broadly seen through the EU's foreign policy within the Middle East. EU institutions strongly base their values on the promotion of democracy and human rights within the geographical region. Yet these institutions established a prevalent priority on the stability of these countries, thus consequently having to stabilize autocratic rulers and act on double standards (Risse, 2012). They claim to prioritize principles over interests, but have nevertheless engaged themselves in contradictory policies. Additionally, the European Union has strongly utilized the art of double standards by imposing sanctions on Tehran's government, justified by human rights violations, as well as engaging in military action against the Libyan dictator, all while failing to encompass and address the repression of the pro-democracy movement in Bahrain (Amirahmadi and Afrasiabi, 2011). 8

9 Secondly, the European Union's foreign and security policy ambivalence is strongly illustrated through the issue of its enlargement of the Turkish state, whom started it accession negotiations in Enlargement has a strong positioning in the European Union's foreign policy because it is directly linked to the security and defence issues of its member states, as well as cultural, either by consolidating such powers or possibly threatening their mere existence. The issue has become increasingly visible and can be seen on numerous levels. For instance, Valery Giscard d'estaing, former French president and head of the European constitutional convention, strongly represented the views and worries of Europeans with regards to the accession of the Turkish state. More importantly, the former president pronounced a provocative statement of Turkey not being a European country and that its accession would be the end of Europe (Bindi, 2010). Several years later, the Turkish government was not offered a formal invitation to the Berlin Summit, which marked the fiftieth anniversary of the Treaties of Rome. Consequently, this specific act created some sense of disappointment and dismay within the Turkish state. Additionally, in a similar Turco-skeptic statement European commissioner brought the Ottoman siege of Vienna to light by stating that the liberation of 1683 would have been in vain (Bindi, 2010) if the Turkish state were granted accession. The European Union's ambivalence and uncertainty regarding the accession of Turkey can also be seen through the ambivalent aspect of institutional measures and protocols taken throughout the extended process of the Turkish accession negotiations. In 1963, it signed an Association Agreement, also known as the Ankara agreement, whose initial purpose was to model a structure for full membership. In 1971, another protocol was signed between Turkey and the EC whose specific goal was to consolidate both actors' economic and political relations. The EU's foreign policy ambivalence is starkly illustrated here since it viewed the agreement as a framework for its containment policy rather than a pre-accession strategy, because it had serious reservations about Turkey's prospects for EU membership on political and economic grounds (Bindi, 2010). Following this, the Turkish state applied for full membership in April In response, the European Union had a general negative overview on such a membership. 9

10 However, the collapse of the Soviet Union engendered an intensified process of enlargement, with the Commission engaging in the accession negotiations with six countries (Czech Republic, Cyprus, Estonia, Hungary, Poland, and Slovenia), all the while excluding the Turkish state justified by an economic and political reasoning (Bindi, 2010). Even after having launched accession negotiations, there have been minimal forward-moving changes. Only Chapter 25, related to Science and Research, has been accessible for negotiations. The European Commission also made the decision to partially suspend negotiations on several chapters of the acquis communautaire, until the Turkish state proves that it can fully respond to its obligations. The Council of Ministers has also decided that eight chapters covering policy areas relevant to Turkey's restrictions as regards the Republic of Cyprus (Bindi, 2010) will not be opened. I. Theories of integration to justify the ambivalence of the European Security and Defence Policy There are several theories of integration that can offer a solid understanding and justification of the ambivalence present in the European Union's foreign policy. More specifically, widespread theories of integration such as the intergovernmentalist approach, as well as the neo-functionalist and institutional approach all offer rational explanations for the puzzle that constitutes the European Union foreign and security policy decision-making processes. In this part, the main theories of integration will be thoroughly defined and constructed in a way to fully justify the ambivalence of the European Security and Defence Policy. 1. Theory of integration I: Intergovernmentalism In a first instance, it is important to fully develop the defining aspects of the intergovernmentalist approach with regards to European integration, drawn from realist or 10

11 neo-realist analyses of inter-state bargaining. The intergovernmentalist theory of integration is on one hand characterized by state-centrism, where the process of integration is defined as a zero-sum game. It specifically argues that European integration is driven by the interests and actions of nation states (Hix 1999:15). The process of integration and the willingness to cooperate will be dependent on a full analysis of the pros and cons of participation. The most important aspect is emcompassing in this qualitative cost-benefit analysis to fully protect national governments' interests. The intergovernmental theory is strongly defined by the concept of the sovereignty of national states. To be specifically defined, it implies the legal capacity of national decision-makers to take decisions without being subject to external restraints (Nugent 1999: 502). National governments will be sure that they fully maintain all aspects of control since they consider themselves to be the most important actors, and thus refuse to cede any level of sovereignty. European cooperation thus implies at most a pooling or sharing of sovereignty, as opposed to a transfer of sovereignty from the national to the supranational level (Keohane and Hoffman 1990: 277). The intergovernmentalist approach was strongly developed by Stanley Hoffman, who established the bases of the intergovernmentalist approach to European integration. He generally rejected neo-functionalist theory, claiming that neo-functionalists had disregarded the context within which it was taking place in explaining the process of European integration (Rosamond 2000: 76). He also rejected the concept that European integration was driven by the concept of spillover, maintaining that international politics remained characterized by a perpetual conflict over interests (O'Neill 1996: 61). Explaining the ambivalence of the European Union's foreign and security policy can be defined through the intergovernmentalist theory of integration. The puzzle of the European Defence and Security Policy can explained through the absence of a European supranational identity, thus emphasizing the lack of a supranational level of decisionmaking processes. There is ambivalence with regards to foreign policies mainly because of national governments fear to lose their national sovereignty if power regarding security and defence issues is delegated to supranational institutions, thus exerting strong 11

12 preferences to maintain power on the national level. Therefore, the European Union's foreign and security policies are largely defined and comply with individual state interests, which have proven to be quite divergent at times, in turn contributing to complex decision-making procedures. This specific hypothesis can be justified on several levels. In a first part, the main essence of the role and responsibilities of the appointed High Representative consolidates the view that decision-making on foreign policy matters depends on individual state interests (Benjamin, 2010 pp ). Where foreign policy is commonly agreed between member states on a specific topic, the High Representative can thus speak on behalf of member states, such as negotiating on behalf on the member states. The intergovernmental positioning of the High Representative acting both as chair of the EEAS (European External Service) and vice president of the European Commission hinders the existence of a functional institute at the supranational level. The entirety of decisions dealing with foreign and security policy issues are approved by a unanimity vote, as well as approval of the European Council. Thus the High Representative is responsible for coming to a consensual decision based upon the decisions of member states and the mandates that they specifically provide to the High Representative. The position of the High Representative can also been seen as an effective way to satisfy the preference of national governments, as it is commonly used as a tool of negotiations between the supranational institutions and other member states (Benjamin, 2010 pp ). During this process, individual member states will show the tendency to delegate collectively or individually on their special interests, as a way to meet their own individual interests. In official terms, the European Council formally exercises control over the High Representative, yet this is conducted entirely in connection to the interests of national governments and their respective influence towards the EEAS membership. It can thus be strongly seen that the presence of ambivalent aspects to the European Union's foreign and security policies can be explained through the intergovernmentalist theory of integration, in which member states are more concerned with satisfying their own national sovereignty rather than delegating those powers to a functionalist institutions, thus creating a stronger and more important divergence in 12

13 member states' national interests. 1. Theory of integration II: Neo-functionalism Ernst B. Hass famously defines the neo-functionalist process of political integration as the process whereby political actors in several distinct national settings are persuaded to shift their loyalties, expectations, and political activities toward a new centre, whose institutions possess or demand jurisdiction over the pre-existing national states (Haas 1958, 16). This theory of integration can be defined by three main characteristics. Firstly, its' core concept is spill-over, where Hass's theory was based on the assumption that cooperation in one policy domain would exert influences in other policy areas, thus leading to integration deepening. Secondly, interest groups and political parties are deemed the main actors in conducting the integrationist procedures. In this sense, integration can be viewed as a process driven by the self-interest of groups, rather than by any ideological vision of a united Europe or a shared sense of identity (Cini & Borragan, 2010 pp ). Thirdly, it can be characterized as an elite-driven approach to European integration, as it seems to be driven by functional and technocratic needs. Following the neo-functionalist logic of European integration, explaining the presence of ambivalence within the European Security and Defence Policy can be seen through the variation among EU member states with regards to their preparedness to communitarize defence affairs. There is firstly a need to understand the positioning of a member state's national sovereignty as an inter-subjective social construction (Risse, 2004), which is a concept that is strongly present in the collective identity of a nation-state (Biersteker and Weber, 1996). From an empirical study conducted by Koenig-Archibugi and Hooghe, the divide between states showing a willingness to delegate powers with regards to their foreign and defence affairs and those on the opposite spectrum leads to the assumption that federal states, rather than unitary states, are more likely to value communitarization of security and defence issues. Member states operating under a federal system have shown a 13

14 preference towards supranationalism rather than intergovernmentalism, and have also exerted a willingness to supranationalize their foreign and defence policies. Thus, federal countries whose citizens are open to the concept of divided and shared sovereignty regarding these issues are also more willing to internalize the idea of supranationalism in several foreign and security policy areas. In the neo-functionalist vocabulary, this concept can be defined ideational spillover (Risse, 2004). The main characteristic of member states showing support for a communitarization of foreign and security policies is the presence and adoption of multilateral and cooperative defence policies (Risse, 2004). They have an ultimate view of the European Union as a 'civilian power', rather than playing on its military capabilities. These specific member states thus place a strong emphasis on cooperative security policy, multilaterism, and the rule of (international) law (Risse, 2004). On another dimension, member states operating in a centralized manner, such as the United Kingdom and France, have shown a strong reluctance in delegating aspects of their national sovereignty to supranational institutions, and have shown a tendency to exert regional military force when considered needed. Therefore, member states operating under a federal system have shown a stronger tendency towards the support and further development of a communitarization of foreign and defence policies, as they have shown a preference towards cooperative and multilateral foreign policies. Taking into the consideration the divergence in member states preferences regarding the subject of defence and foreign affairs communitarization, such reasoning can provide a solid understanding of the double puzzle of European integration (Risse, 2004). In the context of other policy-making processes, the European Union has shown a strong tendency towards constitution building between supranational and intergovernmental institutions. However, on the other hand, the EU has also shown a gradual failure in foreign and defence policy processes in European integration. The above-mentioned empirical analysis thus provides a strong explanation for understanding the process of Europeanization in this respect, as there are different degrees with which the European Union is justified through collective identities. 14

15 1. Theory of integration III: Realism The presence of ambivalent aspects to the EU's foreign and security policies can also be explained through a realist approach. It is first necessary to fully and thoroughly explain the defining characteristics of this theory of integration. Realism defines the context of international politics as an interaction of self-interested states in an anarchic environment, where there is no global authority capable of securing order (Morganthau, 1985). Nugent specifically defined realism as being centered on the view that nation states are the key actors in international affairs and the key political relations between states are channeled primarily via national governments (Nugent 1999: 509). The subsequent theory of integration defined as neo-realism by Waltz in 1979, and can be described as states being self-regarded actors co-existing in an anarchical system (Waltz 1979). International settings can be considered as concentration zero-sum negotiations, with their results determined by the distribution of state power within the international setting. Individual states' policy preferences will show a general failure of convergence, as they all possess their own respective and divergent internal issues. Given these convergence difficulties, consolidating a community encompassing all participating states proves to be a difficult task. Neo-realists identify the presence of international institutions aimed at reducing the degree of anarchy within the states, and view the European Union as one of these institutions, even if located within a highly institutionalized setting. In an attempt to justify the presence of ambivalent aspects within the foreign and security policy of the European Union, the use of the realist approach can be defined as a strong justification of the these inherent issues within foreign and security policy decision-making processes. From Morgenthau to Waltz, the realist theory of integration strongly underlines that individual states are very much unlikely to transfer their national sovereignty with regards to security and defence issues. To support this hypothesis, the strong refusal by several member states to extend Qualified Majority Voting (QMV) to decision-making procedures covering security and defence issues strongly underlines member states preference towards maintaining their national decision-making autonomy with respect to these policy areas (Risse, 2012). 15

16 However, the realist explanation for such foreign policy ambivalence has shown some shortcomings, more specifically with regards to the distinction between the 'autonomy-seeking', seen through their refusal over QMV as mentioned above, and the influence-seeking characteristics defined under the realist approach (Risse, 2012). If member states were genuinely seeking to extend their influential powers on the scale of global politics, the unwillingness for member states to transfer their national sovereignty to supranational institutions is merely self-defeating (Risse, 2012). Consolidating the European Union's identity as a 'civilian power' would also lead to the need to balance the different national interests, which in turn necessitates consolidating alliances. Thus this aspect of the realist approach does not comply with the current situation of favouring national interests. Additionally, the realist approach to providing justification for the EU's foreign and security policy ambivalence is also controversial in the sense that the realist justification only applies to some EU countries, such as the United Kingdom. Two-thirds of member states have shown enthusiasm and willingness to communitarize their security and defence policies, while others have been less willing to do so. It is also important to note that most EU member states are also part of the NATO alliance, defined by intergovernmental procedures of decision-making but featuring a completely integrated military structure (Risse, 2012) Neo-realism does provide a substantive explanation to the ambivalent aspects of the European Security and Defence Policy, yet it can be concluded that these latter arguments are not founded on solid foundations and are thus irrelevant to the case of EU foreign policy ambivalence. 1. Theory of integration IV: Normative Institutionalism The puzzle of the European Defence and Security Policy can also be explained through the normative institutional approach. The latter can be defined as a sub-field of new institutionalism, which is in turn defined as a general theory of integration focusing on developing a sociological view of institutions, specifically the manner in which they 16

17 affect society. Within this context, normative institutionalism is considered as the original new institutionalism, in which the behavioural attitudes to actors is steered by a logic of appropriateness (Thomas, 2009), in turn defined by a sociological interpretation of institutions. James G. March has proven to be the leading author in the theory of normative institutionalism, defining that the logic of appropriateness can be explained by the fact that certain actions are matched to situations by means of rules organized into identities (March, 1994). The behaviour of institutional actors is thus structured by their perceived identities, the relevant situation, and the perceived rules present in the specific context. Normative institutionalism is in contrast to another sub-field of new institutionalism, rational choice institutionalism, which explains the ways in which changes in the relative power of actors is correlated to changes in the institutional rules (Cini and Borragan, 2010 pp ). The normative institutionalist theory of European Union policy making puts forth two different methods the EU can utilize in negotiating agreements when there is a strong divergence in policy preferences (Thomas, 2009). First, entrapment is defined as member states accepting policies that are inconsistent with their policy preferences, since they consider it difficult to distance themselves of substantive EU norms. Second, cooperative bargaining is defined as the establishment of common policies based on mutual compromise, where veto threats are sidelined by the European Union's procedural norms in favour of consultation and consensus (Thomas, 2009). In this context, the normative institutionalist can provide an analysis of the ambivalent aspects of the European foreign policy. Through empirical analysis conducted by Daniel Thomas in Normative Institutionalism and EU foreign policy in comparative perspective, fourteen case studies regarding the European Union's foreign and security policy were taken into conclusion, and it was concluded that nine showed instances of entrapment and four underlined instances of cooperative bargaining. There exist five necessary conditions for these two concepts to happen: First, entrapment is expected to overcome policy divergence if there is an uncontroversial norm with clear behavioural implications (determinacy) and the situation in question is consistent with the normative conditions for agreement (relevance). When 17

18 the norm is contested, indeterminate or irrelevant, the basic conditions of entrapment are not met. In addition, entrapment is facilitated by public attention to the issue (publicity), prior policy commitments (precedent), and by a site of negotiation and deliberation in which EU norms are salient(forum). Appendix 2 underlines both the development and the absence of these factors in the different case studies within the empirical study, it is important to note that all case studies are characterized as being instances of intra-eu negotiations. The example of the Iraq crisis of 2002/2003 can be developed as an example underlining an ambivalent EU foreign policy. The Iraqi policy was strongly explained as an absence of common norms or policy similarities between member states, which ultimately could have led to the creation of an agreement on supporting the war. Cooperative bargaining was also hindered by the presence of public posturing and negotiations outside the institutionalized channels of foreign-policy making process. However, with regards to the reconstructive aid towards Iraq, there existed relevant common norms within the EU on this matter, as well as because EU member states refrained from public posturing (Thomas, 2009). As another example, the case of the Turkish enlargement can be justified and explained through the normative institutionalist approach. The accession negotiations were stifled by three separate cases of diverging preferences among member states. All four conditions of entrapment were omnipresent, from receiving high public attention, the presence of negotiations, yet the Turkish state had undermined the concept of entrapment by failing to fully implement the Customs Unions to Cyprus. Thus the presence of ambivalent aspects in the European Union's foreign and security policy can be strongly linked to the presence of four diversified factors (namely determinacy, relevance, publicity, precedent, forum) that have to be present in order for preference divergences to lead to policy cooperation and coordination between member states. If such factors are not present, a general situation of deadlock arises, yet it is important to note that reaching all four conditions of entrapment in the normative 18

19 institutionalist approach is not always a reachable target. I. Conclusion In conclusion, there have proven to be different unsteady foundations of the European Security and Defence Policy that constitute defining arguments in providing a primary justification for the ambivalent nature of the European Union's foreign policy. These different ambivalent aspects include an issue of 'double standards' from the functionalist institution, to issues relating to the Turkish state's accession negotiations to the European Union. As a means to justify such ambivalence, different theories of integration attempt to provide an in-depth analysis of this ambivalent nature, yet it is important to emphasize whether these theories are conceptually supported by evidence. With regards to the realist approach, it has been proven that such a theory of integration is only merely supported by evidence through the reluctance to apply QMV to decision-making procedures. The latter does not provide a solid justification to the presence of ambivalent aspects of the European Union's foreign policy as its main principles contrast with empirical evidence. Following this logic, the neo-functionalst approach does provide a strong theoretical explanation, yet as seen through Appendix 3, it only provides an explanation on the European level and fails to provide an in-depth explanation on both the domestic and international levels of analysis. The two theories of integration that have proven to provide a strong justification to the ambivalent nature of the European Union's foreign policy are both the intergovernmentalist approach, in which ambivalence is defined through a constant reluctance by member states to transfer its national sovereignty on foreign and security issues to the supranational level, and the normative institutionalist approach, in which the ambivalent nature is justified through the presence of different member state identities and their respective willingness to cooperate on the supranational level with regards to this field. 19

20 I. Appendices II. Appendix 1: Negotiation characteristics and Normative Institutionalism Source: Thomas, D.C. (2009). Explaining the negotiation of EU Foreign policy: Normative institutionalism and alternative approaches. International Politics 46(4):

21 Appendix 2: Conditions of entrapment and cooperative bargaining The 'case' column displays the demands or policy proposals in question. The values for the conditions are positive if they are expected to work in favour of a positive outcome, negative if they are likely to hinder a positive outcome. Source: Thomas, D.C. (2009). Explaining the negotiation of EU Foreign policy: Normative institutionalism and alternative approaches. International Politics 46(4):

22 Appendix 3: Theories and their levels of analysis Source: Wilga, M. (2008). The CFSP in synergetic theorizing: explaining the CFSP via a multi-causal and multi-level analytical model. Jean Monnet/Robert Schuman Paper Series, Vol. 8 No. 7 22

23 I. Bibliography Amirahmadi H. and Afrasiabi K. (2011), The west's silence over Bahrain smacks of double standards, The Guardian. Anderson, S. (2008), Crafting EU Security Policy. In Pursuit of a European Identity. Benjamin D, (2010). Intergovernmentalism or Functionalism? Foreign policy in the European Union after the Lisbon Treaty, University of Bridgeport publications. Bicchi, F. (2006) Our size fits all : Normative Power Europe and the Mediterranean, Journal of European Public Policy, 13 (2), pp Biersteker, T. J., and Weber, C. (eds) (1996) State Sovereignty as Social Construct, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Bindi, F. (2010), The Foreign Policy of the European Union: assessing Europe's role in the world, Brookings Institution Press, pp Cini and Borragan (2010) European Union Politics, Chapter 15. Third edition. Oxford University Press. Charalambides I.C. (2009), Evaluation of the Turkish accession to the European Union, the structural changes and EU cohesion, National Centre for Work Based Learning Partnerships, Middlesex University. Hix, S. (1999), The political system of the European Union (Basingtoke: Macmillan). Hix, Simon and Hoyland, Bjorn (2011) The Political System of the European Union. Part of chapter 12 Foreign Policies: pp Hooghe, L. (2001) The European Commission and the Integration of Europe. Images of Governance, Themes in Euro-pean Governance, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Ernst B. Hass, (1958). The Uniting of Europe: Political, Social and Economic Forces European Foreign Policy Scorecard 2013, (2013) European Council on Foreign Relations, ecfr.eu. Keohane, R.O and S. Hoffman (eds) (1991), The new European Community:decision 23

24 making and institutional change (Boulder, CO:Westview). Koenig-Archibugi, M. (2004) 'Explaining Government Preferences for Institutional Change in EU Foreign and Security Policy', International Organization 54 (1): March, James G. (1994). Primer on Decision Making: How Decisions Happen. Free Press. Morgenthau, H. (1985), Politics among nations: the struggle for power and peace 6th edn (New York: Knopf). Nugent, N. (1999), The government and politics of the European Union 4th edn (Basingtoke: Macmillan). Nugent, Neil (2010). The Government and Politics of the European Union. Chapter 17 Policy Processes : pp O'Neill, M. (1996), The politics of European integration. A reader (London: Routledge). Pace, M. (2007) The Construction of EU Normative Power, Journal of Common Market Studies, 45 (5), pp Risse, Thomas (2004). Neo-functionalism, European Identity, and the Puzzles of European Integratio '. Special Issue for the Journal of European Public Policy. Risse, T. (2012) A Community of Europeans? Transnational Identities and Public Spheres. Ithaca NY: Cornell University Press. Risse, T. (2012) Identity Matters: Exploring the Ambivalence of EU Foreign Policy, Global Policy, 3:Suppl.1. Rosamond, B. (2000) Theories of European Integration (Basingtoke, Macmillan). Smith, M. (2001), The common foreign and security policy in S. Bromley (ed.) Governing the European Union (London: Sage). Thomas, D.C. (2009). Explaining the negotiation of EU Foreign policy: Normative institutionalism and alternative approaches. International Politics 46(4): Thomas, Daniel. Schimmelfennig, Frank (2009). Normative institutionalism and EU foreign policy in comparative perspective. International Politics, Palgrave Macmillan Youngs, R (2004) Normative Dynamics and Strategic Interests in the EU's External 24

25 Identity, Journal of Common Market Studies, 42 (2), pp Waltz, K. (1979), Theory of international politics (New York: McGraw Hill). Wilga, M. (2008). The CFSP in synergetic theorizing: explaining the CFSP via a multicausal and multi-level analytical model. Jean Monnet/Robert Schuman Paper Series, Vol. 8 No. 7 25