Illegal Migration and Policy Enforcement

Size: px
Start display at page:

Download "Illegal Migration and Policy Enforcement"

Transcription

1 Illegal Migration and Policy Enforcement Sephorah Mangin 1 and Yves Zenou 2 September 15, 2016 Abstract: Workers from a source country consider whether or not to illegally migrate to a host country. This decision depends crucially on the proportion of migrants who migrate and on whether or not the host country government decides to regularize them. When there is no uncertainty about economic conditions in the host country, there are multiple equilibria where workers may migrate or not and the government may regularize them or not. When uncertainty is introduced, we show that there exists a unique equilibrium where each state of the world gives rise to a unique outcome in terms of migration and regularization. Keywords: Illegal migration, international migration, global games. JEL Classification: D8, F22, J61, O12. 1 Monash University, Australia; sephorah.mangin@monash.edu. 2 Monash University, Australia, and IFN; yves.zenou@monash.edu. 1

2 1 Introduction More than a million migrants and refugees crossed into Europe in 2015, compared with just 280,000 the year before. The scale of the crisis continues, with more than 135,000 people arriving in the first two months of The vast majority of these migrants, who have predominantly fled the Middle East and Africa, are illegal. The reactions from European countries have been very different. Some countries, such as Germany and Sweden, initially promised to regularize them if they came from war-torn countries such as Syria. Other countries, such as Poland and Hungary, took a strong stance against such migrants and committed to never regularize them. The aim of this paper is to analyze these issues using a simple framework where both illegal migration and the regularization policy of the host country are explicitly modeled. In our model, workers from a source country first decide whether or not to migrate illegally to a host country. Next, the government of the host country decides whether to regularize all migrants or none. Before the migration decision, workers do not know whether they will be regularized or not. However, workers know they are more likely to be regularized when more workers migrate to the host country. In other words, from the potential migrant s viewpoint, we have a game with strategic complements since the optimal action of each worker (migrating or not) is increasing in the average action of the other workers. We first consider the case where there is no uncertainty regarding the fundamentals of the host country s economy, which are captured by the state of the economy θ. We show that, if θ does not take extreme values, then there are multiple equilibria. Indeed, if all workers believe that other workers will migrate and therefore that they will be regularized, then these beliefs are self-fulfilling in equilibrium since the government finds it optimal to regularize them once they have migrated. On the other hand, if workers believe that nobody will migrate, then these beliefs are also self-fulfilling in equilibrium. Given this multiplicity of equilibria, no definitive prediction can be made as to whether workers will migrate or not. Using the tools of global games (Carlsson and van Damme, 1993; Morris and Shin, 1998), 1 we introduce a small degree of uncertainty about the state of the economy θ in the host country. We show that common knowledge about this uncertainty leads to a unique equilibrium where each state of the world θ gives rise to a unique outcome in terms of migration and regularization. There is a large empirical and theoretical literature on illegal migration that analyzes the impact of immigration (both legal and illegal) on employment outcomes in the host country, especially in the United States (see e.g. Ethier, 1986; Epstein and Weiss, 2011; Mayr et al., 1 For an overview on global games, see Morris and Shin (2003). 1

3 2012; Chassamboulli and Peri, 2015; Miyagiwa and Sato, 2015). Western countries have spent significant resources on limiting the number of immigrants via both border controls and internal enforcement (such as employer penalties). Despite these efforts, however, many illegal immigrants have found a way to enter these countries. To deal with these issues, these countries have in return periodically granted amnesty to any worker who can demonstrate that he fulfills certain requirements. Epstein and Weiss (2011) show that the number of illegal workers regularized has been quite significant (see Table 1). In this paper, we propose a new and different perspective on illegal migration. We do not study the mechanisms under which a government reduces illegal migration but rather focus on how the individual s decision to illegally migrate is affected by the same decision from other workers from the same country and by the regularization policy of the host country. The rest of the paper unfolds as follows. In the next section, we describe the model. Section 3 deals with the complete information case while Section 4 solves the incomplete information case. Section 5 concludes. All proofs can be found in the Appendix. 2 Model We consider the strategic interaction between a set of potential migrants from a source country and the government of the host country. The set of potential migrants is a mass one of workers who must decide whether or not to migrate. This is a {0, 1} decision. Their payoff if they migrate depends on the migration policy enforced by the host country government. This government has two options: she can choose to regularize all migrants or none. A worker s payoff from migrating is ω r (θ) if he is regularized and ω i (θ) if he is not, where θ is a random variable that characterizes the economic conditions in the host country. For example, a high θ indicates positive economic conditions such as low unemployment and a high growth rate. We assume that θ is uniformly distributed over [θ, θ]. The utility of a worker in the source country is normalized to zero and hence the payoffs ω r (θ) and ω i (θ) represent net gains from migrating for a regularized and an illegal migrant, respectively. Since they incorporate both the costs and benefits of migration, they can be either positive or negative. We make the following assumptions on the payoffs of potential migrants. Assumption 1 The functions ω r (θ) and ω i (θ) are continuous, increasing, and satisfy 1. For all θ, ω r (θ) > ω i (θ), i.e. the payoff of a legal migrant is always higher than the payoff of an illegal migrant; 2. ω r (θ) < 0 < ω i ( θ), i.e. it is never profitable to migrate when economic conditions are worst, but it is always profitable to do so when economic conditions are best ; and 2

4 3. The function ω(θ) = ω r (θ) ω i (θ) is weakly increasing. The government in the host country reacts to the migration decisions of workers by deciding whether or not to regularize migrants. Again, this is a {0, 1} decision. We assume that the government perfectly observes both the state of the economy θ and the fraction of potential migrants who decided to migrate illegally, denoted by s [0, 1]. The payoff for the government is γ r (θ, s) if she regularizes all migrants and γ i (θ, s) if she regularizes none. These payoffs reflect the interaction between various political economy factors such as the strength of syndicates, lobbies, the median voter s preferences, etc. For notational simplicity, we denote γ(θ, s) = γ r (θ, s) γ i (θ, s). We make the following assumptions regarding the payoff of the government. Assumption 2 The function γ(θ, s) is a continuous and differentiable function such that: 1. For all θ [θ, θ], γ(θ, 0) < 0 < γ(θ, 1), i.e. it is never profitable to regularize when there are no migrants while it is always profitable when there are a mass 1 of migrants; and 2. For all θ, the function γ(θ, s) is increasing in s. Assumption 2 implies that, for any given state of the economy θ, there exists a unique a (0, 1) such that γ(θ, a) = 0. We can therefore introduce a function a(θ) implicitly defined by γ(θ, a) = 0. Intuitively, a(θ) is the mass of migrants for which the government is indifferent between regularizing or not regularizing when the state of the economy is θ. Assumption 3 The function a(θ) is decreasing. Timing: The timing of the game is as follows. First, potential migrants simultaneously decide whether or not to migrate. Second, the government observes the mass of migrants and decides whether or not to regularize them. Observe that when a potential migrant decides whether or not to migrate, she does not know whether she will be regularized or not. Observe also that, from the potential migrant s viewpoint, we have a game with strategic complements since the optimal action (migrating or not migrating) of each worker is increasing in the average action of the other workers. The more other workers migrate, the more likely that a given worker migrates, which increases her utility because the chance that the government will regularize them increases. We now consider two cases. In the complete information case, the potential migrant knows exactly the economic conditions θ of the host country before migrating. In the incomplete information case, he does not know the value of θ. 3

5 3 Complete information Suppose that θ is perfectly observed by migrants. In order to characterize the subgame perfect equilibria of the migration game, we first define two threshold values for the parameter θ. The threshold θ is the value of θ such that a migrant who knows that he will be regularized is indifferent between migrating or not, i.e. ω r (θ ) = 0. The threshold θ is the value of θ such that a migrant who knows that he will not be regularized is indifferent between migrating or not, i.e. ω i (θ ) = 0. Assumption 1 ensures that θ < θ < θ < θ. Proposition 1 When θ < θ, the migration game possesses a unique subgame perfect equilibrium in which all potential migrants decide not to migrate. When θ > θ, the migration game possesses a unique subgame perfect equilibrium in which all potential migrants decide to migrate. When θ θ θ, the migration game possesses two subgame perfect equilibria: one in which all workers migrate, the other in which no worker migrates. As stated above, when a worker decides whether or not to migrate, he does not know whether or not he will be regularized but he knows the state of the economy θ in the host country. If he observes that θ < θ, he will clearly not migrate since this means, by Assumption 1 and the definition of θ, that, even if he will be regularized in the host country, his utility will be lower than staying at home. Since all individuals make the same calculations, nobody will migrate. The opposite is true when θ > θ since the economic conditions are sufficiently good in the host country that it is always profitable to migrate. When θ θ θ, then we have multiple (rational expectations) equilibria. If the workers anticipate that the government will regularize them, then they will all migrate and the government will indeed regularize them. If workers anticipate that the government will not regularize them, then they will not migrate and the government will not regularize them. In both cases, the expectations of the workers are self-fulfilling. These results may explain the huge illegal migration to Europe during the recent refugee crisis and why most migrants chose to stay in Germany and Sweden and not in Poland or Hungary. Given this multiplicity of equilibria, no definitive prediction can be made as to whether workers will migrate or not. Using the tools of global games, we will see in the next section that, when we introduce uncertainty about economic conditions in the host country, each state θ gives rise to a unique equilibrium outcome in terms of migration and regularization. 4 Incomplete information We now assume that potential migrants do not perfectly observe θ, the economic conditions in the host country. When the state of the economy is θ, each worker observes a noisy 4

6 signal x, which is independently and uniformly distributed on [θ ɛ, θ + ɛ]. In other words, conditional on observing the signal x, a potential migrant believes that the true parameter θ is uniformly distributed on [x ɛ, x + ɛ]. For a given strategy profile for the workers, we denote by α(x) [0, 1] the proportion of workers who migrate when they receive a signal x, and s(θ, α) the proportion of workers who migrate when the state of the economy is θ. Since signals are uniformly distributed over [θ ɛ, θ + ɛ], at θ, we have: s(θ, α) = 1 2ɛ θ+ɛ θ ɛ α(x)dx (1) Given a strategy profile characterized by the function α, we denote by A(α) the set of states θ in which the government will decide to regularize all migrants, i.e. Let us denote by θ(α) the state of the economy such that A(α) = {θ γ (θ, s(θ, α)) 0} (2) s(θ(α), α) = a(θ) (3) where a(θ) is the mass of migrants for which the government is indifferent between regularizing or not. Given α, equation (3) defines θ(α) as the minimum value of θ for which the government regularizes all migrants. Since α(x) is weakly increasing in x, θ(α) exists and is unique by Assumption 3. We can therefore write: A(α) = [θ(α), θ]. As a result, the payoff of a worker who decides to migrate when the state of the economy is θ is given by: { ω r (θ) if θ A(α), ω i (4) (θ) if θ / A(α). The potential migrant does not observe θ directly. As a result, the expected utility of migrating must be calculated from the posterior distribution over the states conditional on the signal x, i.e. it can be calculated by taking the expectation of (4) conditional on x. This expected utility can be written as: u(x, α) = 1 2ɛ x+ɛ x ɛ ω i (θ)dθ + 1 2ɛ A(α) [x ɛ,x+ɛ] We now provide three lemmas which will help us derive our main result. ω(θ)dθ (5) Lemma 1 If α(x) α (x), for all x, then u(x, α) u(x, α ). This lemma states that, for any signal x, the higher is the fraction of workers who migrate, the higher is the expected utility of migrating. This means that migration decisions are strategic complements. Now, consider the strategy profile according to which a worker 5

7 migrates if and only if the signal she receives is greater than some fixed number k. The corresponding proportion of migrants is then given by the following indicator function I k : { 1 if x k, I k (x) = 0 if x < k. Notice that I k (x) is weakly increasing in x. When migrants follow this strategy, we have: Lemma 2 The function u(k, I k ) is continuous and strictly increasing in k. This lemma shows that the expected utility for a worker of migrating, given that she received signal k and the proportion of migrants is given by I k (x), is increasing in k. In other words, when the fundamentals of the economy are stronger, the payoff from migrating is higher for a worker on the margin of switching from non-migrating to migrating. Lemma 3 There is a unique x such that, in any Bayesian equilibrium of the game, a worker decides to migrate if and only if x x. Once the equilibrium strategies are determined, it is possible to compute the equilibrium enforcement policy. Proposition 2 There is a unique θ such that in any (perfect bayesian) equilibrium of the game with incomplete information, the government regularizes migrants if and only if θ θ. This is a very strong result, which shows that, when potential migrants face a small amount of uncertainty concerning the fundamentals of the economy, there is a unique equilibrium such that, if the state of the economy θ is sufficiently high, then all workers migrate and the government regularizes all of them. If θ is sufficiently low, then no workers migrate and the government does not regularize any. This result suggests that some information events, for example, when Germany and Sweden announced that they will regularize all refugees from Syria, can trigger a huge inflow of migrants into these countries, even though these events do not convey any real information about the state of the economy. 5 Conclusion In this paper, we model workers decisions to migrate illegally and the government s decision to regularize migrants. When there is no uncertainty about the economic conditions of the host country, we show that there are multiple equilibria where workers may migrate or not and the government may regularize them or not. When we introduce some uncertainty about economic conditions, there is a unique equilibrium where each state of the world gives rise to a unique equilibrium outcome in terms of migration and regularization. 6

8 References [1] Carlsson, H. and E. van Damme (1993), Global games and equilibrium selection, Econometrica 61, [2] Chassamboulli, A. and G. Peri, 2015 (2015), The labor market effects of reducing the number of illegal immigrants, Review of Economic Dynamics 18, [3] Epstein, G.S. and A. Weiss (2011), The why, when and how of immigration amnesties, Journal of Population Economics 24, 1, [4] Ethier, W.J. (1986), The illegal immigration: The host country problem, American Economic Review 76, [5] Mayr K., Minter S. and T. Krieger (2012), Policies on illegal immigration in a federation, Regional Science and Urban Economics 42, [6] Morris, S. and H.S. Shin (1998), Unique equilibrium in a model of self-fulfilling currency attacks, American Economic Review 88, [7] Morris, S. and H.S. Shin (2003), Global games: Theory and applications, In: M. Dewatripont, L. Hansen and S. Turnovsky (Eds.), Advances in Economics and Econometrics (Proceedings of the Eighth World Congress of the Econometric Society), Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp [8] Miyagiwa, K. and Y. Sato (2015), Illegal immigration and multiple destinations, RIETI Discussion Paper Series 15-E

9 Appendix: Proofs of all results Proof of Proposition 1: When θ < θ, by Assumption 1 and the definition of θ, it is a dominant strategy for workers not to migrate. Similarly, when θ < θ, by Assumption 1 and the definition of θ, it is a dominant strategy for workers to migrate. When θ θ θ, workers migrate if they anticipate that the government will regularize them and do not migrate if they anticipate the government will not regularize them. In turn, the government regularizes the migrants if there is a mass 1 of migrants but does not regularize them if there is a mass 0 of migrants, by Assumption 2. Proof of Lemma 1: Since α(x) α (x), equation (1) ensures that s(θ, α) s(θ, α ), for all θ. Then, by Assumption 2, i.e. γ(θ, ) increasing, and equation (2), we know that A(α) A(α ). Finally, because ω r (θ) > ω i (θ), for all θ, we can use equation (5) to establish that u(x, α) u(x, α ). Proof of Lemma 2: First, let us compute s(θ, I k ). Given equation (1) we have: 0 if θ k ɛ, 1 s(θ, I k ) = + 1 (θ k) if k ɛ < θ < k + ɛ, 2 2ɛ 1 if θ k + ɛ. For all k, s(, I k ) is a weakly increasing function that takes values in [0, 1]. We now define θ(k) by the implicit equation: s(θ(k), I k ) = a(θ k ). By Assumption 3, we know that a(θ) is decreasing in θ, takes value in [0, 1] and, therefore, that θ k is uniquely defined. Let us denote ψ(k) = θ k k. We thus have ψ(k) = a(k + ψ(k)), 2ɛ By differentiating with respect to k, we obtain ψ (k) 2ɛ = a (k + ψ(k)) [1 + ψ (k)], or, equivalently, ψ (k) = a (k + ψ(k)) 1 2ɛ a (k + ψ(k)), from which we can deduce that ψ(k) is a continuous and weakly decreasing function in k. Moreover, we know by construction that A(I k ) = [k + ψ(k), θ]. So we can write u(k, I k ) = k+ɛ k ɛ ω i (θ)dθ + k+ɛ k+ψ(k) ω(θ)dθ (6) The first term in the right-hand side of (6) is strictly increasing in k. Because ψ(k) is weakly decreasing in k, Assumption 1 ensures that the second term in the right-hand side of (6) is 8

10 also strictly increasing in k. Continuity comes from the fact that the limits of integration in equation (6) are continuous functions of k. Proof of Lemma 3: First, we show that there is a unique value x of k for which u(k, I k ) = 0. This is so because we know that u(θ ɛ, I θ ɛ ) < 0 < u( θ + ɛ, I θ+ɛ ) and u(k, I k ) is strictly increasing and continuous. When other workers are following the strategies summarized by I x, the net payoff of migration for a worker who receives signal x is given by u(x, I x ). Notice that A(I x ) is of the form [θ(k), θ], so for all x > x, we have {A(I x ) [x ɛ, x + ɛ]} {A(I x ) [x ɛ, x + ɛ]}. Therefore, from Assumption 1, it is easily seen in equation (5) that u(x, I x ) is strictly increasing. We thus have: u(x, I x ) 0 x x, and thus the strategies described in the lemma are equilibrium strategies. Second we show that there cannot be any other equilibrium. It is already clear that, if all workers play a symmetric threshold strategy according to which they migrate if and only if their signal is above a given level (the same for everyone), then this level must be x. Suppose now that workers are not playing such an equilibrium strategy and follow some strategy profile summarized by the function α(x). The function α(x) then takes values different from 0 and 1 at least for some x. We then define: x = inf{x α(x) > 0}, x = sup{x α(x) < 1}. By definition x x. When α(x) > 0, some workers migrate and the net payoff to migration must be at least 0 for this to be consistent with equilibrium behavior. By continuity, at x, we must have: u(x, α) 0. Now, consider u(x, I x ). By construction, I x (x) α(x) for all x. So, from Lemma 1, we have u(x, I x ) 0, which implies, by Lemma 2, that x x. A similar argument shows that x x. But then we must have x = x = x. Proof of Proposition 2: In any equilibrium, the net payoff of the government from regularizing all migrants is given by: γ(θ, s(θ, I x )). Because I x (x) is an increasing function of x, we know that A(I x ) = [ θ, θ], where θ is the unique value of θ that solves s(θ, I θ) = a(θ). 9

Defensive Weapons and Defensive Alliances

Defensive Weapons and Defensive Alliances Defensive Weapons and Defensive Alliances Sylvain Chassang Princeton University Gerard Padró i Miquel London School of Economics and NBER December 17, 2008 In 2002, U.S. President George W. Bush initiated

More information

International Cooperation, Parties and. Ideology - Very preliminary and incomplete

International Cooperation, Parties and. Ideology - Very preliminary and incomplete International Cooperation, Parties and Ideology - Very preliminary and incomplete Jan Klingelhöfer RWTH Aachen University February 15, 2015 Abstract I combine a model of international cooperation with

More information

Published in Canadian Journal of Economics 27 (1995), Copyright c 1995 by Canadian Economics Association

Published in Canadian Journal of Economics 27 (1995), Copyright c 1995 by Canadian Economics Association Published in Canadian Journal of Economics 27 (1995), 261 301. Copyright c 1995 by Canadian Economics Association Spatial Models of Political Competition Under Plurality Rule: A Survey of Some Explanations

More information

THREATS TO SUE AND COST DIVISIBILITY UNDER ASYMMETRIC INFORMATION. Alon Klement. Discussion Paper No /2000

THREATS TO SUE AND COST DIVISIBILITY UNDER ASYMMETRIC INFORMATION. Alon Klement. Discussion Paper No /2000 ISSN 1045-6333 THREATS TO SUE AND COST DIVISIBILITY UNDER ASYMMETRIC INFORMATION Alon Klement Discussion Paper No. 273 1/2000 Harvard Law School Cambridge, MA 02138 The Center for Law, Economics, and Business

More information

Coalition Governments and Political Rents

Coalition Governments and Political Rents Coalition Governments and Political Rents Dr. Refik Emre Aytimur Georg-August-Universität Göttingen January 01 Abstract We analyze the impact of coalition governments on the ability of political competition

More information

Supporting Information Political Quid Pro Quo Agreements: An Experimental Study

Supporting Information Political Quid Pro Quo Agreements: An Experimental Study Supporting Information Political Quid Pro Quo Agreements: An Experimental Study Jens Großer Florida State University and IAS, Princeton Ernesto Reuben Columbia University and IZA Agnieszka Tymula New York

More information

Sampling Equilibrium, with an Application to Strategic Voting Martin J. Osborne 1 and Ariel Rubinstein 2 September 12th, 2002.

Sampling Equilibrium, with an Application to Strategic Voting Martin J. Osborne 1 and Ariel Rubinstein 2 September 12th, 2002. Sampling Equilibrium, with an Application to Strategic Voting Martin J. Osborne 1 and Ariel Rubinstein 2 September 12th, 2002 Abstract We suggest an equilibrium concept for a strategic model with a large

More information

HOTELLING-DOWNS MODEL OF ELECTORAL COMPETITION AND THE OPTION TO QUIT

HOTELLING-DOWNS MODEL OF ELECTORAL COMPETITION AND THE OPTION TO QUIT HOTELLING-DOWNS MODEL OF ELECTORAL COMPETITION AND THE OPTION TO QUIT ABHIJIT SENGUPTA AND KUNAL SENGUPTA SCHOOL OF ECONOMICS AND POLITICAL SCIENCE UNIVERSITY OF SYDNEY SYDNEY, NSW 2006 AUSTRALIA Abstract.

More information

Buying Supermajorities

Buying Supermajorities Presenter: Jordan Ou Tim Groseclose 1 James M. Snyder, Jr. 2 1 Ohio State University 2 Massachusetts Institute of Technology March 6, 2014 Introduction Introduction Motivation and Implication Critical

More information

Approval Voting and Scoring Rules with Common Values

Approval Voting and Scoring Rules with Common Values Approval Voting and Scoring Rules with Common Values David S. Ahn University of California, Berkeley Santiago Oliveros University of Essex June 2016 Abstract We compare approval voting with other scoring

More information

Game theory and applications: Lecture 12

Game theory and applications: Lecture 12 Game theory and applications: Lecture 12 Adam Szeidl December 6, 2018 Outline for today 1 A political theory of populism 2 Game theory in economics 1 / 12 1. A Political Theory of Populism Acemoglu, Egorov

More information

IMPERFECT INFORMATION (SIGNALING GAMES AND APPLICATIONS)

IMPERFECT INFORMATION (SIGNALING GAMES AND APPLICATIONS) IMPERFECT INFORMATION (SIGNALING GAMES AND APPLICATIONS) 1 Equilibrium concepts Concept Best responses Beliefs Nash equilibrium Subgame perfect equilibrium Perfect Bayesian equilibrium On the equilibrium

More information

1 Electoral Competition under Certainty

1 Electoral Competition under Certainty 1 Electoral Competition under Certainty We begin with models of electoral competition. This chapter explores electoral competition when voting behavior is deterministic; the following chapter considers

More information

ON IGNORANT VOTERS AND BUSY POLITICIANS

ON IGNORANT VOTERS AND BUSY POLITICIANS Number 252 July 2015 ON IGNORANT VOTERS AND BUSY POLITICIANS R. Emre Aytimur Christian Bruns ISSN: 1439-2305 On Ignorant Voters and Busy Politicians R. Emre Aytimur University of Goettingen Christian Bruns

More information

EFFICIENCY OF COMPARATIVE NEGLIGENCE : A GAME THEORETIC ANALYSIS

EFFICIENCY OF COMPARATIVE NEGLIGENCE : A GAME THEORETIC ANALYSIS EFFICIENCY OF COMPARATIVE NEGLIGENCE : A GAME THEORETIC ANALYSIS TAI-YEONG CHUNG * The widespread shift from contributory negligence to comparative negligence in the twentieth century has spurred scholars

More information

Skilled Worker Migration and Trade: Inequality and Welfare

Skilled Worker Migration and Trade: Inequality and Welfare Silled Worer Migration and Trade: Inequality and Welfare Spiros Bougheas University of Nottingham Doug Nelosn Tulane University and University of Nottingham September 1, 2008 Abstract We develop a two-sector,

More information

The Role of the Trade Policy Committee in EU Trade Policy: A Political-Economic Analysis

The Role of the Trade Policy Committee in EU Trade Policy: A Political-Economic Analysis The Role of the Trade Policy Committee in EU Trade Policy: A Political-Economic Analysis Wim Van Gestel, Christophe Crombez January 18, 2011 Abstract This paper presents a political-economic analysis of

More information

University of Toronto Department of Economics. Influential Opinion Leaders

University of Toronto Department of Economics. Influential Opinion Leaders University of Toronto Department of Economics Working Paper 403 Influential Opinion Leaders By Jakub Steiner and Colin Stewart April 16, 2010 Influential Opinion Leaders Jakub Steiner Northwestern University

More information

Preferential votes and minority representation in open list proportional representation systems

Preferential votes and minority representation in open list proportional representation systems Soc Choice Welf (018) 50:81 303 https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-017-1084- ORIGINAL PAPER Preferential votes and minority representation in open list proportional representation systems Margherita Negri

More information

Immigration and Conflict in Democracies

Immigration and Conflict in Democracies Immigration and Conflict in Democracies Santiago Sánchez-Pagés Ángel Solano García June 2008 Abstract Relationships between citizens and immigrants may not be as good as expected in some western democracies.

More information

Enriqueta Aragones Harvard University and Universitat Pompeu Fabra Andrew Postlewaite University of Pennsylvania. March 9, 2000

Enriqueta Aragones Harvard University and Universitat Pompeu Fabra Andrew Postlewaite University of Pennsylvania. March 9, 2000 Campaign Rhetoric: a model of reputation Enriqueta Aragones Harvard University and Universitat Pompeu Fabra Andrew Postlewaite University of Pennsylvania March 9, 2000 Abstract We develop a model of infinitely

More information

Candidate Citizen Models

Candidate Citizen Models Candidate Citizen Models General setup Number of candidates is endogenous Candidates are unable to make binding campaign promises whoever wins office implements her ideal policy Citizens preferences are

More information

Sequential Voting with Externalities: Herding in Social Networks

Sequential Voting with Externalities: Herding in Social Networks Sequential Voting with Externalities: Herding in Social Networks Noga Alon Moshe Babaioff Ron Karidi Ron Lavi Moshe Tennenholtz February 7, 01 Abstract We study sequential voting with two alternatives,

More information

Corruption and Political Competition

Corruption and Political Competition Corruption and Political Competition Richard Damania Adelaide University Erkan Yalçin Yeditepe University October 24, 2005 Abstract There is a growing evidence that political corruption is often closely

More information

Wisdom of the Crowd? Information Aggregation and Electoral Incentives

Wisdom of the Crowd? Information Aggregation and Electoral Incentives Wisdom of the Crowd? Information Aggregation and Electoral Incentives Carlo Prato Stephane Wolton June 2016 Abstract Elections have long been understood as a mean to encourage candidates to act in voters

More information

Authority versus Persuasion

Authority versus Persuasion Authority versus Persuasion Eric Van den Steen December 30, 2008 Managers often face a choice between authority and persuasion. In particular, since a firm s formal and relational contracts and its culture

More information

Handcuffs for the Grabbing Hand? Media Capture and Government Accountability by Timothy Besley and Andrea Prat (2006)

Handcuffs for the Grabbing Hand? Media Capture and Government Accountability by Timothy Besley and Andrea Prat (2006) Handcuffs for the Grabbing Hand? Media Capture and Government Accountability by Timothy Besley and Andrea Prat (2006) Group Hicks: Dena, Marjorie, Sabina, Shehryar To the press alone, checkered as it is

More information

Expert Mining and Required Disclosure: Appendices

Expert Mining and Required Disclosure: Appendices Expert Mining and Required Disclosure: Appendices Jonah B. Gelbach APPENDIX A. A FORMAL MODEL OF EXPERT MINING WITHOUT DISCLOSURE A. The General Setup There are two parties, D and P. For i in {D, P}, the

More information

Technical Appendix for Selecting Among Acquitted Defendants Andrew F. Daughety and Jennifer F. Reinganum April 2015

Technical Appendix for Selecting Among Acquitted Defendants Andrew F. Daughety and Jennifer F. Reinganum April 2015 1 Technical Appendix for Selecting Among Acquitted Defendants Andrew F. Daughety and Jennifer F. Reinganum April 2015 Proof of Proposition 1 Suppose that one were to permit D to choose whether he will

More information

"Efficient and Durable Decision Rules with Incomplete Information", by Bengt Holmström and Roger B. Myerson

Efficient and Durable Decision Rules with Incomplete Information, by Bengt Holmström and Roger B. Myerson April 15, 2015 "Efficient and Durable Decision Rules with Incomplete Information", by Bengt Holmström and Roger B. Myerson Econometrica, Vol. 51, No. 6 (Nov., 1983), pp. 1799-1819. Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/1912117

More information

Political Economics II Spring Lectures 4-5 Part II Partisan Politics and Political Agency. Torsten Persson, IIES

Political Economics II Spring Lectures 4-5 Part II Partisan Politics and Political Agency. Torsten Persson, IIES Lectures 4-5_190213.pdf Political Economics II Spring 2019 Lectures 4-5 Part II Partisan Politics and Political Agency Torsten Persson, IIES 1 Introduction: Partisan Politics Aims continue exploring policy

More information

THE EFFECT OF OFFER-OF-SETTLEMENT RULES ON THE TERMS OF SETTLEMENT

THE EFFECT OF OFFER-OF-SETTLEMENT RULES ON THE TERMS OF SETTLEMENT Last revision: 12/97 THE EFFECT OF OFFER-OF-SETTLEMENT RULES ON THE TERMS OF SETTLEMENT Lucian Arye Bebchuk * and Howard F. Chang ** * Professor of Law, Economics, and Finance, Harvard Law School. ** Professor

More information

Sincere Versus Sophisticated Voting When Legislators Vote Sequentially

Sincere Versus Sophisticated Voting When Legislators Vote Sequentially Sincere Versus Sophisticated Voting When Legislators Vote Sequentially Tim Groseclose Departments of Political Science and Economics UCLA Jeffrey Milyo Department of Economics University of Missouri September

More information

Optimal Voting Rules for International Organizations, with an. Application to the UN

Optimal Voting Rules for International Organizations, with an. Application to the UN Optimal Voting Rules for International Organizations, with an Application to the UN Johann Caro Burnett November 24, 2016 Abstract This paper examines a self-enforcing mechanism for an international organization

More information

Voluntary Voting: Costs and Benefits

Voluntary Voting: Costs and Benefits Voluntary Voting: Costs and Benefits Vijay Krishna and John Morgan May 21, 2012 Abstract We compare voluntary and compulsory voting in a Condorcet-type model in which voters have identical preferences

More information

Parliamentarism or Presidentialism? 1

Parliamentarism or Presidentialism? 1 Parliamentarism or Presidentialism? 1 Peter Buisseret Princeton University JOB MARKET PAPER Abstract In parliamentary and presidential systems, the voter delegates policy proposal and veto responsibilities

More information

Lobbying and Bribery

Lobbying and Bribery Lobbying and Bribery Vivekananda Mukherjee* Amrita Kamalini Bhattacharyya Department of Economics, Jadavpur University, Kolkata 700032, India June, 2016 *Corresponding author. E-mail: mukherjeevivek@hotmail.com

More information

NBER WORKING PAPER SERIES HOW ELECTIONS MATTER: THEORY AND EVIDENCE FROM ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY. John A. List Daniel M. Sturm

NBER WORKING PAPER SERIES HOW ELECTIONS MATTER: THEORY AND EVIDENCE FROM ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY. John A. List Daniel M. Sturm NBER WORKING PAPER SERIES HOW ELECTIONS MATTER: THEORY AND EVIDENCE FROM ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY John A. List Daniel M. Sturm Working Paper 10609 http://www.nber.org/papers/w10609 NATIONAL BUREAU OF ECONOMIC

More information

On the Nature of Competition in Alternative Electoral Systems

On the Nature of Competition in Alternative Electoral Systems On the Nature of Competition in Alternative Electoral Systems Matias Iaryczower and Andrea Mattozzi January 20, 2009 Abstract In this paper we argue that the number of candidates running for public office,

More information

Ideology and Competence in Alternative Electoral Systems.

Ideology and Competence in Alternative Electoral Systems. Ideology and Competence in Alternative Electoral Systems. Matias Iaryczower and Andrea Mattozzi July 9, 2008 Abstract We develop a model of elections in proportional (PR) and majoritarian (FPTP) electoral

More information

The Impact of Unions on Municipal Elections and Fiscal Policies in U.S. Cities

The Impact of Unions on Municipal Elections and Fiscal Policies in U.S. Cities The Impact of Unions on Municipal Elections and Fiscal Policies in U.S. Cities Holger Sieg University of Pennsylvania and NBER Yu Wang University of Pennsylvania Prepared for the Carnegie-NYU-Rochester

More information

VOTING ON INCOME REDISTRIBUTION: HOW A LITTLE BIT OF ALTRUISM CREATES TRANSITIVITY DONALD WITTMAN ECONOMICS DEPARTMENT UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA

VOTING ON INCOME REDISTRIBUTION: HOW A LITTLE BIT OF ALTRUISM CREATES TRANSITIVITY DONALD WITTMAN ECONOMICS DEPARTMENT UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA 1 VOTING ON INCOME REDISTRIBUTION: HOW A LITTLE BIT OF ALTRUISM CREATES TRANSITIVITY DONALD WITTMAN ECONOMICS DEPARTMENT UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA SANTA CRUZ wittman@ucsc.edu ABSTRACT We consider an election

More information

Rhetoric in Legislative Bargaining with Asymmetric Information 1

Rhetoric in Legislative Bargaining with Asymmetric Information 1 Rhetoric in Legislative Bargaining with Asymmetric Information 1 Ying Chen Arizona State University yingchen@asu.edu Hülya Eraslan Johns Hopkins University eraslan@jhu.edu June 22, 2010 1 We thank Ming

More information

POLITICAL EQUILIBRIUM SOCIAL SECURITY WITH MIGRATION

POLITICAL EQUILIBRIUM SOCIAL SECURITY WITH MIGRATION POLITICAL EQUILIBRIUM SOCIAL SECURITY WITH MIGRATION Laura Marsiliani University of Durham laura.marsiliani@durham.ac.uk Thomas I. Renström University of Durham and CEPR t.i.renstrom@durham.ac.uk We analyze

More information

Disasters and Incumbent Electoral Fortunes: No Implications for Democratic Competence

Disasters and Incumbent Electoral Fortunes: No Implications for Democratic Competence Disasters and Incumbent Electoral Fortunes: No Implications for Democratic Competence Scott Ashworth Ethan Bueno de Mesquita February 1, 2013 Abstract A recent empirical literature shows that incumbent

More information

Women as Policy Makers: Evidence from a Randomized Policy Experiment in India

Women as Policy Makers: Evidence from a Randomized Policy Experiment in India Women as Policy Makers: Evidence from a Randomized Policy Experiment in India Chattopadhayay and Duflo (Econometrica 2004) Presented by Nicolas Guida Johnson and Ngoc Nguyen Nov 8, 2018 Introduction Research

More information

Law enforcement and false arrests with endogenously (in)competent officers

Law enforcement and false arrests with endogenously (in)competent officers Law enforcement and false arrests with endogenously (in)competent officers Ajit Mishra and Andrew Samuel April 14, 2015 Abstract Many jurisdictions (such as the U.S. and U.K.) allow law enforcement officers

More information

Damage averaging and the formation of class action suits

Damage averaging and the formation of class action suits Final version published in International Review of Law and Economics 23 (2003) 63 74 Damage averaging and the formation of class action suits Nicolas Marceau a,, Steeve Mongrain b a Département des Sciences

More information

On the Nature of Competition in Alternative Electoral Systems

On the Nature of Competition in Alternative Electoral Systems On the Nature of Competition in Alternative Electoral Systems Matias Iaryczower and Andrea Mattozzi May 29, 2009 Abstract In this paper we argue that the number of candidates running for public office,

More information

Introduction to Political Economy Problem Set 3

Introduction to Political Economy Problem Set 3 Introduction to Political Economy 14.770 Problem Set 3 Due date: October 27, 2017. Question 1: Consider an alternative model of lobbying (compared to the Grossman and Helpman model with enforceable contracts),

More information

Unemployment and the Immigration Surplus

Unemployment and the Immigration Surplus Unemployment and the Immigration Surplus Udo Kreickemeier University of Nottingham Michael S. Michael University of Cyprus December 2007 Abstract Within a small open economy fair wage model with unemployment

More information

Bi Zhaohui Kobe University, Japan. Abstract

Bi Zhaohui Kobe University, Japan. Abstract Income inequality, redistribution and democratization Bi Zhaohui Kobe University, Japan Abstract We consider that in a society, there are conflicts of income redistribution between the rich (class) and

More information

Bargaining and Cooperation in Strategic Form Games

Bargaining and Cooperation in Strategic Form Games Bargaining and Cooperation in Strategic Form Games Sergiu Hart July 2008 Revised: January 2009 SERGIU HART c 2007 p. 1 Bargaining and Cooperation in Strategic Form Games Sergiu Hart Center of Rationality,

More information

Maximin equilibrium. Mehmet ISMAIL. March, This version: June, 2014

Maximin equilibrium. Mehmet ISMAIL. March, This version: June, 2014 Maximin equilibrium Mehmet ISMAIL March, 2014. This version: June, 2014 Abstract We introduce a new theory of games which extends von Neumann s theory of zero-sum games to nonzero-sum games by incorporating

More information

Love of Variety and Immigration

Love of Variety and Immigration Florida International University FIU Digital Commons Economics Research Working Paper Series Department of Economics 9-11-2009 Love of Variety and Immigration Dhimitri Qirjo Department of Economics, Florida

More information

1 Grim Trigger Practice 2. 2 Issue Linkage 3. 3 Institutions as Interaction Accelerators 5. 4 Perverse Incentives 6.

1 Grim Trigger Practice 2. 2 Issue Linkage 3. 3 Institutions as Interaction Accelerators 5. 4 Perverse Incentives 6. Contents 1 Grim Trigger Practice 2 2 Issue Linkage 3 3 Institutions as Interaction Accelerators 5 4 Perverse Incentives 6 5 Moral Hazard 7 6 Gatekeeping versus Veto Power 8 7 Mechanism Design Practice

More information

Choosing Among Signalling Equilibria in Lobbying Games

Choosing Among Signalling Equilibria in Lobbying Games Choosing Among Signalling Equilibria in Lobbying Games July 17, 1996 Eric Rasmusen Abstract Randolph Sloof has written a comment on the lobbying-as-signalling model in Rasmusen (1993) in which he points

More information

Immigration Policy In The OECD: Why So Different?

Immigration Policy In The OECD: Why So Different? Immigration Policy In The OECD: Why So Different? Zachary Mahone and Filippo Rebessi August 25, 2013 Abstract Using cross country data from the OECD, we document that variation in immigration variables

More information

International migration and human capital formation. Abstract. Faculté des Sciences Economiques, Rabat, Morocco and Conseils Eco, Toulouse, France

International migration and human capital formation. Abstract. Faculté des Sciences Economiques, Rabat, Morocco and Conseils Eco, Toulouse, France International migration and human capital formation Mohamed Jellal Faculté des Sciences Economiques, Rabat, Morocco and Conseils Eco, Toulouse, France François Charles Wolff LEN CEBS, Université de Nantes,

More information

Policy Reputation and Political Accountability

Policy Reputation and Political Accountability Policy Reputation and Political Accountability Tapas Kundu October 9, 2016 Abstract We develop a model of electoral competition where both economic policy and politician s e ort a ect voters payo. When

More information

Schooling, Nation Building, and Industrialization

Schooling, Nation Building, and Industrialization Schooling, Nation Building, and Industrialization Esther Hauk Javier Ortega August 2012 Abstract We model a two-region country where value is created through bilateral production between masses and elites.

More information

An example of public goods

An example of public goods An example of public goods Yossi Spiegel Consider an economy with two identical agents, A and B, who consume one public good G, and one private good y. The preferences of the two agents are given by the

More information

Party Platforms with Endogenous Party Membership

Party Platforms with Endogenous Party Membership Party Platforms with Endogenous Party Membership Panu Poutvaara 1 Harvard University, Department of Economics poutvaar@fas.harvard.edu Abstract In representative democracies, the development of party platforms

More information

Learning and Belief Based Trade 1

Learning and Belief Based Trade 1 Learning and Belief Based Trade 1 First Version: October 31, 1994 This Version: September 13, 2005 Drew Fudenberg David K Levine 2 Abstract: We use the theory of learning in games to show that no-trade

More information

Classical papers: Osborbe and Slivinski (1996) and Besley and Coate (1997)

Classical papers: Osborbe and Slivinski (1996) and Besley and Coate (1997) The identity of politicians is endogenized Typical approach: any citizen may enter electoral competition at a cost. There is no pre-commitment on the platforms, and winner implements his or her ideal policy.

More information

ONLINE APPENDIX: Why Do Voters Dismantle Checks and Balances? Extensions and Robustness

ONLINE APPENDIX: Why Do Voters Dismantle Checks and Balances? Extensions and Robustness CeNTRe for APPlieD MACRo - AND PeTRoleuM economics (CAMP) CAMP Working Paper Series No 2/2013 ONLINE APPENDIX: Why Do Voters Dismantle Checks and Balances? Extensions and Robustness Daron Acemoglu, James

More information

The Robustness of Herrera, Levine and Martinelli s Policy platforms, campaign spending and voter participation

The Robustness of Herrera, Levine and Martinelli s Policy platforms, campaign spending and voter participation The Robustness of Herrera, Levine and Martinelli s Policy platforms, campaign spending and voter participation Alexander Chun June 8, 009 Abstract In this paper, I look at potential weaknesses in the electoral

More information

Should Straw Polls be Banned?

Should Straw Polls be Banned? The Ronald O. Perelman Center for Political Science and Economics (PCPSE) 133 South 36 th Street Philadelphia, PA 19104-6297 pier@econ.upenn.edu http://economics.sas.upenn.edu/pier PIER Working Paper 18-022

More information

Sincere versus sophisticated voting when legislators vote sequentially

Sincere versus sophisticated voting when legislators vote sequentially Soc Choice Welf (2013) 40:745 751 DOI 10.1007/s00355-011-0639-x ORIGINAL PAPER Sincere versus sophisticated voting when legislators vote sequentially Tim Groseclose Jeffrey Milyo Received: 27 August 2010

More information

Compulsory versus Voluntary Voting An Experimental Study

Compulsory versus Voluntary Voting An Experimental Study Compulsory versus Voluntary Voting An Experimental Study Sourav Bhattacharya John Duffy Sun-Tak Kim April 16, 2013 Abstract We report on an experiment comparing compulsory and voluntary voting institutions.

More information

Informed Politicians and Institutional Stability

Informed Politicians and Institutional Stability Informed Politicians and Institutional Stability A Dissertation submitted to the Faculty of the Graduate School of Arts and Sciences of Georgetown University in partial fulfillment of the requirements

More information

A Study of Approval voting on Large Poisson Games

A Study of Approval voting on Large Poisson Games A Study of Approval voting on Large Poisson Games Ecole Polytechnique Simposio de Analisis Económico December 2008 Matías Núñez () A Study of Approval voting on Large Poisson Games 1 / 15 A controversy

More information

Delegation versus Communication in the Organization of. Government

Delegation versus Communication in the Organization of. Government Delegation versus Communication in the Organization of Government Rodney D. Ludema Anders Olofsgård July 006 Abstract When a government creates an agency to gather information relevant to policymaking,

More information

Discriminatory Persuasion: How to Convince Voters Preliminary, Please do not circulate!

Discriminatory Persuasion: How to Convince Voters Preliminary, Please do not circulate! Discriminatory Persuasion: How to Convince Voters Preliminary, Please do not circulate! Jimmy Chan Fei Li and Yun Wang September 4, 2015 Abstract We study a Bayesian persuasion game between a sender and

More information

Compulsory versus Voluntary Voting Mechanisms: An Experimental Study

Compulsory versus Voluntary Voting Mechanisms: An Experimental Study Compulsory versus Voluntary Voting Mechanisms: An Experimental Study Sourav Bhattacharya John Duffy Sun-Tak Kim January 31, 2011 Abstract This paper uses laboratory experiments to study the impact of voting

More information

The Provision of Public Goods Under Alternative. Electoral Incentives

The Provision of Public Goods Under Alternative. Electoral Incentives The Provision of Public Goods Under Alternative Electoral Incentives Alessandro Lizzeri and Nicola Persico March 10, 2000 American Economic Review, forthcoming ABSTRACT Politicians who care about the spoils

More information

14.770: Introduction to Political Economy Lectures 8 and 9: Political Agency

14.770: Introduction to Political Economy Lectures 8 and 9: Political Agency 14.770: Introduction to Political Economy Lectures 8 and 9: Political Agency Daron Acemoglu MIT October 2 and 4, 2018. Daron Acemoglu (MIT) Political Economy Lectures 8 and 9 October 2 and 4, 2018. 1 /

More information

Supplementary Materials for Strategic Abstention in Proportional Representation Systems (Evidence from Multiple Countries)

Supplementary Materials for Strategic Abstention in Proportional Representation Systems (Evidence from Multiple Countries) Supplementary Materials for Strategic Abstention in Proportional Representation Systems (Evidence from Multiple Countries) Guillem Riambau July 15, 2018 1 1 Construction of variables and descriptive statistics.

More information

Flip-Flopping, Primary Visibility and Selection of Candidates

Flip-Flopping, Primary Visibility and Selection of Candidates Flip-Flopping, Primary Visibility and Selection of Candidates Marina Agranov California Institute of Technology March 2015 Abstract We present an incomplete information model of two-stage elections in

More information

Occupation-specific immigration quotas in political equilibrium

Occupation-specific immigration quotas in political equilibrium Occupation-specific immigration quotas in political equilibrium Karin Mayr May, 2013 Abstract Immigration policies are generally restrictive, yet positive immigration quotas often exist for workers in

More information

Submission Number:JPET

Submission Number:JPET Submission Number:JPET-10-00189 Migration of the talented: Can Europe catch up with the U.S.? Lydia Mechtenberg WZB Berlin, Mannheim University Roland Strausz Humboldt Universität Berlin Abstract We develop

More information

A MODEL OF POLITICAL COMPETITION WITH CITIZEN-CANDIDATES. Martin J. Osborne and Al Slivinski. Abstract

A MODEL OF POLITICAL COMPETITION WITH CITIZEN-CANDIDATES. Martin J. Osborne and Al Slivinski. Abstract Published in Quarterly Journal of Economics 111 (1996), 65 96. Copyright c 1996 by the President and Fellows of Harvard College and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. A MODEL OF POLITICAL COMPETITION

More information

Labour market integration and its effect on child labour

Labour market integration and its effect on child labour Labour market integration and its effect on child labour Manfred Gärtner May 2011 Discussion Paper no. 2011-23 Department of Economics University of St. Gallen Editor: Publisher: Electronic Publication:

More information

With Friends Like These, Who Needs Enemies?

With Friends Like These, Who Needs Enemies? With Friends Like These, Who Needs Enemies? Federica Izzo Current draft: October 12, 2018 Abstract Why are political leaders often attacked by their ideological allies? The paper addresses this puzzle

More information

3 Electoral Competition

3 Electoral Competition 3 Electoral Competition We now turn to a discussion of two-party electoral competition in representative democracy. The underlying policy question addressed in this chapter, as well as the remaining chapters

More information

Growth and Poverty Reduction: An Empirical Analysis Nanak Kakwani

Growth and Poverty Reduction: An Empirical Analysis Nanak Kakwani Growth and Poverty Reduction: An Empirical Analysis Nanak Kakwani Abstract. This paper develops an inequality-growth trade off index, which shows how much growth is needed to offset the adverse impact

More information

Statistical Evidence and the Problem of Robust Litigation

Statistical Evidence and the Problem of Robust Litigation Statistical Evidence and the Problem of Robust Litigation Jesse Bull and Joel Watson December 2017 Abstract We develop a model of statistical evidence with a sophisticated Bayesian fact-finder. The context

More information

Game Theory for Political Scientists. James D. Morrow

Game Theory for Political Scientists. James D. Morrow Game Theory for Political Scientists James D. Morrow Princeton University Press Princeton, New Jersey CONTENTS List of Figures and Tables Preface and Acknowledgments xiii xix Chapter 1: Overview What Is

More information

University of Toronto Department of Economics. Party formation in single-issue politics [revised]

University of Toronto Department of Economics. Party formation in single-issue politics [revised] University of Toronto Department of Economics Working Paper 296 Party formation in single-issue politics [revised] By Martin J. Osborne and Rabee Tourky July 13, 2007 Party formation in single-issue politics

More information

Does Transparency Reduce Political Corruption?

Does Transparency Reduce Political Corruption? Does Transparency Reduce Political Corruption? Octavian Strîmbu and Patrick González March 15, 2015 Abstract Using a common agency game with imperfect information, we show that increasing the transparency

More information

Family Values and the Regulation of Labor

Family Values and the Regulation of Labor Family Values and the Regulation of Labor Alberto Alesina (Harvard University) Pierre Cahuc (Polytechnique, CREST) Yann Algan (Science Po, OFCE) Paola Giuliano (UCLA) December 2011 1 / 58 Introduction

More information

Should We Tax or Cap Political Contributions? A Lobbying Model With Policy Favors and Access

Should We Tax or Cap Political Contributions? A Lobbying Model With Policy Favors and Access Should We Tax or Cap Political Contributions? A Lobbying Model With Policy Favors and Access Christopher Cotton Published in the Journal of Public Economics, 93(7/8): 831-842, 2009 Abstract This paper

More information

Probabilistic Voting in Models of Electoral Competition. Peter Coughlin Department of Economics University of Maryland College Park, MD 20742

Probabilistic Voting in Models of Electoral Competition. Peter Coughlin Department of Economics University of Maryland College Park, MD 20742 April 2, 2015 Probabilistic Voting in Models of Electoral Competition by Peter Coughlin Department of Economics University of Maryland College Park, MD 20742 Abstract The pioneering model of electoral

More information

'Wave riding' or 'Owning the issue': How do candidates determine campaign agendas?

'Wave riding' or 'Owning the issue': How do candidates determine campaign agendas? 'Wave riding' or 'Owning the issue': How do candidates determine campaign agendas? Mariya Burdina University of Colorado, Boulder Department of Economics October 5th, 008 Abstract In this paper I adress

More information

Reviewing Procedure vs. Judging Substance: The Effect of Judicial Review on Agency Policymaking*

Reviewing Procedure vs. Judging Substance: The Effect of Judicial Review on Agency Policymaking* Reviewing Procedure vs. Judging Substance: The Effect of Judicial Review on Agency Policymaking* Ian R. Turner March 30, 2014 Abstract Bureaucratic policymaking is a central feature of the modern American

More information

Do (naturalized) immigrants affect employment and wages of natives? Evidence from Germany

Do (naturalized) immigrants affect employment and wages of natives? Evidence from Germany Do (naturalized) immigrants affect employment and wages of natives? Evidence from Germany Carsten Pohl 1 15 September, 2008 Extended Abstract Since the beginning of the 1990s Germany has experienced a

More information

Games With Incomplete Information A Nobel Lecture by John Harsanyi

Games With Incomplete Information A Nobel Lecture by John Harsanyi Games With Incomplete Information A by John Harsanyi Sujit Prakash Gujar Course: Topics in Game Theory Course Instructor : Prof Y Narahari November 11, 2008 Sujit Prakash Gujar (CSA, IISc) Games With Incomplete

More information

Goods, Games, and Institutions : A Reply

Goods, Games, and Institutions : A Reply International Political Science Review (2002), Vol 23, No. 4, 402 410 Debate: Goods, Games, and Institutions Part 2 Goods, Games, and Institutions : A Reply VINOD K. AGGARWAL AND CÉDRIC DUPONT ABSTRACT.

More information

4.1 Efficient Electoral Competition

4.1 Efficient Electoral Competition 4 Agency To what extent can political representatives exploit their political power to appropriate resources for themselves at the voters expense? Can the voters discipline politicians just through the

More information

Globalization, Child Labour, and Adult Unemployment

Globalization, Child Labour, and Adult Unemployment THE RITSUMEIKAN ECONOMIC REVIEWFeb Vol. 65 No. 4 2017 193 論 説 Globalization, Child Labour, and Adult Unemployment Kenzo Abe * Hiroaki Ogawa Abstract We analyse the impact of globalization on child labour

More information