Internal Politics of Non-state Groups and the Challenges of Foreign Policy

Transcription

1 Internal Politics of Non-state Groups and the Challenges of Foreign Policy Livio Di Lonardo Scott A. Tyson

2 Non-state groups Ungoverned Spaces (Syria, Iraq, Somalia, etc) Haven for emerging groups

3 Non-state groups Ungoverned Spaces (Syria, Iraq, Somalia, etc) Haven for emerging groups What are non-state groups doing?

4 Non-state groups Ungoverned Spaces (Syria, Iraq, Somalia, etc) Haven for emerging groups What are non-state groups doing? 1. Consolidate control of territory (Proto-state) 2. Next generation of terrorism (Global terror)

5 Non-state groups Ungoverned Spaces (Syria, Iraq, Somalia, etc) Haven for emerging groups What are non-state groups doing? 1. Consolidate control of territory (Proto-state) 2. Next generation of terrorism (Global terror) Foreign policy toward non-state groups?

6 Foreign policy challenges: Pressing need to address evolving terrorist threats Uncertainty about ultimate goals (Control territory, conduct terrorist attacks, etc.)

7 Foreign policy challenges: Pressing need to address evolving terrorist threats Uncertainty about ultimate goals (Control territory, conduct terrorist attacks, etc.) Internal politics of non-state groups (Presence of factions with different goals etc. )

8 Foreign policy challenges: Pressing need to address evolving terrorist threats Uncertainty about ultimate goals (Control territory, conduct terrorist attacks, etc.) Internal politics of non-state groups (Presence of factions with different goals etc. ) Forced to rely on actions (recruiting, extremism, etc)

9 Foreign policy challenges: Pressing need to address evolving terrorist threats Uncertainty about ultimate goals (Control territory, conduct terrorist attacks, etc.) Internal politics of non-state groups (Presence of factions with different goals etc. ) Forced to rely on actions (recruiting, extremism, etc) Relevant literature: Arce and Sandler (2007, 2010); Berman (2006,2008,2009); Bueno de Mesquita (2005,2007,2008); Dragu & Polborn (2014); Lake (2002); Lapan and Sandler (1993); Overgaard (1994)

10 What can the authorities in potential target countries learn from groups actions?

11 What can the authorities in potential target countries learn from groups actions? Can target countries exploit internal divisions within groups to get rid of threats to national security?

12 What can the authorities in potential target countries learn from groups actions? Can target countries exploit internal divisions within groups to get rid of threats to national security? Does a more aggressive approach deter groups from planning terror campaigns?

13 What can the authorities in potential target countries learn from groups actions? Can target countries exploit internal divisions within groups to get rid of threats to national security? Does a more aggressive approach deter groups from planning terror campaigns? Are inflexible and committed strategies a better tool to combat potential terror threats?

14 Model Non-state Groups Non-state Group Composed of Incumbent faction and Elite faction

15 Model Non-state Groups Non-state Group Composed of Incumbent faction and Elite faction Each faction Moderate: θ i = 0 Extremist: θ i = 1

16 Model Non-state Groups Non-state Group Composed of Incumbent faction and Elite faction Each faction Moderate: θ i = 0 Extremist: θ i = 1 Terrorism T and other political tactics L: u(t, L θ i ) = θ i T + (1 θ i ) L

17 Model Non-state Groups Non-state Group Composed of Incumbent faction and Elite faction Each faction Moderate: θ i = 0 Extremist: θ i = 1 Terrorism T and other political tactics L: u(t, L θ i ) = θ i T + (1 θ i ) L Preference Composition: 1. Cohesive (C) both extremist (µ C ) 2. Divided (D E ) led by extremist (µ E ) 3. Divided (D M ) led by moderate (µ M )

18 Model Target Country Politician Uncertain of preference composition Wants to stop global terrorism

19 Model Target Country Politician Uncertain of preference composition Wants to stop global terrorism Military intervention BInary action: intervene or not Cost of intervention to politician: c Cost of intervention to faction: K

20 Actions & Timing 1. Incumbent: Group endowed with a resource Invest in global terror potential (r = 1) or no (r = 0)

21 Actions & Timing 1. Incumbent: Group endowed with a resource Invest in global terror potential (r = 1) or no (r = 0) 2. Elite: Support incumbent (s = 1) or not (s = 0) If r = 0 non-support depreciates resource by δ

22 Actions & Timing 1. Incumbent: Group endowed with a resource Invest in global terror potential (r = 1) or no (r = 0) 2. Elite: Support incumbent (s = 1) or not (s = 0) If r = 0 non-support depreciates resource by δ 3. Politician: Intervene or not Eliminates group q(φ + s(1 φ))

23 Actions & Timing 1. Incumbent: Group endowed with a resource Invest in global terror potential (r = 1) or no (r = 0) 2. Elite: Support incumbent (s = 1) or not (s = 0) If r = 0 non-support depreciates resource by δ 3. Politician: Intervene or not Eliminates group q(φ + s(1 φ)) 4. If group survives, faction in control allocates group s resources

24 Terrorism Allocation (x, y, z) for final resources W Explicitly Terrorism T 1. Local terrorism: β y

25 Terrorism Allocation (x, y, z) for final resources W Explicitly Terrorism T 1. Local terrorism: β y 2. Global terrorism: r G(x) G(x) = γ + Γ(x) Γ(x) increasing, concave γ lone-wolves

26 Terrorism Allocation (x, y, z) for final resources W Explicitly Terrorism T 1. Local terrorism: β y 2. Global terrorism: r G(x) G(x) = γ + Γ(x) Γ(x) increasing, concave γ lone-wolves Terrorism T (x, y) = rg(x) + βy

27 Terrorism Allocation (x, y, z) for final resources W Explicitly Terrorism T 1. Local terrorism: β y 2. Global terrorism: r G(x) G(x) = γ + Γ(x) Γ(x) increasing, concave γ lone-wolves Terrorism T (x, y) = rg(x) + βy Other political tactics L(z) increasing, concave

28 Substantive Restrictions 1. Intervene against known threats c qφγ(x )

29 Substantive Restrictions 1. Intervene against known threats c qφγ(x ) 2. Extremist factions interested in conducting global terror attacks G(x ) > 2β

30 Substantive Restrictions 1. Intervene against known threats c qφγ(x ) 2. Extremist factions interested in conducting global terror attacks G(x ) > 2β 3. Intervention imposes large costs (a) Factions: K K (b) Politician: c c Cost Cutoffs

31 What are the Primary Forces? Fact 1 Without recruitment, the elite faction supports if and only if the group is cohesive. Ideological differences lead to internal divisions

32 What are the Primary Forces? Fact 1 Without recruitment, the elite faction supports if and only if the group is cohesive. Ideological differences lead to internal divisions Fact 2 If the group is divided and the incumbent recruited, then the elite supports iff support deters intevention. Intervention can unify an otherwise divided group

33 What are the Primary Forces? Fact 1 Without recruitment, the elite faction supports if and only if the group is cohesive. Ideological differences lead to internal divisions Fact 2 If the group is divided and the incumbent recruited, then the elite supports iff support deters intevention. Intervention can unify an otherwise divided group Fact 3 Extremist incumbent of a divided group has a dominant strategy to recruit. Effect of lone wolves on leaders of organizations

34 Persistent Uncertainty Proposition 1 There does not exist a fully seperating PBE.

35 Persistent Uncertainty Proposition 1 There does not exist a fully seperating PBE. Politician can t learn perfectly the ideological composition of the group

36 Persistent Uncertainty Proposition 1 There does not exist a fully seperating PBE. Politician can t learn perfectly the ideological composition of the group Factions choose their actions to generate uncertainty Extent of uncertainty depends on c

37 Persistent Uncertainty Proposition 1 There does not exist a fully seperating PBE. Politician can t learn perfectly the ideological composition of the group Factions choose their actions to generate uncertainty Extent of uncertainty depends on c Foreign policy with regard to non-state groups always a challenge

38 Reluctant Politician Proposition 2 When the politician is reluctant to intervene (c ĉ), then there exists a unique semi-separating PBE where only extremist incumbent recruits, no elite supports.

39 Reluctant Politician Proposition 2 When the politician is reluctant to intervene (c ĉ), then there exists a unique semi-separating PBE where only extremist incumbent recruits, no elite supports. Recruitment signals ideology of incumbent

40 Reluctant Politician Proposition 2 When the politician is reluctant to intervene (c ĉ), then there exists a unique semi-separating PBE where only extremist incumbent recruits, no elite supports. Recruitment signals ideology of incumbent Moderate wants to signal they re moderate Extremist wants to mimic moderates

41 Reluctant Politician Proposition 2 When the politician is reluctant to intervene (c ĉ), then there exists a unique semi-separating PBE where only extremist incumbent recruits, no elite supports. Recruitment signals ideology of incumbent Moderate wants to signal they re moderate Extremist wants to mimic moderates Cohesive extremist groups strategically project image of internal division

42 A Sheep in Wolf s Clothing Proposition 3 There exists a unique pooling PBE where both moderate and extremist incumbents recruit, and both moderate and extremist elites support. If c < ĉ, it is unique PBE.

43 A Sheep in Wolf s Clothing Proposition 3 There exists a unique pooling PBE where both moderate and extremist incumbents recruit, and both moderate and extremist elites support. If c < ĉ, it is unique PBE. Politician intervenes if the group is divided

44 A Sheep in Wolf s Clothing Proposition 3 There exists a unique pooling PBE where both moderate and extremist incumbents recruit, and both moderate and extremist elites support. If c < ĉ, it is unique PBE. Politician intervenes if the group is divided Incumbents exploit this to quell internal disagreement

45 A Sheep in Wolf s Clothing Proposition 3 There exists a unique pooling PBE where both moderate and extremist incumbents recruit, and both moderate and extremist elites support. If c < ĉ, it is unique PBE. Politician intervenes if the group is divided Incumbents exploit this to quell internal disagreement What about moderates? 1. Moderate elites support extremists

46 A Sheep in Wolf s Clothing Proposition 3 There exists a unique pooling PBE where both moderate and extremist incumbents recruit, and both moderate and extremist elites support. If c < ĉ, it is unique PBE. Politician intervenes if the group is divided Incumbents exploit this to quell internal disagreement What about moderates? 1. Moderate elites support extremists 2. Moderate incumbents recruit

47 A Sheep in Wolf s Clothing Proposition 3 There exists a unique pooling PBE where both moderate and extremist incumbents recruit, and both moderate and extremist elites support. If c < ĉ, it is unique PBE. Politician intervenes if the group is divided Incumbents exploit this to quell internal disagreement What about moderates? 1. Moderate elites support extremists 2. Moderate incumbents recruit Threat of intervention provides a common ground

48 Committed Strategies and Red Lines Might the politician do better commiting to strategies less responsive to manipulation by non-state groups?

49 Committed Strategies and Red Lines Might the politician do better commiting to strategies less responsive to manipulation by non-state groups? Two strategies: I. Commit to never use intervention

50 Committed Strategies and Red Lines Might the politician do better commiting to strategies less responsive to manipulation by non-state groups? Two strategies: I. Commit to never use intervention II. Red line: Respond to recruitment with military force

51 Committed Strategies and Red Lines Might the politician do better commiting to strategies less responsive to manipulation by non-state groups? Two strategies: I. Commit to never use intervention II. Red line: Respond to recruitment with military force Proposition 4 1. Reluctant politician: Does not benefit from I. Only benefits from II if c is not too high.

52 Committed Strategies and Red Lines Might the politician do better commiting to strategies less responsive to manipulation by non-state groups? Two strategies: I. Commit to never use intervention II. Red line: Respond to recruitment with military force Proposition 4 1. Reluctant politician: Does not benefit from I. Only benefits from II if c is not too high. 2. Willing politician: Better off committing to I and II. Reluctance to use military intervention is a strategic advantage

53 Committed Strategies and Red Lines Might the politician do better commiting to strategies less responsive to manipulation by non-state groups? Two strategies: I. Commit to never use intervention II. Red line: Respond to recruitment with military force Proposition 4 1. Reluctant politician: Does not benefit from I. Only benefits from II if c is not too high. 2. Willing politician: Better off committing to I and II. Reluctance to use military intervention is a strategic advantage Harder to exploit by non-state groups

54 Summary Uncertainty and internal politics of non-state groups present challenges for foreign policy Factions exploit, and benefit, from this uncertainty

55 Summary Uncertainty and internal politics of non-state groups present challenges for foreign policy Factions exploit, and benefit, from this uncertainty Cohesive groups project an image of divisions Moderates project an image of extremism to quell challenges

56 Summary Uncertainty and internal politics of non-state groups present challenges for foreign policy Factions exploit, and benefit, from this uncertainty Cohesive groups project an image of divisions Moderates project an image of extremism to quell challenges Hawkish politicians are better off by drawing red lines A dovish position can be a strategic advantage

57 Thanks!

58 Optimal Allocation Lemma In the final stage of the game, for each preference type θ j of the leader, the optimal allocation a (θ j r) is (i) A moderate leader (i.e. θ j = 0) invests all resources into non-terrorist political tactics, i.e. a (0 r) = (0, 0, W ) for all r; (ii) An extremist leader (i.e. θ j = 1), following no recruitment (i.e. r = 0), invests all resources into local terror, i.e. a (1 0) = (0, W, 0); (iii) An extremist leader (i.e. θ j = 1), following recruitment (i.e. r = 1), invests resources both in campaign of global and local terror, choosing a (1 1) = (Γ 1 x (β), W Γ 1 x (β), 0). Back

59 Cost Restrictions K = max{(1 q)(γ(x ) + β(1 x )), (1 q)l(1)} Back c = (µ C + µ E )φqγ(x )