A LOCAL PERSPECTIVE ON THE MILITARY WITHDRAWAL FROM POLITICS IN INDONESIA: East Java

Transcription

1 A LOCAL PERSPECTIVE ON THE MILITARY WITHDRAWAL FROM POLITICS IN INDONESIA: East Java By Jonni Mahroza Thesis Submitted for the Degree of Doctor Philosophy The Flinders Asia Centre School of Politics and International Studies Faculty of Social Science The Flinders University, Adelaide, South Australia 25 August

2 Table of Contents Contents...Page Table of Contents...i List of Tables, Diagrams, Figure, and Map...vi Candidate s Declaration...vii Abbreviations and Glossary...viii Abstract...xvi Acknowledgments...xviii Chapter One INTRODUCTION: Studying recent change in military-political relations in a major Indonesian region Doubted reform? Questioning towards this study Research aims and questions Significance and limitation of the study Thesis organization...12 Chapter Two REGIME CHANGE and MILITARY WITHDRAWAL: Theoretical Framework Introduction Defining a regime Military regimes Democratic regime Process of military withdrawal Patterns and stages Influential factors on military withdrawals Impacts of military withdrawal Functional separation Improvements in professionalism Democratizing a political system Conclusion...34 Chapter Three PRE-1998 MILITARY POLITICS IN INDONESIA: A review of its history until the withdrawal Introduction Pre-New Order period The formation of the new national army and its early involvement in politics Military political expansion during the 1950s The New Order: military in government after the mid-1960s Doctrines: Hankamrata and Dwifungsi Territorial Structure of the TNI The feature of the local military units Bakorstanas and Litsus

3 Wansospol and Staf Sospol Military appointments to the local government bureaucracy The military inlocal Legislative Assemblies (DPRD) Local inter-institution relations: coordination of social and political controls Military relationships with the local bureaucracies Personal Benefits of Service in the Koter The local military s relations with the society before Conclusion...70 Chapter Four METHODOLOGY The Research Strategy A multi-strategy analysis A local case study A semi-grounded or snowball method of data collection The selection of the research site Data sources and collection The pattern of data collection Collecting documents at the DPRD Interviews with DPRD members Collecting data from military units Collecting data at the local government offices Other sources of data Observation Issues of confidentiality...88 Chapter Five REFORMASI AND IMPACTS ON MILITARY-SOCIETY RELATIONS Introduction The New Order s Vanished Legitimacy Economic collapse, demonstrations, attacks on the Chinese community Land reclaiming by villagers Local communal conflicts: the dukun santet and ninja murders Demoralization of the military An Emergence of grassroots-based democracy: The case of the Mutual Aid Communication Posts (PGR) TNI s New Paradigm and soldiers reactions Obstacles to discipline campaign?: From Nge-ter to Nye-per Economic pressures or Reformasi euphoria?: Soldiers protests Summary Chapter Six LOCAL INSTITUTIONAL REFORMS: Dismantling the military s political networks Introduction: The three reforms De-politicization of military institutions Staf Sospol Wansospol Bakorstada and Litsus

4 3. Demilitarization of Political Institutions Withdrawal from government bureaucracy Eliminating military representatives seats in the local Assemblies Impact of Decentralization on the local military Liquidation of the Kansospol Changing Relations of District Government s Executive and Legislature Changing Regulations for the Local Elections Changing lines of communications between the Provincial and the District governments Conclusion Chapter Seven MILITARY INVOLVEMENT IN ELECTIONS OF DISTRICT GOVERNMENT HEADS (1): Towards declining effectiveness Introduction District elections in the New Order Stage I: Selection and nomination Stage II: Approval by the central authorities Stage III: Voting stage Stage IV: The final approval District elections post-new Order Challenging the military domination in Sumbersari Defeating the military in Ngadiredjo Dealing with new powers Restarting the election Powerless against a majority party Left out by ruling coalitions Conclusion Chapter Eight MILITARY INVOLVEMENT IN ELECTIONS OF DISTRICT GOVERNMENT HEADS (2): The rise of personal politics Introduction: The dissolving of a pattern Reasons for military support of candidates Shifting to individual orientations Involvement in civilian political conflicts Deviating from internal consensus Disobeying territorial commanders Open involvement Does institutional or individual matter? The place of the military in unstable civilian politics: Military political backing Conclusion Chapter Nine IMPACTS ON LOCAL MILITARY (1): The collapse of the military s karya positions Introduction: The three problems Problems: Job-losses and individuals reactions

5 3. Political failure: The military-turned-civilian Bupatis and Mayors Deterioration: The DPRD military factions Conclusion Chapter Ten IMPACT ON LOCAL MILITARY (2): The Declining Effectiveness of Its Security Role Introduction The money dried up Koter: Discourse, reactions and soldiers perspectives Debating Koter abolition Reactions of local military personnel What does the Koter mean for the soldiers? A preferred appointment Meaningless professionalism Struggles to move The Koter as a personnel disposal system Separation of the military from the police A compelling situation for a military back-up Ineffectiveness of the military back-up and uneasy relations Conclusion Chapter Eleven IMPACTS ON CIVILIAN: Civilian politicians, civil society and uncivil politics without TNI Introduction Political participation Anti-female president against the bloody thumb-print campaign The Gusdur Impeachment Crisis Politicians and political parties PDIP: Politicians and party PKB: Politicians and party Money politics problems and post-election implications Conclusion Chapter Twelve DEMILITARIZATION OF LOCAL POLITICS, DEPOLITICIZATION OF THE MILITARY AND DEMOCRATIZATION IN EAST JAVA: ANALYSIS OF FINDINGS Introduction Military-society relations preceding the withdrawal Institutional Reforms Impacts on military involvement in Pilkada elections Impacts on (former) karya personnel Impacts on local military units Impacts on civilian politicians, civil society and uncivil politics without TNI Concluding Remarks Bibliography

6 1. Books Journal Articles Unpublished Works Laws and Regulations Official Documents Magazines, Newspapers and Electronic Media Appendix...Page Appendix. 1 Appendix. 2 Appendix. 3 Appendix. 4 Appendix. 5 Appendix. 6 Appendix. 7 Appendix. 8 Appendix. 9 Appendix. 10 Appendix. 11 Appendix. 12 Appendix. 13 Appendix. 14 Appendix. 15 Appendix. 16 Appendix. 17 Appendix. 18 Appendix. 19 Positive and negative impacts of the withdrawal of the military from politics in East Java Possible links between military political withdrawal (in post East Java case), past military political intervention, and various degrees of civilian control and democracy Composition of Interviewees from East Java Possible changes in patterns of military withdrawal Security Fund Assistance to local military and police units Monthly Report of the F-TNI/POLRI of a Provincial DPRD (Cover only) Monthly Report of the F-TNI/POLRI of a District DPRD (Cover only) The Election Committee of the 1994 Jember Bupati Election..376 The Election Committee of the 2000 Sumenep Bupati Election The F-KB Criteria for the Bupati/Vice-Bupati Candidates in the 2000 Gresik Election The F-DIP Criteria for the Bupati/ Vice-Bupati Candidates in the 2000 Gresik Election A Local Newspaper Clipping: A Pedi cab driver registered as the Vice Bupati Candidate in the 2003 Madiun Bupati Election The Complete Documents of the Election submitted for an approval of the Bupati/ Vice Bupati of Situbondo Regency (Cover only) Chronology of the Impeachment of Drs. Bambang Dwi Hartomo, M.Pd. as Surabaya Mayor (Cover only) The Decision of Surabaya Court on the Sampang Bupati Election Dispute (Cover only) The (1999) Decision of the Commander in Chief of the Indonesian Armed Forces for the Assignment of Officers in Civilian Karya Jobs (Cover only) The (1996) Decision of the Commander in Chief of the Indonesian Armed Forces for the Assignment of Officers in Civilian Karya Jobs (Cover only) The 2002 LPJ (End-of-Year Accountability Report) of the Malang Bupati (Cover only) An allocation of Security Funds in the Local Government Budget

7 Appendix. 20 Appendix. 21 The Guiding Book for the Military s Civic Mission at District Level (Cover only) The salary of the Members of DPRD DPRD according to the Government Regulation No. 110/ 2000 (a front page only)

8 List of Tables, Charts and Map Tables, Diagrams, Figure, Map...Page Table II. 1 Typologies of Military Rule...20 Table II. 2 Degree of military political involvement...22 Table II. 3 The (Finer-based) Calculus of Military Withdrawal/ Intervention 26 Table II. 4 Political interactions in the military security role...28 Table II. 5 Relations between political cultures, levels and modes of intervention, and types of regime...32 Table III. 1 Level of authority of local government and territorial command...52 Table III. 2 Key elements of the formal military involvement in politics at local level during the New Order era...62 Table V.1. The Elements of TNI s Internal Reform (Reformasi Internal TNI) Table VII. 1 Political changes affecting the military power in East Java District elections (May 1998 December 2003) Table VII. 2 Outcomes of East Java s District elections (May 1998 December 2003) Table VII. 3 Military achievement in East Java s District Elections Table VIII. 1 Military Affiliation and Aspiration in East Java District Elections Table VIII. 2 Military support for officers competing to be East Java District Heads (May 1998 December 2003) Table VIII. 3 Candidates for District Head/Vice-Head proposed by PDIP and PKB ( ) Table IX. 1 Members of F-TNI/POLRI involved in the recall disputes Chart III. 1 Relations between positions in the local military and the local government execu Chart VII.1 Phases of local election according the Indonesian Law No. 5/ Chart VIII. 1 Percentage of Candidates for District Head/Vice-District Head proposed by PDI Map IV.1 Map of East Java

9 CANDIDATE S DECLRATION I certify that this thesis does not incorporate without acknowledgement any material previously submitted for a degree or diploma in any university, and that to the best of my knowledge and belief it does not contain any material previously published or written by another person except where due reference is made in the text. Jonni Mahroza 25 August 2006 SUPERVISORS DECLARATION We believe that this thesis is properly presented, conform to the specifications for the thesis and is sufficient standard to be, prima facie, worthy of examination. A/Prof Anton Lucas Dr Jim Schiller 25 August August

10 Abbreviations and Glossary ABRI Armed AD AJI AKPOL AL AMD ARMED AU BABINSA BAIS BAKESBANG BAKIN BAKORINDA Angkatan Bersenjata Republik Indonesia - Indonesian Forces Angkatan Darat Army Independent Journalist Association Akademi Kepolisian Police Academy Angkatan Laut Navy Abri Masuk Desa Armed Forces Enters the Village Artileri Medan -- Field Artillery Angkatan Udara Air Force Bintara Pembina Desa (Indonesian military NCO at village level) Badan Intelijen Strategis The Armed Forces Strategic Intelligence Board Badan Koordinasi Kesatuan Bangsa National Unity Coordinating Board Badan Koordinasi Intelijen Negara State Intelligence Coordinating Board Badan Koordinasi Intelijen Daerah Regional Intelligence Coordinating Body BAKORSTANASDA Badan Koordinasi Bantuan Pemantapan Stabilitas dan Ketahanan Nasional Tingkat Daerah Regional Coordinating Board for National Stability and Resilience BAKORSTANAS BAP BAPPEDA BECAK Badan Koordinasi Bantuan Pemantapan Stabilitas dan Ketahanan Nasional National Stability and Resilience Coordinating Board Berkas Berita Acara Pemeriksaan - Police Investigation Report Regional Development Planning Board Traditional three-wheel taxi (trishaw) 10

11 BIA BIN BPD Assembly BPS BRAWIJAYA BRIGIF BRIMOB BULOG BUMN BUPATI CABUP CAMAT CAWABUP CAWALI CAWAWALI DANDIM DANRAMIL Commander DANREM DEHANKAM Security DEPHAN DESA DPC Badan Intelijen ABRI Armed Forces Intelligence Organization Badan Intelijen Negara/ National Intelligence Board Badan Perwakilan Desa Village Representative Bureau of Statistics Regional Military Command in East Java Brigade Infanteri Infantry Brigade Brigade Mobil Police Mobile Brigade National Logistics Board State-owned enterprises District Head Regent Calon Bupati District Head/Regent Candidate Head of a Kecamatan/sub-district (subdivision of Kabupaten) Calon Wakil Bupati Deputy District/Regent Candidate Calon Walikota City Mayor Candidate Calon Wakil Walikota Deputy Mayor Candidate Komandan Kodim Military District Commander Komandan Rayon Militer Sub-District Military Kemandan Korem Military Resort Commander Departemen Pertahanan dan Keamanan Defense and Department Departemen Pertahanan Defense Department Autonomous Village Dewan Pimpinan Central District Leadership Council (of a political party) 11

12 DPD (of a DPP DPR DPRD F-ABRI F-AN F-DIP F-GAB F-GOLKAR F-KB DPRD FKPPI Youth FOKORIN Board F-PPP F-TNI/POLRI GESTAPU and new Rulers GOLKAR GOTONG ROYONG Dewan Pimpinan Daerah Regional Leadership Council party, or social organization) Dewan Pimpinan Pusat Central Leadership Council (of a party, or social organization) People's Representative Assembly - one of the two representative bodies provided for in the 1945 Constitution Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat Daerah/ District,Municipal and Provincial Representative Assemblies Fraksi ABRI Armed Forces Faction in DPR or DPRD Fraksi Amanat Nasional, PAN Faction in the DPR/ DPRD Fraksi Demokrasi Perjuangan, Faction of PDIP in the DPR/ DPRD Frakksi Gabungan Combined Party Faction Fraksi Golkar, Faction of Golkar Party in the DPR/ DPRD Fraksi Kebangitan Bangsa, Faction of PKB in the DPR/ Forum Komunikasi Putera Puteri Indonesia Indonesian Communication Forum Forum Koordinasi Intelijen Intelligence Coordinating Fraksi Partai Persatuan Pembangunan, Faction of United Development Party Representatives in the DPR/ DPRD Fraksi TNI/POLRI, Faction of Military/ Police Representatives in the DPR/ DPRD Acronym for the September 30th Movement, the abortive communist coup that resulted in the demise of the PKI the emergence of the army under Suharto as the of the Republic of Indonesia Functional Groups; the ruling political party; a corporatist federation of groups within society, such as peasants, workers, and women (State Political Party during Suharto and Habibie Presidencies) Traditional voluntary work for common benefit 12

13 HANKAMNAS Pertahanan dan Keamanan Nasional National Defence and Security HANKAMNEG HANKKAMRATA HANRATA HANSIP ICMI ICW KABUPATEN KADES KAKANSOSPOL KAMLA KAMRA KASAD Pertahan dan Keamanan Negara State Defence and Security Pertahanan dan Keamanan Rakyat Semesta Total People s Defense and Security Pertahanan Rakyat Semesta Total People s Defense Pertahan Sipil Civil Defense Ikatan Cendikiawan Muslim Indonesia/ Association of Indonesian Muslim Intellectuals Indonesian Corruption Watch District or Regency, provinces are divided into districts Kepala Desa Village Head Kepala Kantor Sosial Politik Head of Social and Political Office Keamanan Laut Marine Security Keamanan Rakyat People s Security Kepala Staf Angkatan Darat/ Army Chief of Staff KECAMATAN Sub-District, headed by Camat KEPALKA/KA KISDI KNIL KODAL KODAM KODIM KOMNAS HAM The person in charge of an organization, i.e. Kapolri, Kapolda, Kapolres, Kades, Kakansospol Indonesian Committee for Solidarity with Islamic World Royal Netherlands-Indies Army Komando Pengendalian Control Command Komando Daerah Militer/ Military Area Command Komando Distrik Militer Military District Command National Commission on Human Rights 13

14 KOPASKAS KOPASUS KOPKAMTIB KORAMIL KOREM KOSTRAD KOTER LEMHANNAS MARKAS/ MA MPR MUHAMMADYAH MUI MUSPIDA MUSPIKA NGO NKRI NU OPSUS Komando Pasukan Kas Air Force Special Forces Komando Pasukan Kusus Army Special Forces Komando Operasi Keamanan dan Ketertiban/ Operational Comand for the Restoration of Security and Order changed to Bakorstanas (see Bakorstanas) which was eliminated in 2000 Komando Rayon Militer (Indonesian military command at subdistrict level) Komando Resor Militer Military Sub-regional Command (below Kodam, above Kodim) Komando Cadangan Strategi Angkatan Darat Army Strategic Reserve Command Komando Teritorial/ Territorial Commands (Hierarchical deployment of the Indonesian Army Units, from provincial to the village level see Kodam, Korem, Kodim, Koramil, Babinsa) Lembaga Ketahanan Nasional National Resilience Institute Headquarters (e.g. Makodam, Mapolda, Mapolres) People's Consultative Assembly; one of the two representa tive bodies provided for in the 1945 Constitution Modernist Muslim Organization in Indonesia Majelis Ulama Indonesia/ Ulama (Moslem Religious Scholars Council in Indoneia Musawarah Pimpinan Daerah Regional Leaders Forum Musawarah Pimpinan Kecamatan Sub-district Leaders Forum Non-Governmental Organization Negara Kesatuan Republik Indonesia/ the Untary state of the Republic of Indonesia Nahhatul Ulama, Traditional Muslim Organization in Indonesia Operasi Khusus Special Operations 14

15 ORDE BARU ORLA ORSOSPOL Organizations PAM PEMILU PAM SWAKARSA PAN PANCASILA PANGAR PANGDAM PANLIH PANMUS PANSUS PK PASPAMPRES PBB PDI PDI-P PEMDA PEPOLIT (ORBA) New Order, the name of the Suharto regime which governed Indonesia from Orde Lama Old Order,Sukarno government which ruled Indonesia before 1966 Organisasi Sosial Politik Social and Political Pengaman Pemilihan Umum General Election Security Pengamanan Sukarela Voluntarily Militia National Mandate Party Five Principles of the Indonesian Republic which include: Belief in God, National Unity, Humanitarianism, People's Sovereignty, Social Justice and Prosperity. They were devised by Sukarno in July Panitia Anggaran DPR or DPRD Budgeting Committee Panglima Kodam Military Area Commander in Chief Panitia Pemilihan DPR or DPRD Electoral Committee Panitia Musyawarah DPR or DPRD Deliberation Committee Panitia Khusus DPR or DPRD Special Committee Partai Keadilan Justice Party Pasukan Pengaman Presiden Presidential Security Unit Partai Bulan Bintang/ Crescent and Star Party Partai Demokrasi Indonesia (Indonesian Democratic Party)led by Megawati Sukarnoputri, the successor party to the PNI Partai Demokrasi Indonesia Perjuangan/ Indonesian Democratic Party Struggle. Pemerintah Daerah Regional Government Organization for Political Indoctrination in the Ministry of Defense 15

16 PETA PILKADA PKB PKI PNI POLDA POLRES POLRI POLSEK POLWIL PP PP PPM PPP PREMAN PRRI RATIH Tentara Sukarela, Pembela Tanah Air in Java (Volunteer Army) of Defenders of the Homeland, Indonesian army units established during the Japanese occupation Many of its officers became high-ranking military officers and political leaders in Indonesia Pemilihan Kepala Daerah Regional Head Election Partai Kebangkitan Bangsa, National Awakening Party Partai Komunis Indonesia (the Indonesian Communist Party) which was a major political force in the Liberal Democracy and Guided Democracy period. Indonesian Nationalist Party, a secular-oriented Indonesian party which emphasized nationalism, anti-imperialism and concern for the Indonesian peasantry. Polisi Daerah (Indonesian provincial police) Polisi Resor (Indonesian police at district level) Polisi Republik Indonesia/ Indonesian National level Police Polisi Sektor (Indonesian police at sub-district level) Polisi Wilayah Sub-regional Police Persatuan Perjuangan/ Struggle Union which was formed on 15 January 1946 by Tan Malaka, a leader of radical group that wanted 100 per cent Independence from the Dutch colonial power Pemuda Pancasila Five Principle s Youths Pemuda Panca Marga Veteran Son s Organization Partai Persatuan Pembangunan/ United Development Party Hodlums, gangsters, criminals the Revolutionary Government of the Republic of Indonesia, the name of the 1958 regional rebellion directed at the national government. This rebellion was materially assisted by the CIA, but was crushed by the Indonesian army Rakyat Terlatih Civilian Militia 16

17 RI RIS SD SEKDA SEKWAN SESKO PAS-TRAMTIB TAPOL TARPADNAS TKR TMD TNI TNI-AD TNI-AL TNI-AU TRI USTADZ/ KYAI WABUP WAGUB WANRA WAWALI Republik Indonesia Republic of Indonesia Republik Indoenesia Serikat Republic of the United States of Indonesia SATGAS Satuan Tugas/ Unarmed para-police units who deal with public disturbances Primary School Sekretaris Daerah Secretary of Regional Government Sekretaris Dewan Secretary of the DPRD Sekolah Staf Komando Staff Training Command College Pasukan Kententraman dan Ketertiban Municipal guard units, a civilian corps employed by district government to enforce local codes and regulations Tahanan Politik Political Prisoners Penataran Kewaspadaan Nasional National Vigilance Refresher Course Tentara Keamanan Rakyat (People's Security Army) TNI Masuk Desa (replaced AMD, when ABRI became TNI in Tentara Nasional Indonesia Indonesian National Army Tentara Nasional Angkatan Darat/ Indonesian Army Tentara Nasional Angkatan Laut/ Indonesian Navy Tentara Nasional Angkatan Udara/ Indonesian Air Force Tentara Republik Indonesia (Army of the Republic of Indonesia) Muslim Preachers Wakil Bupati Deputy District Head Wakil Gubernur Vice Governor Perlawanan Rakyat People s Resistance Wakil Walikota Vice Mayor 17

18 Abstract This study explains the military withdrawal from politics in the East Java province of Indonesia in post-suharto era. Its purpose is to understand how the transition from an authoritarian to a democratic regime occurred at the local level in the first five-year period, To do so, it analyses the process and the impact of the withdrawal on local military, on local politics, on the newly democratic content of local civil-military relations, and on the form and quality of the establishing of the new democracy. To understand the process, the situation preceding the withdrawal and the implementation of the withdrawal policy in East Java were analysed. It was found that two compelling situations the economic disaster and the collapse of law and order de-legitimized and badly demoralized the military in this major province. The absence of significant resistance from the local military to the broad, dramatic withdrawal policy that followed should be understood against this background. That is, although it systematically dismantled the military territorial units political networks within the territorial structures, within local government bureaucracies and parliament, the military s decision to withdraw from politics afterward was understood by the local military personnel as politically realistic, to save the country and the military s image from worsening much further and thus to limit the loss of the military s political power. This situation depicts a pattern of how local military-society relations drove a change process. The interplay between the public (external) pressures to withdraw, and the (internal) willingness or at least acceptance by the military to respond positively propelled the process. The impact of the withdrawal was very significant. Systemically, the previous integrated system of military, civilian bureaucratic, and parliamentary political relations at the local level was over, this re-established stricter boundaries between the military and the civilian political institutions and cut off the military s direct political links. In addition, the process of democratization made some initial gains from the political decentralization away from tight central control. The power of local politics and the local branches of political parties have become more independent and much less influenced by the activities and effectiveness of the military hierarchy, down to the village levels. The military s control over local politics (and security) declined dramatically, mainly because of the elimination of 18

19 the political networks both horizontally (locally) and vertically (nationally) and the loss of financial resources that previously had streamed through these networks that used to sustain its political domination. It is quite encouraging that there is no evidence about any systematic attempt by the military to revive this declined influence, and it is not likely possible in the foreseeable future. There are also serious challenges to the democratic transition and consolidation, however. There were some problems about how to minimize the potential for political involvement, through which is considered to be defence and security management; about how to plan and organ the future funding which will be adequate to provide for a modern, professional military posture; about bringing a good governance into the military; and about transforming the mentality and attitudes of military personnel toward an apolitical, professional military culture. Clearly, dismantling the territorial units political networks was essential but not enough to make the military more professional. On the civilian side, there was a concern about improving the institutionalization of political parties, so that the political parties are able to accommodate a new trend in political participation which slightly increased, but was more sectarian and violent in its forms. So, the challenge for the civilian is how to establish an effective democratic civilian politics without the involvement of the military. Despite this limited success that it has only led and opened the ways to but had not yet been able to establish military professionalism and strong and effective democracy it should be seen optimistically as a crucial impetus and opportunity to continue the process and to achieve those two preconditions essential to sustain a lasting civilian control over the military. 19

20 Acknowledgment I was able to pursue and complete this study only because of the great contribution from many people and organizations, with only a few of which can possibly be acknowledged here. My most extensive and substantial debt in the whole period of this study is to my supervisor, Dr. Jim Schiller, who has been a constant source of encouragement and support in getting this thesis to this completion stage. His full attention with his views, critics, and comments have made the quality of this thesis much better than it otherwise would have been. I am particularly in debt to Professor Collin Brown for his role in supervising me in designing and preparing this thesis and making me ready to carry out the field work and to Dr Michele Ford and A/Professor Anton Lucas for their supportive and valuable advisory roles at the writing-up stage of this thesis. They were all great supervisors and their supports were so enormous that I was very lucky to be a student of them. I would like to record my gratitude to the Australian Government for awarding an AusAid Scholarship, which provided me with an opportunity to pursue my PhD Program at the Flinders University. I was also very fortune to obtain a strong endorsement for undertaking my study especially from Brigadier General (now retired) H. M. Hatta, S.IP and Colonel Erwin Barley, each was the Commander and the Director in the Artillery Centre of the Indonesian Army, under whom I was working as a serving officer in Cimahi, Indonesia. I am particularly grateful to gain a full support and permission from the Headquarters of the Indonesian Army and the Indonesian Armed Forces to follow this study program. I also wish to express my gratitude to Colonel Suhardjanto, the Indonesian Army Attaché in Canberra, for his genuine kindness and supportive attention that brought the auspicious condition to my stay and study in Australia. I owe a particular debt to the resource people at many levels of government and military headquarters in the East Java province, with their warm welcomes and helpful roles in various ways to provide me with valuable documents and other forms of useful information during my field work. I would like also to express my 20

21 gratitude to Dr Roger Wiseman who gave me priceless suggestions and has done such a professional editing job that appreciably improved the coherence and readability of this thesis. Debts to the staff members of Asia Centre and my student colleagues are also many, and my thanks go to Dr. Liz Morrell, and Mrs. Pat Huxtable, Vincensio Dugis, Bayu Patriadi, Hetifah Saifuddian, David Langdon, and Dianto Bachriadi. Their personal supports, discussions and sharing have made my study environment in Adelaide very encouraging, productive and enjoyable. Finally, my wife Diah, my daughters Nindya and Ayu, with whom I share my life, and who devoted their endless understanding in difficult time of my candidature, deserve more thanks by far than the dedication of this thesis can offer. 21

22 Chapter One INTRODUCTION: Studying recent change in military-political relations in a major Indonesian region A less noticed characteristic of the army today is that it is virtually a state within the state the army, five years into reformasi, remains a closed corporate group willing and able to protect its prerogatives, if need be at the expense of others. 1 less doctrinal and contextual analysis and more attention to local military entrenchment might have yielded more insights into Indonesia s stalled democratic project Doubted reform? Indonesia is experiencing another major change in the history of its military politics. The Indonesian military 3 was expanding its political power from 1945 to 1966, seized and dominated much of government from 1966 to 1998, then recently began to withdraw from politics soon after the collapse of the New Order regime at the peak of democratization movements in To what extent the military has shifted from its previous post-independence history of deep involvement in politics 5 is a fascinating and important topic to study as its complex development both promises hopes and poses doubts for the future of Indonesia and its democracy. The withdrawal of the Indonesian military from politics has been a consequential process of democratization when its wave found a 1 Liddle, William, Indonesia s army remains a closed corporate group, Jakarta Post, June 3, The italic stress on reformasi is added. 2 Kammen, Douglass., Recent Scholarship on the Indonesian Military, Indonesia, Oct 2003., Nr. 76 pp The name of the Indonesian military has been changed since its creation in 1945 from TKR (Tentara Keamanan Rakyat/People s Security Army) to TNI (Tentara Nasional Indonesia/ National Army) to ABRI (Angkatan Bersenjata Republik Indonesia/ Indonesian Republic Armed Forces) and to TNI again since An historical review discussing the development of the military s political role since 1945 is provided in Chapter Three. This includes a description of its political and economic activities and influences at the local level. 5 The scope and range of the local military s political, economic activities and influences are described in Chapter Three. 22

23 convenient opening to hit Indonesia through a financial crisis that has hampered the country since late The crisis was interwoven with political tensions around the national election in the same year and the subsequent re-election of Suharto for a seventh five-year presidency in March Major political developments then erupted. Greater pressures for political and economic reforms (reformasi), both from domestic and international communities, turned the financial crisis into a multifaceted one (economic, political, social and security) that forced the resignation of President Suharto two months after his re-election with the collapse of his military-backed New Order Regime. Reformasi afterwards dis-assembled the New Order s key elements of power, including, specifically, the military. 6 As responses to the demands of reformasi, a wide range of military political reforms has been introduced, covering doctrinal, structural or institutional to operational elements, either initiated internally by the central military headquarters or enforced by the national government through new and revised articles in the national constitution and subsequent legislation. 7 TNI initiated what is called TNI s Internal Reform (Reformasi Internal TNI) which attempted to redefine and reposition the TNI s political role. There were two main aims of these reforms: firstly, to promote confidence and trust-building in the country, and secondly, to undertake more fundamental, structural-oriented policies with the object of reforming the armed forces in order to be compatible with the current process and aims of Indonesian democratization. 8 As described in more detail in Chapter Two, the reforms had to be done in ways that would 6 Scholars described the forces coming from two directions, the international community and domestic movements. For example, Sukardi Rinakit included international actors (particularly the IMF and United States), the student and opposition movements, the elite conspiracy, and intra-military politics. Rinakit, Sukardi, The Indonesian Military after the New Order (Singapore: ISEAS Press, 2005), pp Aspinall said that it was the escalation of opposition in the first five months of the year [1998], propelled by the 1997 economic collapse, that brought about Suharto s political downfall. The book provides an extensive account of ordinary people opposition groups, such as dissidents, NGOs, student activists, political parties struggling for democracy and bringing a repressive authoritarian regime down from power. See Aspinall, Edward., Opposing Suharto: Compromise, Resistance, and Regime Change in Indonesia, (Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 2005), pp The situation around the resignation of Suharto is discussed in Chapter Five, while a detailed description of the dis-assembling of the military political network is provided in Chapter Six. 7 Detailed information about these changes is provided in Chapters Five (Section 5) and Six. 8 Singh, Bilveer., Civil-military relations in democratizing Indonesia: Change amidst continuity, Armed Forces and Society, 26 (4), Summer, 2000, p

24 separate the military from politics and minimize its political influence. This would be done by dismantling political roles attached to the military institutions, by withdrawing all military elements from civilian political institutions, and by redrawing a democratic pattern of civil-military relations, that is, democratic civilian control over the military. Not surprisingly, the Internal Reform has not met the expectations mentioned above. So far, expressions of doubt can be easily found in various writings related to the topic of the transformation of civil-military relations. An early survey in 2000 concluded that despite a qualitative change in civil-military-relations in Indonesia (T)his does not mean that a back to barracks policy has taken place. 9 In 2002 John McBeth, a Jakarta correspondent of the Far Eastern Economic Review, wrote: The military s national role may be dwindling, but it is still wields considerable power. Decentralization will likely enhance this. 10 In mid-2003 William Liddle wrote in the Jakarta Post that no fundamental change had happened in the military s political power; instead, the military especially the Army remains a closed corporate group virtually a state within a state. 11 Recently Aspinall appeared similarly pessimistic, writing that, despite dramatic breakthroughs and moments of great optimism in the Indonesian transition to democracy, it has been also followed by rapid frustration and disillusionment as the military-bureaucratic base of the regime remained largely intact. 12 In his 2003 book, Power Politics and the Indonesian Military, Damien Kingsbury was also clearly pessimistic when he said that if the reform movement had come to a standstill, or has been reversed, in Indonesia s more general political society, then it had certainly come to a halt within the TNI [the Indonesian National Armed Forces] Ibid, p McBeth, John, INDONESIA, The Military Fans Out, Far Eastern Economic Review, September 26, Liddle, William, Op. cit. See footnote 1 12 Aspinall, Edward., Opposing Suharto: Compromise, Resistance, and Regime Change in Indonesia, (Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 2005), p Kingsbury, Damien, Power Politics and Indonesian Military, (London and New York: RoutledgeCurzon, 2003) pp. 231,

25 A great number of other works by Indonesian scholars with similar accounts have been published post-suharto. 14 Because of limited space, here it suffices to mention one excellent example, an Indonesian scholar and military insider Sukardi Rinakit who concluded that democratization has reversed the New Order s pattern of the military s dominant political role into that of the pre-new Order era. In this position, Sukardi said, the military has a veto power that, based on its own judgment, it can impose at a time of its own choice upon whichever civilian government it sees as breaching the constitution similar to the role of Turkey s military. 15 Why was reform doubted? Earlier in 1999, Harold Crouch noted that: Most officers are more concerned with the short-term implications of reform for them personally. In the absence of adequate military pensions, officers have become accustomed to a system which channels them into civilian positions as their military careers draw to close. For them dwifungsi [dual functions defence and politics] is an ideology with very practical consideration [So] Whatever the theoretical arguments in favour of reform, the interests of many ABRI officers are tied to the old system. 16 Terence Lee in his 2000 article, The Nature and the Future of Civilmilitary Relations in Indonesia, explained why the Indonesian military 14 For example, Iswandi in 1998 wrote Bisnis Militer Orde Baru (New Order Military s Business); Abdurrahman Wahid (subsequently President from ) contributed an article to a 1999 book, Berpolitik atau Kembali ke Barak: Militer dalam Wacana Masyarakat Madani (Stay in Politics or Return to Barracks: Military in Civil Society Discourse); Salim Said produced two works on the military in 2001, Militer Indonesia dan Politik: Dulu, Kini dan Kelak (Indonesian Military: Past, Present and Future); and Wawancara tentang Tentara dan Politik (Interviews about Soldiers and Politics); Anas S Machfudz and Jaleswari Pramodhawardani edited a collective work, Military without Militarism: Suara Dari Daerah (Military without Militarism: Voices from the Regions), published in 2001; and Zainuddin Maliki published his book, Birokrasi Militer dan Partai Politik dalam Negara Transisi (Military Bureaucracy and Political Parties in a Transitional State) in Research institutions also produced a number of books with military themes. This includes the Institute for Research and Empowerment and PacIt?????ndonesia that published Tantangan dan Peluang Demiliterisme di Indonesia (Challenge and Opportunity for Demilitarization in Indonesia) in Indonesian Corruption Watch (ICW) and the National Democratic Institute (NDI) in 2003 published Bisnis Militer Mencari Legitimacy (Military Business Seeks Legitimacy). A collective work of several military officers coordinated by a pro-reformist Major General Agus Wirahadikusuma was published in1999. There has been also some individual officers works such as by Arif Yulianto who wrote Hubungan Sipil Militer di Indonesia Pasca Orba: Ditengah Pusaran Demokrasi (Civil Military Relations in Post- New Order Indonesia: In the Middle of a Democratic Cyclone), which was published in Rinakit, Sukardi, The Indonesian Military after the New Order (Singapore: ISEAS Press, 2005) 16 Crouch, Harold, Wiranto and Habibie: Military-Civilian Relations Since May 1998, in Reformasi: Crisis and Change in Indonesia, eds. Arief Budiman, Barbara Hatley, and Damien Kingsbury (Clayton, Australia: Monash Asia Institute, 1999), pp

26 continues to be politically omnipresent and still wields significant political clout within the country, by saying that, The three key foundations of the armed forces role in politics throughout its history representation of the military in the bureaucracy and government, territorial command structure, and its involvement in economic activities remain intact [While] Indonesia lacks strong civilian political institutions. 17 Similarly, Bilveer Singh argued that the factor of the history of the state and nation [that] from the beginning, Indonesian armed forces have been very political in character and remain so, all the more since the country has a track record of weak civilian political leadership and institutions. 18 Again, Damien Kingsbury blamed the chaotic nature of Indonesia as the justification for a central place for the post-suharto military in Indonesian politics. 19 The reality about the military reform described above is an unfortunate part of Indonesian democratization. However, the literature about democratization suggests that such doubt should not be surprising, as it is not unique to Indonesia. For example, by the beginning of the 1990s, Huntington suggested that some countries had reversed their democratization into the previous authoritarianism 20, and by the end of that decade, Dahl was also accounting for frequent failures of democracy in the twentieth century. 21 As well, Carothers in 2002 has pointed out that: Of the nearly 100 countries considered as transitional in recent years, only a relatively small number probably fewer than 20 are clearly en route to becoming successful, well-functioning 17 Lee, Terence., The Nature and Future of Civil-Military Relations in Indonesia, Asian Survey, 40:4, pp. 701, Singh, Bilveer, Civil-Military Relations in democratizing Indonesia: Change amidst continuity Armed Forces and Society. Summer 2000, Vol. 26, Iss. 4; pp See also Bilveer Singh. Civil-military Relations in Democratizing Indonesia: The Potentials and Limits to Change (Canberra Strategic and Defense Studies Centre, Australian National University, 2001). 19 Kingsbury, Damien, Power Politics and Indonesian Military, (London and New York: RoutledgeCurzon, 2003) pp. 231, See Huntington, S. P., The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century, (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1991). 21 Dahl, Robert A., On Democracy, (New Haven & London: Yale University Press, 1998), p

27 democracies or at least have made some democratic progress and still enjoy a positive dynamic of democratization. 22 These doubts raised earlier suggest that Indonesia is not yet to be classified as among the small number of successful transitional countries. However, this gloom about the prospect for a successful democratization in Indonesia should not discourage the democratization. Instead, it should be seen as more realistic in seeing and understanding the problems by increasing the awareness about the complexity of its process. It may be not fair to classify Indonesia into a group of countries, such as Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, Belarus and Togo, that failed in the earlier stage of democratization and returned soon to authoritarian rule; perhaps, it may be more appropriately fitted into a group of transitional countries that have entered a political grey zone, a zone where the countries are neither dictatorial nor clearly headed toward democracy. 23 In Jun Honna s words, the military response to reformasi has been a combination of openness and retreats at different fronts. 24 Moreover, this is a continuing process and not a static condition. Thus, at any particular time, before the current achievement of military reform can be evaluated, the most up to date information must be obtained, with the complexity of the reform process and its impacts recognized and explored to get closer to the reality. To comprehend and assess the interacting processes of democratization and military politics in Indonesia, more and continuing studies are needed that focus specifically on the form, extent and impact of the military withdrawal in its differing settings across Indonesia. Most studies mentioned above were effectively concentrated on the central military leadership and its relationship with the democratization processes at the national level. They have not covered local cases where 25 the organization 22 Carothers, Thomas, The End of the Transition Paradigm, Journal of Democracy, Vol. 13, No.1, 2002, pp Ibid. Types of regime are discussed more in Chapter Three. 24 Quoted from Kammen s review of Jun Honna s 2003 Military Politics and the Indonesian Military. See Kammen, D., Recent Scholarship on the Indonesian Military, Indonesia, Nr. 76, Oct 2003., pp See Chapter Three. 27

28 and activities of the Indonesian military, from its foundational struggle for national independence starting in 1945 and then ever since its attainment in 1949, has always been deliberately and effectively integrated into the politics and economics of local Indonesian society. This society varies widely across the archipelago, and post-1998 reformasi has involved a strong element of decentralization in its reaction against the previously highly centralized New Order. The activities and reasoning of the military in relation to processes of democratization at local and regional levels can only be discovered and understood by studying them at the local and regional levels, not merely inferred by what is thought and said at the general headquarters. 2. Questioning towards this study A large literature on the Indonesian military is now available, both in English and Indonesian. As discussed more in Chapter Three, the central questions have evolved from how and why the military was involved in politics and the involvement developed into domination to how and why the domination was maintained, then, most recently, to if, how and why, the military is leaving politics. I have two main concerns about the existing studies of Indonesian military in the latest phase, post The first concern--based on the skeptical expressions illustrated above, is about the need to broaden our understanding of how and why the military has been leaving politics by examining which impacts have been achieved and why others have not been. The second concern, explained more fully later, is about the tendency to focus investigations mainly at the national level, while paying inadequate systematic attention to military politics at the local level in particular local settings. While, I share several of the doubts expressed about the future of the military s political reform, I am concerned that data and analysis at the national level is insufficient to generalize into a full picture of post-suharto military politics. In this, I agree with Douglass Kammen (quoted at the beginning of this chapter) about Jun Honna s work that less doctrinal and contextual analysis and more 28

29 attention to local military entrenchment might have yielded more insights into Indonesia s stalled democratic project. 26 More local, regional and district, level approaches are needed, not to compete with, but to complement, what has been researched and reported at the national level. The fact is that there is insufficient systematic information about how military withdrawal has been implemented at the local level. What impacts has this withdrawal created and how have both local military and local civilian actors reacted, affected or been affected by the withdrawal process? How far are those impacts significant to analyses of the extent of the democratic transformation of civil-military relations? Is it enough to assume, for instance, that the military is so cohesive and independent an institution that every instruction issued from the central headquarters in Jakarta would have been followed immediately and precisely at each and every step down the formal structure? If this assumption is not made then how far can an account of military reform at the centre be believed to convincingly portray military reform where most military personnel operate, at regional, district or village levels? How far are examinations and speculations about the relations between military national leaders and President Wahid and his PKB party, or these military and Megawati Sukarnoputri and her PDIP party at the centre sufficient to be paralleled by and accurately represent local party-local military relations across the local complexities of Indonesia? Such questions have rarely been seriously posed or answered in the recent studies. So, for the purpose of exploring the complexity (instead of the generalization) of the military political withdrawal, studies need to look more to the local, from the village up to the regional levels of the military structure. In the post-suharto period studies of Indonesian local democracy often as studies of decentralization have become abundant, but studies of local military are quite few. However, it is common to find within the analyses of democratization and decentralization the connections to local military behaviour included among the factors being blamed as obstacles. The military personnel might be included in the analytic frameworks as 26 See footnote 1. 29

30 factors such as local mafia, networks and clans, 27 with, unfortunately, most referenced to the New Order as portrayed by studies published pre Such notorious behaviour of the military may not have changed quickly in the immediate post-suharto era, but more information about continuing or new patterns of such behaviours, as well as other aspects of military politics, also need to be explored for understanding the quality of democratisation. In a distortion, when studies did include the local military politics, they have mainly covered trouble spot areas in more peripheral regions, such as East Timor before the disintegration, Aceh, Irian Jaya or Maluku, which cannot be simply assumed to represent and explain the military politics in much larger, more stable, core areas. For example, Robinson, in his chapter Indonesia: On a New Course in the 2001 book edited by Muthiah Alagappa taking the same local case study: East Timor after The New Order. 28 This work has directed the attention more to the cases of human rights violence as reported by observers than to examinations of the changing organization of the military from insider perspectives. Two useful essays, published in the collection Local Power and Politics in Indonesia: Decentralisation and Democratisation, revealed some features of changing military politics at the local level. 29 Michael Malley, in his "New Rules, Old Structures and the Limits of Democratic Decentralisation", provided some insights about the declining trend in military occupation of local civilian jobs with little (insignificant) change in the political cultures but was too limited to provide further understandings of the actual processes of military withdrawal at the local level. Marcus Mietzner, in his "Business as Usual? The Indonesian Armed Forces and Local Politics in 27 See for example Sidel, John T., Bossism and Democracy in the Philippines, Thailand and Indonesia: Towards an Alternatives Framework for the Study of Local Strongmen, in Harris, John, Stokke Kristian & Tőrnquist, Olle, (ed.), Politicising democracy: the new local politics and democratization (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004) pp Robinson, Geoffrey, Indonesia: On a New Course, in Muthiah Alagappa, Coercion and Governance: The Declining Political Role of the Military in Asia, (Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 2001), pp. 240, Edward Aspinall and Greg Fealy (eds), Local Power and Politics in Indonesia: Decentralisation and Democratisation. (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2003). 30

31 the Post-Suharto Era", gave many useful insights about military politics in non-trouble spot areas. However, the book, published in 2003, was of edited papers from the Australian National University s Indonesia Update conference in mid-2002; so, in addition to its small scale of study, could not cover what has happened since then. In limited ways some Indonesia scholars have tried to approach local cases. Sutoro Eko in 2000, for example, published Masyarakat Pascamiliter: Tantangan dan Peluang Demiliterisme di Indonesia (Postmilitary Society: Challenges and Opportunities of Demilitarism in Indonesia) which, by using a sample of villagers of Yogyakarta, examined people s tendency to adopt militaristic attitudes. 30 This work seems very limited within sociological features of militarist attitudes of the civilians, disconnected from a broader political process, besides not covering the perspective of the military itself. Another study at the local level has been reported in a small book by Hermawan Sulistyo, Bedil & Kursi (Guns and Seats). A fifty-page chapter of Bikini dan Bedil: Ekonomi Politik Hubungan Sipil Militer di Bali (Bikinis and Guns: Political economic civil-military connections in Bali) of this book provided important information about local cases. However, the chapter was based on a small study which covered a wide range of topics, from economic to political to military-professional aspects, again appears to lack sufficient data and deep analysis. A most recent work, published in 2005, is an essay by Sukardi Rinakit, Decentralization and the Military in Regionalism in Post-Suharto Indonesia, that analyses the military s perception about decentralization. Nevertheless, in addition to its small scale, because this essay is mainly based on secondary sources rather than original, primary, data both the new information and analysis being provided is limited. To the best of my knowledge, therefore, no large-scale military-political studies focussed on systematic examination of cases at local levels have been completed. This thesis attempts to partly fulfil the pressing need for 30 Eko, Sutoro, Masyarakat Pascamiliter : Tantangan dan Peluang Demiliterisme di Indonesia, (Yogyakarta: Institute for Research and Empowerment and Pact Indonesia, 2000) 31

32 such enquiries by studying the implementation and the immediate impacts of the military withdrawal from politics in post-suharto Indonesia (1998 to 2003) using the East Java province as a case study. 3. Research aims and questions The practical aim of this study is to explain the local transformation of civilmilitary relations in post-suharto Indonesia in a major region. Its specific objectives are, to describe the process of the military s political withdrawal at the local level, to identify the immediate impacts of the withdrawal both on the local military and local politics, and based on the understanding about the process and the impact, to analyse the problems in democratizing civil miliary relations at the local level. Theoretically, this study is, therefore, aimed at enriching the discourses on the topic of military withdrawal from politics in a democratic transitional period, especially in establishing conditions essential to the establishment of civil military relation pattern which is compatible with democracy. Flowing from those aims are three sets of operational questions. The first set was related to the process of military withdrawal at the local level. In the East Java context, what kind of picture of political developments during the 1998/1999 democratic movements emerged and how can they be attributed to local campaigns that pushed the process of the withdrawal to happen? Specifically, how have the patterns of relations between the local military and local society changed? Then, what kinds of reform/withdrawal policies were implemented in East Java, and how have these policies changed the military s systematic control of local government and local legislature, and local politics in general? How have the military been separated from these civilian institutions and the political networks that linked the local military to these institutions been dismantled? 32

33 The second set of questions was about the impacts of the withdrawal process. How have the local military units, officers, civilian actors or political institutions reacted to, affected or been affected by the withdrawal? How have the withdrawal process had impacts on the effectiveness of political activities of the loca military, for example, in determining the outcomes of the Elections of Heads of Local Governments? Then, what happened to the officers who previously have been assigned civilian jobs? Also, what happened to the local military institutions (Komando Teritorial/ Territorial Commands) after the reform policies were implemented? As well, what happened to civilian politics after the military departure. Has it become more democratic or not, and why? The third set of questions is about the significance of the study to a theoretical explanation about the transformation of civil-military relations. As discussed later in the theoretical review in Chapter Two, a democratic civil-military relationship is characterized by the existence of a strong, effective and professional military which is under an effective control of a strong, effective and democratic civilian political system. Therefore, the study s questions were about the extent to which the military withdrawal since 1998 has produced useful conditions for creating such a character at the local level; has the local military become more professional and, has the local political system become more effective and democratic after the withdrawal, if not, what have been the problems in establishing such conditions? 4. Significance and limitation of the study This thesis has its significance but also limitations. Its significance lies in its timely topic involving Indonesian democratization and military politics and in its new approach toward local cases. It thus serves the interests of those scholars interested in questions both of Indonesian and of more general democratization, civil-military relations or military politics, as well as in Indonesian or Southeast Asian area studies. Hopefully, it can also be used by Indonesian policy makers and politicians, for example, as a reference for understanding problems in initiating policies related to the military reform agenda. Better understanding the achievement of 33

34 withdrawal of the military from politics is important in comprehending the degree and quality of Indonesian democratization. This recent dramatic change in the history of military politics in Indonesia, after a long-standing involvement, must have involved a complex process and far-reaching impacts both on the military and the civilian societies; therefore the study will help explain some of this complexity. Although the study is confined to the military withdrawal in only one province, East Java, this is a major region, the most populous in Indonesia, 31 with a population of over 33 million which would make it about the world s 35 th largest country if it were an independent nation-state. Moreover, such regional studies are necessary to build an adequate picture of the complete Indonesian situation given the likely variations between the regions across the world s fourth largest society, of about 250 million. Commonalities need to be demonstrated rather than presumed. However, it is important that the study s limitations are also recognized. Because of its topic and its approach, there are influential areas at the national level such as national elite relations and policy making processes that this study does not cover. It neither covers all or even a possibly representative sample of geographical local areas of Indonesia nor all aspects of local military politics. Due to issues of access and resources many important but sensitive areas, like military intelligence and business activities, were unable to be addressed in this thesis. Also this thesis is not intended to build new theoretical concepts about the impact of the military withdrawal. Limited time, limited resources, and its reliance on a specific-area (Indonesian) case study, rather than a large scale comparative approach using various countries, makes it less able to address many types of theories of military politics. Nevertheless, it attempts to make a substantial contribution theoretically by providing much 31 East Java used to be the second most populous province after West Java before the separation of Banten (that formed another province) from West Java in In addition, Camboek Berdoeri [Kwee Thiam Tjing], for example, described East Java as one of the provinces with its great social diversity in local cultures, and having open minded people with relatively egalitarianism or less feudal compared to Central Java, Bali, or West Javanese. See Berdeori, Camboek., Indonesia Dalem Api dan Bara, (Jakarta, ELKA, c2004), p

35 of that detailed case information and theoretical interpretation which is needed for future efforts of theory building. 5. Thesis organization To introduce the thesis, this Chapter One provides a short background for the study, the research aim and questions, the significance and limitation of the study, and the organization of the thesis. Chapter Two provides a theoretical direction for the study by discussing the theories pertinent to the study, and that this research could, hopefully, contribute to. It discusses four important concepts that are strongly connected to the withdrawal of the military from politics: military intervention and military rule, civilian control and supremacy, military withdrawal, and democratization. The concepts explain two different forms of regime (military and democratic) and two types of civil-military relations, the patterns and the reasons for their coming into being, thus are important for judging whether or not there has been a transformation, as well as how to measure the extent of it. This theoretical chapter shows that there is not a clear-cut boundary between a military and a democratic regime; thus the complexity of military withdrawal does not start from a clearly-definable point of departure, and the process and impact of each stage or of each element of the process do not always complement each other, but also on some occasions being obstacles to each other in the democratization achievement. This discussion suggests how complex and difficult, but also crucial, is the process of transforming civil-military relations as a part of democratization. Chapter Three generally provides an historical background, but specifically has two aims. One is to provide information about the character of military politics in Indonesia and other possible historical elements needing to be considered in interpreting the process and the impact of the withdrawal and its problems. The other is to provide a picture of the pre-1998 military 35

36 politics, as the starting point of departure, so that it gives a clear idea about how far the process of withdrawal has taken place and how significant are the impacts which have been made. This chapter argues that the history shows that it is necessary to emphasize strongly the difficulties rooted in the process and the impacts of modernization and professionalism of both political and military institutions, which took place under unstable political circumstances both internationally and domestically. Importantly, similar difficulties have remained, as shown across the thesis, in the process of military withdrawal from politics since In addition, this chapter shows that the deep involvement of the military in local politics during the New Order was mainly a corollary consequence of institutional and structural adjustments that were aimed at expanding the military s control over politics, as direct implications of the implementations of the military s political doctrine, namely, Dwifungsi or Dual Function. This description suggests that dis-assembling or reversing the adjustments would be important to cut down the military s political power. The methodology for this research is described in Chapter Four. This outlines the research strategy, namely, a multi-strategy analysis, a local case study approach, and semi-grounded and snowball data collection techniques, and explains the reasons for choosing these kinds of strategy. It also details how the activities of data collection were carried out, and addresses how the issue of confidentiality was handled, such as how a coding system was used to protect the sources and the actors. Chapters Five to Eleven document and discuss the process and the impact of the military withdrawal from politics in East Java since While the preceding chapters rely mainly on secondary data, these seven findings chapters use the primary data gathered during the one-year field study from February 2002 to February Chapter Five describes the instability brought about by multidimensional crisis during 1998 and 1999 in East Java, demonstrating how military- 36

37 society relations changed dramatically, a situation that involved public pressures for the military withdrawal from politics and a condition under which the withdrawal began to be implemented. This chapter argues that there was a strong dialectical relationship among three change indicators: the collapse of law and order, military demoralization, and the emergence of grassroots democracy. The military demoralization a collective expression of frustration, confusion, and feelings of uncertainty among the officers and soldiers was strongly connected to the restraint of the military s coercive capacity and the widening of political participation that marked an emergence of the grassroots-like democracy. At the same time, however, the military demoralization also negatively led toward a psychologically serious degradation of professionalism and effectiveness, and contributed significantly to the worsening of the instability or the collapse of law and order. These three developments were important indicators of the local reactions to, as an impact on, the society-military relations, brought about by the initial signs of a regime change, including the military withdrawal from politics. Chapter Six details broad functional changes of military structures and political institutions in East Java that took place, mainly in 1999 and 2000, as the implementation of the withdrawal policies initiated at the national level. This chapter demonstrates how the military political networks, which were the result of organizational, functional adjustment during the New Order, were dis-assembled and reversed to the original, pre-new Order outlook; then it discusses how important this reversal was to reforming military politics at the local level. Three set of policies are outlined and discussed here. One is the elimination of political elements that had been previously attached to the territorial command structures, including Staf Sospol (Staff of Social and Politics), Wansospolda/rem (the Regional or Sub-regional Social and Political Board), Bakorstanasda (the Regional Coordinating Board of National Strategy, Stabilization and Resilience), and Litsus (Special Screening). The second is the withdrawal of military officers from political institutions, namely, the bureaucracy and legislature, and other civilian jobs. The third is the decentralization of governmental 37

38 decision-making processes, which indirectly, but significantly, reduced the military s control over local politics. Chapters Seven and Eight document East Java s District Head Elections from 1998 to As demonstrated in Chapter Seven, these local elections exemplify the changing trends of military politics at the local level. The trends shown by these elections are important to understand influences of all the changing process and impacts of the military politics discussed in the previous chapters such as changes in society-military relations, changes in military political networks, as well as impacts on the sudden major losses in financial and political terms discussed in a chapter afterward on military power and influence in key local political events. This chapter argues that, in general, the elections indicate a generally consistent trend in the decline of the military s control over local politics, and an increase in civilian political power. While Chapter Seven focuses on the general institutional level of local military politics, Chapter eight scrutinizes the political activities of the individual officers involved in the local elections. These two chapters, generally, but more specifically Chapter Eight emphasizes, that the decline of the military s political roles has included a drastic weakening of its institutional control over the political behaviours of officers who were actively involved in the local elections; and this represents a heterogeneity of political preferences, lack of solidarity, and internal control within the military. This heterogeneity was on many occasions, for personal reasons, influenced by personal channels with civilian political groups. This recalls the similar historical facts that, as discussed in Chapter Three, the involvements of the military officers in politics were also significantly caused by the weakness of this the military s institutional control instead of solely this civilian s. Chapters Nine and Ten examine the immediate impacts of the reformasi on the local military. Chapter Nine examines the impact (of the disassembling of military political networks resulted from the functional and structural changes discussed in Chapter Six) on former political karya officers, namely, those who were withdrawn from civilian jobs, military- 38

39 turned-civilian Regents and Mayors, and the remaining military representatives in the DPRD (the local parliaments). Chapter Ten examines further the impacts on and reactions of the local military units to the reform policies. The two chapters argue that the ways daily sociopolitical activities which individual soldiers, officers or even units carried out at the local level were also controlled by very practical, and short terms considerations, which, if not contradicting the concepts and values, frequently had no clear implications for the existence or absence of the doctrines. Therefore, the ways the personnel reacted have been influenced as much by their perceptions and understanding about these practical matters as by the official doctrines. Further, Chapter Ten argues that the large financial cuts experienced by the local territorial units have made them also less capable of fulfilling their professional duties, mainly because of having been accustomed to relying heavily on financial and material resources guaranteed by the political networks which now were being abolished. This created an important challenge in professionalizing the military. Chapter Eleven examines and discusses features of public political participation and the political institutions in the East Java Province after the 1998 movements, and explains the complexity of some of the problems that have emerged. It scrutinizes the two biggest parties in East Java, the PKB/Partai Kebangkitan Bangsa (National Awakening Party) and PDIP/Partai Demokrasi Indonesia Perjuangan (Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle). Based on indicators provided by these two parties, it argues that the military political withdrawal has broadened the local civilian elite base from Golkar-bureaucrat elites to include newlycreated-party-based elites; but the withdrawal has not substantially increased public political participation, nor soon resulted in a strong democratic institutions Therefore has not automatically developed into a locally strong democratic political system necessary for an effective civilian control over the local military. 39

40 Chapter Twelve summarizes and interprets what have been discussed in previous chapters, and concludes that in the military region of East Java the withdrawal has had important local impacts in terms of transferring formal authority from the military to civilian actors and structures. However, it has also had negative impacts that complicate attempts to professionalize the military and to institutionalize an effective democratic political system, thus obstructing the democratic consolidation to sustain and to continue what has been achieved by the power transfer. Among other important factors (both external and internal to the military) which need close attention by scholars and practitioners are the weakness of governance by civilians and internal control over its officers by the military top leadership. Chapter Two 40

41 REGIME CHANGE and MILITARY WITHDRAWAL: Theoretical Framework There still remain those very numerous cases where, as we have seen, the military are so powerful and the civilian forces so inchoate and feeble that, come what may, the military are bound to dominate politics. 32 Armed forces inherently are political institutions. A continuum of interactions exists between civilians and members of the armed forces, with the result that civilian control of the military is never absolute, nor military control over politics ever total Introduction When reading the first quote above, one should not be pessimistic about the prospect of a regime change, the withdrawal of the military from politics and the establishment of an apolitical military and a solely civilian democratic political system. Yet, one should be aware that this process is very complex, and so should not put too high an expectation on the process and the impact being an absolute one, with the second quote as a cautionary reminder. Similarly, Brooker has claimed that, military intervention [rather than civilian control] is actually a matter of degree rather than a simply yes/ no question. 34 This chapter discusses theories and concepts related to the process of a regime change from military to democratic. It presents and analyses crucial concepts that have been proposed for the exploration of potential changes in the relationships between the military and politics in a state, including the concepts of Military regime, Democratic regime, Democratization and Military withdrawal. It considers how far these are absolute, discrete and independent 32 Finer, S. E., The Man on the Horseback: The Role of the Military in Politics (London: Printer Publishers, 1988), p Welch, Jr. Claude E., Civilian Control of The Military: Theory and Cases from Developing Countries, (New York: State University of New York Press, 1976), p Brooker, Paul, Non-democratic Regimes: Theory, Government and Politics, (London: Macmillan Press, 2000), p

42 concepts rather than being interrelated and names for ranges along a continuum. This is relevant both to more adequate understanding of military-civilian relationships in general and also in recognizing what to look for in an empirical examination of changes in particular cases, such as those in Indonesian society. Specific theories for the study of military political withdrawal at the local level have not been found so far. One possible reason, as noted earlier, is that there has been insufficient attention paid to such local study. Another explanation might be that issues at the local level should not be seen as separate from similar topics of military politics which have been studied at the national level, so there should not be an urgent need to invent new theories specific to local study. This chapter is not attempting to do so, instead it attempts to find a place where such local study will fit into the bigger pictures of theoretical discourses on military politics or on civilmilitary relations. In doing this, it elaborates several existing theories or concepts pertinent to them. The following section will firstly describe how military and democratic regimes have been defined. The next section will discuss the processes of regime change, followed by an outline of the possible impacts of military political withdrawals. 2. Defining a regime Militaries in different countries, or in a single country over different times, have different positions in the political arena on a wide range of factors. Several scholars have put these into two sets. 35 The first is related to the military itself, such as: the nature of military institutions; the social backgrounds and motives of the military leaders; factionalism in the military establishment; military professionalism; and the military mission and roles. The second set is attributed to 35 Alagappa, Muthiah, Coercion and Governance: the Declining Political Role of the Military in Asia (Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 2000) p

43 the national and international environment where the military exists, including: historical legacies; ideology; political culture; development of civil society; strength of civilian institutions; levels of economic developments; and changes in the international context. Differences in those factors produce different types of regime, democratic or military. 36 In order to adequately understand a regime change from a military to a democratic one, it is essential first to understand how each of these types of regime has been defined. This section presents some typologies that define these regimes Military regimes There have been a number of ways of categorizing military regimes. Important writings include those of Finer (1962, 1988), Perlmutter (1977), Nordlinger (1977) and Huntington (1988). 37 Finer defines a military regime as a regime where there exists evidence that the government is in the hands of the armed forces or that it acts entirely or predominantly at their command. 38 He proposes five structural types of military regimes: indirect limited, indirect complete, direct quasi-civilianized, direct, and dual. The first two involve military control behind the scenes, over limited elements or the complete activities of the civilian government. The direct types are characterized by open military control with military leaders holding positions of chief executives, president and/or government ministers. The direct quasi-civilianized regime involves a military-created political party which is emanating from and dependent on the military. In a dual regime, a military officer holds both positions of leader of the military and of a civilian political organization, which is otherwise independent of the military organization, to uphold his authority Donald Horowitz in 1980, as quoted in Alagappa, Ibid, p For a detailed review of these typologies see Brooker, Paul, Non-democratic Regimes: Theory, Government and Politics, (London: Macmillan Press, 2000). 38 Finer, Op. cit, p Finer systematically identified five types of military regime: indirect-limited, indirect complete, direct quasicivilianized, direct, and dual. In the two indirect types the military controls behind the scenes, over either 43

44 Other scholars have attempted to classify military regimes based on the roles of the military in politics. Perlmutter categorizes military intervention on the basis of whether it is carried out by military acting as an Arbitrator or by a Ruler. The former accepts the existing order and has an intention to withdraw after the settlement of the disputes. The latter rejects it and, because of distrust in civilian rule, has no intention of retreating. An Arbitrator has no political organization and does not intend to maximize military rule. In contrast, a Ruler has a political organization and tends to maximize army rule. 40 Nordlinger also classified three types of military regimes. On the basis of two factors the degree of a regime s political /economic objectives and the degree of the governmental power exerted by the military he categorizes regimes into Moderator, Guardian and Ruler. The Ruler type involves the greatest degree with its most ambitious goals and with the military exerting the greatest amount of power, dominating almost all aspects of political, economic and social life of the state and society. The Guardian and Moderator types have limited objectives, with the former preferring direct rule and the latter an indirect one. 41 Huntington based his typology on the specific roles played by the military in modernizing societies. He classifies these into three types that differ in relation to their level of political participation in the society; from the Radical/Reformer type with a low level of political participation to the Arbiter/Stabilizer type with medium and Guardian/Vetoer with high participation. limited objectives or all activities of the civilian government. The direct types are open military regimes or military governments; where military leaders hold positions of chief executives, president and/ or government ministers. Direct quasi-civilianized is marked by the existence of a military-created political party which is created by and dependent on the military. In a dual type, a military officer holds a position as both a military leader and a civilian political organization leader, and balances the two institutions to uphold his authority. Unlike in a direct quasicivilianized, in a dual type the civilian organization is independent of the military institution. Finer, Ibid, p Perlmutter, Amos, The Military and Politics in Modern Times: on Professionals, Praetorians, and Revolutionary Soldiers., (New Haven: Yale University Press. 1977), pp As quoted from Brooker, Op. cit, p

45 As Brooker 42 has attempted to show, there are some correspondences between these four typologies. (See Table II.1). These typologies are useful in classifying the various forms of military government in Indonesia, thus of what was being departed from in the period of this research. Table II. 1: Typologies of Military Rule Perlmutter Nordlinger Huntington Finer 1. Arbitrator 2. Ruler 3. Party-army (evolves from ruler) 1. Moderator 2. Guardian 3. Ruler 1. Radical reformer 2. Arbiter/stabilizer 3. Guardian/Vetoer 1. Indirect-limited 2. Indirectcomplete 3. Dual 4. Direct 5. Direct quasicivilianized Source: Adapted from Brooker. p.45, changes are made slightly to the numbering order Democratic regime As noted above, in a military regime the ruler is the military; it rules either overtly/directly or covertly/indirectly. In contrast, a democracy is defined, for example by Huntington, as a system where: most powerful collective decision makers are selected through fair, honest, and periodic elections in which candidates freely compete for votes and in which virtually all the adult population is eligible to vote. 43 Democracy recognizes civil and political freedoms to speak, publish, assemble, and organize that are necessary to political debate and the conduct of electoral campaigns. 44 So, ideally, civilian leaders in a democratic regime come into power through a fair and free election, and when they come into power they exercise the actual political power. 45 Unlike in a military regime, in a democratic regime the military remains neutral politically and ideologically, and is separated from political 42 Brooker, Ibid, p See Huntington, S. P., The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century, (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1991), p Huntington also incorporated two critical factors proposed by Robert Dahl: contestation and participation. Ibid, pp For a more comprehensive discussion about the criteria of ideal or actual democracy see for example Dahl, Robert A., On Democracy, (New Haven & London: Yale University Press, 1998), especially Parts II and III. 45

46 institutions; the military is also subordinated to and controlled by the democratically elected civilian authority, through a series of constitutional checks and balances. 46 The scope and level of the civil-military relations where it can exercise a limited amount of political roles is limited within a national security policy that has three forms: military security policy, internal security policy, and situational security policy. A military security policy deals mainly with external threats, an internal security policy with internal threats, and a situational security policy with the long-term threats brought about by changes in social, economic and political conditions. Each of these forms has two levels: institutional and operational. The place for civil-military relations is at the institutional level, which involves mainly decision-makers at the elite levels, of the form of military security policy. 47 Consequently, the military s professional responsibility is limited to military security. 48 This limitation of the area for exercising civil-military relations does not exist in a military regime, where the military s professional responsibility focuses on internal rather than military security of society. 49 However, these differences are not a black-white division, because in practice there is not a clear-cut line dividing political roles for the military in democratic and non-democratic regimes, partly because of unclear borders both between the military security policy and the other two (internal and situational) security polices and between the institutional and operational levels. 50 Welch suggested that the military political role should not be questioned in terms of an absolute whether or not, but in terms of the how much and of what kind because any military has its [own] political system. He argued that, given organizational identity, autonomy, 46 See Huntington, S. P., The Soldier and the State: the Theory and Politics of Civil-Military Relations, (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1957), pp Ibid, pp.1-2. See also Dahl, On Democracy, p Huntington, The Soldier and the State, pp Alfred Stepan proposed a new professionalism for new independent states. Security and national development are viewed as inseparable parts. For the reasons of this new professionalism, however, he said, the military could become motivated to intervene in politics. See Stepan, Alfred, Authoritarian Brazil (New Haven and London Yale University Press, 1976), p Huntington, The Soldier and the State, Op. cit, p

47 and functional specialization (the military) can not be precluded from the political arena. 51 Welch graded the degree of the military involvement in politics in a similar fashion to Finer; but while Finer did this in terms of the military regime, Welch did it in terms of the civilian political control. Welch asserted that civilian control always occurs within a context of some forms of military involvement in politics. He drew a continuum of relationships where the power of the military and the power of civilian institutions relative to the enunciation, development, and implementation of policy are present. (See Table II.2) Table II. 2: Degree of military political involvement Welch: Military Influence Military Participation Military Control Military control (Civilian control) (with partners) (without partners) Finer: Indirect limited Indirect complete Dual Direct quasi-civilianized - Direct The above discussion suggests that there is a risk of oversimplification when trying to define a regime whether it be a military regime, democratic regime or something in between, because it seems that there could be difficulty in fitting a regime neatly in one category. Nevertheless, it is possible to examine whether a regime in a certain period of time is becoming, or will become in the future, more or less democratic. Therefore, instead of trying to define Indonesian regimes precisely based on the above categories, a main task of this study is to evaluate to what extent, and why, post-1998 Indonesia from the local level perspective has become more or less democratic. In order to be able to carry out this evaluation, we need to understand concepts related to the process and the impact involved in becoming more or less democratic. As discussed below, the process that makes a regime less democratic or more 51 Welch, Op. cit, p. 2. Despite this, Costa Rica in 1950 eliminated the threat to its democracy by eliminating its military, which however would not be likely to be followed by any other country. See Dahl, Op. cit. p

48 militaristic is called military political intervention, while what makes it more democratic or less militaristic is a military political withdrawal. The next discussion is focused on the second of these contrary processes. 3. Process of military withdrawal 3.1. Patterns and stages The explanation about how a military withdrawal happens has been integrated into the broader explanation about how a transition to democracy occurs. Scholars have suggested that it can involve various patterns. For example, Finer mentioned an abdication pattern where the military withdraws because of being badly discredited or under overwhelming pressures; 52 Rustow used the term pact to emphasis a compromise agreement ; 53 and Brooker added another pattern, dictated, where the military is politically strong and leads the transition to democracy. 54 Huntington named these patterns differently but still with similar meanings they are respectively, replacement, transplacement and transformation. 55 In a simpler way, Welch divides the withdrawal process into two different routes of withdrawal based on the speed or duration of the process (forced) breakdown and (voluntary) extrication. 56 While the former involves a rapid collapse of a military government, a euphoric change of government with little staying power, the latter, he said, lengthens for several years involving liberalization in which an authoritarian regime 52 See Finer, Op. cit, p See also O Donnell, Guillermo and P C. Schmitter and L. Whitehead, (eds.), Transition from Authoritarian Rule: Tentative Conclusions about Uncertain Democracies (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press), pp. 20, 21, 35, As quoted in Brooker, Op, cit, p Brooker, Ibid, pp Huntington compared these three types of process with similar typologies by Linz, and Share and Mainwaring, and suggested that they are the same ideas but just use different words. See Huntington, The Third Wave, Op. cit., p Welch Jr, Claude E., Military Disengagement from Politics: Paradigms, Process, or Random Events, Armed Forces and Society, Vol.18, No.3, Spring 1992, pp See also Welch Jr, Claude E., Long Term Consequences of Military Rule: Breakdown and Extrication, Journal of Strategies Studies 1, September 1978, pp

49 liberalizes a mixture of policy and social changes, including toleration of political opposition, but may not include a real opportunity for opponents to achieve power peacefully. He argues that a voluntary extrication produces a less negative impact on the likelihoods of long-term achievement of liberalization and/or democratization. However, he also suggests that liberalization may be less as a basic change in the regime s foundation than as a strategy of maintaining the status quo. In fact, most withdrawals by military regimes, as Allagappa claimed, were forced instead of self initiated. 57 According to Huntington, however, commonly two or more transition processes come together in every historical case, although one type of process may dominate the others, so the transitions may start with one type but then become another. 58 Similarly, Welch said that [e]ven the most precipitous flight from political responsibility involves some planning; even the most highly planned and phased military disengagements from power reflect elements of pressure from segments of society. 59 So, Welch re-asserted the complexity of a regime change. The purpose of this study, therefore, is not to define which pattern(s) would fit the process of military political withdrawal in post-1998 Indonesia, but instead to explore the complexity of its process where, when and how in East Java the military was weaker, equal or stronger politically vis-á-vis the civil society; what aspect(s) of the process seemed (or did not seem) to be easily or quickly completed; or in which part of the withdrawal the politics seems to be becoming more or less democratic. 57 Allagappa, Op. cit, p Huntington, The Third Wave, Op.cit., p Welch Jr, Civilian Control, Op.cit, p.327. See also the quote in footnote 1. By considering all those patterns, in a long-standing military regime, an evolution from liberalization to democratization, or from transformation to replacement, can be drawn as in Appendix 2. The table is a modification of Brooker s table in which each of the three models is depicted as a separate and independent event. The table tells us that the withdrawal of the military from politics could evolve from one pattern to another, although an extensive withdrawal could happen over a short period of time resulting from a dramatic change in political circumstances. At one point of time, the military is still strong enough to control the situation, but initiates the agenda to leave politics with or without agreements with the civilian opposition, which then widens opportunity for the latter to become very powerful in replacing the military regime. The table is quite useful to understand the long evolution of military regime in Indonesia which will be discussed in chapter Three. For information about the original table See Brooker, Op. cit., figure 8.2, p

50 3.2. Influential factors on military withdrawals What conditions lead to, or speed up, the process of military withdrawal is a matter of great debate in the study of military politics, and the questions are more or less similar to the questions about which factors condition military intervention in politics, or increase the intervention. The debate about this issue has centred around three major concepts: military intervention, military withdrawal, and civilian control. At least three groups of concepts of military politics have been very influential over the last four decade. One of these models, originating in Finer s 1962 work, The Man on the Horseback, suggests that two factors, disposition and opportunity, are pertinent to the military s political involvement occurring. 60 Disposition refers to factors internal to the military including military ideology and values, institutional or individual officers interests; opportunity to external factors including social, cultural, political or economic circumstances of the country. The other two models involve competing priorities in causation, each emphasising one set of factors over another. While Janowitz in his 1960 Professional Soldier stressed the (military) internal factors, especially social background and organizational characteristics of the military, 61 Huntington in his 1968 Political Order in Changing Society put more emphasis on (social) external factors, specifically the political and institutional structure of the society. 62 These concepts have been widely used to explain not only military interventions into, but also withdrawals from, politics Finer reached this conclusion based on a comparative study over one hundred countries studying why and how the military interventions in politics occurred. See Finer, Samuel. E., The Man on The Horse Back, (Colorado: Westview Press, Inc, 1982). 61 By military characteristics Janowitz was referring to the military s control of violence instruments; its ethos of public service and national identifications; its skill structure, which combines managerial ability with a heroic posture; and its internal social cohesion that produces stable leadership. What he meant by social background was that because the officers are recruited from the middle and lower-middle classes they do not have strong loyalty to an integrated upper class as political leaders. Janowitz, Morris, The Professional Soldier: A Social and Political Portrait (USA: The Free Press. 1960). pp Huntington argued that the most important causes of military intervention in politics are not military but political and reflect not the social and organizational characteristics of the military establishment but the political and institutional structure of the society. His main reason is that military interventions are only one specific manifestation of a broader phenomenon in under-developed societies: the general politicization of social forces and institutions. Huntington, S. P., Political Order in Changing Societies, Op. cit, p Finer wrote, what applies to military intervention can also be played back to explicate its excursion. As cited by Alagappa, Muthiah, Coercion and Governance: The Declining Political Role of the Military in Asia, (Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 2001), p

51 This study, however, is not in order to argue for or against either the military or civilian sets of factors as the most important to cause a regime change, but to identify what within each set of military or civilian factors drives/ speeds up (or inhibits/ stops/ reverses) the change, the transition toward democracy. Therefore, instead of assuming only those which have been initially claimed by one or other of these theorists to be the most important, it may be better to consider a wide range of possible factors, and then try to assess how they would affect the withdrawal process. For this purpose, Finer s formula would be the most useful starting point as it provides a quite comprehensive framework. Paul Brooker 64 has attempted to summarize the many factors which several scholars regard as influential for both military intervention and military withdrawal, and put them together into a framework of a calculus of military withdrawal and intervention which modifies and extends Finer s formula, as seen in Table II.3. Weaker motives to withdraw/ Stronger motive to intervene Table II. 3: The (Finer-based) Calculus of Military Withdrawal/ Intervention Stronger motives to withdrawal/ Weaker motive to intervene Increased opportunity for (further) withdrawal Ideological/ National Interest 1. Fulfilling promise of democratization 2. Ideological/ legitimacy problems 3. Belief in civil supremacy Corporate self-interest 1 Political difficulties of governing the country 2. Public reputation besmirched by 1. Civilian government has legitimacy 2. Absence of previous coups 3. Presence of foreign troops 4. Elite, paramilitary units, or mass civilian protest that may become an organized and occasionally armed challenge unpopular/ ineffective military rule. 5. Withdrawal (actual or 3. Politicization/ factionalism arising from policy-making (fear of politicization of military) 4. Fears of coup failure or military rule threatened) of foreign support 6. National security problems 7. Negative economic trends 8. Electoral overconfidence Individual Self-interest 9. Demonstration effect 1. Military governors political difficulties (domino, snowball) of of governing the country global/regional democratization increases civilians (political) selfconfidence Less opportunity for withdrawal/ Increased opportunity for 64 Brooker, Op. cit, p

52 Ideological/ national interest 1. Protecting national interest or ideological goals 2. Protecting regime s work in pursuit of national interest or ideology Corporate self-interest 1. Protecting military and its corporate interest from retaliation/ retribution 2. Protecting its corporate autonomy under future civilian government Individual self-interest 1. Protecting governing and internalsecurity officers from retaliation/ retribution 2. Division over issue of appropriate time to withdraw 3. Politicization/ factionalism resulting from personal affiliations with political groups intervention 1. Civilian government s lack of legitimacy 2. Civilian government dependent on military 3. Civilian government discredited e.g. from corruption, economic failings 4. Civilians ignore interests/ policy preferences of the military 5. Civilian successors are not potentially stable and peaceful party or party system Sources: This table is modified from four tables of Brooker (2000) pp. 61, 195, 197, 200). The author(s) suggestions for each point have been deleted to provide space. One factor, 3. Politicization/ factionalism resulting from personal affiliations with political groups, has been added to Stronger Motive to Intervene. This is because, based on an examination of the Indonesian case, as discussed more in Chapter Three, it appears that this factor has been very influential in increasing the involvements of the military in politics. As Brooker says, all the factors included in the framework reflect the complexities of the real world of military interventions in politics, and each factor is actually a matter of degree rather than a simple yes/no question Impacts of military withdrawal Huntington said that, as a crucial part of democratization, the military withdrawal should aim at transforming civil-military relations into a pattern which is compatible with democracy in a long term. 66 Such a pattern has been frequently termed as (democratic) civilian control over the military, a mechanism that ensures that in providing the security for and protecting 65 Brooker, Ibid, p Huntington, The Third Wave, Op. cit., p

53 the state and its people, the military does not endanger what it tries to protect, or act in ways not delegated to it by the people or the state. 67 Whether the withdrawal will achieve the establishment of civilian control, according to Huntington, is determined by three related things: the type of authoritarian regime, the power of the military establishment, and the nature of the transition. 68 Following this suggestion, the primary data of the case study presented in this thesis (Chapters Five to Eleven) focuses mainly on the last category, while the first two are addressed in Chapter Three by relying on secondary data. So, this study is not focused on the notion of civilian control, which would have a much wider scope including, and mainly referring to, national level issues; but only on the conditions at the local level that lead to it (which are mainly included in the third of Huntington s categories). According to Arguiro, in the (transitional) immediate term, the impact of the withdrawal would be on the dismantling of the military s direct political involvement in non-military roles; while in a longer term, on the increase in the civilian participation and involvement in redefining and controlling the military professional role. 69 As discussed below, these impacts are to be achieved by (and measured by the extent of) the separation of the military from political institutions, the improvement of military professionalism, and the establishment of a strong, effective, democratic political system (democratic does not necessarily mean strong or effective, e.g. a decision may be made democratically, but is not necessarily implemented effectively as those who implement it are weak in one way or another) Functional separation With regard to the functional separations, as noted earlier, a model has been provided by Huntington it means limiting the civil-military political interactions 67 Huntington also suggests that an ideal concept of democratic civil-military relations must have a fair balance between functional and social imperatives, referring to fulfilling a standard of being a strong and effective military, and social imperatives, referring to being fully controlled by and accountable to the state s society. Huntington, The Soldier and the State, Op. cit., pp Huntington, The Third Wave, Op. cit., p As cited by Alagappa, p

54 (this can be drawn as in Table II.4 below). The table shows that cell A is the main area within which the military s interactions with political institutions regarding its security roles should be allowed, while cells A1, B, B1, C and C1 are where the interactions should be minimized or eliminated. Table II. 4: Political interactions in the military security role Forms of National Security Policy Military Security Policy Internal Security Policy Situational Security Policy Institutional level A B C Operational level A1 B1 C1 Linking back to the earlier Table II.2, Welch characterized this situation as military influence with civilian control with, he said, significant degrees of involvement remain(ing) limited to those holding ranking position (while) lateral contacts at lower levels are discouraged to preserve the integrity of the chain of command and the integral nature of institutional boundaries. 70 For the purpose of this study, the interactions at the local level are regarded as those lower level ones which Welch asserted should be minimized or eliminated. There is, however, some criticism of the concept of civil-military separation, for instance by Schiff. She argues that civil-military separation as advanced by Huntington is bound to American liberal culture and values, and is not always applicable to other cultures, therefore she prescribed a concordance theory that highlights an inclusive dialogue among the military, civilian leaders and citizens, to agree about what should or should not be separated, as exemplified by India and Israel. 71 However, as Peaver has pointed out, in Schiff s analysis, a distinction between military and civilian could hardly be avoided and Peaver argued that an analysis of civil-military relations should start with a clear distinction between the military and the civilian. 72 Although the two countries selected as her 70 Welch, Civilian Control, Op. cit, See Schiff, Rebecca L., "Civil-Military Relations Reconsidered: A Theory of Concordance," Armed Forces & Society 22 (Fall 1995). 72 Although Peaver sees that the military-civilian separation is getting difficult even in democratic countries like the United States with a technology-heavy military establishment, where large number of civilians are recruited into military jobs, and extensive coordination cross-departmentally is needed he argues that this does not mean that the separation can be abandoned, instead, it should be defined more clearly. 54

55 examples are regarded as democratic, it seems that in Schiff s proposal the military intervention is not judged on the basis of whether it is or is not compatible with democracy, but whether the military follows the result of the dialogue. The question is then, what if the dialogue results in allowing a military s political involvement which is not compatible with democracy? Therefore, although it does warn of the complexity of separating the military from politics, and may offer an alternative to possible unwanted deadlocks that might reverse the transition process toward democracy, Schiff s view seems also to pose potentials for preserving a military s political power. This study is mainly looking at the changing interactions in situational security, which are related to a military s social and political roles, in internal security, and in military security at operational level (A1, B1, C1). While still having some regard to the institutional level (A, B, C), this study limits the scope of investigation to the local institutions because it relies on the data from the local level Improvements in professionalism With respect to military professionalism one long-standing debate has been whether it strengthens civilian control or encourages military intervention. The debates came to the surface as reactions to Huntington s book, The Soldier and the State, which argued that an effective way of achieving civilian control is by objective civilian control, by professionalizing the military, by rendering them politically sterile and neutral. This produces the lowest possible level of military political power with respect to all civilian groups. At the same time it preserves that essential element of power which is necessary for the existence of the military profession. A highly professional officer corps stands ready to carry out the wishes of any civilian group which secures legitimate authority within the state. 73 Janowitz, for example, argues that, instead of reducing the military political power, those organizational and professional qualities facilitate to 73 Huntington, The Soldier and the State, pp

56 accumulate political power. 74 Also, Stepan, in Authoritarian Brazil, said that as the internal security and national development are inseparable, the military s professional expertise and responsibility in developing countries should focus on internal rather than military security of society. 75 So, it seems that it also depends on what is meant by professionalism if Stepan s definition is followed, then it is more likely that professionalism encourages a greater control of politics by the military. Another criticism has been put forwarded by Finer, similar to Janowitz s view, saying that military intervention into civilian affairs is encouraged by some features of professionalism, such as the military s capacity to act decisively. Besides, he said, some professional armies tend to regard themselves as "servants of the state rather than the government in power," thus undermining the authority of individual civilian leaders. 76 Despite the debates, however this view of Huntington has remained influential. 77 In addition, although it may be doubted that military professionalism can lead to a professional ethic of voluntary subordination, either by the professionalization as suggested by Huntington, or by an integration of the military officers into wider social values as suggested by Janowitz, 78 undermining military professionalism is not desirable as it neglects the functional imperative of the military which can create the same effect, such as serious security problems, or military factionalism, that leads to the politicization of the military. As noted, when 74 See Janowitz s preface page in Abrahamsson, Bengt, Military Professional and Political Power, (Beverly Hills/London: Sage Publication, 1972) pp. 1, 10. See also Morris Janowitz s book, The Professional Soldier: A Social and Political Portrait (USA: The Free Press. 1960). Unlike Huntington s concept that emphasizes institutional separations and gives a greater autonomy to the military, Janowitz stressed the importance of social integration. He is cited by Feaver, who used the term societal control in describing this social integration as an alternative to the political perspective in the Huntington concept of state-institutional control approaches. See Feaver, P. D., The Civil-Military Problematique: Huntington, Janowitz, and the Question of Civilian Control, Armed Forces and Society, Winter 1996, Vol.23, Iss. 2; p Stepan, Alfred, Authoritarian Brazil, (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1976), p See for example Finer, Op. cit, pp As Feaver has summarized, the influence of Samuel Huntington's monumental The Soldier and the State has been the greatest and most lasting theory, and even modern analyses of civil-military relations feel obliged to begin with a reference to Huntington's theory. See Feaver, Op. cit., p Similarly to Huntington s, however, Janowitz s theory, as Peaver has also pointed out, relies on the concept of officer corps and professionalism, that is, on the voluntary intention of the military officers. In Huntington s it stems from professional military ethics, while in Janowitz s it is derived from self esteem and moral worth, which in Peaver s view are quite similar. Peaver preferred, however, to add them to Huntington s three criteria of professionalism. See Peaver, Peter, Op.cit, p

57 professionalism encourages the military s political involvement, it is also because of the weakness of the civilian political system. So, the choice should not be that which weakens the military professionalism, but the one that strengthens the civilian political system. To see the possible strengthening of both military professionalism and civilian political system from an East Java perspective is one of the main concerns this study. However, despite accepting the notion that professionalism encourages the military s political involvement, the study is looking the other way around, that is, at the conditions and the extent to which a decreased involvement of the military in politics (as the result of the withdrawal) made the military more professional. As noted in Chapter One, this is done by looking at two areas; the perception and attitudes toward politics of individual officers and the local military units as institutions. These perceptions and attitudes toward politics are important indications of whether a condition is favourable or not to the establishment of an apolitical, professional military Democratizing a political system In terms of democratizing a civilian political system, a basic question is what kind of democratic political system does a country need as the prerequisite to a civilian control? For sure, it is not a kind of praetorianism, which Huntington explained as possible in a society lacking effective political institutions that are capable of mediating, refining, and moderating group political action. 79 In a praetorian society, he said, each group of society nakedly uses a variety of forms of direct political actions: businesses bribe, workers strike, students riot and military stages coups. So in societies with a politicized military, then the clergy, civil service, universities, trade unions and business corporations are also politicized. 80 Huntington suggested that to meet such intended institutions, the politics has to have a high degree of autonomy, complexity, coherence and adaptability, the four categories that he set up for political 79 Huntington, Political Order in Changing Societies, (New Haven: Yale University, 1968), p Huntington, Ibid, p

58 institutionalization. 81 Finer has classified four degrees or levels of political culture that would influence the relative ease of military intervention in politics. 82 (See Table II.4 below). Table II. 5: Relations between political cultures, levels and modes of intervention, and types of regime 83 Order and characteristic Level and Mode of Intervention Resultant Type of Regime of Political Culture Mature Legitimacy paramount and unobtainable by the military Developed Legitimacy important and resistive to the military Low Legitimacy of some importance but fluid Minimal Legitimacy unimportant Influence: 1. Normal constitutional channels. 2. Collusion of or competition with the civilian authorities Influence and blackmail: Points 1 & 2 above, plus: 3. Intimidation of the civilian authorities 4. Threats of noncooperation with or violence towards the civilian authorities Blackmail, displacement and supplantment: Points 2 to 4 above, plus: 5. Failure to defend the civilian authorities against violence 6. Violence Displacement and supplantment: Points 3 to 6 above - Civilian - Indirectlimited - Indirectlimited - Indirectcomplete - Dual - All five types of military regimes - All five types of military regimes 81 Huntington, Ibid, pp Finer, The Man on the Horseback, Op.cit, p The table is a modification of Finer s table, for simplification using numbering to indicate the relations instead of using arrows as in the original. See Ibid, p

59 The first level is regarded as mature in which the military intervention is considered as a wholly unwarrantable intrusion. At this level, procedures for transferring power and the sovereign authority as the result of this transfer are approved widely by the public, who strongly oppose the breach of these procedures or other persons or centres of power that are not resulting from the approved procedures. In addition, a large proportion of the public are orderly structured and mobilized into solid private, social organizations or political parties. The second level is a developed political culture where, although civil procedures and public authorities are well rooted, what constitutes the sovereign authority is in conflict, therefore despite public s strong resistance, the opportunity for military intervention greater than in the mature. The third level is a low political culture where public opinion is too weak and self-divided to resist the military intervention, while the regime s institutions and procedures are in dispute, this providing wider entrance for the intervention. Finally is minimal political culture, in which for practical purposes any government can ignore public opinion the politically articulate are so few and weakly organized. 84 As mentioned earlier, to what extent democratization has affected the political culture in East Java case is one of the main concerns of the study. In order to be able to evaluate this, the study will need also to examine what kind of democratization or democracy had been occurring in post-1998 in Indonesia, specifically East Java. Is it one of those which scholars call procedural democracy, or true democracy 85, or substantial democracy 86 or illiberal democracy? 87 Huntington said that defining democracy in terms of elections, that is a procedural definition, is a minimal definition that is insufficient for those who prefer true democracy that includes: effective citizen control over policy, responsible government, honesty and openness in politics, informed and rational deliberation, equal participation and power, and various other civic virtues.another problem is that, even if leaders assume power through a democratic election, it needs to be questioned whether 84 Finer, S E., Ibid, Huntington distinguished the rationalistic, utopian, idealistic definitions of the true democracy from empirical, descriptive, institutional and procedural definitions. See Huntington, The Third Wave, p For Carothers this true democracy is substantial democracy, democracy beyond the vote. See for example Carothers, Thomas, The End of the Transition Paradigm, Journal of Democracy, Vol. 13, Iss. 1, 2002, p The term Illiberal democracy is used by Fareed Zakaria in his 2003 book, The future of Freedom: Illiberal Democracy at Home and Abroad, to describe a kind of democracy that he identified as tyranny of majority, which combines with intolerance, political corruption and thuggery, and abusive rulers at all levels of power. Cited from a book review, The future of Freedom: Illiberal Democracy at Home and Abroad, by Diamond, Larry, Journal of Democracy, Vol. 14, Iss. 4, Oct 2003, pg

60 or not they fully control the actual power, especially in newly established (immature) democracies. 88 A further problem, especially based on the idea of substantial democracy, is that there are some grey areas where a military and a democratic regime cannot be easily distinguished as both fall into the categories of semi-democracies or semi-dictatorships. 89 Despite these problems, many scholars, some mentioned, believe that a strong civilian political system is a determinant factor in achieving a civilian control. Welch s book, Civilian Control of the Military, provides a good example in concluding that, of several potential bases for civilian control of the military, the strongest come through the legitimacy and effectiveness of government organs. However, Welch suggested that because of several factors, including poor economic development, impending social cleavages and a high possibility of national disintegration, weak political institutions, or a low level of political legitimacy, a strategy that focuses on (the) civilian political establishment, giving paramount attention to its legitimacy is more unlikely in many developing countries. He suggested that civilian control is more realistically achievable in the near future through a strategy that concentrates on the military establishment: its boundaries, mission, values, organization, recruitment and socialization. 90 As mentioned, to what degree this would be possible in post-1998 Indonesia is to be addressed in this thesis by looking at the existing conditions in East Java. 5. Conclusion To summarize this theoretical discussion, it is important to highlight the difficulty in drawing an exact line between a military regime and a democratic one. This applies in examining regime change, in assessing which pattern is more dominant than others. When a military regime is to 88 Diamond, L and J. Linz and S. M. Lipset, Preface, in L Diamond, J. Linz and S. M. Lipset (eds.), Democracy in Developing Countries (Boulder: Lyne Rienner, 1989), p. xvii. See also Brooker, Op. cit. p Brooker, Ibid, pp For further discussion, see Welch, pp. 35,

61 change, the actual changes may not start from a single clearly defined point of departure, but from many points across institutions of both military and democratic types of regime. The withdrawal is likely to be not a single isolated process, but multi-faceted; and the outcome is by no means linear or in a one-way direction, but may contain reversals. The processes and the impacts at every stage of the change are intertwined, and at some stages form two kinds of forces; one driving the change, the other reversing it. The outcome, therefore, depends on how each process and impact and thus these created forces are managed, and on the ability to control them towards the intended direction. Therefore, the tasks of this study would be; not to try to fit the post-1998 Indonesia into a specific definition of regime, but to understand where it has become more or less democratic. This is done not by limiting the portrayal of the withdrawal process in East Java into only one or other of the specific pattern(s) mentioned earlier, but by understanding the potentially complex combination of different patterns involved; and not by judging only whether the withdrawal has impacted on the degree of the establishment of civilian control, but by evaluating (potential) conditions both within the local military and local politics that lead to, or hinder, this establishment. 61

62 Chapter Three PRE-1998 MILITARY POLITICS IN INDONESIA: A review of its history until the withdrawal The TNI was one of the forces of the people s struggle which was at the same level and which fought shoulder to shoulder with other forces, such as parties. The military itself would not be politically active yet neither would it be simply a spectator. 91 the circumstances of a self-created army, [General] Sudirman s leadership, a weak civilian institutional context, and experience of conducting a military government during the guerilla war together constituted the circumstances which shaped the subsequent political behaviour of the military officers Introduction 91 Part of a statement by General A. H. Nasution, the Chief of Staff of the Indonesian Army during Sukarno presidency up to 1963, quoted from Jenkins, David., The Evolution of Indonesian Army Doctrinal Thinking: The concept of Dwifungsi, Southeast Asian Journal of Social Science, Vol. 11, No. 2, p Said, Salim., Genesis of Power: General Sudirman and The Indonesian Military in Politics , (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 1991), p

63 As Chapter One noted, disappointments about the unsatisfied achievement of democratization are wide-spread in many parts of all continents, ranging from Eastern Europe to Africa to Latin America and to Asia. Here, the fragility of new democracies, or the augmentation of political chaos, have hindered efforts to achieve democracy in substance, although it seems possible to maintain democracy in form. 93 Scholars seem to have considered unfortunate legacies of the past regime as among important factors of this hindrance. 94 Therefore, given the importance of understanding this factor, the chapter attempts to discuss Indonesian pre-1998 military legacies to see how they can influence the continuing process and impacts of the democratic transition presented in the subsequent chapters. Also importantly, it gives an historical background about the development of military politics in Indonesia over the half century up to 1998, before the military withdrawal started. In addition, it provides a picture of the military s political involvement in East Java before the withdrawal, to understand what was being withdrawn from in local practices, thus what process and impacts were involved locally. 2. Pre-New Order period 2.1 The formation of the new national army and its early involvement in politics From its very beginnings the Indonesian military has been politically oriented, mainly due to the nature of the Indonesian Independence revolution ( ) that combined armed struggles and political activities. 95 The Indonesian military (TNI/Tentara Nasional Indonesia) was 93 Carothers, Thomas, Democracy without illusions, Foreign Affairs, Jan/Feb 1997, Vol. 76, Iss. 1, pp Substantial democracy or true democracy is described in Chapter Two, section In searching for the explanations for this democratization problem, Aqűero for instance classifies scholars views into three groups. One group blames the unfortunate legacies of the past regime. Another group accuses the arrangements, institutions and dynamics of the post-transition period. The third group combines the claims by arguing that new institutional arrangements are complicated by the past. Agüero, Felipe, Legacies of Transitions: Institutionalization, the Military, and Democracy in South America, Mershon International Studies Review, November 1998, Vol. 42, Iss. 2, pp See also similar points by Huntington mentioned in Chapter Two, p Explanations like this can be found in many studies of this era, including Anderson, Benedict R. O G., Java in Time of Revolution: Occupation and Resistance, , (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1972), especially chapters 7, 8, and 9, pp ; Nasution, A. H., Tentara Nasional Indonesia, Vol. I. (Djakarta: Pembimbing, 63

64 created from politically conscious people, either affiliated with or independent from political groups which had developed during the Japanese mobilization policy. 96 According to Crouch, in this period the politics and military action were inseparably intertwined. 97 Elsewhere Crouch said that it was the nationalist struggle, not an intention to pursue a military career, that motivated most of the officers to join the Army; they never regarded themselves as apolitical soldiers and continued to be involved in politics in the years after Independence. 98 However, apart from a commonality in their aims in the struggle for independence, their differing processes of recruitment caused much rivalry and conflict, mainly between the ex-knil and ex-peta officers and their supporters but which also included struggles for advantage and control between Left and other representatives. Even during the years of the armed struggle for Independence ( ) part of the struggling was between those with different political ideas about the future State, particularly over how socialist or communist it should be. 99 The military was involved in suppressing organized movements against the Unitary State which had been based on religion and region as well as Leftist politics and, in the first 1955), 15-48; Crouch, Harold., The Army and Politics in Indonesia (London: Cornell University Press, 1978), p. 24; Said, Op. cit, p The new Indonesian Army was created in 1945 from combining various separate groups, including the regular troops from the previous colonial military KNIL (Koninklijk Nederlandsch-Indisch Leger, Royal Netherlands Indies Army), former auxiliary troops (PETA, Pembela Tanah Air) raised and trained during the Japanese occupation, and others from the wide variety of more local self-organized armed groups that had sprung up during the Independence struggle, including several linked to political parties, particularly the Communist and Socialist parties but also the nationalist and Muslim. However, by mid-1947 a unitary central command had been established, with the ex-knil largely in control, and the name of the military changed from TKR (Tentara Kemanan Rakyat/People s Security Army) to TNI (Tentara Nasional Indonesia/Indonesian National Army). See for example Said, Ibid, pp. 3, Crouch, Op. cit, p Crouch, Harold, Indonesia in Military-Civilian Relations in Southeast Asia, Zakaria Haji Ahmad and Harold Crouch (eds.) (Singapore: Oxford University Presas, 1985), p. 50. As quoted by Lee, Terence, The Nature and the Future of Civil Military Relations in Indonesia, Asian Survey, 40:4, 2000, pp Dijk mentioned that initially there was a strong Leftist influence in the organization but this was removed by Leftist party influences were from the PKI (Indonesian Communist Party), Partai Sosialis (Socialist Party), Pesindo (Indonesian Socialist Militia), and Partai Buruh (Labour Party). They were under the leadership of the Defense Minister Amir Syarifuddin ( ), a secret Communist Party member since 1935 but publicly joined to the PSI (Indonesian Socialist Party). He had an ambition to build a leftist loyalist army and attempted to achieve this by three main strategies. First, he organized and built leftist irregular armed groups into what later in 1947 was named the TNI Masyarakat (Peoples TNI). Second, he inserted political sections, named PEPOLIT (Pendidikan Politik Tentara/Military Political Education), into every level of the regular military units, with officers of each section dominated by leftist politicians given titular ranks, whose main function was to bring the military under the influence of the leftist ideology. Third, the Defence Ministry dominated most administrative roles in the military, including job appointments, and especially with regard to the irregular armed groups was to be fully controlled and managed by the Ministry, out of the headquarters hands. PEPOLIT and TNI MASYARAKAT were abolished by the new Defence Minister (also Vice President) Hatta in Dijk, C. Van, Rebellion under the banner of Islam (Netherlands: Martinus Nijhoff, 1981), pp , 344; Wolf, Charles Jr., The Indonesian Stor, (New York: American Institute of Pacific Relations, 1948), p

65 years of Independence, a variety of localized attempts at social revolution. 100 A number of coup threats by dissident officers occurred, as well as the quickly suppressed Madiun Rebellion by Communist-led troops in September 1948, before the final achievement of full Independence from the Dutch. Several military officers, including General Sudirman, the Armed Forces Commander in Chief, joined Tan Malaka s radical PP (Persatuan Perjuangan/ Struggle Union) which was formed on 15 January 1946 because they agreed with the idea of a 100 per cent Independence that would be achieved through armed struggles, and that proposed the formation of Peoples Government, Peoples Army and the nationalization of foreign-owned companies. 101 There was also the 1946 July 3 Affair which was an incident when Major General Sudharsono, a supporter of the PP, came to the Presidential Palace in Yogyakarta demanding the dissolution of the Syahrir Cabinet, a week after the kidnap of PM Syahrir by members of The Third Division commanded by Major Yusuf, ordered by Sudharsono. 102 So, various frictions within the military, between the military and the civilian government, as well as the whole country against the Dutch colonial power characterized the early establishment of the Indonesian military. There was a move to having all armed activity carried out by the new Republic s army together with a disbanding of local irregular forces, a move which caused opposition within the government from those parties and individuals with links to these forces as well as those who preferred a more regionalized basis for the new state. 103 From a mixed and fairly poorly equipped force of about 200,000 early in the Independence struggle, increasing to about half a million by mobilization for guerilla 100 Dijk, Ibid, p For a discussion of various regional contexts see, for example, Kahin, Audrey R., Regional Dynamics of The Indonesian Revolution: Unity From Diversity (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1985). Her examples included Pekalongan, Banten, Aceh, East Indonesia, East and West Sumatra, Jakarta, Ambon and Sulawesi (none of which are in East Java). 101 Sundhaussen, Op. cit, p Sundhaussen, Ibid, pp Dijk, Op. cit, p

66 resistance in 1947/8, the plan was for a modern professional military of about 57, The planned modernization and reduction in size of the armed forces, which continued into the beginning of the 1950s but then with a further reduction from 1952 due to the deteriorating economic situation of that time, produced much sectional dissent within the military, including public protests. 105 Meanwhile, at the unit levels the leadership was still very autonomous but popular, and not much different from the early months of the creation of the army. The leaders could not be transferred; nor were they willing to carry out orders which they opposed; thus the army leadership could not control them; yet many of them simply became the executors of their subordinates wishes; as the command no longer went from above below, but from the bottom to top. 106 As yet, the central leadership was not strong enough to impose its command and control. What is important to be learned from this early development of militarypolitical relations in Indonesia is that how this condition an already politicized military; the military s weak command and control as shown by the several rebellions and coup threats; politically active and divisive local units affiliated with different political ideologies (socialist, leftist, rightist, or nationalist); a factionalized officer corps based on source sentiments (KNIL, PETA, various people Laskar forces) and on political ideology (socialist, rightist, communist, or nationalist), as well as on differences in personal ties; strong feelings of independence instead of being belonging to, or under, the government remained and was passed onto the next period. 2.2 Military political expansion during the 1950s One aspect of the previous feature of the Indonesian military that seems to have continued into the 1950s was the relations between its divided officer 104 Wolf, Op. cit, pp. 59, 61, 132, 134; Dijk, Ibid, p Crouch, The Army and Politics in Indonesia, Op. cit, p Nasution, Op. cit, pp , quoted from Anderson, Op. cit, p

67 corps and political involvement of its officers. This was clearly demonstrated by what scholars called the October Affair. On October pro-nasution troops marched to the Presidential Palace demanding the Cabinet be sacked. The demand was a response to what the officers called the politicization of military affairs by civilian politicians a close senior military ally of Sukarno being retired by Nasution, the Chief of Staff of the Army, but then Nasution and several of his senior staff being replaced by the President. 107 The officer corps was divided, with four of seven regional commanders being pro-17 October action, while the other three were classified as anti-17 October action. 108 However, as a reaction to the October 17 Affair, there was a growing concern about internal unity and a deeper anti-politician attitude shared among the officers. In mid-1954 the two groups reconciled, and then in a meeting in Yogyakarta from 17 to 25 February 1955 the declaration of a clear-out of the 17 October affairs; a demand for a clarification of the limits of the political influence on the army ; a stress on the importance of technical ability and seniority as the criteria for military appointments; and a statement of the unity of command. Shortly afterwards the army refused to accept the government appointment of a new Chief of Staff on the grounds that it infringed the resolution, in particular the seniority criterion. As the result, the President appointed the army s nominated candidate, but this was followed by the resignation of the entire parliamentary Cabinet that failed to have a voice on the appointment. It was from this point that the military s political influence was expanded in the following years. Its main political strength against the civilian government was that it was now much more united and cohesive than ever before [I]f we are to understand the October 17 affair we must look first at a number of background factors, particularly those having roots in the country s first-class financial crisis. (The) UN-advised 1953 government budget required the retirement of 60,000. Feith, Ibid, pp Feith mentioned that the East Java, East Indonesia, and South Sumatra regional commanders were replaced by coups organized by pro-sukarno officers who claimed the commanders had been involved in the October 17 Affair. 109 Feith, Op. cit, pp ,

68 A local-central divide to some extent also remained as the local commands gained much autonomy which developed into what could be called a warlord situation the local commanders, in cooperation with the local civilian elites, pursued political and economic activities out of the control of the central government. 110 The culmination of this was demonstrated by the declaration of the PRRI (Pemerintah Revolusioner Republic Indonesia/Revolutionary Government of the Indonesian Republic) rebellion in Sumatra and of Permesta (Perjuangan Semesta/Our Struggle) in Sulawesi in To deal with these regional rebellions of Sumatra and Sulawesi, where dissident officers played leading roles, the Martial Law was declared on 14 March 1957 and was continued until Under its provisions the Chief of Staff (in his role as PEPERPU, Penguasa Perang Pusat/Central War Authority) and the regional commanders (as PEPERDA, Penguasa Perang Daerah/Regional War Authorities) enjoyed strong political and economic power for the objective of national security although military leaders loyalties were divided between the central command and the President. 112 In the economic sector, the military also benefited from this Martial Law that was used to legitimize its actions against PKI (Indonesian Communist Party) and nationalist demonstrators taking over the remaining Dutch-owned enterprises in 1957 and the putting of the management (and proceeds) of the enterprises under military supervision. 113 Even after the end of Martial Law the military s economic accumulation was increased when the British enterprises were similarly nationalized in1964 and the American 110 In the early 1950s the military were not politically active at the national level. See Feith, Ibid, p Along with military operations conducted to force the speeding up of the unification of the initially federated states into the unitary system, at the local level the military officers actively played political roles along with the military operations. Some local resistance to the formation of the Unitary State was eventually put down by military operations with officers and soldiers also actively involved in political moves to support the unification, especially in West Java (Pasundan State), South Sulawesi and South Maluku. One clear example was the arrival of Lieutenant Colonel A. J. Mokoginta with a number of small military units in Makassar (now Ujung Pandang) where they worked actively for the downfall of the East Indonesian State. See, Feith, Ibid, The PPRI/PERMESTA rebellion had very complex causes, range from protests against the growing communist influence in the central government to the issues of regional autonomy, but was influenced by the United States interests in encouraging and supporting the regional military units to counter the communist influence at the centre. See Kahin, Audrey R., Regional Dynamics of The Indonesian Revolution: Unity From Diversity (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1985). 112 Crouch, Harold., The Military and Politics in Indonesia, Op.cit., p. 46. See also Lev, Daniel S., The Political Role of the Military, Pacific Affairs, Vol. 36, No. 4 (Winter, ), pp. 352, 354, The Dutch enterprises were nationalized in See Lev, Ibid, p

69 enterprises in This strengthened the base for the military s business activities long afterwards, sustaining what can called an almost self-financing military since the government provided only around thirty percent of the total military budget. 115 This self-financing character is important in understanding the political independence of the military from the civilian government, and why it was very capable of supporting and mobilizing its political positions when it wanted to. In its relations with the civilian politicians, the central headquarters demonstrated its long-held anti-politician 116 attitudes by supporting the abolition of the parliamentary system in favour of the so-called Guided Democracy which was formally decreed by Sukarno in 1959, allegedly to unify the badly divided nation. 117 In the new Guided Democracy Cabinet two active military officers, for the first time in Indonesian history, were listed in the Cabinet and the top military leaders were appointed ex-officio on the Dewan Nasional (National Council) in which President, as its Head, held a strong power over the Parliament. Initially the military was formally accepted as one element of those officially recognized and acceptable political forces included in the overall government Golongan Fungsional (Functional Group) considered as politically equal to political parties but, after lobbying from Nasution, was recognized as a special Functional Group that consisted of all branches of the Armed Forces, Police, Veterans and the militia organizations OKD (Organisasi Keamanan Desa/Organization for Village Security), and OPR (Organisasi Pertahanan Rakyat/Organization for People s Security). When latter in 1959 the National Council was dissolved, the new Parliament, called the DPRD-GR (Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat - Gotong Royong/Mutual Help People s 114 Crouch, The Army and Politics in Indonesia, Op. cit, p Crouch, Ibid, p See also Samego, Indria et al., Bila ABRI Berbisnis (If the ABRI Does The Business) (Bandung: Penerbit Mizan, 1998), especially Chapter 2 on the historical background of the military involvement in business activities. 116 This attitude development can be seen in the issue of diplomacy vs. armed struggle in the revolutionary era (see notes on Tan Malaka s PP above), the surrender of the civilian government to the Dutch in 1948 (See Crouch, The Army and Politics in Indonesia, Op. cit, pp. 26, 27); but importantly the controversial issue of the October 17 Affair (mentioned above, see also Crouch, Ibid, p. 29). 117 Since the second Cabinet of Ali Sastroamijoyo President Sukarno had the idea about this kind of regime and had worked on making it real years before. By the end of 1956 it was widely debated among government officials, public and the media. Feith, Ibid, pp

70 Representative Council) was formed and the military was given 35 of the total 283 seats. 118 So, from this time the military involvement in politics moved from simply influencing the government policies, as in the early 1950s, to participating in business activities and the government bureaucracy, as well as in the Parliament. The military s direct participation in politics was developed further and justified by the Nasution-designed concept of the Middle Way, which later in the New Order regime was further ratified and developed to become the Dwifungsi (Dual Function) Doctrine that gave the military two roles, as a political force as well as the defence force. In accordance with the spirit of the Presidential Conception 119 introduced in 1957 by Sukarno, Nasution s Middle Way was introduced for the first time in a seminar during the Anniversary of the Staff and Command School in 1958 in Bandung. Both Nasution s and Sukarno s concepts denied the appropriateness of an implementation of a pure Western Democratic concept, but defined a Democratic concept with limitations necessary for the national conditions. In Sukarno s view the Indonesian Democracy needed to be led by the leadership, while in Nasution s view the military was neither to carry out a military coup nor to isolate itself from politics but rather had to contribute into and participate in politics Golongan Fungsional included the Armed Forces, Labourers, Civil Servants, Religious groups, Farmers, Intellectuals, Youths and other non-party groups. 119 Main points of the Presidential Conception were: The Western Parliamentary System of Democracy was not compatible with Indonesian identity, so it had to be replaced by a Guided Democracy System. To implement the guided Democracy, a Gotong Royong Cabinet, which include all parties and organizations based on the existing balance and composition, was to be formed. It also mentioned a Four Leg Cabinet that embraced all four big parties: Nationalist PNI, Religious NU and Masyumi, and Communist PKI, as main components of the Gotong Royong Cabinet. A National Council (Dewan Nasional) that consisted of parties representatives and all functional groups was to be formed. See, Susanto, Nugroho, Pejuang dan Prajurit: Konsepsi dan Implementasi Dwi Fungsi ABRI, (Warrior and Soldier: Conception and Implementation of the ABRI Dual Function) (Jakarta: Pustaka Sinar Harapan, 1991), p Nasution in his Middle Way speech on 12 November 1958 said, The position of the TNI was not like that an army in Western countries, in which the military was solely an instrument of the government (alat pemerintah). Neither was it like that of various Latin American armies which monopolized political order. Individual officers must be granted an opportunity to participate in the government and make use of their non-military skills in helping develop the nation. Officers must be permitted to participate in determining economic, financial, international and other policies at the highest level of government. Therefore, they must be in all the institutions of the state, not just in the National Council and the Cabinet, as was already the case, but also in the National Planning Council, the diplomatic corps, parliament, and elsewhere in the government. Quoted from Jenkins, David., The Evolution of Indonesian Army Doctrinal Thinking: The concept of Dwifungsi, Southeast Asian Journal of Social Science, Vol. 11, No. 2, p

71 Although the military, as represented by Nasution, certainly did not agree with the inclusion of the Communist Party in the government, this did not led to an overriding challenge to Sukarno s overall conception; instead, the military felt more compelled to be active in politics as a counterbalance to the growing influence of Communism. In this the military gained major support for its political role, such as, in domestic politics, from the Islamic Masyumi Party as a traditional anti-communist organization 121, and internationally, from most western countries. So the military was accommodated in day-to-day civilian politics for at least four purposes: as a counter-balance to the growing Communist movement; as a back-up against those political groups opposed to the Guided Democracy; as a strong coercive force to counter regional rebellions; and to achieve the projected integration of West Irian and confrontation against Malaysia. Sukarno s attempts and threats to use the military and then mass mobilization against the continuation of Dutch colonial control in West Irian and the Konfrontasi opposition to the foundation of Malaysia with infiltration and fighting in Sarawak both brought the military deeper into active involvement in the politics of government as well as demonstrating the rapidly increasing potential and armed power of the Indonesian Communist Party. This was only part of the increasingly polarized divisions opening up in Indonesia, mainly between the organized Left and a combination of conservative, notably religious, groupings with the military mostly supporting the latter for a variety of reasons, including nationalism, security and order. 122 By 1963 regional rebellions had been successfully handled, 123 and West Irian had been taken into the Indonesian Republic. Internal security began to be under safe control and consequently the Martial Law was lifted. Nasution was then replaced with A Yani as the new Chief of Staff of the 121 This was despite the conflicts at the same time between Masyumi and the military regarding the regional rebellions which Masyumi was suspected to have supported locally. This suspicion was a long standing one, rooted in the time of the Masyumi government, especially the Sukiman Cabinet s ( ), policy of persuasion toward Darul Islam rebels. See Feith, Op. cit, pp Crouch, The Army and Politics in Indonesia, Op. cit, pp See Feith, Herberth and Lev, Daniel S., The End of the Indonesian Rebellion, Pacific Affairs, Vol. 36, No. 1 (Spring, 1963), pp

72 Army for two reasons. First, Sukarno had become closer to the PKI which now demanded general elections it appeared likely to win while Nasution was seen as a strong man that would bring Army resistance to it; and second, Sukarno and the PKI were getting impatient to crush Malaysia and both came out with an idea of mobilizing a force of twenty million, with a large proportion of this to be provided and organized by the PKI as the Fifth Force while Nasution and the Army were strongly opposed to this. Later it was proved that Yani was just the same as Nasution, opposed to both programs. 124 By the mid-1960s the rivalry, polarization and confrontation in government and in communities across Indonesia had intensified until the kidnapping and murder of seven of the military s Jakarta-based generals set off a vast wave across Indonesia of the killing of actual and alleged Communists and those sympathetic to Communism. There was extensive military involvement in the orderly organization of this, including its restraint in some localities. Many writings have been produced focusing especially on what the New Order called the 30 th September 1965 Communist Coup Attempt that opened the whole takeover by the military in 1966, but at least there were two types of explanations that have been prominent one arguing that factionalism and conflicts inside the Armed Forces were the main causes of the tragedy, 125 and another emphasizing the Communist betrayal of the Indonesian state s ideology Panca Sila and 1945 Constitution. 126 None of these versions seems to have given completely satisfactory evidence 124 The PKI strongly supported Sukarno in the Malaysia Confrontation, but spoke out against the threat of NEKOLIM (Neocolonialism) for an additional purpose. The PKI wanted much of the armed forces to be sent to Sumatra and Kalimantan so as to empty Java of them and thereby to smooth its plan of a total revolution in Java in order to bring the PKI into power. This plan was identified by Army leaders who then tried to undercut the execution of the military operations and sought a peaceful solution with Malaysia without the consent of Sukarno. See Sundhaussen, Op. cit. p The Army was also active in foiling the election plan by proposing Sukarno to be the President for life. The idea was initially proposed by Major Suhardiman in the MPRS meeting and pushed by the Army to be discussed seriously, and adopted as the MPRS decision on 18 May See Sinjal, Daud, Military Academy Yogya: Laporan Kepada Bangsa, (Yogya Military Academy: Report to the People) ( Jakarta: Pustaka Sinar Harapan, 1996) p Among these has been the work of Benedict Anderson and Ruth McVey who in 1971 published A Preliminary Analysis of the October 1, 1965 Coup in Indonesia. 126 See the work, by Nugroho Notosusanto and Ismael Saleh, produced The Coup Attempt of the September 30 th Movement in Indonesia, published seventeen years later (and twenty three years after the event) in 1988 as the official army version. See also two interviews with Sergeant-Major Bungkus, a former soldier involved in the 1965 killings of the five Indonesian top leaders, in Anderson, Benedict R O G, and Djati, Arif., The World of Sergeant-Major Bungkus: Two Interviews with Benedict Anderson and Arief Djati, Indonesia, Iss. 78, Oct 2004, pp

73 however, and the truth remains a mystery. 127 However, putting those explanations together re-emphasizes the notion of converging forces between the domestic and international forces that continued to influence the military politics in Indonesia. Yet, to explain how this military s political expansion led to a complete political takeover in 1966, it is necessary to look back to the preceding period of more than twenty years. Sundhaussen for example, who took this approach, strongly argued that the systematic failure of the political system made a greater contribution than the ambitions of the officers did to the politicization of the military. 128 However, Crouch criticized Sundhaussen for having seemed to have over emphasized the passive political attitudes of the military officers, and under-estimated the fact that the officers, as Crouch observed, have been always able to maximize the opportunities for their interest. 129 Nevertheless, in several statements, Crouch seems to agree with Sundhaussen, for example when saying that, The Army soon found itself drawn back into the political arena not primarily as a result of the political ambitions of officers or the shortsighted machinations of politicians, but because the complex of circumstances contributing to the fluidity of the power structure did not allow the military to isolate itself from politics. Successive governments took the form of uneasy coalitions that were under constant parliamentary attack, while the group controlling the army headquarters was unable to assert its authority over rival factions in the region. In such situation it was only to be expected that the rivalry between factions in the army would become enmeshed with the struggle between government and opposition in parliament as each sought allies. 130 Daniel Lev gave a similar account in 1964, claiming that, although the army s revolutionary origins and continual domestic operations since 1948 have made the officer corps fully aware of national politics and the 127 Crouch provided an excellent section on Theories about the Coup analyzing various accounts, including the two versions mentioned previously, on who were probably responsible for the Coup Attempt. See Crouch, The Army and Politics in Indonesia, Op. cit See Sundhaussen, Ulf., The road to power: Indonesian military politics, (New York: Oxford University Press, 1982) p Crouch, The Army and Politics in Indonesia, Op cit, p Crouch, Ibid, p

74 army had been on the political defensive before 1956; 131 only in , because of the army s own deep involvement in the national crisis, was there a powerful feeling that the army must assume the responsibility for saving the nation, as they had done in the revolution against Dutch colonialism in As in what Sundhaussen insisted later, Lev suggested that for a variety of reasons they avoided seizing power and were forced instead to compete for it. 132 The momentum that effectuated such a saviour role rolled into a proclamation of a nation-wide Martial Law (state of siege) in March 1957 that provided for a broader and deeper involvement of the military in politics. Nevertheless, the relative importance of military or civilian factors would be hard to prove either way, although it does appear that Sundhaussen s interpretation, of a more passive, reactive military, does apply more to the decade from 1945 and Crouch s, a more active expansion, from the mid- 1950s as political and economic conflict deepened in Indonesia. A careful examination of their claims, notwithstanding, indicates that they agree on an absence of a organized military push for political power during the two decades from 1945 to From a different point of view, Audrey Kahin and George McTurnan Kahin, Subversion as Foreign Policy: the Secret Eisenhower and Dulles Debacle in Indonesia suggest that various US foreign policies to cope with communist expansion strongly steered the direction of Indonesian politics. These ranged from apathy to opposition to Dutch colonialism in , to supporting the regional rebellions in Sumatra and Sulawesi against the communist-influenced Soekarno government in , then a shift to supporting the central leadership of the Indonesian military for the same reason after the regional rebels failed. 134 Obviously, 131 Lev, Daniel S., The Political Role of the Military, Pacific Affairs, Vol. 36, No. 4 (Winter, ), p Ibid, p Crouch, The Army and Politics in Indonesia, Op. cit, p. 35; Sundhaussen, Op. cit, p Kahin, Audrey R. and Kahin, George McTurnan., Subversion as Foreign Policy: The Secret Eisenhower and Dulles Debacle in Indonesia, (New York: New Press, 1995). See also various reviews of this book, including by Berger, Mark T., in The Journal of Asian Studies., May 1996, Vol. 55, Iss. 2; pp ; Pius, Richard M., in Presidential Studies Quarterly, Summer 1998, Vol. 28, Iss. 3; pp ; and Bernstein, Lewis, in Military Review, March/ April 1999, Vol. 79, Iss. 1, pp For a discussion about the Regional Rebellions see, Feith, 74

75 international factors are also important to be considered in understanding the development of political involvement by the Indonesian military. All the above arguments suggest that what happened in 1965/66 should not be seen as separated from the continual complexity of development of military politics in the twenty years before the explosion. It appears that much of what has been previously mentioned as the revolutionary feature of the military and military politics seems to continue in the period from 1950 to 1965/66. Weak command and control by the central headquarters and local-central competitions were clearly demonstrated by the PERMESTA/PRRI rebellion, although the central control strengthened from the early 1960s with the ending of regional rebellions. The factionalism of the officer corps based on the officers sources, as well as based on various ideologies of political parties, was fading, but several military officers in 1960s were also under the influence of the PKI and in personal ties with President Sukarno. So, in general, a politicized character of the military was much developed after the mid-1950s especially with its broader political participation through the Guided Democracy regime, the formulation of the middle way doctrine to justify the participation, and a broader economic base to mobilize its political power. How this stage of development of military politics was passed onto and built up further in the New Order regime will be presented next. However, for the purpose of this study, the following description of the New Order s military politics is mainly limited to the local features of the military political networks, to give a picture of the starting point of the post political changes which are presented in the chapters after that. 3. The New Order: military in government after the mid-1960s After General Suharto assumed the Presidency in March 1966, the military s political involvement in the New Order regime became very Herbert and Lev, Daniel S., The End of the Indonesian Rebellion, Pacific Affairs, Vol. 36, No. 1 (Spring, 1963), pp For a discussion about the Indonesian Communists, see for example Pauker, Guy. J., Current Communist Tactics in Indonesia, Asian Survey, Vol. 1, No. 3 (May, 1961), pp

76 systematic and systemic. It was constitutionally and ideologically justified by developing the existing doctrine of Dwifungsi which was implemented in all structures of political institutions and activities. The following describe the doctrine and its implementation Doctrines: Hankamrata and Dwifungsi There were two crucial elements of the national military doctrine that became the ideological basis for the institutional structure and roles of the military in the New Order. One was Hankamrata, the acronym for Pertahanan Keamanan Rakyata Semesta (People s Total Defense and Security, originally titled People s Total War). 135 The other was the Dwifungsi ABRI (Dual Function of the Armed Forces of the Indonesian Republic). Hankamrata was mainly a defense and security doctrine, the implementation of which required involving all potentials (human and material) of the nation for the purposes of defence and security. By implication, however, the doctrine required continued social and political interactions. Dwifungsi, on the other hand, was mainly a political doctrine that justified the military having political roles beside its military security role. The two doctrines appear in different, but related, laws, one in a defence law 136, the other in a political law 137. However, Dwifungsi doctrine originated from what was in 1958 known as Nasution s Middle Way Concept (Konsep Jalan Tengah) which itself mainly used as a basic idea the earlier doctrine of the people s total war. 135 In the New Order the abbreviation Hankamrata (from Pertahanan Keamanan Rakyat Semesta) was used but in the post-new Order era, after the national police force was separated from the military, this was shortened to Hanrata (from Pertahanan Rakyat Semesta) as Keamanan refers to domestic security affairs which were allocated to the police. 136 Law No. 20/1982 on Defence and Security and Law No. 2/1988 on Prajurit ABRI (Soldiers of the Indonesian Republic Armed Forces). 137 There have been several Laws that institutionalized the doctrine, including Law No. 80/1958 and MPR (S) Decree No. II/1960 (A/II/404/Sub/C) that positioned the military as a functional group; Laws Nos. 161/1969 and 5/1975 on the Structure and Composition of the MPR (People s Consultative Assembly), DPR (Parliament) and DPRD (Local Parliaments); Laws Nos. 2/ 1985, 3/1973, and 3/1985 on Political Parties and Golkar, and MPR Decrees Nos. IV/1973, IV/1978, II/ 1983, II/1988, II/1993 on GBHN (Broad Outlines of State Policy). 76

77 The Hankamrata or People s Total War doctrine was originally drawn from the experiences in fighting against the Dutch in the revolutionary period. According to Brig. Gen. Nugroho Notosuanto, a former member of the Student Fighter Troops (Pasukan Tentara Pelajar) and a Minister of Information in the Suharto era, it was born from the failure of a (conventional) linear defence strategy. 138 When the Dutch military forces launched the first major military operation in July 1947, they easily destroyed the first and the second lines of the TNI defense so a (new) guerilla strategy was formed with the troop deployments organized locally in defence pockets for each separate area, the military and the people working together in the fighting resistance. 139 This integrated approach has since been claimed to be effective as the Indonesian military survived the second Dutch military action in 1948 and, even though the government was overthrown, continued to fight a guerilla war with this until international pressure led to the Agreement to transfer power from the Dutch to the Republic in December Since then the various internal security operations conducted by the TNI have strengthened the justification for continuing to use the Kemanunggalan (Integration) concept. These military operations included those conducted to force the speeding up of the unification of the puppet federal states into the unitary system and those to put down the PRRI-PERMESTA rebellions in Sumatra and Sulawesi. These experiences suggest that Indonesian unity had serious internal security threats. Therefore the military believed strongly that for it to be able to defeat potential internal insurgencies it would have to penetrate deeply into the social life of the local people to separate the insurgents from the people, protecting the people and winning their support. Thus this emphasized the need for the permanent presence of pro-republic military 138 Notosusanto, Nugroho., The National Struggle and the Armed Forces in Indonesia, (Jakarta: Department of Information of Indonesia, 1979), pp For deeper discussion about the nature of the guerrilla war see Nasution, Abdul Haris, Fundamentals of Guerilla Warfare, (Singapore: Donald Moore Books, 1965). See also Paurker, Guy J., The Indonesian Doctrine of Territorial Warfare And Territorial Management, (Santa Monica, California: The Rand Corporation, 1973) 77

78 forces in the regions in the forms of territorial commands with their roles of Hankamrata advancement. There have been many studies and debates about Dwifungsi, 140 a doctrine that sustained the New Order for more than three decades. Here it suffices to re-stress that it was much influenced by Nasution s Middle Way model. 141 His view should also be understood in a situation, which Feith and Castles described as marked by abortive coups in Jakarta and successful ones in the provinces, increasingly frequent violations of constitutional norms, calls for a radically political order including Soekarno s for a Guided Democracy and fears of civil war. 142 Dwifungsi was developed from this principle. In April 1965 it was adopted as the military doctrine, which was reinforced in the second Army Seminar of August As described in more detail later, Dwifungsi was afterward implemented in three main ways. First, the military institutional structures were revamped by inserting political functions, the bureaucracy was militarized by appointing military officers to its strategic positions, and political activities were militarily controlled by using military-led extra-structural bodies (see the second part of this chapter). Here, it is sufficient to re-emphasize two points. 140 One of the most important works is David Jenkins 1983 article, The evolution of Indonesian Army Doctrinal Thinking: The Concept of Dwifungsi, Southeast Asian Journal of Social Science, Vol. 11, No. 2, 1983, p Jenkins suggested five stages of the historical development of the doctrine: the revolution period (1945 to 1949), liberal democracy period (1949 to 1957), instability period (central-regional conflicts, the failure of parliamentarian democracy, and Martial Law), Guided Democracy (1959 to 1965), and the New Order period since More recent accounts include Salim Said s book, Tumbuh dan Tumbangnya Dwifungsi: Perkembangan Pemikiran Politik Militer Indonesia (Jakarta: Aksara Kurnia, 2002) and a chapter about the historical development of Dwifungsi in Rinakit, Sukardi, The Indonesian Military after the New Order (Singapore: ISEAS Press, 2005). 141 See footnote 1. Regarding the words the same level, I Ketut Gunawan has observed that in the military s thinking there is neither civilian supremacy nor military supremacy. See Gunawan, I Ketut, Thai and South Korean Military Withdrawal and Democratization: Notes on the Indonesian Military Politics, JIIA Fellowship Occasional Paper 3, 2000, p Feith, Herbert and Lance Castles, Indonesian Political Thinking (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 1970). p There are three main parts mentioned in the doctrine: 1) Fundamentals of the Doctrine of National Land Defence; 2) Fundamentals of the Doctrine of the non-military function; and 3) Fundamentals of the Doctrine of management of the non-military function. See Notosusanto, Op. cit, p

79 First, when the implementation was designed the political, economic and security conditions were extremely chaotic following the 30 September 1965 Coup Attempt and the subsequent massive killing tragedies. So it was not designed in a stable condition that provided a choice for establishing an apolitical military, but at a time in a longstanding history that compelled such an involvement. Second, the longevity of the New Order regime under President Suharto was sustained by the Dwifungsi s political institutionalization and its legitimacy resulted from how the doctrine was implemented. William Liddle described the political institutionalization as the Three Pillars of the New Order the Armed Forces, Bureaucrats and Golkar and the legitimacy-building as comprising three types of legitimacy: performance legitimacy, defined as economic success; symbolic legitimacy, as popular bureaucrat ; and the coercive legitimacy of the security forces. 144 However, its wider acceptance in the Indonesian society under the New Order was also the result of doctrinal education pursued in civilian and military schools, through the subjects of P4 (Pedoman Penghayatan dan Pengamalan Pancasila/Guide to the Full Comprehension and Application of Pancasila) History, Kewiraan (Manliness), PSPB (History of the National Struggle) that emphasized, among other elements, the Dwifungsi and the military s heroism during the revolution. 145 Furthermore, its usefulness was also demonstrated throughout Indonesia s villages by operating the military s ABRI Masuk Desa (AMD, ABRI Enters the Village) civic programs, in which the soldiers built villages infrastructures, such as roads, irrigation systems or public buildings, in order to maintain the organic link between the soldier and citizens. 146 At the local level (from provincial down to the village), the 144 For more discussion see Liddle, R. William, Suharto s Indonesia: Political Rule and Political Institutions, Pacific Affairs, Vol.58, No.1, See Bourchier, David., The 1950s in the New Order Ideology and Politics, in Bourchier, David., and Legge, John (eds.), Democracy in Indonesia in the 1950s and 1990s (Clayton: CSEAS Monash University, 1994), pp See also McFetridge, Charles Donald, Seskoad Training the Elite, Indonesia, No.36, October 1983, p Weatherbee, David E., Indonesia s Armed Forces: Rejuvenation and Regeneration, Southeast Asian Affairs, 1982, p

80 implementation of the Dwifungsi was sustained to a greater extent by the military s territorial structure, as described next Territorial Structure of the TNI When the independent Indonesian government was re-established in 1949 the temporary guerilla government that had been operating on a regional basis under or outside Dutch occupation was abolished but its territorial structure was kept and used to organize military as well as political forces in the unification of the, briefly, federated states into a unitary state, as noted before. This military territorial command structure closely but not exactly corresponds to the civilian government territorial administrative structure. 147 (See Table III.1). Table III.1. Level of authority of local government and territorial command. Level of Authority Civilian Government Territorial Command Kodam/ Korem Regional Provinsi Provincial Government Military Command/ Subregional Military Command Kabupaten/ Kota District/ Kodim District Military Municipality Government Command Kecamatan Sub-district Koramil Sub-district Military government Command 147 The territorial command structure is one main part of the broader military organization. The Indonesian Army is organized and deployed in two types of Commands; Central Defence Forces (Balahanpus/Bala Pertahanan Pusat), and Regional Defence Forces or Territorial Commands (Balahanwil/Bala Pertahanan Wilayah). These two types of troops originated from the concept of people s total war, later called Perang Rakyat Semesta (People s Total War) or Pertahanan Rakyat Semesta (People s Total Defence). Created in late 1948 by Colonel (General) Abdul Haris Nasution, Balahanpus consists of two mobile forces. The hierarchy of Territorial Command levels are the KODAM (Komando Daerah Militer/Military Area Command; KOREM (Komando Resor Militer/Military Resort Command); KODIM (Komando Distrik Militer/Military District Command); and KORAMIL (Komando Rayon Militer/Military Rayon Command). A KODAM usually covers one of the larger Provinces or, outside Java, more than one of the smaller. For example, the KODAM V Brawijaya for East Java Province or the KODAM I Bukit Barisan for the Provinces of North Sumatra, West Sumatra, Riau and Jambi. A KOREM covers a smaller Province or several Districts (rural Kabupaten/Regency or urban Kota/City) of larger Provinces. For example, KOREM 17 Agustus covers West Sumatra Province, but KOREM BDJ Malang covers only the regencies and cities of Malang, Pasuruan, Probolinggo, Jember, Bondowoso and Situbondo. The rest of the thirty eight regencies and cities in the Province of East Java were covered by three other KOREMs. A KODIM is over one or more smaller Districts (Kabupaten) with a KORAMIL for one or two Sub-Districts (Kecamatan). The lowest level of territorial authority is the Village NCO (BABINSA) who has territorial tasks that cover one or more villages. See for example, Lowry, Robert, The Armed Forces of Indonesia (Allen & Unwin Pty Ltd, New South Wales, 1996), pp

81 Desa Village Babinsa Village NCO A large portion of a KODAM s personnel are regular troops not specifically assigned territorial tasks. 148 Personnel specifically assigned the territorial tasks are only those at the headquarters of KODAM, KOREM, KODIM or KODAMIL. The number of these personnel range from around 40 in a KORAMIL to about 300 in a KODAM, with the total size of the territorial staffing of each KODAM depending on the number of Districts and Sub-Districts within its jurisdiction. In this thesis, the term Territorial Command or Koter refers mainly only to the four headquarters of KODAM, KOREM, KODIM or KODAMIL and does not include the regular troops that were under their lines of commands. Unlike the regular troops, the Koter has specific territorial roles, mainly described under three main aspects: Geo, Demo, Konsos (Geography, Demography, and Social Conditions). The daily work of the Koter was to collect data about these three aspects, analyze them, and develop (membina) them to become RAK JUANG (abbreviation of Ruang/Space, Alat/Means, Kondisi/Condition, Perjuangan/Struggle) for the purpose of National Defense. 149 The relevance of the territorial command structures, for this study is that their command structures are organized according to the level of regional political authority, standing as the main basis for the two levels of internal and situational security 150, and for the operational level of military security. They were not specifically designed to cope with the political role, but mainly to carry out the defence role; yet, as noted above, the function eventually evolved to be also political, reflecting the dual military political structure. The following section describes in more detail the political relations of the territorial structure They were organized, in a similar way to the Balahanpus troops, in fighting units, either as Companies (around 100 to 200 troops), Battalions (around 600 to 1000 troops), or Brigades (around 3000 to 4000 troops). Usually the Brigades are under the command of a KODAM Commander in Chief (Pangdam/Panglima Komando Daerah Militer), while battalions which are not the subordinate units of brigades are under the command of KOREM commanders. 149 Buku Pentunjuk Koter This book is not made available to public. 150 See Chapter Two for more about functional separation. 151 Most of the description is based on my personal communications with several senior military officers in East Java, as well as my own knowledge and understanding as a serving army officer. For the purpose of the study, the description covers only elements or aspects that are discussed in the case-study chapters (Five to Eleven). 81

82 3.3. Pre-1998 military politics in East Java The feature of the local military units East Java is one of the provinces where Indonesian military units are heavily concentrated. The highest military authority in the Province is KODAM V Brawijaya whose Headquarters is located in Surabaya, the Province s capital. Its area of jurisdiction covers a territory of about 47,000 km2 which is inhabited by around 35.5 million people 152. Paralleling the Province s governmental bureaucratic structure which is divided into four sub-regions (Karesidenan), the KODAM authority is also divided into four KOREM: KOREM Surabaya, KOREM Malang, KOREM Madiun, and KOREM Mojokerto. Below these KOREM are 35 KODIM, one for each District (Regency or City), except for Surabaya City which has three KODIM, for northern, eastern and southern Surabaya. Below each KODIM are KORAMIL, one for each or a cluster of Kecamatan. 153 In 2003 about 78,900 military personnel and 30,000 policemen lived in East Java Province 154 about 0.3 percent of its 35.5 million people. So, although this is a study about a local case, it studies military politics in an area whose population is clearly bigger than the populations of many countries in the world Political elements within/ attached to the Territorial Commands 152 These, and other figures, are based on 2003 statistics produced by Kodam V Brawijaya. 153 Like Kodam Headquarters, all headquarters at the lower levels are located in the relevant level capital towns, mostly near the complex of government offices. Numbers of personnel for each KODIM vary, depending on the number of sub-districts and villages allocated to it, ranging from the smallest with 120 personnel for Malang City to the biggest with 609 for Malang Regency, the former District having only 5 Sub-Districts and 55 villages while the latter has 36 and 409 respectively. In 2003, around a third (7,650) of KODAM V Brawijaya s roughly 20,000 personnel were Babinsa (Village Development Sergeants), about 6,000 were troops forming ten battalions under the KODAM command, and another third were occupying administrative and staff jobs in the various levels of headquarters. As well as these territorial units, there were also several non-territorial units based in the East Java Province. The Army Strategic Reserve Command (KOSTRAD), for example, had one division of about troops whose brigades and battalions were spread around the districts of East Java. The Indonesian Navy has its Eastern Fleet in Surabaya with several Naval Bases and a Marine Brigade. The Indonesian Air Force has two big Air Force Bases in the Regencies of Malang and Madiun. The Indonesian Regional Police, with a similar territorial structure to the military s, had its Regional Police command (POLDA/Polisi Daerah) in Surabaya, a Sub-Regional Police command (POLWIL/ Polisi Wilayah) in each of the four Karesidenan, a Resort Police command (POLRES) in each District, a Sector Police (POLSEK/ Polisi Sektor) in every Sub-District, and Community Protecting Sergeants (BALINMAS/Bintara Pelindung Masyarakat) in the villages. For more information about the structure of Indonesian military forces, see for example Lowry, Robert, Op. cit., Chapters 4, 5 and The number is based on the document produced by Kodam V Brawijaya in It would be about 34 th, just ahead of Kenya, Morocco and Canada, according to the US Census Bureau statistics for

83 In East Java, as elsewhere, extra-structural (political) elements were added to the territorial structures. These were the Bakorstanasda, Wansospolda, Wansospolrem, Litsus, Staf Sospoldam, Staf Solpolrem and Staf Sospoldim, which are described in the following sub-sections Bakorstanas and Litsus To restore law and order after the 30 th September 1965 Communist Attempt Coup, a national body called the Kopkamtib (Komando Pemulihan Keamanan dan Ketertiban/Restoration Command of Security and Order) was created with General (later President) Suharto as Commander in Chief. At the KODAM level, such as for East Java, the corresponding body was named Laksusda (Komando Pelaksana Daerah/Regional Executing Command). Later, with Presidential Decree No. 29/1988, the national Kopkamtib was replaced by Bakorstanas (Badan Koordinasi Pemantapan Stabilitas dan Ketahanan Nasional/Coordinating Body for National Stability and Resilience), while the KODAM s Laksusda was replaced by a Bakorstanasda (Badan Koordinasi Pemantapan Stabilitas Daerah/Coordinating Body for Regional Stability and Resilience). The KODAM s Bakorstanasda had an intelligence capability, and the right to arrest anyone suspected of being a disturbance to social and political stability. In the name of stability, the Territorial Commander had authority to intervene across civilian departments, private and social organizations. The membership of Bakorstanasda included all leaders of the respective area: Government leader, Chairman of the DPRD, Military District Commander, Regional Police Chief and Judicial Chief. It also had a permanent organizational structure staffed by both military and civilian officials. The civilian members could be bureaucrats, lecturers, or social or religious leaders who advised the Chairman on a wide range of aspects of social problems. The former Chairman of the Supreme Advisory Council, Admiral Retired Sudomo, who was also a former Commander of the national Kopkamtib, publicly explained in 2000 that this body and its successor, the Bakorstnas, had been established with a task covering all aspects of 83

84 social and politics that could affect national stability. Yet, he said that specific emphasis had been given to the prevention of any Communist resurrection, to store or collect archives of Communist Party movements in Indonesia, in particular data in relation to the 1948 Madiun and 1965 incidents. For this specific task, by a Presidential Decree (Surat Keputusan Presiden, No. 16/ 1990), a special screening (Litsus) was applied to ensure no one could develop Communism in Indonesia. 156 During the New Order era, all would-be candidates for elections to Provincial or District Legislative Assemblies, for example, were required to pass this Litsus in the relevant Koter headquarters, and the results were determined and approved by the local Bakorstanasda, the Wansospol described next. Those who were categorized as unclean in terms of Communist influence were not issued a SKKT (Surat Keterangan Tidak Terlibat/Certificate of being Free of Communist Influence) and could not stand for election to the local Assembly Wansospol and Staf Sospol As at the national level there was a Dewan Sospol (abbreviated to Wansospol), Social and Political Boards, at the KODAM and KOREM levels it was called Wansospolda and Wansospolrem respectively. These consisted of local senior officers and territorial commanders who had the authority to process the assignment of military officers into civilian positions in the local government bureaucracies. The KODAM s board was led by the Pangdam, the Territorial Commander, corresponding to the national level board being led by the Armed Forces Commander in Chief, and at KOREM level by the Danrem. In addition, a Staf Sospol or Social and Political Staff Unit, was attached to the territorial structure at each level above the village, to assist their territorial commanders with data and analysis about social political aspects within the territorial area. At the Provincial KODAM level the unit was 156 Aspects related to the national stability was very broadly interpreted at operational level, the tasks of the body included being mediator of various labour conflicts, land conflicts, communal conflicts etc. See Sudomo: It should have been done long ago, Kompas Online, 9 March

85 headed by a Colonel, at the KOREM by a Lieutenant Colonel, and at the KODIM by a Captain. The Staf Sospol assisted the territorial commanders at each level in disseminating military policies regarding social and political developments, and in external communications with local governments, local Assemblies or other local institutions Military elements within local political structures In addition to the political instruments attached to the territorial commands discussed above, the military also controlled the Province s local institutions through Kekaryaan 157, the military occupation of vital positions within these institutions, especially its government bureaucracy and legislatures Military appointments to the local government bureaucracy The military occupation of positions in the local bureaucracies was not limited to the top positions of Governor (Province), Regent or Mayor (Districts), but was extended to many lower positions within the local government structure. At the District (Regency or City) level each division head position was liable to military occupation, but the ones that were commonly occupied by the military were the Chairman of the Social and Political Office (Kansospol) and of Regional Civil Defence (Mawil Hansip), the Market Chief (Kepala Pasar), the Bus Station Chief (Kepala Terminal), Directors of Regional Transportation (Organda) and of Regional Telecommunication (Dinashub), and the Regional Parking Chief (Kepala Parkir). Among those the Kansospol was the most influential position in terms of local politics. Along with the Mawil Hansip, the Kansospol positions were always occupied by an Army Lieutenant Colonel. The other positions in the bureaucracy were mainly occupied not for political or security reasons but because they generated and controlled considerable financial resources, although the Organda and Dinashub also theoretically involved important facilities to support military operations. 157 Kekaryaan or tugas karya means assignment of military officers to civilian positions. 85

86 As noted, each District s Kansospol office had a direct line to the Provincial Directorate of Sospol, and to the Directorate General of Sospolof in the Ministry of Internal Affairs at national level. As the Chiefs of Kansospol were always military officers, this secured the nominally civilian networks within the military institutions Even in cases where the Mayor or Regent was a civilian, the Chief of Kansospol could act quite independently of that person although structurally it was a subordinate division. When the Regent or Mayor was also a military officer, usually a Colonel, the Chief of Kansospol became his main political assistant. The Chief of Kansospol had responsibility for assessing any official to be promoted into important positions in the local government. This included applying a Litsus (Special Screening), officially to make sure that someone was not leftist or radical rightist although such a screening could generally be used to classify a person as one of us or them in political groupings. Those employees who were identified as having leftist or radical rightist tendencies were to be excluded from promotion or, in a worst scenario, to be fired. Internal to the operations of local government, the Kakansospol continually observed the political behaviors of the government employees. Politically, all civil servants were required to have loyalitas tunggal, one and only loyalty, to Golkar, and automatically became members and activists of Golkar, and members of the KORPRI (Korp Pegawai Negeri Republik Indonesia/RI Civil Servants Organization) or of the PGRI (Persatuan Guru Republik Indonesia/RI Teachers Organization), through which their loyalty was continually watched and assessed. Job placements and career promotion were highly determined by the degree of loyalty presented, including that by family members. It was possible for a civil servant to be not promoted, or even fired, for example when his or her spouse was found to be an activist of an opposition party. The observation was normally carried out by means of military bureaucracy networks, for example, in the village among the Babinsa (Village NCO), Kades (Village leader) and the heads of the RT/RW (neighborhood associations). 86

87 Externally, the Kakansospol had the responsibility of supervising all political parties, mass and social organizations, including in designing and determining the forms and the programs of their organizations. This ensured that all organizations could not develop towards being able to challenge the government and the government ruling party Golkar. The Kakansospol coordinated the execution of Litsus for prospective candidates for the local legislatures, including those of the opposition parties, with the military territorial commands and its Bakorstanasda (Coordinating Body for Regional Stability) The military in the Local Legislative Assemblies (DPRD) As elsewhere in Indonesia under the New Order, in East Java the military domination in the local legislatures was gained from a combination of its decreed 20% of the total seats of each DPRD with its underlying domination over the Golkar faction, usually the biggest faction of a DPRD. Apart from the F-ABRI (Fraksi-ABRI, the military faction in a DRPD) and F- Golkar the only other parliamentary groupings allowed during the New Order were the factions of the Islamic PPP and the non-muslim (secular and Christian) PDI. In the 1997 DPRD of Malang City for example, of the total 45 members, 17 were F-Golkar and 9 F-ABRI (military faction), thus an absolute majority of 26 together. The remaining 19 were 16 F-PPP and 3 F-PDI. In more extreme cases like the DPRD of Magetan Regency, all members were either F-Golkar (36) or F-ABRI (9) with no F-PPP or F-PDI, while in Madiun Regency, F-Golkar had 35, F-ABRI 9, the F-PPP only 1 and the F-PDI no members. The military s influence in Golkar was not only because an important portion of the Golkar faction members were from military families, but also because the Golkar leadership was dominated by the military. Among the military s family were included members of the Soldier s Wives Association (PERSIT), the Retired Military Association (PEPABRI) and the Military s Children s Association (FKPPI). In terms of the leaderships, until 1998, 32 of the F-Golkar in the 37 Districts of the East Java were led by 87

88 retired military officers. Consequently, domination of the leaderships of the DPRD was also easily gained. When a decision was taken by a deliberation mechanism, the leadership domination was an effective tool, and when a decision was taken through voting, the majority in numbers was already held. In fact, most decisions were taken through deliberation. Normally officers with the rank of Lieutenant Colonel occupied positions in the Province s various DPRD. However, being appointed to the legislatures was considered as less attractive to career officers. 158 Despite this, it was not always disadvantageous because it could be a temporary, useful stepping stone toward subsequent strategic positions. It was also common that the officers would move several times into civilian positions and then come back to military jobs. So, it was not unusual for good-career officers to be holding positions in the legislatures since it was seen as an important part of their career development. The presence of able officers had contributed to the quality of military representatives in the legislatures in the past. To understand the impact of the post-1998 declining military role on the DPRD it is important to see the role of these Provincial and District Assemblies in the New Order era. Acording to the Law at that time, the DPRD was one part of the total Local Government (PEMDA/Pemerintah Daerah) with the local executive bureaucracy as the other 159 but, instead of controlling the PEMDA s executive branch, the DPRD simply endorsed, in a procedural formality, every single policy initiated by the executive. As mentioned earlier, the local governments leaders had special forums in which they could persuade and insist on the executive s political preferences. Importantly, because the executives were led by the military, it was the responsibility of the military officers in the legislatures to prevent any resistance that could rise from the opposition factions there. The 158 Career officers are those officers who joined the military through the Army, Naval or Airforce Academies. In these they are trained for 3-4 years to hold command positions, and prepared or projected to subsequently hold top leaderships in the Indonesian Military. Secondments to DPRD positions were less desirable especially when compared to the positions in local bureaucratic executive structures such as those of District Bupati/Mayor or Provincial Governor. It was also less favourable than command positions either in territorial structures or the military s regular units. It was less desirable not only in terms of prestige e.g. no commanding power, but also in terms of financial benefits e.g. no authority over a large budget allocation. 159 National Law of Regional Government No.5/74. 88

89 legislatures role was thus far less than its theoretical sense, which was to represent actual public aspirations and participations. So the military s active control over local politics was mainly carried out through the executives of the Provincial and District local governments, not their legislative bodies which, during the New Order era, had the role mainly to be the constitutional stamp that legalized and backed up their executives domination Local inter-institution relations: coordination of social and political controls As described previously, during the New Order each Province had an array of Social and Political Boards, Muspida and other forms of socialpolitical forums operating through the interlocking military-government relations down through hierarchical levels from Provincial to Sub-District and below. These informal forums had been very effective in coordinating problems involving all local institutions. They were very solid, not only because they had intensive meetings but also, because the members were dominated by the military officers, they adopted military hierarchical values. Except for judiciary leaders and the police chief (who was also a member of ABRI before the separation of ABRI into the military TNI and the police POLRI), they were usually all military officers, including the DPRD Chairman and Golkar s Chairman. Normally the local government executive leader was the most senior Colonel, so was obeyed and respected by the others. Therefore, this government leader effectively controlled the other local institutions. Power was concentrated in the local executive that had strong influence over all local institutions imposing and sustaining political power, including legislative and judiciary bodies and even the community. The government leader maintained this influence through the Muspida. Most local problems, whether of governance, social, political or security, were deliberated through this forum. The local government provided a monthly 89

90 allowance for the Muspida members, Uang Muspida (Muspida Money). 160 As well as the local Muspida forum there were also special forums such as Forum ½ Kamar (1/2 cameral forum) or Forum ¼ Kamar (1/4 cameral forum). These were specific forums for discussion of political problems between the local government leader, the local F-ABRI and the local F- Golkar (the members of the Military and Golkar Factions in the local DPRD). The Forum ½ Kamar was a meeting among the three parties, while the Forum ¼ Kamar was between the government and either one of the factions Military relationships with the local bureaucracies The pre-1998 relationships in East Java between the military Territorial Commanders and the Heads of (nominally civilian) Local Governments can be seen as two-way patron-client relationships, depending on the level of each. For example, a District Regent or Mayor was the client not only of the Governor as the direct superior civilian administrative authority, but also of the Pangdam (Military Area Commander in Chief) who had decided or approved his nomination as the Regent or Mayoral candidate in the first place. 161 Also, the future careers of these Regents and Mayors depended on their Pangdam as the Chairman of the KODAM s Wansospolda. He had the authority to allow or make them stay in the position or be pulled back to the military units. Yet, the local military-bureaucracy relations could not be simplified only to the pattern of military control over the bureaucracy. Instead, it also 160 The amount of the money varied from one District to another. In Malang for example, in 2003 each Muspida member got Rp.2,500,000 rupiah (around US$300), about the same as their official monthly salary. This information was received in my personal communication with an official in the Pemda (Local Government Office) of Malang Regency, who was responsible for distributing the money to the Muspida members. 161 The patronage power was regulated by a procedure of the Kekaryaan, the terminology for military personnel being appointed to civilian executive posts. In the case of Bupati (leaders of the government executive bureaucracy of rural or largely rural Districts) for example, the procedure of appointment was regulated by a Decree of the (national) Armed Forces Commander in Chief. The form of this Decree had been adjusted several times, the last time by Decree No. 811/ XII/ 1996 dated December 4 th, This determined that the mechanism was to be started if there was a requesting letter for a military Bupati candidate from the Provincial Governor to the Province s KODAM Pangdam (Military Area Commander in Chief) who would appoint this officer (who would be one of his subordinates) as a candidate after consulting the national Armed Forces Headquarters. The success of an officer to be nominated as the Bupati/Walikota (Regent/Mayor) candidate was therefore determined formally by the Dewan Sospol (Social Political Board), chaired by the Armed Forces Commander in Chief at national level and by the Sospolda of the KODAM at Provincial level. 90

91 operated the other way around; the military territorial units were obliged to support the bureaucracy. So, a system of zigzag controls prevailed from the higher to the lower level of each part, as seen in Chart III.1. Chart III. 1: Relations between positions in the local military and the local government executives in the New Order. Level of Authority Executive Bureaucracy Territorial Structure Provincial level Governor: (Senior) Major General Pangdam: (Junior) Major General Sub-provincial level Regent or Mayor: (Senior) Colonel District level Direct line of command Patron-client relationships Danrem: (Senior) Colonel Dandim: (Lieutenant Colonel) At District level, for example, the Dandim military commander had to support the power of the District s executive bureaucracy leader, the Regent in a rural area or the Mayor in an urban one. Similarly, at the Provincial level, the Pangdam and Danrem had to back up the power of the Governor. For the military leadership to get access to the local governments economic resources, or to be recommended as a successor to them, the Regents or Mayors had to be made happy with the local military s performance in supporting their interests. In this respect, apart from financial benefits and opportunities gained, playing political roles can be seen more as political burdens than rewards for the institutions. These 91

92 relations were possible because particular positions of bureaucracy leaders were usually related to particular ranks in the military structures. However, no matter how the relations were seen, whether as the military controlling the bureaucracy or vice versa or as a complicated and shifting mixture, they had the consequence that the officer positions in Koter, the Territorial Command, were commonly see more in terms of seeking political and financial power than advancing a purely military career, or at least as crucial steps to gain higher positions in a military career. As seen in Diagram III.2, military political instruments were operated at all political institutions at all levels within the Province. Table III. 2: Key elements of the formal military involvement in politics at local level during the New Order era. Within the Military Territorial Command Within the Bureaucracy Within the Legislatures Within the Political Parties Territorial commanders as the Chiefs of Bakorstanasda, Wansospolda and Wansospolrem. Litsus by Intelligence Staff Staf Sospol (Social Political Staff section at each level) Military Officers as the Governors, Regents and Mayors Military Officers as the Head of Sospol Directorate/ Ditsospol at provincial level, and Sospol Office/Kansospol at district level Domination of the Muspida Military Domination of Local Parliament (DPRD) Leaderships Military Faction (F-ABRI) Domination of the leaderships of the majority Golkar Faction Golkar (Government ruling party) dominated by military. PPP and PDI (Opposition parties) controlled tightly by Bakorstanas/da, Wansospol, or Kakansospol 92

93 The military territorial commanders thus had strong power in local intrainstitution relations because of their ability to utilize these instruments. The staff structure of the Bakorstanasda and implementation of the Litsus also provided additional jobs for the officers and contributed significant amount of money to the military Personal Benefits of Service in the Koter For the officers, experiences in the Territorial Command could be just as important as the money in their career building. Positions of territorial commanders such as Military District Commander (Dandim), Military Resort Commander (Danrem), and Military Area Commander in Chief (Pangdam) at Provincial level, were very strategic springboards to get into politically and economically powerful civilian government posts. Dandim and Danrem were strong positions to aim at Bupati/Regent or Mayor positions, while Pangdam was the best for the Governor s position. Once such territorial commander positions had been held, dozen of other subsequent positions were also opened up. These could range from the Pembina in Golkar (the government ruling party) and its affiliated organizations to the Bakorstanasda for a Pangdam or the Chairman of Wansospol or the Chairman of Koter s business foundations. These positions would provide the officers with not only abundant sources of money but also political experiences, connections and power needed for higher political or bureaucratic positions in Jakarta. At that central national level being Director General or Secretary General of Departments of the Cabinet were common civilian positions to get next, or a transfer back to military regular jobs at higher positions. For the best career officers, since it was a piece of cake to get launch-pad positions such as Bupati or Mayor, Chairman of a Local Parliament (DPRD) or other positions at District level, these positions could be their final appointment, but could be longer-standing (a full two terms) positions for officers with less successful military careers. 93

94 It was not unusual for the main tasks formally outlined by the headquarters to become a lower priority than the individuals businesses. The activities required in official job descriptions in collecting information and analysing Geo-Demo-Konsos (Geographic, Demographic, and Social Condition) aspects required for territorial personnel and units were given very little attention. The building and maintenance of business networks were crucial in financing the operation of the political role of the territorial units. Indeed, symbiotic interactions marked the relations between the local territorial commanders and the local business elites during the New Order period. While the businessmen could support career and political ambitions of the officers, the officers with their powers, including political, could not only guarantee the physical security of their businesses, but also could strengthen their lobbying in struggles over project tenders offered by the local governments. The intensity of interactions with external interests varied greatly from one unit to another, from one position to another, as well as from one individual to another. The greater the possibility of interacting intensively, the more favoured the unit or the position will be. Actually, there were several factors that influenced the choice of location of territorial unit they preferred to be moved to. Whether the individual personnel would be assigned in the locations according to what they wanted was mostly determined by kasak-kusuk (lobbying and negotiation). While this applied to all ranks, there was a difference in the formal procedures which applied. Whereas the rank and file soldiers were offered a choice of preferred location included in an application form for moving, the career officers were not. For most rank and file soldiers, place of birth or origin of family usually came first as the move was seen as a part of preparation for retirement, and basah-kering (business opportunity, literally wet-dry ) as a second consideration. For career officers basah-kering usually came first. For example, being appointed as a Commander of the Military District Command in a city was more attractive than in a (rural) regency, in a big city rather than in a small city, and in an industrial city/regency rather than in a largely agricultural area. 94

95 However, although economically a position in a big industrial city was more beneficial for territorial units, politically it was less so as in more traditional agricultural regencies the existence of the military seemed to be more respected by the people and be more involved in the local politics. Some reasons for this phenomenon are that people in the latter generally had a lower education level which contributed to a lower appreciation about democratic civil-military relations, a smaller middle class that thus would present less potential to challenge the existence of the military in politics, a smaller and weaker local press which limited political transparency and public participation, and more of a feudalistic culture that saw the military personnel as having higher social status and thus to be respected. Despite this, business opportunity mainly dominated the preference for territorial unit (Koter) locations for officers. Related to this, how much money would have to be spent for kasak-kusuk purposes depended mainly on how favoured the locations were in this regard. The importance of Koter positions was not only for the officers but also for the soldiers, although the soldiers considered their positions more in terms of financial gains than political power, and as preparation to enter retirement. The most favourite position for the soldiers being appointed into the Koter was as a Babinsa (Bintara Pembina Desa/Village Sergeant- NCO). This position was also crucial in building political support for Golkar. In fact, the Babinsa was involved in all aspects of development of the village including social, political and economic aspects, and security approaches were utilized in solving almost all problems of these aspects. Although structurally the position of Babinsa was not higher than that of the Kepala Desa (Village Head), mostly Kepala Desa were dependent on and effectively in a lower position than the Babinsa as the latter frequently positioned himself, and was accepted, as atas nama komandan (acting on behalf of the military higher commanders), although sometimes manipulating this for his individual interests. Politically, a Babinsa was capable of mobilizing the village people, through the Kepala Desa, to support the success of development programs outlined by the higher 95

96 authorities at national level, as well as the success of Golkar in every general election The local military s relations with the society before 1998 Although the primary source of military political power came from its coercive capability, to sustain the power the military needed a sufficient level of public acceptance or legitimacy. 162 As previously mentioned William Liddle has suggested that the social and political stability that sustained the long-standing New Order regime was based in the regime s legitimacy: its economic performance, popular bureaucrats, and coercive legitimacy. 163 However, those three kinds of legitimacy, especially coercive legitimacy could not have been maintained without being supported by a systematic control of the polity such as described above, which Liddle has also described as the institutionalization of the three pillars of the New Order the military, bureaucracy and Golkar. 164 The coercion legitimacy implies that resistances to the ways the military ruled the country did exist, but they were put under strong control. In the case of land conflicts for instance, as reported by the scholar Ikrar Nusa Nusabakti, under the New Order government the villagers were too fearful to protest when their lands were taken unfairly. They believed that in the end their loss would be greater if they did protest, not only because of the corrupt judicial system, but mostly as they would face the military threats and intimidations organized by the opposing parties. The East Java cases in Nipah, Sampang District, where dozens of villagers were shot by the security forces, and in Jenggawa, Jember District, where villagers were 162 Sundhaussen, Ulf, The Durability of Military Regimes in Southeast Asia, in Zakaria Haji Ahmad and Harold Crouch, (eds.), Military-Civilian Relations in Southeast Asia, (Singapore: Oxford University Press, 1985), pp For further explanation, see Liddle, R. William., Suharto s Indonesia: Political Rule and Political Institutions, Pacific Affairs, Vol.58, No.1, Ibid. 96

97 arrested and tortured, both in 1996, were some examples of the hapless position of the villagers relative to their local military-backed opponents. 165 Although in some cases violence was involved, most local social conflicts were resolved through the deliberative mechanism of the Bakorstanasda headed by the Pangdam (Military Area Commander in Chief) of KODAM V Brawijaya which covered East Java Province. 166 If cases were brought to the court, its decisions would be under influential interventions and pressures from this body against the villagers, while in the field the villagers were usually persuaded in a deliberation process through their Village Heads who would be backed-up by military territorial and police personnel. The nearest military units would also be asked to provide security back-up for the companies which, in return, would pay security funds to the units. The coercively oppressive attitudes of the security forces would effectively secure the land from any villagers who attempted to provoke an escalation of the conflict. Human rights violation by the troops was not uncommon. As mentioned above, there was an infamous case in Jenggawah where, in January 1996, the troops of Battalion 512 forced the villagers to confess to something they never did, the burning of the storage sheds of the state company PTP XXVII in Lengkong Village, Jenggawah, Jember Regency. This was revealed when six farmers wrote and signed a letter to the Pangdam of KODAM Brawijaya, Maj. Gen. Imam Utomo, on 17 January A week later (on 26 January), speaking at a meeting with the Muspida, the Pangdam admitted that there had been wrong procedures done by the troops. He had instructed the Unit s Commander to pull back the troops and apologize. Nevertheless, it was uncommon to bring such a case to court. 167 The press would not have been brave enough to produce news that went against the government authority s interests, unless it was prepared to be banned, or the journalist to be amankan (meaning arrested or killed, but 165 For discussion on these cases see for example Bhakti, Ikrar Nusa (ed.), Militer dan Politik Kekerasan Orde Baru (Military and Political Violence of the New Order) (Bandung: Penerbit Mizan, 2001), pp As described previously, the Bakorstanasda comprised all local state leaders: government bureaucracy, military, police and judiciary. 167 See Kompas, 26 January

98 literally pacified ). 168 Critics and allegations against the authority would not appear in the headlines. The authority could easily steer the public opinion toward the intended target it was disposed to blame, and held effective threats and actions to prevent and stop public unrest, thus ensuring stability. 169 The maintenance of stability needed for the continuation of development programs had always justified the government s actions against any unwanted publications or unwelcome people s actions. This is despite some allegations that some violent incidents up to 1998 were at some stages caused by military members to provoke fear and requests for security and protection thereby legitimating their continuing presence and influence. 170 So far this section has presented some pieces of the picture of the New Order regime, especially the political machinery of its military at the local level. It shows that after the military took over national power in 1966, the military s political dominance was maintained by broadening the implementation of the Dual Function doctrine of the armed forces, such as structurally by attaching political functions/organizational elements to the military institutions and restructuring the political structures and government bureaucracies where the military officers were assigned strategic positions. So it shows the stage of military s political domination when the New Order collapsed in May 1998, a stage from where the military political withdrawal would take place. To link this back to the previous main issue, what historical legacies of military politics would the New Order pass onto the post-new Order period? Firstly, there is the Dwifungsi or Dual Function (the defense and social-political roles of the military) that had been widely and 168 One example was a journalist of the Harian Bernas (Bernas Daily), Fuad M Syafruddin, who was kidnapped and killed after reporting a scandal of 1 million rupiah paid by Colonel Sri Roso to be the Batul Regent, Central Java, in In June 1998, the Regent was interrogated on the allegation of his involvement in the Udin killing. See Kasus Udin: Bupati Bantul Bersedia Diperiksa Polisi, Kompas 2 June His house was occupied by mobs who demanded he resign. See Rumah Dinas Bupati Diduduki Masa, Kompas 3 June See Kingsbury, Op.cit., especially chapter 8, pp See for example Rinakit, Sukardi, Decentralization and the Military, in Erb, Maribeth; Priyambudi Sulistiyanto and Carole Faucher (eds.) Regionalism in Post-Suharto Indonesia (London and New York: RoutledgeCurzon, 2005), p

99 systematically indoctrinated in more than thirty years and that has been very strongly entrenched to justify the military involvement in politics. Jun Honna, for example, argues that during the New Order era ideological reformulation has been used to rationalize the hardliner military approach to democratic movements. 171 This Dwifungsi mind-set of the officers would probably not change easily in the short term. Secondly, there had been a political institutionalization, which pre-new Order regimes could barely and rarely achieve, that had been to some extent achieved by the New Order, but it went in an unfortunate direction,to a military-style political system. 172 The polity became more manageable by the state regime than in the eras before the New Order, but it reflected more the aspiration of the New Order (military) government than of the people, thus was undemocratic. Liddle described this institutionalization as being actually limited to the Pyramid of the New Order s state institutions Suharto, military, ruling party Golkar, and bureaucracy 173. This made the state institutions became very strong, but made its society very weak. The strong feature of these institutions, however, was coloured by its undemocratic, corrupt and unaccountable ingredients established in strong elite networks. Thirdly, the military command and control system became much more integrated, stronger and effective, but due to the deep political involvement of the military and its individual personnel, military professionalism was compromised by political and personal interests, and loyalty (especially at the high level) came to be measured more in terms of political considerations than of professional military duties. Factionalism based on ideologies, sources of recruitments (KNILL/ PETA etc), and localities were no longer found, but subtle competitions based on personal ties, such as among groups of Suharto men and non-suharto men, different years of 171 Honna, Jun, Military Ideology in Response to Democratic Pressure during the Late Suharto Era: Political and Institutional Content, Indonesia, Vol. 67, April 1999, pp This style is most appropriately seen as gradually modified between the forms of military regime ranging from direct quasi-civilianized to an indirect-limited, using Finer s classification as discussed in Chapter Two. 173 See Liddle, R. William, Suharto s Indonesia: Political Rule and Political Institutions, Pacific Affairs, Vol.58, No.1,

100 officer graduations, as well as red/nationalist vs. green/islamic, were also developing and giving a new colour of internal conflicts or factionalism within the military. 174 Fourthly, there is a memory about the economic success of the New Order. Earlier it was noted that Liddle in 1985 argued that the New Order s durability was sustained by a strong legitimacy, which he explained as performance legitimacy, defined as economic achievement, as well as symbolic legitimacy or bureaucratic populism and coercive legitimacy. 175 So, if democratization could not achieved better results, this memory and experience about the economic development success under militaristic management and leadership could possibly preserve the military distrust toward democracy and civilian political systems, as well as hinder an emergence of a total/strong resistance within the civilian society to the military s political involvements. Later in 1996, Liddle added another legitimacy, electoral democratic legitimization which was carried out under the Pancasila ideology, which he labeled as a useful fiction, 176 which seems related to what he had called symbolic legitimacy. As this minimized the chance for the Indonesian people to exercise a true democracy, 177 the New Order produced civilian elites who lacked experience to run a truly democratic system. So, despite its success in modernizing state (and military) institutions, the New Order period produced and passed disadvantageous legacies to the next regime, such as a militaristic political culture, a neglected military 174 As summarized by Douglass Kammen and Siddarth Chandra, in A Tour of Duty : Changing Patterns of Military Politics in Indonesia in the 1990s, there was a long-standing interpretation of personal transfers as simmering conflicts among the military elites. For an historical explanation see for example, Ruth McVey who, in her 1972 essay The Post-Revolutionary Transformation of the Indonesian Army Part II, presented an historical analysis of the transformation of the military as an institution, from a guerrilla force to a modern force, that eventually brought it to be the most effective and strongest political force in the country. Here, it seems that what McVey has called the diffusion of power within the military has regained its importance. 175 See the notes in section Liddle has had also several works about the New Order elections, including, Liddle, William., Pemilu-Pemilu Orde Baru (New Order elections), (Jakarta: LP3ES, 1992; Liddle, William., A Useful Fiction: Democratic Legimization in the New Order Indonesia in R H Taylor (ed), the Politics of Elections in Southeast Asia, Cambridge University Press, 1996, and Liddle, William, Indonesian Elections: Personal Power and Regime Legitimacy, Muslim Politics Report 14 July/ August As noted in Chapter Two, p , Huntington defines true democracy as effective citizen control over policy, responsible government, honesty and openness in politics, informed and rational deliberation, equal participation and power, and various other civic virtues. 100

101 professionalism, and a lack of experiences in running an effective democracy for the civilian leaders. As seen across the case-study chapters (Five to Eleven) later, these legacies of the previous regime have been among the difficult problems that 1998 democratization have been facing. The next chapter reviews studies on military politics in Indonesia. 4. Conclusion The review of military politics in the previous regime, pre-1998 withdrawal, suggests the complexity of the military s political involvement in Indonesia, as complex as what had been mentioned earlier in Chapter Two. On one hand, the historically politicized development of the military institution and officer corps, its long-standing self-perception as the saviour of the Indonesian state, its various forms of internal factionalism and conflicts encouraged the military officers to involve themselves in politics. On the other hand, a seriously divisive polity with unstable governments and social and political disintegrations that characterized the weakness and failures of the civilian political system provided opportunity for that involvement. Both those sets of factors were to some extent affected by international political conflicts from the very beginning of the existence of the Indonesian state. All factors were tied together to form dialectical interactions in determining the nature of the Indonesian state-building, with its varying degrees of military involvement in politics. Although the task of this study is not to analyze these factors as causes of the military intervention in the first place, an understanding of this longer historical background with its legacies leading to the system of activities operating at the recent point of departure from where the process of military withdrawal from politics took place is important to adequately understand what this study is dealing with - the process and the impact of that military political withdrawal at the local level. 101

102 Chapter Four METHODOLOGY 1. The Research Strategy As noted, the plan of this research was to explore the process and the impacts of the withdrawal and their problems at the local level over several aspects of military politics. These aspects were to include: 1) those internal to the military, such as the military institutions and personnel; 2) those external to the military, namely, political institutions and officials, politicians and societies; and 3) the changing patterns of interactions between those two sets of internal and external aspects, as well as within each set of them that affected or were affected by their political views, doctrines, ideologies, interests or behaviours. 178 Therefore, any research strategy to be used had to be able to facilitate efforts to meet these goals A multi-strategy analysis In order to be able to study those three aspects of local military politics, the study needed a methodology that enables analytic or methodological cuts across macro-micro, and quantitative-qualitative analysis such as the approach of multi-strategy analysis. 179 This kind of methodology allows a reasonable balance of exploration and comprehension of the dynamic changes of military politics and their consequences. For example, the study needed to understand: in what (macro) contexts the changes took place; in what institutional settings (territorial units, military fractions, government offices, legislatures, or political parties) the changes had impacts; what types of individuals in military or civilian positions were 178 See Chapter Two for theoretical discussion; and also Chapter I about why the study was of the local level. 179 A multi strategy approach is used for social research, not specifically used for the study of civil military relations, but this approach is quite useful for this study of civil-military relations at the local level. See Layder, Derek, New Strategies in Social Research: An Introduction Guide (Polity Press, Cambridge, 1993). 102

103 affected; how specific (micro) face-to-face interactions among them were affected; what kinds of (macro) values, doctrines, cultures or histories influenced these interactions. To a major extent, the appropriate data and analysis to satisfy these needs would be descriptive qualitative to interpret the views and behaviors of military-civil social or political interactions. However, to a minor extent, simple quantitative statistical methods would also be useful to portray trends, for instance, in any changing balance of power between military and civilian as indicated by their relative success or failure in local elections. So, different levels and types of data and analysis have been used at different points of this study, but they are used to complement each other to support the generally qualitative approach which is dominant in the whole thesis. By using the multi-strategy approach this study has attempted to avoid over-treating the civil-military distinction as if it were a dichotomy with each alternative simply homogeneous, as the studies concentrating at the national level appear to have tended to see, as noted in Chapter One. Rather, this study has tried to explore the heterogeneity of the forms of government, for example, in personal political views, interests or preferences of their actors as well as at different levels of institutional hierarchies because of different backgrounds and personal or environmental circumstances. Highlighting the heterogeneous outlooks of both military and civilian institutions and actors would complement a fuller understanding of the complexity of problems facing efforts of solving civilmilitary tensions A local case study Furthermore, to be able to portray a potential complexity rather than a presumed simplicity of military politics, this study took a case study approach where unique features of the case are made available to be scrutinized. In this study the Indonesian Province of East Java was selected as the case study site. This focus on uniqueness is not, however, 103

104 to say that the outcome of the study in East Java would be useless for answering other questions emerging in comparable case studies of different locations. Instead, the uniqueness of the result of the East Java study could increase awareness in setting up different case studies conducted at different locations of Indonesia to provide for testing generalizations from the findings from this study. Local military situations within and outside Java may be different, for example, in the ways the military interact with local civilians who use different traditional languages and cultures. For example, Javanese-origin military personnel may have faced anti-javanese sentiments from local civilians outside Java during the 1998/1999 riots 180, a feeling which may not be found in those serving in Java. Given the possibilities of such differences, the perceptions or feelings of attachment between people acting in military and civilian positions might need to be analyzed in different ways, in order to understand how relative changes of their political circumstances affected their social interactions. Nevertheless, those differences should not ignore the commonness they have, for example, from institutional doctrines or values that may encourage them to react similarly to, or be affected in similar ways by, the changes to some degree. However, in addition, the choice of this case study approach is not because there can yet be any generalization based on an existing pool of many different Indonesian local case studies. In fact, there have been only very rare local case studies of military politics in Indonesia and these are small and anecdotal. As noted, generalizations about features of local military politics have appeared to be made based on studies that mainly focused their investigations at national level with an assumption that their findings can be simply projected downwards to the local A semi-grounded or snowball method of data collection 180 As they did in the establishment of the unitary state and the PRRI and Permesta rebellions in Sumatra and Sulawesi.See Chapter Three. 104

105 The fact that local case study of military politics is rare also posed another problem, specifically, to make the study well-planned from the early process of the research, as there was no sufficient ready-to-use model of local military study so far. The ways the data collected, as will be explained later, relied to a significant extent on a snowball method that what happened or was collected on one day in the field determined what to gather over subsequent days, and the respondents chosen to be interviewed was influenced by the issues emerging from the previous interviews. 181 The theoretical discussion in Chapter Two helped provide general insights about military politics and shape an analytical framework for this study, but the exact respondents could only be decided in the field work, following the day-to-day process of data collection. On the other hand, there were some minor additions to the discussion in the theoretical chapter itself, mainly after the field study had been completed and further insights gained as its data was analyzed. So, this study was not intended in the first place to be theory testing, in the sense that there had not been clear theoretical assumptions to be tested from the earlier process, yet some findings of the research may have theoretical implications, as pointed out in the final chapter. With its limited time and resources neither was this study thought to be sufficient to generate any kind of genuinely new theory from fully grounded data as suggested by a grounded theory building mechanism, although again, some of its data and interpretations may be used by other researchers for such a purpose. 182 In such a case, the theoretical framework provided in Chapter Two has to be seen more as one to which the findings of the study could contribute to than one that mainly shaped the study in the first place. 181 See Coleman, J.S. (1958): Relational analysis: The study of social organizations with survey methods. 182 According to Layder, however, not all research falls neatly into one category [theory testing] or the other [theory building], as at different stages and degrees each involves the other process. See Layder, Op. cit, p

106 However, instead of being contradictory to the choice of the methods used, the problem of newness of local military study has to be seen as strengthening the intention to explore the heterogeneous feature of Indonesian civil-military relations. This was because to avoid precise planning beforehand the research methodology allowed the data collection to be as flexible as possible, without having to be too limited by this plan. Therefore, a triple combination of multi-strategy, local case study and semi-grounded (or snowball) approaches was preferred to study the complexity of problems 183 in military politics that Indonesian military and the newly-established democratic society has been facing in post- Soeharto Indonesia. Nevertheless, in order to be able to measure how heterogeneous, unique or common is the East Java case relative to other regions of Indonesia, subsequent comparative study will also be needed. The resources of this study could not be extended to fulfill this, yet provides a detailed picture of the East Java case over the specified period as a base for such a possible comparison in any future research. 2. The selection of the research site The general aim of the research that guided this study was to understand the changes in military politics at the local level during the last five years (1998 to 2003). Initially, to get to such a local level, two local regions of studies were selected, the East Java and Riau Provinces, which were to represent Java and non-java cases, 184 with two or three Districts then to be selected from each Province. However, after around three months of the field study activities in East Java, I found that there would be much potentially important data from the other thirty five Districts of the East Java Province that seemed to me to be too important not to collect. Furthermore, collecting the data only from such a limited number of the 183 See Chapter I, Section 2 for the research problems and questions. 184 The choice of Riau for the intended comparison rather than West Java or other non-java provinces was based on several considerations. Two of these were: Current demands for decentralization in Riau were stronger than in East Java which continues to be generally seen as part of the core of Indonesia, thus politically Riau appeared less stable than East Java; Whereas Riau was an economically resource-rich area, East Java was not. It was predicted that these and other different conditions might offer different insights into civil-military economic interactions in Indonesia. The choice was also based on practical considerations and that I was personally more familiar with those two provinces than with others. 106

107 thirty eight Districts of East Java would lead me, as I had come to believe by then, to be likely to overlook many of the real features of military politics in the Province. In fact, then I found that I would have been much less able to portray the complexity of military politics in East Java had I stuck to the initial plan. Therefore, I broadened the research activities to include all thirty eight Districts of East Java for the whole twelve-month field study, at the expense of losing the initially intended comparison with Riau - nevertheless by then I had decided that the data from the initially planned limited number of Districts would be also too inadequate to validly represent Riau. Studying East Java as a case offered two sets of methodological benefits. Firstly, as the Province possesses a large number of military units 185 that could affect, or be affected by, the changes in the local military politics it provided a range of alternatives of units from which to gather data. In addition, for the same reason 186, their institutional or individual behaviours at the grassroots level were more observable by the local communities, so asking local people also provided possible alternative ways of gathering useful data.. Secondly, as the Province has a large number of Districts (thirty eight), the largest number of all Indonesia s provinces, consequently it had a large number of District Head Elections in each year of the five years of the research s time frame. Therefore, under a single value of the variable of KODAM leadership, as it continued to be under the same KODAM leaderships and control 187, it was possible to observe the trends of military behaviours that continually 185 See Chapter III, Sub-section In less populous Provinces where there are also relatively few units, there can be more geographic separation and less likelihood of everyday observation by neighbouring civilians. 187 As compared with a comparison of District Elections occurring across a military area with command split between more than one KODAM, thus involving more than one value of the KODAM variable. 107

108 Map IV.1: Map of East Java Source: Note: For reasons of confidentiality the District names used in the text have been changed and not put on this map instead of the real names. (Section 4 describes this confidentiality issue).

109 emerged from these local elections. Military political activities at the local level were not limited to the election cases, but these events were important political struggles where the local military s roles were very important to the analysis of any changes in the civil-military relation. 3. Data sources and collection This study used three main sources of data: Official documents, interviews and direct observations. It also drew on a wide variety of secondary data, all of which could be organized according to the three main goals stated in the beginning of this chapter: About the military; about the local politics, and about the local military politics. These types of data will be detailed later. In each District I stayed around three to six days on my first visit before moving on to the next one. On some occasions I revisited a District for another one or two days for clarifications or additional data collection. Close distances, ranging from half an hour to two hours between District Capitals, 188 made these returns relatively easy. During the one full-year field study I managed to visit thirty six of the thirty eight districts of East Java, 189 collected many useful official documents, interviewed around one hundred and forty respondents and observed directly face-to-face interactions between the military and civilians at the local institutional or society level. This is not to say, however, that there were no obstacles; for example, there were several occasions where suspicions from the respondents did hinder the effectiveness of interviews. 188 My research base was in Malang City, around eighty kilometres from the Provincial Capital, Surabaya (see Map IV.1) 189 Two Districts were not visited, Bondowoso and Jombang, because of limitation of time, so the data about these two Districts was gathered from the mass media, but this does not have a significant effect on the analysis stage of the study as the other thirty six Districts already provide a sufficient data and the evidence gained did not indicate any relevant important peculiarities of these two. 77

110 3.1. The pattern of data collection The patterns of the activities of the data collection varied from day to day, but in most Districts I found it more convenient to start developing the snowball from its local legislative office (Kantor DPRD), then continued to the military unit headquarters or to the government offices, and finished with non-government organizations, activists, or local people. There are several reasons for doing it in this order, which I realised after experiencing the data collection activities for around two months. Firstly, DPRD offices were almost always a more friendly environment and more welcoming than were military units or government offices which had much stricter visit procedures in terms of which sites, which officials, and in what times to visit. So, as well as the friendly environment, the provision of time for the researcher was more flexible. Secondly, DPRD offices offered a variety of good choices to start with collecting data at any point of time during the office hours as there were always some members of the DPRD ready to talk about different types of issues, and issues about military politics or democratization were of great interest to them. Thirdly, there were always many new types of relevant issues emerging from these conversations that were very useful as a guide to the next interviews at the military units, government offices or other further sources Collecting documents at the DPRD In most cases, however, my activities did not start with interviewing the DPRD members. Instead, firstly in the morning I went to visit the Secretary of the DPRD who then directed me to the relevant staff members dealing with Risalah Rapat (DPRD Meeting Archives) where relevant materials for my research could be found. From studying the documents (see the Bibliography) I could list the potential informants from the DPRD. The Secretaries frequently then helped contact them, or they themselves 78

111 became my respondents. Those very helpful DPRD Secretaries understood well my position as a researcher which I had explained beforehand, either through initial corresponding letters, phone calls or in some cases only from my prepared introduction letters brought to them by their receptionists, as well as from my further explanation during the visits. However, I also benefited from my position as an officer of the Indonesian Army which they knew from copies of my official Surat Perintah Pendidikan (Education Assignment Letter), issued by the Minister of Defence and Army Headquarters, included in the collection of introductory and identifying documents that I had put together with introduction letters signed by my university research supervisors. I did feel mostly that they respected me and helped my field work in many ways because of this status, which otherwise they might not have done. There were at least two occasions where the DPRD Secretaries in two Districts were not welcoming initially until they were assured by members of the F- TNI/POLRI (the appointed Army faction) in those DPRD who advised him to ask me for my Army Identity Card, which they checked. In most cases the Secretaries were very helpful, even providing more documents than those I needed for my research, and introducing me to other potential respondents who they thought would be relevant to talk to me about my topic. A wide range of types of data were collected from the DPRD Secretariat Offices (see Bibliography). This included details on the identities of the DPRD members, archived meeting reports of the DPRD (both of its general meetings and those of its specific committees) related to various political issues, such as reports about DPRD meetings with local military commanders, corresponding letters from or to local military commanders, reports about meetings with the Local Government, reports about meetings with local people, reports about Pendapat Fraksi (Official Statements of the DPRD Fractions) about various issues, and including the detailed records about the Elections of District Heads which I explored carefully to look for the role of the military. Reports about the local 79

112 elections were the most complete data that I gathered, ranging from the chronological process 190 to letters from various organizations or persons responding to each stage of this process and the outcomes. Those documents were very useful to interpret what had been really happening during the processes of the elections. There were also many useful documents regarding the current or recent inter-institutional crises, mainly DPRD-Local Government tensions, such as: the cases of impeachments in Surabaya; the DPRD refusals of (Retired Military-led) Local Government s Final Accountability Reports in the Districts of Bangkalan and Pamekasan; accusations of corruption involvements by both institutions such as in the Districts of Sampang, Tuban or Surabaya; or regarding riots over election conflicts in Sampang. There were many of these types of documents that I collected from the relevant DPRD which were very useful in analysing the civil-military relations at the local institutional level. Some bundles of additional documents were even sent to my research base as self-initiatives of the Secretaries of various DPRD because they thought the documents would be useful for my research, such as the cases of the Regencies of Sampang and Pasuruan. In Madiun, the Secretary of the DPRD instructed a staff member by phone from Jakarta (he was on duty leave) to help me search additional documents on my second visit. A bundle of collected clippings about the Surabaya Mayoral Election in 2000 in which several military officers, active or retired, had participated was also given me by the initiative of the Secretariat of that City s DPRD. I found that these additional documents were extremely useful Interviews with DPRD members As mentioned, most respondents to be interviewed at the various DPRD were chosen from important issues which had emerged from the documents collected previously at the Secretariat. In general, the 190 For details of what these involved, particularly during the New Order, see Chapter X, Section 2. 80

113 questions to be asked in the interviews were also similarly based on that preparation. In most interviews, the respondents who were members of the DPRD preferred informal discussions to formal interviews. In this sense, the questions prepared before the interviews were used flexibly, mainly as the starting points to get the interviewees understand why they had been chosen as the informants. Once the interviews had started, the questions developed and the interviewees were let talk freely, even to explore other topics that they saw as more important than those which were introduced at the beginning of the interviews. For example, at one DPRD I chose the Chairman of the F-TNI/POLRI because of his important role in determining the faction s position in the local Regent Election, but during the interview he revealed that he had been the Dandim during 1998 riots. In that case, the topic was developed or shifted to his experiences during the riots; although at certain moments during the conversations I also tried to get him respond to the questions that I had prepared. Some interviews were carried out in groups of members of the factions or members of the same commissions of the DPRD, but most were in private. As people seemed uncomfortable to talk when the conversations were being taped-recorded, I did my best in taking notes, then revised them each evening, and talked to the respondents again if I considered clarifications were needed. With the help of the DPRD Secretaries and members of the F-TNI/POLRI, who were also my respondents, I managed to interview most of the Speakers of the DPRD of East Java s Districts and the Chairmen or members of the F-Golkar, F-DIP and F-KB factions in those DPRD, but I also spent time talking with members of other smaller parties. 191 Those respondents at the DPRD offices were advantageous to my field work, not only because of their previous experiences but also because of their helpfulness in introducing me to other respondents outside their DPRD. Most of the Secretaries of DPRD that I met had previously served as a Camat (Head of Sub-district Government), for instance, and were very 191 List of respondents is provided in Appendix 1, but presented in codes to protect their identities. The coding system is explained later in this chapter. 81

114 open to talk about their experiences of being a Camat during the New Order era, and their previous relations with Sub-district military units (Koramil). Among other ways, it was through them and from previous information they gave that I had opportunities to talk with several Camat and also Village Heads in their Districts. Many F-TNI/POLRI members had served as local military commanders or staff officers of Koter in different areas, or as Heads of Kansospol or members of Wamsospolda or Wansospolrem 192 before serving as parliamentary military representatives. Therefore, as noted, the interview topics were not limited to DPRD matters but usually broadened to other matters outside the DPRD but relevant to local military politics, including about the internal matters of the local military, the previous roles of those Sospol bodies, or their own personal roles on them. Some of the information they gave, and their personal contacts with local government officials, also helped me to get to the respondents in local government offices. Many of them were also very kind to introduce me by phone to the local military commanders or officers, as well as to retired military officers who they knew would be relevant informants for my topic, and to ask them to be interviewees. On some occasions the members of F-TNI/POLRI also gave me useful documents, such as the F-TNI/POLRI s periodical reports to the military Headquarters in the Province or in Jakarta, or corresponding letters with military units within the District, for example, proposal letters for security fund assistance that were useful to analyse how their relations with military units changed or continued over the first five years of post-soeharto Indonesia. Again, mostly they became very helpful after they knew that I was an Army officer doing the study instructed by the Central Military Headquarters. They understood this from the introduction letters and from the ongoing conversations, although I always tried my best to explain my status as a student, not as an Army officer. Probably as seen as an 192 See descriptions of Koter, Kansospol, Wansospolda and Wansospolrem in Chapter Three. 82

115 insider, in some offices of the F-TNI/POLRI I was treated in a very friendly manner (sometimes too friendly), like a family member, served lunch and snacks while having conversations in their offices about the Indonesian military. While doing this, on many occasions staff members of the local DPRD Secretariat helped search for and copy documents I needed as they were asked by the Chairman of the F-TNI/POLRI to do so. Because of the informal, loosely-planned nature of the interviews, some interviews could last hours. For example, in Gresik, I stayed in the office of the F- TNI/POLRI and talked with the faction s Chairman for about a half day, from the morning to mid-day. In such a long time of interview I could ask about and gain a wide range of information, from personal experiences of the respondent, such as being a former personnel staff in the KODAM and now serving as the Chairman of the military representation in the District s DPRD, and explore the respondent s feelings about the changes which had occurred and were continuing to occur to military politics, as well as how he portrayed other officers feelings and behaviours as affected by the changes. Similarly, respondents from the non-military fractions were very helpful and useful sources of data. In Bojonegoro District, for example, a member of the F-DIP, who was also the Speaker of the DPRD, provided almost one full working day of his time for talking with me. The interview stopped when he asked me to accompany him for lunch in a restaurant in the city, but after that we came back to the office again to continue the discussion. When I asked him why he treated me in such a friendly way, he said that it was because he was amazed by my willingness to try hard to study, unlike other officers he knew who favoured seeking for jobs instead; besides, he said, he was also interested in my topic and discussing it with me. He told me, I hope more and more military officers like to understand democracy, as you do. 83

116 He talked about a wide variety of issues in military and local politics, ranging from his experience as a PDI 193 activist during the New Order in the early 1990s, such as being chased by military intelligence agents because of his involvement in some demonstrations at one end; to his broad knowledge and experiences from being the Speaker of the DPRD since the post-soeharto era and how he explained his relations with the military since then. This kind of personal view and experience was very important to understand the position of the PDIP in relation to the military as well to the broader democratic politics from its members perspective. Not only did I obtain lots of information from what he mentioned, but I also had the opportunity to observe, for example, some ways of how he interacted with his constituents when two of them met him and asked him for money because of having helped him in organizing some demonstrators against his opponents within his Party of the District. 194 Interviews with other F-DIP members of other Districts differed, but these respondents were more or less just as helpful and open in giving information as in Bojonegoro. As in the case of F-TNI/POLRI members, those respondents from the F-DIP also gave me the ways to get to PDIP 195 respondents outside the DPRD, such as the Party s officials and constituents in the District. Also, respondents from F-Golkar, F-KB 196 or other fractions were just as enthusiastic as those mentioned above in helping to provide useful data. Unlike most F-DIP respondents who liked to recall past disharmonious relations with the military, most F-Golkar respondents tended to romanticize a past Golkar-military honeymoon. For instance, one Golkar respondent in Batu City, who has been a member of the DPRD from Golkar for twenty years, gave much information not only about Golkar in 193 The Indonesian Democratic Party was the predecessor of the PDIP, the Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle, which was set up to replace it after the machinations leading to the expulsion of the PDI s leader Megawati Sukarnoputri and the violent take-over of its central administration Jakarta offices organized by the New Order in The PDI then virtually disappeared as a mass political party. 194 This PDIP internal conflict is discussed in Chapter Eleven. 195 The F-DIP (Fraksi - ) is the faction of members of a DPRD belonging to the PDIP (Partai ). 196 Fraksi-Kebangkitan Bangsa, the parliamentary representation of the PKB, Partai Kebangkitan Bangsa, People s Awakening Party. The PKB, set up post-1998, is based in the mass Islamic movement, Nahdatul Islam, and is particularly strong in East Java. (See later chapters for more information). 84

117 the past and now, but also about the military as he used to work closely with military officers. Based on his experience, he could give comparisons between, for example, how different was the position of Golkar now against other fractions without military supports compared to the past with its military back-ups. Unlike F-DIP members, most of the respondents of F-Golkar I interviewed were long-service legislators, so they had many years of information about the military. In the case of F-KB respondents, the usefulness of their information, like that of the F-DIP representatives, was because of their different perspective about the local military and local democracy, that I discuss more fully elsewhere in this thesis. For an example, because of disappointment with the result of the Tuban Regent Election in 2001, where the F-Golkar had affiliated with the F-TNI/POLRI and some dissident F-DIP members and thereby won the election, one respondent from the F-KB in the Tuban DPRD revealed various corrupt features of the local politics dominated by such an affiliation. So, there was much important information, including about local military politics, that could be gained from the interviews with DPRD members from the various factions. On one hand, different versions of descriptions about the same issue emerged from them; on the other hand, they also raised different issues about local military politics that concerned them most. This provided valuable data that sometimes could be put to local members of the military, as explained below Collecting data from military units As noted earlier, collecting data from military units were not as easy as in the DPRD, even though it was being done by an Army officer like me. For researchers who have had experience in trying to collect data from military units, this is not new. Most official documents in the military are classified as secret, so could not be revealed to the public. To interview a District Commander or lower ranks would-be researchers have to get written permissions from the superiors, and this process could take months before the interviews take place. When the interviews do occur, the 85

118 person being interviewed does not answer much, apart from stating a formal institutional statement that could be found more easily in public media. So, if a researcher is to follow formal procedure, he or she could end up wasting time in waiting for information that may or may not be useful enough in the end. In my research I did not use formal procedures, simply because I knew that they would not work. Instead, I went to visit the respondents 197 as a friend at the same rank, a junior officer or a senior officer, just like common visits among officers in the military. Yet, I always managed to explain to them at some early stage of the conversation that certain information would be used for my thesis, and assured them that their information would not harm them, their units, or the military in general. They did not mind that I would use their information. Again, my position as an insider was advantageous. Firstly, I knew very well which data, according to the Indonesian military, are allowed or not allowed to be made available to the public, and I knew where to find those allowable data without having to follow long procedures. Secondly, with my twelveyear service in an Army Battalion as Platoon Commander, Company Commander, and Staff Officer of the Battalion, I am familiar with most problems faced by military units, so the ways of asking questions were much more as sharing experiences than asking new information. This made my military respondents more comfortable to talk more openly. For example, when I asked someone about what the situation was like during the 1998/1999 riots around his units, where he was and what he was doing, how he felt, and what happened to other personnel he knew, he already knew that I shared some of his experiences and feelings. So, when he answered he would not just give formal institutional statements or the like. Similar situations applied for questions about the standards of military professionalism of the soldiers, or their common behaviours, for 197 Mostly, these military personnel had jobs that were important to military politics, such as the Commanders of Staff of the Koter, as well as some sergeants and privates in positions of Babinsa. Explanations about these positions were given in Chapter Three. 86

119 example. However, one of the most important things I found being an insider at the same time as researcher was that the respondents were confident enough to express their feelings because they knew that their expressions would make sense to me. For example, when I asked about their reactions about the demands from some elements of society to abolish Koter, or about the accusations of involvements of military elements in some communal conflicts or in crimes, they responded openly and fairly, arguing or confirming, as I discuss elsewhere in this thesis. As noted, the data about the military were not only collected from the local military units, but also, because of its focus on military politics, mostly from the members of the F-TNI/POLRI of each District, and from former military officers who had no military procedures to limit their speaking. Additional information about the military was also gathered from civilians who knew information about the military because of their work or life activities involved having close contacts with the military, for example, government officials (especially former staff members of Kansospol at District Government offices), local police, politicians (especially Golkar members who used to work closely with the military during the New Order), nongovernment organizations activists, journalists or scholars in relevant areas. So, although within the military units collecting data was more difficult, useful data about military politics was also available outside the units. 87

120 3.5. Collecting data at the local government offices Although not as strict as in military units, collecting data from the bureaucratic officials in the Local Government offices (Pemda) was also more difficult than from the members and staff of the DPRD. Some respondents were contacted initially by letter or phone on the basis of their connections to certain issues found and studied from the information already gathered at the DPRD. Many of them were referred by DPRD respondents. There were also several officials who were available to be the respondents without prior arrangements. The respondents from the many Pemda include their Heads (Mayors or Regents) of the Pemda, Secretaries of Pemda, Heads or staff of Bakesbang (former Kansospol) 198, and Sub-district Heads (Camat), or Village Heads. However, because of limited time and resources, as well as the degree of relevance of the data, although at the District level I visited all DPRD offices, only around a half of all 38 District Local Government bureaucracies were visited and interviews carried out. At the two lowest levels of government administration only several selected local Camat and Village Heads were interviewed, all in the Regencies of Malang (my research base), Pasuruan, Blitar and Jember. Nevertheless, as in the case of the military, the data about the local government political affairs, especially their military connections, was also collected from the DPRD respondents and other sources, rather than relying solely on the government officials themselves. However, I did collect some specific information that was only available at the various Pemda, for example, about security assistance funds that they gave to the local military, the reactions from bureaucrats about changing working environments, such as from military style to new civilian styles of leaderships, or about new relations between the local government and local military units in the post-new Order era. 198 The Bakesbang and Kansospol are discussed in Chapter Six, the latter also in Chapter Three. 88

121 3.6. Other sources of data Apart from those mentioned above, there are also two other types of data sources that this study used. One was local media publications, such as East Java s major newspaper Jawa Pos, that has branches in several Districts with each branch publishing local content. These media were used to complement information gathered from official documents and interviews, as well as to understand how certain issues, like local elections, were reported. Another was interviews and discussions with local NGO activists and journalists. Many of my contacts with these groups were made during a three-week Autonomy Awards assessment around March 2003 in various Districts initiated by the Jawapos, for which I was asked to join the assessment team. There were also many of them who were easy to find at or through the DPRD or Pemda offices and ready to discuss issues related to the topic of my research. The data from them and their perspectives were used for comparison against the data collected from official documents and other interviews, so that a more balanced range of views could be collected and assessed Observation During my trips to different districts of East Java I also tried to observe as much as I could of face-to-face interactions between the military and civilians in different settings, including formal governmental meetings and informal grassroots level activities. Several times I attended DPRD meetings (when open to the public) where various local leaders, including local military commanders and members of the F-TNI/POLRI, also participated in the meetings. I observed carefully attitudes of both civilian and military sides, for example, if there were indications or expressions of any sense of equality, dominance, superiority, subordinacy or solidarity within a group, or conflicting attitudes which may be influential behind the scenes but may not be found in the formal interviews or documents, and tried to understand what this meant to the degree of military political 89

122 influence and to the balance of power between military and civilian as reflected at these micro-levels of interaction. On some occasions, the observations were accidental in nature. For example, once when I was interviewing the Secretary of the Sampang DPRD, two sergeants who identified themselves as personnel of the Sub- Denpom (Military Police Sub-Detachment) of Sampang came into the Secretary s office after having refused to wait in the queue in the receptionist office although they knew that the Secretary had a guest (me). Once in the office they asked for donations for the anniversary celebration of their unit. What this meant I interpret in Chapter Ten; however, it was valuable information from a non-planned observation. In another example, while I was staying in a hotel during my research visit to Ponorogo Regency in July 2003, I witnessed a local military sergeant who claimed himself to be an intelligence agent checking the list of the hotel s guests. When I asked about this I was told by the staff of the hotel that he came to do this almost every night. I then talked to the hotel owner who revealed some more information. These kinds of observations were very useful in understanding the complex ways of the local civil-military social interactions. 4. Issues of confidentiality Military politics is a very sensitive issue in Indonesia. Since the collapse of the New Order civil-military relations have been dominated mainly by suspicion about the political intentions of either side. With the help of a new unlimited nature of the media, each side is inclined to exploit political issues into serious accusations in favour of one side, but for disfavour of the other. Therefore, this research has tried to make maximum efforts to protect both the sources and the actors involved in the data being presented. In most of the references, the interview respondents were coded with characters and numbers. All military/police respondents are coded with M (e.g. Interview M1, M2, M3); respondents who were 90

123 government bureaucrats with B (e.g. Interview B4, B5, B6); respondents from the PDIP party or a F-DIP fraction (of local parliament/dprd) with D (e.g. Interview D7, D8, D9); respondents from the PKB party or a F-KB fraction with K (e.g. Interview K10, K11, K12); respondents from the PAN party or a F-AN fraction with A (e.g. Interview A13, A14, A15); respondents from Golkar party or a F-Golkar (or, previously, F-KP) fraction with G (e.g. Interview G16, G17, G18); respondents from the PPP party or a F-PP fraction with P (e.g. Interview P19, P20, P21); respondents from a NGO with N (e.g. Interview N19, N20, N21); respondents who were Village Heads with V (e.g. Interview V13, V14, V15); respondents from villagers or ordinary people with pseudonym names. 199 In addition, many of the actors and the Districts were given false names, except when the actors names had been already revealed by public media, or when the respondents or actors wanted their names to be revealed. Coding the names of the Districts is important because in many cases, the coded actors and respondents names would be easy to identify through their reported positions in a named District. For example, if a respondent or actor is the Chairman of F-TNI/POLRI, which position would be important to be mentioned, his real name could be simply traced by knowing the District. However, a careful selection of what should be coded or renamed, and in what ways has also been made to ensure that data presented is understandable and has not lost its essential substance. As a serving army officer with professional obligations to the Indonesian military institution and to my senior officers, I am fully aware of possible implications for the issue of continuing confidentiality, therefore, all respondents and actors appear in the thesis, and all notes and any other potentially confidential material that have been collected have been, and will be, continually treated as confidential, not available to any party without my prior written consent. 199 More information about the composition of the interviewees is provided in Appendix 3. 91

124 Chapter Five REFORMASI AND IMPACTS ON MILITARY-SOCIETY RELATIONS The two central desiderata protection by the military and protection from the military are in tension because efforts to assure the one complicate efforts to assure the other Introduction As noted in Chapter Three, although the primary source of military political power comes from its coercive capability, to sustain the power the military needs a sufficient level of public acceptance or legitimacy without which disengagement becomes inevitable. 201 William Liddle suggested that the legitimacy that sustained the long-standing stability of the New Order regime was of three types: economic performance ; popular bureaucrats ; and coercive legitimacy. 202 Despite some resistances and frictions that eventually surfaced into uncontainable movements around the collapse of the regime in May 1998, to a large extent it had been successful in maintaining its Law and Order, imposing an obedience of the people towards the regime. This chapter examines the situation in East Java around after which a broad scale of military withdrawal from politics took place which showed how this legitimacy quickly diminished. It shows how the worsening of the state s economic conditions had eroded its performance legitimacy, and further quickly set up the state s power elements (bureaucrats, Golkar and the military) as the reformist groups common enemy. They, especially the military, were widely and openly criticized and demoralized, and unlike in the New Order, the public effectively prevented the military from using its coercive capability, even when law and order 200 Feaver, Peter D., Civil-Military Relations1, Annual Review of Political Science, June 1999, Vol. 2, pp See Chapter Three., sub-section See Chapter Three, footnote

125 appeared about to collapse. This situation as a demoralizing force represented the grassroots drives for a military reform agenda. Based on that examination, this chapter argues that events around the fall of Suharto and during the immediately subsequent years in East Java demonstrated that the military society relations entered a period where the public acceptance and tolerance of the military had seriously deteriorated. This made it possible for an emergence of a new pattern in these relations where the military position was significantly declining, and could no longer maintain its long-standing control over the community, either in security or political terms. The following section has four sub-sections that present four important cases illustrating the loss of legitimacy of the New Order and a sudden collapse of law and order. What all these four cases meant to the societymilitary relations is then discussed in the second section that links them to the ways they demoralized the military, and the ways they were also worsened by this de-legitimization. There is then third section which presents a case that exemplifies the emergence of grassroots-based democracy, and this is followed by a final, summarizing, section. 2. The New Order s Vanished Legitimacy 2.1. Economic collapse, demonstrations, attacks on the Chinese community An article in the July 22, 1998 issue of the Washington Post reported that Indonesia is near chaos. The rapidly deteriorating financial situation, with the currency having plunged to more than 13,000 rupiah 203 to the US dollar compared to 9,500 when President Suharto was replaced by B.J. Habibie two months earlier, made the situation worse. Some 20 million Indonesians became unemployed in 1998, inflation reached 100 percent, and by the end of the year at least half the population sank below the 203 It had fallen as far as 16,600 to the US dollar by June 16. See the exchange rates of Rupiah from July 1997 to June 1998 in Rupiah Makin Terpuruk, Kompas 16 June

126 poverty line. The fall of the rupiah's value against foreign currencies had driven up the prices of such basic foods as rice and cooking oil which were imported, and eroded purchasing power. The article described a food problem that was caused by sky-high prices of basic goods, with the disruption of the country's food distribution system which had broken down in some places entirely because of an exodus of the Chinese merchants. Rice mills were attacked, shrimp ponds were looted and golf courses were occupied to plant crops in the rough by angry, increasingly hungry, and no longer in fear of the authorities, people across the country. 204 The above report was certainly true for East Java. 205 The student demonstrations decreased significantly for a few days after President Suharto resigned, despite some smaller scale demonstrations that accused Habibie of replacing Soeharto as a continuation of the previous regime and demanded its abolition. 206 Entering June, however, the strike actions again increased, but the protests were now largely directed at local targets, yet the driving forces behind the demonstrations were similar; the economic suffering and resistance to the existing authority. 207 For example, on 5 June 1998 around ten thousand workers held a strike in Surabaya demanding an increase in wages because their current wages was too small to meet the sky-rocketing prices of daily needs. 208 On June 15 in Tuban Regency a mass of thousands organized by the Rengel People Demands (Rakyat Rengel Menggugat) held a demonstration demanding the accountability of the Sub-district Head (Camat), Moch Nur Rahman, who, in their words, had deprived people (merugikan rakyat). The angry mobs ransacked his office. 209 According to one of my military 204 See also Ratusan Petani Tanami Lapangan Golf Cimacan, Kompas 15 June For a similar report about other parts of Indonesia see for example, Chapter V: Pembangkangan, Kerusuahan dan Kekerasan, in Eko, Ibid. pp The biggest demonstration in Surabaya occurred on May 1998, when around 50,000 protestors, students from various universities of Surabaya gathered in STIESA campus, Surabaya, and others of tens of thousands in other cities of East Java, such as Malang, Pasuruan, Ponorogo, Jember, Madiun, Mojokerto, Pasuruan, Gresik, and Sidoardjo. After May 20, no demonstration achieved these numbers. See the collective work in Aksi Mahasiswa: Reformasi Total (Jakarta: Yayasan Mentari Nusantara, 1998). See also Zon, Fadli., Politik Huru-hara Mei 1998, (Jakarta: Institute for Policy Studies, 2004) especially Appendix: Rekapitulasi Gerakan Mahasiswa 23 Februari 1 Mei 1999, pp ; and Fadhly, Fahruz Zaman (ed.), Mahasiswa Menggugat (Bandung: Pustaka Hidayah, 1999). 207 See for example, Reformasi di Daerah Mengarah Isu Lokal, Kompas 1 June See Buruh Maspion Mogok, Kompas 6 June Jawapos, 16 June

127 respondents from the local Military Sub-district Command (KORAMIL) HQ, which was next to the Camat s office, they could not do anything to prevent the riots as their numbers was too big, and the mobs even threatened to attack the Headquarter, but left after the soldiers threatened to shoot them. 210 The next day several groups of youth organizations and religious leaders held a demonstration in front of the local Assembly and Local Government offices in Situbondo, another town in East Java. They demanded the resignation of several officials, including the Regent, Colonel (Ret) Sudaryanto who was accused of involvement in fifty cases of corruption, collusion, and nepotism (KKN) practices. 211 Similar large demonstrations were held during the week of June 14 to 20 by workers from Surabaya s main port, Tanjung Perak, some of them marching to the City Parliament demanding higher pay. 212 By the end of June the angry mobs began attacks on shops and homes owned by ethnic Chinese. In the provincial capital Surabaya, fears of violence had made many ethnic Chinese flee, leaving from the local airport with some reportedly flying to Hong Kong and others to Singapore. There was no exact number of the Chinese who left from Surabaya, but a respondent who was at that time working in the Immigration Office proposed a number of 5000 to 7000 during the month from the 30,000 Chinese in Surabaya city. 213 Those who could not flee for their lives after looting in the East Java started arming themselves with machine guns for protection. 214 In the district of Jember, especially in the Sub-districts of Mumbulsari, Silo and Kencong, about 150 km southeast of Surabaya, the mobs did not attack only the Chinese, but also shops and houses that were accused of protecting the Chinese Interview M Interviews M48 and M See Straits Times, June 19, See also Pelabuhan Tanjung Perak Lumpuh: 7000 Karyawan Texmaco Unjuk Rasa (Tanjung Perak Port Collapse: 7000 Texmaco Staff Strike), Kompas 18 June Interview on 18 June 2003 with Hadi Sumarno, an Immigrant officer of Surabaya. See also Budaya Arek Kurangi Konflik Antar Etnis (Arek Culture Reduces Ethnic Conflicts), Kompas 19 June 1998, Jawapos, June 15, See Washington Post - July 22, Interview B47. 95

128 This issue is important to understand because the Chinese community best represented one of the beneficiary groups in the New Order economic development system. Since they have been a vulnerable target in many social riots, they usually used security protections provided by military members. In 1973, they were attacked by the mobs in Bandung riots, in 1983 in the Jakarta Tanjung Priok riots, and in the May 1998 riots of Jakarta. 216 According to some of my Chinese respondents in Malang, in the New Order era they had usually maintained good relations with two or more military personnel. 217 As one respondent said, We only need to pick up the phone when there was a security obstruction, and they would come. If the obstruction came from oknum (rough) military men or policemen we sometimes only needed to mention some military commanders names that we know, then the problem was gone. 218 This kind of protection disappeared in While in the cities the public anger was expressed through the mob attacks on the Chinese, out of the cities there were reclaimings on land and forests by the villagers Land reclaiming by villagers According to Dianto Bachriadi, East Java has had a quite high record on the land conflicts, from almost two thousand land conflict cases, covering more than ten million hectares throughout Indonesia, almost two hundred cases were in the East Java Province which made it the third biggest after West and Central Java. 219 Land reclaiming means that the villagers reoccupied and used the land without the consent of the owners and sometimes the action was followed by a demonstration, demanding the issuing of certificates in their names of these reclaimed lands. On July 29, for example, around three thousand people of Lidah Kulon Village, 216 See for example, Kingsbury, Damien., The Politics of Indonesia (New York: Oxford University Press, 2003), pp. 9-10, 90, 188, 235; Emerson, Donald K., Indonesia Beyond Suharto: Polity, Economy, Society, Transition. (New York: An East Gate Book, 1999), especially chapter 6, Economy. 217 Interviews C116, C121, C The respondent was owner of a real estate company in Malang. Interview C In 2001 KPA Resource Centers recorded a total figure of 1920 cases; in 2004 it decreased to 1753 cases. In East Java the figure decreased from 172 cases in 2001 to 169 in This made it the third biggest after West Java s 484 cases and DKI Jakarta s 175 cases. The 2001 figures were presented in Bachriadi, Dianto., Konflik Agraria di Indonesia sejak Massa Orde Baru, a paper presented at the KPA Seminar in Bandung August For the 2004 figures, see Pikiran Rakyat, 11 April

129 Surabaya, held demonstrations in front of the Local Attorney-General s Office, demanding recognition of ownership of a golf course that they had just re-planted with crops. 220 Most of the cases involved government institutions or government-backed private companies on one side against the ordinary people, villagers, on another. 221 What important for the purpose of this study is about seeing how restrained the military dealt with the villagers involved in the conflicts in post At least twenty-three cases covering over 15,000 hectares in East Java were between the military and the villagers. 222 Until 1998, unresolved conflicts were calmed by using the government s coercive means, but resentments had developed subtly and covertly. 223 After June 1998, the villagers found the reformasi momentums to reclaim those lands, occupied and planted them with rice paddies, logging the forest trees for their own needs without being in fear of the dangers as they would have had in the past. 224 The involvements of the military in land conflicts were categorized into three types: as the direct owner of the lands; the associate owner of state/private companies owning the lands; or as third parties helping resolve the conflicts. 225 One of the biggest cases in the first category was in the Purbaya area covering the three Sub-districts of Pagak, Bantur and Gedangan in the Southern Malang Regency. 226 Other big cases were in Raci, Pasuruan Regency, over two thousands hectares between TNI-AU (Air Force Units) and the villagers, and in Grati, Pasuruan Regency, over eight thousands hectares between TNI-AL (Naval Units) and the villagers. 220 Jawapos 30 July Bachriadi, Ibid. 222 For a more detailed list of land conflicts, see also the data base of the Departemen Kehutanan/ Forest Department at: See Chapter Three. 224 According to Herlambang Perdana, the Chief of the Farmers Division of LBH (Lembaga Bantuan Hukum, Legal Advocate Association) Surabaya, from 1998 to 2002 there had been 52 new reclaiming cases by villagers among 1000 cases for Indonesia as a whole. See Kompas, 19 November This categorization was based on the data of the DPRD (Local Parliament) of Malang Regency. Apart from the three categories, there were also disputes between the military institutions and their ex-military families, but these cases were smaller in number. One example of them was between the Army s KODAM V Brawijaya over land on Rajawali Street No. 57 Krembangan and retired military families. Surya, Table of Description of Land Conflicts in Malang Regency (Inventarisasi Permasalahan Tanah di Kabupaten Malang), as Appendix C-1 of the 2002 s End-of-Year Program Accountability Report of the Bupati of Malang. 97

130 In June 1998 for example the villagers occupied and planted the lands of 4811 hectares which used to be part of the Marine s Puslatpur (Marines Fighting Training Centre) in Bantur area. They not only planted the land, but also built tents and houses there, and refused to move to anywhere else with compensations offered by the military. We would rather die here if they [the military] force us to move. By 2004 this case had still not been resolved; it even returned to zero as both sides moved backwards to their original positions and cancelled some compromises made in the previous two years. 227 In another case in Singosari, Malang Regency, there was a land dispute between Dengkol villagers and the Lanud Abdurrahman Saleh Air Force base over three hundred hectares, a part of the Air Force base area. 228 A similar case was between farmers of Harjokuncaran village, Malang Regency and the Army s Puskopad (Pusat Koperasi Angkatan Darat/ Local Army s Business Centre) of KODAM V Brawijaya over the 666 hectare Tlogorejo Plantation. According to Colonel H Jasmin Seno, the Head of the Puskopad, it belonged to the Army, while according to Muhammad Yasin, the villagers representative, among those who had built houses and planted the land with food crops, the land had been distributed to their parents by the Japanese occupation troops in the 1940s. Having occupied the land, on May , the villagers demonstrated in front of the DPRD, demanding the return of the land to them. 229 In the second category, the military was usually involved in the State Plantation Companies, PTPN. In some cases the military was also 227 See Kompas 31/8/2004, or Surya, 10/9/2004. The quoted phrase was re-stated by a respondent who was a local government official dealing with the case. Interview B The Air Force claimed the land based on a document letter of the Air Force Chief of Staff (SK No. 023/P/KSAP/50, dated 25 May 1950 and Surat Keputusan/Decision Letter (SK) of East Java BPN No. 132/530.3/35/1990 that gave right to Lanud Abd Saleh to use the land. The villagers, on the other hand, claimed that their families had owned the land based on a document issued in Up to 2004, since the villagers re-claimed the land in 1998, there has been no solution agreeable to both sides. See Tanah Lanud Disoal: Pemkab Tak Mau Cawe-Cawe, Radar Malang, 27 Sept The Army s claim was based on the Letter of Menteri Pertanian/Agriculture Minister (SK No. 263/Kpts/UM/6/1973, dated 2 June 1973, stating that the Army bought the land for Rp. 66,875,000. This is said in the Table of Description of Land Conflicts in Malang Regency (Inventarisasi Permasalahan Tanah di Kabupaten Malang), as Appendix C-1 of the 2002 s End-of-Year Program Accountability Report of the Bupati of Malang. See also Warga Desa Harjokuncaran Minta Kejelasan soal Tanah, Kompas, 25 October 2001; Tempo Interaktif, 23 February 2001; Kompas, 7 February

131 involved as a partner in a joint venture, or simply as the authority that would legally approve the land contracts. 230 In most cases, however, the military acted as the protectors of the state s property. One of the biggest cases was in Kalibakar, Southern Malang Regency. On 24 August 1998, thousands of farmers of five villages living around a two thousand hectare cocoa plantation cut down hundreds of thousands of cocoa bushes, then occupied the land. The villagers reclaim was based on the 1941 leasing between the villagers and the Dutch investor who had planted coffee. After the 1957 nationalization of all Dutch companies, it was run by PTPN XII, the Twelfth State Plantation Company, which in 1965 had planted cocoa. 231 Since 1970 the villagers had wanted their lands back, but never succeeded because of the government s effective oppressive actions. One example in the third category was the Karangpilang case where the military was a third party trying to mediate the conflict. The Sub-district Military Command (KORAMIL) 0832/06, Karangpilang, Surabaya City, was built near Babatan Village on land whose ownership was in dispute between the village and a real estate company, PT Bhakti Tamara. According to the Commander of the KORAMIL, Captain Sudadyo, in 1995 there was a deal with the Village Head, Buntoroyono to sell the fourteen hectares land to the company. The deal was formalized in the letter of the Village Head No. 5/1995, dated 7 February However, before the deal was approved by the Surabaya City Mayor, Buntoroyono resigned and was replaced by Drs. Nanang Widodo because the village people disagreed with the selling. Yet, Nanang secretly continued the deal after the company offered that it would provide buildings for the Village Head s office, a health clinic for the village people and for the KORAMIL office. 232 Nanang had revealed that he continued the deal because there was 230 As the Chairman of Bakorstanasda, the Pangdam V, for example, received a proposal for a "Pola Kemitraan (Joint Venture) between the Local Government of Jember, PTP XXVII, and the farmers of Jenggawah (Jember)". The proposal was presented by KH Imam Masyhuri and H Cholid in Kodam V/Brawijaya, on Friday, The agreement was witnessed by KH Luthfi, Kodim Commander 0824 Ltc. Djasmin Senos, the Head of the Social Political Office of Jember, Ltc. Giyono Sutomo, and 15 Jenggawah farmers. Jawapos, 15 January Sukardi, Land For People Inside Indonesia, January-March 2002, accessed on 19 October 2004 from the internet, Website: Kompas, 6 Oct

132 security protection from the KORAMIL, because it needed the office. The people kept disagreeing with the deal, but because the KORAMIL was backing up the arrangement, they did not protest it openly. 233 After the fall of Suharto in May 1998, the people of Babatan brought up the case again, demanding the return of the land to the villagers. The situation became tense on 4 October 2001 when five employees from the company working on the land were attacked by thousands of the Babatan villagers. The employees escaped to the KORAMIL HQ, but the angry mobs came there and demanded the five employees be given up to them. Having burned the trucks parked in front of the office, they threatened to burn down the KORAMIL. The villagers only left after the mobs forced all parties to cancel the deal. 234 So, in all three categories, the local military could no longer solve the land conflicts based on the military preference as they could do in the New Order era. During the New Order most cases had been resolved through the deliberative mechanism of the Bakorstanasda (Badan Koordinasi Strategy Ketahanan Daerah/Coordinating Body of Strategy for Regional Resilience) headed by the Pangdam (Military Area Commander in Chief). 235 A former member (from ) of Bakorstanasda said that after 1998 this body was totally ineffective until it was finally abolished in 2000 by President Abdurrahman Wahid. 236 Military territorial units from the lowest level of the Sub-district level KORAMIL to the highest (Provincial) level KODAM, which in the New Order era had been powerful in settling the land conflicts, now could not even solve their own land disputes against the villagers. Repressive solutions were no longer effective as they 233 Nanang disclosed the information to one of my respondents who had been helping to try to find a solution to the conflict. Interview M The five employees were Untung, Wanto and Surpri, Ragil and Parjri. They were also accompanied by two policemen, Chief Brigadier Police (Bripka) Mat Kasan and Second Brigadier Police (Briptu) Subaeri. See Kompas, 6 Oct As described previously, the Bakorstanasda comprised all local leaders: government bureaucracy, military, police and judiciary. See Chapter Three, Relation with the society. 236 Interview M11. In the case of Harjokuncaran villagers against the Army s Puskopad, on , East Java Bakorstanasda initiated a meeting for the conflicting parties, and claimed that the conflict was solved (as written in the Table of Description of Land Conflicts in Malang Regency, as Appendix C-1 of the 2002 s End-of-Year Program Accountability Report of the Bupati of Malang), but as seen in the footnote 80, up to 2003, the conflict was still there. 100

133 had been in the past. A local government official said that the military could not do much except hold up and prolong the settlement process when the legal settlement would seem to be disadvantageous to the military. 237 The villagers, in contrast, were more convinced that the whole society and the political system would stand with them in the settlement of land conflicts. They realized that the people would no longer tolerate and accept any military intention to use its force in resolving the conflicts. This increased the courage (keberanian) of the people to act against the military oppression. Don t ever try now to oppress the people (menindas rakyat) like in the past, if you don t want trouble (kalau ndak mau susah). 238 On the other hand, there was a common thought among the military officers that it was not the right time to take tough stances against the people under the current unstable social and political circumstances. 239 In fact, the Bakorstanasda did not take any significant steps, but left the military units to negotiate on their own. The latter were more concerned about the security of their own base than the unused land (lahan tidur) that was occupied by the villagers living around the base. Our base is surrounded by dozens of villages without good fences; as far as they do not directly threaten the base, we need to avoid provocative actions that might make the situation worse. 240 Despite this, however, there was also a thought that the conflict was only temporary as the result of democratic and reform euphoria (reformasi kebablasan) and that, in the end, the law would decide that they [the villagers] would have to go Local communal conflicts: the dukun santet and ninja murders By the end of July 1998 villagers had turned into judge, jury and executioner; the most shocking tragedies, the killings of accused sorcerers (Dukun Santét/Black 237 Interview B Interview V The respondent was an officer of the Abd Saleh Air Force Base, but at the time of interview was a military representative in an East Java District Parliament. Interview M Interviews M83, M32, M Interview M

134 Magic Practitioners) had begun to take place. The killings started in rural villages of Bayuwangi, the most eastern Regency of East Java, but spread out in the following weeks to the neighboring Regencies such as Jember, Pasuruan, Sumenep and Malang. By the end of October 1998 the number of victims had reached 143 in Banyuwangi alone and 105 in the neighboring regions. Various versions and theories about the murders had offered confusing and conflicting answers, including the theories of conspiracy against the NU, ex-pkis revenge, pure crimes or culturally motivated communal crimes. 242 This study was not designed to answer who were behind the killings and why, as those theories had attempted to do. Rather, its specific aim was to search for the significant meaning of this tragedy in terms of the military community relations. Highlighting the arguments made about the previous two issues, the attacks on the Chinese and the land reclaims, it re-stresses that the murders demonstrated the declining of the military s control over the society during the same period. The following facts indicate this. Firstly, the military had made no comment or explanation about the murders; neither had it taken any significant step to stop them in the beginning of their emergence in June The first public comment was given by the Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces, General Wiranto, on 18 Oct August 1998 during his visit to Banyuwangi, when he stated that it was not impossible that the murders were "a result of conflict in the political elite". 243 In contrast to this was the statement from the National Police Chief Lt. Gen. Rusmanhadi that the offenders must be Communists or their descendants. Similarly, the East Java Provincial Police Chief said that the Dukun Santét cases were pure crimes motorized by ex-pki families who were determined to commit revenge. None of these statements could be proved true, however. Wiranto s statement was made one day after Abdurrahman Wahid (Gusdur) gave a comment which later became the widest publicly-believed theory, that of a conspiracy against the Islamic NU. Wiranto s statement appeared to be a reaction 242 See for example, Pembunuhan Berantai di Bumi Osing, Tempo, 19 October 1998; Mohammad, Kartono, Dari Daha Sampai ke Banyuwangi, Tempo, 26 October 1998; Dukun Santét Dibasmi, Ninja Diganyang, Lalu Apa Lagi? Tempo, 2 Novemebr In English see for example Brown, Jason, The Banyuwangi Murders, Inside Indonesia, No. 62, April June 2000, or Liebhold, David, That New Black Magic, Time Asia, Vol No. 15, 19 October 1998; For a more detailed list of the victims, see for example ELSAM Human Right Reports on ELSAM s website: Pembunuhan Berantai di Bumi Osing, Tempo, 19 October

135 to Gusdur s accusation that Army elements were involved in the conspiracy. 244 In the New Order era, the military, as the state s security authority, would have been the first element that issued clarifications to the public and taken appropriate steps from the beginning to steer the public opinion. So, more of the general public believed in the Gusdur allegation, regardless of the reliability of this theory, than what the military and police stated. It was clear that the government and the army could no longer dominate what the people had to believe, as it would have in the past. The newly born free press, which significantly contributed to the overthrow of the New Order regime 245, helped keep this hypothesis alive in people s heads by blowing it up in the dailies main headlines. The government and the security forces were rarely given space in the news. In fact, even some of the defensive statements from the military were significantly limited in their reporting by the press. This also helped the conspiracy theory to remain dominant among the East Javanese public. 246 In the New Order era the authority could easily dominate public opinion. 247 Now, public opinion had been shaped toward a simple good and bad, and the military was in the bad position. Its element was alleged to have been involved in master-minding the killings, 248 it was ignored when it called for their stopping, and there was scepticism about whether it would be able to provide an effective solution to them. Eventually, the 244 As the National Head of NU (Nadhatul Ulama, the largest Islamic organization), Gusdur indicated, in a statement on 17 October 1998 that the killings were a conspiracy against his organization. The National Chairman of the NU s associated PKB party, Matori Abdul Jalil, said it was a conspiracy to fail the election and to destroy the basis of PKB. See Elsam, Op.cit., p. 20. It was then re-stated by the East Java Head of the NU, KH Hasyim Muzadi, who believed that the killings aimed to discredit the NU. These statements were initially based only on some rumors but were then allegedly confirmed by the investigation conducted by a NU fact-finding investigation team, which claimed that the victims were mostly NU clerics and members, not the sorcerers. NU followers who are the stronghold of the Islamic syncretism and traditionalists believed Gusdur s allegation about a secret alliance of a rival Islamic organization (ICMI/Indonesian Association of Islamic Scholars), the government, army elements and Suharto loyalists as being behind the killings. The argument for this theory was that because NU was planning to form the PKB Party, the party would be a potential challenger against the existing government so therefore had to be weakened. Muzadi alleged publicly that the killings aim to provoke [revenge] attacks from NU followers. This would create rural chaos and discredit NU and in turn NU would be forced to face the army. Augustus See Hakim, L., Aksi Pembantain Dukun Santet/Tukang Sihir: Studi Kekerasan Sosial Dalam Tragedi Banywangi Tahun 1998, Jurnal Ilmu-Ilmu Sosial (Social Science Journal), Fakultas Ilmu Administrasi Negara Universitas Barawijaya, Vol 14. No For significance of the media s involvement in toppling Suharto from power see for example Kingsbury, Op.cit. p A source from some respondents who used to be close to the former Regent, Colonel Purnomo Sidik, who resigned because of the allegation of being involved in the murders expressed this. The former Regent repeatedly made statements denying his involvement, but these rarely appeared in the newspapers. Interview B See Chapter Three. 248 For an example of an article especially discussing the involvement of the military in the murders see, Siapa Dalang Kasus Dukun Santet? Suara Merdeka Cyber News, 7 December 2003, accessed from the internet on 21 October 2004, on the website address: 103

136 existing government and the military were psychologically isolated from the rest of the community. The people, the reformist elites and the press were the ones who determined what had to be believed and done, not the government and its law enforcement agencies. 249 Several scholars had written about this case, but no one has found strong evidence about the accuracy of the conspiracy theory, although some seem to attempt to direct their analysis toward a conclusion that implies that Gusdur might be right. 250 However, there is independent research which disagrees. A research project carried out in 1999 by the Public Administration Faculty of the University of Brawijaya in Malang across nine Sub-districts of the Banyuwangi Regency, suggested that Recent statements and stories on the causes of and the background to the 70 killings investigated are very different from those prevailing at the time of the incidents. For instance, none of the victims were Koranic teachers, kyais or religious leaders, mosque trustees or other Islamic figures, likewise the perpetrators were not masked ninja types or military from outside the area, but neighbors. Indeed, there is little or no evidence these killings were carried out by outsiders working to a sinister plan or conspiracy to destabilize area, should thus be discounted. The true reasons for the killings and even the identities of some of the killers and people who planned them are known to local communities Although the government, military and police denied the allegation and released their version of what was actually happening, the public was not really convinced. They believed Gusdur and NU Kyais more than anyone else, as they always did. In the past, these Kyais were mainly used as tools by government officials to convince the NU followers when they needed public approval. Now the government was bad (an anti-reformist group) while Kyais were the good reformist groups. Gusdur said that "the masterminds are everywhere, in the cabinet and outside the formal political structure." One of the cabinet members who Gusdur indicated was involved was Small Business and Cooperatives Minister Adi Sasono, who was the Chairman of the Indonesian Association of Muslim Intellectuals (ICMI), and who denied the allegation. The reason for Gusdur to accuse Adi Sasono was not clear, but it may be because he was not only a Habibie cabinet minister and came from the same (ICMI) group, but also he was very close personally to Habibie. Partly, the conspiracy argued that it also aimed to undermine the MPR General Session that was to decide the future of the Habibie government. Yet, ICMI was not a party, unlike NU it had no mass support, and it had no any link to any group capable of conducting violence. See 250 Many writers like Mahony, Siegal and Loveard who discussed the theories and accusations as to who was behind the dukun santét murders did not find the truth which remains unknown. But they found that most people, however, believed the murders were politically motivated and the climate of instability subsequently led to an increase in violence and a surge of untamed impulses. See Mahony, Inez, The Role of Dukun in Contemporary East Java: A case study of Banyuwangi dukun, Research Report to Faculty of Social Science and Politics, University of Muhammadyah Malang, December See also Siegal, James T., Suharto Witches, Indonesia, issue 71, 2001, pp ; Loveard, D., Death s Long Shadow: a mysterious killing spree troubles the nation, Asiaweek, vol. 6, Nov. 1998, p See Hakim, L., Aksi Pembantain Dukun Santet/ Tukang Sihir: Studi Kekerasan Sosial Dalam Tragedi Banywangi Tahun 1998, Jurnal Ilmu-Ilmu Sosial (Social Science Journal), Fakultas Ilmu Administrasi Negara Universitas Barawijaya, Vol 14. No. 2. Augustus 2002, especially the abstract, p Another writer, Jason Brown, The Banyuwangi Murders, Inside Indonesia, April June 2000, No. 62, found that In Banyuwangi of the 143 suspected dukun santét who were murdered only one was a Koranic teacher. Brown suggested that while it 104

137 The exaggeration of the conspiracy theory by the media shifted the issue from the original, accused sorcerers to politicized, suspected ninja murders. 252 The impacts on the community included the spread of suspicion and anger among NU followers throughout the East Java Province, especially where NU followers were concentrated. This anger was manifested in two levels of developments. The first was the spread of the case from Banyuwangi to neighboring Regencies where NU communities were dominant in the local population. While in the original murders the target was the alleged sorcerers, in the new one it was the alleged mysterious killers of the sorcerers. In both stages the victims were multitude, but in the second the victims were wrongly targeted and included insane people and visitors to the villages where the killings happened. While in the first case the victims were killed by a group of villagers, openly during the day but sometimes secretly during the night, in the second all were openly and brutally executed by villagers. 253 The second development was an escalation of demonstrations in the Regency capital, Banyuwangi City, demanding the resignation of the Regent, Colonel T Purnomo Sidik. The fulfillment of this demand was stated to be a form of responsibility that he had to show, over both his failure in providing security for the Banyuwangi people and also his alleged involvement in masterminding the killings of Dukun Santét. 254 The demands and threats from the NU community forced him to resign only two years into his second five-year term as Banyuwangi Regent. 255 is true that a NU investigation team had found that 83 of the 143 killed were actually NU members, this was not particularly unusual given that Banyuwangi has always been a staunch NU stronghold. 252 Local, national and international media that frequently took the issue as their headlines were: Jawapos, Surya, Suara Merdeka, Kompas, Tempo, Asia Week, or Time Asia. See for example, 253 Ibid, p See also an article by Jason Brown, The Banyuwangi Murders, Inside Indonesia, April June 2000, No. 62. Jason Brown said that one of the factors that spread the tragedy to the neighbouring regions was that, NU spokesmen often overreacted to the situation by calling on the community to protect their local Muslim cleric, creating a scene of hysteria throughout the entire province. 254 The allegation was controversial. NU s accusation was based on the fact that on 17 September 1998, Regent Purnomo Sidik sent Radiogram No. 450/ /1998 to all heads of Sub-Districts (Camat) to check all data about suspected dukun santét in their Sub-districts. Yet, according to the Regent the data was used for an attempt to evacuate the potential victims to the safe locations. Interview M It was not really clear, whether the mass demonstrations against the Bupati were spontaneous consequences of this tragedy, or whether the tragedy had been intentionally masterminded or politicized as the destabilizing force for the speeding up of power changes. On the surface the former seemed to prevail. Yet, the latter was not impossible, if it was thought to be too long to wait for three years for the next Bupati Election. Second, it was also possible that it was thought that the existing Bupati would be a potential obstacle for the PKB to win the incoming national election in Banyuwangi Regency. And third, it was, possible that it was thought to be a strong force to destabilize the Habibie government so that Habibie supporters would be discouraged and lose bargaining power in the incoming MPR session that would decide the future of his presidency. Any intention by Habibie supporters 105

138 In fact, the ninja issues (which evolved from the Dukun Santet issues, in searching for and executing the suspected killers (ninja) by the local people) were not stopped by the military and police, but mostly by calls from the religious kyai leaders. 256 The ninja hunting was a public reaction to stop the dukun santét killings. The ninja issue was provoked by the local NU s political leaders who felt threatened, mainly on the basis of the conspiracy theory. However, the issue became another tragedy because it triggered the same brutal social punishments to the suspects. The calls for stopping the actions were made after these leaders realized that they indirectly had created the same human tragedy that they wanted to stop in the first place the dukun santét killings turning into suspected ninja killings. The military and police, on the other hand, did not achieve significant results in stopping the either case. The local security forces were reluctant to act decisively; when they tried to stop them, the hysterical mobs who often out-numbered them; and when police arrested those suspected to be connected with the murders, villagers protested outside police stations for the release of their friends and threatened to burn the stations. 257 In Gondang Legi village in Malang Regency some soldiers living in or around the village were threatened to be targeted, because of being suspected by the mobs as the spy agents, or the backers, of the Ninja. For a few weeks they chose to live in the battalion housing to escape from the mobs. 258 By the end of November, the public murders decreased, but sporadic and mysterious killings continued. 259 So, in the Dukun Santet case the military was not the victim, but suspected as among the (ninja) executors. In the Ninja case, the military personnel were among of maintaining power and delaying the national election until 2002, for example, would have to be prevented. In this sense, the tragedy would be used to further discredit the Habibie government. To prove this, however, a further study is needed, which this thesis has not been able to explore. 256 A respondent who was the Head of the village where the Ninja hunting took place revealed this. Interview V20. Another Village Head confirmed that his villagers stopped the Ninja hunting only after the kyais called for a halt. Interview V Interview P145. The respondent was a police officer in Malang Resort Police Headquarters. 258 Interviews M112, M113, M146, M In Sumenep, for example 59 accused sorcerers were murdered in the period of 1999 to Bali Post Online, 22 April Accessed from the internet on 20 October 2004, balipostcetak/2002/4/22/n4.htm. 106

139 the targets as victims, because of the allegation of being the suspicious Ninja. Yet, both cases indicated the apparent collapse of law and order, thus the decline of the military role in the community as the state s manager of violence. 3. Demoralization of the military As noted, the military restrained much of its coercive power and let the people carry out their brutal actions. Attempts at persuasive calls, unfortunately, were not effective either. On 20 May 1998, the East Java Governor, Basofi Sudirman, and the East Java KODAM Military Commander in Chief, Maj. General Djaja Suparman, had called for the security and the people to work together to clean up the rioters. 260 On June 16 the military headquarters in Jakarta issued a warning about a crackdown against lawlessness but it appeared ineffective to stop the disorder. 261 Also, as demonstrated earlier, in the cases of Dukun Santét and Ninja in East Java, public opinion was mainly controlled by NU s kyais who had gained their political autonomy and exerted their political ambitions independently from the previous bureaucracy and military influences. In the New Order era, the government and the military had used these informal leaders to help them control the society, and in return the government usually provided the kyais and their religious Pesantren Schools with materials and financial assistance. 262 In contrast to the people who seemed to lose their fear of military coercive power, local military officers and soldiers seem to lose their selfconfidence to use the coercion, partly because of there being no clear legal support for their actions. As local military respondents told me, We do not want to be blamed for violating human rights, intervening into non- 260 Rakyat Harus Ikut Mencari Perusuh, Kompas 22 May On 19 June 1998 Djadja Suparman and Police Chief Maj.Gen. M Dayat repeated the calls for the people to help the security forces to ensure the security. See Pangdam V jamin Keamanan Masyarakat Jatim, Kompas 20 June People had been worried about conflicts that might break out after the fall of Soeharto. See, for example, statements by Muhadjir Effendi (Rektor UNMU Malang), KH Cholil Bisri (the owner of the Pesantren/Islamic Boarding School in Rembang, and Daniel Saparingga (Political Observer of UNAIR Surabaya) in Gerakan Reformasi Memasuki Masa Krusial, Kompas 22 May Washington Post, July 22, Interview K2. The respondent was a Deputy of a District DPRD in East Java, and a Kiyai and a member of F- KB 107

140 military affairs, victimized for the favour of the elite 263 ; If our commanders cannot protect themselves from the Human Rights charges, there was no way they would protect us, should we commit similar crimes 264 ; We were confused about what to do ; and that the important thing now is how to secure my self and my family, because nobody (else) would, even the commanders. 265 One respondent said that in many cases the orders came late because of, it seems, the higher commanders unwillingness to take responsibility (saling lempar tanggung jawab) as if in fear of similarly unwanted human rights violation accusations. 266 Consequently, although the riots happened near their military base, for example, no officer took an initiative before they got very clear orders from their higher authorities. According to a military respondent the officers and soldiers were concerned more about the effects of the reform movements on their personal matters. In fact, the land conflicts, for example, were clearly a mass action against the military institution, while the individual officers and soldiers were reluctant to take initiatives on their own, for example, to prevent or stop the villagers occupying the lands. 267 A self restraint, whether realized or not by the military both at the institutional and individual level was not taken on a purely voluntary basis but resulted from a comprehension about a growing power of the people. At local-leadership level, there were also confusing procedures about the responsibility for Control and Command (Kodal) between the military and the police, especially since the May instruction of Gen. Wiranto about the transfer of Kodal from the local military commander to the local police chief. 268 In the field this transfer affected also resentment between the military and the police about who would hold the security fund (dana taktis komandan). Previously, each soldier usually got security pocket 263 Interview M Interview M Interview M Interview M The respondent was an officer living near the disputed area. Interview M On May , General Wiranto issued an instruction on the transfer of Kodal from the Military Area Commander (PANGDAM) to the Area Police Chief (KAPOLDA) in case of riots. TR Pangab selaku ketua Bakorstanas, Nomor TR 14/STANS/1998. The TR was cited in Zon, Fadli, Politik Huru Hara Mei 1998, (Jakarta: Institute for Policy Studies (IPS), 2004), p

141 money from this security fund. 269 In addition, local military respondents told me that they could feel how nervous the military s top leaders were as they gave so many warnings to the local military units, and sometime similar warnings were repeated for several days. For example, they received some instructions from the Intelligence Assistant of the KODAM V Brawijaya Headquarters in Surabaya, not to tolerate any mobs coming onto them, to keep at least a half of the troops on the base when the units were required to send any troops to different areas, so that any attack on the base could be prevented, not to bring their troops to jog outside the bases as they used to do every morning; to reduce using military vehicles, to cover the military s vehicles number plates with ordinary (civilian) cars plates, because there had been reports that military vehicles were being harassed and attacked by those who called themselves reformists. 270 In fact, it was also reported that some soldiers who lived outside the base did not come to their bases because they had been harassed by the mobs on their ways. 271 However, there were also some military respondents who appeared apathetic because of their resentments toward the democratization movements, as they said, Let them [people] know what they got from the reform era, that they would not be able to solve their problems without us [the military] and that they did not really want us to go back to barracks. 272 They might have thought that this would make the people learn to appreciate them. In addition, some military respondents said that in 1998 the soldiers were too reluctant (ogah-ogahan), sick (muak) and bored (bosan) to do the security operations as in some cases, some local security personnel shared social jealousies with local people against the Chinese. 273 As noted before, the military were themselves becoming the 269 Each soldier usually was given about 20,000 rupiah (US$ 2.50) per day, but sometimes the commanders marked up the numbers of their troops in order to get more money. Interview M Interviews M10, M133, M129, M As mentioned before, most territorial units, except fighting units like Battalions or Companies, did not provide housing and did not house their soldiers in a military complex, but they lived in private housing within the civilian communities. 272 Interview M This was expressed by some of the local officers and soldiers during the interviews. Interviews M112, M139, M113, M141. Before 1998, some of them also took advantage of the insecurity situation, as the more scared the Chinese were the more expensive the price for security protection that the Chinese would pay, so the more 109

142 target of the angry public. The KORAMIL (Sub-district Military Command) in Kencong was several times threatened by mobs searching for Chinese who were alleged to be hiding inside the headquarters. A month earlier, some angry mobs also came to the units insisting on bendera setengah tiang (a flag at half-mast) for a solidarity recognition of the Tri Sakti University students shot in the student actions in Jakarta. 274 It seems that reluctance to act was becoming a common feature of the local military in East Java during the 1998/1999, because of several factors mentioned above, such as loss of self confidence and confusion both at leadership level or among field officers and soldiers in the field, apathetic attitudes because of resentments toward the democratization movements, or a degradation of moral responsibility for the security. This reluctance seems to be responsible for, as well as affected by, the collapse of law and order. As reformasi was a multifaceted process the collapse of law and order did not represent the whole situation in East Java. The other side of the faces of reformasi has been marked by the emergence of grassroots-based democracy, as seen below. 4. An Emergence of grassroots-based democracy: The case of the Mutual Aid Communication Posts (PGR) The sense of democratic freedom in the East Java soon after the resignation of President Suharto was partly markedly symbolized at the grassroots level by the mushrooming of the PDIP-colored (red and black) so-called Mutual Aid Communication Posts (PGR, Poskom Gotong Royong) shelters. Within a few months there were tens of thousands of these PGR throughout the Province. According to a PDIP activist, there were 20,000 or more, with the biggest number in Surabaya, Malang and Jember. 275 They were built on the sides of the roads, at a distance apart of money they got. This was revealed by some military respondents (soldiers who used to work as security guards in entertainment centres in Malang City). Interviews M147, M132, M Interview M The biggest number was in the Provinces of Central Java and Yogyakarta, with more than 25,000 buildings, according to the claim by Drs Suratal, the Chairman of PDIP Central Java to the Harian Barnas ( Bernas Daily). In Semarang City there were about 300 PGR buildings, said Ismoyo, the Chairman of PDIP Semarang. The 110

143 about two hundred metres or less, on the corners of town squares or near train stations, markets or in the villages centres, and even in unused yard spaces of public buildings. 276 The important significance of the existence of the PGR buildings to this study is that how they were built and used represented what sorts of people and what sorts of political attitudes composed the PDIP; thus depicted what sort of public political participation was being demonstrated. Apart from how important the PGR activity was to the PDIP, to the majority of the population it simply represented another trauma of the politics of chaos, and frequently violence, which took over the vacuum space left by the powerlessness of the state s law enforcement. The public initiative to build PGR emerged firstly from the Chairwoman of PDIP, Megawati Sukarnoputri, during the party s Rakernas (National Work Meeting) in Jakarta, August In the meeting she instructed PDIP members to build PGR buildings in each Commissariat of each Subdistrict (Korcam/ Komisariat Kecamatan). The instruction was then formalized in a letter No 57/DPP/IN/XI/ 1998 about the building of Posko Gotong Royong. 277 According to a PDIP politician, the buildings were selffunded and the jobs were carried out by the local supporters who had great enthusiasm and loyalty to Megawati s call. Yet the local people who were actually involved in the work said that the sources of funds came from donations that were distributed by the PDIP organizations both at local and national level, collected from passers-by, from street-singers (pengamen) and organized beggars recruited from unemployed, homeless people, or from pedicab (becak) drivers. Except for the first-mentioned source of the money, the respondents refused to use the word donation because mostly it was not given voluntarily, but because the youths in the Posko asked for donations by force (narget atau setengah memaksa). So, the travellers gave the money because they were scared of the practice of Kuningisasi ( Yellowing ), painting buildings yellow, the Golkar colour, during the New Order inspired the Central Java PDIP. Shops and private properties which had used to be Golkar yellow now turned into the PDIP red and blacks. See Harian Barnas, 25 November Interview D7 (the respondent was a member of the F-DIP of Malang City, ). 276 During 1998 and 1999 I was living in Malang, East Java, and witnessed the messiness of PGR buildings. 277 It was decided to have a minimum number of one PGR in each Korcam. Interview D7. 111

144 youths. Those who were involved in the building work and the guardians of the buildings were also paid from this money. 278 The way they were built also demonstrated a sense of irregularity. Local government officials complained that PGR buildings became negative political propaganda, built without licence, and some stood on the government s property (tanah pemda). The Regent of Nganjuk, Drs Sutrisno R., for example, asked 279 that the PGR buildings on Jalan Gatot Subroto be removed because they were built on local government property. The Chairman of the Islamic Followers Party (PUI/Partai Umat Islam) of East Java, H Adji Said Abbas, for example, urged the local government to stop the building of the PGR buildings that were recently mushrooming (menjamur). The buildings on the sides of the major roads made the view look so messy, and must be discordant with the city plan. 280 A PDIP politician said that the posts acted as a multifunctional network, as communication lines among the members, for recruiting new members and as informal security posts (pos pengamanan). 281 The local people, however, complained that they became the centres where PDIP members gathered, stayed awake overnight, played gambling and getting drunk, sometimes with loud dangdut traditional music, but they could not stop them. 282 The massive number of the buildings also showed a sense of domination that made other groups in the community feel threatened. Abdurrahman Wahid 283, Chairman of the PKB, who, after the 1999 election was to become the next Indonesian President, complained that the number of Posko PDIP was too many, worsening instability more than 278 Interviews C119, C120, C125, C127. The respondents were not members of PDIP, but they said that they were involved in the works to make money. 279 It was an interesting indication of the political climate at that time that he asked rather than demanded or just sent people out to knock them down! 280 Rawan, Keberadaan Posko-Posko di Pinggir Jalan (Risky, the existence of PGRs on the side roads), Jawa Pos 25 June Secretary of PDIP Yogyakarta, H Surasmo Priyandono BA. See Suara Pembaharuan, 23 January 1999; ; ; or Kompas, Interview V Commonly known as Gusdur or Gus Dur. 112

145 helping the security as claimed by PDIP elites. 284 The existence of the PGR was intimidating and disturbing to some local communities. In several Islamic-based areas, such as Pasuruan, some of the buildings were burnt by community members because of their being used for organizing crimes by local youths, 285 and most of the buildings were used for recruiting homeless and street boys for PDIP demonstrations. 286 From the security forces point of view, the spread of the PGR buildings throughout the East Java territorial area was seen mainly as a threat to the security of the community and the state, rather than as a part of maintaining security. Basically, it was because those who ran the PGR buildings were people traditionally regarded by the military or police as part of the sources of criminals. Unlike other militias or community security assistants such as Wanra/Perlawanan Rakyat (People s Defense) and Kamra/Keamanan Rakyat (People s Security) who were mostly recruited from Golkar s youth organizations (FKPPI or PPM), or from Islamic youths of NU s Banser, PDIP s youth following were traditionally regarded by the military and police as sources of instability, therefore, the existence of the PGR were seen cynically and suspiciously by the military as a security challenge. 287 Furthermore, they also appeared to take over some social roles that used to be dominated by the military territorial units. 288 Despite these concerns, the military at all local levels did not take any step to stop them. One reason for this was that there was no instruction from the highest command to stop them. At the central policy level the military did not want to be accused of being anti-reform and anti-democracy. It was trying hard to wipe out the bad image (citra) of anti-democracy which was being condemned by the demonstrations. The officers and the 284 Kompas, 17 December Interview V Interview V Interview M11. In contrast, PDIP respondents usually expressed the positive aspects of these PGR. Interviews D7, D Interview M

146 soldiers at the local level were uncertain about how to cope with the PGR that were established under the banner of reform and democratization. 289 One of my respondents, an Islamic activist, criticized the name Posko as sounding like a military term, and warned of the PDIP s military strategy. 290 Military respondents were similarly concerned about the use of the abbreviated name, which in Indonesian military terminology means Command Post, regarding them as a chaotic way to challenge the existence of the military territorial command. 291 On the other hand, the sentiment of PDIP s mass of supporters was effectively exploited by using the attraction of these PGR. The leaders claimed that they were the symbols of the PDIP people s political struggles. The Chairwoman of PDIP, Megawati Sukarnoputri, for example, warned that the PDIP offices would be attacked by unidentified groups, and instructed all PGR near the offices to be prepared for preventing the attacks. She warned that the 1997 Kudatuli (Kerusuhan Dua Puluh Tujuh Juli/July 27 riot) might reoccur. 292 However, apart from sceptical views from others, the PDIP managed to maximize the existence of PGR as its political campaigns attracted marginalized elements of society to join with the PDIP s self-claimed identity 293 as being the party of the little people (wong cilik), such as pedicab drivers, street sellers, unskilled labourers, unemployed, homeless or beggars, whose total numbers however were not marginal at all. These sorts of people tended to interpret democracy as the struggle of small people like them against injustice caused by the state policies. The PDIP 289 The Army Chief of Staff repeatedly stated that his program was to improve the image (citra) of the army in the eyes of the Indonesian people. This meant avoiding intervention in political matters in any form. Interviews M41, M33, M Interview C Most military respondents expressed this interpretation. Eg. Interviews M41, M4, M The July Riot was the overthrow of Megawati from the PDI leadership and the take-over of the central PDI office by military-backed groups, involving injuring hundreds of victims from the Megawati supporters defending the building. For a discussion about this riot see, for example, the collective work Peristiwa 27 July, (Jakarta: Institut Studi Arus Informasi & Aliansi Jurnalis Independen, 1997), or Bhakti, Ikrar Nusa, Militer dan Politik Kekerasan Orde Baru, (eds.) (Bandung: Penerbit Mizan, 2001). After the PDI-P (Indonesian Democratic Party (for/of) Struggle was successfully established to take over most of the supporters and the vehicle of the PDI, while the PDI itself withered. 293 The PDIP s symbol was a buffalo s head, implying the ordinary people. 114

147 expressed its leading role in this struggle through the PGR where these people were paid to join the struggle and promised to get a better condition when the PDIP won the political competition to take over the power in the country. So the PGR buildings became the centres for the recruitment of new PDIP members and for organizing political actions, and thus took a pivotal position in the PDIP s campaigns during the 1999 general election. 294 In fact, many PDIP politicians who took strategic positions either in the legislative or executive branches of local government after the 1999 election were those who were recruited through, or activists running, the PGR. Several of them, however, were well known by the local peoples as not appropriate, partly mostly not educated enough, to hold those positions because of their past background. On one case, for example, in 1999 a member of the PDIP faction (F-DIP) of one District s DPRD failed to be elected as the DPRD Speaker despite the faction being the biggest in the DPRD, because he, according to respondents in the DPRD, only had a Primary School Certificate as his highest formal education evidence. 295 Some kept demonstrating their original attitudes, such as getting drunk in public places, being involved in gambling, involved in riots and violence, caught in police sweeping through entertainment centres for using illegal drugs, or being jailed for corruption charges, etc., after holding public offices. As described in more detail in Chapter Eleven, a PDIP member, who had become the Speaker of the DPRD in one city was caught by journalists several times getting drunk, and once was caught up among drug (ecstasy tablets) users in a police raid, and later was jailed for a corruption conviction. So, beside the image of the PDIP as the party of 294 During the election campaigns in May 1999, these PGR were effectively used as the centres for organizing mass mobilization for PDIP campaigns. Six months before the election, there was an increased war of symbols and banners in strategic places, such as cross-roads and town square areas. In Surabaya, some banners claimed the area as the territory of PDIP supporters, ("Anda Memasuki Kawasan PDI Perjuangan,"/You have entered the area of PDIP). On Jagir and Kedungbaruk Streets, for example these banners were set at distances of fifty to hundred metres. Some clashes occurred among parties supporters, mainly however between Golkar and the new parties. On the 26 th Anniversary of PDIP, 7 March in Surabaya, for example, around 1200 Golkar banners and flags were removed during the night. Similar incidents happened in Central Java s cities, such as Tegal, Brebes and Pekalongan, while in Yogyakarta three PGR on Kusumanegara and Glagahsari Streets were removed. Kompas, 22 March Interview D7. 115

148 wong cilik people that the activities of its PGR succeeded in projecting, the same PGR also left an image on the majority of the local population that the PDIP was a party that lacked good politicians mainly because they were recruited through PGR activities, 296 rather than from religious activists as in PKB or PPP or from educated scholars such as in PAN. 297 With the PDIP winning a significant proportion of the number of politicians in the local legislatures, they contributed to the negative perception of the people toward the local Parliaments. As one NGO activist said to me, No wonder if the quality of DPRD members was disappointing as the majority of the members had not been prepared properly, especially those from the F-DIP, who were recruited randomly and suddenly (secara karbitan). 298 The PGR phenomenon is important in terms of the concept of participatory politics, in an experience dramatically unlike that during the New Order when the military were the most active elements of the political forces, including during the preparation for the elections. In the case of the war of symbols, for example, the military Governors or Regents would actively arrange the Yellowing of public places to make them Golkar s colour. 299 Now this publicity technique had been taken over by the PDIP party, by Redding of the area, by a party that had been most intensively oppressed by the military. There was not enough evidence on the relations between these PGR and the success of the PDIP gaining the largest amount of voters in the 1999 election, yet the importance of the PGR showed clearly the great participation of the PDIP supporters. They contributed significantly to the rise of democracy, taking the most advantage of political space being vacated by the military. However, the feature of the increased public participation that was demonstrated by the PGR also shows that to a large extent those who 296 More information about this is presented in Chapter Eleven. 297 A composition of DPRD members in the Districts of East Java is provided in Appendix 298 Interview N Among the most notorious was the Governor of Central Java, Maj. Gen. Suwardi who carried out Kuningisasi (yellowization) of Semarang City. See for example, Gubernur Jateng Tunjuk Kajati untuk hadapi Gugatan Kuningisasi (tte Governor of Jateng/Central Java appointed the Provincial Attorney General to handle the Accusation over Yellowization), Republika Online 31 March Accessed on 25 October 2003 from 116

149 were active in the PGR were mainly motivated by the economic difficulties they were experiencing and the financial rewards offered, or promised for post-victory delivery, by the PDIP. Beside that, as noted, it also demonstrated that many of those who were recruited through the PGR to be politicians were recognized by the public as having regrettable backgrounds. Moreover, as seen later in Chapter Eleven, the increase of public participation in politics was only a temporary phenomenon around 1998/1999 rather than reflecting a permanently higher political awareness and active involvement. Regardless of the quality of this kind of a newly grassroots democracy, its existence (along with the collapse of law and order and the demoralization of the military) was very important in encouraging the military to think about how to respond this political development. One important form of response from the military was the so-called Paradigma Baru TNI (TNI s New Paradigm), presented below. 5. TNI s New Paradigm and soldiers reactions In response to the public pressures, in October 1998, the military initiated its New Paradigm to begin reassessing its political role. 300 There were three main points outlined in this new paradigm. First, the term of Dwifungsi was changed into Peran TNI (the Role of the Military), which expresses that there was no more an explicit political role for the military. Second, the military was to reposition in the context of democratic freedom within the frame of order and certainty. And third, the military was committed to a readjustment of its future military role. 301 The following table outlines the main points of the Internal Reform (Reformasi Internal) of the military based on the TNI s New Paradigm. 300 See the note in Chapter One, sections 1 and See, ABRI Abad XXI: Redefinisi, Reposisi, dan Reaktualisasi Peran ABRI dalam Kehidupan Bangsa (21st Century: Redefinition, Reposition and Reactualisation of the Role of ABRI within the Life of the Nation) (Jakarta: Mabes ABRI, 1998), pp This book was distributed on the Anniversary Day of the Indonesian Armed Forces, 5 October See also, Chapter Four, Dari Empat Paradigma Baru ke Rapim Tahun 2000 [From Four New Paradigms to the 2000 Leaders Meeting] in Said, Salim., Tumbuh dan Tumbangnya Dwifungsi: Perkembangan Pemikiran Politik Militer , (Jakrata: Aksara Karunia, 2002), pp

150 Table V.1. The Elements of TNI s Internal Reform (Reformasi Internal TNI) No Elements 1 To define the new paradigm of ABRI s social and political role 2 To define the new paradigm of TNI s future role 3 To abolish ABRI s Kekaryaan Staff, Directing Board of Karyawan and Security and Order Staff the Decision of the Minister of Defence and Security/ the Commander in Chief of ABRI, No. Kep/ 10/ P/ XI/ 1998, dated 10 November To replace the Assistant of Social Politics with the Assistant of Territorial, ~ the Decision of the Minister of Defence and Security/ the Commander in Chief of ABRI, No. Kep/ 09/ P/ XI/ 1998, dated 10 November To cease the organizational relations with Golkar party and take the same distance with all existing political parties, ~ an Instruction Letter of the Commander in Chief of ABRI No. ST/ 19/ 1999, dated 29 January To abolish kekaryaan of ABRI by an early retirement and converting to be civil servant, ~ the Decision of the Minister of Defence and Security/ the Commander in Chief of ABRI No. Kep/ 03/ P/ II/ 1999, dated 15 February To separate the National Police from the ABRI from 1 April 1999, ~ the Decision of the Minister of Defence and Security/ the Commander in Chief of ABRI, No. Kep/ 05/ P/ III/ 1999, dated 31 March To change the name of ABRI to TNI, the Decision No. Kep/ 259/ P/ IV/ 1999, dated 12 April To change the Staff of Social Politics into the Staff of Social Communication, ~ the Decision of the Minister of Defence and Security/ the Commander in Chief of ABRI, No. Kep/ 09/ P/ VI/ 1999, dated 29 June To abolish the national and Regional Board of Social Politics, ~ the Decision of the Minister of Defence and Security/ the Commander in Chief of ABRI, No. Kep/ 09/ P/ XI/ 1999, dated 10 November To abolish the Social Politics Staff of Kodam, Korem and Kodim. 12 To declare that TNI is not to be involved in formal politics. 13 To reduce the number of the faction of TNI in national, provincial and district parliament. 14 To be committed and consistent to the neutrality of TNI in the national election. 15 To evaluate the relations with the TNI s family organizations and their members. 16 To revise the TNI s doctrine in order to be compatible with the Reform and its role. 17 To apply public accountability to the foundations, businesses and corporatism of the TNI. 18 To eliminate the position of Deputy Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces 19 To abolish the national and regional coordinating board of national 118

151 stability and resilience. 20 To ensure that all TNI members participating as candidates in the local government head elections have retired before running for office. 21 To abolish the Awareness Command Post (Post Kewaspadaan Nasional). 22 To abolish Social Politics subjects in the TNI education curriculum. 23 To define the concept of re-functioning and re-stucturization of territorial governmental functions. 24 To improve the TNI s members understanding and realization of law and human rights. Source: The original text is Indonesian which is sourced from Mabes TNI, TNI Abad XXI: Redefinisi, Reposisi, dan Reaktualisasi Peran TNI (Jakarta: Mabes TNI, 2000) p and Mabes TNI, Implementasi Paradigma Baru TNI dalam Berbagai Keadaan Mutakhir (Jakarta: Mabes TNI, 2000), pp.22-25, as quoted by Fattah, Dr. Abdullah, Demiliterisasi Tentara: Pasang Surut Politik Militer , (Yogyakarta: LKiS, 2005), pp The twin immediate impacts that this New Paradigm was expected to produce were a building of external public trust 302 ; as an internal instruction to the soldiers and officers to help secure this mission of recovering the military s good image. 303 Based on the ABRI Abad XXI (21 st Century ABRI) book which had been distributed to all units, the Commanders were instructed to explain this mission to the soldiers who were then expected to avoid any behavior that could invite negative reactions from the public. This section attempts to identify the impact of this paradigm change on the soldiers behaviours that could recover the trust of the local people and lead to a better behaviour in interacting with civilians. As the following shows, practically, the soldiers and the officers were urged to elevate the standard of discipline, but many of my military respondents, unfortunately, 302 As mentioned by Singh. See Chapter One, section The Indonesian Army Chief of Staff, General Tyasno Sudarto, on 16 May 2000 explained that the Army Top Leaders Meeting (Rapat Pimpinan Angaktan Darat) had decided to produce an Army White Paper (Buku Putih), an explanation, among other things, of the 2000 work program of the Army, which was aimed at recovering the image of the Army (mengembalikan citra TNI-AD) externally and internally. Internally, it was mainly to attempt to improve the soldiers discipline, such as by facilitating a quick court (pengadilan cepat) at every KODAM, to improve professionalism, and to upgrade the welfare of the soldiers by, for instance, providing each Battalion with one hundred million rupiahs (around $ 10,000) Dana Abadi (permanent savings, means that the unit can only use the bank interest, but not the principal). The money comes from the Kartika Ekapaksi Foundation of which I am the Chairman, he said. Externally, the Army would build a positive communication with the local society around the military units, to prevent the national disintegration and to enforce the supremacy of the law. See Kompas, 17 May

152 suggest that there was no clear effect of these discipline campaigns on the soldiers and officers in the local units Obstacles to discipline campaign?: From Nge-ter to Nye-per One clear example of this was a national newspaper report, in Kompas 5 September 1999, about soldiers involvement in illegal logging. The report said that dozens of military and police personnel were involved in penjarahan hutan jati (illegal teak logging) in East and Central Java. One of them carried with him an M-16 machine gun with twenty bullets, as revealed in an Evaluation Meeting on the topic of Handling the Illegal Logging (Penanganan Penjarahan Hutan on 4 September 1999). 305 The report was that Col. Police Atim had revealed that in Blora thirty eight policemen, and some Sub-district Military Commanders, Village NCOs and personnel of Battalion 410/Alugoro were involved in the illegal loggings. All policemen had been pulled in to the HQ for investigation, all military personnel involved had been reported to the Pangdam, but some eight people, including the one with the gun had not been processed because of protection from oknum higher officers. My local military respondents said the word discipline for the soldiers has lost its meaning (tidak berarti apa-apa). This campaign, he said, was seen largely as empty words that, however, were aimed at the wrong targets (salah sasaran); it should have been directed to those who were involved in the KKN at the leadership level (bapak-bapak yang KKN diatas), as demanded by the public. 306 Another respondent said that, the soldiers were not stupid; they all understood that the bad image of the military was not caused by the degradation of their discipline, but by the officers involved in the New Order s KKN; so why had they to be pressed down? In fact, most 304 Interview M The meeting was chaired by the Operation Assistant of Police Central HQ May. Gen. Police Bimantoro, and attended by the Director General of PHPH (Forest Protection), Soemarsono, Chief Director of Perhutani (Forestry Affairs), Bambang Sardjito, East Java Police Chief, and the Chief of Pusat Komando Pengendalian Operasi (Puskodalops)/Central Command of Controlling Operations, Colonel Police Atim Supomo. Kompas, 5 September Interview M53. Interview M

153 soldiers knew that some of their commanders enjoyed the money (setoran) resulting from the business (nge-ter) 307 [including illegal] that the lower-ranks (bawahan) run outside their duties. 308 Moreover, the military had not been immune to the various internal corruptions, such as budgeting markups, which, just as among civilians, were systematically and widely practiced by involving the lower-rank soldiers; so it was very understandable that soldiers knew how corrupt their commanders were but they just had no right to speak, as the following shows. One respondent who was the Chief of Training Preparation (Kasiapjar/Kepala Seksi Persiapan Pengajaran) at a military training centre in East Java said that every year he was involved in such a systematic markup. 309 His formal role was to select the course topics to be proposed for the next term s programs. In reality, he said, his job was to keep the number of the course topics (mata pelajaran) as high as possible, because every single topic brought money, such as for producing the topic manuals or for paying the trainers incentives. He said, ideally, for a three month course, there should be seven to ten topics, but in reality it could be thirty to forty topics, most irrelevant (invented) nonmilitary topics, such as social and political doctrines. To be able to do that, he shortened the allocated time for each topic, for instance, some topics were only allocated a two-hour class, while the training time was extended to include the evening classes; and in many topics, because of the limitation in the number of the trainers, the classes were fictive. Yet, this was good, he said, because what was important was that, the cash arrives (uangnya turun), the more topics we propose, the more money arrives, and the more limited the (number of) trainers, the more money we save, this was the key. However, it was common that the amount of 307 Nge-ter is a common term among the military personnel to explain various activities to get money or business relations outside their official jobs at territorial units. Nge-ter is not limited to the territorial service, although ter refers to territorial units, but also to non-territorial units and personnel. 308 Interview M Interview M

154 money approved was only around a half of what had been proposed, therefore, he said, we have to propose as much an amount as we can. Those officials who process the proposals know very well that they have been marked up. Yet, they also like and encourage this first, for the purpose of showing that they have reviewed and cut the amount being proposed, as if they were working properly, and secondly, to increase their incentive which was normally, but illegally, accounted for in a percentage. Simply, to get approval one had to pay those who processed the proposal. Also common, he said, was that the approval comes at the end of the program, instead of at the beginning of it. When I asked why, he answered that it was because each level of the bureaucratic ladder kept the money for a certain time to get the bank interest for them; and at some levels, the original amount would be also cut (disunat). The implication, he said, was that the training institution would have to provide funds by itself to run the program, by doing it as economically as possible (meaning by creating more fictive programs), and get reimbursement later. In general, he said, the institution would manage to get a reimbursement much bigger than what had been spent. A further technique to increase the benefit was to increase the number of the trainees, which was the main source of money because each trainee was allocated allowances, the spending of which was carried out collectively by the training institution; but this was someone else s job, he said, yet I know that it works in a similar way. When I asked where the marked-up money goes, he answered that it was the responsibility of someone else, the Financial Division (Bagian Keuangan), but listed some who commonly received this that he knew, including the biggest portion, of course, for the Commander of the Training Centre, staff who were involved in making the proposals, the officials who processed the proposals, and the inspectors who during or after the training signed the endorsements (the latter of the three groups consisting of many levels). When I asked whether he got some money, he told me, 122

155 well just small splashes (cipratan kecil), but everybody knows, who can live with merely the salary without having additional incomes (nyeper) 310. In general, training programs were regarded as projects to make money that benefit those who were involved in many different levels of the military bureaucratic ladders. Some could speculate that the quality of the training did not matter, as this was not the purpose but only to act as a means to serve a pattern of corruption. As this practice was not a secret of a certain group of people, but commonly known (sudah membudaya), that means all soldiers understood it, so how would they trust and obey the demand for discipline coming out from and required by their officers? To break such a systemic pattern of corruption would not be an easy task, as it seemed to need a comprehensive approach, ranging from political to cultural to practical. That, however, should be discussed separately from the main concerns of this study Economic pressures or Reformasi euphoria?: Soldiers protests In the 1998 chaotic circumstances where there was a shocking messiness of the social economy, the politics and the security, soldiers were among the poor Indonesians who were economically hampered by these difficulties. They were very vulnerable (sangat rawan) to the attraction of involvement in criminal activities as a way of economic survival. 311 The report on logging mentioned earlier, was just one example of how soldiers could be involved in such activities. There was a growing concern among officers about the increasing economic pressures on the soldiers on one hand, and the influences of reformasi euphoria on the other. On several occasions, military leaderships in Jakarta had sent written instructions as well as attentions to the local units to be aware of the influence of the reformasi. 312 In fact, 310 Nyeper is a common word referring to getting additional incomes beyond the official income in Indonesia. It can refer to several terms, such as, nyari persenan (to get a percentage share, or commission), but sometimes, people also use the term ceperan to refer to the money obtained as the result of the nyeper activities. 311 Interview M Interview M

156 changes in the attitudes of the soldiers did happen. It had never happened in the New Order era that soldiers openly criticized and demonstrated against their commanders decisions that they did not agree with. Now, it happened. On one occasion in early 1999, one company (around one hundred and thirty troops) of a Battalion in East Java decamped in the middle of the night from their barracks and stayed away for two weeks, to express their protests against the attitude of the Company Commander who in the soldiers view frequently gave too heavy punishments. The troops demanded, and the demand was approved by the Headquarters, that the officer be moved before they agreed to return to their barracks. 313 On another occasion in mid-1999, members of another Battalion came to the higher Headquarters under which command the Battalion was placed, to protest their Battalion Commander s decision prohibiting the soldiers from using their official houses (rumah dinas) as shops (there were at least twenty small shops in the Battalion s complex). Again, the Commander s decision was then revoked. 314 Initially, it was suspected that there were reformist groups who had attempted to infiltrate and influence the soldiers, but no evidence was found by the Headquarters and it was concluded that the actions were mainly expressions of frustration in dealing with economic difficulties. The Headquarters in Jakarta instructed that the officers adjust their leadership style towards one which emphasizes a humane touch (sentuhan kemanusian). 315 A former Lieutenant Colonel in East Java told me that many officers only know how to press and to threaten their soldiers with discipline measures, but lacked concerns about the difficulties and problems being experienced by their subordinates and the units. 316 He pointed out a local military commander s official house (rumah dinas) 317 and said, look in that house, there are at least five expensive cars, while the soldiers families are 313 The names of the Commander and the unit are not given, for reasons of confidentiality. 314 The names of the Commander and the unit are not given, for reasons of confidentiality. 315 The Humanistic Touch was made a topic for an essay competition among young Army officers, as part of the campaign to change the leadership style. Interviews with a Kostrad s Battalion s officers. 316 Interview M The respondent s house where the interview took place was located around fifty metres from the official house of the commander that he pointed out. So, it could be clearly seen what he meant. 124

157 starving and have no houses, and the units have no trucks, ambulance or sufficient health facilities; other officials (pejabat) are more or less like that. He said, The commander is treated like a king, but he gives nothing to develop his unit and to help the soldiers. In coping with the economic difficulties, there had been official nation-wide government programs of planting unused lands (penenaman lahan tidur). The programs were operated under the ABRI Masuk Desa (ABRI Enters the Villages) Programs. There was no available document from the military about Lahan Tidur, but Appendix shows a document from the Department of Education illustrating how the program was organized interinstitutionally on a large scale. 318 This included, at its small scale at the local level, military units being instructed to convert the gardens within the units complexes into farming lands for planting various crops needed for the soldiers families. (However, in the opinion of one of my respondents, the harvest results did not help significantly in solving the problems, while the soldiers felt that they used more energy than they got from the programs. 319 ) Some field commanders, such as those at Battalion level, understood the economic problems facing the soldiers, but they also had to implement stronger measures of discipline over their soldiers, as required by higher instructions. 320 Some of my respondents reported that, to reduce the pressures on the soldiers, some commanders said to the soldiers, You can break the rule as long as the top (yang diatas) does not know, or, If you do it cleverly and safely (asalkan pinter-pinter); and Most of us understand what this means and play it well. 321 So, in applying the 318 The document is an official letter from the Director of Higher Degrees of the Department of Education of the Republic of Indonesia, sent to Indonesian State and Private Universities, requesting them to provide technical assistance to the programs. See also Kasad Subagio: Saya akan perintahkan prajurit bertani. (Chief of Staff of the Army, Subagio: I will instruct soldiers to do farming), Kompas November Interview M It was common in the units under the command of Kostrad (Komando Strategi Cadangan Angkatan Darat Strategic Reserve Command), to apply the rule that if one soldier or officer breaks the discipline, the commanders who were up to two steps above will be also given punishment as their leadership responsibility. This was to ensure that the commanders/superior officers paid greater attention to the leadership factor, such as control and supervision. Interviews M112, M148, M Interviews M11, M10, M

158 discipline measures, there was a compromise in the commanders feelings between their feeling of insecurity against their higher command and their personal integrity on one hand, and their understanding about the difficulties of their soldiers on the other. 6. Summary Three important related developments have been identified: the nearly collapse of law and order, the demoralization of the military and a psychological vacuum of power; and the rise of democratic forces. The first development, there were mass attacks on targets associated by the mobs with beneficiaries of the New Order system. In the cities this was demonstrated by the attacks on Chinese community and their properties, while outside the cities by attacks on lands and properties owned by state or state institutions, including the military. In the communal conflicts there emerged issues such as Dukun Santét killings and Ninja hunting in In all of these conflicts the military was unable to deal with them effectively. The military prescriptions to solve the problems were largely rejected, and the people carried out their own unlawful solutions. The military was not always the direct target, yet it was the one commonly blamed for the reasons of the conflicts and most of the effects that they created. In the communal conflicts, it was blamed for not acting sufficiently or for not taking any action while it was restrained from acting effectively. In the land conflicts, it was blamed for protecting and siding with the rich. This accusation helped restrain the military intention to act decisively to stop the land takeovers by the villagers. There was a great feeling of confusion and reluctant attitudes among the soldiers and officers. Consequently, there existed some feeling of a vacuum of power at the community level, despite the physical presence of the security forces. At the same time, political circumstances encouraged an emergence of democracy. One clear example of this phenomenon was the mushrooming of Posko Gotong Royong (Communication Posts for Community Mutual 126

159 Aid) set up by PDIP supporters. It was impressive because in a short time their number became massive, and they represented an emergence of a social force that would stand against the military s control over the society. So, in general, it seems that there were strong dialectical relationships among the three developments, the almost collapse of law and order, the military demoralization and the emergence of democracy. The great effect of this growing power of the public was not only on the attitudes of the local military officers and soldiers, but also contributed at the national level where the military leadership responded by issuing some new policies about military reforms. As discussed in the last section, the reform policies took the form of a paradigm shift from the New Order s Dwifungsi the security and political Dual Function of the military to a much more restricted political role for the military. The immediate impact of the paradigm shift on the efforts to improve the military image by measures to increase the discipline of the soldiers was not quite significant; nevertheless, they further opened broader entrances for more systematic changes to happen, as demonstrated in Chapter Six. 127

160 Chapter Six LOCAL INSTITUTIONAL REFORMS: Dismantling the military s political networks The key issue is one of setting limits within which members of the armed forces, and the military as an institution, accept the government s definitions of appropriate areas of responsibility Introduction: The three reforms Democratizing civil military relations requires re-establishment of clear boundaries between the military and the civilian political institutions as a way of cutting down the military s direct political roles. As mentioned in Chapter Three, in the past New Order (military) regime these border lines were very blurred or absent, with the security and political roles integrated. Not only did individual military officers 322 Welch, Jr. Claude E., Civilian Control of the Military, Op. cit, p

161 occupy positions in civilian political and bureaucratic institutions, but military institutions equipped themselves with political functions. In addition to this horizontal integration, there was a strong vertical integration as the decisionmaking processes within civilian institutions at all levels were highly centralized and arranged in strict hierarchies parallel to the structures of military commands. To re-establish borders between the military and civilian institutions, three packages of reforms have been very important parts of national reform programs. One was the depoliticizing of military institutions, that is, the elimination of organizational elements within military institutions that carry out direct political roles. Another was the demilitarizing of civilian institutions, that is, the withdrawal of all military personnel from them. The third was the decentralizing of governmental decision-making processes, which reduced the absolute power of the central government. The concern of this chapter is the forms and extents of these changes and their effects on the military in their attempts to separate the civil and military institutions and to cut the military s direct political roles a crucial step in a democratic transition from a military rule before civilian control over the military can be established. 2. De-politicization of military institutions As mentioned previously, territorial commands and territorial commanders were equipped with organizational elements such as the Staf Sospol (Social-Political Staff Unit), Dewan Sospol or Wansopol (Social-Political Board), Bakorstanasda (Regional Coordinating Agency for Stability and Resilience) and the Litsus or Penelitian Khusus (Special Screening) 323 that were assigned political roles during the New Order era. The post-new Order military reforms abolished these elements of the military institution, and attempted to bring the territorial command back to its original functions in the defence and security areas. The following subsections deal with the abolition process of each of the four bodies. 323 Detailed descriptions of these have been provided in Chapter Three. 129

162 2.1. Staf Sospol The Staf Sospol were replaced by Komsos (Social Communication) from April 1, The change in name was intended to indicate that the military no longer had roles in political affairs. The level of authority of this replacement body was reduced; at KODAM (Regional Military Command) level it became a sub-section of Territorial Staff. A Sospol had been led by a Colonel, while a Komsos was by a Major, thus lowered by two levels. In addition to the elimination of the Colonel-level position, its staff numbers were also cut down by more than a half. 324 The scope of its function was limited to being an administration service, such as in arranging recruitment or replacement, for the military representatives in the DPRD. 325 Moreover, this role would continue only until 2004 when that statutory military representation in the parliaments would cease. However, the job description for its daily tasks still followed the same job description that used to apply to the Staf Sospol. 326 One respondent said, There is no need to rush; people would never check in such detail. He added that civilians would only need to know that the name has changed, and that is enough to show the military s good intentions. 327 This opinion reflected the limits on civilian understanding of what was happening inside the military, including the depth of the political reforms within the military institution. It also reflected that what the military called Internal Reform was at least as much a showing of responses to public demands as satisfying an organizational reform inquiry. The task of coordinating the presence of the military representatives who were still in the DPRD until 2004 also kept the Komsos active in political matters. In addition to routine communications (regular reports) between the F-TNI/POLRI from all Districts, political lobbying by civilian politicians seeking support from the KODAM, for example, were still made through this section before they could see the Regional Commander in Chief (Pangdam) or his 324 It was not clear how many personnel in KODAM V Brawijaya were affected by the changes in the replacement of Sospol by Komsos, but a respondent estimated a figure of around three hundred including those who had worked in the KODAM HQ itself, the four KOREM HQs, and the thirty four KODIM HQs. Some of them were moved to territorial staff, others were temporarily stationed with no job in the HQs Maintenance Companies. Interview M43. At the District level (KODIM/Military District Command) the Staf Sospol Section was reduced to a sub-section of Komsos and integrated into the Intelligence Section headed by a Captain; its daily tasks were focused on collecting Social-Political Data from Sub-district Commands; and it was no longer required to communicate directly with the Sub-district government. Interview M Interview M Interview M Interview M

163 Territorial Assistant. Many politician respondents who I asked about their approaches to get support from the KODAM in the cases of Bupati or Mayoral Elections mentioned that they were linked to the Territorial Assistant or the Pangdam by Komsos and Territorial Staff. 328 Although some of my military respondents expressed their worries that in the new system the military may have difficulties in getting information related to the prevention of security disturbances, mostly they felt relieved with the elimination of Sospol Staff because this reduced the complexity of territorial tasks 329. Especially the lower-ranked officers viewed the information provided by the civilian governments as full of formality routines and useless because most of the information was not up-to-date and no better than what was openly available in newspapers or radio. 330 One respondent claimed that the most important reason they kept communicating with the civilian government, mainly the Sub-district Governments (Kecamatan), had been the money as the fruit of communication (nge-ter), which can exceed the monthly salary. Apart from the fact that financially the abolition was a disadvantage, as discussed below, in general the tasks of the Staf Sospol were regarded as burdening, mainly because they dealt with information involving the complexity of the social-political problems that most staff members (especially the lower ranks) were not specifically prepared and trained for. 331 Respondents who had worked as staff officers in this Section said that that they were pleased to see that the abolition of Sospol has closed the gate to external interaction 332 about social and political matters. Another respondent, the Chairman of a F-TNI/ POLRI, said that the most obvious difference between the past Staf Sospol and the new Komsos was that, while the former intensively instructed and controlled the members of the F-TNI/ POLRI, the latter simply received information, helped administration of the factions and was much less active than the former. 333 This suggests that it did minimize the military s external 328 Interviews M81, M109, M Interviews M43, M112, M Interview M The respondent was an Ex-Chief of Sospol Staff at District Command. Interview M Interviews M11, M32, M Interview M33. See laso Appendixes 7 and 8 that show that F-TNI/POLRI of the District or Provincial DPRDs routinely submitted reports to their respective Headquarters. 131

164 political relations. Compared to the Sospol Staf 334, the Komsos had a very low degree of external political relations Wansospol Whereas the elimination of Sospol staff slightly reduced the status, staffing and the structure of territorial staff, the elimination of the Wansospol, the regional and subregional Boards of Sospol, abolished the formal authority of territorial commanders at the regional or sub-regional level in determining the possible occupancy of positions of District Bupati or Mayor or other civilian positions by active or retired military officers with the rank of Colonel or just below. 335 However, just as Komsos was not entirely free from all political tasks, some territorial commanders still attempted to determine the outcomes of the Bupati or Mayoral Elections. As will be discussed in Chapter Eight, the cases of Sumberwaras (2000), Buluhlawang (2003) or Mangun Redjo (2003), for example, demonstrated such involvement, 336 although the ways became much more under-cover and based on personal relations. The cases also show that this involvement could happen because the civilian political elites were inclined to try to use the remaining influence of the military for their own political interests. 337 Most of the involvements of territorial commanders in the local government leaders elections were a consequence of the continued existence of the military representatives in the relevant DPRD because some of the commanders held the view that as they were responsible for supervising the military representatives they thus had the political right to be involved, including setting political preferences for the military representatives. However, several other of my military respondents said that it was money that motivated the commanders more than the other reason. 338 However, because of the new changes, the political roles that the commanders could play had become very much limited. One former Wansospol member 334 As described in Chapter Four, the Staf Sospol used to communicate intensively with Sospol Offices of the local governments at the Provincial and the District levels, with the F-ABRI/F-TNI/POLRI of the legislatures at both levels and with the various social organizations under the supervision of the military. 335 How these authorities were used in the past has been discussed in Chapter Three. 336 Interviews M59, M83, M109, K58, P85, D Interviews D105, D101, P Interviews M83, M89, B57. This is discussed in more detail in Chapter Eight. 132

165 suggested that since the abolition of the Wansospol, the job rotations of local government officials can no longer be controlled by the military (that is, the territorial commanders) as they could be previously. Explicitly, his concern was mostly about the loss of the military s ability to prevent undesirable groups, referring to Communist or Islamic radical supporters, from occupying these local government leadership positions. Implicitly, though, he also expressed the loss of the military officers more general opportunities to dominate the course of politics. 339 Unlike in the Staf Sospol, these regional Wansopol positions had been mostly occupied by officers at the rank of at least Lieutenant Colonel. With their capabilities both in terms of political experience and knowledge, as well the possibility of personal interests in these positions, therefore, the abolition was seen as a greater disadvantage for the military, especially for the higher ranks Bakorstanasda and Litsus The elimination of the security agency Bakorstanas and the political screening Litsus were decided by President Wahid issuing a Presidential Decree (Keppres. No.38/ 2000) which was announced by the Cabinet Secretary, Marsilam Simanjuntak on 10 March According to Simanjuntak, the President would like to see that nobody will be seen as a threat unless proven otherwise by intelligence. Since then all previous political surveillance roles for the military, except those of the observation activities [genuinely] related to security and measures, were formally abolished. The President urged that "financial matters, (and) ongoing duties of the Agency will be settled by the TNI Chief Commander in one month, followed by a report to the President afterwards." 340 This implies that the President recognized that in the past there had been distortion by the New Order government through these institutions in defining and handling what the regime viewed as threats by the citizens against the state See Chapter Four, Interviews M89, M See Sudomo: Seharusnya sudah dilakukan dari dulu (Sudomo: it should have been done long ago), Kompas, 9 March The military itself realized this distortion. The Jawa Pos, a local newspaper, published an apology from the Military Area Commander in Chief, Pangdam Maj.Gen. Sudi Silalahi, to the East Java people after the abolition of Bakorstanasda. See Jawa Pos, 6 April

166 De facto, however, the Bakorstanasda (the local, regional and district, versions of the Bakorstanas) and Litsus had already effectively ceased to operate before the announcement. As discussed in Chapter Five they had been ineffective since the May 1998 reform movements. Bakorstanasda did not and could not act to curb mob attacks on Chinese in Surabaya and Jember, land takeovers by the villagers, or Dukun Santét and Ninja murders. Also, the Litsus had no longer been applied to vet the candidates in the 1999 general election. 342 Despite this, however, as in the case of the Wansospol, concerns about the abolition of the Bakorstanasda and Litsus included the possibility of the resurrection of Communist groups, including in power struggles to get into the top positions of the local governmental institutions. 343 Nevertheless, at the national level, the State Intelligence (Bakin) Chief, Lt. General Arie J. Kumaat said, that the "cancellation of these rules will not relax our alertness in the job. We will coordinate all intelligence activities in an effective way to guard the country. 344 The Bakorstanasda and Litsus had been considered to be important parts of both political and also intelligence instruments. In the past, military territorial commanders had strong power in local intrainstitution relations because of their utilization of these instruments. Unlike Wansospol, these institutions also had dealt intensively with problems at the regional and local levels, including social and communal conflicts. They also stored much information vital to the maintenance of the security and stability of the New Order regime. Therefore, the abolition of these institutions would contribute to a significant reduction in political influence. The importance of this elimination was that they were formally liquidated, so it closed any legal road to revive and restore them. Remarkably, in constrast with the foreshadowed liquidation of the Staf Sospol and WanSospol, the abolition of the Bakorstanasda and Litsus had never been outlined in the military internal-reform programs. One respondent said that this was because the military have never thought that the potential for resurrection of the latent communist threats (bahaya laten komunis) had diminished the 342 Unlike during the New Order era, legislature candidates were no longer required to pass the special screenings which were carried out by the Territorial Commands and Bakorstanasda. Thus, there were no longer those who were declared unacceptable by being categorized as unclean in terms of Communist influence. 343 Interviews M4, M3, M See Sudomo: Seharusnya sudah dilakukan dari dulu (Sudomo: It should have been done long ago), Kompas, 9 March Interview M11. In a meeting between the Resort Military Command (KREM) of Surabaya with social and informal leaders of Sampang Regency, the Commander, Colonel Bambang Suratmo, made clear that TNI 134

167 threat that the Bakorstanas and Litsus had been originally directed to counter when they were originally created in 1988 and 1990 respectively. Therefore, looking at how easy it was for President Wahid to abolish these institutions but how important they were in the military s view, an argument can be made that the military position at that point of time was very weak, not only against the public 346 as discussed in Chapter Five, but also against the new President (especially in the first year of Wahid s presidency). 347 The liquidation of Staf Sospol, Wansospol, Bakorstanasda and Litsus removed political elements attached to the military institutions, or depoliticized them. The following section is about removing military elements within the civilian institutions, or demilitarizing them. 3. Demilitarization of Political Institutions Two important policies of demilitarization that significantly reduced the military political power within the civilian political institutions were the withdrawal of military officers from the civilian local government bureaucracies (Pemda), and the reduction (and foreshadowed abolition) of military seats in the local parliaments (DPRD) Withdrawal from the government bureaucracy On 15 February 1999, the Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces, General Wiranto, signed a Decision (Decree No. Kep/03/P/II/1999) to withdraw all military active-duty officers from civilian jobs. The Decree stated that personnel were given rejected abolishing MPR (Congress) Decree/TAP MPRS No. XXV/1966 that disbanded communism in Indonesia. See Jawa Pos 1 May People s actions against the military were sporadically still taking place in In Jombang, for example, the President s original town, the Bupati, Retired Colonel Affandi and his staff were held as hostages for three hours by a mob under the coordination of KMPR/Komite Mahasiswa Peduli Rakyat (Student Committee for Care of the People). The mob demanded land re-distribution, abolition of Territorial Commands and an increase in labor welfare. 347 A month after the abolition of Bakorstanas and Litsus, President Wahid led a Loyalty Roll Call (Apel Kesetiaan) of 15,000 NU BANSER militia, the supporters of the President, in front of the HQ of KODAM V Brawijaya, Surabaya. See Jawa Pos, 22 May This could be seen as a show of force by the President to the military. 135

168 three choices: to come back to their military units; to retire early; or to change their status from military to civilian servants at the same level. 348 Those in the positions of local government leaders as Bupati or Mayors mostly chose to be retired early and run for a second term in elections for a second five year period in office). 349 (No one in fact successfully achieved the extension. 350 ) Most officers who were not local government leaders returned to their military units, a small number transferred to become civil servants. 351 By mid-august 2000, in East Java there were no longer any active military officers serving as the Heads of local government Executives, except Col. Indarto, the Bupati of Tuban, who retired in There were also no longer any officers assigned to be the Chiefs of Kansospol (Social-Political Offices), Heads of Organda (Local Transportation), Heads of PDAM (Perusuhan Daerah Air Minum, Local Drinking Water Companies), Heads of Terminal (Bus Stations), Heads of Pasar (Main Markets), Parking Managers or other local government positions with political or economic clout. By comparison, in 1997 thirty three of the Province s thirty seven Regency and City Government leaders had been military officers, while hundreds of others controlled the other jobs mentioned above. Even though in general the withdrawal from most staff positions took up to a year 353, the withdrawals from the Bupati and Mayor positions, the top District leaders, were not completed until 2003, for example, in the Regencies of Bangkalan, Bojonegoro, Nganjuk, Pasuruan, Probolinggo and Jombang. Although the Bupatis were already formally retired from the military, they were still the same persons, and could still have the same political perceptions and behaviour. The ways the demilitarizing reforms were carried out, therefore, to a great extent depend on those persons. Also, in maintaining power, they may have seen that their individual interests could no longer mainly rely on the supports from 348 Keputusan Menhankam/Pangab Nomor Kep/03/P/II/1999, issued 15 February Cover of this document is shown in the Appendix Interview M For further details see Chapter Seven, Section Interviews M43, M The case of Colonel Indarto became controversial after he was increasingly accused of corruption before the Tuban Bupati Election. See for example, Pangdam Persilahkan Periksa Bupati Tuban Jawa Pos, 29 April See also Jawa Pos, 20 May 2000 about permission given by the Regional Military Commander, Pangdam Silalahi, for the investigation of Indarto s case. 353 According to one respondent, an ex-chief of the Kansospol in a Regency Government, the officers were given a maximum of one year to decide their preferences. Interview M

169 the military institutions but they would need to build relations with other social forces, although this by no means required they have no important relations, which could be in political, economic or other forms, with the military. Until 2003 in those Regencies the withdrawal simply involved changing the status of the top leaders from active-service to retired military officers, instead of completely eliminating the links between the military and the centres of local political power. One respondent who used to work as the Chief of the Kansospol in a Regency Government said that the withdrawal from civilian institutions was the primary step that indicated the military commitment to leave direct political roles. 354 Given the past occupation by the military officers of the top leaderships of the local governments and strategic (politically and economically) positions of the chiefs of staff (as discussed in Chapter Three), the impact of the withdrawal from local bureaucracies was the abolition of the military s presence and direct control over the local government executives policies through which political power and economic resources were directed. Thus, the withdrawal was a big cut of the control of power in both political and economic senses. In addition, because the military-executive relations can be seen as the military s political support to the bureaucracy, the withdrawal could mean becoming free from political obligations. A retired military respondent who was an ex-dandim (Military District Commander) said that when he became Dandim the main indicators of whether or not he was successful in doing his job were: first, whether or not the Golkar ruling party won the election within his commanding area; second, whether or not the Bupati was happy about the way he secured the government s development programs; and third, in relation to the second, whether or not his superiors were happy about his territorial capabilities (kemampuan nge-ter). This Nge-ter capability refers to the degree of socializing with local politicians and businessmen and the amount of money (setoran) sent to the superiors as the fruits of this socialization. 355 In this sense, his relationship with the bureaucracy was in giving political support more than one of political control. Nevertheless, because mostly both the military and the executive leaders were 354 Interview M29. This was confirmed by another ex-chief of the Kansospol in another Regency, Interview B The respondent was a former Dandim, Interview M113. Similar explanations were also given by another former Dandim. Interview M

170 from the same source, the officer corps, the withdrawal meant the decline of power, regardless of whether it was seen as a control or support. This was especially true for the case of the leaders of the executives. As already mentioned, local power used to be concentrated in the local government executive. In this sense, the military withdrawal from the local government bureaucracy meant a sharp decline in the military s political influence in terms of inter-institutional controls over other local institutions such as legislative and judiciary bodies as well as over the community. The structure of formal authority at the District level, for example, was clearly characterized by the strong top-down control by the Bupati or Mayor who was also usually the most senior Colonel among other Heads of local institutions. A retired-military officer respondent who had been the Speaker of a local Assembly s F-ABRI in 1998 reported to me that until 1998 everything (apapun) was determined by the Mayor (Pak Wali) who was the most senior retired-colonel. This Speaker of the DPRD was also a retired-colonel but junior to him. Both the Military District Commander as well as the Chief of the District Police were Lieutenant Colonels, and were clearly junior players obliged to support the Mayor. 356 In informal forums such as the Muspida 357 too, the position of the Bupati or Mayor was very strong. After the reforms, under civilian leaderships, the Muspida still exist, but the military can no longer dominate or steer them. The Dandim was the only military officer left in the forum, and instead of controlling, he was now the one being controlled and watched by others. 358 One respondent revealed that recently the Dandim was rarely present at the local Muspida forum; instead, he delegated his chief of the Intelligence Section, a Captain, to attain the Muspida meetings. 359 The Muspida allowance (Uang Muspida) was still distributed every month directly to the Commanders, not to those who were delegated to attend. 360 However, its value was small (around Aus $300) though for many of the local Indonesians that would be a lot of extra money for turning up to meetings of a council and there 356 The respondent was a former Chairman of an F-ABRI. Interview M Detailed description about the Muspida is given in Chapter Three. 358 Interview M The respondents were staff of a Bakesbang. Interview B The respondent was the Chief of a Regency Government s Finance Sub-Division. Interview B

171 was no more additional (ceperan) fund assistance from the local executive because the military was no longer controlling the relations. In Chapters Nine and Ten, about the impact of this withdrawal on the local military as well as on the military s abilities to control the outcomes of the local elections, it is clear that the withdrawal did significantly cut down the military s direct control over the local governments, though the speed of the process varied from one District to another. For example, in Ngawi Regency, where in 1999 a civilian successfully replaced a military leader as the Bupati, the process of de-militarizing the civilian government bureaucracy was carried out more quickly than in Pasuruan, where the replacement of the retired-military Bupati took place in So, the withdrawal abolished military presence in and direct control over the local executive body where local political power and economic resources were concentrated, minimized the military s control (through the executive leader position) over other local institutions (legislature and judiciary bodies), and reduced the central military s control (through its local units) over local politics Eliminating military representatives seats in the local Assemblies The elimination of the military representatives from the local parliaments in 2004 was preceded by the reduction of the number of the military seats from 20 percent to 10 percent with the completion of the 1999 general election. 361 Without an alliance with Golkar this number was very weak, 362 especially compared to factions such as the F-DIP or F-KB which occupied around a half or even in some areas took around two thirds of the total seats. 363 In terms of the leadership of the local Assemblies (DPRD) too, there was a significant decrease on the side of the military. While they used to dominate the leadership positions including the 361 The allocation of ten percent guaranteed around 3 to 5 of a total 20 to 45 seats. In the Regencies or Cities with populations of more than a half million, their DPRD had 45 members with 5 of them from the F-TNI/POLRI (formerly the F-ABRI). Those with a population below a half million had members, with 3 of them from the F-TNI/POLRI. 362 As part of the TNI s Internal Reform, in April 1999 the TNI decided to cease its relation with Golkar, the New Order ruling party in which the territorial commanders used to be the Head of the local Dewan Pembina (Directive Boards), and military families used to be members of Golkar s local branch leaderships or members of the Golkar faction in the local legislature. 363 In the Regency of Magetan, for example, the PDIP occupied 22 of 45 seats in the DPRD; in Madiun 20 of 45; in Situbondo the PKB was elected to 25 of the 45; in Sampang 25 of 45 members. In other Districts the PDIP and PKB won more or less the same number of seats with about one third each. 139

172 Chairmen or Speakers of DPRD or the chairmen of committees, in East Java after 1999 there have been no longer military officers serving as Chairman of any DPRD, and only a small number of the DPRDs that chose a military officer as one of the three Deputies of their Chairman (and these are mostly unimportant positions). Since such positions were chosen by voting, the failure of the officers to win positions was closely related to the faction s small number of seats and their relative lack of non-factional appeal. In addition to the factors of the cessation of relations with Golkar 364 which replaced most of the members of military families and relatives from the parliamentary representatives of this faction, the decrease in the influence of the military in the over three dozen DPRD across the Province was also caused by other factors. These included the increasing resistance of the public to the existence of the military in the DPRD 365 and the decrease of the military s institutional support to the individual military representatives in the DPRD as a consequence of the central military s commitment to leave politics. This last factor will be discussed more in Chapter Eight and Nine and, but it is important to note here that it created conflicts of interests internally among the military elements, and reduced its solidarity, cohesiveness and bargaining power against other components in the many and various DPRD. The recruitment of the members of F-TNI/POLRI seems also to have changed and this contributed to the faction s declined influence. Before 1999 the military Headquarters sent at least Lieutenant Colonels who had considerable political experience and knowledge to occupy positions at the DPRD. After 1999 the Headquarters sent lower rank officers, mainly Captains and Majors, 366 and from 2001 they also sent First and Second Lieutenants, the lowest rank of military officers, and with very little, or no, previous experience in politics. 367 By 2003, the year before the military representation was to end, only around twenty percent of the remaining representatives were Lieutenant Colonels. Most of those were 364 The military-golkar relations during the New Order are described in Chapter Three. 365 Interviews M4, M According to a respondent this was because the military did not see the military positions in the DPRD as important anymore, the position was only to fulfill what the Law required about staying in the DPRD until This was found for example in the Regencies of Bangkalan, Pamekasan and Magetan. 140

173 about to retire from military service, and were usually less committed to the military units they had come from but were more individually focused and money oriented. 368 A long-serving politician suggested to me in 2003 that the quality of the military representatives was much worse than the previous ones. He described them as following their own paths and more ignorant of public aspirations, adding that the officers frequently ignored the aspirations of the military units, for example, over issues such as allocation of security funds assistance from the local government budget (APBD) for the units. 369 One F-KB politician viewed the decline of the military s political role in the DPRD as a consequence of decreasing support and control from the KODAM the Territorial Command. Unlike during the Soeharto era when the Regional KODAM very tightly controlled the military representatives, now it did not set specific political targets for them. Consequently, the attitudes of the military officers in the legislature, as described by the respondent, tend to be wait and see, less motivated, and less initiative, especially in terms of responding to the public s aspirations. 370 Manshur 371, a senior Golkar politician, expressed to me his concern about the low quality of members of the F-TNI/POLRI in the DPRD of Batang City. He regarded them as too innocent, and too conservative for today political conditions. For example, he said, it has become common strategy for civilian politicians to mobilize their constituents to come to the DPRD prior or after Assembly meetings, with the constituents voices being used to support the politicians positions on certain issues such as development projects because the politicians had individual interests in the projects. Another example, he said, was when some groups of politicians collaborated in advancing their interests; group A asked group B to propose A s interest in an Assembly forum, and in return, A would propose B s 368 This was reported by a young officer respondent who had experiences with what he called unpleasant attitudes (prilaku memalukan). Interview M The respondent, who was also a member of the Golkar faction, pointed out two examples of military aspirations for which they should have been active, but did not appear interested: one was the debates on annual budget allocations for security operations by the local KODIM and Polres, the local military and police units; the second was about financial or equipment assistance for these units. Instead of the F-TNI/POLRI, it was the F- Golkar which had tried hard to support the proposals in many occasions. Civilian (Golkar s DPRD Member) Interview G Civilian (PKB s DPRD Member) Interview K Manshur, a senior politician from Golkar and the Chairman of the DPRD of Batang City, said that he had worked for than twenty years as a Member of the DPRD, and used to be very close to members of the F- TNI/POLRI (previously the F-ABRI). 141

174 interest. Also, he said, political negotiations with the executive that involved bribes, pressures or other dirty tricks had been usual among the civilian politicians. In his stated opinion, the young officers, the military representatives, in the three examples just mentioned were unable to differentiate between which ones are real demonstrations and which ones are not; to identify who speaks for whom, or to understand why the executive agrees or disagrees with an arrangement that in these officers view was illogical. The current military representatives were much less skilful politically than the current civilian politicians. 372 However, despite their decreased power, the continued presence of the military representatives in the DPRD until 2004 considerably complicated the efforts of withdrawing them from direct political roles that had been started in 1999 in the immediately post-new Order reformasi period. As with the members of other factions, the F-TNI/POLRI remained involved in reviewing, planning and evaluating the local government policies, and even got involved in the power politics in the process of local elections for the Bupati or Mayors positions. How this complicated the efforts in specific cases is discussed in detail in Chapter Seven. Here it suffices to say that there was serious confusion among the members of military factions about what the military neutrality position being drawn by the central leaderships meant in actual practice, especially in relation to their own DPRD jobs. Generally speaking, on one hand, the military institution was committed to a neutral position with the faction s individual members given freedom to take political positions. On the other hand, they were told that their memberships in the DPRD were military assignments (penugasan) so they were to represent the military institution, not the people. Therefore, they would have to obey what the institution told them. This ambiguity was interpreted differently and loosely by different members in accordance with their individual interests. Some officers viewed their status in the DPRD as a duty appointment (penugasan), which meant representing the military rather than as a representative (perwakilan) of the people. These different views seem to affect the degree of their attachment and loyalty to the 372 Interview G

175 military. Which interests they attempted to support, whether the military s or the civilians when conflicts arose between them, would depend partly on their different perceptions and could therefore be different for different people. For example, those such as Lieutenant Colonel (Police) Dwi Usyanto from the F- TNI/POLRI, the Deputy of the Chairman of the Madiun Regency DPRD, emphasised that because the nature of the officers tasks at the DPRD was an appointment from their institution, they had to be committed to the mission the institutions intend to achieve. They had to follow the sistem komando (the command system) outlined by the institution, and work for the interests of the institutions. 373 In contrast, others, such as Lieutenant Colonel Paulus, the Chairman of the F-TNI/POLRI of the Sidoarjo Regency DPRD suggested that once the officers start working at the DPRD, they had to think of themselves as being representatives of the people because they were members of a DPRD (Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat Daerah/Local House of People s Representatives), not perwakilan militer (representatives of the military). Paulus, who was about to retire, did not agree with the idea that the officers at the DPRD had to primarily promote the interests of the military. 374 Whether or not they represented the people could also be questionable. Bambang Sunggono, a politician from the F-PAN of the Jember Regency DPRD and also a lecturer at the Islamic University of Jember, criticized the fact that it was discernible that because of the majority of members of DPRD from the military are not originally from the local area, they appear to be less attached to the local people. 375 In fact, more than ninety percent of these officers did not come from the Regencies or Cities where they had become DPRD members. 376 Unlike the 373 Interview M At the time of interview the respondent was in conflict with the KODAM HQ over his replacement due to his membership period having exceeded his retirement date by 6 months. Interview M49. One respondent in the DPRD Secretariat mentioned that the Provincial Headquarters had three times sent an officer to ask for the replacement of this retired officer, but the DPRD had not responded positively because the replacement would change the constellation of politics in the DPRD. Besides, according to the respondent, he had lobbied the Chairman of the DPRD to not sign the letter of agreement for the replacement. Interview B Interview A For example, in the DPRD of Blitar City, , none of the three members of the F-TNI/POLRI were from Blitar. One was born in Yogyakarta and lived in Malang, two hours by car from Blitar; one was born in Jombang and stayed temporarily in Blitar; and another one was born in Boyolali in Central Java and lived in Surabaya, four hours by car from Blitar. Another example was in Pasuruan City where of the three members of the F-TNI/POLRI, none was born or stayed there. Similar cases were found in most districts. See data from Asosiasi DPRD Kota Seluruh Indonesia (All-Indonesia Association of City DPRD). Internet source: 143

176 civilian members of the DPRD, who must be permanent residents of the Regencies or Cities, the officers did not have to be and they stayed in them only some days a week, but spent most of their time elsewhere. This is one reason why the way they experienced and understood local societies problems was different. While the civilian Assembly members seemed to be more attached to their local constituents, the officers seemed to be less so. 377 Unlike the civilians who realized that their performance at the DPRD would affect their constituents trust, and thus affect their future political career, the military officers did not have accountability to any such local constituency. This section has shown that there were several important factors that reduced the military power in the DPRD: the cutting of military seats by a half; the termination of military relations with Golkar; the departure of military officers from DPRD leaderships; the change in the recruitment that treated military representative jobs as less important for the military headquarters; the different/unclear interpretations of their job by the faction members (between penugasan and perwakilan ); and the growing public resistance to any military presence in the DPRD. In what ways this reduction of power affected military power in local politics will be discussed more especially in Chapter Seven and Eight about the elections of District Heads. 4. Impact of Decentralization on the local military The process of democratization in Indonesia has involved a decentralization 378 of government that loosened the very tight control of the central over the local governments. As discussed below, this decentralization had also affected the civilmilitary relations at the local levels in several ways. First, it eliminated the existence of the military-created political office (Kansospol) within the local governments. Second, it minimized the effectiveness of the Muspida in which the military commanders used to have access to the local institutions. Third, it minimized the roles of the military in the local elections. Fourth, it cut the link between the District and the Provincial levels, thus minimizing the opportunity for 377 Interview A Decentralization was regulated by the Law No. 22/1999 on Regional Autonomy and the Law No.25/1999 on the Regional Government s Finance. Both Laws were produced during the Habibie Presidency, but became effective in January 2000 during the President Abdurrahman Wahid period. 144

177 the higher Military Commands at the Provincial level to maintain their interests within the District-level governments. Fifth, Law No 25/1999 about the decentralisation of financial allocations ruled out any possibility that the local government budget could be overtly devoted to defence and security funding assistance. Each of these is discussed below Liquidation of the Kansospol The Law No. 22/1999 on Regional Autonomy specified functions and encouraged the restructuring of the local governments. This ruled out the existence of the Kansospol and created the Bakesbang (Badan Kordinasi Kesatuan Bangsa/Coordinating Body for National Unity) in its place. As discussed above, the occupation of the position of the Head of Kansospol by military officers was ended by the military withdrawal programs, yet the existence of the Kakansospol itself was put to an end only after the Autonomy Law became effective in January The new body was very different from the previous Kansospol in that, for example, there was no longer a section for the Litsus (Special Screening) which had been a vital element in the Kansospol structure. New elements such as the Sub-bagian Masalah Strategis dan Pemasyarakatan HAM (Subdivision for Strategic Problems and Human Rights Dissemination) was also added. Unlike the Kansospol, the Bakesbang was not given specific political tasks, so it had no political authority over government employees. 379 It also has changed the way the governments have relations with political parties and organizations. According to the Chief of the Malang City Bakesbang, the government no longer supervised the political parties but now regards them as the partners of the government, thus the relations have formally changed from superior-inferior to equal. The government, consequently, no longer has responsibility in assisting financial matters of the organizations. Unlike in the past, the financial assistances can no longer used as a weapon by the government to justify its involvement in the internal matters of the organizations and to play one group against another. The organizations now are free to gather and to speak up 379 Interview G6. 145

178 about their political inspiration and aspirations, and the bureaucracy too can concentrate on its service to the public. 380 According to one respondent, who was an official of the Malang Regency Bakesbang, the most important impact of the liquidation of the Kansospol had been the diminishing of the military s political channel in the bureaucratic structure. 381 Yet, as suggested by another official of the same Bakesbang, some degree of intelligence coordination with the Military Command is still carried out. This is through a District-level forum called the FKI/Forum Kordinasi Intelijen (Intelligence Coordination Forum) and involves intelligence elements among the Muspida members, such as the Intelligence Section of the KODAM (District Military Command), of the Polres (District Police), of the Local Attorney General, of the Local Judiciary, and of the Bakesbang. The Forums (one in every District) meet regularly once a month to discuss social security issues. 382 Despite this, the respondent also said that the meeting is not as intensive as when the Kansospol existed. The issues shared in the discussion were very limited because the current Bakesbang no longer did the Special Screening (Litsus) and no longer collected intelligence information directly. In addition, he admitted that although the top leaders of the local institutions (Muspida members) had become the members of the FKI they rarely attended the forum in person but sent the Chief of their respective Intelligence Sections who came and then reported to them afterwards. 383 So, as shown by the creation of the FKI forums the military s direct channel into the Bakesbang was not fully eliminated, but the scope of relations has been very much limited compared with the old Kansospol Changing Relations between the District Government s Executive and Legislature The previous Law on Local Government, Law No 5/1974, which had operated during and as an important element of the New Order, dictated that Local Government (Pemerintahan Daerah) consisted of the bureaucratic Executive and 380 Interview B The respondent was a former staff member of a Kansospol and a lecturer at a private university in Malang. Interview B The respondent was a staff member of the FKI. Interview B Interview B

179 the parliamentary Legislature (DPRD). 384 In practice, however, the Executive controlled the Legislature; the latter was dependent on the former and became solely a rubber-stamp body that would justify legally all policies and their implementation as initiated by the Executive. 385 The new Law No. 22/1999 gave more power to the Legislature to control the Executive. 386 As will be discussed in Chapter Eleven, the logical consequence would be a significant change in the relations, from subordinate to superior (or equal) on the part of the Legislature. In reality, in many cases tensions and conflicts increased between these two local arms of local government. The impacts on the military were in at least two areas: the resulting ineffectiveness of the Muspida, through which the military had previously benefited from interinstitutional relations, and the more complicated procedure now needed to get financial assistance from the local government. Regarding the Muspida, like the limited FKI forum discussed above, the increased political conflicts between Executives and Legislatures prompted the Executive Heads to become reluctant to use the Muspida forum. They could have needed this forum more than they needed it in the New Order era because through it they could have moderated the stronger (than in the New Order) resistance from the Legislature; but in many cases in reality the conflicts moved the two bodies away from each other, to attack each other, instead of bringing them (the Bupatis or Mayors heading the Executives and the Chairmen of the DPRDs) to sit together in the Muspida forum. Psychological barriers, with each treating the other as the enemy not as a partner and being highly suspicious of each other, hindered the re-vitalizing of the Muspida forum. 387 As one District Commander said, he not only felt left out in dealing with local problems which were in many cases strongly related to security matters, 388 but also had no coordinating forum through which the commanders could communicate [their] concern and advise how and in what ways the military could contribute to the finding of the solutions to those problems. 389 This can be 384 A copy of this document is held by the author. 385 See Chapter Three. 386 Law No. 22/ 1999 about Regional Autonomy. 387 The new feature of the executive-legislature relations is presented in the last section of Chapter Eleven. 388 The security matters he meant were growing criminalities; indicating he was still seeing the military as primarily responsible for handling the internal security that was supposed to have been handed over to the police. 389 The respondents were active-service Military District Commanders. Interviews M32, M55. This was confirmed by a civilian politician (Golkar Party member). Interview G5. 147

180 given either positive and negative, or mixed, interpretations. In a positive view, it could be understood as the military having realized that they were no longer regarded as the most responsible and most capable body to solve the social and political problems in their command areas; they could no longer act as the initiators and the leading authorities without the consent of the civilian authorities; and the civilian authorities were no longer dependent on the military. In a negative view, however, with so many problems left unresolved, this could be highlighting the weakness of the civilian political leadership: lacking coordination, indecisive, and lacking capacity to solve social and political conflicts, and with this weakness tending to encourage the use of violence as political pressure (as discussed in more detail in Chapter Eleven). The latter possibility would thus preserve the importance of the military as the political and security back-up for either side. With respect to the procedures for getting financial assistance from the bureaucracy that had became more complicated, the military now had to approach both the Executive and the Legislature when they needed assistance from the local government. Similarly to the previous Laws on local government, Law No 25/1999, the new financial law for the budgeting of local government, did not mention explicitly how the local military units would get access to financial assistance from the local government. However, in the past, whether or how the military would get the money from the local government depended mainly on the Heads of the Districts Executives who were mostly military officers. Now, these local government Heads were under close surveillance by their DPRD. 390 If the financial assistance were to be allocated through the annual Local Government Budget (APBD) the military needed channels into the DPRD through which their lobbying could be done in order to prevent or overcome expected, and forewarn of unexpected, resistance; while other lobbying needed to be carried out to the executives who would be proposing the budget to the DPRD. 391 Yet if the financial assistance were to be given by the local government by allocations from, for example, the Bupati s Discretionary Fund (Dana Rumah Tangga Bupati) which could however be very limited, the military needed good relations with the Head of 390 Interview M Interviews M55, M51, M33, G5. 148

181 the Executive and also assurances that there would be no legal or political problems which could be initiated by the DPRD or opposition groups. 392 As shown in Chapter Three, in the past such problems could be deliberated within the forum of the Muspida; and political opinion could be designed in harmonized ways so that the protests from DPRD members, for example, could be countered. 393 The better governance and transparency demanded by the new system had decreased possibilities of financial mismanagement or other covert management, including unclear financial allocations for the defence and security apparatus. Although collusions among the actors might be still possible, yet the ways they would have to be done had become more complicated Changing Regulations for the Local Elections As noted, in the past the dominant role of the military in determining the outcomes of the local elections was a consequence of the military s dominant positions in both the Executive and Legislative arms of local government, as well as the regulations that made it possible. The new Regulations that were based on the Autonomy Law No 22/1999 ruled out the possibility of serving military officers being registered as Bupati or Mayoral Candidates before quitting from the service. Previously, the officers intended to register as candidates were only required to have formal permission from their superiors, but after late 2000 they were required to fully resign from the military service before their registration. Similarly, the military factions (F-TNI/ POLRI) that had been halved since 1999 but still existed in the DPRDs until 2004 were not allowed to propose any candidate (either civilian or military) from their own faction s members. 394 However, as discussed in Chapter Seven, the absence of the military s proposal for their ownchosen candidates caused the members of the F-TNI/ POLRI to become wild 392 The respondent was a Regency Government Secretary. Interview B As Chapter Three mentions, forums such as a Half Cameral Forum (Forum Setengah Kamar), or Quarter Cameral Forum (Forum Seperempat Kamar), used to be employed, as initial meetings prior to a general meeting with all DPRD members, to persuade those members of the local elites who might oppose certain policies. 394 The Central Military HQ issued an instruction about the prohibition of the military faction from proposing any candidate. A copy of this instruction is held by the author. 149

182 players (pemain liar) who other civilian factions competed to make alliances with in order to support their own positions. 395 In this sense, the new rule did not always achieve the goal originally intended, to neutralize the F-TNI/POLRI members, but more deeply involved them individually and informally, though not institutionally or formally. The important factors that caused this were not limited to the military, but also to the interests of the civilian political groups (see further discussion in Chapter Seven). Another change that indirectly reduced the possibility of the military intervening in the election process was the new limitation put into the involvement of the Minister of Home Affairs and the Provincial Governors. In the past these posts were always held by military generals. The previous regulations made it possible for those officials to determine the outcomes of local elections to suit their preferences. 396 Now the positions of Minister of Home Affairs and in many areas the Governors were occupied by retired generals. It would be mistaken to suggest that these retired generals always represent the military institutions, but it is also misleading to conclude that there would be no political link that might tie them to their former institution. So, the importance of the change in the Local Election Regulation is that it attempted to minimize rather than completely eliminate the use of such ties to steer the outcomes of the elections. 395 Interviews K58, A46, M This is described in more detail in Chapter Seven. 150

183 4.4. Changing lines of communications between the Provincial and the District governments The new Autonomy Law authorizes District Governments to communicate directly with the Central Government without the consent of the Provincial Government. 397 This reduced the power of the Provincial Government officials in many internal matters of the Districts. Zig-zag communications 398 between the military commanders and the heads of local governments involving the two levels that had prevailed in the past were partly caused by the strong position of a Province over the Districts within it. The Law s reduction of the Province s power consequently reduced, for example, the possibilities of a (Provincial) Pangdam using his authority to intervene in the relations between the (District) Bupatis or Mayors with (larger District) Danrems or (smaller District) Dandims. The District Governments have become less attached politically to the Provincial Governors and the Pangdam thus have become more independent but more separated from other government powers. 399 The weakening positions of the KODAM against the Districts can be seen, for example, in the cases of replacing the military representatives in the District DPRDs. In these cases the Pangdam, the Commander in Chief of the KODAM, could no longer determine the replacements based on the interests of the military even when some officers serving in the DPRDs had retired. Such cases were found for example in Sampang, Sidoarjo and Mojokerto Regencies. In the Sidoarjo case the officer had been retired for almost 6 months but had not been replaced because the DPRD had not agreed to the replacement because it would affect the local balance of power in the DPRD. A similar reason was expressed by the DPRD in Sampang that was in the process of preparing for the local election when the Pangdam requested the replacement. 400 Another example could also be seen in the TMD/TNI Masuk Desa (Soldiers Go Into the Villages) programs. Some DPRD at District level refused to support the 397 See Law No. 22/1999 about Local Autonomy. 398 See Chapter Three. 399 Interviews M43, M Copies of documents of the correspondence about the replacements are held by the author, the original document by the Sampang DPRD. 151

184 financial needs of the programs as requested by the KODAM. For example, such cases were found in Bangkalan and Malang Regencies. The reasons advanced by their DPRD members were not only because it was not authorized by the Law No 25/1999 about Financial Allocations of Local Government, but also because the locations and aims or activities of the TMD were rarely communicated by the military to the local governments and their respective local area communities. 401 Whatever the possible reasons might have been, such refusals would have never happened in the past era; requests from the Provincial level either by the military or civilian institutions would always have been obeyed by the Districts. 5. Conclusion This chapter s account of institutional reforms shows that the liquidation of political elements attached to the military territorial structures, the withdrawal of military officers from local bureaucracy and from DPRD, as well as the decentralization, have largely separated the military from civilian institutions, which this separation involving the establishing of clearer boundaries between the military and the civilian. The reforms have also dismantled the military s political networks, involving a minimizing of the military power in local politics. However, as the military presence in the local Parliaments remained until 2004, the military officers, either as DPRD members or the commanding officers who supervised these members, were still involved in several ways. As will be seen in the next two chapters, in some DPRD these officers still played important roles in local elections for instance, although it is also clear that their political power had declined significantly, mainly because of the removal of most of the military s previous political networks. Although the institutional changes were to a greater extent the result of the public pressures discussed in the previous chapter, those pressures did not play vital roles in defining how the changes would happen. The strong influence of the New Order s actors in outlining and implementing the agenda of the reforms since Interviews M81, G6. 152

185 such as when and how the military would withdraw from the executive and legislative arms of local government made a total and rapid elimination that might have been expected by some people seem very far from possible. So, it seems that the five-year changes were more patterns of orderly and gradual changes than abrupt ones. The result of the institutional reforms, nevertheless, have been quite positive, the degree of the military direct links and controls over the civilian political spheres has been reduced to a minimal level, and is by no means comparable to those which were maintained during the New Order regime. The next five chapters will demonstrate the ways these reform programs have had impacts on the military s political activities at the local level, on the local military units and personnel, and on the local civilian politics both in encouraging and discouraging ways to the future democracy in Indonesia. 153

186 Chapter Seven MILITARY INVOLVEMENT IN ELECTIONS OF DISTRICT GOVERNMENT HEADS (1): Towards declining effectiveness [There is] not much we [F-TNI/POLRI] can do apart from supporting the majority, as we do not want to create difficulties in relationships with the Bupatis both for the fraction [F-TNI/OLRI] and for the military units stationed here Introduction Chapter Two has noted that democracy can be defined as a system where most powerful collective decision makers are selected through fair, honest, and periodic elections in which candidates freely compete for votes. 403 This chapter presents the example of how local government leaders, among the most powerful local decision makers, were elected through the Pilkada/Pemilihan Kepala Daerah (Local Heads Elections), the elections of the Heads of District Governments, 404 and shows the decline of military political roles in this. Involvement in the Pilkada had been a crucial political activity for the military in the New Order era because, as suggested earlier, this helped maximize control over all aspects of local power, social, political, economic or security, by the military occupying or controlling top and strategic positions. 405 Therefore, the declining role of the military in the Pilkada meant an improvement of the democratic quality of these events. The first section of this chapter shows how military officers, or civilians with strong military connections, were placed in these positions. Specifically, it describes the situation in which the Pilkada procedure, although appearing democratic on the surface was actually a kind of manipulation of democratic concepts which 402 Interviews M79, M See footnote 12 in p Regents (Bupati) of the more rural Regency or Municipality (Kebupaten) and Mayors (Walikota) of the larger City (Kotamadya) District Governments. The term Districts will be used to refer generally to both Regencies and Cities. Similarly, District Heads will refer generally to both Regents/Bupati or Mayors. The terms Regency and Kabupaten have the same meaning and will be used interchangeably. Also DPRD, Local Assembly, Local Representative Assembly, Local Legislature or Local Parliament all mean the same. 405 At District level the military occupied various jobs in the local bureaucracy, from the District Head to Parking Manager (as described in Chapter Three). 154

187 guaranteed the continued hold over power. Although the Pilkada were not the only local political activities which the military were engaged in, they were the most observable political events. An account of the ways the military steered the outcome of the Pilkada gives an insight into how its political influence had changed. Various elements of the local political institutions, in the legislative, executive and security apparatuses, were involved in this political activity. It attracted attention from almost all elements of the respective local societies. Conveniently for this research, it was widely publicized by mass-media and thus provided a wide range of data resources. During the study s five-year period all thirty eight Districts of the East Java Province held Pilkada. All military factions 406 (F-TNI/POLRI) of the legislative Local Representative Assemblies (DPRD) of these Districts, as well as all military territorial units such as the KODIM and KOREM stationed in the Districts were in various degrees involved in the Pilkada. Because they were under the authority of the East Java Provincial Military Area Command, KODAM V Brawijaya, the roles played by the military in each District reflected the political position of the military as an integrated institution. 407 As will be shown later, the trend of change in the military role in Pilkada over the five years from 1998 to 2003 has been in line with the broader development of political circumstances. Since most reformist elites who led the 1998 anti-new 406 During the New Order, for ideological reasons the seats reserved in all parliaments for the military/police were called a fraction (fraksi) as the term faction was not acceptable because of its divisive sectional implications. The only groupings allowed in the Assemblies and national parliament were the military/police, Golkar (Golongan Karya, Functional Groups, with membership based on civil servants), a single Islamic aggregate and a single non- Islamic aggregate. The latter were called either parties, the PPP (Partai Persatuan Pembangunan, the United Development Party) and the PDI (Partai Demokrasi Indonesia, the Indonesian Democratic Party), or when sitting in a parliament, factions, as in F-PP and F-DI, with Golkar also known as F-KP then, after the 1999 recognition of parties, F-Golkar ; Military/police representatives as the F-ABRI (Fraksi-Angkatan Bersenjata Republik Indonesia, Republic of Indonesia Armed Forces Faction) or, after the 1999 division between the two forces, F- TNI/POLRI (Fraksi - Tentara Negara Indonesia/Polisi Republik Indonesia, Indonesian National Army/Police Faction). 407 Even though each Pilkada was held in a different District, the military elements in each District were not isolated and independent actors. Their political perceptions and actions were influenced by the Pilkada which had been held in the neighbouring Districts. It does not mean, however, that Pilkada in all Districts were always connected in a fully continuous pattern. Different circumstances, times and areas, as well as actors, limited the way the Pilkada in one District could be seen as a continuation of the trend shown by the previous ones. Yet the fact that the military representatives came from the same institution and had to follow the same code of conduct ruled by the military headquarters led to the ways they represented the institution in each District being linked from one to another, and the ways civilian political groups dealt with them were learned also from this interconnection. 155

188 Order movements were only absorbed into the institutional system after the completion of the 1999 election, the actors in the Pilkada were still mainly the continuing New Order elites. A significant change, however, marked the relations between the military elites on one side and civilian Golkar elites on the other. The Golkar position rapidly shifted from being a loyal supporter of the military rule in the New Order era to being a competitor. During the next stage, from 2000 onward, Pilkada cases demonstrate the diminishing of military political domination, and in contrast, the growing power of the new groups of political elites. The Pilkada cases in this period show that the decline of the military political control had become widespread. In many cases the military appeared to be reduced to becoming only a minor player, either because a single majority party existed or two or more major factions formed a strong alliance and the military faction was left out. Before discussing the election cases of the post-new Order era it is necessary to critically overview the previous system of District Head election as practiced by the New Order regime. This overview focuses on the roles of the military in that system, and provides a means to understand the changes of the military role in the post-new Order system. 2. District elections in the New Order In general, under the New Order the military role effectively ensured that all District Head candidates who were proposed by the military either military officers or civilians close to the military won the elections. Through a chain of patronage power the military dominated all stages of the election, from the selection and nomination of the candidates, their approval by the Ministry of Home Affairs (MHA) prior to voting, to the public voting by the Assembly members and the approval of the elected candidate by the Governor and the MHA (see Chart VII.1 below). 156

189 According to Law No. 5/ about Local Government, the local DPRD could select and nominate three to five candidates who then had to be proposed to the MHA for its approval. The MHA then decided three candidates who could be elected by the Assembly members. When the election had been completed, the election result had to be sent again to the MHA for final approval. The following subsections discuss how these stages worked and how the military controlled each stage. Chart VII.1: Phases of local election according the Indonesian Law No. 5/1974. The MHA approves three candidates and instructs the DPRD to elect them (II) The MHA approves the final result and issues the Decree of Assignment of the new district head (IV) The Governor endorses the proposal The Provincial Governor supervises the election The Governor endorses the proposal The Local Assembly (DPRD) nominates three to five candidates and proposes them through the Governor to the Minister of Home Affairs/MHA (I) DPRD elects and proposes a final approval through the Governor to the MHA (III) The Governor inaugurates the elected candidate 408 The selection of the local government heads was regulated by the Law No. 5/1974, especially Chapter III, Paragraph Five, points 14 to 21, and the regulation was detailed further by the Regulation of the Minister of Home Affair No. 10/ 1974, about the procedure for the nomination, election and inauguration of local government heads. 157

190 Stage I: Selection and nomination Technically, the procedure of selection and nomination was dominated by the military through an election committee, called the Technical Committee (Panitia Teknis). Key players in this committee were usually military officers, active or retired. There were three key officials who could exercise strong influences: firstly, the current District Head who set up the Committee and to whom it was responsible; secondly, the Speaker/Chairman of the DPRD who chaired the Committee; and thirdly, the Head of the Social and Political Office (Kansospol) 409 of the District Government who was the key member of the Committee. 410 In addition to these three officials, outside the committee there were also several actors, such as the local military commanders and other Muspida members who worked to drive the outcomes according to the regime s interests. Under the direction of the executive leaders, who set up the Committee, these mostly involved military officers and local elements of the New Order regime who were well coordinated to ensure that all nominated candidates were supporters of the existing government regime. In formal terms, an open participation was offered to all eligible citizens to register as a candidate for the position of District Head. In practice, however, as one respondent said, an individual registration could hardly exist, either because of fears of being accused as surpassing the military s preference, or because of the Eastern cultural values that view negatively an individual ambition for power. The respondent said that a common practice at that time was, a potential candidate was asked to register by political or social organization(s), rather than a 409 For explanation of Kakansospol and Litsus see Chapter Six. 410 Around six months before the end of his office, the existing District Head (Regent/Mayor) would form the Technical Committee (Panitia Teknis) that was responsible for the selection of candidates, mainly checking the candidates administration requirements, and assessing which were eligible and which were not. Among the most important criteria for eligibility was loyalty to the state ideology of Panca Sila and the 1945 Constitution. The degree of loyalty was assessed through a special screening (Litsus) which was carried out under the supervision of the Chief of Kansospol, one of the members of the Committee. For an example of the Technical Committee, see Appendix 9, about the Technical Committee for the Jember District Head election, Besides the Panitia Teknis, there was a Special Committee (Panitia Khusus) that was formed by the Jember DPRD. It was responsible for drafting the rules regarding the voting stage of the election (Tata Tertib Pemilihan), such as the minimum number of DPRD members required to vote, the voting and the counting, the criteria for a valid vote, etc. Like the Panitia Teknis, it was chaired by the Speaker of the DPRD, but its members were all the DPRD members. Yet, unlike the Chairman of the Panitia Teknis who was responsible to the existing Regent, the Chairman of the Panitia Khusus was responsible to the Speaker of the DPRD, that is, himself! So, one person reported the performance of his job to himself in a different job, but a higher position. While the Panitia Teknis determined who were allowed to be elected, the Panitia Khusus determined how the voting stage of the election was to be carried out. 158

191 candidate registering on his own. 411 In the case of military officers, their headquarters instructed them to register. Publicly, this instruction had to be based on official requests for military candidates from the local authority, or from local social or political organizations. 412 However, undercover practices, such as informal lobbying prior to the common formalities, were also very possible. For example, as another of my respondents told me, the top military headquarters contacted local commanders to lobby the local factions and asked the factions to send proposals that request the headquarters to provide the candidates; or an ambitious officer might secretly lobby the local factions in order to propose his name to the headquarters; or an influential businessman from Jakarta might lobby local political groups in order to propose his chosen officer who could secure his business in the district. 413 Most of the DPRD members or local people were only informed after the Technical Committee revealed who the military s favoured candidate was. Usually, along with this information there were also accompanying candidates who were secretly prepared to be the defeated candidates. One of Golkar s local leaders said that three local elements of the New Order regime, local territorial commanders, local bureaucrats and Golkar inside and outside the DPRD, 411 Interview G5 (the respondent was a local leader of Golkar). See also Hans Antlöv who quoted a Javanese proverb, be interested, work hard, perfect the world, to refer to a cultural genuine ethic of members of traditional Javanese leaderships in handling their political jobs, that is, with a disinterested manner, detached from the shuffling of every day politics. See Hans Antlöv and Tak-Wing Ngo (eds.), The Cultural Construction of Politics in Asia (Richmond, Surrey: Curzon Press, 2000), pp This proverb seems to be applicable to a much broader cultural context, including the contexts of ambition for political power that should not be shown openly. A person can attempt to create a suitable condition that suits his ambition, for example showing his activeness and capability in the area he is interested in, or building a network that can bring him to the position he is aiming at, but the offer to participate directly in the competition for the job has to come in the first place from outside, either from eligible organizations or an influential person. 412 The process for a military candidate to participate in the election was regulated in the Kekaryaan (Assignments in Civilian Jobs) procedure. Any proposal from the local factions for a military candidate had to be sent to the Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces. He would then instruct the Wansospol (Board of Social and Political Affairs) to find an officer to be a candidate and to check all requirements needed. Based on the recommendation of the Wansospol, the Commander in Chief issued an instruction letter to the recommended officer candidate to register and compete in the election. As the letter would also be forwarded to the local military commanders, they would also understand about their responsibility to support the success of the candidate to win the election. (See Armed Forces Commander in Chief Decree Surat Keputusan Panglima Angkatan Bersenjata, No: Skep/811/XII/1996, 4 December 1996 on procedures for work assignments in executive jobs. (Cover of this document is shown in Appendix 18). For an explanation about Wansospol, see Chapter Six. For more information about the origin of the Kekaryaan see, for example, Nasution, A.H, Kekaryaan ABRI, Jakarta: Seruling Masa, 1971). 413 According to the respondent, however, in these latter two cases of individual ambitions, wider support would have to be negotiated to ensure the coordination and interconnectedness of the military in controlling the elections, in some way within the military network Interview M11 (a former F-ABRI member of the DPRD of Malang City). 159

192 collaborated with the Technical Committee to prepare and select three to five candidates; with one being a favoured candidate and the others accompanying candidates. 414 Each faction of the DPRD officially proposed its own candidate, but their candidates were normally limited to those who had passed the selection process conducted by the committee. The nomination would be made by a DPRD general meeting, with this final list based on the factions official proposals. The nominated list that was proposed to the central government for an approval was therefore not much different from what the committee had recommended. Stage II: Approval by the central authorities The second stage, the approval by the Ministry of Home Affairs/MHA, was intended to check that local players had nominated candidates based on the central government s interests. If the local nomination did not comply with the interest of the centre, the MHA could change it. The approval stage could also be another arena where the competing groups continued the lobbying contests. Although officially the selection and nomination might seem to be solely a formality to legalize a centrally-approved or appointed candidate, nevertheless, undercover, internal competitions before getting such a candidate could be tough and tricky. The competitions could happen either within the military, bureaucrats or Golkar, or between the institutions. One respondent reported that one factor that made it difficult to find the true candidate (approved by the centre) was that the centre was not always a single voice. He said that a military general, a Minister or other national leaders might be claimed by competing local elements to be representing the most valid central voice. 415 One of the accompanying candidates might have a hidden ambition and see a possibility to become the most favoured candidate. The group supporting this candidate could use the approval stage to lobby the MHA. This was most likely when all candidates were civilians, and the military did not take a firm position. Although it was also possible to happen when the DPRD nominated an officer as the most favoured candidate, in such cases the 414 In preparing and selecting the candidates, the respondent said, Golkar followed the doctrine of ABG lanes, an abbreviation of Armed Forces, Bureaucrat and Golkar, meaning that, the candidates have to be recruited from these three sources. Interview G Competing factions within the military were usually between groups based on year of graduation from the Armed Forces Academy, from Staff and Command Colleges, based on the Branches or Corps, or based on Kopassus/non-Kopassus (Special Forces) alumni, or specific individual relations such as family or friendship ties. Interview M

193 possibility that the central government would change its preference was much smaller. This was because the MHA, and most of the Governors who gave the endorsement to the proposal, were military generals. They were most likely to be on the same side as the military headquarters. 161

194 Stage III: Voting stage Although there was always a possibility for the District Assembly members to vote against the central government s preference, normally the military could control this stage. Firstly, in terms of the numbers, in all Districts, the Golkar and military factions combined together were always the majority. 416 Secondly, domination in numbers meant also domination in leaderships. Furthermore, the leaderships of local Golkar were also dominated by the military. 417 When a decision was made through a deliberation, the domination of leaderships was an effective tool to persuade other factions. In voting, the biggest number was already unchallenged. In most, however, deliberative negotiations were agreed to be the first choice before or instead of voting. 418 Nevertheless, it was not always that the other factions members accepted the decision in these deliberations automatically, but mainly because they were scared of unpleasant consequences that would follow should they openly oppose it, such as threats and intimidations. 419 Therefore, it was very common that candidates from the PPP and PDI could hardly even pass the first stage of selection at the local elections whether through voting or deliberation. Commonly however, the two factions did not propose any candidate on their own choice; instead, they proposed military-recommended candidates. 420 If any differences occurred among the ruling groups prior to the voting, such as between the Armed Forces and Golkar, there were special forums to solve them. One such forum was called a Quarter Cameral Forum (Forum Seperempat Kamar) with one of the four Assembly factions meeting with the District Head or with the local Territorial Commander to work out the differences; for example, the 416 Until 1999, under the 1974 Act, the Armed Forces faction was allocated twenty percent of the Assembly seats, that is nine where there were forty five, or five out of twenty in smaller Districts. In several Districts Golkar alone took more than fifty percent of the seats. For example, in the 1997 General Election, in Magetan Regency Golkar took thirty six of the forty five DPRD seats and because nine of the other seats were already allocated to the military, there was no seat for the PPP or the PDI. In Madiun District Golkar took thirty five of the thirty six available, leaving only one seat for the PPP and none for the PDI. 417 Before 1999, in all of the then thirty seven DPD (Regional Leadership Councils) of Golkar in East Java, the position of Chairman was occupied by the Commander of the relevant Military District (Dandim). Interview G5 (the respondent was the spokesperson of Malang City). 418 As dictated by the Panca Sila (Five Principles), the State s ideology, it was stated that Indonesian s democracy adopts people s representation and deliberation in wisdom. Therefore, deliberation was always used as the first choice, while voting was the last choice in solving political problems. Interview M41 (a member of an F-ABRI). 419 Interview D1 (the Chairperson of the PDI party for a District in East Java since 1984, and now the Chairperson of the DPRD of the District). 420 A former member of the Chairman of an F-ABRI said that the two factions (F-PP and F-DI) always consulted about their candidates with the military. If the military did not approve their candidates they usually cancelled them and followed the recommendation from the military. Interview M

195 F-KP (Golkar faction) meeting with the District Head; or the F-ABRI (military faction) with the Military Area Commander. Another forum was called a Half Cameral Forum (Forum Setengah Kamar) in which two of the four Assembly factions met with the local government leader or the local territorial commander. One former member of an F-ABRI described these forums as deliberation forums (forum musyawarah), where the District Head or the Territorial Commander had the opportunity to deliberate with the factions. 421 Stage IV: The final approval The final approval was the last resort for the central government to solve any disputes in the local elections, for instance, if two candidates gained equal votes 422, or to prevent an undesirable candidate from occupying a strategic position through the election. As mentioned earlier, there was a possibility that the result of the voting stage would be different from what had been ordered by the central authority. In some cases a deliberation might work so no voting was needed. Yet in other cases, an unidentified group within the military or the Golkar factions might have personal interests in sabotaging the order. Therefore, final approvals by the Governor and MHA (stage IV) were needed to ensure that the final decision always belonged to the central government. In summary, although political competition in the District elections existed, the scope of the competition was very much limited to being among certain elite groups of the regime, not providing for any contestation between the government and the opposition parties that represent different parts of the society. Furthermore, as some members of DPRD admitted, the past local elections were mainly pretence. 423 All processes were aimed at strengthening the existing regime. Even though the election procedure appeared officially and publicly to be quite democratic, at every stage the military effectively controlled the processes, either by creating the regulations through which the military could dominate the 421 In a different context, outside the election events, these forums were also used by the factions to give early warning and to deliberate with the District Head about certain controversial issues that might be raised by the legislatures in the Assembly hearing session with the government. Interview M11 (a former military faction member). 422 The case of Madiun City, where two candidates gained equal votes, exemplifies this dispute (shown in Table VII.2 in this chapter). 423 Interview M41 (a member of the F-ABRI of the DPRD of an East Java District since 1992). 163

196 system or by operating undercover activities through the patronage networks between or within military and political institutions. It is these two ways of institutional control that the military seemed to have lost in the post-new Order era, as shown in the next election cases. 3. District elections post-new Order As mentioned in this chapter s Introduction, some interrelated factors that reduced the military control over the District elections were in line with the broader development of political change (see Table VII.1). May 1998 Table VII.1: Political changes affecting the military power in East Java District elections (May 1998 December 2003) Date Events Impacts Soeharto resigns; public pressure on the military to leave politics strengthens July 1998 April 1999 July 1999 January 2000 Decemb er 2000 Military relations with political groups ended, including with Golkar party, Retired Military Association/Pepabri, and Military Family Association/FKPPI. Military Headquarters decided to withdraw all military personnel from government bureaucracies National Election produced new local Assemblies. New Autonomy Law No.25/1999 became effective and new Regulations on the Local Elections were produced Military Headquarters instructed all military officers to retire before registering as District Head candidates, and prohibited any military faction of a DPRD from Military lost public support in the elections; strong demands for a free and fair election Military lost traditional political affiliations, especially in the Assemblies, thus possess smaller number of votegetters to compete in the elections Military lost bureaucracy s supports to compete in the local elections Number of Assemblies military seats were reduced from twenty to ten percent of the total The Provincial Governors and the MHA have no longer authority to change the nomination list and the election result Without having District candidates to work for, officially the opportunity for the military faction to be actively involved in the 164

197 proposing any candidate in local elections. (Instruction of Panglima ABRI No. ST/214/2000, 12 December 2000) elections was reduced Firstly, there was a stronger public pressure on the military to leave politics. Then, there were substantial changes in laws and regulations as well as in the political structures as responses to the public pressure, and these changes weakened the military s position in politics including in the election system. Thirdly, as a consequence of the shrinking of the military s control over politics, various resources (either financial or moral) needed to support its political power eventually dried up or ran away, and thus reduced further the military control over local elections. The changes listed seem to have contributed to a very dramatic change in the outcomes of the District elections in East Java over the five and a half years from May 1998 to December 2003 as seen in Table VII.2. Table VII.2: Outcomes of East Java s District elections (May 1998 December 2003) N o Districts / Election dates Active duty military/ police The winners of district elections (sources or positions before registration) Retire d militar y/ police Bureaucra ts (Golkar or member of no party) New Parties (civilian ) membe rs 1 Malang City/ H 2 Mojokerto City/ H 3 Madiun City/ H 4 Ngadiredjo Regency/ 10- H V Lamongan Reg./ V H 6 Gresik Reg./ H / V 7 Sumber Yasin City/ H V 8 Jember Reg./ H / V 9 Situnggal Reg./ V H 165

198 10 Ponorogo Reg./ H V 11 Sumenep Reg./ V H 12 Banjarwetan Reg./ V H Blitar City/ H / V 14 Sumberwaras Reg./ H V 15 Trenggalek Reg./ H V Pacitan Regency/ H / V 17 Mojokerto Reg./ H / V 18 Sidoarjo Reg./ H V 19 Mangliawan Reg./ H V Blitar Reg./ H V 21 Probolinggo City/ Data not available 22 Kediri City Data not available 23 Kediri Reg. Data not available 24 Pasuruan City (2000) H / V 25 Tunggal Redjo Reg./ 08- H V Batang City/ H V 27 Bangkalan Reg./ H / V Buluhawang Reg./ H V Probolinggo Reg./ H / V Nganjuk Reg./ H / V 31 Pringgodani Reg./ V H Talangwetan Reg./ H V Pasuruan Reg./ H* V 34 Madiun Reg./ H V 35 Mangun Redjo Reg./ 10- H V Lumajang Reg./ H V 37 Jombang Reg./ H V 38 Bondowoso Reg./ H V Total H: 0 V: 0 H: 3 V: 0 H:17 V:7 H:12 V:25 Notes: H = District Head ; V = District Vice-Head; *Districts where PDIP became the biggest party. In contrast to the period pre-may 1998 when most Districts were headed by military officers, in the first five-year period of the reform only three retired military 166

199 officers, and no active-duty officers, were elected as District Heads; almost entirely, civilian leaders were elected. 424 The following two sub-sections describe how this process a consistent, steep and rapid decline in the trend of the military institutional roles - happened. The Pilkada cases in an urban City District, Sumbersari, 425 and a rural Regency District, Ngadiredjo, will be used to show the significant shifts chronologically in the relations among the New Orders political players. While in the Sumbersari case the military faced a serious challenge, in the Ngadiredjo case it experienced a total defeat. The District of Sumbersari held its Pilkada soon after B. J. Habibie took over the Presidency in May 1998, whereas the Ngadiredjo election occurred shortly after Abdurrahman Wahid replaced him in October The two different circumstances 426 affected the degrees to which the local military could exercise power over the procedures of the Pilkada. These two were selected not only because they were held at two critical periods, but also because in both cases the military factions of the DPRD were obliged to struggle to try to elect a military officer. 427 So, they represent a sequential, declining trend in the degree of military power that could be mobilised to try to achieve this Challenging the military domination in Sumbersari City The Sumbersari Pilkada was typical of a 1998 development of the Indonesian political outlook; mass demonstrations were strong enough to interrupt the Pilkada process. These involved a public rejection of all nominated candidates and successfully forced the Sumbersari DPRD to agree to restart the election process, 424 See Appendixes 9 to 13 that illustrate how different the situation in Compare the 1994 and 2000 election committees where military officers held key positions in the first, not in the second. As well, restrictions imposed by parties, not to allow military officers as candidates, while opened opportunity bigger to civilian including Pedi Cap driver. 425 The names both of individuals and places have been changed. 426 The different circumstances were mainly brought about by the 1999 election that produced new Assembly members and a new power constellation in the DPRD where the military power became much weaker. 427 There were two other Pilkada in other city Districts being held in the period between them, but all nominated and accepted candidates were civilians so the roles of the military were not so significant in terms of civil-military political competitions, therefore they are not presented in this chapter. In addition, from January to June 1998, prior to the Pilkada in Sumbersari there were also five other Pilkada where military officers were elected to be the District Government leaders, yet unlike in Sumbersari they came to office in relatively smooth processes, without significant challenges from either opposition parties or from Golkar elites, so neither are they discussed here. 167

200 in order to comply with better democratic procedures. 428 Although the military finally succeeded in determining the outcome, the new circumstances made it much difficult for them to achieve this, and showed the beginning of the decline of the military s local political power. The nomination process for the candidates had started in February 1998, a few months before the end of the New Order regime. A formal decision about the nominated candidates was taken and publicly announced by the DPRD on May 19, 1998, only two days before the resignation of Soeharto. Five candidates were proposed: Colonel Suyadi, as the most favoured candidate, and four civilian bureaucrats who were regarded as accompanying candidates. 429 All candidates were proposed by the F-ABRI and F-KP factions. The two other factions, F-PP and F-DI, did not put forward their own-chosen candidates; although formally these factions proposed the same names, they only followed 430 the F-ABRI and F-KP, the ruling government factions. 431 Despite stronger pressure put on the military by public demonstrations, the existing New Order s system and rules still worked on favour of the military. This included an internal rule of Golkar that it was to accommodate the three ABG channels in the process of selecting Bupati/ Mayor candidates. 432 The public pressure and the existing system became two competing forces that contributed significantly to the re-shaping of the relations between the military and the other factions. According to one respondent, who was the spokesman of the F-ABRI when the election was held, there was a tension between the F-ABRI and other factions regarding whether or not to re-start the election procedure. 433 He said that he received an instruction from the Military Headquarters in Surabaya and Jakarta 428 The protestors labeled the previous nomination list as full of Corruption, Collusion, and Nepotism (KKN/ Korupsi, Kolusi, Nepotisme). See Diulang Penjaringan Pimpinan Dua Dati II di Jatim, Kompas 5 June See the DPRD Decree No 10/ 1998 about names of candidates of Kepala DaerahTk II (District Government Leader) of Sumbersari. As explained before, accompanying candidates refers to those civilian candidates who are prepared by the election committees or by DPRD members to lose the elections. These candidates were normally informed that they were not going to win the elections, and had been selected only as a formality to complement the election process. 430 Interviews G5, G6. Both respondents were Sumbersari District leaders of Golkar. Interview M11 (the former Chairperson of Sumbersari). 431 The DPRD of Sumbersari District consisted of F-KP/Golkar 17; F-ABRI 9; PPP 16 and PDI 3. The first two were the government factions and occupied 26 seats, more than a half of the total 45, while the last two were opposition factions, occupying 19 seats. 432 ABG (ABRI, BIROKRASI, GOLKAR/Armed Forces, Bureaucracy, Golkar) was an internal procedure of Golkar, in which all candidates for the positions of government leaders would be looked for from these three sources. Interview G Interview M

201 to stick to following what had been planned, while other factions including F-KP (Golkar), the biggest faction, wanted to accept the public s demands. Because he considered it was impossible to pursue the instruction, he tried to convince the Headquarters that the F-ABRI and F-KP could secure (mengamankan) the election of Colonel Suyadi as Mayor but the public demands to restart the election would also have to be accepted. In the end the Headquarters agreed the election process would be restarted. On 29 May, after ten days of demonstrations, the DPRD area was fully occupied by protestors and the DPRD agreed to their demands. 434 New applications for the Mayoral Candidature were then re-opened by the DPRD with an allocated time from 8-20 June All interested candidates could freely and equally participate for the first time after thirty two years; and twenty six applicants registered as candidates. 436 However, according to the existing Laws and Regulations on Local Elections, the twenty six candidates would have to be sorted by the Technical Committee, which was at that time chaired by Colonel Adi Susilo (as he was the Chairman of the DPRD) and with the retiring District Head and the Head of the Social and Political Office (both military officers) as the other members. The result of this was that the Committee cut the number by a half to 13. The remaining 13 candidates consisted of 5 military officers including Colonel Suyadi, 4 bureaucrats and 4 non-bureaucrat politicians. 437 So, although the public could force the military to broaden the opportunity for participating as candidates, the military still had authority to determine who were eligible or who were not to continue to the next process. As the public continued to protest against the newly nominated candidates, the anxiety of the military had not yet vanished. Specifically, the protest was directed at Colonel Suyadi. According to a Golkar respondent, Colonel Suyadi was opposed not only because of his military status, but also because of the issues of 434 The demonstrations had been continuing since ten days before. Thousands of people surrounded the DPRD demanding the resignation of Soeharto at the time the decision was taken on 19 May 1998, and refused the decision. 435 Interview M Risalah Rapat Penutupan Pendaftaran Calon Walikota [Sumbersari], 22 June Risalah Rapat Penetapan Bakal Calon Walikota [Sumbersari], 26 June

202 not being a native person (putra daerah). 438 The local origin issue was heated because the three previous Walikota were, besides being from the military, not originally from Sumbersari, but from Pacitan, a Regency in the most western part of East Java Province. According to one retired military respondent of mine, proposing a successor who had a personal tie with the predecessor was one of the common strategies taken by the predecessor to protect himself, including his remaining interests, such as in projects where he or his family were involved or to cover any secret scandals during his period of office. In this we see one variation of neo-patrimonialism, where the predecessor as a patron offers an office position to the successor as a client, and in return the client gives a protection to the predecessor. 439 One military respondent said that the officers involved in the election process were warned by their commander that if they failed to defend Colonel Suyadi, their career would be at risk. To secure Colonel Suyadi the military would have work out the two issues. Tension between the military and Golkar elites was heated after Golkar showed a reluctance to support Colonel Suyadi. In the DPRD voting on 3 July 1998 to nominate five of the thirteen eligible candidates, of the total forty five members of DPRD only eleven members voted for Colonel Suyadi (military). Eleven votes were also given to Edi Rusdi (Golkar), eight to Iman Harun (Golkar), eight to Colonel Harris (military) and three to Dedi Taher (PPP). One respondent who was a local leader of Golkar told me that Golkar members had begun to think of ignoring the ABG mechanism due to public pressures calling for an independent Golkar, free from the influence of the military. 440 In fact, he said, Edi Rusdi, a 438 Interview G Interview M11. I found also similar patterns of patron-client relationships in two other districts, that is, Bojonegoro and Tulungagung. In Bojonegoro, as in the Sumbersari case, the predecessor-successor personal relationships were built based on their local origin. In Sumbersari they came from Pacitan, in Bojonegoro three Regents in succession were from Madura. When these native person issues emerged after 1998, in Sumbersari there was a Pacitanization (Pacitanisasi) issue, in Bojonegoro there was Maduranization (Maduranisasi) issue. This was revealed in an interview with a PDIP local leader of Bojonegoro, Anwar Soleh, in In Tulungagung the predecessor-successor personal relationships were based on the same professions, that is, the Civil Engineering Division (Dinas Pekerjaan Umum,Dinas PU). The PU is a division of local government that deals with the government projects such as road building or other physical development projects. So, in Tulungagung there was an issue of PU-nization (PUnisasi). This was stated by one military respondent who was a military representative in the DPRD of Tulungagung, Interview M Formally, the ABG/ABRI-Birokrasi-Golkar (Military-Bureaucrats-Golkar) mechanism was still recognized. In principle the ABG mechanism suggested that candidates for the local government leaders had to be taken from the three sources, and determined through a deliberative process among the three components, but in the end it was usually decided by the military because all top leaders of the three institutions were military. Interview G5; Interview G6. 170

203 Golkar member, gained increasingly strong public support, but also that Golkar s youths were mobilized to support the demonstrations. 441 The Vice-Chairman of Golkar in Sumbersari suggested that some members of Golkar saw the public resistance to Colonel Suyadi as a suitable moment for promoting Golkar s young cadre (kader muda Golkar) to take over Golkar s leadership from the military. He said that there was prolonged, subtle, unexpressed discontent among the Golkar youth about the military domination of Golkar leadership. Military domination hindered their attempts to gain a bigger share of positions either in the legislature or executive. 442 So, there was a convergence between the public pressure and the individual ambitions of local Golkar members that were no longer blocked from above. However, again, the existing nomination system favoured the military. According to the election procedure, the list of the candidates was forwarded through the Governor of East Java Province to the Minister of Home Affairs on 11 July It was at this stage that it became clear that through the existing procedure the military could reject potential challengers to Colonel Suyadi. On 27 August 1998 when approval letters were received from the Governor and the central government it became clear that Edi Rusdi s name had disappeared from the list. Three candidates, Colonel Suyadi, Iman Harun and Dedi Taher, were approved while two others, Edi Rusdi and Colonel Harris, were not. 443 Despite the elimination of Colonel Suyadi s main competitors from the list, the military still worried because some members of the F-KP (Golkar) who had previously supported Edi Rusdi now said openly that they would shift their support to Iman Harun, another candidate advanced by the F-KP. 444 According to one respondent, at this stage the military used direct intervention including distribution of money (amplop, envelopes ) and intimidation (ancaman). For example, a 441 The support was expressed through demonstrations, local news papers and radio. For a current reference, see the local newspaper [Sumbersari] Post 12, 15, 22 July Edi Rusdi was the son of a former Sumbersari Mayor ( ) who was a Retired Colonel. He was also an activist of the FKPPI (Forum Komunikasi Putra Putri Indonesi/Indonesian Youth Communication Forum), an organization of military families sons and daughters, an organization in which the respondent had also become an activist. Interview G See the Ministry of Home Affairs letter No. X /2781/PUOD, August 27 th 1998 and the East Java Governor s letter No. X /557/012/1998, August 27 th Interview M

204 week before the election a local military Territorial Commander secretly invited all forty five members of the legislature to his office. The respondent suggested that the Commander distributed money (as much as 2 million rupiah) for each person to support Colonel Suyadi and warned that a failure to comply with the demand would be seen as opposing the military s position. After the meeting members of the PPP complained that the meeting demonstrated an old political attitude that was no longer appropriate in the era of reformasi. 445 Despite the protest, especially from the F-PP, the direct intervention remained effective. According to one Golkar respondent, shortly after this meeting, all F-KP members were invited again to the office, warned that their support for Iman Harun could risk Colonel Suyadi s position, and required to guarantee a full support for Colonel Suyadi. 446 This finally secured Colonel Suyadi s position when the election was held on 28 August 1998, of the 45 members of DPRD, 24 voted for Colonel Suyadi, 1 each for Iman Harun and Dedi Taher. This made up 26 votes consisting of all those from the F-ABRI and F-KP. 447 The 16 members of the PPP and the 3 of the PDI abstained. Although the outcome was finally steered by the military, the F-KP members apparent decision to take a different line from the military s, especially at the early stage, and the decision of the F-PP and F-DI members to abstain in the voting stage, showed a real challenge to the military, and marked a beginning of a change in the relations among the elites involved in the elections in the Sumbersari district Defeating the military in Ngadiredjo Regency The eventual success of the military in electing Colonel Suyadi could not be repeated in the Ngadiredjo Pilkada. Colonel Sudarman, an officer proposed by the F-TNI/POLRI to become the district leader of Ngadiredjo Regencywas defeated 445 After the election Colonel Suyadi s voters were again invited to meet the Pangdam V Brawijaya to receive another 5 million rupiah each as a reward for their success in the election. Interview M11. This was confirmed by Golkar respondents who were interviewed separately. 446 Interview G See Risalah Rapat Paripurna Khusus (Resumé of Special Parliamentary Summit) about the Mayoral Election on 28 th of August 1998 in Sumbersari. 172

205 by Dr. Hanafi, a candidate proposed by Golkar. There were several factors that caused this failure for the military. Beside the declining support from the military institution, it included also a change in the election term and in the groups of actors involved. The new election rule came into effective in the middle of the process of the election. Consequently, the first half of the process applied the old rule and the rest followed the new rule. Likewise, the actors involved were different. The DPRD members involved in the first half process of the election were the product of the 1997 General Election, while those who were involved in the rest of the process were mainly new Assembly members, the result of the 1999 Election. In this new DPRD the number of the military representatives had been cut down by half (from twenty to ten per cent, to five of the forty-five members). What is interesting, however, is not how the circumstances had changed, but how the military and local elites had coped with these changes. The election was prepared in March 1999, three months before the first post- Soeharto free, national, General Election was held on 7 June Through the usual deliberation process, the DPRD nominated five candidates and proposed them to the Ministry of Home Affairs (MHA). They were two active military officers, one retired officer and two civilians. The active officers were Colonel Sudarman (an army officer) and Colonel Susanto (the existing Bupati), both proposed by the F-ABRI; the retired officer was Ret.Col. Sudaryatmo (the DPRD Chairman, a member of the Golkar Faction/F-KP); and the two civilians were Dr. Hanafi (Head of the Regional Health Service), also proposed by the F-KP/Golkar 448 ; and Drs. Qomary Armen (a Golkar member of the Indonesian Parliament in Jakarta), proposed by the F-PP. As in the previous case, the F-DI decided not to propose any candidate. 449 The MHA then approved three of these candidates to be elected: Colonel Sudarman (proposed by the military), Dr. Hanafi (by Golkar) and Qomary Armen (by the PPP). As in the Sumbersari case, two names were eliminated from the list, Retired Colonel Sudaryatmo (proposed by Golkar), who 448 Unlike in the Sumbersari case where Golkar was formally committed to the ABG mechanism in selecting the candidate, in the Ngadiredjo case the mechanism had been abolished due to the national decision to separate Golkar and the military in 11 July 1998; and the F-ABRI and the military stood on two opposite positions. 449 The F-PP supported Qomary Armen, a Golkar member, instead of a PPP member. It was suggested to me by a Golkar respondent that this was seen by Golkar as a conspiracy designed by the military to break Golkar votes into several small groups so that they were not big enough to challenge the group of Colonel Sudarman.The respondent was the Chairman of the F-Golkar in the Ngadiredjo DPRD from

206 had been the strongest challenger to Colonel Sudarman, and Colonel Susanto (F- ABRI). According to the Chairman of the F-TNI/POLRI, as a former Military District Commander of Ngadiredjo and a staff officer of the Military Area Command, Colonel Sudarman was seen as a better candidate to replace Colonel Susanto, the District Head whose current term of office was ending but could have been renewed. Similarly, he said, the Headquarters in Jakarta wanted to see a leadership change (pergantian pimpinan) to cope with the new political circumstances, and that was partly why Colonel Susanto was not approved by the MHA. 450 The respondent added that the Headquarters of the Provincial Military Area Command institutionally viewed it as important for the military to occupy the Ngadiredjo s top position as part of geographical consideration (pertimbangan geografi) regarding the local history of Communist movements. He described Ngadiredjo as similar to the Regencies of Bojonegoro and Magetan, located along areas which were regarded as the formerly strong bases of Communist loyalists. Therefore, he said, although institutionally the military limited itself in its involvement in the election process, it regarded the securing of Colonel Sudarman s victory as crucial. 451 On the other hand, as in Sumbersari, Golkar s support shifted to the reserve candidate, Dr. Hanafi, after finding out that the MHA had eliminated their primary candidate, Retired Colonel Sudaryatmo, from the list. A respondent who was the Chairman of the Golkar faction of the Ngadiredjo DPRD from 1999 to 2004 said that Dr. Hanafi had been a reserve candidate in case their first was not approved by the MHA. The respondent admitted that the support from the F-KP members for Dr. Hanafi was then given in full, and no one supported Qomary Armen, a Golkar deserter proposed by the F-PP. 452 The military was aware of the strengthening position of Dr. Hanafi and attempted to influence F-KP members to 450 The respondent was a member of the F-TNI/POLRI and the Deputy Chairman of the DPRD. 451 Interview M The respondent who was also a dentist, an office-mate and a close friend of Dr. Hanafi at the Regional Health Office, said that initially Dr. Hanafi had no political ambition to register as a Candidate for Regent. Yet the respondent encouraged him to go forward, claiming that he had even prepared most of the administrative requirements on behalf of Dr. Hanafi. Interview G

207 support Colonel Sudarman. Remarkably, the task of trying to influence the F-KP members was carried out by Retired Colonel Sudaryatmo (the former candidate proposed by the F-KP) and Colonel Susanto. They told Yasni, an F-KP respondent of mine, that it would still be better for the District to have a military officer as the Bupati because of Ngadiredjo s geo-political consideration, as noted above. The respondent said that the F-KP members refused such advice and said that they had to stick to their existing position, supporting Dr. Hanafi; and some of them were also disappointed with the change in the position of Retired Colonel Sudaryatmo in his switching from pro-golkar to be pro-f-abri. 453 From this stage of the election, political circumstances (the rules, the actors, and the military political policies) changed as the result of the 1999 General Election. The name of the Golkar faction was changed from F-KP to F-Golkar ; and F- ABRI was renamed F-TNI/POLRI. Both F-TNI/POLRI and F-Golkar had two important tasks: first, they needed to lobby the new groups in the DPRD in order to accept and continue with the previous process rather than start from the beginning again; then, if this step was successful, they needed to build support from the new groups in order to gain their votes. After lobbying and holding a series of meetings, the new DPRD accepted all the candidates who had been nominated by the previous DPRD. A member of the, now, F-TNI/POLRI acknowledged that despite earlier complaints and protests the new DPRD accepted the argument that starting reselecting candidates from the beginning would cost lots of money, energy, and other consequences that could cause worse political instabilities. 454 According to a Golkar respondent the new parties members agreed to not restart the process because of the hard work of Golkar members to lobby them. 455 In contrast, a military faction respondent, who was a Vice-Speaker of the DPRD, suggested that the acceptance from the new parties proved that the military had strong influence (pengaruh kuat) in the DPRD, although it was small in 453 Interview G Interview M32 (the Chairman of the F-TNI/POLRI of Ngadiredjo since 1999). 455 Interview G

208 number. 456 Another military respondent alleged that it was because of money that talks (uang yang bicara), and admitted that Golkar and Dr. Hanafi spent lots of money to bribe the new DPRD members in order to secure his victory. 457 It will be clearer below that the last explanation mentioned seems to be the most likely reason. The F-TNI/POLRI s effort to influence the new groups in the DPRD to accept the existing candidates was not followed by a victory at the voting stage. The F-Golkar achieved a better result. 458 A military respondent who was involved intensively in the process described that the failure as one logical consequence of political reformation. 459 He pointed out several factors that caused the failure. The first was the absence of support from military institutions, especially the Pangdam, the Military Area Commander in Chief. This was related not only to the political neutrality commitment of the military thus the withdrawal from politics announced by the Headquarters on the 1 st of April, but also to the fact that the selection process for the position of Pangdam was underway. Therefore, he said, the institution was too busy to pay serious attention to the election. 460 The respondent said that F-TNI/POLRI members were ignored (seolah-olah dicuekin) by the three levels of territorial units (KODAM, KOREM and KODIM) that used to give full support for military-proposed candidates. Yet they knew what the institutions expected them to do, that is to win victory for the candidate from the military no matter whoever was approved (mensukseskan calon dari KBT, siapapun yang disetujui) by the MHA. The respondent admitted that he himself visited the nineteen PDI-P members from door to door to lobby them for support. He pointed 456 Even until now all political problems, including political conflicts among the new factions of the DPRD were solved in my office. The civilian factions still trust the military as a neutral, stabilisator (stabilizer). Interview M Interview M Of the 45 seats in the 1997 DPRD, 26 were occupied by Golkar, 9 (non-elected) by F-ABRI, 9 by the PPP and 1 by the PDI. In the 1999 DPRD, F-Golkar and F-TNI/POLRI occupied only (elected) 6 and (non-elected) 5 seats respectively. New parties occupied the other 34. The PDI-P (Indonesian Democratic Party for Struggle, the successor to the PDI) occupied 19 seats; the PKB (National Awakening Party) took 7 seats. The other 8 seats were shared by 6 small parties: PPP, PAN, PNI, PNI-MM, PKP and PBB. In order for their Regent Candidate to be able to succeed in the election, F-Golkar, F-TNI/POLRI, and F-PP would have to lobby other parties for their support in order to collect at least the necessary 23 votes. At the voting stage held on the 10 th of November, Col. Sudarman gained only 18 votes and so lost against Dr. Hanafi (Golkar s candidate) who got 22 votes, while the other 4 votes were given to Qomary Armen (PPP s candidate). (Risalah Rapat Paripurna Khusus DPRD (DPRD s Special Session) at the Bupati Election of Ngadiredjo Regency, dated the 10 th of November 1999.) 459 Interview M Pangdam Major General Ryamizard was replaced by Major General Sudi Silalhi, as announced in the Presidential Decree, dated November 4 th, a week earlier. Interview M

209 out that if all these nineteen members plus the five members of the F-TNI/POLRI had supported Colonel Sudarman, there should have been 24 votes for him, and the target could be achieved. The respondent stated that had the institution really wanted to secure Colonel Sudarman, lots of sponsors would have helped to finance the lobbying. 461 The military respondent claimed that, although earlier they had agreed to give their support, on the voting day some of them had supported Dr. Hanafi who was stronger financially. He said that he had information that the group [F-Golkar and Dr. Hanafi s group] gave each Assembly representative 15 million rupiah (US$ 1500), while we [Colonel Sudarman s group] only gave them 2.5 million rupiah. 462 A Golkar member, who claimed to be the key actor who designed and managed Dr. Hanafi s success, viewed the failure of the military at the election as having been caused by its lack of sensitivity to a new political circumstance; instead still relying on the old political strategy. The military, he said, believed too much that all members of the PDI-P would follow their Chairman once he had made an agreement with the F-TNI/POLRI. He also revealed that Golkar s success in building support from the new groups or parties in the DPRD was the result of the lobbying carried out from the first stage. This confirmed information given me by a military respondent, mentioned earlier, that the new groups agreed not to demand a restart for the election because Golkar had spent lots of money to bribe them. The Golkar respondent also said that his party had carried out political actions for several days before the election stage, including dawn attacks (serangan fajar) 463, because Golkar believed that the politics could change at every minute. As a result, Golkar could steal around 6 votes from F-DIP members who had 461 Interview M As the key member of the success team of the Colonel Sudarman group he knew that some of the money was provided by Colonel Sudarman himself and some additional funds from sponsors (Chinese businessmen). Another factor, that the respondent said made the F-TNI/POLRI members disappointed and frustrated, was the factor of Colonel Sudarman himself who had no willingness to follow the steps of the election process. The respondent added that he was too confident with the old pattern that every military-supported candidate must win and the F-TNI/POLRI s members were responsible to ensure it. He gave as examples that Colonel Sudarman never came to present his vision and mission to the DPRD forum as formally required by the DPRD s Decree and he never met supporting groups that had been lobbied although he was several times invited by the F-DIP members to discuss many things, especially concessions that they might get after voting for him. The Colonel might have thought that meeting the Chairman of the PDI-P once in Surabaya, the city where Sudarman lived, would be enough. Interview M Interview G

210 been attracted by the F-TNI/POLRI long before the election, as well as additional votes from the PKB and other small parties. 464 When asked about how the military reacted to Golkar s political moves, the respondent complained that the military acted with typical behaviour, intimidating and threatening. He said there were threats made, including that his family would be killed if Colonel Sudarman failed to become the Bupati. The same threats were sent to Dr. Hanafi s house. The respondent decided to tape-record them as proof should this case be brought to the court. He suspected that the message was sent by the group of Colonel Sudarman; and became more convinced when after the election he was invited to the Ngadiredjo s KODIM HQ where the Commander angrily blamed him as the main cause of the failure of Colonel Sudarman; accusing him of betrayal. However, he argued to convince him that Ngadiredjo s people did not want a military Bupati anymore, and that Golkar s aspiration was to support civil supremacy. 465 When asked about his opinion of the failure of the military, the Chairman of the F- TNI/ POLRI responded that the key factor that brought Dr. Hanafi to a victory in Ngadiredjo was the money. He also suspected that there were personal deals between Dr. Hanafi and Yasni as they were both working at the same office as dentists. 466 However, although disappointed with the political actions of Dr. Hanafi s group, he praised Dr. Hanafi as individually much better than Colonel Sudarman. His leadership could be more accepted by the people of Ngadiredjo than Colonel Sudarman s Interview G The respondent said, I am still keeping the records and I have informed some local journalists about that, but then we decided not to bring it to the Court because we knew they were only threats. Interview G With regard to special deals between Dr. Hanafi and Yasni, the latter claimed that he was the person who encouraged Dr. Hanafi to participate in the election and also prepared most of the administrative requirements for this, including completing the application forms, but he denied the accusation that there was a financial deal between them. Interview G Although the geo-political calculations of the military required that Ngadiredjo Regency be led by a military officer, personally, this officer was not so happy with Colonel Sudarman s personality, especially his highly temperamental attitudes. He also labelled it as out of control and further pointed out that, when the Colonel was the District Commander (Dandim) of Ngadiredjo, he several times punished his men by beating and kicking them in front of local people, and once this had been publicized by the local media. Another example was that, after the election when he knew that he lost, he spontaneously shouted at two members of the F-TNI/POLRI, accusing them of having betrayed him and supported Dr. Hanafi. The respondent, who was one of the leading actors in the 178

211 So, some members of F-TNI/POLRI did not support Colonel Sudarman personally, but did so mainly because they understood that the military institution expected them to do so. Yet they also understood that the institution had loosened its control and lowered its expectations. When asked about the reactions of other F-TNI/POLRI members to the failure, one of my respondents said, for sure, disappointed, but they seemed to realize that they had to accept the political reality, that they were no longer in a position that could determine the outcome of the election. He said that the one who was very disappointed was Colonel Sudarman, but he had to understand that we had tried our best; only the conditions had made it much difficult to play the old games [threat and intimidations] Dealing with new powers From this point the completion of the Ngadiredjo Regency Pilkada forward, the military position in the successive Pilkada had no longer been dominant. Table VII.3. shows that from January 2000 to December 2003, from twenty nine local elections listed, the military faction was unsuccessful in sixteen elections; either when it proposed its own candidates (eight cases) or supported other factions candidates (eight cases). Table VII.3: Military achievement in East Java s District Elections May 1998 to December 2003 Districts/ Dates Achievement by military faction Colonel s side, had been very angry with the accusation. He said that he had replied, As the Chairman of the F-TNI/ POLRI I told him that, as a Colonel it would be shameful for him that he had shown to the public his childish attitude that made me lost my respect for him, and made me much convinced that he was not appropriate for the position. So, I was challenging him to go to the Commander in Chief to report his accusations. With regard to the geo-political calculation pointed to by the respondent, it had been decided that the Regencies around the area were classified as vulnerable to the influence of Communists; therefore, in the past two of them had to be under close supervision of the military and were always led by military officers. As the position of Regent in another neighboring District had been occupied by a civilian, it was even more desired by the military that Ngadiredjo should be controlled by the military. Interview M Interview M33. Another military faction member said, Colonel Sudarman knew how I struggled by myself by visiting their [PDIP s members] houses one by one to get support for him. Interview M

212 Successf ul /Failed Military supporte d candidat e (A) Votes results Opposing factions candidates (B,C,D, etc) Tota l Seat s Malang City, Successf 24 B:1, C:1, 98 ul* Abstain: 19 Mojokerto City, 02- Successf 8 B:7, C: ul Madiun City, Successf 9 B;9, C; ** ul* Ngawi Regency,10- Failed* 18 B:22, C:4, Abstain:1 Lamongan Reg, 13- Successf ul Gresik Reg., Failed* 5 B;25, C:6, D:4, E:1, F:1, Abstain: 3 Surabaya City, 07- Failed* 10 B:17, C: Jember Reg., Successf B:19, C: ul Situbondo Reg., 17- Failed 12 B:28, C:1, Abstain:3, Invalid:1 Ponorogo Reg., 11- Successf B:1, C:16, D:7, ul Invalid:1 Sumenep Reg., 03- Failed* 12 B:28, C:4, Invalid:1 Banyuwangi Reg, Failed 5 B:23, C:15, C: Blitar City, Failed* Sampang Reg., 22- Failed* Trenggalek Reg, 25- Failed* 5 B:23,C:15, Invalid:2 Pacitan Reg., Successf 29 B:12, C:4 45 ul Mojokerto Reg., 23- Successf 22 B:9, C:6, D:5, ul E:1, F:1, G:1 Sidoarjo Reg., 28- Successf 28 B:4, C:10, D: ul Malang Reg., Failed* A:1; AA:5 B:19 C:19, Abstain:1 Blitar Reg., Failed* 16 B:24, C:5 45 Probolinggo City Data not available Kediri City, Data not available Kediri Reg. Data not available 180

213 Pasuruan City, Tuban Reg., Batu City, Bangkalan Reg, Bojonegoro Reg, Probolinggo Reg, Nganjuk Reg., Pamekasan Reg, Tulungagung Reg, Pasuruan Reg., Madiun Reg., Magetan Reg., Lumajang Reg., Jombang Reg, Bondowoso Reg, Failed Successf ul 29 B:15, Invalid:1 45 Successf 18 6, Invalid:1 25 ul Successf ul Successf 29 15, abstain:1 45 ul Successf 27 B:17, C:1 45 ul Failed Invalid: 5 B:31, C:4, 45 Abstain:5 Failed Failed 16 B:17, C:12 45 Failed 21 B:22, Invalid:2 45 Successf 18, Invalid:2 45 ul Failed Successf ul 25 14, Invalid:6 45 Data not available Failed Notes: * Military faction proposed its own candidate Military faction supported the single majority party (FKB) Military faction against the majority party (FKB) Two big factions affiliated and without the military the groups would have remained the Military faction affiliated with big faction(s) and without the military the groups would have been defeated. Military faction members were divided ** Two candidates who gained nine votes each were proposed to the MHA which approved the candidate who was supported by the military faction. ++ In the Districts with 45 seats 5 were allocated to the military, in others three. In eight of the sixteen defeated cases, the military faction members were divided, indicating that the institutional control and internal solidity was weakening. In the 181

214 other thirteen cases the military faction was siding with winning groups. In nine of these, in which it had either supported a single majority party (two cases) or joined an alliance of two big factions (F-KB and F-DIP in all seven cases), the faction s support was not very significant in bringing about the victory as the majority party or the alliance already had enough votes to win. In only four of the twenty nine elections was the military faction s role significant in bringing its alliance s groups to their victory. So, a general trend that the table shows is a continuation of the decline of the military influence in the local Bupati/Mayoral elections, a trend that had begun in 1999, as discussed earlier. There was no single reason for the failures of the military factions in the elections, instead several reasons were accumulated. Some were specific to certain cases, such as the existence of a solid, single majority party or two or more big parties allied to support one candidate who was not the military faction s preferred one. Some other reasons, nevertheless, seem to be general to all Districts, such as changing political circumstances, changing rules of the election or misreading of local politics. According to one member of a military faction, generally it was obvious and widely felt that the military as an institution was attempting to stay away from the election activities. Consequently, the individual officers of the F-TNI/POLRI, or their Territorial Commands, were uncertain about their roles. The following are election cases that provide more information about the decline of the influence of the military institution in local politics as demonstrated in Tables VII.2 and VII Restarting the election The Ngadiredjo Election case was the only one in the East Java province where the F-ABRI and F-KP succeeded in persuading the newly elected legislatures to accept the nomination process prepared by the old Assemblies. In the other five of the six elections (Lamongan, Surabaya City, Jember, Situbondo, and Gresik) with a similar transitional condition the new Assemblies decided to restart the election 182

215 procedure. All Bupati/Mayor s candidates who had been selected and nominated by the previous legislatures were removed from the candidate list. 469 The elections were postponed until after January 1 st 2000, the time the new Law (No. 25/1999) on Regional Autonomy was expected to come into effect. 470 Two Districts held their elections in January, three others in February. In the first two Districts all candidates were completely new, whereas in the other three the previous three candidates joined the elections along with the new candidates. Several respondents gave similar reasons why the military F-ABRI (F-TNI/POLRI) and F-KP (F-Golkar) had not been as successful as their counterparts in Ngadiredjo in getting the new Assembly members to agree to continue what the previous legislatures had started although, as a respondent in Gresik Regency said, these factions had tried to lobby them. The reason was the strong influence of the religious kiyai leaders (President Wahid was one of the most respected kiyai among F-KB members) to prohibit all F-KB members from accepting any bribe offered in order to accept the requests from the Golkar or F- TNI/ POLRI groups. 471 In the Surabaya City District the F-PKB had almost equal DPRD numbers with the F-PDIP, but in all the other four (Regency) Districts the F- KB was dominant, with around or more than a half of the DPRD members. The respondents said that it became common for members of the F-KB in the legislatures to be invited by the respected kiyai of the places to make a religious oath on the name of Allah (bai at/ bersumpah atas nama Allah) as a guarantee of their loyalty to religious values, such as honesty in politics (kejujuran dalam berpolitik). 472 The military s failure to convince the new Assemblies in the five 469 The decisions were stated in Decrees of the DPRD of: the District of Jember, No. 20/ 1999, October 25 th 1999; the District of Situbondo, No. 7/1999, November 2 nd 1999; the District of Lamongan No. 31/1999, October 25 th 1999; the District of Gresik No. 170/ 309/ /1999, October 27 th The Decrees were published by the Biro Bina Otonomi Daerah Jawa Timur (East Java Local Autonomy Building Office), Permasalahan Enam Kepala Daerah Tk II Provinsi Jawa Timur (a copy is in the possession of the author). 470 The Law No. 22/1999 on Decentralization was produced in Habibie s Presidency, but its coming into effect was delayed due to the lack of readiness of the necessary accompanying operational regulations. During Gus Dur s Presidency, demands for the Law to be brought into effect were increasing, and there were threats that if not, some Regencies would dis-integrate from Indonesia. It was partly to satisfy these demands that the central government then promised that the Law would come into effect by January 1 st The respondents were members of the F-TNI/POLRI and other factions from these regions. Interviews M38, M41, M48, G36, P This is not to say that bai at was always effective to prevent money politics within the various F-KB. It was probably quite effective in the first months of the new legislatures coming to office, but when eventually the reform spirit and ideals began to erode, the bai at became less effective. Interview M

216 Districts to follow what had been done in Ngadiredjo by not restarting the election indicates that its power was declining Powerless against a majority party One of the newly important factors that limited the military s political influence in local elections has been the emergence of a majority party that was relatively solid internally and independent of support from the military or other political groups. The 1999 election in the East Java province made the PKB become the majority party in four Regencies. Of the total forty five seats of each DPRD it occupied thirty in Situbondo, twenty five in Sumenep, twenty five in Bangkalan and twenty eight in Bondowoso. In these Regencies, as a respondent said, the PKB could easily bring its Bupati candidates to victory in the elections. 473 In contrast, in Situbondo, for example, the military position was very weak. In June 1998 anti-military-rule protestors had occupied the executive and legislative buildings and demanded the District Head, Retired Colonel Sudaryanto, resign. 474 The 1999 legislature refused all procedures related to the Bupati Election that had been prepared by the previous one. In the 2000 Bupati Election, as a respondent said, with 30 of 45 seats PKB could do easily whatever they wanted, including steering the Bupati Election outcomes. When the election was held, Drs. Mohammad Diaman, who was proposed by the F-KB, gained 28 of 45 votes. The F-TNI/ POLRI allied with the F-DIP and proposed a different team of Bupati and Vice-Bupati candidates, but had no chance of winning. 475 In Sumenep the election showed a similar result. H. Ramlan Siraj (Bupati) and Drs. Abdul Muis (Vice Bupati), the team of candidates who had been proposed by the F-KB, won 28 of the 45 votes. The F-TNI/POLRI proposed Retired Colonel 473 In terms of vote percentages there were eight Districts that had simple majorities, but because 10% of the total seats were still allocated for the non-elected F-TNI/POLRI representatives, in four Regency Districts the parties that gained fifty percent, or slightly above, of the votes could still not make up a simple majority in the legislature. These four Regencies were: Pasuruan where the PKB gained 55% of the votes which entitled them to 22 of the 45 seats; both Madiun and Surabaya where the PDIP gained 50% of the votes and 20/45 of the seats; and Magetan where the PDIP gained 52% and 21/45. (The vote percentages are taken from Jawa Timur Dalam Angka 1999 (East Java in Figures 1999), p Already mentioned in Chapter Five. 475 Interviews M48, M

217 Sukarno Marsaid (who had been the sitting Bupati from 1995 until that moment) and Drs. H. Rafik (a retired local Attorney General), but got only 12 votes. According to one military respondent, in addition to the faction s five votes, seven votes were gained from Golkar (3) and the F-DIP (4). The respondent said that even though they had predicted that H. Ramlan Siraj would win, the F-TNI/POLRI kept proposing different candidates because they had to accommodate the intention of Ret. Colonel Sukarno Marsaid to participate in the election. As the existing Bupati, he felt that he had enough resources [finance] to support his candidature, said the respondent. His group had planned to carry out a dawn attack (serangan fajar), or bribe, the day before the election, but the plan could not be executed in relation to the F-KB members because they had been quarantined by the religious kiyai leaders several days before the election, to prevent such actions from influencing them. 476 So, the existing position as the Bupati and the financial resources he had were no longer sufficient when used by the Colonel to bring him into a second term of office in a competition against the majority faction. In Bangkalan, similar features were found. As one respondent said, whatever we do to change the constellation of the map in the DPRD would not affect the PKB s attempt to take over power. 477 Retired Marine Colonel Abdul Fatah (the existing Bupati) was prevented by the F-KB from reassuming power by rejecting his LPAJ (Laporan Pertanggung Jawaban Akhir Jabatan, Final Accountability Report). By this refusal, according to the election rule, he lost his chance to register as a Bupati Candidate in the election. 478 Although the F-TNI/POLRI tried to save him by accepting the LPAJ, thereby becoming the only faction that accepted the report, its position was too weak (terlalu lemah) to prevent the overall rejection. It also could not defend him when the Election Committee refused his registration. As in Situbondo and Sumenep, in the Bangkalan election the F-KB-proposed team of KH. Fuad Amin for Bupati and Ir. H. Mohammadong for Vice-Bupati won 476 Interview M53 (a member of the F-TNI/POLRI of the Sumenep District DPRD). 477 Interview M The Bupati lodged his rejection of the DPRD assessment on his LPJ to the Court. By lodging this complaint, he could argue that the final decision about the LPJ had not yet been made so he could register as a Regent Candidate. However, his registration was rejected by the Election Committee, and his complaint also refused by the Court. (A copy of the documents related to this conflict is in the possession of the author). 185

218 the election easily, by 42 of the 45 votes. Military respondents said that the F- TNI/POLRI had not much choice other than supporting the majority, otherwise the faction would create difficulties in relationships with the Bupatis, not only for the faction but also for the military units stationed here. 479 So, the three cases suggest that when a solid, single majority faction existed, it was difficult for the military as a minor faction to influence the outcome of the election Left out by ruling coalitions Another factor that limited the military role in the Pilkada was the formation of powerful coalitions embracing big non-military political groups. In the Trenggalek Pilkada, the F-TNI/POLRI candidate team of Drs. H. Suyanto (for Bupati) and Hardjiyo (for Vice-Bupati) gained only five of the total forty five votes, which were only the votes given by the faction members with no support from members of any other faction. The candidates proposed by an affiliation of the F-PKB and F-Golkar won twenty three votes (see Table VII.3). According to one military respondent, the F-TNI/POLRI since the beginning had been very pessimistic about the chance for Suyanto to win the election, but he kept asking to be proposed by the faction. This respondent also revealed his suspicion that Suyanto was the one sent by the F-KB and Golkar to prevent the F-TNI/POLRI members from joining the F-DIP group, but he only began to suspect this after the result was announced. Because, he said, if they joined the F-DIP they might attempt to break the F-KB and F-Golkar affiliation. When asked why that alliance had not asked the F-TNI/POLRI to join, he said that maybe the two factions had already enough members to win the election, so they did not want to share the money with the F-TNI/POLRI. 480 Therefore the F-TNI/ POLRI members were kept away from the coalition, but prevented from joining another coalition (F-DIP) that might 479 Interviews M79, M Similar cases where two big factions, mainly the F-DIP and the F-KB, formed a coalition for the District Head elections without including the F-TNI/POLRI were in Pasuruan City and Pacitan Regency. According to some respondents, the reasons were similar, first, they were strong enough to win the election, second, they did not want to include what they called non-reformist groups, but perhaps, third, in the words of one respondent in Trenggalek, they did not want to share the money (bagi bagi rezeki) that they got from the elections. Interview M64 (a member of the Trenggalek DPRD F-TNI/POLRI). Money politics is real but difficult to prove said one respondent in Pasuruan. He mentioned that there was a defeated candidate who spent about $300,000 (Tiga M) to bribe as a deposit, based on a self-account by the candidate to the respondent, a close friend who was a bureaucracy official in Pasuruan. Interview B

219 be strong enough to challenge. This was done by giving the F-TNI/POLRI one candidate to elect. In the Regency of Mangliawan (pseudonym), the case was quite similar. The military faction proposed two teams of Bupati and Vice-Bupati candidates; the first pair only gained one vote, the other five. One respondent who was a relative of the Bupati candidate who gained only one vote revealed that the candidate had spent a large amount of money, said to be three billion rupiah, to help the military faction in lobbying, looking for other factions support, but failed. Other factions were divided into two alliances, led respectively by the F-KB and the F-DIP, which gained an equal number of votes, nineteen each. However, the respondent said that although the military faction appeared weak, the members were lucky because there was no victor yet; so when the second round of voting was held to choose between the two candidate teams with the equal largest votes in the first round, the military s support became vital to win the election, whichever side they gave their votes to would win the election. 481 Nevertheless, the significance of the military faction in the second voting was just as a supporting group, not a leading group to be supported as in the New Order. As in Trenggalek, the military faction in Mangliawan was unsuccessful in bringing its own candidate to win the election. In the 2003 election of the Regency of Ngantang (pseudonym), the military faction produced five invalid votes in voting for the two competing candidates, indicating a frustrated attitude in dealing with big factions. One member of the faction revealed that they did this because they were disappointed by the decisions made by other factions to propose candidates that in the military faction s view were unqualified. Although the faction did not like the candidates there was not much they could do to stop them, so they made their votes invalid. 482 One senior officer of the local 481 Asked whether the military faction was able to design the conditions in order to get to this second voting, the respondent was not sure, but he said he got information that the winner spent no less than fifteen billion rupiah. (Interview B111, a Pasuruan District bureaucracy official). In another interview with a military respondent, but in a different District the respondent mentioned that the military faction created a situation where two affiliations had equal numbers. The respondent said that they did so by secretly convincing each side that if the group could build at least eighteen members, the military faction (five members) would join them and with twenty three members they would win. Interview M An alliance of two large factions, F-KB and F-DIP, dominated this election. This alliance proposed a single team of a Regent candidate A from the PDIP and a Vice-Regent candidate from the PKB. Another alliance was 187

220 Territorial Command said that the Headquarters was disappointed at the faction s decision. Firstly, the faction wasted their voting rights but achieved nothing because the decision did not influence the outcomes. Secondly, the childish decision did not contribute any good to the future relations between the elected District Head and his supporting factions on one hand, and the local military units on another hand. The respondent suspected that the faction made the decision because of a difference in the amount of money as a concession for the support. 483 However, one of the faction s members said that it was not about money but about the principle regarding the quality of the candidates. He said that because of the decision, they were visited by an officer sent by the Headquarters to investigate what happened. The respondent said that the territorial officers thought that the faction received the money but did not want to share (bagi bagi rezeki). The officer asked him why the faction in Ngantang was unlike the military factions in other Districts and did not share the election result (meaning money). Regardless of whether or not the military was involved in the money politics (this issue is discussed in the next chapter), at this stage it is important to note that the Ngantang case shows how weak the military faction had become in influencing the election result. 4. Conclusion The Pilkada cases presented above demonstrated the rapid decline in influence of the military institution in local political affairs. This decline was influenced by the changes in the number of the appointed military representatives in the DPRD in favour of (new) political parties, the change in the Pilkada regulations from those led by Golkar, but this second one was manipulated by the first by sending a candidate B to register through Golkar, but with the purpose of his being defeated. By doing this, he prevented Golkar proposing an ambitious candidate that might be strong enough to challenge the PDIP s candidate. Asked about how he could manage to be defeated, the respondent said that as soon as the official list of candidates was issued in a DPRD decree the faction could no longer change and propose another candidate so, after this decree was issued, the candidate B could begin his self-destructive action, for example, by refusing the previous deals so that the proposing faction did not vote for him. The respondent said that after the selection process, the military faction was the only faction that was actively and fairly conducting a fit and proper test of all registered candidates. As the result the faction produced a list of rankings based on their achievement in the test. The list was forwarded to other factions to consider, but these other factions ignored it and proposed two candidates who were ranked among the lowest ones. Interview R The respondent said that childish refers to an attitude among the military faction members who felt irritated when the civilian factions said they did not need the support from the military faction (tidak perlu dukungan TNI). Interview M

221 that legitimized the dominant roles of the military institutions to those that restricted them, and the growing power of the civilian political communities. In the 1998 Sumbersari Pilkada case, although the military power was limited, mainly by public pressure and the growing challenge from the civilian factions in the DPRD, the military was still able to determine the outcome of the Pilkada, because the Pilkada regulations provided the military with strong authority to do so, and the local military officers involved were still obliged by their headquarters to struggle for the victory. In the 1999/2000 Ngadiredjo case, the military power was limited by several changes mentioned above, especially new power constellations and new rules and regulations for the Pilkada, therefore, despite some efforts by the local military, including intimidations and briberies, but with a declined support from the KODAM, the military Bupati candidate was defeated. Even more in the remaining cases since 2000, the military faction in most of the Districts became a minor player, either because of the emergence of a single majority faction or because big civilian factions formed an affiliation and left the military faction out. This encouraging declining trend at the institutional level was, however, only half of the picture of the military involvement in the local elections. A discouraging part of the picture, portraying involvements at individual level that highlight problems of minimizing the military s political influence and problems of building a democratic local election, is presented in the next chapter. Chapter Eight MILITARY INVOLVEMENT IN ELECTIONS OF DISTRICT GOVERNMENT HEADS (2): The rise of personal politics Some of the F-DIP members came to us [F-TNI/POLRI members] asking for supports, and I told them, if they could increase their group members to twenty [a half of the DPRD members without F-TNI/POLRI], then we would join their group, because we do not want to side with the loser Interview M53 (a member of the F-TNI/POLRI of Mantingan, ). The group was formed by several the F-DIP members who did not agree with the rest of the faction proposing a former-golkar Bupati to run for a second term, and instead proposed one of the F-DIP s own cadre who was the Speaker of the Mantingan DPRD. 189

222 I was threatened [by a local territorial commander] to be recalled from my position as the member of the F-TNI/POLRI if I did not vote for the candidate that he asked me to, but I did not care because I had already reported that problem to my own commander [who promoted him to the F-TNI/POLRI member in the first place] and he backed my position Introduction: The dissolving of a pattern The marked decline of the military s political roles in the post-soeharto era (as presented in the previous three chapters) included a drastic weakening of its institutional control 486 over the political behaviours of officers who were still active in political matters, such as in the Pilkada. This will be discussed below. As mentioned earlier, the previous specific guidance from the military headquarters, for example about which factions or candidates the military had to support or with which factions it should affiliate, was stopped. As examples of the response, the first quote above suggests a pragmatic (inconsistent) consideration depending on who would win or lose, the second suggests the decreased level of internal solidity. As Table VIII.1 shows, there was not a clear pattern of aspirations of the remaining military factions and they could affiliate with any party. Table VIII.1: Military Affiliation and Aspiration in East Java District Elections January 2000 December 2003 Regencies (R)/ Cities (C) Bigges t faction Factions that the military affiliated with Proposed F- F- F- F- F- District K DI Go P PA Head B P l P N candidate Resu lt Lamongan F-KB X X PAN Win This dissident group was unsuccessful although my respondent from this group claimed that they had already managed to gain twenty members by lobbying other factions members, and did not know what the F-TNI/POLRI members voted for. Interview D67 (the Speaker of the Mantingan DPRD and an F-DIP member). 485 Interview M38 (a member of the F-TNI/POLRI of Buluhlawang, ). This case is discussed in section In Chapter Two (Table III.2, p. 26) and Chapter Three (p. 47), I highlighted military factionalism and the weak institutional control as an important factor that influenced the military intervention into or withdrawal from politics. In this chapter, therefore, it is quite relevant to ask the question of whether or not a similar indication was found during the processes of the local elections. 190

223 (R), Gresik (R), Surabaya (C), Jember (R), Situbondo (R), Ponorogo (R), Sumenep (R), Banyuwan gi (R), Blitar (C), Sampang (R), Trenggalek (R), Pacitan (R), politician F-KB No affiliation Retired military* (d) F-DIP X Active military* F-KB X X Lose Lose F-KB X PKB politician Win F-DIP X Bureaucrat Win F-KB X X Retired military* F-KB No affiliation Retired military (d) Lose Lose F-DIP X X X Bureaucrat* Lose F-KB X X X X Retired police* (d) Lose F-KB No affiliation Bureaucrat* Lose F-DIP X X Private businessm an Win F-DIP Bureaucrat Win Mojokerto (R), Sidoarjo F-DIP Bureaucrat Win (R), Malang F-DIP No affiliation Businessman* (d) Lose (R), Blitar F-DIP X X Businessm Lose (R), an* Probolingg F-DIP o (C), Kediri F-DIP (C),12-00 Kediri F-DIP Data not available (R), -00 Pasuruan F-KB X X X X Lose (C),12-00 Tuban F-DIP X Politician Win (R), Batu F-DIP X X Bureaucrat Win (C), Bangkalan F-KB X PKB Win (R), politician Bojonegoro F-DIP X X Retired Win 191

224 (R), Probolingg o (R), Nganjuk (R), Pamekasa n (R), Tulungagu ng (R), Pasuruan (R), Madiun (R), Magetan (R), Lumajang (R), Jombang (R), -03 Bondowos o (R), -03 military (d) F-KB X PKB politician F-DIP No affiliation No preference F-PP X X Bureaucrat (d) Win Lose Lose F-DIP X Bureaucrat Lose F-KB X X X X Retired Lose military F-DIP X X Bureaucrat Win F-DIP X X X X Bureaucrat Lose (d) F-DIP Bureaucrat Win F-DIP F-KB X X X X Bureaucrat Lose Total Notes: Only 34 of the total 38 district elections are listed as the other 4 had taken place before the effective change of regime in 1999 with the halving of the size of the military factions in each DPRD (see Chapter Seven). * Military faction proposed its own candidates (d) Military faction members divided Although it could have been considered appropriate in principle for the military faction to support the biggest faction because this represented the biggest group of society, the table shows that it did not always do so. Of the thirty eight elections, in at least twenty three cases it did not support the biggest faction (eleven were F- KB, twelve F-DIP). In addition, the military factions positions in the Pilkada were not necessarily following the military s relations with other parties at the national level. 487 Moreover, the military factions were not obviously more likely to support 487 In the National Parliament, the military representatives on several occasions had sided against the F-DIP, including in the F-DIP s efforts to gain success for Megawati as President in The military faction at the 192

225 the F-KB during the Presidency of Abdurrahaman Wahid (the national Chairman of the PKB) from October 1999 to July 2001 nor to side with the F-DIP during the Presidency of Megawati (the national Chairman of the PDIP) from July 2001 to September So, there were no obvious indications on how the military position in the local level Pilkada was connected to party-political events at the central level. 2. Reasons for military support of candidates A member of the military faction of the Malang District DPRD said that the military s national Headquarters never gave an instruction, but there was a common sense among the faction members about how they should choose the candidate to support. 488 Firstly, the candidate had to have a strong political (Pancasila) ideology and strong nationalism. This, perhaps, explains why the military factions seem to have been more comfortable affiliating with Golkar and the F-DIP (both of which have a clear secular nationalist ideology) than the F-KB (ambiguous about the relationship between its nationalism and Islamic ideology), although after more than a year the military began to affiliate with F-KB. It also suggests why before 2001, especially when the military was allowed to propose its own candidate 489, most candidates supported by the military faction were either military officers or bureaucrats (see Table VIII.2). Secondly, the candidate had to be the most probable candidate to win. So the candidate did not have to be proposed by the biggest faction, although it would be an additional credit for him. Arguments about his personal capacity to be the District Head and whether there were sufficient resources to support him (to lobby the Assembly members), mainly financially, had to be able to convince F- TNI/POLRI members that these factors could bring him to victory. So, a retired military or bureaucrat was not necessarily supported by the F-TNI/POLRI if he seemed to have little chance of winning. national level seemed to take a position closer to the F-KB than to the F-DIP, especially in the early months of the administration of Wahid. 488 Interview M From 2001 on the F-TNI/POLRI were prohibited from proposing any candidate and military officers were not allowed to register as candidates for District Heads before they had quit the military. 193

226 Thirdly, the candidate did not face a strong rejection from the public, so that if he won his victory would not destabilize the politics and security in the district. However, as will be seen later, the above criteria were very open to multiple interpretations and in fact, what determined the military position in each Pilkada appears to have been based at least as much as on individual judgements than institutional guidance. 194

227 Table VIII.2: Military support for officers competing to be East Java District Heads Regency/City Election Dates Malang (C) May 1998 December 2003 Existing Military District Heads/ Period Elected to Office/ Reason for Leaving Ret.Col.Susamto/ )/ Completed two terms in office Mojokerto (C) Led by civilian since 1994 None Madiun (C) Led by civilian since 1993 None Ngawi Col. Subagio SW/ /Retired 1999 after failing to get approval from the MHA Officers registered as candidates (Officers supported by military highlighted) (Won=W; Lost=L) Col. Suyitno (W); Col. Hatta; Col.Subagio SW; Col.Sudharsono (L); Col.Sudibyo Lamongan Led by civilian since Col.Marine.X [Name not available] (L) Gresik Surabaya (C) Jember Situbondo Ponorogo Sumenep Banyuwangi Blitar (C) Sampang Col.Navy. Ret. Soewarso/ / Retired 2000 after losing in the 2000 Election Col. Sunarto Sumoprawiro/ / Re-elected in 2000, but died of sickness in Australia in the middle of second term of office (2002). Col.Winarno/ /Retired 2000 after losing in the 2000 election Col.Ret. Sudaryanto/ Returned to his military unit in 2000 Name not available. Col.S.Marsaid/ /Retired after losing in the 2000 election. Col. HT. Purnomo Sidiq/ Resigned in 2000 Led by civilian. Col.Police.Fadillah.Budiono/ / Col.Suwarso (L), Col.Marine.Mansyur Ch; Ltc.Sumartono Col.Sunarto Sumoprawiro; Col.Bambang Satriawan; Col.Marine Budhiarto Machrup (L) Col.Winarno (L); Col.Giyono Sutomo None None Col.S.Marsaid (L) None None Col.Fadillah Budiono (W), 195

228 Trenggalek Pacitan Mojokerto Sidoarjo Malang, Re-elected in 2000 Led by civilian. Col.Ret. Sutjipto/ /Retired after losing in the 2000 election. Led by civilian. Col. Ret. Sudjito/ /Retired in 2000, did not take part in 2000 election Col. H.A. Said ( )/Retired in 2000 after completing two periods in office Led civilian Ltc.Abdullah; Col. Syamsudin None Colonel Sutjipto (L), not supported by the military None None None Blitar None Probolinggo Led by civilian. None (C) Kediri (C) Led by civilian since None Kediri (R) Led by civilian None Pasuruan (C) Name not available. None 2000 Tuban, Col. Ret. Indarto/1996- None /Retired and Batu (C) 2002 Bangkalan, Bojonegoro, Probolinggo, Nganjuk failed to register in 2001 Led by civilian since 2002 (newly created city) Col.Marine.H.A.Fatah/ /Retired in 2000, did not register in the 2003 election Col.H. M. Santoso/2003- present/retired 2000 after losing in Sidoarjo,then elected here in 2003 Col.Murhadi/ /Retired 2000, did not register in the 2003 election Col.Ret.Sutrisno/ /Retired in 2000,did not participate (Data about reason is not available) None None Col.Santoso (W) None None Pamekasan, Led by civilian since None Tulungagung Led by civilian since 1987 None Pasuruan Col. Ret. Dade Angga/ Col.Dade Angga (L) /Retired 2000, lost in 2003 Madiun Led by civilian since 1998 None 196

229 Magetan Led by civilian since 1998 None Lumajang Led by civilian since 1998 None Jombang 2003 Col. Afandi/ /Retired 2000, lost in 2003 election Col.Affandi (L), not supported by the Bondowoso 2003 Led by civilian since 1998 military None 3. Shifting to individual orientations In the stated view of an F-KB member, a main factor that encouraged the shift toward an individual orientation was that as an institution the military no longer set a victory as a specific target to be achieved by the faction members. 490 A military respondent told me that, on one hand, the broad institutional policy as well as public demands required all officers to stay neutral politically; on the other hand, the job description of the military representatives or of territorial commanders allowed them to remain active in politics. 491 It was individual interests, however, that drove them to choose between neutrality and involvement. For example, when there were no significant individual benefits, they stayed away and justified their inactivity by using the neutrality position. If, however, they thought they could make money from the involvements, especially in election cases, they used the position of being the representative members to justify involvement. As one respondent said, winning the election was not always the primary goal of the military faction; sometimes they could gain better individual benefits by siding with the defeated groups, especially when the groups possessed larger financial resources and were more generous. 492 As the issues of the individual motives are discussed in detail in the next sections, here it is only necessary to note that these personal orientations contributed as a significant reason to the failures of the military in the elections. 490 Interview on with Ahmad Syafii, Deputy Chairman of the Malang City DPRD. 491 Interview M Interview M89. The respondent said, usually before the voting stage the candidate or the financial sponsor of the candidate would spend a large amount of money for campaigns and lobbying, the political activities where the supporting faction could be given money, because the spending for these activities was rarely audited. So, even though the candidate was later defeated, the supporting factions could still get lots of money. 197

230 Nevertheless, more important than the issue of which candidate would be supported was the degree of the involvement that the officers should have had. Many officers who had varied characters and interests were skilful enough to justify their deep political involvement, although they could have minimized their political activity had they really been inclined to support the institutional commitment to leave politics. Economic orientation became a common drive for the officers in their political actions in most Districts. Frequently, different individual interests also surpassed the basic sense of group unity and loyalty, either among the F-TNI/POLRI members or between the faction and the territorial officers connected to the Pilkada. As seen in Table VIII.1, in at least seven cases the military faction members were divided into different competing groups. The following two sections of this chapter demonstrate some features of the active individual involvements of the members of the military factions, in contrast to the declining institutional influence discussed in the previous chapter. 4. Involvement in civilian political conflicts The Sumberwaras Regency election was one of the cases where the military representatives were actively involved and divided into different groups. The case suggests that once the military elites had sided with one or more of the conflicting parties it was difficult for them to play a role as the political stabilizer (stabilisator politik), that used to be a part of New Order ideology. More importantly, it complicated the efforts of minimizing the military s political involvement. The military political activities around the Sumberwaras Pilkada process in 2000, and around its disputed result the year after, demonstrate how the military was contributing to the political and security instability in the District. First, the voices of the military faction members of the local Assembly were divided into two blocks, each siding with one of the two competing Islamic groups; a group of three with the F-KB (the faction of the National Awakening Party, PKB) and a group of two with the F-PP (the faction of the United Development Party, PPP). 493 Second, the Dandim (District Military Commander) of Sumberwaras, Ltc. Herdi, who should 493 Two of the F-TNI/POLRI members: Ltc.Pantje, and Ltc.Muchalib (the then faction Chairman) sided with the F- PP, while three others: Ltc.Suganda, Ltc. Sumanto and Ltc. Syahrir with the F-KB. Interview M59 (the Spokesperson of the military faction). 198

231 have been a supervisor over the faction was busy with his own ambition to register as a Bupati (District Head) candidate. His relations with the military faction tensed because they did not support his plan to register as their candidate. 494 Third, a senior officer in the provincial KODAM Headquarters, Colonel Suharno secretly promised the F-KB that the members of the F-TNI/POLRI would support F-KB 495, but failed to meet this promise at the voting stage. In the previously normal line of command procedure, the KODAM, the Provincial Regional Command, gave an instruction about the military position to be taken in the election; and the F-TNI/POLRI members obeyed the instruction; while the more local District Command (KODIM) assisted in controlling the faction in order to comply with it. If this procedure prevailed, it would have been easy to think of the military as an integrated, solid body; and whether or not the military is to be involved in politics is mainly a matter of what kind of instruction is given. In reality, the KODAM as an institution was not involved in this election, but a powerful officer as an individual in the Headquarters misused his authority in pursuing his individual involvement; while the subordinate officers who were the faction s members did not totally obey the instruction, nor did the KODIM District Commander fully fulfil his obligation as the supervisor on behalf of that senior officer of the KODAM. Individual officers were driven by their own personal interests instead of by a clear unity of command. However, the implementation of the reformasi idea of cutting the military links to day-to-day political activities could not be burdened solely on the military, the civilian society shared the responsibility. Unfortunately, the Sumberwaras Pilkada case demonstrated that civilian politicians practiced the same paradoxical behaviour because of their immediate interests in power. In late December 1999, a visit by the Campaign Team of the PKB to the Surabaya Makodam (KODAM Headquarters), for example, drew this institution back towards the electoral competition. In a meeting with a senior officer, Colonel Suharno, the Team 494 Ltc.Herdi was the Dandim of Sumberwaras at the time of the Bupati election, and was ambitious to join the competition for the Bupati position. However, his approach to the faction was turned down by its members. Interview:M The promise was revealed in an interview with the Chairman of the F-KB Team (Interview K58). 199

232 expressed the F-KB s aspiration and called for the military to support the F-KB in the election. 496 Belief in the KODAM s power over the members of the F- TNI/POLRI in the Sumberwaras DPRD had led the PKB Team to this lobbying. In addition to the visit, which defined the military as still continuing to be an important political player and would have pulled the KODAM back into politics, the F-KB offered a deal in return for support, which was antithetical to the national-level efforts to get the military out of politics. The concession put forwarded by the Team was that PKB would elect any Bupati candidate from the military who was appointed by Colonel Suharno. Similarly, Colonel Suharno s acceptance of the deal offered by the PKB indicated a lack of commitment by the military to really withdraw from politics. Furthermore, an appointment of his former personal assistant, Retired Ltc.Abidin, as the Candidate could easily create negative suspicions, as if he was expecting more returns from their personal relationship in the future if his appointee candidate succeeded in the election. 497 However, although all members of the F-TNI/POLRI were instructed to vote for Ret.Ltc.Abidin, 498 two of the five members of the faction had conflicting individual interests which made them take different lines. Ltc.Muchalib, the Chairman of the faction, had already made a personal commitment to vote for another candidate, the police officer Ltc.Fadli Bianto, who was being proposed by the F-PP. The reason behind this was very personal; Ltc.Muchalib owed Ltc.Fadli Bianto for helping his son to be accepted as a student at AKPOL, the prestigious Police Academy, in Semarang, Central Java, two years 496 As the Chief of the Campaign Team for the F-PKB, Farid Mubakir held meetings with the Party s Dewan Syuro (the most influential body for decision making within the PKB) in preparation for the Bupati election and these meetings decided that the Team had to meet a powerful officer in the KODAM in Surabaya. The decision to take a Bupati candidate from the military was not only because of lack of self confidence among the F-KB members, but also because the opposing group powered by the F-PP had taken a police officer, Ltc. Fadli Bianto as their Bupati candidate. It was thought by PKB members that the people of Sumberwaras would accept the military better than the police. Another reason was because, compared to other factions, this faction was a bit late in carrying out its internal consolidation for the Bupati election. Besides, it was believed that with Abdurrahman Wahid having the position as President, it would be easier for the F-KB to link their interests (intended support) to the military. Interview K58, with the Chairman of the faction s Campaign Team. 497 A reason for the appointment given to me verbally was that, he was a Madurese-born, mixed-arabic- Indonesian who was quite religious, and who was expected to be widely accepted by Sumberwaras religious people. Interview K A few days after the visit by the F-KB Team to the KODAM, all five members of the F-TNI/POLRI were instructed to meet their Pangdam in Surabaya. The faction members were instructed to secure (amankan) the policy to support the F-KB. In early January 2000, their Danrem (local sub-area commander) came to the F- TNI/POLRI office and re-emphasized the message from the Pangdam about what was to be the military position in the election. Interview M

233 before 499. Another member of the faction, Ltc.Pantje, initially had ambitions to enter the Bupati competition himself, but then cancelled his registration and decided to support Ltc.Fadli Bianto who once had been his direct superior officer when they were both serving at the AKPOL. Thus, both these officers had their own reasons for deviating from the Pangdam s instruction to support the F-KB candidate, Ret.Ltc.Abidin. The disobeying by some officers of their superior s instruction in the Pilkada shows that officers may ignore the national (but apparently not regional) institutional commitment to leave politics if by doing so they could pursue their personal interests. So, in addition to the fact that the KODAM headquarters could not restrain itself from being involved in politics, it could not fully control the political activities of its officers at the District level, and this added another problem to the efforts of withdrawing the military entirely from politics. The difficulty that the KODAM headquarters had in controlling the political activities of the members of the F-TNI/POLRI in this District was also complicated by the ineffectiveness of the District Military Command. As already mentioned, normally, the KODAM would delegate its direct control over these faction s members to their District Commander. However, instead of carrying out the necessary supervision over the faction to ensure it would support Ret.Ltc.Abidin, the District Commander, Ltc.Herdi, attempted to use the faction for achieving his own ambition for the Bupati office. The appointment of Ret.Ltc.Abidin by Colonel Suharno as a candidate to go forward, publicly through the F-KB, was viewed as the reason why a permission letter proposed by and for Ltc.Herdi to the KODAM in order to enable him to register as a candidate was not issued until after the registration deadline. 500 Ltc.Pantje and Ltc.Muchalib, who had decided to support Ltc.Fadli Bianto, undermined the instruction from their Komando, as well as the intention of Ltc.Herdi, their KODIM Commander, to use the F-TNI/POLRI as his political vehicle for joining in the competition. 501 He had badly misjudged the situation. He 499 Indications that Ltc.Muchalib would support Ltc.Fadli Bianto had been noticed by F-PKB members. In several conversations with F-KB members he had given signs of this, once stating implicitly that he had to do that. Yet, although the F-KB members understood the situation he was in, they were not so sure that he would be brave enough to disobey his Pangdam s instruction. Interview M Interview M Ltc.Herdi, the Dandim of Sumberwaras came several times to the F-TNI/POLRI office, expressing his intention to register as a Bupati candidate through the faction. However, Ltc.Muchalib, the Chairman of the faction never 201

234 was ignored by the F-TNI/POLRI members but, because he had expected that the F-TNI/POLRI would support him, he had previously refused an offer from the F-KB to propose him as their Bupati candidate and so the appointment by Colonel Suharno of Ret.Ltc.Abidin to the F-KB faction s place - which could have been his - was enough reason for him not to be committed to Abidin s success in the election. 502 In fact, shortly before the day of the election, he was replaced as the Dandim by another officer and was moved to the KODAM Headquarters in Surabaya, which could indicate that Colonel Suharno had some doubts about Ltc.Herdi s readiness to support Ret.Ltc.Abidin as a candidate. When Ret.Ltc.Abidin was removed from the list of candidates at the first stage of the selection 503, Colonel Suharno s mood toward the election also turned down. Some members of the F-KB, however, seemed to be unaware of the extent to which changes in political interests could affect political relations. Pressured by a three-day dateline for changing their candidate, the F-KB proposed Ret.Col.Syamsul Arifin as a substitute for Ret.Ltc.Abidin to the Election Committee, but without consulting in advance with Colonel Suharno about this replacement. 504 One military respondent thought that the change in mood was caused by the F-KB s unilateral decision to replace Ret.Ltc.Abidin with someone who was unacceptable to Colonel Suharno. In fact, he said that after the failure of Ret.Ltc.Abidin, Colonel Suharno seemed to permit a free choice to the military gave serious attention to it, keeping arguing that in the current political condition (reformation era) the F- TNI/POLRI could no longer promise any support to a military officer wanting to run for a Bupati position in the election. Interview M Before the Campaign Team of the F-KB met the KODAM s powerful officer, Col. Suharno, who then appointed Ret.Ltc. Abidin to be their Bupati candidate, some of its members had approached Ltc.Herdi about this position, but he refused because he wanted to go forward through the F-TNI/POLRI. Interview M The rejection of Abidin was based on a letter from the Sumberwaras Education and Culture Service which stated that his High School Certificate was invalid. This letter was received by the Election Committee just three days before the administrative deadline for candidature submission. Many speculations emerged about the arrival of the letter. Some said it was a political conspiracy that involved Fadli Bianto s groups, some blamed the military for not seriously providing a Bupati candidate for the F-KB, some others suspected that Ltc.Abdin himself was involved for financial reasons but, at the time of the interviews, no one could prove those theories. Interview B57 (the DPRD Secretary, who was a member of the Election Committee). 504 The name of Syamsul Arifin had previously emerged from what was called the F-GAB, the Combined Faction with 5 members: 2 from Golkar and 1 each from PNU, PKU and PAN. However, because of internal conflict this faction cancelled proposing any candidate. The 3 from Golkar and the PKU moved to the Fadli Bianto group, which had also been joined by the F-PP and F-DIP. The F-KB, which was still shocked and confused about the sudden news brought about by the Education and Culture Service s letter, accepted the offer of Syamsul Arifin to replace Abidin. The other two of the F-GAB members stated their intentions to join the F-KB, but at the election only one supported Ret.Col.Syamsul Arifin. The F-KB with 18 members got a total of only 22 votes for him (with the additional 4 being 3 from the F-TNI/POLRI and only 1 from the newcomer). Some F-KB members later suspected that Syamsul Arifin and the two newcomers were a part of a conspiracy to defeat the F-KB. Interview M

235 faction. 505 He did not seem to give his support to Ret.Col.Syamsul Arifin as strongly as he had supported Ret.Ltc.Abidin, a change which the F-KB members were not aware of. The Chairman of the F-KB Team which had previously met with Colonel Suharno admitted that until the outcome of the election was announced, they had trusted what Colonel Suharno had promised, that the F- TNI/ POLRI members would vote for the F-KB side. Furthermore, the PKB members thought that it would be unlikely that Colonel Suharno would take a position that might irritate the PKB President Abdurrahman Wahid s feelings, that is, by changing his position. In fact, the election produced different a result from what the F-KB had expected. Among the members of the F-TNI/ POLRI it was suggested that subtle disloyalties by the subordinate officers toward their superior officers did not come to the surface overtly, unless the superiors gave signs of losing control and gave the chance for disloyalties to appear. Only after finding out that Colonel Suharno no longer assigned a clear and firm position for the TNI/ POLRI faction members, did Ltc.Pantje and Ltc.Muchalib make public that the former was intending to put himself forward as a Bupati Candidate representing the F-TNI/POLRI, while the latter was on the side of Ltc.Fadli Bianto. 506 Some members of the F-KB were aware that two F-TNI/POLRI members were in the opposing camp, but they were still optimistic about winning the election. Firstly, because there was the secret deal with three members (one from each of PAN, PNU and PDIP) of the opponent group who agreed to support F-PKB for their own reasons, 507 The F-KB predicted that it would win the election with 24 of the 45 votes, consisting of the F-KB 18, the F-TNI/POLRI 3 and the new (secret) deal 3. However, the politics was too unpredictable; the F-KB candidate team was 505 Ltc.Pantje, who was not pleased with the intervention by the Pangdam, claimed that he had asked several times whether the military would stay in its previous position, backing the F-KB, but had found no definite answer from the HQ. He assumed that the members were freed to go on their own, which was why he was brave enough to register himself as a Bupati candidate from the F-TNI/POLRI. Interview M The cancellation of the registration of Ltc. Pantje a Bupati candidate from the F-TNI/POLRI, was also a result of personal persuasion, by Ltc.Muchalib, the Chairman of the faction. Interview with Ltc. Pantje, This respondent did not reveal what the reasons were for them to move and what concessions they had been promised from the deal in the beginning. Yet, he expressed his suspicion that it was a part of the opponents strategy to send these three men to pretend that they were on the side of the F-KB. In fact, he said, the idea to take Ret.Col.Syamsul Arifin as the one to replace Ltc.Abidin came from them. In connection to this, further, he also said that it was also possible that this proposed candidate was delivered to the F-KB side for the favour of Ltc.Fadli Bianto, as both candidates were retired police officers who might have personal deals. 203

236 defeated with only 22 votes against 23. It was this reality that most of the F-KB members could not accept. Being the biggest faction in the DPRD, having been supported by President Wahid, the National Chairman of the PKB, and having been promised by Colonel Suharno of the KODAM of support from the F- TNI/POLRI, the result was totally outside of their prediction. In the Sumberwaras Election it was shown that all political competitors agreed to follow a democratic procedure in conducting the succession of the local leader, but did not agree to accept whatever result might be produced by that procedure. Disappointment because of a defeat led to efforts to invalidate the election result and attempts to re-hold the election so that the loser could become the victor. To achieve this, a reason that could be used to challenge the validity of the outcome of the election would have to be found. Once this was achieved, a strategy would also have to be designed to ensure a victory in the re-election. The F-KB Campaign Team found a way of protesting the election result. They found that one voter (from the F-AN) for their successful opponent had ended his membership, thereby losing his voting right, before the election. 508 Their argument for the re-election was that, if that invalid vote was excluded, then the voting would have been equal, 22 : 22, and with this result the election rule dictated that the election would have to be restarted. Two days after the election Fahmi Markan and other members of the PKB went to Jakarta to submit the complaint letter to the Minister of Home Affairs. 509 Yet, even if this demand were met, this would not itself be enough to bring victory to the F-KB. In order to win the election it would need at least one additional member to vote for its candidate team. The F-KB decided that the additional vote would be sought from the military. On the next day, F-KB members met the Pangdam in Surabaya and questioned his previous commitment and assurance for the victory of the F-KB at the just-held election. According to the chairman of the team, they also demanded that Colonel Suharno accepted responsibility for the involvement and contribution of his officers to the defeat of the F-KB. In this 508 The respondent said that before the election some members of the F-KB had known that this voting Assembly member had terminated, but they did not see it as important at that time to take any action because they were convinced that they would win the election. Interview K Interview K

237 meeting Colonel Suharno agreed with the idea of re-election, and again gave an assurance that the military would support the F-KB. 510 Shortly after the meeting, the KODAM issued a recall letter which removed Ltc.Muchalib from the F-TNI/POLRI and proposed to replace him with an officer who would support the F-KB. 511 Yet according to the Law 512 regarding the replacement of DPRD members, the replacement become effective only after the Chairman of the DPRD signed the resignation letters. Ltc.Muchalib s resignation faced an obstacle when the Chairman of DPRD, who was a member of the F-PP, was disinclined to sign the letter because he understood that the recall would be a disadvantage for his faction which had just won the election. Instead of signing the letter, he launched a revenge move by blowing up a scandal of another member of the F-TNI/ POLRI, Ltc.Suganda who had supported the F-KB then demanding that the KODAM recall Ltc.Suganda too. After prolonged uncertainty, and no response by the Chairman of the DPRD to three letters sent by the Headquarters about the recalling of Ltc.Muchalib, some military police personnel were sent to Sumberwaras to pick up Ltc.Muchalib by force, while Ltc.Suganda was kept there. So, the Law was not able to stop the military Headquarters using force to pick up Ltc.Muchalib, and a double standard was applied in the cases of the two officers, with both biasses in favour of the F-KB. Initial efforts by the F-KB team to get support for the idea of re-election seemed to have produced successful results. The members of the F-KB claimed that the Director General of Regional Autonomy, an official who, on behalf of the Minister of Home Affairs, has authority to verify election results, agreed with them. They also claimed to have support from the Governor of East Java, and from President Wahid, the founder of their party. However, because the rest of the factions opposed the idea of re-election, it was then decided to bring the dispute to the PTUN (State Administrative Court). However, on 26th October 2000 this Court 510 Interview K As an indication of the complexity of personal interests apparently involved in the relationships between institutions it should be noted that the recall letter for Ltc.Muchalib sent to the DPRD was, on behalf of the Pangdam, signed by Ltc.Herdi, the former Dandim who had been turned down when he stated his intention to register as a Regent Candidate through the F-TNI/POLRI faction - by Ltc.Muchalib who was the Chairman of the faction. Ltc.Herdi was now was in charge of the Personnel Staff and, finally, seemed to have found a way of revenging himself against Ltc.Muchalib. 512 The Law No. 4/1999 about the Composition and the Structure of Parliament (MPR, DPR and DPRD). 205

238 announced its decision, disapproving the idea of re-election. Based on this decision the Governor of East Java decided to inaugurate the newly-elected Regent, Ltc.Fadli Bianto. In a violent reaction, the night before the Inauguration Ceremony, F-KB supporters burned down the DPRD buildings where the ceremony was to be held. The burnings indicated the frustration of the F-KB after their failure in overturning their loss. The riots also indicated the weakness of the security forces. Local police and military units were not only very small in number in the Sumberwaras District, but they were also unsure about what to do. The local police was aware of the public view that it was linked with the elected Regent who had been the Commander of their unit. If they took action to block F-KB supporters from carrying out the burnings, they could be seen as protecting the group of the Regent, the opponents of the F-KB. 513 The local military units, under the KODIM (District Military Command) and KORAMIL (Sub-district Military Command), were not allowed to act as police forces without being asked by the police and also were worried about being accused of siding with one of the conflicting parties. 514 The splitting and weakening of the internal solidarity of the military was not only typical of the Sumberwaras District, but experienced in many Pilkada cases. The following Pilkada case suggests another variation of this problem. 5. Deviating from internal consensus According to the Chairman of F-TNI/POLRI in the Pringgodani District 515, Ltc.Suparlan, two of the five members of the F-TNI/POLRI who betrayed (membelot dari) the expected faction consensus in the Pringgodani election were natives of Pringgodani and not Army or Police but Naval (Major Muhammad Yasmin) and Air Force (Lt. Suparna) officers. The naval officer was replaced soon after the election and never met with the rest of the faction members from then on. The air force officer was not replaced because he was newly appointed to the DPRD job. It was the latter who revealed the reasons for the betrayal to my 513 Interview B Interview M61 (the Dandim of Sumberwaras). 515 Names of both District and actors are pseudonymous to protect their identities. 206

239 respondent who then passed on the information to me in our discussion. The stated reason was that they did not want to see Pringgodani became the second [Sumberwaras], referring to the Sumberwaras riots, discussed earlier. His argument was that the F-PP was the biggest faction in the DPRD which was strongly supported by the public through mass demonstrations; both the F-PP (and initially the F-KB) and the demonstrations strongly rejected the Regent candidate that the F-TNI/POLRI was committed to support, therefore if the F-PP were defeated and the public disappointed, the reactions could be as destructive as they had been in Sumberwaras. The respondent suggested also that the loosening of control by the Kodam over the members of the F-TNI/POLRI, especially those who were not Army officers, was an important factor that made it easier for them to breach the initial agreements. As in the case of Maj. Muhammad Yasmin, the KODAM did not do anything to punish him because he was a naval officer. The respondent believed that the Local Naval Headquarter had known the position that Maj. Muhammad Yasmin planned to take and permitted it. Here, inter-military branch relations seem to be less coordinated, and the KODAM no longer had strong authority over the representative members from the military who were non-army officers. He suspected that money also played an important role in this game, although he could not provide any evidence. Neither was Lt.Suparna replaced. My respondent said that, like Maj.Yasmin, Lt.Suparna was convinced that his political choice was approved and protected by the Air Force headquarters to which he was thought to be responsible, and in fact, the KODAM did not take any action against his position. The split within the faction between the Army and Police on one side and the Navy and Air Force on the other was not the only dimension of the internal friction in Pringgodani. As in the Sumberwaras case, the Dandim had a disagreement with the F-TNI/ POLRI members. In Sumberwaras they refused to support their Dandim s intention to register as a Regent Candidate. In Pringgodani, the local Dandim wanted to register as a Vice-Regent Candidate through the F-KB, but did 207

240 not get the necessary Permission Letter from the KODAM, partly because there was not a recommendation for this from the F-TNI/POLRI. So, the relations between the faction and the Dandim were not good, just like in Sumberwaras. 516 The Pringgodani Election was a case where the military was actively involved and took a clear position from the beginning of the process although the candidate being supported was a civilian. The DPRD Paripurna Meeting to consider Regent Dwiatmodjo s end-of-job LPJ report was held long before the election process began, and the F-TNI/ POLRI, along with five F-DIP members, two members of the F-KB, two of the F-PP and one of the PBB, arranged and used the meeting as a test case to see how strong was the support for Dwiatmodjo s re-election. In fact, fifteen DPRD members who supported the LPJ voted for Dwiatmodjo in the first round of the election. As they had been lobbied before, the F-KB with its nine members agreed to join Dwiatmodjo s supporters for the second round after their failure to get their team elected in the first round. 517 So, until the final outcome of the election was announced, the Dwiatmodjo group led by the F-TNI/POLRI appeared to have a large chance of succeeding, with a total of twenty four assured votes of the total forty five. In fact, the actual final result was only twenty two, as the other two had moved to the opponent. The defeat was caused by the betrayal by the two officers who had their individual reasons. It showed a significant shift in the internal conditions of solidarity, loyalty to superiors, friends and other military organizational ethics which had commonly prevailed or been 516 An example of reaction from the Dandim to the F-TNI/POLRI in expressing his disagreement with the faction position was when the faction accepted the LPJ/Laporan Pertanggung Jawaban (End-of-Job Accountability Report) of the existing Regent Dwiatmodjo because this acceptance would open the way for Dwiatmodjo to register as a candidate. A respondent who was the Chairman of the faction said that he was rung by the Dandim at night after the meeting, and the Dandim gave an order on behalf of the Pangdam to see him tomorrow morning to explain the faction s acceptance of the LPJ. According to the respondent the faction s decision was interpreted by the Dandim as ignoring the aspirations of the public. The respondent admitted that before the LPJ meeting, there were mass demonstrations that tried to force the members of the DPRD, including him, to reject the LPJ. In fact, two-thirds (30/45) of the members refused the LPJ. On the same night the respondent reported by phone the misunderstanding and the intervention from Dandim to the Aster (Territorial Assistant of the Chief of Staff of the Kodam). He said that the Aster rang and corrected (menegur) the Dandim, and confirmed there were not any instructions (petunjuk) or delegation of authority from the Pangdam to change the faction s decision in the case of the LPJ. Interview M93. Therefore, it was quite logical when the respondent gave an opinion that the Dandim s reaction was not because of his concerns about the public, but his concern about his chance to register and to be supported as their candidate by the faction. 517 According to one respondent from this group of nine, the instruction to vote for Dwiatmodjo was received from the national leadership of the PKB only in the last minutes before the second round of voting. The respondent said the leadership was concerned about the domination of the F-PP in Pringgodani, the only Regency District of four where the PKB could not become the majority. Interview K

241 relatively successfully imposed during the New Order era, including in political matters. 6. Disobeying territorial commanders The previous two cases demonstrate disobedience of some of the military faction members to their KODAM, disloyalty of the Dandim to the KODAM, and internal differences within the faction. In the following case, in the Buluhlawang 518 Election, all F-TNI/POLRI members disagreed with the local Territorial Commanders, the District Commander (Dandim) and the Sub-Regional Commander (Danrem), about which candidate would be supported. Again, non-army officers took a leading position and tended to be more independent from the old, armydominated patterns of military politics. Lt.Tjan Santos, who was a young Air Force officer and a member of the F-TNI/ POLRI of Buluhlawang, was actively but secretly steering the position of the faction against the position preferred and instructed by the local military Territorial Commanders, the (local) Danrem and the (Regency) Dandim. According to him, members of the faction were instructed on several occasions by the Danrem to vote for Suwandi, a Regent Candidate proposed by the F-DIP (which had 14 members) and supported also by the F- Islam Plus (6 members). Another respondent, Ikbal Tamrin, the Chairman of the Islam Plus Faction confirmed that once the Danrem gave the instruction to the F- TNI/POLRI members to support Suwandi. This had been in a meeting where Suwandi and all his supporting groups, including the respondent s, were present, perhaps on purpose of convincing Suwandi. 519 Similar information was revealed by the Chairman of the F-TNI/POLRI, Ltc.Chamdani, who I interviewed separately, that the Danrem had overtly urged the faction members to vote for Suwandi. The instruction was totally disobeyed however, and Suwandi s opponent Ret.Col.Sutiono won the election. Ltc.Chamdani, an Army officer of the military 518 Names of District and actors are pseudonymous to protect their identities. 519 Interview M

242 faction, said that as an Army officer he initially felt compelled to secure (mengamankan) the instruction, but because it was almost certain that Suwandi would be defeated even with the support from the F-TNI/POLRI he then chose not to follow the instruction. 520 When asked about money politics in the Buluwalang District, Lt.Tjan Santos admitted that he believed that there were no Pilkada that was free from money politics. In this District, he said, both campaign teams of the two competing groups in the election offered large amounts of money to the members of the F-TNI/POLRI. Yet, the decision about which group they would side with also depended on which group was considered to be the most likely to win. Otherwise, they would wrongly choose (salah pilih); choosing the defeated candidate, wasting their voting rights and creating a bad start for their future relationship with the elected Regent. Yet he did not, perhaps being too embarrassed, relate the reason explicitly to what he had said previously, that the large amount of money offered was usually paid in full only after the candidate was certain that he won the election, and only a kind of non-refundable deposit was paid in advance. 521 He did not say that this was the reason why calculating the most-probable-to-win candidate was very important, because a salah pilih meant only receiving a small deposit, not the full payment. According to Lt.Tjan Santos, to make sure that he would not salah pilih, he once met with two of the group of four of the F-DIP deserters, Marni and Harmansyur, in a car on a toll-express road (Jalan Tol Malang-Surabaya), about 200km from Buluhlawang, to get personal affirmation without being watched by the opponent group members, as every member of DPRD was subject to being spied on during the election process. In the group of Ret.Col.Sutiono, the challenger of Suwandi, the respondent was one of the internal agents to spy on the group members. For example, when some Golkar members were visited by Suwandi s team, he checked and made sure of their positions; also, when the Danrem said that he visited Kyai Langitan, an influential religious leader living in the neighbouring District, in order to endorse Suwandi, he also visited the Kyai soon after to make 520 According to the respondent, Ltc.Chamdani had another reason for supporting initially Suwandi; that Suwandi as Regent Candidate was partnered with a Vice-Regent Candidate who had been a close friend of Ltc.Chamdani since they were both studying at university. 521 Interview M

243 sure that he still wanted the F-KB members to vote for Ret.Col.Sutiono. With this position appointed by Ret.Col.Sutiono, he could get most of the information he needed for convincing other members of the F-TNI/POLRI that siding with Suwandi, thus with the Danrem and Dandim, would be a salah pilih position. Maj.Mukhtar, an Army officer who had been assigned by the Danrem the task of bringing all members of the F-TNI/POLRI to the side of Suwandi was, however, one of those convinced by Lt. Tjan Santos, then Lt.Chamdani, another Army officer, too. Two other members, from the Navy and Police, had been easily convinced before. Andi Sochib, a member of the F-DIP and also the Chairman of the DPRD, who had decided to be absent on the Election Day because he did not like either Regent Candidate, alleged why the Danrem supported Suwandi. He said that Suwandi gave him large amounts of money and promised to give him a big house in Buluhlawang if Suwandi won the election. Suwandi was a successful businessman in East Kalimantan, and was listed as a member of East Kalimantan Golkar at the time he registered as the Buluhlawang Regent Candidate. He was also backed by H.Hasbi, a big businessman who was a member of Golkar and also the spouse of the District Head of a neighbouring District where Golkar, although a minority in the DPRD, could successfully dominate the DPRD and the Regent s Office. 522 He said, since money dictated everything in the Pilkada, the Danrem worked hard to get as much money as he could. One thing that he successfully achieved, as suggested by the Chairman of the F-Islam Plus, was a kind of misleading propaganda against Ret.Col.Sutiono, which attracted five of the six F-Islam Plus members to vote for Suwandi. The respondent said, Before the election we had got wrong information from the Danrem that Ret.Col.Sutiono was not a good man, in fact, after the election we knew him as a good Moslem. Lt.Tjan Santos and Ltc.Chamdani in separate interviews expressed how they felt irritated and ashamed with the way the Danrem discredited the personality of 522 Interview D86 (the Chairman of the Buluhlawang DPRD who was a member of the F-DIP). 211

244 Ret.Col.Sutiono. 523 Yet he failed in trying to watch closely every move of the F- TNI/POLRI members to ensure their obedience. 524 Unlike the Danrem and Dandim who openly showed their positions, KODAM officers did not. According to the F-TNI/POLRI members, they thought that the Danrem acted on behalf of the KODAM, therefore they did not communicate directly with it on the election matters. Later, they knew that the KODAM was not sufficiently informed; either about the personalities of the Candidates or about the position of the local military. The KODAM sent its congratulations to the F- TNI/POLRI members after it knew that the faction did not salah pilih, while the Dandim was replaced soon after the election because, as my respondent said, he was likely to have difficulty in having a relationship with the new Regent who he had tried to defeat. A respondent from the KODAM stated that its Commander was not informed about the political situation in the Buluhwalang District. This seems unlikely. It is more likely he took the same position as the Danrem and Dandim because his information came from them. 525 However, he did not show this position openly, so it was easy to change his position when he found that opposing Col.Sutiono would be disadvantageous. 7. Open involvement In the Regency of Mangunredjo 526 the military (mainly the F-TNI/POLRI members) was deeply involved in the whole process of the Bupati election. The 523 The respondent said that the Danrem depicted Sutiono as a former military officer who had been serving for a long time as the Chief of Bulog (the State Rice Distributiion Agency) in West Irian, who knew only how to make himself rich and who even never contributed anything to the military units around his office during the time he was in this position. Interview M The respondent said that two nights before the Election Day, all members of the F-TNI/POLRI escaped from Buluhwalang and slept in a hotel in another Regency, to avoid the Danrem, but unfortunately he found them with the assistance from the Dandim, and warned them not to meet and make any deal with Ret.Col.Sutiono In the morning before the election the Danrem repeated his instruction but that was then disobeyed by the F-TNI/POLRI members. Interview M Ltc.Chamdani also said that Suwandi was the only Regent Candidate who sowan (came to get a blessing from) the Pangdam; and Ret.Col.Sutiono did not sowan to the Pangdam because he felt far more senior (according to the graduation year of the Military Academy) to him. Besides that, he also had an unpleasant experience, being refused by the KODAM when in 2000 he sowan to the KODAM as a part of his lobbying as a Regent Candidate in the Sidodadi (false name) Pilkada in 2000 when he failed to win. Interview M84 (the Chairman of the Buluhlawang F-TNI/POLRI.) 526 Names of District and actors are pseudonymous to protect their identities. 212

245 faction members were involved in forming a coalition group that embraced all the small factions directed at challenging the biggest faction, participating actively in secret lobbying to weaken that opposing group and providing means for protecting and ensuring the loyalty of the coalition members. This deep involvement was strongly related to the role of an influential officer, Ltc. Air Force Djodi Sutanto, an Assembly member from the F-TNI/POLRI. Not only was he the most senior officer (the only Lieutenant Colonel, the other four ranging in rank from First Lieutenant to Major), but also had the longest time of service as the military representative in Mangunredjo. 527 In relation to the Territorial Command, it was he, not the Chairman of the F-TNI/POLRI, who reported the situation to the Pangdam. 528 It was also because of his experience in the Mangunredjo DPRD that he had been considered and elected as one of the Deputy Chairmen of the DPRD. 529 On the brink of the Pilkada, the political constellation within the DPRD was moving to form two competing blocks, a coalition that consisted of the F-PKB, F-Umat, F- Golkar and F-TNI/POLRI on one side, and the F-PDIP, with 21 of the 45 DPRD members so the biggest faction, on the other side. The idea of forming the coalition originally emerged from the relation between the existing Bupati, Drs. Sunardji, and the two factions, F-Golkar and F-TNI/POLRI, which had elected him to the Bupati position in It was calculated that a coalition would be strong enough to challenge the F-DIP, the faction that had indicated that it did not want Sunardji to have a second term in the Bupati position 530. Having carried out 527 Ltc.Air Force Djodi Sutanto has served in the Mangunredjo F-TNI/POLRI since Another member, a Police Major, had served since 1997, while the other three members (two Army Majors and a Naval Captain) had just started their service in the faction in He was close not only to KODAM HQ, but also to the LANUD (Air Force Base) HQ in the District, as well as to the existing Bupati whom he was supporting in the election. The Naval Captain in the faction asserted that everything in relation to the F-TNI/POLRI was determined by Ltc.Djodi Sutanto, including what was to be included in the periodical reports to the military units. Interview M Priyo Prasmono, the Chairman of the DPRD and a member of the F-DIP, admitted that members of the F-DIP respected him because he was pemain lama (an old player) in Mangunredjo, which was why they supported him as the Deputy of the DPRD. He regretted, however, that Djodi Sutanto had forgotten the F-DIP s help to get him into his current position. Interview D Sunardji s name was not included among the 6 potential candidates selected by the Rakercabsus (Special Meeting of the PDI-P Branch) in late May All 21 members of the F-DIP and 5 leadership members of the PDIP Branch selected who they considered the best three: Agus Wahyudi (the Chairman of the F-PDIP) gained 11 votes, Januar Narimo (existing Vice Bupati) 9, and Drs. Sugeng Mulyani (the Secretary of the Bupati) 3. The 213

246 extensive lobbying of the F-KB and F-Umat, the coalition was able to collect 24 potential voters on its side, exceeding the 21 members of the F-DIP. The Bupati s coalition eventually grew to 30 after 6 of the F-DIP members were also persuaded to join the coalition. Tukiman, a member of the F-DIP who was one of those being approached by Ltc. Djodi Sutanto, admitted that the members of the F-DIP were persuaded by exploiting frictions within the faction. 531 This was done to convince the faction members that they would not win the election. The demoralization was combined with material offers such as money, a car or a house. 532 Priyo Prasmono, the Chairman of the DPRD and a member of the F-DIP who was very disappointed with the involvement of the F-TNI/POLRI viewed the existence of this faction in the Mangunredjo DPRD was a disadvantage for his faction. First, although in the Mangunredjo District the PDIP won more than 50% of the votes in the General Election in July 1999, the F-DIP faction could not gain the simple majority in the legislature because of the allocation of 5 non-elected seats to the F-TNI/POLRI, meaning that the F-DIP s seats were only 50% of the elected 40, not of the total 45. In the case of the 2003 Bupati election, a few months before the election the PDIP held a meeting with the Dandim of Mangunredjo together with all members of the F-TNI/POLRI, and re-stressed the neutrality of the military in the election. In fact, the military faction was involved deeply on the side of the F-PDIP s opponent. 533 other 3 votes were given 1 each to Rusdianto, Ahmad Yuharno, and Sulatino. After the highest ranked three were sent to the central authority of PDIP, Sugeng Mulayani was recommended by the centre to be taken as the F- PDIP s Bupati candidate. Interview D104 (a member of the F-PDIP of the Mangunredjo DPRD). 531 Friction within the F-DIP was triggered by the recommendation letter from the central leadership of PDIP in favour of Sugeng Mulyani who was only the third favoured candidate elected by the local PDIP memberships selection, not an original PDIP man, and in fact only supported by 3 of the 26 PDIP voters in the selection process. Besides, members of the F-PDIP doubted the authenticity of the letter because it was sent by post not delivered directly by a PDIP man. In a meeting with Ltc.Djodi Sutanto, he had tried to convince my respondent, who was a member of the F-DIP, that the 9 supporters of the second most popular F-DIP would-be candidate would move to the coalition side, and asked him to join them. The respondent admitted that 6 members of the 9 were initially convinced and made personal deals with the Campaign Team of the coalition. However, later they came back to the PDIP after the an envoy from the central leadership came to Mangunredjo to show a letter from the leadership, signed by President Megawati, instructing them to vote for Sugeng Mulyani. Interview D In his approach to the respondent, a large amount of money was offered. He said that he could have been rich suddenly should have he accepted the deal, but he refused the offers. Interview D Priyo Prasmono stated that previously F-DIP wanted to follow a faksun politik (a logical concept of politics) that F-DIP as the biggest faction would take the Bupati position and F-KB, as the second biggest, would take the Vice Bupati position. However, this proposal was refused by the F-KB because it had formed a coalition along with Golkar, the F-Umat and the F-TNI/POLRI. Interview D106 (the Chairman of the DPRD, and a member of the F-DIP). 214

247 K.H. Abdul Najib, the Deputy Chairman of the DPRD and a member of the F-KB, described the involvement of the F-TNI/POLRI in the coalition as an active, volunteer player. Not only were they involved in the lobbying, but also in voting for the Deputy Bupati candidate within the coalition. The Bupati candidate was not nominated through voting because Sunardji was already agreed on by all coalition members as the F-TNI/POLRI had tried hard and successfully to convince the F- KB members that he would certainly win. 534 A member of the F-TNI/POLRI said that there was a perintah komando (instruction from the military HQ) to join the coalition in supporting the Sunardji s group. 535 KH.Abdul Najib, however, viewed that whatever was instructed by the military HQ, it was very much influenced by the information and inputs given by the F-TNI/POLRI members. He suggested that the members should not hide their personal interests behind the HQ s instruction. For example, it was the initiative of Ltc. Djodi Sutanto to ask the Air Force Base in the District to provide accommodation for nineteen coalition members in their three days quarantine before the election. 536 Besides, the HQ did not intervene very far, such as determining how deeply the F-TNI/POLRI could be involved in the political lobbying for the coalition. 537 The failure of the coalition was a consequence of the weakness of its solidarity, but to a greater extent it was because of the success of the PDIP consolidation. Tukiman said that the decision by the central leadership to accept Sugeng Mulyani as the PDIP Bupati candidate was aimed at reducing resistance from the other factions, given that Sugeng Mulyani was an experienced bureaucrat and might have many friends in Golkar and the military. Although it created frictions 534 Interview K105 (the Deputy of the Chairman of DPRD, who was an influential leader in the coalition). 535 Asked whether they regretted siding with the Sunardji s group after finding that they were on the losing side, one member of the F-TNI/POLRI said that nothing has to be regretted because they were all carrying out perintah komando (commands). Interview M Quarantine became a common way of protecting the solidity of the voting groups in every local election. It was to ensure that all members had no contact with anyone who intended to get him out of the group by one way or another. Some quarantine was carried out very toughly such as not allowing any contact with outsiders even by phone. Interview K105. As also pointed by a senior F-DIP member, the F-DIP was put into quarantine for 10 days before the election and moved four times to different hotels and cities, from Madiun to Solo to Surakarta and back to Solo, before being driven in a bus to Mangunredjo on the election date. During the quarantine the members were also sworn to not betray the faction, and promise if they failed in this they would resign from the faction. Interview D104. Members of the F-TNI/POLRI were not quarantined in the same place with the coalition members, but as a separate group by Ltc.Djodi Sutanto in the Merdeka Hotel, Madiun. Interview M Interview M108 (a member of the F-TNI/POLRI). 215

248 and resistance from within the faction, an internal solidarity was successfully consolidated after President Megawati, the Chairman of the central leadership of PDIP, sent her envoy to Mangunredjo to clarify the PDIP position. Indeed, following the internal consolidation, some members of the coalition, especially those who had personal relations with Sugeng Mulyani were eventually attracted to the F-DIP side. 538 One of them was Major. Police Agung Sukarman, a member of the F-TNI/POLRI. Nevertheless, he also gave as his reason that if the F-DIP did not win the election the political stability in Mangunredjo would be very bad because the majority of Mangunredjo people, who support the PDIP, would be angry and it would be a hard work for the police. He claimed his choice had been approved by Police HQ. However, the other members of the F-TNI/POLRI who were disappointed with him said that it was only an invented justification, and they suspected that he had received a large amount of money for his change. 539 Indeed, every individual or group of the military who were involved in the Pilkada were clever enough to invent justifications for their political actions, and it is very likely to continue to be so until a law exists that clearly states that any involvement by members of the military is prohibited in Pilkada. 8. Institutional objectives or individual ambitions: Does it matter? To sum up, in general, these Pilkada cases show that changes in the direction of the military s national institutional policy did not bring significant changes in individual military officers political attitudes which would speed up the withdrawal that the national institution was trying to achieve. Its commitment to leave politics in the reformasi era might restrict individual officers political actions. However, especially for the officers who were the members of the F-TNI/POLRI, this effect was overwhelmed by other factors. Under the New Order system, direct political involvement was fully legalized, but personal interests were much restricted by institutional direction; the officers taking a certain political position because they were ordered to do so rather than for the fulfilment of their individual interests. In the post-new Order era, in a circumstance where the political power of the military 538 Interview D Other members of the coalition who moved to the other group were two from Golkar, who were friends of Sugeng Mulyani, and one from the F-Umat who had a family tie with him. Interview M

249 institution was declining, personal politics developed without a sufficient control from the institution. Nevertheless, in reality the distinction between the military as an institution and the military as individuals is not as clear as in the theory. People, especially civilian politicians, did not seem to be bothered to recognize whether the military were involved for personal or institutional purposes. In fact, despite the decline of the institutional role in local politics, as discussed in Chapter VII, my interviews with several politicians, government officials and local people suggest that they saw the military were considerably involved in the Pilkada, and their judgments were mainly based on what the individual officers were doing in the elections, as discussed above. 540 So, no matter which, individuals or institution, they saw it as the military. Furthermore, these individual officers were the agents of the military institution, what they did in the election affected the big picture of the military as an institution. A further important question is - what was the impact of the formal decline of the military s political effectiveness on the quality of the elections and on local governance? By formal I mean the institutional level of involvement (as discussed in the previous chapter) rather than the individual political activities discussed in this chapter, although the detailed local activities involved both. Did it produce better District Heads; a better democratic political system; better public trust and perception about politics - all political aspects the Districts need to improve the living condition of their people? These sorts of questions are considered in the next section. 540 Politician respondents who expressed similar views in the interviews included: Lilik Indarto of the F-DIP (Chairman of Madiun Regency DPRD); Ikhsan Tamin of PAN (Deputy Chairman of Bojonegoro DPRD); Prayogo Prayitno of FDIP (Chairman of Magetan DPRD), Abu Nai m of F-KB (Deputy Chairman of Magetan DPRD), H. Baitulwi of Lamongan Golkar). Among the government officials who also expressed this view were: A. Rivai (former staff of Malang Regency Kansospol, Chief of Bakesbang Malang Sub-division; Hary Yudanto (Secretary of Madiun Regency DPRD); and Widiastono (Secretary of Madiun City Government). Among the local people: Sudirman (Village Head of Saptorenggo, Malang), Subakir (Village Head of Mangliawan, Malang). All these interviews took place in

250 9. The place of the military in unstable civilian politics: Military political backing Although the main focus in the discussion so far has been on the military s role in District Regent or Mayoral election politics it must be recognized that the situation was not simply one of undemocratically dominant and disruptive activities of military representatives in an otherwise stable and democratic civilian politics. Civilians shared responsibility with the military in making the implementation of the policy of the minimization of military political influence over the elections stumble. One of the civilian politicians undesirable contributions in their political activities around the various District Head elections was their tendencies to seek a political backing from the military. This factor could reopen political gates for politically adventurous officers. The tendency to seek a military backing was caused to some extent by the fact that the members of the Assemblies military factions had the right to vote, in several Districts were inclined to participate actively in the election process, and demonstrated a potential to influence the election outcomes. Consequently, many civilian politicians decided that the military still had to be seen and treated as an important player in politics. Therefore they tried to present acceptable conditions to the local Assemblies military factions and to lobby what they thought were the relevant military Headquarters to instruct those members who they believed were the Headquarters representatives to vote for them. 541 This was especially evident when there was no simple majority faction in the DPRD, or when a simple majority faction existed but was not solid. As one respondent said, to get the military support the civilian factions understood that one thing that they had to do was to choose their candidates with criteria that suited the military. 542 These included an approved, nationalist, ideology; the probability of winning; public acceptance; personal integrity; personal capability; 541 For example, when the Sumberwaras F-KB campaign team came to the KODAM for military voting support, it was based on this perception. Some members of military factions told me that such visits were commonly made by civilian factions from other Districts, including two examples, in the Districts of Pringgodani and Talang Sari, where it was actually these informants who had taken the Campaign Teams of the competing civilian factions to their own local Headquarters to visit (sowan) powerful officers there. In some cases they had been asked for guidance by a Campaign Team, in others they had offered this help. Interviews M93, M Interview P

251 and financial resources, as been mentioned earlier. This respondent said that the new parties interpreted the criteria by, firstly, choosing retired military or (former Golkar) bureaucrats to ensure acceptance on the first criterion. Then they looked for a Vice District Head candidate partner for him from business groups, to satisfy the final financial requirement. Alternatively, if their retired military or bureaucrat District Head candidate already had adequate financial sponsors, usually business leaders, the team place for the Vice District Head candidate would be given to the faction or, if an alliance of factions had been formed, to the leading faction. The respondent claimed that usually the personal integrity and capability requirements can be made up (bisa diatur atur) as long as the first and last criteria had been met, because they were very subjective. As seen in Table VIII.3 and Chart VIII.1, the two biggest East Java factions (F-DIP and F-KB) were often not confident enough to propose their own cadres. In the thirty six elections in East Java, fifty one percent of the District Head candidates proposed by the F-DIP were bureaucrats with only twenty percent F-DIP members and forty six percent from the F-KB were bureaucrats compared to thirty seven percent being party cadres. According to one respondent, taking a nonparty-partisan candidate such as a retired military or bureaucrat made it easier to form an affiliation or to build support for the candidate, as compared with looking for a candidate from particular parties where each party within an affiliation would want to promote its own members which would made it difficult to form a solid alliance. 543 It was thus common for these civilian factions to limit their choosing of their own cadres to the Vice District Head candidatures unless the faction was a simple majority which would be expected to win the election without needing support from other factions, for example, the PKB in the Districts of Situbondo, Sumenep, Bangkalan and Bondowoso. When asked about what would be the advantage for the party after bringing a non-partisan District Head candidate to victory, one legislative member said that the party would then be able to get more access to the government s resources. For example, he said, in the District of Buluhlawag 543 Interview P

252 where the F-KB proposed a retired military officer as the District Head candidate who had won, in less than a month the table of the elected District Head was already full of proposals for financial assistance sent by boarding schools (pesantren) and political organizations that were under the coordination of the PKB. Asked whether would it be different if the elected leader had been from F- KB, he replied that, of course it would be much easier to get bigger access to the government s sources, but why do you have to propose your party s cadre if you are not sure that he would win because other factions did not want to support him?. However, the problem with a faction proposing a non-party member was that, if not all members agreed to such a choice, as happened in several Districts, the disagreements ended up with internal conflicts, either within a faction, between the faction and the local party leaderships, or between the central and the local leaderships. 220

253 Table VIII.3 Candidates for District Head/Vice-Head proposed by PDIP and PKB No. Regencies (R)/Cities (C) Candidates proposed by PDIP Candidates proposed by PKB Mil Bur Oth Par Mil Bur Oth Par 4.* Ngawi (R), H, V H, V 5# Lamongan (R), V H H V 6# Gresik (R), H V V H 7* Surabaya (C), V H H V 8# Jember (R), H, V V H 9λ Situbondo (R), H, V V H 10* Ponorogo (R), H V V H 11λ Sumenep (R), H V V H 12# Banyuwangi (R) V H V H * Blitar (C), H, V H V 14# Sampang (R), H V H V 15# Trenggalek (R), V H H V 16* Pacitan (R), V H H V 17* Mojokerto (R), V H H, V 18* Sidoarjo (R), H V H V 19* Malang (R), H V H V 00 20* Blitar (R), H V H, V 21* Probolinggo (C), V H V H 22* Kediri (C), H V H V 23* Kediri (R), H V H V 221

254 24# Pasuruan (C), H V V H 25* Tuban (R), H V H V 26* Batu (C), H V H V 27λ Bangkalan (R), H V V H 28* Bojonegoro (R), H V H V # Probolinggo (R) H V V H 30* Nganjuk (R), V H H V 31 Pamekasan (R) H V H, V 32* Tulungagung(R) H V H V 33λ Pasuruan (R), H V H, V 34* Madiun (R), H V H V 03 35* Magetan (R), H V H, V 36* Lumajang (R), H, V H, V 37* Jombang (R), H V V H 38λ Bondowoso (R), H V H, V Total 3H 18H 9V 7H 19V 7H 7V 4H 16H 11V 2H 10V 13H 14V Notes: Mil = Active/Retired Military; Bur = Former Golkar/Bureaucrats; Oth = Others; Par = Party cadres H = District Head ; V = Vice District Head * = District where PDIP was the biggest party. # = District where PKB was the biggest party λ = District where F-KB was the simple majority faction in the DPRD. 222

255 Chart VIII.1. Percentage of Candidates for District Head/Vice-District Head proposed by PDIP and PKB Others PDIP 20% 20% PDIP Bureaucrat 51% Military 9% Military Bureaucrat Others Others 54% PDIP 20% Bureaucrat 26% PDIP Bureaucrat Others Proportions of PDIP s District Head candidates Proportions of PDIP s Vice District Head candidates PKB 37% Others 6% Military 11% Bureaucrat 46% Military Bureaucrat Others PKB Proportions of PKB s District Head candidates PKB 40% Others 29% Bureaucrat 31% Others Bureaucrat PKB Proportions of PKB s Vice District Head 10. Conclusion In contrast to what has been reported in Chapter Seven as an encouraging development, that is, the dramatic decline in the trend of the military s political influence in the Pilkada at the District level, the above discussion indicates that the political activities of the individual officers involved in the Pilkada were now not being controlled effectively by the military institution. The cases of Sumberwaras, Pringodani and Buluhlawang, or Mangunredjo demonstrated that the officers took conflicting positions, and the internal solidarity within the F-TNI/POLRI as well as the relations between the faction members and the local military commanders were badly divisive. In Mangunredjo for example an officer was openly and deeply involved in organizing an affiliation of small factions, in challenging and trying to break up the majority F-DIP faction, and in providing a local military base as quarantine to gather the affiliation members weeks before voting. Various personal considerations, but mainly economic gains, dominated the different positions that these officers took in the elections. The weakening control by the KODAM over the F-TNI/POLRI members in some ways was affected by the perceptions and attitudes of non-army officers of being more independent from the KODAM s control influence, as some of these officers claimed that their 223

256 political choices were reported to and backed by the commanders of the units that appointed them. This is simply not enough evidence to suggest that there were conflicts among the military branches at the higher level, but it did suggest a decline of the political influence of the Army over the other branches (Navy and Air Force) compared to that of the New Order era. As argued earlier, unstable civilian political power was influenced to some extent by the continued existence of the military representatives in the local parliaments. In cases where the party political constellation was more or less evenly divided, the position of the military faction became pivotal; whichever group they joined would be the strongest. This had two major implications. First, to get the military s support meant finding candidates that satisfied criteria favoured by the military. As already shown, the majority of the District Head candidates were chosen from former New Order bureaucrats instead of the parties cadres who were democratically proposed from the parties grass roots, with this decision leaving unresolved conflicts within the parties. Second, the civilian politicians continued to believe that it was still necessary to approach the military headquarters and local territorial commanders believed to have an authority over the members of military factions. This reopened opportunities for political adventurists within the military to determine the election outcomes, including for pursuing their personal interests. In other words, the civilian politicians contributed to making the uncontrolled, deeply politicized, and divisive feature of political activities of these individual officers. As the result of this, moreover, the outcomes of the District Head elections within the Assemblies did not yet meet expectations about what ideal democratic elections should have produced. These outcomes were significantly determined by the recruitment process of the candidates. The negotiations and decisions involved in this process by the party factions of the local parliaments was influenced mainly by the potential candidates ability to fulfil the personal interests of the factions members, the voters, instead of being based on the candidates personal leadership quality and integrity. With the military representatives still there until 2004, it will take at least until 2009, after their elimination, before all the District 224

257 Assemblies will hold democratic elections for the Regency or Mayoral Heads of their Districts without the direct involvement of the military. 225

258 Chapter Nine IMPACTS ON LOCAL MILITARY (1): The collapse of the military s karya positions When our turns are about to come, the doors [to the chances of having political/ financially-profitable jobs] are closed, that is not fair. 544 we did not join the army in order to have civilian jobs, but the command assigned us to the civilian posts in order to maximize our contribution to the national development; so, if now the nation no longer wants us to be there, that s OK Introduction: The three problems In Chapter Two it was mentioned that to see the extent to which the military s political withdrawal has had an impact on the creating of a condition favourable to the professionalism of local military, the political perception and attitude of the officers need to be examined. 546 In this chapter attention is paid mainly to the former or remaining karya officers appointed to non-military (political) jobs. Three categories of them are identified and described: firstly, military personnel who were withdrawn from civilian jobs; secondly, the former military Bupatis and Mayors who struggled to survive without direct support from the military institutions; and thirdly, the remaining military representatives in the local parliamentary Assemblies. These were the groups of officers who were directly affected by the institutional changes described in Chapter Six, especially by the demilitarization policies of local political structures. The examination of the impacts on them is essential both to understand the reactions, political perceptions and attitudes of military personnel who can be regarded as highly politicized during the previous era and also to identify the problems in efforts to turn the military into an apolitical military. So, the aim of this examination is not to see professionalism in 544 The respondents were young officers, expressing similar views. Interviews M112, M113, M Those respondents were older officers. Interviews M53, M67, M59. Another respondent who expressed a similar view to that of these men had by then been retired for almost a year, and was now active in the Pepabri (Persatuan Purnawirawan ABRI/Association of Retired Military). Interview R See Chapter Two, sub-section

259 terms of the technical capability of the officers in doing their professional jobs, but in terms of the changing degree in their perceptions or attitudes toward politics, an important indication of whether a condition was favourable or not to the efforts of establishing an apolitical, professional military. 2. Problems: Job-losses and individuals reactions The disappearance of jobs was one of the obvious direct impacts of the compulsory withdrawal of military officers from civilian posts. According to one respondent, who was working in the personnel staff 547, in 2000 about two hundred middle-rank officers (from Major to Colonel) were temporarily stationed without jobs in the Military Area Command Headquarters, in Surabaya, after being withdrawn from civilian posts. This number was greater than the total number in these ranks across the territorial units of the Province, which was only around one hundred and fifty officers. 548 These displaced officers then had to wait for months before being placed in new jobs. Some of them were eventually appointed to replace military representatives in the F-TNI/POLRI in the various DPRD across the Province until ; and others filled staff positions in the different levels of local headquarters across the KODAM s corresponding military region. 550 This was confirmed by another respondent who was one of those officers waiting for a job in At the time of the interview, he was a member of the F- TNI/POLRI in an East Java District. He stated that those who returned to the KODAM Headquarters in Surabaya had to wait there for almost a year. Some of them tried to entertain themselves by saying that until they got the new jobs the officers came to the office for work for blind wages (makan gaji buta) ; but mostly they were shocked, and for the high-ranking officers there were several kinds of power-loss syndrome as well. The higher their ranks, such as for Colonels, the more limited the jobs that would be available. In comparison to the lower levels 547 Interview M Data from the KODAM headquarters. 549 As mentioned before, the system of appointing military representatives to DPRDs was to be ended at the 2004 local elections. 550 Interview M

260 such as Lieutenant Colonels or Majors, appropriate job availability at the level of Colonel was very limited. 551 This number does not include the hundreds of sergeants and privates withdrawn from the positions of Village Headmen, the lowest level of local government. The number at this level was much bigger than the number of the officers withdrawn from District or Provincial-level positions. This was not only because each District contained many villages but also because, unlike the District Bupatis or Mayors who decided to retire early (this will be discussed in more detail later), most sergeants who had become Village Heads chose to return to their units. Of four hundred and nine villages, thirty had military personnel as their Village Head in 1998, but by 2003 only seven retired military and police personnel remained in these positions. 552 The other twenty three had left, to return to their military units or to retire. In total, across the Province s thirty eight Districts four hundred military former Village Heads returned to their units. 553 In 2003 the remaining seven (retired) military Village Heads in the Malang Regency were mostly in villages around the military bases, such as near a big Air Force Base or around an Army Brigade Complex, and had their periods of office extended until One of these men claimed that the people of the village had asked him to stay in the position, unlike his counterparts in other villages where they had been forced to step down in 1998/1999, before the end of their appointment period. He said that being the Village Head nearby the military complex was much more secure since he felt a kind of psychologically security back-up from the military units there. However, the Chief of the Malang District Government s Village Administration Sub-Division said that these ex-military Heads had a mutual-benefit relationship with the units near the village while on one hand the units had interests in keeping a former soldier in control of the village for the pembinaan teritorial (territorial approach), on the other hand the Village Head got the units support for his authority. 551 Interview M A document of the Sub-Bagian Pemerintahan Desa (Village Administration Sub-Division of Malang Regency). 553 A copy of the document is held by the author. 228

261 Beside the quite heavy individual shock that each person experienced, there was also a heavy burden for the organization in providing new jobs for them. 554 For the sergeants and privates, job availability was not a big problem; in fact, most Subdistrict Commands (KORAMIL) had personnel shortages so they could be appointed to the readily available jobs there, therefore it was an advantage for the organization. However, as an officer in a Sub-Regional Command (KOREM) said, the main problem was usually in terms of adjustments demanded on their return to their military working environment. Rules and disciplines were usually applied much more strictly, while economic rewards were much lower than they had received in their previous positions as Village Heads. Whereas for the organization the main difficulties would be in terms of dealing with these returning personnel having frustration-related problems, especially those causing negative effects on their working performances, the main difficulties for the individual soldiers were more direct, that is, in terms of the reduction in their material benefits and their changed working conditions. 555 Economically, being retired (earning around Rp. 700,000/around US$80 per month) and retaining their positions as the Village Heads would be a good choice. Most Village Heads in Java are allocated some hectares of land as tanah bengkok 556 for their use during their service period, and also earn some additional money from their administration of the village people, such as over issuing ID cards, land transactions, in operational funds from the higher administration, etc. However, especially in 1998, public resistance and demands for the resignation of the military Village Heads were very strong. As discussed in Chapter Five, threats and intimidations from the people made them less protected, and the choice of staying on as the Village Head became less favorable than returning to their units. 557 However, this immediate problem also had a significant impact on the way the individual officers and soldiers saw themselves, and the social environment in 554 Interview B Interview M112. The respondent was an officer in the headquarters of a KOREM in East Java. 556 Land allocated instead of some salary. 557 See also Chapter Five. For more information about the income of the village headmen see also, for example, Schiller, Jim, Developing Jepara in New Order Indonesia, (Australia: Monash Asia Institute, 1996), pp

262 which they operated. This can be seen from how they reacted to the changes. Their reactions varied, but generally they felt disappointed and hopeless. One Lieutenant Colonel described his feeling, especially while he was waiting for a new job, as having been just thrown away (dicampakkan begitu saja). After waiting for eight months he was appointed to be one of the military representatives in a local legislature. When asked about how he would describe the perceptions of the individual officers waiting like him, he pictured this as a departure from seeing themselves as the most important element of the society. 558 The officers, he said, realized at that time that they had not much choice available, apart from following what was demanded by the reformasi. He said that not many officers believed the current democratization was the way that Indonesia should have headed, but they accepted it as a reality that they would not be able to stop but would have to live with and to cope with. 559 A similar view was held by another Lieutenant Colonel, who had experienced a drastic effect of the 1998 movement on his family life. Previously he was working as a Kepala Parkir (Chief of Parking) in one of the cities in the province. In that position he earned almost three million rupiah (triple his formal one million rupiah salary). After being withdrawn to military headquarters, he said, Now I do not have a good position that could sufficiently support my family; I have not any house yet for my retirement; I do not have enough money to pay for two of my kids who are studying in the university. He revealed that he and his family were very shocked to find that the effect of the reformasi was much worse for them personally than what he had expected. He had not thought that the changes would go so far, involving his withdrawal from a lucrative (basah) job. He said that he never believes that a democratic system would be good for the country. In his opinion, the change was just a matter of time, just like the cycle of a wheel, sometime you are on the top, another time you are at the bottom; democracy is not better than other systems; if now democracy is on the top it is just because of the time cycle. Different generations sometimes want to live in different ways from their predecessors The respondent described how the military personnel used to see the military institution as a super body that could do anything, and saw the military personnel as the first-class citizens but the civilians as the second class citizens. Interview M Interview M Interview M

263 Many lower rank soldiers also felt that the current conditions were only temporary. They tended to romanticize the possibility that sooner or later the military would take over the national leaderships and they would be returned to their previous positions. 561 Among them were the sergeants or privates who had been Village Heads, or lower rank officers who had been promoted to be officers from NCO sergeant ranks and did not really understand political affairs. Some of these respondents were formerly appointed to profitable positions in local economic sectors such as in terminals or markets. 562 When asked their opinions about democracy, they generally answered that they did not believe in democracy, but they saw that it had now become a fact of life that they could not deny. It appears that the ways the personnel expressed their feelings to me were very much influenced by their personal conditions, dependent on the degree of the impact of the changes on them. Some respondents who were nearing retirement age, for example, seemed to accept the withdrawal more positively than the younger ones did, simply because they had less to lose. As an old soldier who was about to enter retirement said, I do not really care, I am going to be retired, that is the business of the young officers. In contrast, a young officer respondent expressed his complaint by saying, when our turns are about to come, the doors [to the chances of having political/financially-profitable jobs] are closed, that is not fair. Although usually less crudely expressed than this, other younger officers tended to show their disappointment toward the military s withdrawal policy. 563 In contrast, the older officers tried to be positive by saying, we did not join the army in order to have civilian jobs, but the command assigned us to the civilian posts in order to maximize our contribution to the national development; so, if now the nation no longer wants us to be there, that s OK. But, similarly, they sceptically expressed the opinion that the withdrawal policy was implemented too soon and went much further than what civilians had demanded Interviews M115, M116, M119, M123. All respondents were sergeants serving at a military territorial unit in Malang. 562 They were recruited (ditarik) by their former commanders who had become the Kepala Terminal (Head of Terminal) or Kepala Pasar (Head of Market) to be their assistants or staff. At the time of the interviews they had already been withdrawn to Sub-district Commands. Interviews M121, M122, M See footnote See footnote

264 The group of military who didn t retire but switched to be civil servants was not large in East Java. In fact, there were only two of them (out of a potential of two hundred!), and the view of this pair was quite different from those who had returned to the units. One of them, a former Lieutenant Colonel who was now a civil servant, revealed a personal reason for the conversion of his status. He said that his decision was importantly influenced by an uncomfortable feeling of the past political involvement of the military. When serving as the Head of the Kansospol (Social Political Office) of a District Government until 2000, he was involved in some dirty political games. 565 In addition, he said, when he became the Head of the Kansospol he felt more like a civilian politician than a military officer, therefore he felt more comfortable to continue in the civilian position. At the time of the interview he was the Head of the Badan Kepegawaian (Employment Division) of a District Government. 566 The Division he now headed was responsible for recruiting, selecting and promoting the Local Government s staff. Although the position was less politically influential than his previous one, in the eyes of internal staff it was one of those that were considered to be basah (lucrative) involving ceperan (unofficial payments). 567 His view about democratization thus, by extension, the military political withdrawal was rarely found among those who were still active duty officers. He viewed the democratization as the way that should have been followed, in contrast to those returning-to-the unit officers views that saw it just as a matter of power struggle, defeat or defeated, not good or bad. So, the impacts were different from one person to another, but most reported a feeling of hopelessness from what was described in Chapter Five as a demoralization process. However, one positive effect of this process was that it had apparently encouraged introspection about the past military politics, which was needed for the military reforms. Most of them recognized the past level of 565 For example, he said, he once in 1997 asked the members of PP (Pemuda Pancasila the government supported Pancasila Youth Organization) to dress with PDI costumes, to join the PDI demonstrations, and to provoke a riot, so that to discredit the PDI, and to justify the future demonstrations by opposition groups or parties. Interview B Interview B This feeling was expressed by two officials (also former staff members of Kansospol) in a different division of the same District Government. Interviews B12, B

265 military involvement in politics were no longer acceptable in the current circumstances. They acknowledged, for example, the military s negative images such as, to know and can do everything when referred to the territorial social and political roles, too tough when referred to political controls, or too greedy when referred to the ambitious military officers. 568 This increased their awareness about public sensitivity to the military issues that the roles were to be more carefully handled. Nevertheless, in a negative form, the effect was manifested in a degradation of their sense of responsibility. When asked about post-soeharto social disorders happening in the Province, for example, the military respondents usually reacted by saying let it be (biarin aja), that is what they want (memang itu yang mereka mau), or why should we bother, we have got enough our own problems (ngapain itu diurusin, kita aja pontang panting). 569 It appeared that the policy of military political withdrawal was not fully supported personally, especially by those who had gained direct benefits from the previous engagement. However, although the withdrawal had not automatically produced their full acceptance of the democratic norms - in fact they blamed democratization as the source of their difficulties they recognized that the democratization was inevitable. Most military personnel had stopped being involved in political and economic activities mainly because they had no choice. They would be ready to come back if the situation made it possible, for example, the institution allowed them to or the political circumstances gave them an opportunity. Their reason for their resentments toward the newly imposed democracy was very personal and practical that it made their lives more difficult economically. Although there were some personnel who seemed to think more ideologically and politically, and realized that the military had decided what it should do withdraw from nonmilitary activities nevertheless, if their personal interests were at stake, and if future political circumstances allowed them to pursue these interests, this politically ideal perception would be easily overwhelmed. 3. Political failure: The military-turned-civilian Bupatis and Mayors 568 Interviews B15, M11, M Interviews M51, M112, M113. See also Chapter Five. 233

266 Another direct impact of the military withdrawal was on the former military Bupati and Mayors who decided to retire early and try to keep their current positions. In 1998 nineteen of East Java s thirty-eight District Governments were led by military Bupati and Mayors (see Table VIII.2, p. 181). Fourteen of them decided to stay in their existing positions and so retired early from the military, while five chose to go back to the military units, either because of having no signs of significant support from their local DPRD factions 570 or because of having completed two periods of office by then. Yet, one former Bupati said that he wanted to complete his service until the retirement age. He said, I came from very poor family before joining the military, now I have got everything, and it was because of the military, so I should not leave the military. 571 Fourteen of the eighteen who stayed in the positions attempted to run for a second term in the office through the next local elections, Pilkada (which will be presented in detail below). The challenges for the eighteen officers who resigned from the military so they could stay in their District Government leadership positions were how to cope with the loss of direct support from the military and how to compensate for this loss by building new relationships with civilian groups. Officially, they would need to show publicly that they were already separated from the military institutions, as this was the image that the institution wanted them to demonstrate as a way of convincing the public about the military response to the reform demands. On the other hand, these former military officers would also need to convince potential supporters who were on the reformist side including those who strongly opposed the existence of the military in politics that there was a convergence of interests of both sides. However, as shown below, behind the scenes the (historical and personal) links between the institutions and the former officers were kept alive. In its quarterly official reports about territorial activities under the sub-heading of Bidang Komsos (Social Communication) up to April 2003, the KODAM V Brawijaya Territorial Staff mentioned maintaining communication with retired military personnel and their families (Membina Keluarga Besar TNI, Cultivation of the Army s Extended Family) as being routinely carried out in each District 570 Two examples (personal and District names changed) of these cases were Retired Colonel Sutriman in the Ngayarsari District; and Retired Colonel Sukarni in the Sampurredjo District. The information about them was reported during interviews with respondents who were members of the DPRD in each District. 571 Interview M

267 Command headquarters. This included inviting them to activities such as sport and other social activities, and routine gatherings every three months. The reports also mentioned a total of 313,093 registered KBT throughout the Province. The aim of the communication was, according to the reports, to have the same visions, perceptions and commitment in an attempt to re-build the military s public image, and it was also said that the Pembinaan (Cultivation or Development) was done by respecting the political rights of the KBT members. 572 Those who believe that the military institution still had a strong influence in local politics would think that these former officers would have to be able, at least, to show their empathy toward the military that after becoming civilians they were not a threat to it nor would join the civilian pressure groups that were causing difficulties for the military. Therefore, it is also logical to think that the success or the failure of these former officers in achieving their political career would depend importantly on their abilities in keeping a successful balance between these two strategies, in a kind of being a double agent; publicly being a (civilian) reformist but secretly collaborating with anti-reformist elements of the military. The features of these former officers political struggles varied from one District to another, but it is possible to classify them into five categories according to their success in achieving this balance, from complete failure to complete success. (i) The first category includes the complete failures, those who became the direct victims of the democratic movements by being forced out of office before the next elections. This was experienced, for example, by Retired Colonel Purnomo Sidik, who had been Bupati of Banyuwangi. He was elected firstly in 1991 then, at the end of that five year term, re-elected for a second term that would normally have been However, by the end of 1998 he was being pushed to step down by mass demonstrations. In addition to the demonstrations, the new (1999) DPRD members put strong pressures on him to resign. He was able to defend his position for more than a year after the pressures were put on him. However, his power significantly declined after he retired from the military in 2000 and in the same year he resigned from the position. The main reason behind calling for the 572 Laporan Pelaksanaan Program Kerja Kodam V/Brawijaya, Bidang Territorial, s/d 30 April TA 2003 (Reports on Koter Programs up to 30 April 2003), p. 10. These reports are not made available to the public. 235

268 resignation was an accusation that he had been involved in the Dukun Santet murders 573, although this has never been proved as it has never been brought to court. Another less sinister but similar story happened in a nearby District. Retired Colonel Sudaryanto, the Bupati of Situbondo was forced to leave the office by around a thousand demonstrators who took over the District Government office buildings in June He was accused of being involved in fifty KKN cases 574. Although, as in the case of Colonel Purnomo Sidik, this case had never been brought to the court when in 2000 he finished his first office term, apparently the accusation was effective in stopping him from registering as a candidate for a second term. The cases of both Purnomo Sidik and Sudaryanto, as noted in Chapter Five, seemed to be direct consequences of the reformasi atmosphere in which the military political withdrawal took place. They were becoming political targets of the reformasi movements, while the military did not want to be seen as siding with them especially after they were retired. 575 Because at this time the military was campaigning on soul-searching (mengembalikan jati-diri) and restoring public trust (mengembalikan kepercayaan rakyat), it seemed to try to avoid being affected by the negative issues involving (former) military personnel, taking a position of a sort of washing of hands and offering no protection to them. 576 (ii) The second category, also clear failures, is of former military Bupati and Mayors who completed their current, first, term of office but were prevented from participating in the elections for their second terms. Colonel Iwan Darmawan, the Bupati of Tunggal Redjo, for example, did not face significant disruptions from the reformasi movements that escalated in 1998/1999. Yet in 2000, a year before he finished his first five-year period and a year before he could prepare for the next election, he was shaken by an accusation of corruption over a market renovation project. 577 What is interesting is not whether the allegation was true or not, 573 Explaining the Dukun Santet issue has been very controversial, as Chapter Five has noted. 574 See also Chapter Five. 575 Although it could be that there were particular issues about the reputations of these two men rather than a generalized one of the military, but there was not enough evidence to support that. 576 In 2000 he had two meetings with the Danrem of Malang who required him to follow the public demand for his resignation. Interview M43, with an officer who was in charge of organizing administrative matters of the military representatives in the DPRD. 577 The officer was outraged by the corruption charge. Interview M

269 because such notorious scandals were usual during the New Order era, but whether those who used to protect him would keep shielding him or not. F-Golkar and F-TNI/POLRI, the two factions that had supported him to be Bupati of the District in the 1996 election abandoned him and, in fact, exploited the case. Hanif, as the District Chairman of Golkar, took a position against him, preventing him from joining the 2001 Pilkada, so that he could pursue his own ambition to occupy the Bupati position. Because he had close relations with the Provincial level KODAM, she could easily get the District s F-TNI/POLRI Assembly members to side with her. An influential Golkar member of the local DPRD, supported by its F- TNI/POLRI, sent an official letter to the KODAM Headquarters, requesting that Iwan Darmawan be recalled to his unit. The demand was accepted at KODAM and the recall letter was issued along with a permission letter that allowed an investigation over his conduct. Iwan Darmawan, who was the only military Bupati in East Java who intended to run for the 2001 election but had not proposed his retirement in 2000, ignored the re-call and threatened to disclose what he claimed to be the truth, that is, if the HQ did not protect him he would reveal that most of the money he was accused of obtaining corruptly had gone to high ranking officers of the HQ. In the end, not only did he lose a chance to run for a second term as Bupati, his case was brought to the court, while Hanif, the spouse of one of the most successful businessmen in Tunggal Redjo managed to win the 2001 Pilkada with a significant support from the military. 578 In this case, as in the cases of Purnomo Sidik and Sudaryanto, the military tried to avoid being blamed for any involvement in the scandals. Preventing former military officers from extending their tenures as Bupati/Mayor was not always done by the DPRD through an exploitation of their scandals. It could also be done by making use of existing regulations, by rejecting their LPJ/Laporan Pertanggung Jawaban (Final Accountability Report). Such a rejection would cause them to lose their chance to register for participation in the next election. This tactic was experienced by Retired Colonel H. Agus Fajri, the Bupati of Bandulan. Unlike in the previous Tunggal Redjo case, here the F- TNI/POLRI (military/police faction) attempted to secure the position for him. The 578 Interview M73. The respondent was the Chairman of the F-TNI/POLRI in this District. 237

270 Chairman of the faction, Lieutenant Colonel Muntahar, suggested to me that the planned rejection was mainly aimed at preventing the Bupati from running for a second term in the 2003 Pilkada, therefore the F-TNI/POLRI viewed it as unfair and decided not to support the rejection by the rest of the DPRD. This faction was the only one that accepted the accountability report while all other factions refused it. As a consequence of the acceptance, he said, the F-TNI/POLRI members were instructed to come to the KODAM HQ, just a few days after the DPRD session, for an investigation, because they were suspected of having received hundreds of millions of rupiah from H. Agus Fajri as a return for accepting the report, but all the faction members denied the accusation. Muntahar admitted that, long before the DPRD s LPJ session, the F-TNI/POLRI had lobbied other factions members to accept the report. This was done in an attempt to save H. Agus Fajri in the coming election. Yet, the respondent said, this was done only because the faction members viewed that they had a loyalty responsibility to help him as members of the KBT (Keluarga Besar TNI/ Extended Military Family), not because of any money. To say the money implies it did exist, however. This does not mean, however, that H. Agus Fajri succeeded in maintaining a good relation with the military. According to the Chairman of the F- TNI/POLRI, the communication between the Bupati and the F-TNI/POLRI members was poor. He described the relation as not good because H. Agus Fajri always looked down on the faction members; seeing them as sub-ordinate officers with lower ranks. He never treated the faction members as equal to him, although he should have done so to these legislature members. Besides, he never paid attention to the welfare condition of the faction members (never giving them money). This sounds ambiguous but it could be taken to mean he was honest and did not bribe or sweeten them with money. Having also been a military representative in a legislature for some years in Malang before moving to Bandulan District, this respondent compared the financial assistance in both places given by the Bupati to the local DPRD F-TNI/POLRI members, suggesting that it was much better in Malang, and describing H. Agus Fajri as terlalu pelit (too stingy). Their lobbying was somewhat difficult because H. Agus Fajri did not provide financial supports (so they could not bribe other factions members on his behalf). He seemed too proud of himself and assuming that the report would be 238

271 accepted by the LPJ session because his previous yearly reports had always been accepted. He ignored the advice from the F-TNI/POLRI members that he would have to use money this time in order for the report to be accepted. On the other hand, he tried to convince the F-TNI/POLRI members that he had got an assurance from Kiai berpengaruh NU (an influential NU cleric), KA that all F- PKB members, the biggest faction that occupied a simple majority of the DPRD s seats, would accept his final report in fact, it did not. 579 The refusal by the DPRD s LPJ session became a justification for the Election Committee to refuse his application to register as a Bupati candidate in the 2003 Pilkada. He challenged both refusals, of his LPJ and of his registration, in the appropriate court, the PTUN (Pengadilan Tata Usaha Negara/State Administration Court). However, in both cases the court decided that the refusals were valid, so he was unsuccessful. 580 H. Agus Fajri had failed both in securing a continuation of his relations with the military and in building new support from the civilian groups. The F-TNI/POLRI members had shown a willingness to help him, but they had been turned down as he kept showing his lack of respect for them and was not ready to pay them financial incentives. Communication seemed to be the main problem, not only between Bupati and the faction, but between the faction and Headquarters. As it appeared, the decision taken by the F-TNI/POLRI was not based on the instruction of the KODAM Headquarters, and the faction had not consulted with this Headquarters in advance either. Headquarters had itself attempted to avoid being involved too deeply in negative (controversial) political issues, such as those between this Bupati and his DPRD, that involved F-TNI/POLRI members, or those involving former military officers at the District level. (This is later discussed further.) As in the previous three cases, Headquarters reactions appear to have been mainly aimed at keeping an image that, if something unpleasant happened 579 Interview M79, with the Chairman of the F-TNI/POLRI of this District s DPRD. 580 According to the Chairman of F-TNI/POLRI, the refusal of the LPJ by DPRD could be challenged in the court because not all factions refused it (F-TNI/POLRI accepted it), while the refusal to the registration was also weak because the registration took place when the LPJ refusal had not been given legal decision. But he said, it seems that the court was influenced very much by the political pressures and threats by political groups that if Agus Fajri won there would be political chaos or instability. Interview M81, with the Deputy Chairman of the DPRD of this District, who was also a member of its F-TNI/POLRI. 239

272 involving people identified as being military representatives, it had nothing to do with the military institution itself but only with rough (oknum).individuals. Building support from the new political parties was not an easy task for the former military Bupati, even though they may be regarded as clean by not being involved in or even accused of any scandal. As mentioned previously, during the New Order regime only the Golkar (government), PDI (secular or Christian) and PPP (Islamic) organizations were allowed to field parliamentary candidates. One of the obvious elements of reformasi was the allowing of almost any (non- Communist or non-military) political grouping to establish itself as a recognized political party. A large number put forward candidates at the subsequent elections but only a few gained enough votes to succeed in getting any of their candidates into the national or local parliaments. The (Islamic) religiously-oriented PKB and PAN were two of them that were successful, particularly the PKB, while the PDIP replaced the, by then, discredited PDI. This was clearly shown in the case of Retired Colonel Maryoto in the District of Prambanan. The Chairman of the local DPRD s F-TNI/POLRI, Lieutenant Colonel Wardoyo Hasim, revealed that, on behalf of Maryoto, he arranged a meeting in a hotel to try to set up a coalition of the F-TNI/POLRI, F-DIP and PAN members, to build support for Maryoto in the coming election. In this meeting a commitment was agreed, to do their best to bring him to a victory. However, as time went by, some members of the coalition changed their positions and left for the opposition group, the combined F-KB and F-Golkar coalition. 581 Later, Maryoto said that he was not so sure about relying on the F-TNI/POLRI because the faction would not be in the DPRD from so, if he were elected to be Bupati, the F-TNI/POLRI would not be there to back him up, so he considered a move toward the F-KB. In an attempt to lobby this faction, he managed to facilitate a big wedding party for the family of an informal leader, Kiyai Basir, of an Islamic boarding school (pesantren), providing funds and staff to help. The pesantren leader agreed with Maryoto s suggestion to invite ex-president Abdurrahaman Wahid (Gusdur), the 581 There is no first-hand evidence about why they changed their positions, but the respondent suspected that they were promised bigger bribes by the coalition group. Interview M Because of the policy that the compulsory allocation of non-elected seats to the military would be stopped at this election. 240

273 national Chairman of the PKB, and Akbar Tanjung, the Chairman of the Golkar Party and the Chairman of the National Parliament (DPR), to the wedding party. During the party he took the chance to approach the two political parties Chairmen. Unfortunately, this lobbying effort did not work either, the PKB-Golkar coalition decided to nominate someone else. 583 My respondent told me that Maryoto then indicated that he wanted to return to the F-TNI/POLRI, F-PDIP and PAN coalition, but some members who had previously supported him felt disappointed with his previous move, and now did not accept him, so he decided not to go forward. So, as in the previous cases, Retired Colonel Maryoto failed to register as a Bupati candidate. (iii) In the third category were some former military Bupati who were allowed to participate in the Pilkada, but were unsuccessful. The majority of cases of the political departure of former military Bupati and Mayors fell into this category. Some of them were competing against former officers or against active officers, 584 but all failed. As well as the example described of the two officers in Godean, there were the cases of the two officers in Jambangan; the three officers in Ngadiredjo; and the two retired officers in Jabung Anyar. As one example, in the Godean District, Retired Colonel Suwarna Solikin previously had been nominated as the primary candidate, and been approved by the Minister of Home Affairs. The newly elected DPRD legislature, however, refused to continue the process of the election and restarted a new Pilkada. Criteria for the eligibility of candidates were revised, and all factions except the F-TNI/POLRI put forward a requirement stating that military officers, either active or retired, were not eligible. Consequently, Suwarna Solikin could only register through the F-TNI/POLRI which had only five members. These five potential votes then dropped by one because Lieutenant Colonel Markus Sumanto, a member of the faction, decided to register himself as the Vice-Bupati candidate through the F-PKB. According to a member of the F- TNI/POLRI, Suwarna Solikin decided to go forward because he thought that he could build additional supports from the members of other factions. In fact, at the final voting stage, he gained only one of the forty-five votes Interview M88, with the Chairman of the F-TNI/POLRI of this District s DPRD. 584 Interview M33, with a former member of the Wansospolda of East Java. 585 In contrast, his opponent, HRM, the Chairman of the DPRD, won 32 votes. The other three members of the F- TNI/POLRI chose to join the F-KB, the biggest faction, to support HRM. 241

274 Similar situations to this were experienced by Retired Colonel Sukamdani Marlan in the Sumedang District, Retired Colonel Sudjati in the Pancang Tanggul District and Retired Colonel Dodi Amarullah in the Pisang Candi District. They managed to register and follow the process of the Pilkada till the end, but finally lost because the majority of the voting local legislators did not support them. (iv) In the fourth, small, category were those who won their re-election but subsequently suffered from crippling or fatal conflict. There were two retired Colonels in this category: Retired Colonel Sudirman Nasirun, the District Head of Sumber Yasin, and Retired Colonel Fadli Bianto, the Bupati of Sumberwaras. Although he managed to win the election in 2000 for a second five-year term, Sudirman Nasirun subsequently failed in his struggle to secure his position because of corruption allegations. He was forced to step down in the middle of 2002 over several cases of corruption, and died while on his retreat (supposedly for medical reasons) to Australia. Fadli Bianto still survived until 2003 but, at the time of study, it was uncertain that he would make it until 2005, the end of his second period of office, because, like Sudirman Nasirun, from the early days of his being re-elected he never stopped being shaken by political controversies and pressures. The inauguration was postponed for a year after the election, political chaos ended up with the burning down of the DPRD offices by the opposition groups soon after the delayed inauguration corruption scandals brought him to the courts, and marked his second period. (v) The fifth category, the completely successful, is made up of only one man, Retired Colonel Sutiono, the only former military officer who was successful in winning election in At the end of 2003 he managed to get a Bupati position on his second try. One respondent said that when Sutiono registered as a Bupati candidate in the 2000 Pilkada of Sidikalang, he was not supported by the KODAM, nor by the F-TNI/POLRI there. 586 The respondents from the F- TNI/POLRI of this District said that the faction did not support him because the KODAM gave a sign that it did not support him. So, instead of through the F- 586 Interview M

275 TNI/POLRI, he registered through the F-DIP, the second biggest faction after the F-KB. 587 One military respondent said that Sutiono had an unpleasant experience in his relations with his former institution. When he came to the KODAM with the purpose of legalizing his documents for use in the Pilkada registration administration requirements, he attempted to meet an officer in the personnel staff, the staff that on behalf of the Commander in Chief could produce a letter of recommendation for his registration. He tried to ask for the recommendation, but was put down by the officer, who had ranked lower than him before he had retired but who told him in an angry intonation while pointing his finger at him that the KODAM would not give him such a letter. The officer said, If you wanted a recommendation letter, you should have asked the Pepabri (tassociation of Retired Military), not to KODAM. The respondent said that Sutiono was shocked by the way he was treated at the KODAM. 588 So, Sutiono got a new lesson from KODAM that being a retired officer did not have to mean being automatically supported by the military institution. He did learn from this experience; having failed in the Sidikalang Pilkada, two years later when he participated in the Buluhlawang Pilkada he avoided going to the KODAM for a blessing (restu) as most candidates who wanted to get the support from their F-TNI/POLRI did. 589 Yet he managed to get the full support from the five members of the local F-TNI/POLRI, who took a different position from the local territorial commanders, and won the election. The case of Buluhlawang is discussed more detail in Chapter Eleven, but it is important to note here that Sutiono proved that the 2003 circumstance showed that the military territorial commanders could no longer control the position of the F-TNI/POLRI members in the Pilkada, even less so their outcomes. This was simply because these commanders were not supported institutionally to take such a control, although in some occasions they did use their institutional positions to justify their actions. In 587 Interview M68, with the Chairman of the F-TNI/POLRI; Interview M67, with the Deputy Chairman of the DPRD. 588 The respondent who witnessed this drama said that Sutiono was surprised when finding out that his former junior spoke rudely to him without showing any respect, only a few months after he had retired. The respondent was present at this incident as he had been one of the personnel staff at the KODAM in At the time of interview he was the Chairman of the F-TNI/POLRI in a District of East Java Province. He said, after Sutiono left the room, the officer told the staff that Sutiono had to learn that the KODAM did not want to be involved anymore in such matters. Interview M This District Chairman of an F-TNI/POLRI revealed that Sutiono did not want to go to the KODAM, which is why it did not support him, whereas his opponent did go there for a blessing. Interview M

276 addition it also proved that a candidate who was a retired military man was not always preferred by the military institution above a civilian; and it was personal rather than institutional relations that strongly determined the political behaviors of the military officers. The lack of success of the former officers in continuing their political careers was mainly because they failed both to secure sufficient support from the military hierarchy and to build new supports from the civilian political groups. For the military institution, supporting these former officers could harm its commitment to leave the political arena. For the new civilian political groups (political parties, democratic activists or NGOs), there was no guarantee that these former officers would be fully on the reformist side, while embracing them could ruin the public perception toward their groups as reformist. However, although these former officers did not succeed, they remain the most available element for civilian elites who were willing and competent to bring attractive military officers into becoming involved in politics. As shown, especially by the last category of the uniquely exceptional success, members of an F-TNI/POLRI could be successfully pulled into supporting a former officer to be elected into a Bupati office. This retired officer was even much skilful than the local military commander who had attempted to use his institutional position to prevent the faction from supporting him. 4. Deterioration: The DPRD military factions The strong resistance of the public to the presence of the military in the DPRD reduced the interests of officers in being selected as candidates for the F- TNI/POLRI appointments. 590 Meanwhile, those officers who were already in a DPRD increasingly felt they were being isolated and marginalized. In some occasions, local groups would come to a DPRD to see representatives from all factions except for the F-TNI/POLRI, excluding it by adding except F-TNI/POLRI in their proposals for the meetings. 591 For example, such exclusions happened frequently in the Ponorogo DPRD, where a similar discriminatory approach was 590 Interview M33, with a former staff member of the Social Political Section in a territorial unit. His previous job was involved in the selection process for the F-TNI/POLRI member candidates. 591 Another consequence of being left out by the meeting would be that they did not receive the meeting incentives (uang rapat). Interview M4. 244

277 also displayed by the civilian DPRD leaders. In responding to the demands from members of BPDs (Village Councils) in Ponogoro to increase their monthly incentives, the DPRD Chairman invited the Chairman of all its factions apart from the F-TNI/ POLRI for a similar reason that those in this faction were not representatives of the people. 592 Unlike in the New Order era, being a military representative at the DPRD was no longer being seen as a good stepping stone for a military-political-related career. Meanwhile, the military institution also became disinclined to give away good career officers to these positions. So, the Headquarters sent non-career officers (conscript officers) who worked at administrative tasks. Unlike in the New Order era when former Commanders of Battalions of Infantry, Artillery or Armour used to be appointed to positions in DPRD, now the majority of army officers in DPRD were non-career officers from administrative branches of the CKM (such as the Corp Kesehatan Militer, Military Health Corps) or from sections of the BINTAL (Ideology and Chaplaincy Service). However, on November 30, 2000, the National Government issued Government Decree (Peraturan Pemerintah) PP. No. 110/ 2000, which brought about a dramatic increase in the salaries of members of the local Legislative Assemblies. As the salaries of the members of each District Legislature are calculated based on that District Government s revenue, the amount varies greatly from one District to another. In the rich Districts like the City of Surabaya the salary of the DPRD Chairman was more than 30 million rupiah a month (about Aus$ 4000), while in a poor District like the Regency of Situbondo it was only around 5 million (about Aus$ 700). Yet, this is much higher than an average wage of the lowest rank of civil servant, which is around 500,000 rupiah (about Aus$ 70) per month. 593 As a consequence, the position of the military representatives in DPRD began to attract greater attention. Although the groups of officers interested in the DPRD jobs were still primarily non-career officers, the increase in the salary quickly corrupted the process of recruitment. Most appointments since the increase in the salary had been determined by the amount of money spent for paying pelicin (the 592 Interview M See Appendix 22 that shows numerous items of routine allowances for the DPRD members. 245

278 smoothing or bribe) to the officers in charge of selection, instead of by the quality and integrity of the candidates. Furthermore, while in the past the officers had to take several courses, lasting six to nine months, such as the Suscaleg (Legislation course), Sussospol or Susgati Sospol (Political courses), before working in the legislatures, now these courses were eliminated. So the changing process of the recruitment that increasingly ignored the candidates capability and integrity also significantly influenced the reported recent low quality of the political capabilities of the members of F-TNI/ POLRI. 594 Jealousy and scepticism toward the officers who were in the thirty eight DPRD across the Province also increased because of their decreasing ability but their increasing willingness to pay the high cost of kasak-kusuk (bribe money) for the positions. As they were appointed because they paid money, not because of their credibility, once they got the jobs most of them thought mainly about earning money, not about their job responsibility. Related to this, the HQ was suspicious that the members of the various F-TNI/POLRI were involved in money politics during the Bupati/Mayor elections, but had no sufficient means to prove it. Therefore, the positions as the military representatives became looked down on morally within the military. 595 Furthermore, conflicting positions in the elections between the territorial commands and the various local F-TNI/POLRI became common (discussed further in Chapter Eleven). Even though some territorial commanders wanted to put tight controls over the F-TNI/POLRI members, the commanders were limited by the institutional commitment to stay neutral in politics and not to intervene in the factions political activities. This commitment to neutralaity became the powerful justification for the faction members to protect their freedom from the territorial commands attempted controls. 596 It also appears that after the increase in salaries of DPRD members, some retired officers refused to end their DPRD jobs as military representatives even though their appointment had finished once they retired. Some of them used political 594 Interview M32. For more opinions about the decrease in the personal quality of the F-TNI/POLRI members, see also Chapter Six. 595 Interview M45. The respondent was an officer of the KODAM Provincial Headquarters responsible for personnel recruitment and selection of members of the F-TNI/POLRI. 596 Interview M

279 lobbying within their DPRD to try to prevent their being replaced. As the mechanism of recalling a member of the DPRD had to consider many political aspects, thus took time, the military HQ frequently could only replace them after six months or more of disagreement. On 5 February 2002 the Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces issued an instruction, No. STR/127/2002, instructing that members of F-TNI/POLRI must be active-duty officers, implying that it had been discovered by the headquarters that some of these members had been retired but not yet replaced as the F- TNI/POLRI members. As seen in Table IX.1 KODAM Headquarters sent follow-up letters to the Chairmen of the DPRD in several Districts, such as Mangliawan, of Moronegoro, Sidikalang and Talangsari. In these cases the recall letters had been issued and sent to the DPRD by the Pangdam or the East Java Governor two or thee times before the replacement took place at around three to eighteen months the military representatives retired. Table IX.1. Members of F-TNI/POLRI involved in the recall disputes District names and number of cases Mangliawan (2) Moronegoro (2) Officer branches and retirement dates 1. Ltc (ret) Navy Ltc (ret) Navy Ltc (ret) Army Ltc. Army (active- duty) Recall letters 1 st : nd : (from Pangdam) 1 st : (from Governor ) 2 nd : (from Pangdam) 1 st : (from Pangdam) 2 nd : (from Pangdam) Data not available Solutions Replaced around six months after retired Replaced around six months after retired Replaced around twelve months after retired Picked up by Kodam military police from his office and stationed at the HQ 247

280 Sidikalang (2) Sumberwaras (1) Sumber Yasin (1) Talangsari (2) 5. Police Commissioner (ret) Ltc (ret) Army (active-duty) 7. Ltc..Army (active-duty) 8. Ltc (ret) Navy Ltc (ret) Army Ltc (ret) Navy st : (from Pangdam) 2 nd : (from Pangdam) 1 st : nd : rd : Data not available 1 st : (fom Governor) 2 nd : (from Pangdam) 1 st : nd : rd : st : nd : rd : without job. Replaced around eighteen months after retired Replaced several months after retired Picked up by Kodam military police from his office and stationed at the HQ without job. Replaced around three months after retired Replaced around eight months after retired Replaced around seven months after retired Sources: Official letters from KODAM to the respective DPRDs and from interviews with relevant officers. Note: All names of places appear in the table are pseudonyms. The table shows that, in these cases, not only the Pangdam but also the Governor had no longer a dominating influence over the District DPRD, as their letters had been repeatedly ignored by the DPRD Chairmen. The second letters of the Pangdam to the Speakers of the DPRDs stated that, [the Headquarters] requests that the Chairman of the [respective district] DPRD not complicate personnel and administration development within the sphere of the military institution (disampaikan kepada Ketua 248

281 DPRD agar tidak menghambat pembinaan personil dan administrasi di lingkungan TNI) 597 This letter implies that by ignoring the Pangdam s first recall letters, the Speakers of the DPRDs were acting as if undermining his authority as the superior of the military representatives at the DPRDs and complicating the personnel management of the military. Tensions between the DPRD and the HQ marked this process, with the rebellious officers hiding behind political reasons and under protection from the Speakers of DPRDs who had their own political interests in maintaining political balance of power (or with bribery possibly playing a role!). The challenges by the DPRD Speakers and (in theory) military representatives to the recalls by the military institution demonstrate a quite radical change in the relations between the military and the local politics, which was unimaginable in the New Order, and underlines the decline of the military s (institutional) influence over the local politics. To end a deadlock of the negotiations, some of the refusers were compulsorily picked up by military provosts, forced to leave their DPRD seats and to report to their previous military units. An officer who was dealing with these replacement matters in KODAM said that, in Sumberwaras, Lieutenant Colonel Muchalib was forced to come to the Headquarters after a year of extending his DPRD membership without waiting for the DPRD Speaker to sign the replacement letter and he was ordered to report to his unit commander every morning for two months until his retirement letter was issued. 598 Similarly, in Moronegoro, Lieutenant Colonel Sugondo Harsono was picked up by the Headquarters provost after six months because he ignored the recall order. The respondent told me, We [the Headquarters] had followed the procedures, but because the DPRD did not show an intention to respond positively, we did it in our own way, we sent military provosts to pick him up. 599 In response to this, the DPRD could not but accept new officers as the replacements; although some politicians who were members of the groups of the replaced officers criticized the military for not respecting the democratic political mechanism. The Speaker of the DPRD in 597 Copies of the letters are in the possession of the author. 598 Interview M Interview M

282 Sumberwaras said, We could not accept that [the instruction to Ltc. Muchalib to leave the seats without the PDRD consent], because we knew that the replacement was very political [related to the issue of re-election of the Bupati 600 ], but they [the military headquarters] insisted. This DPRD Speaker might have been considering more his groups political interests in delaying the replacement. Yet this consideration does not seem to be relevant to these officers who were to be replaced, their personal economic gains seem to have been more dominant instead. The various more self-oriented attitudes of these local military officers, which have been discussed in more detail in Chapter Eight, give clear indications. Here, it suffices to note that in a circumstance where getting an adequate economic life was not easily accessible, and where there were now opportunities to challenge the rules and regulations, there were these several cases of military officers who had previously been appointed to be members of local decision-making elites, subsequently attempting to make use of the rules revealed inadequacies or overtly disobeying them in order to increase or at least maintain personal economic gains. 5. Conclusion The changes of political circumstances led to hard times in the personal lives of the military personnel who had previously benefited from the appointment of military personnel into civilian local bureaucratic or political roles. In fact, across East Java the new post-1998 political constellations affected hundreds of military personnel of different ranks who lost their civilian positions (and incomes and lifestyles), the military Bupati and Mayors who had to stand on their own feet for their political struggles, and the members of the reduced military representative factions in the District legislatures who, although suddenly more highly paid, were to remain only until Yet, whether the various difficulties they had experienced had also changed the perceptions of these individual personnel in terms of democracy and professionalism has a question mark over it. Their immediate expressions of opinion in interviews were very much influenced by how 600 This Sumberwaras election case was discussed in Chapter Eight., section

283 the changes had affected them individually. It was apparent that in the views of most of them the influence was much more negative than positive and that the democratizing changes were the causes that were to be blamed for their difficulties. This is despite the fact that, behind the immediate resentments, for a relatively large minority there had emerged a new understanding that the military was no longer the politically superior body that it had been, so the previous arrogant tendency had begun to decline. As the impacts they experienced were too severe to quickly overcome or forget, it appears that it will need a substantial time before a truly democratic concept can be fully accepted within the military. This is not to suggest that there was a strong possibility for the military to return to politics as in the New Order, because suspicion and resistance from the local civilian political societies to what they saw as military intervention into their political spheres were still too strong, such as was demonstrated by the Speakers of DPRD in several Districts over the attempted recalls of members of the F- TNI/POLRI by the KODAM. Notwithstanding, the negative reactions shown by the former karya officers indicates that, in continuing to minimize military involvement in politics it would be unrealistic to rely solely on the willingness of the individual military as there is still a great number of personnel who had tasted the fruits of political power and may be ready to return to the politics if and when possible. Instead, systemic restrictions by rule of law will have to be continually maximized, although in the long run a professional ethic of being an apolitical military will have to be encouraged within the military as an essential condition for a lasting civilian control over it. While this chapter has focussed on impacts on the politicized individual local military personnel, the next chapter will focus on the local military units. Chapter Ten IMPACT ON LOCAL MILITARY (2): The Declining Effectiveness of Its Security Role 251

284 when asking the military units to help to provide soldiers for guarding such as exhibitions or music concerts such as dangdut, [traditional music], it was much easier, as they do not care about the procedures, but when asked controlling demonstrations, they talked about the procedures. 601 If you report you have lost your motorcycle and ask for help to the police, you will lose your car Introduction Having examined the impact of the withdrawal on individual officers in Chapter Nine, for the same purpose, that is, to look for the likelihood of the establishment of an apolitical, professional military, 603 this chapter will look at the local military units. As noted earlier in Chapter Six, the removal of most of the military direct control or even presence from local bureaucracy and the dismantling of the military s political networks appeared to have minimized not only its political power, but also those of its economic resources which were attached to those controls and networks. The question that this chapter attempts to address is, what has happened from the financial cuts to the local territorial military units; how, if at all, has the military tried to deal with these cuts; how has this change in the financial aspect affected the perception of the Army personnel about the territorial jobs and the future roles of the territorial commands; and what is the prospect for the improvement in professionalism of the territorial units. As also related to the professionalism and as part of the military reform policies, this chapter questions the impact of the military-police separation on the security management at the local level. 2. The money dried up Although Koter had remained unchanged in its structure, its ability to perform both political and security roles could by no means be comparable to its powerful capability during the New Order era. The financial impact of the military withdrawal from politics had been of vital importance. Large amounts of money that had come previously with the social and political programs assigned to the territorial 601 Interview P Interview V As described in Chapter Two, sub-section

285 units had now disappeared. A former military District Commander suggested that, after the New Order era, no less than five hundred million rupiah a year that used to be received by the District level KODIM units now had dried up. 604 In addition, the units had also lost access to the local government resources that used to be channeled through strategic local civilian positions occupied by military officers. 605 Furthermore, as a consequence of these two factors, the territorial units also lost many business partners, who now made closer relations with the local civilian governments partly as consequential effect of a new decentralization and with the police which was increasingly gaining a stronger power than the military. 606 Promising for the future efforts of minimizing military politics, however, is that there was no indication of a systematic attempt by the military to compensate that the loss, for instance by channeling the military interests to the retired military who were members of political parties or local government leaders. There were, nevertheless, various personal approaches by the local territorial commanders to the members of the F-TNI/POLRI to get security fund assistance from the local governments. This security fund assistance had recently become one of the few additional sources of money to supplement the formal, and small, fund that was provided from the central military command budget. For an indication of what these involved see the detailed list in Appendix 6 and 20. The amounts of money varied greatly from one District to another depending on several factors, such as the amount of the District Government s locally-raised income (PAD/Pendapatan Asli Daerah), the relations between the District Commander and the District DPRD s F-TNI/POLRI (which would be possible only up to 2004 when this faction would be abolished), and the capability of the F-TNI/POLRI members in lobbying other factions in their DPRD and the leaders in their District Government. If all these factors were favourable the District s military units were allocated large security funds, if unfavourable they would get very little, although there were cases in which a mixture produced the most. 604 Interview M29, with a former Military District Commander in the Godean District who, at the time of interview, was a member of the F-TNI/POLRI of the Matingan DPRD. 605 Examples of these various positions are mentioned in Chapter Three. 606 Interview M18, with the Military District Commander of Mangliawan (false name). 253

286 One of the most successful cases was found in Situnggal District. Here the Government s total budget was not large, but the lobbies are effective, and as the result the security budget for military and police was allocated more than 10% of the total local government revenue (1 billion of the 9 billion rupiah PAD) in the 2003 budget. 607 This percentage was much bigger than the amount allocated in the Panorama District, for example, where the security fund only provided an amount of two hundred million rupiah (one fifth of that in Situnggal) in the same year, although the District PAD there was slightly bigger. In fact, compared to other Districts, Situnggal s revenue of nine billion rupiah was much smaller, but the ratio of the security fund allocation was among the highest in the East Java province. Other Regencies that provided significant amount for the security financial assistance are Malang, Surabaya and Banyuwangi 608. Because of this, those Districts have been favoured places for the District Military Commander candidates. In contrast, the Districts of Ngadiredjo, Panorama, Sumber Manjing, Ngayarsari, and Bandulan were less favoured because the chances available for financial benefits were much more limited. Not only were their government budgets much smaller but also the business communities with which the Commanders could interact were very limited. 609 It is not really clear what factor or factors had made the lobbying by the F- TNI/POLRI members in the Situnggal District DPRD as effective as they claimed. It was quite ironic, actually, that the lobbying in the District could alleged to be much better done than in other Districts, because Situnggal was a District that was dominated by the PKB, which occupied 30 of the 45 DPRD seats, and since 1998 was an area where anti-military sentiment was quite strong. Anti-military sentiment in this Islamic-dominated community was much influenced by past experience such as an incident between the military and the local community in 1996 when rioting occurred in front of the local court, with several local people beaten and shot by soldiers during the riot. In early 1998, the military Regent was forced to step down by the mass demonstrations, and had no chance to participate in the 607 This was reported by some respondents who were members of the F-TNI/POLRI and by the Secretary (Sekwan) of the Situnggal DPRD. 608 The real names of these Districts. 609 Information about the favourite/less-favourite classification was given by military respondents, former Military District Commanders and current District Commanders: Interviews M51, M89, M92 and M

287 2000 Pilkada because of strong resistance from the public. In some interviews with members of the F-TNI/PPOLRI they claimed that they felt responsible to make sure that the military units located in the District had sufficient attention from the local government, which was why they worked hard to achieve this. Yet, this statement does not answer why the local Government and the local DPRD members agreed with the faction s proposals. 610 Whether they personally got something in return for example, some kind of commission from the projects - was not clear, but it was quite reasonable to think of this because it was a very common practice of the ways DPRD members achieve an establishment of development projects for their constituent area. Respondents stated similar attitudes of DPRD members in the Districts of Bandulan and Panorama for example, earning some commissions from the projects they proposed for the area of their respective constituents. They said that this was so common that other members usually turned a blind eye to those who were practicing it. 611 The respondents also suggested that recently the conflicts between the Chairman of the DPRD and the Regent were heating up. The respondent said that recently many mass demonstrations from both sides were held in front of both the Regent s Office and DPRD Office. In the former the demonstrators were protesting the corruption allegation against the government officials involved in the management of the Beras Taskin (Rice for Poverty Lifting) program, while in the latter the demonstrators were sent by the Regent for counter-demonstrations to protest against the DPRD members intervening too far. 612 Whether the faction also took advantage of this conflict to lobby both sides, by playing a double agent role such as playing one against the other, or pretending to side with each of them in favour of the proposal was also not impossible, but there is not sufficient data to suggest that. Perhaps there were more security fears, real or imagined, in this District? In 1998 and 1999 the District was one of those where Dukun Santet killings (discussed in Chapter Five, pp The respondent stated that before putting forward the proposal for the security fund in the DPRD s APBD (budget) meeting, he contacted the commanders of the military and police units in order to get them to lodge their lists of needs for the financial/material assistance. These lists were combined and became the reference for the faction to support the proposal. Interview M Interviews M80, M Interview M

288 103) happened. It might be thought that the security forces need to be supported to minimize or prevent such violence in the future. The importance of the role of the F-TNI/POLRI members in helping the security units to get financial assistance from the local government budget was shown by the respondents from Banjar Wetan. Lieutenant Colonel Markus, Deputy of the Chairman of the Banjar Wetan DPRD, illustrated how he could secure the proposal for the security budgets during the DPRD meeting. As the moderator of the meeting, he managed to make the floor pass the pages containing the security budget by avoiding questioning of those pages in the meeting, thus avoiding possible resistance from the other members. It would have been a different story, he said, if the meeting was led or moderated by someone else. 613 Chapter Eleven discusses the attitudes of the DPRD civilian members, including their laziness in coming to their offices or in doing their jobs properly or being mainly interested in making money; so, it was possible that Markus s tactic worked. However, in my opinion this tactic was only working incidentally, and if any other members had seriously wanted and intended to question the allocation, they would have seen, known about and prepared beforehand what was in the proposals (including the security allocations) before the meeting. In addition, although Markus said most of the meeting participants did not read the proposal carefully before the meeting, it would be necessary for only one or two to have done the work beforehand and raise the attention of the others to it. So, I do not think that this was all that needed doing to get the proposal through. Instead, as noted earlier, bribery seems such a normal practice that also helped to keep them quiet. In addition, it seemed also that Markus had his personal economic interests in helping the security units in getting security funds from the APBD. He told me that the fund was not given in cash, but in the forms of building materials, or 613 Technically, he said, it was like this: OK, page blah blah blah, no problem, page blah blah blah are clear, let see the next page, and so on. He also said that most of the meeting participants were not prepared in advance to see in detail the hundred pages of the budget lists, so it was not too difficult for him to manipulate the DPRD members attention to not scrutinize the parts containing security budgets. So, it involved a kind of cheating-like trick. Interview M55. Another officer revealed another way of securing the interests of the military that normally he asked members of other fractions to speak in favor of his interests, and in return, he did the same thing for the interests of the latter, such as project allocations for his area of constituents. Interview M

289 renovation projects for the security units bases, while he was involved in the projects. The cases of Situnggal and Banjar Wetan were contrast with the cases of Panorama, Ngayarsari or Bandulan where the members of the F-TNI/POLRI did not try hard to get the security fund increased in the local government budget. In these Districts the respondents from members of the F-TNI/POLRI criticized their District Military Commanders who were less proactive in approaching them and who had failed to build good relations with the local government leaders. 614 On the other hand, the Military District Commanders of these two Districts criticized the F- TNI/POLRI members, claiming that did not care about the security forces, only attempted to fill up their pockets. 615 So, the relations between the military units and the F-TNI/POLRI members seem not to have been harmonised either; thus access to the local Governments budgets was poor too. In Batang District, it was not the F-TNI/POLRI members who attempted to help the security forces be allocated financial assistance in the government budget, but a civilian, the Chairman of the DPRD, and the member of the F-Golkar. According to him, the members of the F-TNI/POLRI did not pay attention to the needs of the security forces; it seems that they were too worried of being criticized by other faction members if they attempted to get the units greater access to the government s resources. One member of the F-TNI/POLRI that I interviewed confirmed that there was not much that they could do to help the military units in this District because resistance from the other factions was strong. 616 The Golkar representative had long been a Golkar member in the DPRD in several Districts since 1982, and had a good relation with military commanders in these Districts. As in the Banjar Wetan case mentioned earlier, he himself contacted the military district units to ask what they needed. He usually offered assistance in the forms of physical developments such as building renovations, transportation or communication tools. 617 A formal, technical, reason that the respondent gave about why he preferred to give the assistance in the forms of material, not cash, 614 Interviews M53, M89, M Interviews M82, M Interview G Interview G

290 was that there was no article in the new law (Law No.25/1999 about local government financial matters) that made it possible to allocate any amount of money to the military units. By giving assistance in the form of materials, this would be included in the development budget (Anggaran Pembangunan). Yet what he did not say was that a concealed mark-up was only possible to be arranged through this way, a common practice that was mentioned earlier. In most Districts the military units were reluctant to propose financial assistance because of worries about being politicized by the DPRD members. 618 However, there were some exceptional cases. A Golkar respondent criticized the Military District Commander (Dandim) in Mantingan District for being too vulgar in proposing to the DPRD for a FWD Nissan Terrano (price around 300 million rupiah, about Aus$ 45,000) that would be used as the Dandim s own official car (Mobil Dinas). This respondent said, I know that the KODIM s position has been very poor compared to the other members of the Muspida in terms of finance, no longer very rich as during the New Order era, but the Commander should not have gone too far, to have been no longer ashamed to beg (meminta minta) to the local Government. He suggested that the proposal was triggered by jealousy at the local District Police previously proposing 1 billion rupiah for the Mantingan Pilkada s security budget. Actually, prior to the proposal there had been an informal discussion between him and the Commander. This should have been enough, and should have not been formalized with a written proposal because it would attract strong resistance from other factions. The proposal could have been embarrassing for the military, should the respondent have not kept it secret. When the proposal was directed to him as the Chairman, he decided not to let the other committee members know in order to secure the Commander s face. Being the son of a retired military man, and having had a political career in Golkar as the result of his close relations with the military, especially when he was an activist of the FKPPI (Forum Komunikasi Putra Putri Indonesia, an association of youths in military families), he could not, he said, ignore his feeling of attachment to the military, therefore he felt psychologically responsible to not let the military down. The result of the proposal was that all Muspida members were given a Mobil 618 This was what several Commanders stated in the interviews. Interviews M82, M92, M18, with people who were all Military District Commanders when the interviews were conducted. 258

291 Dinas (official car), but one with a much lower price, a 150 million rupiah FWD Kijang LGX. 619 The F-TNI/POLRI members were reluctant to help the proposal get approved, as they knew that by doing so their position would be unpleasant in front of other civilian politicians. They felt that, should the proposal be approved, let it be without us (tanpa kita), for fear that something unpleasant would happen latter. 620 However, another Golkar member made the criticism that it had been the feature of the current F-TNI/POLRI members that they were less concerned about the financial condition of the territorial command. 621 His assessment of the F- TNI/POLRI members was similar to what was mentioned by a Golkar respondent elsewhere, in Batangan they were busy about their individual interests; realizing that they would not be in the DPRD after 2004 they were using the limited time as effectively as possible to increase their individual economic benefits. 622 As mentioned earlier, the increased amount of money allocated for security services by the District Governments after 1998 was not comparable to the loss of financial resources that the military units had been used to access in the New Order era. When I asked some military commanders about the current budget from their local Government, the answers suggested that the condition was much worse than what was claimed by some F-TNI/POLRI members. In most Districts the amount was not distributed directly to the security units, and some of this did not reach the targets. The funds were kept by the District s Bakesbang (Badan Kesatuan Bangsa/Coordinating Body for National Unity), the division that replaced the more political Kansospol in 2000, and were only distributed little by little (kincrit-kincrit) to the units when they applied with proposals for financial assistance. 623 Also, some part of the security budget was kept by the Secretary of 619 Interview G Interview M4, the Chairman of the F-TNI/POLRI of this District. 621 Interview G Interview G77. The respondent was the Speaker of the Batangan District DPRD. 623 The Security sector was under the Bakesbang responsibility. The body has its own civilian security troops, called Satpol PP, stationed at every Sub-district as well as at the District offices. The body coordinated security fund assistance for the police and military. Interview M79, with a police officer who was the Chairman of the F- TNI/POLRI of the District DPRD. 259

292 the DPRD in anticipation of the potential future need to help finance the daily logistics of security troops deployed to deal with demonstrations. 624 In the case of Mantingan for example, although the total security allocation in the 2003 District Government s budget had been more than 3 billion rupiah, the Military District Commander, in an interview on 1 September 2003, claimed that the District Command had received security assistance of no more than 30 million rupiah (about Aus$ 4,000) after forwarding three requests, each of less than 10 million. He did not even know that the budgeted figure for security was as large as it was, because he had never been informed, either by the government or by the local F-TNI/POLRI. On one hand, he did not either ask about it because he realized that the local government was not responsible for budgeting for the security forces. On the other hand, it was his view that the local Government intentionally kept it secret to avoid unwanted proposals from the security units. 625 A lack of communication with the F-TNI/POLRI members that had coloured the relations between the military territorial commands and the, supposedly, military representatives since 1998 seemed to have also caused this lack of information. Suroso, the Secretary of the Mangliawan Government, pointed out that a special budget for the military and police units cannot be allocated in a District Government s yearly budget because, according to the Decentralisation Laws No. 22 and 25/1999 about regional autonomy, they are not a part of the role and function of a Pemda (Local Government). Only because the Pemda saw that the security of the District was in the legally specified interests of the local government, was the local Government willing to help financially support the local military and police units. The funds for this were taken from the Regent s Domestic Operational Fund (Dana Rumah Tangga Bupati). Suroso refused to disclose the exact figure to the public, and refused to tell it to me when I asked in the interview. 626 However, the Head of this Government s Finance Sub-Division, admitted that around 86 million rupiah a month (1.032 billion a year) was given to the various KORAMIL (Sub-district Military Commands) and Polsek (Sub-district 624 In Mantingan, 200 million rupiah was kept by the DPRD, 950 million rupiah by the Government. Interview M4, with the Chairman of the District s F-TNI/POLRI. 625 Interview M18, with the Military District Commander of Mangliawan. 626 Interview B14, with the Secretary of the District Government. 260

293 Police units) for security assistance. Besides, he sent 1.5 million rupiah for each of the top Commanders, and five hundred thousand per month for the Chiefs of Staff Sections of the military and police units in the Mangliawan area, in the form of operational funds for the local Muspida members. 627 To sum up, the money received by the military territorial units since 1998 had been drastically reduced. By 2003 the efforts by the F-TNI/POLRI in some Districts to get financial assistance for the security forces were not always going smoothly, however, because some DPRD members were opposed to the idea of giving money to the local military/police units as they viewed the defence and security sector as being not included among the decentralized sectors that had become the newly legalised responsibility of local District Governments. Moreover, even when it was agreed to allocate such funding in the local governments APBD, the distribution to the units was mostly not smooth either, mostly not immediately and directly passed on. Instead, the money was kept under the control of the government officials who would decide what would be passed on and why, with any not spent in this way being retained in the government funds for other purposes. When, after the 2004 elections, there was to be no longer any F-TNI/POLRI in the DPRD, extra funding for the military and police units would rely only on the civilian DPRD politicians. As Lieutenant Colonel Asni A Rahman, the Chairman of the F- TNI/POLRI in Sumenep, told me, the military and police Commanders would have to build good relations with their local Government leaders, as well as with the retired military officers joining parties, so that the units needs could be accommodated in the Governments budget. 628 However, this should not be mistaken to mean that the military territorial units in the past were better maintained because of lots of money flowing to the units. The fact was that for the institutions themselves, the conditions were not much different. If the units received much more money in the past, it did not go in significant amounts to the interests of maintaining the units, but to support the political activities that the 627 Interview B Interview with Lieutenant Colonel Asni A Rahman on 27 July

294 Commanders were required to carry out. 629 Yet, although in terms of the readiness of the military equipment the military capability in the New Order was no better, the morale of the units (at least among their commanders) were higher because they had sufficient ready-to-use money and held stronger political power to more quickly organize, for instance, transport systems, communication equipment and other logistic supports belonging to the (civilian) private companies to support the inadequacies of the units own equipment had they been needed to conduct security operations. 3. Koter: Discourse, reactions and soldiers perspectives Despite the loss of much of the financial resources of the territorial units, nevertheless, there was no indication that the existence of the military units was in jeopardy, perhaps because most of the money received through the political activities and networks previously was used for supporting the political activities that were already abolished at the same time. The following sub-section discusses the issue of abolition of the territorial structure Debating Koter abolition As noted earlier in Chapter One, on one hand, scholars have observed that some people since 1998 have begun to challenge the continuation of the territorial concept characterizing the posture of Indonesian military. Having dis-assembled the military political power in executive and legislative bodies, the challenge has been now directed to Koter. Anti-Koter groups argued that the territorial structure had undermined previous progress towards democratization, especially through the military structure paralleling the government bureaucratic structure from the provincial to the village level which had very effectively opened military access to the local government authority and kept it interacting closely with the local civilian political institutions. 630 The proponents of the territorial system, especially the 629 See Chapter Three. 630 See for example, Rinakit, Sukardi., Decentralization and the military, in Erb, Maribeth; Sulistyanto, Priyambudi; and Faucher, Carole, (ed.) Regionalism in Post-Suharto Indonesia, (New York: RoutledgeCurzon, 2005), p

295 military, argued that the current Koter was merely a troop deployment (gelar pasukan), with nothing to do with the military s intention to maintain political power; on the contrary, the Koter had guarded the democratization process. 631 The amended 1945 Constitution, the new Defence Law No. 3/ 2002 and the Armed Forces Law No. 34/2004 have redefined the role of TNI as the state s defence which is to be executed based on the state s policy. 632 This redefinition has been limited, nonetheless it was decided that, due to the nature of security threats and the ability of the state to deal with them, the state defence system to be used has remained the so-called Sishanrata (People s Total Defence). This inevitably requires, as described in Chapter Three, social and political interactions of the military at every level of its institution from the preparation to the execution of the defence system. The implication of Sihanrata is that the territorial command structure is to be kept as the structure best facilitating the operation of Sishanrata. Tracing back further, the doctrine is derived from the 1945 Constitution, Chapter XII, Section 30 (1), that All citizens have rights and responsibility to participate in the country s defence and 30 (2) The character of this defence will be arranged according to the Laws 633. This is interpreted in the Defence Law as being the Total Defence system, with all citizens required to be actively involved in its implementation should the designated scenario occur, that is, a foreign military s occupation of Indonesian territory. However, it is actually a matter of interpretation, whether or not the citizen s right and responsibility in the defence system as stated by the Constitution has to involve their direct participation (via conscription) in military operations. Yet, the Defence Law interprets it as direct participation, declaring that the military combat units are the main component, and the people who are to be grouped in guerilla troops commanded by territorial commanders are the supporting components of the total defense system. Preparing such 631 Keberadaan Kowil mulai tingkat Kodam, Korem, Kodim dan Koramil merupakan bentuk gelar kekuatan TNI AD, guna menyiapakan potensi wilayah dalam rangka penyelenggaraan tugas pokok TNI AD untuk pertahan Darat (The existence of Kowil from KODAM. KOREM, KODIM and KORAMIL is a form of troop deployment for the purpose of preparing regional potentials for territorial defense). Taken from Pokok Pokok Penyelengaraan Pembinaan Territorial TNI Angkatan Darat, Markas Besar Angkatan Darat, Jakarta, 30 January 2003, p UU TNI. 34/ 2004, Chapter VI, Section Section 30 (1): Tiap-tiap Warganegara berhak dan wajib ikut serta dalam usaha pembelaan Negara (every citizen posses right and is obliged to participate in the activity of state defense; Section 30 (2): Syarat-syarat tentang pembelaan diatur dangan Undang-undang (Requirements for the participation must be in accordance with the Laws). 263

296 supporting components thus becomes one of the tasks of the territorial commands. Moreover, in this system the man-power is only one element of territorial support, beside the moral, intelligence and economic resources that would be devoted to a perceived long-term struggle even if the civilian government had been destroyed, as happened in the 1948/9 guerilla war at the end of the Independence Struggle. In fact, the doctrine is to a great extent based on the lessons when the military and the people were fighting side-by-side against the Dutch troops. There is no comparable or contradictory historical experience that Indonesians have had since then. It has continued to be widely believed in the Indonesian military that their strength depends on the support from the people. 634 As noted in Chapters Two and Three, the military has since its beginnings claimed that it is the people s army, so it must not be separated from the people. The military is from the people, struggle for and with the people, and will come back to the people, the prevailing motto said. Salim Said argued that the Indonesian military was self created, created neither by the government nor by the legislative body. The Indonesian military was firstly created by revolutionary youths, thus directly created by the people 635, though in the years after that the development of military institutions, including the recruitment of personnel and provision of material equipment and training can be said to be also dependent on the government. The doctrine of People s Total Defence has been justified, not only by the legal standing and historical experience, but also by the objective conditions of the country s economic capability. It was accepted that the government would not be able to fund the entire provision of military equipment that would be needed for pre-emptive actions to prevent the landing of a foreign country s military forces in Indonesian territory. It was also assumed that the government would not be able to fund all long-term fighting within the territory. Therefore, all elements of the society and all potencies of the territory, including private companies and 634 For example, when in July 2003, the Chief of Staff of the Indonesian Army, General Ryamizard Ryakudu briefed the officers serving in East Java about Territorial Duties, he emphasized that the key to the successfulness of Koter duties was by winning the support from the people. His paper was titled Garis Besar tentang Pembinaan Territorial: Baik-baik saja dengan rakyat (Outlines of Territorial Guidance: Just be kind to the people). 635 See Chapter Three. 264

297 industries, would have to be maximized to support the struggles to defend the country. Under a national military emergency, the military would take the command of all these economic potencies. In peace time, the government does not need to establish a big and strong military, but it is given access to identify all potential resources, and keep in contact with them, directly or through the government bureaucracies, so that the military can easily utilize them if perceived military threats come. This kind of task is the responsibility of the territorial commands. So, the territorial structure is actually the operational implication of the People s Total Defense. Even if its structure were to be eliminated and replaced by an alternative, it could be assumed that any replacing structure would require more or less similar structure, roles and functions as long as the Total Defense concept remains. An alternative defence system is not impossible, but the bottom line to where it is possible to leave the Total Defence Concept is when the country s preemptive capability can definitely ensure that no military forces of the enemy can enter and remain in Indonesian territory, a capability that requires the superiority of pre-emptive capability of military operations, which is out of reach of the Indonesian economy. Yet, the three phases of the Total Defence System: attacking in the enemy in its home base, on their way to as well as on their arrival in the Indonesian territory, seems to be the only one applicable to successfully responding to a non-nuclear equipped enemy. However, whether the defence system would enable the country to defeat a likely attacker is debatable, depending on the strength of the attacker country, but this defence system facilitates the Indonesian military to carry out a prolonged guerilla war within the Indonesian territory Reactions of local military personnel While much has been discussed about the doctrinal and political perspectives of the military s top leadership, 637 little has been reported about how the lower level 636 For more information about this guerilla war, see Nasution, Abdul Haris., Fundamentals of Guerilla Warfare, Singapore: Donal Moore Books, See Chapter Three. 265

298 Koter personnel reacted to the demands to abolish their institutions, and about their opinions about the internal problems and consequences should the abolition occur. 638 Military elites in Jakarta may be aware of political implications resulted from either the abolition or the continued existence of the Koter, but most officers and soldiers at the lower ranks seem to be concerned more about its practical implications for impacts on their personal interests. This is not to suggest that the local military s reactions are more important than the other military perspectives, neither is it to suggest that members of the military elites at the centre have no personal interests, nor is it to say that there had been steps or actions by the local military personnel in efforts to influence any decisions regarding the future of the Koter. However, it is quite logical to expect that the perceptions of the military elites are influenced also by their understandings about what impacts the positions they take will possibly have at local, operational levels. One military respondent from a non-koter combat unit asked about how the officers at his unit reacted when they heard the news from TV that Maj. Gen. Agus Wirahadikusuma had launched an idea of abolishing the Koter said, variously (beda-beda) but many of them grumbled (menggerutu), in such terms as no wonder he talked that way because he had got his turn to enjoy service in Koter, and being Pangdam, what about us? (that is, the junior officers who had not yet got their turn ). 639 When I asked what he thought about it, the respondent said that Agus Wirahadikusuma just tried to make a sensation to get popularity and sympathy from reformist groups. Another respondent said, well... he knows what he says we re only crocho (really nobodies), so maybe he is right. For 638 Earlier surveys in 1999 and 2000 in some selected area suggest that the local people disagree with the idea of abolishing the Koter. See Marcus Mieztner, The Armed Forces and Local Politics in the Post-Soeharto Era, in Aspinall and Fealey (eds.) Indonesian Update 2002, (Singapore: ISEAS, 2003). 639 Enak aja beliau ngomong begitu, mentang-mentang dia sudah dapat giliran menikmati dinas di Ter, trus jadi Pangdam. What the respondent means was that, by proposing the abolition of the Koter, Agus Wirahadikusuma was selfish, because he does not care about those who had not got chances to have a position in the Koter like him. Interview M126. There was an increased debate within the TNI s generals about how or how far of the military reform would have be done. See for example a collection of views of those labeled as reformist generals in the Wirahadikusumah, Agus et al (eds.), Indonesia Baru dan Tantangan TNI: Pemikiran Masa Depan [New Indonesia and TNI s Challenge: the Future Thought] (Jakarta: Pustaka Sinar Harapan, 1999). See also an analysis by Salim Said about those views in Chapter Four, Dari Empat Paradigma Baru ke Rapim Tahun 2000 [From Four New Paradigms to the 2000 Leaders Meeting] in Said, Salim., Tumbuh dan Tumbangnya Dwifungsi: Perkembangan Pemikiran Politik Militer [The Growth and the Fall of Dual Function: the Development of Thought of Military Politics ]., (Jakrata: Aksara Karunia, 2002), pp

299 us what is important is that as long as it can improve the living conditions of the soldiers, that s OK. 640 It was very rare that I found respondents gave their views based on the old or the new doctrine or based on the institutional interests. Most were based on their personal interests, even when the question was directed to the doctrinal (political) or institutional (such as the professionalism issue). For example, when asked what the respondent thought about the effect of the abolition on professionalism, he answered, It sounds good to concentrate on professionalism, but how would the soldiers concentrate on professionalism if they always think about how to get the rice that their family can cook for tomorrow? 641 He also said that the Commanders could not merely think about professionalism, they have to fulfill their responsibility to ensure the soldiers welfare (memenuhi kesejahteraan anggotanya). Yet, he said, because they can not give money, they have to let the soldiers have the time to conduct their business. This what the soldiers commonly call wise commanders, he said. Otherwise, if the commanders do not understand this problem, they will be farted and peed on (be ignored) by the soldiers. 642 When I asked about how the reformasi had affected this practice, he said, the reformasi has changed nothing, but made it worse as economic pressures have been stronger. What all the respondents above were saying was that they see the Koter as a better place, compared to non-territorial units, to improve their living standard. The information from the latter respondent also implied that, even if the Koter were abolished, but without improving the economic life (salary) of the soldiers, it would not improve the professional standards of the military. From several interviews it can be said that in general the reactions of the local officers and soldiers to the idea of abolishing the Koter were more resistant than supportive, and the reasons for the resistance were very much personal, regardless of their political views. As it is so personal, it is sensibly understandable that the resistance had not been expressed openly, in addition to the very top- 640 Interview M Interview M146. The respondent was a Battalion Commander. 642 The expression used was dikentuti atau dikencingi sama anggotanya. 267

300 down nature of the military organization also hindering this expression from coming out. For the soldiers the abolition would directly affect their daily lives, while for the officers, although they were not always directly affected, their views and understanding about how it would affect their soldiers were also important in shaping their points of view, regardless of these views appeared in rhetorical statements. The soldiers resistance will be better understood when we grasp what the Koter means for the soldiers, and how much the political changes, including the loss of financial resources mentioned earlier, have affected their view about Koter. The following describes this What does the Koter mean for the soldiers? A preferred appointment Being placed in territorial rather than central units was favoured by most personnel of the Indonesian Army. Economic interest seems to have been the most common reason. In common with Indonesian government civil servants, solders formal salaries have been always very small. 644 For the soldiers, being positioned in a territorial unit could mean having much time and more opportunities for getting involved in social interactions and business activities, thus, having more chances to make money to compensate for the small formal salary. Especially for rank and file soldiers, moving to territorial units was seen as a crucial step in preparing for retirement. For career officers the money meant not only an improvement to their standard of living, but also a vital support for promotion to higher positions. Normally, young officers and young soldiers started their military service in combat units in Battalions or Brigades, or (non-territorial) administration offices, of the Indonesian Army. In the early years of service, they still felt excited with the success of passing the recruiting process or initial training. The patriotic doctrines, pride and prestige of being a soldier or an officer, as compared to their friends who 643 The following description is constructed from several interviews with military respondents who served both in Koter and non-koter units. This description refers to conditions both pre- and after 1998, that have not changed significantly. Interviews M92, M122, M112, M Data from a regular unit suggests that a new private has a salary of around 700,000 rupiah (about Aus$ 100) monthly. The lowest standard of a regional wage was 400,000 (Blitar Regency), that means the soldiers receive better pay, therefore, the jobs as soldiers are still favoured by many youths. 268

301 did not succeed, overwhelmed the small salaries they received. However, especially for the lower rank soldiers, it did not take long before they got to a stage of being sick and tired of monotony and having a heavily burdened economic life which serving in the military offered very little, if not no, chance to escape. 645 Many respondent officers also said that that most of those who breached discipline were those who had economic problems. Specifically, they said, most of those personnel had their salaries in deficit every month, a situation which Indria Samego has termed a gali lobang tutup lobang or unescapable debt-trap. 646 Here is the pattern. At the beginning of his service, the monthly salary of a single soldier or officer was enough for only two or three weeks. If they got married or had children, the salary was only enough for two weeks or less. For the rest of the month they would take loans in the form of groceries from the grocery koperasi, which then billed their debts to the accountant s office (jurubayar) every month. Consequently, each month the salaries became smaller and smaller, then minus; while the debts became bigger and bigger, going beyond the rates of their salaries. The only way for them to solve this problem would be to get additional income outside working hours. Some of them ended up being Satpam (private security) at entertainment centres or shopping centres, being private parking attendants, brokers (makelar) for vehicles or properties, backing gamblers or prostitution, or even involved in crimes when they found no other ways. The problem with serving in the combat units was that they did not provide enough time to leave the base. Therefore, moving to a territorial unit, where there was no restriction to go out or in fact there was no base, was regarded as a way of having a chance to attain a better economic life Meaningless professionalism There are also other reasons why many preferred serving in territorial units, including because they were not interested in military professionalism because they considered it to be pretend, or pseudo, professionalism (professionalisme 645 See the interview with Indera Samego, an Indonesian military researcher, in Di Wilayah Pelosok, Koter Sangat Besar Fungsinya, Forum Keadilan, No. 26, 23 October 2005, p Interviews M112, M92, M

302 pura-pura). To understand the professional aspect of the military professionalism at the field level, it is essential to see what activities soldiers do in a combat unit. An officer said that, in a combat unit the soldiers have to be made busy inside the base, and should not be left to do day-dreaming. The busier the soldiers, the more tired they will be in the night, the less desire to go outside, the less chance to interact with outsiders, and the less chance to commit indiscipline or even crime outside. A low crime rate means good credit for the unit and for the commander. 647 Another officer said, at the combat units they serve full time, mostly overworked though underpaid, under-appreciated as individuals and with less time and freedom for private needs. According to respondents, there were two kinds of programs that made them busy in combat units. One was a set of training programs related to technicalities of the military profession and scheduled by the central headquarters. These were usually elaborated into more detail in lowerlevel units to be monthly, weekly and daily programs. The other was extracurricular program, such as sports, ceremonial activities, or cleaning or gardening activities (most units did not employ professional cleaners or gardeners, so the soldiers did this work). The standards of training in combat units under the regional or territorial Balahanwil (Regional Troops) were generally lower than in those belonging to the central Balahanpus (Central Troops) commands. One reason, as some respondents said, was because there were so many non-program activities that they did not have time for training. These activities included civic actions, AMD (ABRI Masuk Desa, Soldiers Entering the Village) 648, ceremonies of units anniversaries (common for the level of Battalion upward), or security operations to back up police, ranging from at national or local elections to soccer competitions to entertainment concerts. Soldiers liked these activities more than training because they usually got food allowances (uang makan) and the work was much more relaxed. According to respondents, although generally better than Balahanwil s units, conditions among different combat units of Balahanpus were also different. 647 Interview M After ABRI was renamed TNI, this program became TMD. 270

303 Light Armed Infantry units usually had better training conditions. Non-infantry units like Armour or Artillery had lower standards of training mainly because of the limitations in weaponry equipment, either being too old or too few in numbers. Generally, all combat units shared the same problem, that due to the budget constraints the quality of the training was less important than the quantity of it. As such, the training was mainly used to satisfy the demand for periodical reports or to safeguard the reputations of the units and the commanders. The supervisors usually understood the problems and tolerated the low quality, especially if the pocket money (sangu) or service (pelayanan) from the inspected units was good enough. Most personnel knew the game and were compelled to play it properly. Creating fictive programs to save the money for something other than what it was had been prescribed for was not uncommon. Or, if the training had to be done, then it would have to be undertaken as economically and simply as possible. As such, low rank officers were motivated to search for rekanan or partners for funding their units programs. Good relations with the personnel of territorial units in the vicinity of the central unit s base would be very useful. Normally, such contacts were made through intelligence staff of the battalions whose tasks required intensive contacts and interactions with territorial units. According to respondents, the majority of the soldiers knew that training was meant to be slightly more than just a drama to justify periodical reports. However, they also understood that they did not have a right to speak out or to complain, and that they all had to play the pretences appropriately to protect their units, themselves and their commanders. Moving to territorial units therefore meant escaping from all these pretences. In contrast, here was less time for training activities, less demands for (fake) professional capability, and less isolation from society. So, there would be many chances to improve their economic life Struggles to move Normally, to move to territorial units, rank and file soldiers (especially private and corporal ranks) would have to wait until they had only ten or less years left before retirement (forty-eight years old), or they had a Doctor s Certificate (Keterangan 271

304 A3) that stated that they were physically not eligible (too unhealthy) to be in the combat units. Alternatively, they could move five or ten years earlier if they were promoted to be Territorial Sergeants after passing a Territorial Warrant Officer School (Secabater/Sekolah Calon Bintara Teritorial). However, this was not an easy way. Objective assessments for student recruitment hardly existed. Most candidates could only succeed after three or more tries and after spending lots of money for paying smoothers, bribes (pelicin). Some of them had to sell their motor cycles, parents properties or whatever could be changed into money to pay these pelicin. Yet, even passing the Secabater did not necessarily mean that they would be automatically appointed to the territorial structure. Further lobbying, money and connections (kasak-kusuk) determined most of when and where they would go. Without these factors they could spend several more years in their present units, or even spend all of their remaining service years as sergeants in their battalions. Those privates or corporals who did not pass the Secabater would face more difficult ways. Without money and connections to get the Doctor s Certificate for example, it would be very difficult to move to territorial units. Unless they are working at lucrative (basah) positions such as cashiers (jurubayar) who could build relations with bank staff to get easy loans, or logistic staff who worked on selling and buying materials they could spend the rest of the service there. As such, they would not be prepared to enter retirement, have no house to stay in and no post-service job to earn money for their family apart from a small retirement compensation. Some commanders were inclined to let retired personnel stay for several months or years in the base housing, but when newly recruited soldiers arrived and needed the accommodation, they would have to go. Therefore, some of the soldiers were ready to sell any land, animal or vehicle they owned to pay the pelicin to move to territorial units. All sacrifices made to move to the territorial units influenced their working performance once they were posted. One familiar target would be how they could get the money they had spent back in one way or another. It was well known among the soldiers that the success of the territorial members was measured by 272

305 their capability in ngeter (making money through social or business interactions). If a soldier, for example, came by or visited a friend who was a territorial member, his ngeter level was shown by services to complement the guest, mainly in satisfying entertainment or the amount of sangu (money given to the guest at the end of the visit). It would be much better if he could show the guest that all the money he devoted to these services did not come from his own pocket, but from those of his rekanan (mainly Chinese businessmen). For rank and file soldiers, most positions in territorial commands were more interesting in terms of their own welfare than were those in fighting units. The less busy the position, the more free time it would give, the more attractive it would be. Yet, the most favourite position was Babinsa (Village Development Sergeant). Mainly responsible for the guidance of defence and security while at the same time becoming the ears and eyes of the military, one Babinsa normally covered one village, but in less populated rural areas one could cover three or more villages. Structurally, Babinsa was the lowest position in the territorial hierarchy, and formally under the authority and supervision of a Sub-district Military Commander (a Captain). Yet, being the only member of the military in the villages which were distant from the Commander s base, the existence of a Babinsa appeared very independent. Usually Babinsa were treated as one with a higher social status (dituakan) by the village people, similar to and even sometimes higher than the village s leader The Koter as a personnel disposal system If there is a single way to compare the Koter s soldiers and the combat units soldiers it is by defining the former as invalid soldiers, while the later were fresh soldiers. According to a chief of the personnel staff at one combat unit, all soldiers who were above thirty five years old (retirement had been at forty eight, until in 2004 it was amended to fifty three) or had physical (health) problems (Status A3) must be proposed to the superior commands to be moved to territorial units. 649 This was one way to keep up the readiness of the personnel of the combat units 649 Although, as discussed above this was not easy but they had to compete using whatever means they had since the number of those personnel categorized as invalid was far bigger than the Koter could accept. Besides, the ability of the superior command to supply new soldiers to replace them was also limited. 273

306 by prioritizing those who were young, single and had fewer economic pressures than those who were older and married. The implication of this for the Koter was that most soldiers in it were officially invalid soldiers. Instead of ending their military service they were simply disposed of to the Koter. Serving in the territorial units made their physical and discipline conditions even worse as control from the Koter units was far less rigid than in the combat units. They grew longer hair, dressed less neatly, paid less respect to their superiors, or became more likely to argue against or be disloyal to them. They interacted with civilians more intensively than with soldier comrades or superior officers. For those who are in the positions of Babinsa in remote villages, contacts with superiors were usually done through phone or radio communication if they had one. They were more able to communicate with local people as well as building business partnerships with them. One Babinsa suggested to me that he could stay in his position much longer than his friend had because he helped his Sub-district Commander to start a chicken farm business (ternak ayam) in his village. All the conditions about service in the Koter that has been just described the image that Koter as easy money-making jobs for the army personnel, and that Koter was to escape professionalism and the place for disposed, unprofessional personnel, were long-standing and had not changed by 2003 when this study took place, except, importantly, for the officers, who by then had already lost their opportunities to use the positions in the Koter as corner stones for the political jobs, and who had already lost wider chances to maximize economic benefits from the political connections involved in being Koter officers Separation of the military from the police Democratization requires that the military not only be separated from political institutions (as Chapter Six has shown this has been happening rapidly and successfully), but also be given a clearly defined role so that any potential for future military political involvement can be minimized. For Indonesia, theoretically, 650 For information about what service in the Koter meant for the officers in the New Order era, see Chapter Three. 274

307 this means a reversal of the previous role of the New Order s military from its Dual Function new professionalism that embraced social, political and defence and security roles to an old professionalism that limits its role to defence matters only. 651 As a part of the post-1998 military reform there was an organizational separation of the police from the military, and consequently, the military role was, in principle, limited to mainly a defence role, while domestic security was intended to have become solely the function of the police. Yet, due to the high challenge of internal security and the weakness of the police, a military back-up was still needed but, nonetheless, even with this back-up the security conditions overall became far worse than under the New Order regime. Similarly, the effectiveness of the military s defence role, as reflected in the case of local military units, seemed to have also declined. Indeed, the local realities show that the security sector has seen the least significant achievements resulting from the military reform. Although the reformasi has to some extent made it possible for Indonesia to redefine the military s professional role in a way that is compatible with democracy, it has not so far been able to fully implement it. This section discusses the problems of military-police separation and the issues of the military professional role at the local level A compelling situation for a military back-up During the New Order Indonesia s military and police force were both organized within ABRI, the Republic of Indonesia s Armed Forces. From April 1999, the Republic of Indonesia s National Police (POLRI) was symbolically separated from ABRI, which had its name changed to TNI, the Indonesian National Army. On 1 July 2000, POLRI was further separated from or taken out of the Defence Department and placed directly under the President. 652 Law No. 2/2002 defines the POLRI s roles as enforcing Public Security and Order (Kamtibmas/Keamanan dan Ketertiban Masyarakat), Law Enforcement (Penegak Hukum), Protector, 651 See the theoretical discussion in Chapter Two. 652 This decision was formalized by the Presidential Decree No. 89/2000 and the People s Consultative Assembly (MPR) Decree No. VI/MPR/2000 that defines the role of the TNI and POLRI. 275

308 Guardian, and Servant of the Public (Pelindung, Pengayom dan Pelayan Masyarakat). The rhetorical reason behind the separation has been mainly to improve the protection of Human Rights, to establish effective, strong civilian (nonmilitaristic) Police Forces but, politically, also to minimize the involvement of the military in domestic security which is closely connected to political matters. 653 At least initially this separation was not generally believed to benefit policing. On 3 July 2000 Tempo Interactive reported a special poll indicating that seventy seven percent of the public asked did not trust the police, and seventy percent said they did not believe that the separation would improve police performance. 654 My interviews in East Java in 2003, as shown below, indicated that the public trust toward police has not improved significantly since then. One of the key problems that had made the domestic security condition worse has been that the government had not been able to provide an effective police force to fully take over the domestic security role that used to be handled by the military-police joint forces, the ABRI. The limited number of personnel and the low quality of the professionalism of the police force has been frequently stated by observers as the main obstacle. Nationally, in 1998 the ratio of police to the population was 1:1032. In 2003 the average ratio across East Java was about 1:1183 but much higher in some Districts. 655 According to a senior police officer, a theoretically ideal ratio would be 1: Corresponding to the Babinsa of the TNI at village level, there is a police position, called a Balinmas (Bintara Pelindung Masyarakat)/Village NCO-Police. Ideally one Balinmas is responsible for one village, but in reality, such as in Malang Regency, one is responsible for four to seven villages. I found that there were some villages in this Regency that had no Balinmas, but the job was 653 See for example a statement from President Abdurrahman Wahid that dengan terpisahnya kepolisian dari TNI dan Dephan, maka tradisi militeristik yang selama ini melekat pada Polri harus dihilangkan (with the separation of the police from TNI and Defense Department, militaristic traditions must be eliminated). Masyarakat Tak Percaya Polisi (Public Do Not Trust Police), Tempo Interactive, , accessed on 5 October 2003 from Masyarakat Tak Percaya Polisi (Public Do Not Trust Police), Tempo Interactive, , accessed on 5 October 2003 from Data from Litbang Kompas in Tempo Interactive, accessed on 25 October 2003 from See also Jenderal Polri Surplus, Pangkat Rendahan Minus (Police General Surplus, Lower Ranks Minus), accessed on 10 January 2006 from the POLRI s website: According to data from the Polda/Polisi Daerah (Regional Police) of East Java, the number of police in East Java in 2003 was around thirty thousand compared to the Province s total population of around thirty five million. There were significant variations between Districts, For example, in the City of Malang, according to its District Police (Polres), the number of police personnel was around 600 while the population almost one million, a ratio of about 1: Interview with, Superintendent Iwan Sumanto the Chief of Police Personnel Staff of Polres Malang on

309 covered by an active-duty NCO-Policeman being the Village Head. So, one individual had to act as a Village Head, 657 and at the same time as the Balinmas for several neighbouring villages. When I asked one of these how he managed his time, he said that much of his responsibility as Balinmas, such as routine patrolling,or attending villages social events that require security guards, were shared with the Babinsa, and his reports to the District Police Chief were mostly based on the information from the Babinsa. He said, This is just too much responsibility, but I have no choice, except to follow the instruction. Yet, when I asked why he chose to become the Village Head, he gave several reasons, including that he was born in this village. He included two interesting reasons. One was that because unlike the military [all military candidates have to quit their service before participating in the Village Head election] the police can keep their status as police while being the Village Heads, for the reason that the police have been considered as civilians. Another was that instead of collecting bribes on the road from the drivers I prefer being a Village Head [the traffic police/polantas (Polisi Lalulintas) are notorious for their corrupt attitudes, taking bribes from the drivers who breach, or are claimed to have breached, the law]. Here, as the Village Head I receive an income more than my salary as a policeman, he said proudly. 658 It would be interesting to explore the phenomena of this police-village Head double job, but the focus of this study was not on this direction. But what is important from his revelation is that the police themselves realize how corrupt is the image of the police. 659 Indeed, the low quality of the police performance is also influenced by its professional outlook. Observers have suggested that the police who, in the New Order era, used to apply a military-style repressive approach, emphasizing security more than service, have not yet been able to reverse that emphasis. 660 Analysts have suggested the importance for the police to focus on cultural 657 Unless mentioned otherwise, all names of individuals and places have been changed. 658 Interview V See also for example, Polisi Kita Masih Buruk Rupa (Our Police Still Has Ugly Face), Tempo Interactive, , accessed on 5 October 2003 from and Masyarakat Tak Percaya Polisi (Public Do Not Trust Police), Tempo Interactive, , accessed on 5 October 2003 from See Polisi Kita Masih Buruk Rupa (Our Police Still Has Ugly Face), Op cit

310 changes in its operational methods to adapt to a more friendly outlook, and leave its military style. 661 However, one police officer claimed that the efforts to create a friendly-outlook police had been hampered by two things: one was the reformasi freedom euphoria that made people more ready to break the law, and the other one was the collapse of the intelligence networks that used to be operated in the New Order era. The first, he said, requires the police to be tougher, rather than, softer against the criminals; and the second has forced the police to rely more on repressive than the weak preventive measures. 662 Nevertheless, the police performance also was also influenced by the low credibility of the police personnel in terms of their personal integrity, which was graded by the public as far below that of the military. When I asked several Village Heads to compare the Balinmas (police) and Babinsa (military), they said that the village people preferred to look to the Babinsa for help more than to the Balinmas. 663 One Village Head said that there was a common joke about police, If you report you have lost your motorcycle and ask for help to the police, you will lose your car, implying that once you ask police for help, you will have to pay a large amount of money otherwise you will be ignored, and with no guaranteed result. Besides, he said, in responding to security problems, the police would usually only come after a crime had happened, while the Babinsa was always interacting with the people s life and providing a preventive effect against crime. 664 One Bupati responded when I asked the same question by saying, My people have been accustomed to obeying the soldiers, while disrespecting the police. 665 In his Regency, there are reoccurring conflicts every year among various clubs of traditional martial arts clubs (pencak silat), which the Bupati claimed exemplified an event in which only the military could effectively handle the insecurity situation its created. 661 See for example, Polisi Harus Hindarkan Militerisme (Police Must Avoid Militarism). Tempo Interactive, , 18:38, accessed on 5 October 2003 from Interview with Superintendent Iwan Sumanto the Chief of Police Personnel Staff of Polres Malang on Interview V21. In some way I felt that the respondent was trying to please me (as a military officer) with his answer to give credit to Babinsa, but I think this should be also interpreted as he undermined the police, and this undermining of the police seemed common among the civilian respondents. 664 See Footnote Interview with Bupati of Madiun, Djunaedi Mahendra, in March In October 2004 the clash reoccurred and hundreds of military and police were deployed to stop it. See for example, Ratusan aparat dikerahkan: Taur Kelompok Pencak Silat Terulang (Hundreds of security forces were deployed: the Pencak Silat Clash reoccurred), Jawapos, 12 October

311 An important indication from this is that the situation, both the weakness of the police and the weakness of civil society, had forced the military to continue backing-up the police to ensure the security. It seems that the timing to separate the military and the police was just not suitable. The policy was implemented when the security challenge was at the peak, while the government ability to build a strong and effective police was at the lowest point. The compromise was then needed, that the police were to be backed-up by the military. However, the implementation was poorly designed, confusing both the military and the police Ineffectiveness of the military back-up and uneasy relations In fact, unclear procedures of backing-up at the operational level created problems of their own and contributed significantly to the lack of success in improving the security conditions. One military respondent explained that in 1999 when demonstrations and riots spread everywhere the troops could not be deployed because it was unclear who would be responsible for the deployments. 666 The respondent explained the situation in the following way. In the New Order era, when a troop deployment was needed in a District, to handle a demonstration for instance, the Dandim (District Military Commander) could quickly coordinate the military units and police in the District, although this was not always the case in 1998/1999. Moreover, financial matters were not questioned, because the Dandim could provide logistic support, such as reimbursements for petrol for the vehicles that the units used, food allowances for the troops, and even some sorts of pocket money for the soldiers involved in the operations, as well as incentives for private intelligence agents. This was because the Dandim would have had lots of unofficial sources, mainly through channels to local businessmen or provided by the District Head of Government who was also a military officer. The Dandim was demanded by the Headquarters to be able to carry out his job properly even without official logistic support, and this was 666 Interview M92. The respondent was a Military District Commander in East Java. 279

312 possible given the greater financial autonomy that a territorial commander had then. After the military-police separation, he said, both the procedures for asking for the military troops and the need to arrange logistic supports had to pass up and down longer bureaucratic ladders. When a District Police Chief (Kapolres Kepala Polisi Resor) needed a troop back-up, he could no longer ask directly to the units in the District, but he had to send the enquiry to the Provincial Police Chief (Kapolda/Kepala Polisi Daerah), then the Kapolda passed the enquiry to the Provincial Military Commander (Pangdam/Panglima Daerah Militer) who would gave the instructions to the units in the District. Yet, the respondent said, in reality it was more complicated than that, because sometimes the officers in the KODAM said that there had to be an approval from the Headquarters in Jakarta as well. So, if in the New Order era, a Dandim could deploy the troops within minutes, after the military-police separation it could take hours, days, or no deployment at all. Then there were questions of who would be responsible for providing the logistics for the operations. On one hand, the District Government was responsible for providing financial assistance for the security operations in its local area, but it was unclear which operations, on what scale, and in what amount. Moreover, on the other hand, the security forces, military or police, were centralized forces, thus were the responsibility of the national government. After several experiences of military units not getting reimbursements after back-up operations, when they were asked to back-up again they responded with various excuses for not being ready for deployments, such as having training programs or other activities. Then, to find which another available unit would take time. A police respondent explained his experience in dealing with asking for military troop back-up, saying that, once he had received responses from the military that the police were cengeng (a word used for a child who cried too easily) and too dependent when the jobs are not exciting or not lucrative but not wanting to share lucrative jobs. He said, when asking the military units to help to provide soldiers for guarding such as exhibitions or music such as concerts/dangdut [traditional music], it was much easier, as they do not care about the procedures, but when 280

313 asked to control demonstrations, they talked about the procedures. 667 So, even if a clear procedure could solve the problems, this police informant suggests that it would not always be followed. In some cases, procedures were also applied selectively, especially following practical considerations, such as about the scale of operation or the lucrative character of the job. Some advocates of the separation believed that it would make the police more independent when dealing with crimes involving the military. However, the following information from another police respondent indicated otherwise. This respondent said that the amount of crime involving the military personnel could be minimized during the New Order regime as all intelligence elements, including those of territorial units, combat units, police, as well as private (unofficial) informants had been integrated. However, the crime rate had increased due to the factors of economic crisis as well as the separation of the police and the military. This had ruined the existing intelligence networks because the intelligence agencies now worked separately and were less coordinated. In addition, the unofficial informants had run away. 668 A Military Policeman who dealt with the military personnel involved in crimes suggested that there were at least one or two personnel from each of the dozens of military units in East Java identified as being involved in vehicle thefts every year, either as the direct actors or as the buyers of the stolen vehicles. One of the common crimes involving the military and police personnel at the rank and file level has been curanmor (pencurian kendaraan bermotor/motor vehicle theft), known in the East Java Province as alap alap (the name of a black, aggressive bird). 669 Another police officer said that the most difficult case in this category was to deal with motor cycle thieves, because their network involved many specialists, from locksmiths, used spare part traders, parking attendants, and oknum (rough) military and police personnel. 670 In Malang City for example, it was publicly known that in the Pasar Comboran (one among several similar used spare part markets), 667 See footnote Interview P Interview P Interview P

314 the traders sell spare parts resulting from disassembled, stolen motor cycles. Hundreds of traders in this market survive because of cheap supplies, and are visited by many customers every day because of the cheaper prices compared to those offered by the legal dealers. So, some members of the community shared their roles as well. The officer explained that, once a motorcycle was stolen, in less than a day the spare parts would have spread to several traders, even been sold, which is why it was difficult to detect. When vehicles, mainly cars, were not disassembled some police personnel were involved in producing illegal certificates for the cars after making some modification to the cars bodies and moving them to different cities. In such situation, non-criminal police could not do their jobs properly without reliable intelligence networks. He estimated that less than five percent of the vehicles that were stolen each year could be returned to their owners. Some NGO activists in Madiun expressed their pessimism about the improvement of law enforcement brought about by the separation because the basic problems of the law apparatus lay in its morality, for example, many personnel of both the military and the police being involved in illegal businesses. These activists claimed that, locally, some police members were involved in drug trading (mainly ecstasy and putaw) while some Military Police were involved in illegal logging. 671 None of the activists knew how these were organized, but they could identify that these groups of criminal activities really existed. They believed that these personnel were not alone, but were protected by the higher rank officers who they were working for. This information is in line with the report by Tempo Interactive mentioned earlier. So there were two additional difficulties for the police to stop the illegal businesses; first, that the police members themselves were not clean, and second, a high level of conspiracy between individual police and military personnel was still too strong to break. On another side of the military-police relations, tension between the military and police also created another problem. One iceberg tip of the more subtle tensions surfaced on 16 September 2001 in Madiun, where around three hundred troops from Kostrad s Infantry Battalion 501 attacked police posts. Local media 671 Interview N.158, N159, N

315 reported 672 that according to an official report from East Java Polda Headquarters, at 11 pm, Saturday 16 September 2001, there was a misunderstanding between military and police personnel when they were in a queue at a petrol station, after which a soldier was accidentally shot in the leg. This incident was responded to by the Battalion 501 members by a retaliatory attack just after midnight on Sunday. As the result of the attack five posts and several offices of the Polres Madiun (Madiun Resort Police) were ruined, several police vehicles were pushed into the river, sixteen police personnel were wounded, and two civilians who were nearby were accidentally shot to death. By late 2002 there had been several other military-police clashes reported across Indonesia but this was the only one that had occurred in East Java, most had been in the more restless regions. 673 Several hypotheses were proposed to explain why these clashes had happened. The Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces, General E. H. Sutarto told the press that the clashes were caused by too much solidarity (jiwa korps yang berlebihana) among the soldiers. 674 Some military personnel I discussed this with regarded the police as having become arrogant in carrying out their jobs since the separation, 675 whereas a police respondent suggested that military personnel have not understood the new position of the police that could no longer protect the military as in the past. 676 Whatever the causes have been, 677 the cases show that the effectiveness of the internal control within both institutions had weakened. More importantly, the 672 See for example, Oknum Polisi-TNI Bentrok, Madiun Geger: Dua Warga Sipil Tewas, Belasan Orang Luka (Rough Police-TNI Clashed, Madiun shocked: Two civilian dead, tens wounded), Suara Merdeka 17 September The national Indonesian newspaper, Pikiran Rakyat on 2 October 2002 reported that, up to 2002, there have been twelve accidents. These were: 1) 24 January 2001: Clash between TNI (Combined Battalions) against Brimob (Police Mobile Brigade) in Ambon, 1 soldier dead; 2) 27 February 2001: TNI-Brimob clash in Sampil Port, Central Kalimantan, 3 civilians dead; 3) 3 March 2001: TNI-Police clash in the village of Latta Sirimau Ko, Ambon, 1 policeman dead; 4) 21 April 2001: TNI-Police clash in Payosigadung Kotabaru-Jambi, 1 soldier dead; 5) 2 May 2001: TNI-Police clash in West Aceh, 1 policeman dead; 6) 28 August 2001: TNI (Battalion 611)-Brimob Police clash in Serui Irian Jaya, 2 soldiers dead; 7) 2 September 2001: TNI-Police clash in Palu, Central Sulawesi, 1 soldier dead; 8) 16 September 2001: TNI (Battalion 501)-Police in Madiun, 2 civilians dead; 9) 27 December 2001: TNI (Battalion 408)-Brimob Police clash in Ambon, 3 wounded; 10) 14 May 2002: TNI (Kopassus)-Brimob Police clash in Kudamati, Ambon; 2 soldiers and 2 policemen wounded; 11) 12 August 2002: TNI AD (Battalion Bekang)-Brimob Police clash in Bogor; 1 policeman dead, 3 others wounded; 12) 19 August 2002: TNI (KODIM)- Police clash in Flores, East Nusa Tenggara, 7 policemen and 2 soldiers wounded. See KSAD Sampaikan Maaf kepada Polda Sumut: Kodam-Polda Sepakat Gudangkan Senjata (KSAD apologized to North Sumatra Polda: Kodam-Polda agree to store their weapons), Pikiran Rakyat 2 October Pikiran Rayat, Ibid. 675 Interviews M117, M61, M92. The respondents were officers in a KODIM in East Java. 676 Interview P Other hypotheses involving the possibilities of rivalry over protection rackets or illegal businesses or engagement in local ethnic fighting were not brought up in the discussions. 283

316 effectiveness of security management after the military-police separation had deteriorated, and this gives an insight into why the security conditions had previously appeared to be handled properly. Understanding the problems that arose from the military-police separation just discussed is necessary to understand the relative weakness of security management in the immediately post-new Order era. 678 The East Java case shows that while the separation seemed useful to prevent the military from violating human rights or to protect the military from being accused, it had done very little to improve the rights of the people for security protection. In other words, the policy had protected the military image more than it had improved the security management. The separation had followed the democratic procedures, in this sense of redefining the military s role including by limiting its involvement in domestic security. However, the separation should have been aimed at ensuring that the military s new role effectively prevented it from being involved in politics, including through domestic political-security linkages, rather than simply aimed at redefining divisions of labour between the military and police. So, although the policy of the separation has been initiated, it had yet to be followed by efforts to maximize its implementation, especially by creating an effective and strong police force. As shown in Chapter Five, in a democracy people have rights, including to be wrong, or to take, perhaps, wrong decisions. In that chapter, it was clear that the ways human rights had been protected were not only by restraining the potential violators, the military, but also by undermining some of those rights, those to an assured security. As Feaver says, protection from the military is in tension with protection by the military. 679 In Indonesia, the implementation of the separation policy appeared to suggest that protection from the military had been maximized, while protection by the military had been minimized without replacing it with an effective protection by police. In many cases, people saw the police as an 678 In other regions, such as Maluku, Poso (Sulawesi) or Kalimantan the security conditions worsened after the separation. See lists of conflict areas for example Rinakit, Sukardi., Decentralization and the military, in Erb, Maribeth; Sulistyanto, Priyambudi; and Faucher, Carole, (ed.) Regionalism in Post-Suharto Indonesia, (New York: RoutledgeCurzon, 2005), p See Chapter Five, footnote

317 organization or as individuals who they need to be protected from as well. For democracy to go on a more effective track, the problems of building effective police forces would have to be given a higher priority. 5. Conclusion As the discussion has shown, there was a big cut in financial sources of the territorial units and this cut minimized the political power of the local military. Despite personal approaches between the commanders of the local units and the members of F-TNI/POLRI to get security assistance funding from the local government budget, the amount was very small compared to what the units might have had in the New Order era. It was quite encouraging that there was no indication that this financial loss was dealt with systemically through military channels in the local politics to compensate the loss. The cut did not, however, affect the continued existence of the territorial units. In fact, there was an indication that the military continue to assert that the territorial structure is a realistic form of troop deployment for Indonesian current political, economic, or security conditions. Two areas of security reforms are likely to become long term problems. The first is around the question of whether the military would continue to back-up police for internal security; and the second is whether the external defence strategy will adopt a conventional form that requires a highly professionalized military and excludes non-combatants from military operations or will stick to the concept of people s total defence that involves nonmilitary elements of society in providing for logistic support and for a guerilla warfare strategy. The answer will determine the relevance of the current structures of the territorial command. In addition, neither did it affect the perception of their images as the easy moneymaking jobs for the individual personnel and as the place for disposed of, unprofessional soldiers. Not only could this influence the professionalization of the military, but also the effective security management at the operational, local level. The above discussion has argued the reduced effectiveness of police in handling domestic security, as well as of the military in dealing with its defence role since 285

318 1998. This suggests that the Koter system, or a Koter-like system if it is changed, will remain more or less as it was, integrating the military with the society (in a security management context the former has stronger power than the latter) instead of separating it. The implication for the civil-military relations is that their level and scope, instead of being limited to the national, institutional level as suggested by Huntington (see Chapter Two), will be spread over multi-layer interactions involving sub-national, operational levels, thus, preserving potentials to be involved in political matters produced by or related to the security problems. 286

319 Chapter Eleven IMPACTS ON CIVILIAN POLITICS: Civilian politicians, civil society and uncivil politics without TNI...societies with politicized military also have a politicized clergy, politicized civil service, politicized universities, trade unions and business corporations [this society lacks effective political institutions that are] capable of mediating, refining, and moderating group political action Introduction In Chapter Five it was noted that any step taken by the military to ease its political control would be followed by an increase of political control on the part of the civilian society, which in turn strengthened pressures for a further decrease in the military s. This chapter will report on some of the local changes on the civilian side, the further increase in civilian political power. According to Huntington, there are four possible scenarios that can happen in a military political withdrawal. They can be any combination of two variables each of which can be given two values values: returning or retaining power, and/or increasing or limiting political participation of the people. 681 The maximum democratizing impact that is generally expected would be the combination of returning power and increasing public political participation. In this case, there would also be a wider opportunity as well as an immediate necessity to establish democratic institutions that would be able to mediate the increased participatory politics of various social forces. In its best result, the military withdrawal from politics will produce a strong democratic system that is characterized both by a high level of public political participation and by effective democratic institutions. Many scholars of civil-military relations believe that this strong democratic 680 Huntington, Political Order in Changing Societies, (New Haven: Yale University, 1968), pp According to Huntington, the possible scenarios in the military withdrawal are that the military returns power and increases participation; returns power and limits participation; retains power and increases participation; and retains power and limits participation. 287

320 system would be not only a rational result of the military withdrawal but also a definite requirement for a preventive measure against a future military political involvement. So, it is vital to establish a civilian control over the military. 682 In reality, the process and its result are not always as simple, straightforward and clear-cut as in the theory, but can be much more complex. Especially in the East Java case, as shown in this chapter, the military political withdrawal did not immediately increase public political participation, it did not soon result in a strong democratic institution, nor did civilian politics automatically develop into a strong democratic political system necessary for an effective civilian control over the military. The following sections will discuss the features of public political participation and the political institutions in the East Java Province after the 1998 movements, and explain the complexity of problems that happened. It attempts to identify indicators that show how the further decrease in military political control has had impacts on the civilians, and to illuminate the kinds of problems the civilian politics, the politicians and parties have been facing since Political participation For most of the more than thirty five million East Javanese their political engagements had been limited to the activities around the general election, once every five years. Most of the political affairs had been allowed to become the business of several small groups of elites. The rest of the population were too busy struggling against economic difficulties, or too sceptical about the traditionally negative image of politics dirty games, deceitfulness, or selfishness 683 implying that good people should not be involved in politics. However, as Chapter Five has 682 See theoretical discussion in Chapter Two. 683 These two reasons were expressed during interviews by respondents who were mainly local people and village heads. Eg. Interviews V23, V

321 demonstrated, although not yet having become the majority, 684 the number of people who directly participated (or were mobilized) in political activities around 1998 had began to increase dramatically to a level that was beyond what the New Order government used to be able to contain and control. So, this means that at community level the military had already lost its former control by the 1998 reformasi, rather than fully as a consequence of the reformasi, although formally its control over political institutions was dis-assembled later, post What made many people suddenly become actively politicized and depart in 1998 from the de-politicization of the society (the strategy of masa mengambang/floating mass) 685 that had been run by the New Order for thirty-two years? Discourse about the 1998 movements has been much concentrated on one-sided explanations, mainly focusing on the regime s attitudes and reactions toward the democratic movements. The conclusions then have usually been that the degree of achievement in transforming the regime toward a democratic system depended greatly on the degree of resistance, or alternatively accommodation, by the regime to the movements. 686 Very little attention has been paid to the other side of explanation by looking at the nature of the movements, who ran them and how the process happened. The case of the PDIP s Posko Goto Royong (PGR) reported in Chapter Five has shown that different individuals, groups or elements of the society had different motives for being politicized but, in general, they were influenced by economic frustration that made them disposed to accept the 684 My respondent who was a village head said that in 1998 the majority of people his village remained passive, but they hoped that the crisis would go away as soon as possible, either by the demonstrators ceasing their actions or Soeharto resigning as was being demanded by the demonstrations. He said that the majority felt relieved when Soeharto decided to resign because they thought that the conditions would come back to normal, neither because they genuinely supported the reform movements, nor because they thought that the reformist groups would be able to handle the country any better than the New Order could. Interview V The New Order policy of protecting the masses from involvement in political activity by forbidding any activities at the village or general community level by political parties apart from the (allegedly non-party) government political organization Golkar. 686 See for example Jun Honna s book, as already noted in Chapter Two, Military Doctrines and Democratic Transition: a Comparative Perspective on Indonesia's Dual Function and Latin American National Security Doctrines, (Canberra: Dept. of Political and Social Change, Research School of Pacific and Asian Studies, Australian National University, 1999). 289

322 economic rewards offered through political networks that were organized by some groups of politicians. As soon as the economic rewards ceased to satisfy, the public political participation (mobilization) reverted to levels which were not much different from its previously low level (perhaps with an exception of a higher level of NGO activities post-1998 as they continued to receive financial support from their donor-sponsors), with the same continuing reasons, too busy with economic struggles and too sceptical about the politics being offered. In addition, as the following two sub-sections will show, a strong patrimonial culture that characterized the social ties between followers and leaders facilitated a situation where the support from the former to the latter was something taken for granted, mainly as the product of personal or charismatic qualities of the leaders rather than rational or ideological considerations Anti-female president against the bloody thumb-print campaign In one sense, the newly-democratic political system was seen by many people as more a source of instability than a solution to politics. This was exemplified soon after the 1999 election by the case of the Female President Ban by Gus Dur s PKB and the PDIP s reaction to the ban, shown in a mass petition of bloody thumb-prints. In another sense, it gave an example of temporarily high public political participation that was closely related to violence, where direct mass political pressures became a primary means of political action. The PDIP-PKB conflict at the grassroots level was triggered by the political competition for the presidential election in the national parliament in Jakarta. PDIP supporters expected that Megawati had to become the President because she was the leader of the party winning the largest number of seats in the 1999 national election, while PKB supporters, with an interpretation of Islamic teaching that forbids a female president, urged the PKB to not support Megawati and declare a refusal. The refusal issue had been controversial for a few weeks, but was formally declared on 1 July , in Pasuruan, 290

323 East Java, by a hundred Nahdatul Ulama (NU, Council of Muslim Theologians) kyai (religious leaders) representing eight Provinces. 687 This refusal invited strong reactions from the PDIP s supporters who were worried that the declaration would influence all Islamic parties to oppose Megawati s candidature. They expressed their loyalty to Megawati by collecting a million bloody thumb-prints (cap jempol darah), and declared a loyalty to death (kesetiaan sampai mati) to her. They also collected a million signatures from PDIP supporters on a massive banner displayed in public places. 688 In August before the national People s Consultative Assembly (MPR) 689 general meeting PDIP supporters in East Java and Central Java were preparing to rally in Jakarta to secure Megawati s position in the Presidential election. They also formed several militia groups; Banteng Sumber Nyowo, Panji Tengkorak and Mangkubumi. 690 This development increased the political tensions and made the people worried that a communal conflict might soon break out. The underlying conflict between the PDIP supporters on one hand, who were disappointed about the failure of Megawati to become the Indonesian president, against PKB supporters on the other, who were benefited by the Islamic coalition of PKB, PPP, PAN and PBB, diversified the previously 687 The PKB was the political party based in the NU. The declaration was made at 7 p.m. in the Pondok Pesantren Ikqya' Ussunnah of Habib Abdul Rohman Assegaf. According to Drs Jumadik Sahal Sulaiman, the chairman of the meeting, there were five agreements declared: These were to: 1. refuse a PKB coalition with PDIP; 2. refuse a female president; 3. support a PKB coalition with Islamic parties.; 4. support a president with religious vision and statement; 5. call for ukhuwah islamiyah (Islamic friendships). The eight Provinces were Jakarta, West Java, East Java, Central Java, West Sumatra, South Sumatra, West Kalimantan and North Sulawesi. See 100 Kyai NU Kumpul di Pasuruan, Menolak Presiden Wanita, Jawapos. 1 July 1999; 100 Ulama soal Capres Wanita, Kompas, 3 July The action was carried out by the RPD (Rakyat Pro-Demokrasi, Pro-Democracy People) forum, led by a PDIP member, Abd. Gani, at Pasar Turi, Dupak St, Demak St, Jepara St and Gresik St. The signatures were written on a 270m long banner with the statement: RPD supports Megawati to be the Indonesian President. See Cap Jempol Darah Terus Dikembangkan ke Ranting Republika, 30 June 1999; Setelah Cap Jempol Darah, Sejuta Teken Dukung Mega, Surabaya Post, 5 Juli At the time the MPR (Majelis Permusyawaratan Rakyat/People s Consultative Assembly) usually only met every five years to elect the President and Vice President and determine the General Outlines of State Policy for that period, although it could be called into special session to consider important issues of state policy. (It was such a Special Session that was called in 2001 to impeach President Gusdur.) Half of its members were appointed and half were the elected members of the DPR (Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat/People s Representative Assembly), the legislative Parliament of Indonesia. Its role and powers have since been changed. 690 Tabloid Magazine, 19 August

324 usual pattern of reformist-nonreformist political struggle where the military, along with Golkar, were generally put on the side of non-reformists. In many ways, however, at this time the military had no business (tidak ada urusan) with this conflict. 691 The military was committed to keeping a neutral position in political matters, and itself was too busy receiving condemnation (menerima hujatan). As a respondent said, any statement could have been politicized to further corner (lebih memojokkan) the military. 692 A military respondent, who was a Sub-district commander at that time, said, I would love to see an open war between them, so that they learned what they gained from the democracy. 693 Personally, I would support NU s declaration, not because of the religious reason, but because of my feeling of hate for the PDIP that was dominated by korak (petty criminals). 694 One former Babinsa (Village NCO) reported that he had never received an instruction from the higher command about what to do concerning the Bloody Thumb-print action. But, he said, I think they [the officers] did not really care about it. 695 Nevertheless, another Babinsa revealed that he had got an instruction to find out information about when the local PDIP mass would leave for Jakarta, in order to anticipate the security condition in the capital. However, he never obtained the required information because he could no longer contact informants who used to help him. 696 Later it was evident that the worry that an open conflict would occur between PDIP and PKB supporters would not be fulfilled, and the petition had failed to bring Megawati to the Presidency the members of the MPR had elected Gusdur instead. Nevertheless, the importance of this case is 691 The respondent was Head of a Kansospol in Interview M Interviews G6, M67, M Interview M Interview M Interview M Interview M116. A former Sub-district Commander, who had since become the Sub-district Chairman of Golkar in Malang, similarly confirmed that since 1998 the military intelligence network had disappeared. This was because it was impossible for a Babinsa to work alone. Previously, they had relied too much on their civilian informants (TBO/Tenaga Bantuan Operasi), who were kept by the military with funding (amplop, envelopes ) which was supplied by local Chinese businesses. Since the collapse of the New Order, both the informants and the funds had evaporated. This situation explains not only why the military no longer used its former intelligence network for observing the people s political activities, but also explains why it could not properly deal with the communal conflicts mentioned in the previous sections. The deteriorated nature of the military intelligence opened the way for these difficulties. Interview R

325 that it became a point where the reform groups began to abandon the New Order regime and the military as their common target as they began another battle among themselves in the competition for power The Gusdur Impeachment Crisis Direct mass political pressures and violence were not the exclusive domain of the PDIP supporters in East Java. By the end of 2001, the Gusdur Impeachment Crisis a conflict between President Gusdur and the Parliament exemplified how the PKB supporters in the East Java reacted similarly. At times, anger and pressures toward their political opponents were violently expressed by Gusdur s supporters. Basic problems in the increased political participation in the post-1998 democratization process were here re-emphasized. It was too direct and disorganized and thereby strengthened the traditional perceptions by the military and the majority of Indonesians that Indonesian people had not yet developed sufficient maturity in politics, and that the military was needed to restore law and order. In mid-1999, after Gusdur, rather than Megawati Sukarnoputri, had been elected as President by the MPR, his somewhat erratic attempts at reforms produced continual disagreements between him and the members of opposing parties in the Parliament and various conflicts and unrest within Indonesian society. By the beginning of 2001, partly due to dissatisfactions with the ways Gusdur s Presidency was operating and with its directions, there were moves in the National Parliament, the DPR, to call a special session of the People s Consultative Assembly, the MPR, to consider his impeachment and ejection from office. Eventually this happened in August In January 2001 Gusdur s supporters in East Java had talked about going to Jakarta to secure the embattled Gusdur Presidency. Speaking in the Pondok Pesantren Langitan on Sunday, 7 January 2001, the national leader of the NU, KH Hasyim Muzadi, said that the NU would send masses of defenders to Jakarta if there was a mass movement from the opposing parties in Jakarta to topple Gusdur. Yet, a few days later, Syaifullah Yusuf, the national leader of the NU s Ansor 697 youth movement, Barisan Ansor Serba Guna (Banser)/All-Purpose Ansor Guards urged them not to come to Jakarta because it would be counter- 697 The name has a religious significance. The Ansor were those in Medina who followed the Prophet Mohammed after he left Mecca. 293

326 productive for Gusdur s popularity. As an alternative, the national meeting in Pandaan, Pasuruan, of the Ansor commanders, led by Syaifullah Yusuf, issued a statement that they would carry out actions from their local bases in order to secure the Gusdur government until On 7 February 2001 mass attacks began on Golkar offices in Surabaya. Golkar s elites accused supporters of the small leftist party Partai Rakyat Demokrat (PRD, People s Democratic Party) of taking advantage of the mass actions by stoning and damaging Golkar s offices. The PRD East Java leader, Muhammad Sholeh, denied the accusation but confirmed that they joined the demonstrations along with activists from PMII, GMNI, GMKI, PMKRI and LMD under the Front Reformasi Total (FRT, Total Reform Front). 699 Attacks on Golkar offices also took place in other East Java cities such as Banyuwangi, Situbondo, Pasuruan and Bondowoso. The national leader of the NU, KH Hasyim Muzadi, claimed the main role in attempting to topple Gusdur was being played by the PDIP and Poros Tengah (Central Axis) politicians. But, the people understood this as the work of the strength of the past, Golkar Published on TEMPO Interaktif, Jakarta: at 22:06 WIB. 699 Ketua PRD Jatim, Muhammad Soleh: Kami Bukan Dalang Pembakaran Kantor Golkar at 23:48 WIB, TEMPO Interaktif, Surabaya. 700 KH Hasyim Muzadi: Saya Tak tahu Kenapa Golkar Jadi Sasaran at 23:56 WIB, TEMPO Interaktif, Surabaya. 294

327 Gusdur, President Abdurrahman Wahid, claimed there was a third party joining the demonstrations held by his supporters. He had ordered the military and police to control the actions, but because they were outnumbered by the masses, he asked them to restrain themselves to prevent unintended victims. KH Abdulloh Faqih, the leader of the Pondok Pesantren (Islamic Boarding School) Langitan Tuban, had a meeting on 8 February 2001 with the East Java Provincial and District NU leaders to discuss mass uprisings by supporters of Gusdur after the attacks on Golkar offices and blockades of streets in cities in the eastern part of the Province, including Jember and Banyuwangi. The meeting asked the masses to be controlled but did not blame them, blaming the anti-gusdur parliamentary elites instead. 701 On one hand, the NU and PKB elites publicly regretted the violent mass actions, but on the other hand, they appeared to be siding with these actions in attempting to show their support for Gusdur. This worsened the security instability. Early in May the national media reported that Gusdur had formed a special force consisting of all political forces outside the parliaments, including small parties. He said, I am ready to die in the palace I do not want to resign. He also believed that Megawati would soon fall sick. Political observer Indro Tjahyono predicted that clashes would soon break out. The leader of the Murba Party, Hadidjoyo Nitimihardjo, reported that "pasukan sorban (turban [Islamic] troops), such as GPI ex-masyumi militias, had arrived in Jakarta to counter the NU Banser troops. 702 According to Gusdur, his supporters in the East Java were ready to declare Independence and appoint him as the president, and that some Achenese and Papuan leaders would do the same thing should he be impeached. He claimed that, in total, there were six provinces that would declare their Independence. In East Java there were reports of several incidents, according to Colonel Lilik Koeshadiyanto, the Intelligence Assistant to the Commander-in-Chief of Kodam V Brawijaya, such as in Nguling, Pasuruan, where the mobs had cut down the trees to block the Pasuruan Surabaya and Malang-Pasuruan roads and in Muncar, Banyuwangi, where seventeen houses of Muhammadyah members were red-crossed and sent threats Kiai Langitan Minta Massa Gus Dur Diredam, at 9:38 WIB, TEMPO Interaktif, Surabaya. 702 Gus Dur Lebih Memilih Meninggal di Istana Radio Netherlands, 4/05/ Tempo,

328 On May 2001, one of the biggest actions by Gusdur s supporters occurred in Pasuruan, East Java, where they damaged and burned dozens of buildings. They also occupied the Parliament buildings and Government offices of both Pasuruan City and Pasuruan Regency. Among the buildings burned were the offices of the PDIP and the PPP, a High School and mosque belonging to Muhammadyah (connected to PAN, a rival Islamic party), a house of the Pasuruan PAN leader, Bethel Church, and two police posts on the main Soekarno-Hatta road. The Government offices, including the Mayor s main office, were written over in red colour with This building is taken-over by the people. The Police Chief of Pasuruan City, Ltc. Police Wakin, recorded at least twenty one buildings were damaged and burned. The action started on Sunday, 27 May 2001, by setting old tires on fire in Nguling Market, Grati Sub-district. The Pasuruan Probolinggo road was blocked. The aim of the actions according to H Ragil Amir, the action coordinator, was to reject the MPR session in Jakarta. The security forces only came at 3 o clock the next afternoon when the action had begun to calm down, and after the mobs dispersed. They could only clear the remains of the burned buildings. 704 In other cities of East Java, the security forces had been warned to anticipate the actions, but these continued over the following days without the security forces being able to handle them effectively. 705 The next day, 29 May 2001, the violence was continued. In Pasuruan there were attacks on the Gereja Protestan Indonesia Barat/West Indonesian Protestant Church (GPIB), the Catholic Church St. Agustinus and the Gereka Kristen Jawi Wetan/East Javanese Christian Church (GKJW). The latter attack happened at a.m. A police post was damaged, the three churches were burned and destroyed and shops were stoned in Jalan Niaga and Jalan Nusantara by a mob of more than 1000 men. Around the mass even attacked the District Police Headquarters, and 132 persons were arrested. The Chairperson of the PKB faction in the local Assembly, H Misbahul Munir, condemned the shooting of a number of demonstrators. He blamed the riots on the conduct of the political elite in the national parliament that induced the anger of the people. At a press conference at the NU office in Pasuruan Regency, the local commander of the Hizbullah militia, KH Masyudi, stated that 11 demonstrators had been shot, including three seriously wounded; one in the arm, one in the chest, and one in the 704 DI PASURUAN, MASSA MERUSAK DAN BAKAR GEDUNG, Kompas, 29 Mei In Malang all policemen were forbidden to go home by the Malang Police Chief, Ltc. Police Nicolaus Eko Riwayanto, in anticipation of the riots. In the meeting with the District Commander of 0833 Malang, Ltc. Guruh M, and the Malang Mayor, Col. Suyitno, he said that the threats had come from Gusdur s supporters, most of whom had come from other cities. In Probolinggo, at least 300 military troops, police and 40 men of the militias of Pagar Nusa and Banser were sent to save the PLTU (Pembangkit Listrik Tenaga Uap/Electricity Generator) in Paiton, Probolinggo, on Some additional troops were sent from Battalion Zipur 10 and the Marines to increase the security according to the Chief of Paiton Police, Captain Police Subadar. The Pagar Nusa men were led by H Idris Hasan Mubarok, Coordinator of Pagar Nusa, Paiton. (See PLTU Paiton Aman Pasukan Pengaman Ditambah, Kompas 31 Mei 2001.) In Surabaya, religious leaders included in the Ikatan Kerukunan Umat Beragama Surabaya/Surabaya Religious Tolerance Union (IKUBS), helped map the areas vulnerable to riots, such as religious centres. The leader of Nahdlatul Ulama Surabaya, H Sunarto, included the areas of Sukolilo, Keputih, Pogot, Semampir, Sidotopo, Kapasan, Lakarsantri and Wiyung. He urged an increase in security in these areas. Romo Eko Budi Susilo Pr, the Christian leader, said regretfully there had been hundreds of religious centres damaged by the mobs. See Daerah Rawan Konflik di Surabaya Perlu Dipetakan, Kompas, 31 May

329 back. He warned that the repressive acts of the state apparatus would further provoke the mass. 706 On 30 May 2001 around six thousand of Gusdur s supporters, led by Drs Rusdi Romli, occupied the offices of the Situbono Assembly and Local Government. They forced the DPRD speaker, H Aqiq Zaman, and the Bupati, H Moh Diaaman, respectively to sign over these buildings to the people. With these signatures all government offices down to the lowest level were supposedly given to the people for an unlimited time. All the staff were told to take the day off. Security troops could only watch from main roads. The mob said they would return the offices after the MPR session was cancelled. Some of the mob then moved to Basuki Rahmat road and burned down two of the PDIP posts. 707 The difficulty of handling the riots in East Java during the months of the Gusdur Crisis was increased partly by the psychological effect on the military of the fact that the riots were carried out by Gusdur s supporters. There was no explicit protection for the supporters by the President, but the military officers were well aware of the danger on their own fear of an accusation of salah prosedur (wrong procedure) or human rights violations if, for example, a security operation weakened the political position of the President. 708 Also, the local riots were mainly driven by political competition at the national level, at the time when the military was being pressed to be not involved in political issues. The political neutrality that was internally instructed by the military leadership had been taken for granted at the sub-national level, as shown during the previous political confrontations during the 1999 national election. The 2001 Gusdur Crisis was one of the subsequent effects of this confrontation that was understood by the military officers and soldiers as now beyond their responsibility. 709 Yet, partly, there was also a growing feeling of disappointment towards the Gus Dur policies of military reforms among the soldiers and officers who saw Gusdur increasingly using divide and 706 See President Regrets Violence in East Java Jakarta, Kompas Online Wednesday, 30 May See also Warga Gereja Pasuruan Masih Trauma Akibat Amuk Massa, TEMPO Interaktif, Jakarta, 30 May Massa Sita Kantor Pemerintah Kabupaten dan DPRD Situbondo, Kompas, 31 May Interview M99. The respondent was a Lieutenant Colonel serving in the Pasuruan Regency DPRD. It was not uncommon to hear Gusdur accusing someone, although frequently he denied what he said soon after. The Commander-in-Chief of the Kostrad (Army Strategic and Reserve Command) denied Gusdur s allegation that Kostrad members were involved in the Pasuruan riots, East Java. He said that the reports given to the President, including that some Kostrad wore police uniforms, were sontoloyo (silly). SCTV, 26 June Interview M

330 rule approaches, playing one group of officers among the central military elite against another in his attempt to control the military. By not carrying out sufficient action to stop the riots, the military got at least two advantages. One, as the target of the riots was not the military but the political parties of Golkar, PDIP, PPP, PAN and PBB, the political resistance toward Gusdur would be stronger. Two, sooner or later, one of the conflicting groups would seek protection and alliance from the military. 710 By July 2001, the position of Gusdur in Jakarta was clearly weakening. Officers and soldiers, with many other Indonesians, had predicted that the Gusdur Presidency would soon come to an end. Security forces had seemed to lose respect for Gusdur and his supporters. Consequently, the psychological obstacle, in relation to the relation between the President and the military, which had previously hindered their acting decisively against Gusdur s supporters, was now lifted. The police and the military began to consolidate their operations to safeguard the Sidang Istimewa (Special Session) MPR, that was being organized to start in Jakarta on 1 August 2001, as well as to try to ensure security and order in what were expected to be likely unsettled areas outside Jakarta. In Probolinggo, for example, police held an operation called Operasi Mantrap Semeru III, involving 915 police and military personnel. From 13 July they checked for weapons, such as knives or guns that might be used in riots. To reassure the local community about the preparedness of the troops, they carried out a show of force on 19 July On the same day, three students of the Universitas Islam Malang/Malang Islamic University (Unisma) were arrested by the Malang police. The next day another student disappeared when police dispersed about two hundred and fifty demonstrators in front of the University of Brawijaya campus, just after they started their action. Some students were injured in the incident. The demonstrators had demanded the abolition of Golkar, the bringing of New Order leaders to 710 Interview K58. The respondent was a member of the F-KB (National Awakening Faction) of Gusdur. 711 Pengamanan Menjelang SI Polres Probolinggo Gelar Operasi Mantap Semeru III, Kompas, 14 Juli

331 court and the abolition of the military s Dual Function. They called their group a Forum Warga Negara/Citizen Forum (FWN). Edi Banteng, the public spokesman of FWN, said they were distributing two thousand brochures calling for pembangkangan sipil (civilian disobedience) by not paying taxes and blockading food distribution to the city. 712 Ltc. Police Suseno Djahri, in a meeting with the Wali Kota (Mayor) of Probolinggo, Banadi Eko, the Chief of Judiciary, Francs Loppy, the Commander of Sub-Denpom (Military Police Sub-district) V, Captain CPM A Iskandar, Captain Inf. Panjaitan from KODIM O820 Probolinggo, Battalion Zeni Tempur X Kostrad, the Pagar Nusa Coordinator, Kraksaan branch, Sahudi, and some informal social leaders, made it clear that the security forces would shoot at any anarchist action. On 23 July, the day when Gusdur was impeached by the Parliament, as well as the days afterwards, there was no significant public demonstration held by Gusdur s supporters, in spite of their threatening to do so. The Resort Police (Polres) of Probolinggo and Military District Command (KODIM) 0820 of Probolinggo claimed that they had begun to limit the movements of provocateurs. 713 The Gusdur Crisis was the point where the New Order s traditional pattern of local civil-military relations at the local community level began to recycle towards the assumption that the civilians could not manage and control their political actions, so they had be controlled by the military. The replacement of Gusdur by Megawati as the President re-emphasized this concept, as Megawati relied very much on the military to sustain her Presidency for the rest of its term until , which gave much room for the military to recover from the serious demoralization that had taken place after Aksi Tuntut Pembubaran Golkar, Dibubarkan Aparat, Kompas, 20 July One day before, Kompas News reported the Commander-in-Chief (Pangdam) V Brawijaya, Maj. Gen. Sudi Silalahi had warned that twelve provocateurs had entered the tapal kuda (horse-shoe) area including Pasuruan, Probolinggo, Situbondo, Bondowoso and Banyuwangi. They came both from Jakarta and from outside Java, but the security forces refused to reveal their identities. See Polres dan Kodim Persempit Ruang Gerak Provokator, Kompas, 26 July It was for only three years as she had taken over from Gusdur after two years of his five year term and was completing the rest of this. 299

332 To sum up, the grassroots features of the PDIP and PKB in these two East Java cases demonstrates a changing nature of local political participation of the people a temporary, chaotic increase. In addition to the PDIP s PGR case discussed in Chapter Five, both the PDIP s Bloody Thumb-print Campaign and the PKB response to the Gusdur Crisis discussed in this chapter show that such mass mobilization became an important political show of force that made them heard by the political opponents. However, such kinds of attempted direct pressure mostly produced results counterproductive to the long-term efforts of building a democratic society as an effective means of civilian control over the military. Mainly, this was because of the character of threatened or actual mass violence attached to the mobilization. It could simply attract unsympathetic perception from the silent majority that was frequently deprived by the actions. It could also easily make state repressive actions toward the mass movements gain a general public acceptance and approval, thus becoming de facto justifiable under the banner of public interest. Consequently, in the long run, attitudes against such political activity both from the general public and from the security forces could potentially abort the seeds of democracy growing and developing. 3. Politicians and political parties While the above section addressed the questions of why the 1998/9 military withdrawal had not immediately improved public political participation, the following section discusses the issues associated with the political institutions that had not yet become properly institutionalized after the start of the process of withdrawal. Some indicators of impacts of the further decrease in military political control on the civilians will be identified, and the kinds of problems being faced by the politicians and parties since 1998 will be discussed. 300

333 3.1. PDIP: Politicians and party Being a politician had increasingly been seen by the civilians as the way to get connected to large sources of money, somewhat similarly (but more dramatically) to how military officers eventually saw their involvements in politics during the Soeharto era. Some politicians worked for their ideologies, but many of them were motivated by the money. Their loyalties to the society or the constituents who chose them, and to the political parties to which they are attached, were very flexible, if not uncertain, and dependent on where they could make lots of money. For example, Basir Suliki, was a poor and ordinary painter labourer in a furniture factory before he was recruited by the PDIP and became a PGR shelter organizer in early 1998 in the District of Sumber Yasin. 715 After the 1999 election he became a legislator in the Sumber Yasin District Legislative Assembly, and because the PDIP occupied the biggest number of the seats of the DPRD he was elected as the DPRD Chairman without a significant challenge from other factions. Since then he suddenly became a rich man, owned two big luxury houses in Sumber Yasin, drove expensive European cars and attended VIP entertainment centres regularly. At one time he was among those who were caught in the sweeping operations carried out by the police against the ecstasy drug users in entertainment centres. At another time he spoke publicly, as published in a local newspaper, that if you want to be rich, be a politician, a statement that attracted condemnation throughout the District saying that it was an immoral statement. Later he was sentenced to four years in jail by the local court because of a corruption charge, after he moved to another newlyestablished party and the PDIP was no longer inclined to cover his corruption case. Titan Osman was another example of a PDIP politician in the District of Tunggal Redjo. He was a poor cassava farmer before he was asked by an existing PDIP politician to organize a PGR building in his Sumbersari village, in early June Following his success in recruiting hundreds of 715 Names of the persons and Districts in the cases have been changed. 301

334 new members of PDIP through the PGR that he organized, he was included in the lists of the PDIP legislators for the Tunggal Redjo DPRD. Like Basir Suliki, his income changed suddenly and dramatically, and he expanded his activities in the cassava business to a much larger scale. From 1999 he became one of the biggest cassava traders in Tunggal Redjo, buying much more land to plant the cassava and employing hundreds of labourers for his own cassava farm as well as buying and stocking much more cassava from the smaller farmers. Most of the labourers who worked for him were those who had been involved in the PGR that he managed. When I was interviewing him, he unsuccessfully invited me to invest in his cassava business and asked for help to market his twenty thousand tons of cassava to other Districts! In 2003 he was one of the eleven local PDIP legislators whose party membership was suspended by the PDIP national leadership because of their being accused of disloyalty to party policy during the Bupati election in Tunggal Redjo (this election case will be described more later). He told me that, in short, his life had changed a hundred and eighty degrees after he became a politician. However, he also added that joining politics has made him a much bigger cassava businessman rather than a great politician. 716 Tanu Kusman was a vegetable street seller (gerobak sayur) in the Mangunredjo District before a friend asked him to join the building of PGR in He was inclined to give up his small business because the income as an activist almost doubled his previous earnings from selling vegetables. 717 When his name was included on the PDIP list for the Mangunredjo Legislature in the 1999 elections, he never thought that he would be elected, because he had thought that the PDIP would only get a small number of votes, as it had in previous years. In fact, the PDIP gained around fifty percent of the votes in the District, and it was decided that his name would be included in the official final list of PDIP legislators. 716 Interview D Daily he earned around ten thousand rupiah (about Aus$1.50) from selling vegetables, while as an activist he was paid fifteen to twenty thousand a day plus a free box of lunch. 302

335 Like most of these, his life changed dramatically from being among the common people (wong cilik) to being in a rich middle class group. After becoming a legislator Titan Osman had enough funds to develop his talents as a trader. At the time of my mid-2003 interview with him he had established and was managing vegetable storage corporations (koperasi pengepul palawija) in three different Sub-districts of Mangunredjo. He said that these corporations had a double role: first, to provide a place [for him] to invest his large official income as a legislator; and second, to facilitate a sustainable contact with the constituents who support him as a legislator. Before further analyzing the cases of these three local PDIP legislators, another three cases will be presented, of executive leaders emerging from the PDIP. Sudjarwo had become the District Head of Mangliawan. He was a junior security guard of a private university in the District when he was asked to join the PDIP s political actions in In 2000, as a PDIP legislator of the Mangliawan District, he was approached by the PKB to be proposed as a Vice District Head candidate. A PKB politician said that the choice to propose Sudjarwo was made as a strategy to attract the PDIP faction members to affiliate with and support the candidate team from PKB. 718 However, his decision to have an affiliation with PKB was unwanted by his PDIP faction which already had its own Head and Vice Head candidate team for the coming District election. The disagreement ended up with the suspension of Sudjarwo s PDIP membership because he continued with his plan to register as the Vice District Head candidate through the PKB. Nevertheless, his PDIP membership was restored after he won the election and became the Vice Head of the District. Two years later he moved into the top position after the elected District Head died, with then no Vice Head. The main criticisms of Sudjarwo s subsequent leadership were that he was not able to implement the brilliant development plans outlined by the former District Head, partly because he was not educated enough to discern the plans. 718 Interview K

336 Budi Darmawan, who was a civil servant and a teacher at a state university before 1998, was another example. After the 1998 abolition of the regulation that obliged all civil servants to become members of the government ruling party, Golkar, he decided to join the PDIP and managed to become a local PDIP politician. Like Sudjarwo, in 2000 his membership was suspended by the PDIP because of his acceptance of being proposed as a Vice Mayoral candidate from the PKB, rather than on the PDIP s candidate team. The same pattern followed; after the PKB s team won the election and Budi Darmawan became Vice Head of the District, the PDIP saw its interests were in restoring its relation with him and restored his membership. Then, in 2002, he became much more powerful after he also stepped up to become the District Head after the previously elected occupant died. However, his hostile relations with some members of the PDIP faction led by Basir Suliki, the DPRD Chairman, who had not voted for him in the 2000 election, remained unsettled. With a significant role being played by these members, he was impeached by the District DPRD over an allegation of having been involved in a corruption scandal which had been charged against the former District Head. The impeachment, however, was rejected by the Ministry of Home Affairs, so he remained in his position. However, the conflict between the Executive and the Legislature did not stop, with both institutions continuing to attack one another. During this period, the public regarded the Executive s relations as the worst ever, like cat and dog relations, difficult to get harmonized. 719 Finally, Budi Darmawan got his chance for revenge and managed to bring Basir Suliki to court on a corruption charge that put him in jail for four years, as was mentioned earlier. Although Budi Darmawan had not emerged from a social group with a social status as low as that from which Sudjarwo had originated from; yet they were similarly lucky political adventurers who took the most advantage of the democratization. 719 Interview M

337 The third example of a new District Head was Pardi Suripno, another civil servant and a lecturer at a state university during the New Order era. Like Budi Darmawan, he had been a by law Golkar member who then turned to be a PDIP politician in As one of the very few educated politicians of the PDIP in the District of Matur Anyar, he was elected to the leadership position of Chairman of the District PDIP. After the 1999 election he was listed as a national legislator and served in the DPR in Jakarta until 2003, the year when he was proposed by the local PDIP faction as their District Head candidate for the period of He did not seem to have difficulties in winning the election as, beside other reasons, partly but most importantly he got a strong back-up from the local businessmen 720. Indeed, the first impressions that the respondents gave in my interviews imply that his success in the election was regarded as the victory of the businessmen who had business interests connected with his position. This business orientation that Pardi Suripno had played was not unusual to the people of the District. To the colleagues who knew him when he was at the university, Pardi Suripno s business talent was well known because he was the official who was in charge of the university s internal corporation (koperasi universitas). In addition, he was also a financial officer of a real estate company that had fallen bankrupt during the economic crisis in A former customer of this real estate company complained about his success in the election because, in his view, Pardi Suripno was a criminal. According to this former customer, Pardi Suripno had sold the certificate of his 300 square metre property to a local bank in 1985 without his consent, so he had taken the company to court.. The case was suspended with a deliberation 721 in which Pardi Suripno promised to give the certificate back when he got money to buy it back from the bank, but he never did, so eventually the owner had to repay the money to the bank himself to get his property s certificate returned in The respondent 720 Some other reasons suggested were that it was due to: the large number of the PDIP faction in the Legislature (seventeen of the total forty-five), he gained a strong support from Golkar with a concession of a Vice District Head position for Golkar; and he was supported by the military faction that viewed him as a former civil servant and a former Golkar member, thus not one of the original hardliners of the PDIP who would be too critical of the military in politics. 721 In the interview, the respondent showed the agreement paper in which Pardi Suripno promised to give the certificate back, but had never done so. Interviews C151, C15, the respondents being a husband and wife couple who were interviewed at the same time. 305

338 said that he was not brave enough to bring the case to the court, especially since 1998 when Pardi Suripno began to be surrounded and protected by PDIP bodyguards and activists. The respondent also claimed that the real estate company where Pardi Suripno became the financial officer had cheated lots of people in several ways. These included not paying the land owners from whom the company had bought the land for a real estate project and by not building the houses for buyers who had paid deposits but not paying back then, then by using a legal bankruptcy, the company had ceased to exist and the managers had escaped. So, it was alleged, Pardi Suripno s background and personal interests in financial affairs seemed to have motivated him more than did an interest in advancing democracy. These cases of three local legislators and three local executive leaders are only some examples of the PDIP politicians in East Java with similar features. As some revealed below, mostly the legislators originated from marginal groups with a very low level of economic life and education. Those who had better educational backgrounds and higher social class, such as those who became the executive leaders, were very easily identified because there were only a few of them. Some of the PDIP politicians were old politicians having been active before the collapse of the New Order, but most new politicians, the majority, were recruited through a similar mechanism, that is, in the brief period when the PGR buildings operated in They experienced a similarly sudden change in their economic lives and social status after becoming legislators. Lastly but more importantly, these backgrounds influenced their political attitudes and perceptions in that becoming close to the power circle was a powerful means to escape the poverty and powerlessness they had experienced before. Therefore, their political considerations were mainly poweroriented, the maintenance of the interactions with the power interests that would sustain their individual benefits, although this would include deviating from what their political institution, as well as their constituents, had expected of them. 306

339 In the case of the Sumber Yasin District, the conflicts could last years after the election and broadened the scope and the scale of the conflicts, although some were limited to the duration of the election activities. In one version, such as shown by Sudjarwo s case, an individual politician would be discharged because he affiliated with and was supported by another party to contest the position of District Head but this affiliation had been disapproved by the national leadership. In another version, the local leadership and the national leadership supported different candidates for District Head with each side claiming that it was the most rightful authority to decide. The local leadership insisted that they represented the voices of the local people, while the national leadership insisted that they represented the broader interest of the party as an institution. The election case of the District of Tunggal Redjo, where eleven of the fourteen members of the PDIP faction in the DPRD local Legislature were discharged (dibebas-tugaskan) in 2002 because of the Bupati election conflict, exemplified a local-centre conflict. According to Titan Osman, a discharged legislator, the District branch leadership (DPC/Dewan Pimpinan Cabang) and the PDIP faction in the DPRD supported Jamroni Kasim, the Chairman of the DPC, to be proposed as the Bupati candidate. However, he said, the PDIP national leadership (DPP/Dewan Pimpinan Pusat) instead appointed Sugeng Suleman, who was a bureaucrat from the neighbouring District and a former Golkar member. My respondent said that the national DPP tried to force the local PDIP legislators to vote for Sugeng Suleman as Bupati and for his partner as Vice Bupati candidate, from the PKB s team. If this had gone to plan, the fourteen members in the F-DIP and twelve in the F-KB would collect twenty-six votes from the total forty-five DPRD members, and so the PKB s team would win the election. In fact, the pair gained only fifteen votes because eleven F-DIP members voted for someone else, Hanif, who was in the candidate pair proposed by Golkar, which then won the election. The Jakarta leadership of the PDIP viewed the actions of the eleven PDIP legislators as betraying the institution and discharged them from the PDIP faction membership as a punishment. Consequently, since the election, the fourteen 722 legislators had been inactive in faction tasks, but remained being the legislators for doing nothing, yet got the same salaries as usual. Titan Osman said that they had refused to vote for Sugeng Suleman because of several factors. Firstly, he was not supported by the grassroots of PDIP because they knew that he was not a genuine PDIP man, but a former Golkar member who had not proved his loyalty to the PDIP. Besides, he was not originally from the District, and more importantly he was being accused of being involved in a 722 The remaining three still-pdip members were too few to have any influence, thus did not attempt to organize as an active faction. 307

340 corruption scandal. 723 Furthermore, Titan Osman claimed the eleven members of the PDIP felt very disappointed by the way Sugeng Suleman treated them, which he described as inhumanely (tidak manusiawi). They were held as if kidnapped (kaya disandra) for seven days before the election date. The drama started a week before the election when all of the PDIP legislators of the District were invited to Jakarta to receive a direct instruction in order to secure the policy the central leadership (in other words, to vote for Sugeng Suleman). The next day they were brought by a bus which was guarded by the PDIP s security forces (SATGAS) to a hotel in Gombong (Central Java) for two days, then were moved to the Malioboro Hotel (Jogyakarta) for another two days, and then to the Swarna Hotel in Nganjuk for the last three days before they were dropped again in the morning of the election date in their District of Tunggal Redjo. While they were being held they were not allowed to make any contact with anyone either directly or by phone. Titan Osman said he was wearing a T-shirt for seven days because he was not allowed to go anywhere outside the hotel. Only when he got home that morning could he change the clothes. Yet, finally, when he got home he also found that lots of messages and threats had been sent to his home while he was away. These had been sent by the grassroots of the PDIP, urging him not to vote for Sugeng Suleman, if he does, he and his family would be killed. He told me, Pretend this is a war, the threats of the enemy here [in his District] were much closer to his home than the threats from Jakarta, therefore I chose to save my family from the threats of the PDIP grassroots public than to save my political career from the Jakarta s threats. Asked why the central PDIP leadership in Jakarta chose Sugeng Suleman instead of Jamroni Kasim, he said, It was mainly because the lobbying [meaning money] by Sugeng Suleman to Jakarta was much stronger than that by Jamroni Kasim. However, Agus Muzahar, a PKB politician, said that the reasons why these eleven members of the PDIP did not vote for Sugeng Suleman included the role played by Hanif and her husband H. Hasbi. She was a former Chairman of the DPRD, a Chairman of the Tunggal Redjo Golkar, one of the richest businesswomen in the District and won the election. Sugeng Suleman suspected that these eleven men received lots of money (amplop yang besar) from H. Hasbi in order to vote for her. He said that Tunggal Redjo has remained under strong control of Golkar ; the Chairmanship of the Legislature was occupied by a Golkar member and the Executive leader was also Golkar. More specifically, he said, politics in Tunggal Rredjo was controlled by the couple of Hanif and her husband; he controlled the Government by his economic power while she occupied the position as the Chairman of Golkar of the District. This situation, he added, had run since the New Order era; for example, eighty percent of the tenders of the local government s development projects were won by the companies the couple owned. So, if Titan Osman and Agus Muzahar were right, it seems that the central PDIP in Jakarta, as well as the local legislators, were steered in their decisions by money, taking different sides to be supported as these depended on the sources of who gave the money. The degree of their loyalty to their institutions as well as to 723 Sugeng Suleman was serving as the Chief of the District Development Plan, which the respondent said was a lucrative position. 308

341 their constituents was very much determined by their economic interests. Furthermore, each individual or group within the party was so strongly preoccupied with distrust and suspicion of each other that individual integrity and moral values were not something to realistically rely on. Therefore, the centre used the force of kidnapping to prevent the legislators from having social interactions in which the centre suspected that they could be influenced, such as by being bribed, to disobey the central institutional decision to vote for Sugeng. Similarly, the grassroots used threats of violence, including being killed, to prevent the legislators from betraying their constituents aspirations. Is this suspicion realistic? Looking at what most respondents (politicians, military officers, government officials and local people) said about money politics that it was real, and nobody believed that there was an effective mechanism to stop it then the answer would be, yes, it is realistic. Another internal PDIP conflict over a Pilkada happened in Tunggal Redjo s nearest neighbouring district, Buluhlawang, in 2003, although, unlike in Tunggal Redjo, this conflict did not significantly involve the party s central leadership, but was mainly among the local legislators. Yet the main reason was very similar, that some members did not agree with the decision taken by the local leadership, led by the Chairman of the Buluhlawang District PDIP, to take a former Golkar member as its Bupati candidate. According to an F-DIP respondent, this Bupati candidate was still registered as a member of the Golkar faction of the DPRD in a District in a Province outside Java when he approached the F-DIP of Buluhlawang, expressing his intention to be a candidate through the F-DIP faction. The respondent said, Is it logical?...where can I put this face? therefore, although some members begged with tears (datang kerumah saya nangis nangis) in order to support him, but I refused it. Asked the official reasons why the F-DIP was inclined to take Suwandi as its candidate, he answered, Lots of reasons, but the mainstream was only one, that is, he had lots of resources to grow the party (dia punya banyak harta untuk membesarkan partai). Yet, he said, I had information that he [Bagong Santoso, the PDIP District Chairman who supported this applicant] was promised a big house, if he [Suwandi] won the election. Eight of the fourteen F-DIP legislators, the Bagong Santoso group swore they would resign from their legislature jobs if they failed to get Suwandi to win the election. In fact, after having found they had failed, they refused to resign, and this became the source of the conflict between this group of eight and the remaining six. The six legislators who were not in the Bagong Santoso group formed a new F-DIP faction and claimed that the existing faction was not legitimate because they had promised to resign. This dualism in the PDIP faction had impacts on the daily work of the DPRD, for example, both the two sides making rival claims about which of them had the right to sign the DPRD s letters when all factions were required to do so. 724 Internal conflicts within the PDIP either among groups of local members or between the local and the central leaderships were common in East Java Pilkada cases during A Golkar politician, Mudjono, who was a Deputy of the Chairman of the Mojokerto DPRD, said that the internal conflicts of the PDIP was 724 Interview with the Speaker of the DPRD of Buluhlawang, Interview D

342 because the PDIP politicians lacked maturity in running an organization (kurangnya kedewasaan dalam berorganisasi). In the Mojokerto District, the PDIP was the biggest faction of the DPRD, but during the 2000 Bupati election, only two of its members voted for the candidates proposed by their faction, the others supporting others. Mudjono said Golkar had an interest in seeing the PDIP internal conflicts continue, so that Golkar could take advantages from this friction PKB: Politicians and party While most PDIP politicians had been recruited through the PGRs, most PKB politicians were recruited from Islamic Boarding Schools (pesantren) and their affiliated Islamic organizations. A common characteristic of the PKB politicians was that they used the title of K. (kyai), a title for Islamic scholars, before their names. In the Districts around the north-east of East Java for example, where the PKB became the biggest faction in the DPRD, almost all of the PKB legislators had the title. 725 A kyai was regarded as a religiously highly educated person, and ideally, an honest and responsible person, or recognized as having a high standard of moral values in his daily life. Therefore, regardless of the levels of their economic life, the kyai were socially respected, their words usually trusted, and their attitudes usually looked on as examples to be followed by others. However, when they came into and interacted with politics, on one hand, the kyai as social agents to some extent may have influenced the politics with their religious moral values, but on the other hand, to a greater extent the politicized kyai were not able to prevent themselves from being polluted by the fakes and frauds of politics. According to a respondent who was a legislator in the District of Bandulan, when it came to business of the stomach (urusan perut) the kiyai legislators acted just as badly as the others who were not kyai, and some of them were even worse than crowds of petty extortionists (korak), corrupt and deceitful. 726 The politicized kyai sometimes used their higher social status to manipulate their followers, and develop democratically unhealthy politics. As mentioned before, the political culture that was being developed by the political parties had been similar, that is, with the use of violence as a major political means. In PKB cases, the burnings of DPRD buildings in 2000 in Sampang by a PKB mob because of disappointment with the result of the Bupati election, the 1998/99 Dukun Santet and Ninja murders, and the burnings of offices belonging to Golkar, PDIP, PAN and PPP at the end of 2001, these were provoked and organized by some PKB kiyai politicians. 727 Also, the authoritarian culture which the national reformists had wanted to replace in the first place had been re-cycled by the political party. The conflicts between 725 The northern part of the East Java province was known as the tapal kuda (horseshoe) area where the PKB was numerically dominant. This area includes the island of Madura which consists of four Districts, and the District Regencies of Lamongan, Sidoarjo, Pasuruan, Probolinggo, Situbondo, Banyuwangi, Jember and Bondowoso (all real names). Most of the kyais had graduated from the pesantrens, rather than from secular schools. 726 Interview M Interview with the Speaker of DPRD. Interview P

343 the democratic values that the PKB had been trying to develop and the very nature of its traditional decision-making mechanism where patrimonialism and authoritarianism was inherent became a common problem. The conflict between, on one hand, the intention to obey the kyai in his decisions which relied mainly on his personal judgment and, on the other, the spirit of democracy where a decision is taken through a democratic mechanism, was obviously evident. A lack of solidarity was another institutional problem. When different kyai had different political positions, so did their followers. Whether religious matters should be separated from politics had been a long-standing debate within the PKB, but there had not yet been a broad agreement among PKB members about whether the obedience to the kyai would include non-religious political matters. Despite their good reputations in terms of religious knowledge, the new PKB politicians knowledge and experiences about a modern, democratic political institution were on the average just as low as those of the PDIP politicians. Internal conflicts within the PKB regarding the Pilkada, for example, were much the same as what happened in PDIP; most of the conflicts were resolved, or left unresolved, by power competitions, rather than democratic-like mechanisms. For example, in the 2003 Pilkada of Prambanan (pseudonym) District, former-president Abdurrahman Wahid, as the National Chairman (DPP) of the PKB, disagreed with the local leadership over which candidate for Bupati would be supported. According to Ltc.Wardoyo Hasim, a respondent who was a Deputy Chairman of the Prambanan DPRD, around two months before the election, Gusdur, as PKB National Chairman, met with Akabar Tanjung, as Golkar National Chairman, in Prambanan. 728 In the meeting it was agreed that the two leaders would support Cacuk Lamin, a Golkar member with a family background of NU, as their common Bupati candidate. The PKB central leadership argued that the PKB would need to support a Golkar candidate because the PKB lacked a capable member to hold that position, and it was agreed that Cacuk Lamin would have to support the PKB should he win the election. However, Cacuk Lamin was rejected by the local PKB legislators who decided to support Abdul Hamid, a PKB member who was the current DPRD Chairman but strongly ambitious to win the Bupati position. The stated reasons for the local rejection of Cacuk Lamin were that he was not a PKB member and was not from the local PKB grassroots. Because of this decision, the PKB central leadership took away Abdul Hamid s party membership, but he still managed to win the election with support from the PAN (National Mandate Party, a rival to the PKB, linked to the mass organization Muhammadyah, an Islamic alternative to the NU) and the F-TNI/POLRI. 729 Another respondent alleged that Abdul Hamid was successful because of the role that was played behind the scenes by Iwayan Bandoro, an East Javanese businessman who was known by most politicians as one of the strongest financial sponsors for local Heads 728 As mentioned previously, this meeting was architected by the former Bupati, Col. Maryoto (pseudonym) who, by inviting them to a wedding party, hoped his efforts would get support from the two Parties for a second term of office at the next Bupati election. However, at the meeting the two party leaders agreed on a different arrangement, that Maryoto was not to be supported. The pesantren itself did not support the agreement. The pesantren leader, instead, asked Golkar faction members to support Abdul Hamid (pseudonym) with a barter promise that in the 2004 election, all voters under the influence of the pesantren would vote for Golkar. Interview M88, with the Chairman of the F-TNI/POLRI. 729 As also mentioned in the previous chapter, Gusdur sent a complaining letter to the TNI for this military involvement in its supporting of Abdul Hamid. 311

344 elections. 730 This was confirmed by Wardoyo Hasyim, the Chairman of the F- TNI/POLRI in Prambanan, who told me that in the three days of public examination (uji publik) of the election result, it was reported that there had been money politics where every legislator who voted for Abdul Hamid received 200 million rupiah (about Aus$ 3,000) provided by Iwayan Bandoro. 731 Although, unfortunately, the case could never be proved because of lack of evidence, the public had their stereotype about the mentality of politicians reinforced. So, it was again evident that money was believed to strongly determine the decisions of party members in their political actions. Another example of the local-central conflicts of the PKB was shown by the differences in the 2003 East Java Governor s election where the Party did not have a unified voice over the candidate to be supported. While the grassroots wanted to promote a PKB member, the central leadership was not so confident about the capability of the PKB member being proposed for the position so decided to name a retired military officer as the candidate. 732 As a result, the PKB members positions were divided and this contributed to its failure to win the election. 733 The lack of self-confidence among the parties about their own members ability to occupy bupati/mayor positions was due to the fact that they were not yet ready to take over the positions after the sudden collapse of the New Order. Despite an enormous number of mass supporters who sustained the power of some wellknown reformist leaders at the national level, such as Abdurrahman Wahid (PKB), Megawati (PDIP), or Amin Rais (PAN), such leaders lacked local followers who had ready-to-use bureaucratic-related capabilities to run local government without support from the previous New Order s former bureaucrats. The case of Prambanan (pseudonym) District described above is one among only a few cases where the parties members were confident to take the local governments top positions. The common feature however was that both PDIP and PKB relied very much on the former New Order officials. One of the strategies that the parties made to cope with this shortage of human resources was by limiting the occupation by their own members to the deputy positions, such as Vice Bupati or Vice Mayors, and putting up former bureaucrats or retired military officers for the first positions in the name of their parties. The cases of Mangliawan and Sumber Yasin Districts described above exemplify this approach. Moreover, in those two cases where candidates were proposed by the local PKB faction and won the election, none in those elected to either the first or second positions were genuinely PKB members. In Mangliawan, the Bupati was a former Golkar member who had been a lecturer in the state university and the Vice Bupati was a 730 Another respondent also mentioned his name as the main supporter of the elected Mayor in Matur Anyar (pseudonym), Pardi Suripno (pseudonym). Interview M Interview M The central PKB decided to take retired Maj. General A Kahfi as the Party s Governor candidate, and ignored the aspiration at the grassroots that wanted to promote Syaifullah Yusuf, the National Chairman of Banser, the NU youth militia. 733 The F-KB as well as Golkar claimed that they were solid, so it was not sure which members did not vote according to the instruction. 312

345 PDIP politician, while in Sumber Yasin the Mayor was a retired military officer and the Vice Mayor was, again, a PDIP politician. So, the features of mass political participation and the under-developed level of political institutionalization were still two major problems in building a strong democratic institution, which could not be resolved simply by a military withdrawal from politics. The long term result of both processes, a relatively unchanged level and nature of political participation as well as an unsettled institutionalization of the political parties, might be a chronic public distrust towards the civilian political system. Eventually, this could converge with the anti-politician attitude of the military. When it comes to a perceived growing need for a stable political system that the military appeared to be ready to offer, the public might not only accept to the strengthening of the military in politics, but also might possibly support it. In this perspective, it is quite relevant to recall a theoretical assertion (discussed in Chapter Two pp ) that the inability of the civilian politics to provide an effective control over the military would be also because of the inability of the civilian politicians to satisfy the public with effective, stable politics, instead of solely because of the political ambitions from the military. 4. Money politics problems and post-election implications It would be a mistake, however, to see the internal conflicts within the Parties over the candidates for District Heads as purely caused by differences in political perceptions between promoting the Parties own cadres but with a bigger risk of being defeated on one hand, and accepting non-cadres who are more likely to win on the other. This reasoning was mixed up with motivations of politicians to pursue their personal interests. In some cases, it appeared that this second motive dominated the first. Again, the cases of Tunggal Redjo, Buluhlawang, and Prambanan exemplified this. The process of democratization, including the withdrawal of the military from the local politics, had impacts on the quality of a local election, its process and the new leaders that it produced, thus usually had implications for post-election governance in the District. Theoretically, if the new local leaders were produced by fair and democratic elections, they would be more able to bring new hopes for a better quality of democracy in the local governance. In comparison, those who 313

346 came to power through a process flawed by such as money politics, deceitful campaigns or conspiracy may be less able to do so; having to devote some part of their power to provide appropriate satisfaction to those involved in the flaws or to keep them hidden, at the expense of democracy. East Java s District elections demonstrated such a wide range in degree of democratic quality that it is nearly impossible to neatly classify them, but they generally stood somewhere in between the two extremes of perfectly democratic and completely flawed. The military withdrawal from formal parliamentary politics had moved them away from the New Order model of non-democratic elections towards, but still far from, perfectly democratic elections. As revealed, protests over the results of the District elections were common in East Java. These included various allegations, usually that the winners had been involved in money politics 734, falsifying documents 735 and/or other corruption scandals 736. Also there were disputed procedures 737. However, although most protests failed to revoke the results, the tensions continued. In some cases the installation of elected leaders was delayed for months, 738 in others the situations developed into destructive relations between the competing groups, as obviously demonstrated in the Sumber Yasin and Sumberwaras cases discussed. As described previously, in the New Order regime, the executive generally dominated the relations, with the legislature functioning mainly as a rubber stamp to justify and democratically legitimate most of the policies issued by the executive. Under the new civilian leaders there have been four variations of relations found in different Districts of East Java: executive domination, legislature domination, collusive and conflicting. This study suggests that each of these variations was very strongly connected to the elections that produced the leaders. An executive domination indicated an insignificant change from the old pattern prevailing during the previous regime. In the District of Tunggal Redjo, as one F-KB respondent described it above; Golkar kept dominating the local politics. The latest District Head election for the period of was won by Golkar, thus maintaining its grip on power by occupying the legislative leadership position of the Chairman of the DPRD and the executive leadership Bupati position. As described previously, although in the 1999 election the PDIP became the biggest faction (with fourteen seats) and the PKB the second biggest (twelve), eleven of the PDIP legislators joined the Golkar group along with the rest of the legislature s members, and left the PKB alone as a small group of opposition. Two thirds of the legislature s members were loyal supporters of the current executive leader. The spouse of the Bupati was a big business person in this district, and he could buy 734 For example, Jember (Interview P46), Banyuwangi (Interview M55), or Probolinggo Regency (Interview M88). 735 For example, Pasuruan Regency. Interview M For example, Jember Regency. Interview B For example, in Sampang, the election result was challenged because one voter of the winning group had been issued with a resignation letter by the Minister of Home Affairs, but this had not yet been followed up by the Sampang DPRD. The dispute was whether he did or did not have a right to vote. Interview P58. See also document about the decision of Surabaya Court on the Sampang Bupati Election Dispute. The front cover of this document is shown in Appendix In Districts such as Jember, Banyuwangi, Pamekasan, Sampang, Tulungagung or Pasuruan the inaugurations of the elected leaders were delayed several months because of the protests. Interviews P46, M55, K58, B96 and M99 (All respondents were members of the respective Districts DPRD). 314

347 the loyalty even from the members of the opponent parties. The only difference between the previous and the current regime is in terms of the means while the previous regime used oppression, the current one used money but in the pattern of the relations they are the same, that is, the executive dominates the relations. 739 In legislature domination it was found that the legislators went too far, intervening even into non-political, bureaucratic technicalities with, frequently, these interventions being ill-motivated and self-interested. For example, the Malang Regency was described by several respondents as being in this category because the Legislature was so dominant that it was difficult for the Executive leader, the Bupati, to initiate and implement development projects within the time expected. He was originally elected to be Deputy Bupati but had assumed power because the Bupati had died. My respondents described him as being far less capable than the previous District Head in terms of leadership, educational and political background. He was in many ways not supported by the faction of his own party, the F-DIP, because he had been proposed for the position by the F- KB. The Speaker of the Regency DPRD, who was a PKB local leader, was so dominant in controlling him mainly because he was a powerful politician who had organised the rise of the new Bupati into that position. The respondents also complained that some legislators intervened too deep into the technicalities of bureaucracy (hal hal teknis birokrasi), including into the career development of some of the lower level officials. 740 In an area where the executive-legislative relations were marked by Collusion, the two institutions managed to agree to carry out unpopular policies for the selfinterested benefits of both sides. The Government of the District of Ponorogo, for example, was headed by a former Golkar bureaucrat who came to power in the 2000 election with the support of the PDIP, one of whose members occupied the position of DPRD Speaker. The collusion described by a respondent was between these two, the District Head and the Speaker. The respondent said that several times in DPRD meetings he had tried to criticize the Executive for not being transparent in the development projects but had always been told by his own faction leader to stop criticizing because some DPRD leaders were individually involved in those projects. 741 Where there were Conflicting relations the legislators used their controlling role destructively, such as in exaggerating the Executive s mistakes without offering any solutions but with the main aim to topple the existing Executive leaders, while the Executive did not respond properly to the complaints advanced by the legislators; both sides using power approaches and arrogance instead and failing to solve their differences. The cases of Surabaya and Sampang, for example, fell within this category. 739 Interview K Interviews B12, M15, B14 (all officials of the Malang Regency Government). 741 Interview M

348 As argued above, money politics and unresolved political conflicts could hinder the attempts to establish local democratic elections, to produce the best qualified leaders, and for the new leaders to perform their best leadership - all of which are needed for developing an effective democratic system in post-new Order Indonesia. It may be argued about whether there was a cause-and-effect relation between the military political withdrawal and such imperfect attitudes of the politicians or they were mainly coincidental. However, looking at the post-election implications having been mentioned above it would not be difficult to agree that the withdrawal of the military from politics has not resulted in, and will not automatically produce a strong, effective and democratic political system. This is much more complex than simply a matter of withdrawing the military from politics which provided necessary but not sufficient conditions. Furthermore, many decisions within a faction or party were made through power approaches, rather than in democratic ways. The persons or groups that hold stronger, including higher positional, power within the party tended to impose their views upon the others. This simply recycled the previously prevailing authoritarian decision-making process which had been intended to be replaced, rather than developing a full and open democratic one. As many politicians found themselves powerless within such an organizational mechanism, they attempted to exercise their power outside the institutional arrangements, such as by secretly affiliating individually with other, including opposing, groups, thereby sacrificing their loyalty to their party institutions. Both the authoritarianism tendency and the individual bypassing weakened the evolution of democratic institutions needed to produce better democratic standards in the practices of politics. The quality of the outcomes of future elections will depend greatly on the improvement of the political attitudes of the civilian politicians to become more mature democratically. 6. Conclusion The discussion about political participation above highlighted the feature of public participation in politics exemplified by the PGR, Party Communication Post, case discussed in Chapter Five. It appeared that the nature of participation had not been able to significantly depart from what Huntington described as praetorian society in which the social forces expressed their political actions directly and nakedly [and mostly destructively] without an effective political system to mediate them. 742 Although the period around the last year of the New Order and the first years of the post-new Order demonstrated new characteristics of the 742 In a praetorian society, Huntington said, every element of the society is politicized. See Chapter Two. In Indonesia, there was a politicized military, politicized university and politicized students, politicized religious clerics (ulama) and boarding house schools (pesantrens), and politicized labourers. 316

349 participation slightly higher and yet disorderly, in general, the level of political participation remained low, and the majority remained passive and sceptical toward politics. In terms of the institutionalization of political parties, the study suggests that two important factors, the parties internal solidarity and autonomy, remained difficult challenges in the efforts of political institutionalization, 743 an important process by which a strong and effective political system is established. In many ways, the interplay between the short-term individual economic motives of the politicians and the patrimonial traditions inherited in the political culture strongly influenced the lack of solidarity and autonomy of the political parties. So, the roots of the problems were similar to those the described cases of public political participation have indicated. How can the interconnection of these two factors be explained? The findings of this study indicate that the prevailing political culture determined that the politics commanded the economy, so being involved in politics was seen as the way to be closer to the power that controlled the economic resources. Therefore, in order to be able to maximize the achievement, considerations for political actions, including political attachments, followed what appeared to best serve the economic interests; and this far exceeded that loyalty to the institution which would be a prerequisite for the institution s solidarity. Similarly, the institutional autonomy was easily undermined by external forces intervention simply because the individuals who ran the institutions had connections of economic interest with the external interest groups Huntington, for example, outlines four factors of political institutionalization: Cohesiveness, Flexibility, Complexity and Autonomy. See Huntington, Political Order in Changing Societies, (New Haven: Yale University, 1968), pp In my personal communication with Jim Schiller, a leading Flinders University scholar on Indonesian local politics, Schiller suggested that the view of post-soeharto democracy in this study that seems to show a lack of moral standards in politicians is not worse than moral standards in other Asian democracies, in the military and bureaucracy under Soeharto, in the US or France or Italy. He argued that democratization in Indonesia occurred because of the sudden collapse of Soeharto s New Order regime, while the democratizers or reformists who took over the political control lacked a reform plan and adequate democratic experiences, while they had also to take over all problems of the country left by the New Order. So, in a more optimistic view, as in time the politicians will get more experience in establishing and running a well-functioning democratic system, so they will eventually be able to provide a better civilian control over the military and to prevent the return of the military to its previous political domination. 317

350 As noted in the section about the political participation above, violent types of political pressures could be counter-productive to the long-term efforts of building a democratic society, an essential condition to establish civilian control over the military. Not only could it simply make the silent majority that was frequently deprived by the actions unsympathetic to the actions, it could also force them to accept or approve repressive state actions toward the mass movements, thus providing de facto justification for the repression as it was done under the banner of public interest. As the result, the seeds of democracy would be difficult to grow and develop. Therefore, improving civilian political institutions that would be able to effectively accommodate, organize and process the growing public participation into positive and constructive forces will be needed to produce an effective, democratic civilian political system impervious to various kinds of military political intervention. 318

351 Chapter Twelve DEMILITARIZATION OF LOCAL POLITICS, DEPOLITICIZATION OF THE MILITARY AND DEMOCRATIZATION IN EAST JAVA: ANALYSIS OF FINDINGS 1. Introduction For many of those who care about the role of the Indonesian military in politics, the collapse of Suharto s New Order regime in 1998 instigated curiosity and concerns about the impacts that subsequent political change would have on that role. It had played a long-standing and systematic political role in that regime. What would happen in military politics? What would be the new roles of the military in politics? Soon afterwards it became clear from many studies that the most central issue of military politics in post-suharto Indonesia was the complete withdrawal of the military from politics. Nevertheless, many questions related to this issue remain unanswered or unsatisfactorily answered. As noted earlier, most studies did not explore the issue deeply into the local cases where the military politics in Indonesia has been systematically ingrained for a long time. Therefore, the specific aim of this study was to explain the process and impact of this withdrawal at the local level: on local military, on local politics, on the newly democratic content of local civil-military relations, and on the form and quality of the establishing of the new democracy. Relying mainly on extensive primary data collected in East Java over the year from February 2002 to February 2003, the study focuses carefully on the Indonesian military politics of a specific place and time. A description and analysis of the relations between the military and politics in East Java from 1998 to 2003 is reported in the previous seven case-study chapters. The case of this major province of Indonesia can contribute many insights to answering broader questions, such as how and why Indonesian military politics has changed in the way it has, and what has been achieved or is likely to be achieved in efforts to reform this military. 319

352 This chapter will provide summaries of the elements of the case study which have been presented in detail in the preceding chapters and conclude with a final analysis. Chapter Five, the first case study chapter, examined how local events around the collapse of the military-backed New Order regime in mid-1998 affected military-society relations preceding the subsequent withdrawal. The discussion of Chapter Six described and evaluated the institutional reforms, the core of the withdrawal policy, which dismantled the systematic involvement of the New Order s military in politics at the local level. The next two chapters examined the impacts on the local involvements of the military in real political activities, in which it had been dominant, by analysing the political roles and influence of the local military in attempting to manipulate the outcomes of the post-1998 local elections (Pilkada). Chapters Nine and Ten reported the impact of the withdrawal on local military both on karya officers (previously) appointed to non-military jobs and on military territorial units whose defence and security jobs were connected closely to local political affairs to illuminate some of the problems in establishing an apolitical, professional military. Chapter Eleven completed the report of the case study by observations on the civilian side of local politics, involving the general society, elites and political parties, to more clearly provide for understanding what is needed for the establishment of strong and effective civilian political institutions in the absence of the military. The following sections will summarize these seven case-study chapters. 2. Military-society relations preceding the withdrawal 745 we [the officers and soldiers] did not want to be unnecessary heroes (pahlawan kesiangan); we do not want to be blamed for violating human rights and victimized for the favour of the elite; If our commanders cannot protect themselves from the Human Rights 745 As mentioned this section is based on the material in Chapter Five. 320

353 charges, there was no way they would protect us, if we commit similar offences. 746 The economic and political catastrophe that provoked the collapse of the New Order regime in mid-1998 led many East Javanese people to carry out various forms of action to express their angers. Labourers held massive strikes; demonstrators ransacked and occupied government offices, then forced local government and village leaders to resign; mobs attacked the Chinese community; villagers unlawfully reclaimed state lands, and mysterious Ninja killers murdered hundreds of accused sorcerers (Dukun Santet), then mobs inhumanely killed hundreds of those suspected of being Ninja members. These state-society or communal tensions and conflicts at the local level where the people had lost trust or fear of coercive measures posed by the (military) government authority, while the soldiers and officers were not only restrained from using its coercive power 747 but also demonstrated a disastrous failure of security management in maintaining law and order are just small pieces of the complex features of the political circumstances in which a dramatic change in military politics in Indonesia was occurring. The quotations at the start of this section clearly suggest a feeling of loss of self-confidence among soldiers and officers at the local unit level when facing the rioting just mentioned. Such a feeling seems to have been the same reason why the orders from the higher commands to deploy the troops were received late or after riots had happened; as one respondent said, the higher commanders unwillingness to take responsibility because of fear of human rights violation charges. In fact, the officers and soldiers in the lower (field) units could feel how their higher leaders were very nervous from too many warnings from the Headquarters. As reported in my interviews with them, they were warned to remain on base to avoid being accused or caught as a suspected Ninja killer, to keep a 746 See footnote 63, 64, p As noted earlier, in fact, the ransacked Camat office in Rengel was located next to the Sub-district Military Command Headquarters (Koramil); the mobs came into and threatened to burn down the Koramil in Kencong, Jember when searching for Chinese who were allegedly hiding inside the headquarters; many unilateral landreclaims by local people even included the military s training areas such as in Malang and Pasuruan. 321

354 number of troops on the base to prevent attacks by the mobs, to avoid wearing military attributes on clothes, cars or motorcycles in public appearances, and to prioritize securing the military units and personnel first before trying to stop the riots. 748 Meanwhile, at the local leadership level there was a lack of clarity of instructions regarding changing operational procedures after the transfer of the Control and Command (Kodal) of security operations from the military commander to the police chief on 14 May As some local military and police respondents told me, the field commanders were not only confused by the new procedures, but there were also cases of subtle competition between the military and the police about who would be in charge of the security funds (dana taktis komandan). 749 On the other hand, as expressed by some of the local officers and soldiers, in the 1998 chaos the soldiers were too reluctant (ogah-ogahan), sick (muak) and bored (bosan) to carry out the security operations; some of them even sharing social jealousy with local people against the Chinese. Moreover, resentment toward the civilians reform demands made the military more apathetic (instead of concerned) about security issues. When I asked why the military did not take firm steps to prevent or stop the riots, a respondent replied, Let them [people] know what they got from the reform era, that they would not be able to solve their problems without us [the military], and that they did not really want us to go back to barracks. Several thought this would make the civilians learn to appreciate them. Also important was, as a respondent said, that no one was sure about two controversial rumours: whether the rioters were the reformist groups who were attacking the New Order s elements of power, or were New Order loyalists, including the military, orchestrating the riots in trying to discredit the reform movements. We were confused and what was important at 748 Indeed, as military respondents in some local units reported, there had been some small incidents between local communities and the soldiers as they passed through civilian areas. 749 More about this case of military-police separation will be dealt with later. 322

355 that time was how to secure myself and my family, because nobody (else) would, not even the commanders would. 750 So, caution or reluctance to act seemed to be the common local choice to secure themselves in the uncertain situations, and this choice became the main characteristic of the military attitude at the local level post This may be an important clue to why the military did not take firm actions against people s actions during 1998/1999. The change in military-society relations was also symbolized by emergence of versions of grassroots democracy, such as shown by the mushrooming of the PDIP-colored, red and black, Mutual Aid Communication Post shelters called PGR (Posko Gotong Royong). As instructed by Megawati Sukarnoputri, the Chairwoman of PDIP, in August 1998 PDIP members built tens of thousands of PGR shelters on the sides of roads, in some places only about two hundred metres or less apart, on the corners of town squares or near train stations, markets or in the villages centres, and even in unused yard spaces of public buildings. Many pedicab drivers, street vendors, unskilled labourers, unemployed, homeless or beggars were recruited as new PDIP members through the PGR. In the 1999 election the PGR activities clearly demonstrated a great mobilization of the grassroots and contributed significantly to the success of the PDIP in becoming the largest party, partly due to the attractiveness of the platform it presented of being the party of the little people (wong cilik). Many of those who managed the construction of the PGR shelters were recruited from the groups traditionally regarded by the military or police as sources of criminals, therefore the existence of the PGR were viewed suspiciously and cynically by the military. The criticism by an Islamic activist that the name Posko sounded like a military term was shared by military respondents who were concerned about the use of the word Posko which in the abbreviations of Indonesian military terminology means Command Post and regarded them as being a rebellious (but chaotic) way to challenge the existence of the military territorial command Footnote 65, p See Chapter Five, pp

356 Despite these concerns, the military in East Java did not take any significant steps to deal with the PGR as the officers and the soldiers at the local level were uncertain about how to cope with them as they were established under the banner of reform and democratization. 752 The mushrooming of PGR shelters and their activities appeared independent from the control of the military. This made the military anxious about an emergence of a strong group of social forces that would resist the continued involvement of the military in politics, and indirectly increased the pressure for the military withdrawal from politics. So, widespread de-legitimization of the New Order regime, including its military, turned over the military-society relations; the military s control weakened significantly over the local society which, correspondingly, gained stronger power. The almost collapse of law and order locally, the de-legitimization and demoralization of the military and the emergence of the local grassroots-like politics show that defending the New Order regime by the military would be politically unrealistic. Instead, the decision to withdraw from politics was probably thought to stop the near-anarchic situation from developing, to save the country and the military s image from worsening much further and thus to limit the loss of the military s political power. Yet, precisely in what ways that situation influenced the military leaders political perceptions in Jakarta to initiate the withdrawal policies will need further study. 3. Institutional Reforms 753 Although in 1998/1999 public pressure reduced the previous effectiveness of the New Order s instruments of power as mentioned earlier, most of their main components the military, bureaucracies, and Golkar were still well in place. As Chapter Six documented, the military s systematic 752 Footnote 89, p This section based mainly on the material of Chapter Six. 324

357 and formal involvement in politics was reduced only after these machines began to be dismantled in 1999 through the so-called TNI s Internal Reform (reformasi internal TNI). 754 The reform involved a wide range of policies. Those readily identifiable and prominent at the local level included the abolition of the political functions previously attached to the military territorial units, the withdrawal of military officers from their civilian positions in the local governments, and the reduction (and then abolition in 2004) of the military-appointed representatives in the local parliaments/dprd. In addition to these internal reforms were the decentralization-related policies that changed the structure of local government bureaucracy and were complementary to the TNI s Internal Reform. Chapter Three described the organizational elements attached to the territorial units that were assigned political roles during the New Order era. As analysed in Chapter Six, these organizational elements, which included the Staf Sospol, Wansopol, Bakorstada and Litsus, were liquidated in the early post-new Order period. The Staf Sospol (Social Political Staff), one of five main Staff Structures directly under the Chief of Staff of the Territorial Command, Koter, 755 which was responsible for coordinating the political roles of the Koter, was replaced by Komsos (Social Communication) from April 1, Its level of authority was reduced by two levels, at Kodam level for example, from a Colonel-headed staff section to a Major-headed sub-section subordinate to the Territorial Staff. The staff numbers were also reduced by more than half. Similar reductions were made to the lower levels of Koter, such as Korem and Kodim. This reduction, not elimination, had a significant impact, despite some limitation. According to former staff officers of Staf Sospol, unlike the past Staf Sospol which controlled the members of the DPRD s military faction, the F-TNI/ POLRI, the Komsos sub-section simply 754 Detail of reform elements are presented in Chapter Five, Table V. 1, p The organizational structure of Koter is presented in Chapter Three, Table III 1, p

358 helped administrative aspects of the factions and was much less active than the former Sospol. 756 So, its function had been narrowed. Another element that was eliminated was the Board of Sospol (at Kodam Wansospolda, at Korem Wansospolrem), through which Territorial top leaders, as the Heads and members of Wansospol, determined which personnel would occupy the positions of District Bupati, Mayor or other civilian positions in government. 757 Without Wansospol territorial commanders could still play their political roles in the Bupati or Mayor elections, but, as discussed in Chapters Seven and Eight, their political influences had become very much limited. Lastly, those of Koter s political elements abolished in 2000 with the broadest political influences 758 were the regional level Bakorstada (at national level Bakorstanas) and the political screening bodies or Litsus. 759 Although de facto Bakorstada and Litsus had already effectively ceased to operate in 1998/1999 before they were formally eliminated, 760 their formal abolition closed the possibility of reviving and restoring them in the future. 761 While the removal of political elements attached to the military formally depoliticized the military institutions, the withdrawal of military officers from the civilian local bureaucracies (Pemda) and the reduction of (in 2004 elimination of) military seats in local parliaments (DPRD) formally demilitarized the civilian political institutions. 756 The limitation was however, as suggested by an officer working in this section, that Komsos still follows the same job description as Staf Sospol. Also, many civilian (politician) respondents told me that they were linked to the Territorial Assistant or the Pangdam by Komsos and Territorial Staff in seeking support from Kodam in the case of Bupati or Mayoral Elections. See footnote 7, p Wansospol is described in Chapter Three, pp As described in Chapter Three, pp , Bakorstada s very wide responsibilities included all aspects (social, political, economic, religious, or cultural) that were deemed important to the maintenance of national stability and resilience. 759 See pp See land conflicts discussed in Chapter Five for example. 761 As noted in p. 127, this abolition had never been outlined in the military internal-reform programs as the military have never thought that the latent communist threats (these bodies were aimed to prevent them) had diminished. Looking at how easy it was (there was no significant evidence of resistance by the military) when President Wahid abolished these institutions, by issuing a Presidential Decree, one could consider how weak the military s political position was at that time. 326

359 As reported earlier, karya officers (those who occupied civilian jobs) were instructed to choose one of three choices: to come back to their military units; to retire early; or to change their status from military to being civil servants. 762 Those in the positions of local government leaders as Bupatis or Mayors mostly chose to be retired early and run for a second term in elections for a second five-year period in office. However, only two of the eighteen of them in East Java in fact managed to extend their positions into the second term. Most officers who were not in the government leadership positions returned to their military units, while a small number of officers became civil servants. As the result, by mid-august 2000, in East Java there were no longer any active military officers serving as the Heads of local government executives (except Col. Indarto, the Bupati of Tuban, who retired in 2001) and there were no longer any officers assigned to the Heads of staff in East Java District governments. So, the implementation of the policy of withdrawal from civilian institutions actually did abolish the military s presence and direct control over the local government executives policies through which political power and economic resources were directed. In other words, the withdrawal also reduced the central military s control over local politics. Moreover, as the local executive dominated local politics, withdrawal from the local executive leader positions meant also a decline in the military s control over other local institutions such as the legislative and judiciary bodies. For example, in the Muspida, an informal forum where the leaders of local institutions met, the position of the Bupati or Mayor was very strong. 763 Now, under civilian leadership, the Muspida still exist, but the military (the Dandim being the only military officer left in the forum) can no longer dominate or steer the forum. Compared to the relatively rapid withdrawal of the military from executive government jobs, the withdrawal from parliament took a longer process, 762 As page 128 noted, this is the Instruction: No. Kep/03/P/II/1999 of the Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces, General Wiranto, signed on 15 February Previously, the structure of formal authority at the district level, for example, was clearly characterized by the strong top-down hierarchical control by the Bupati or Mayor who was also usually the most senior Colonel among other Heads of local institutions. A retired-military officer who was the Speaker of a local Assembly s F-ABRI in 1998 reported that until 1998 everything was determined by the Mayor (Pak Wali) see footnote 35, p

360 involving two steps. After their number was halved (from 20% to 10 % of the total DPRD members) in the 1999 election, the military representatives (F-TNI/POLRI) were eliminated in the 2004 election. (The second step is not covered by this study). The halving of the F-TNI/POLRI numbers made the faction much weaker after the 1999 election, compared for example to factions such as the F-DIP or F-KB which occupied around a half or, in some districts, even took around two-thirds of the total seats. Besides, because of the termination of its alliance with Golkar, the military families and relatives were also removed from the Golkar faction. In addition, my data shows that after 1999 there have been no military officers serving as the Speaker of the DPRD or the Chairman of DPRD Committees in any district of East Java. It also seems that since 1999 the positions as the members of F-TNI/POLRI became less important for the military. The jobs that before 1999 were filled by Lieutenant Colonels (middle rank officers) who had considerable political experience and knowledge, after 1999 were occupied mainly by Majors and Captains, even First and Second Lieutenants, the lowest rank of military officers, who had very little, or no, previous experience in the practices of politics. Although still around twenty percent were Lieutenant Colonels, mostly they were about to retire. Also, some of the F-TNI/POLRI members did not view their DPRD jobs as requiring them to follow the sistem komando (the command system), referring to having to work for the interests of the institutions. 764 Lastly, there was an increasing resistance by the public to the existence of any military in the DPRD. For example, in the DPRD of Malang City and of Ponorogo Regency, the F-TNI/POLRI was left out of the DPRD meetings with local people as requested by these people. (See sub-section3.2. of Chapter Six) Considering all of those factors that were important in minimizing the military s political power in the DPRD, some civilian politicians seem to be 764 As noted, Lieutenant Colonel (Police) Dwi Usyanto, stressed the nature of the appointment as military assignments (penugasan) in suggesting that the faction members have to follow the instructions, while Lieutenant Colonel Paulus argued that the role of being a representative of the people because they are members of a DPRD/Local House of People s Representatives), not perwakilan militer (representatives of the military). See footnotes 52 and 53, pp

361 correct when, for example, Bambang Priyo Utomo, a Golkar politician of Malang City described the post-1999 F-TNI/ POLRI members as much less solid and more individual-oriented more ignorant of public aspirations, even as (they) ignored the aspirations of the military units, or when Mashuri Abdul Rochim, a senior Golkar politician in Batu Municipality, said they were too innocent (terlalu lugu), and too conservative, much less skilful politically than the current civilian politicians. As will be mentioned more in the later summary section about the bupati/mayor elections, this deterioration was also caused by conflicts of interests among the military elements that limited their solidarity. Institutional reforms to separate the military from political institutions were also affected in several ways by the decentralization programs brought about by the new Autonomy Law No. 22/1999. Firstly, the Law that restructured the local government structures replaced the military-created political office (Kansospol) within the local government with the Bakesbang which was no longer given political authority to monitor the political activities of the government employees, political parties or organizations, and societies. An official of the Bakesbang of Malang Regency told me that the liquidation of the Kansospol diminished the military s political channel in the bureaucratic structure. 765 Secondly, because the new Autonomy Law gave the legislature stronger control over the executive, it became difficult for the local military to get financial assistance for the provision of security directly from the executive (more about this will be discussed later). Thirdly, the new Law changed the rules of the local elections which, as also considered later, minimized the roles and ability of the military in steering the outcomes of the elections. Fourthly, the new Law authorizes District Governments to communicate directly with the Central Government without passing through or the consent of the Provincial Government. This reduced the power of the Provincial 765 Although, as noted, some degree of intelligence coordination through the FKI (Intelligence Coordination Forum) preserves some of the military s direct channel in the Bakesbang, as a staff member of the Bakesbang of Malang Regency said, the Forum is much less intensive than when Kansospol existed and the scope of relations has been very much limited compare with the old Kansospol. For more detail see pp

362 Government officials, as well as of (Provincial) Pangdam, in many internal matters of the Districts. 766 These three institutional reforms, the abolition of political elements within the territorial structures, the withdrawal of the military from local bureaucracies and DPRD, and the decentralization, were crucial in reestablishing stricter boundaries between the military and the civilian political institutions and cut down the military s direct political roles. 4. Impacts on military involvement in Pilkada elections 767 A few months before the Pilkada [in Sumberwaras] was held, we came to the Kodam [to meet a senior officer] to request that Kodam guarantee that F-TNI/POLRI members vote on our side as the biggest faction [F-KB], and as a concession we would accept [vote for] any military man appointed by Kodam as bupati candidate if he was proposed through F-KB. 768 Involvement in the Pilkada was crucial for the military politics in the New Order era because, as suggested in Chapter 3, this helped maximize control over the top and strategic positions in local politics, thus over all aspects of local power; social, political, economic or security. Therefore, in fact, the military had dominated all stages of the election. 769 Chapter Seven shows how this military power in the Pilkada declined because of some interrelated factors in the broader development of political change since In contrast to the period pre-may 1998 when nineteen out of the thirty seven Districts in East Java were headed by military officers, in the first five-year period of the reform only three retired military officers, and no active-duty officers, were elected. (See Table VII.2). 766 As reported sub-section 4.4 the Kodam could not replace the military representatives in several districts although the officers had been retired but the DPRD refused the replacement because it would affect the local balance of power in the DPRD. As also reported earlier, in the TMD/TNI Masuk Desa (Soldiers Go into the Villages) programs, some DPRD refused to support the financial needs of the programs as requested by the Kodam. 767 This section mainly based on the more detailed material in Chapters Seven and Eight. 768 Interview with Success Team of F-KB (for the 2000 Pilkada) in Sumberwaras in June A detailed description of these stages is presented in Chapter Seven, Diagram VII. 1, p

363 An early change of the military role in the Pilkada was observable in two cases, the Pilkada in the District of Sumbersari held soon after B. J. Habibie took over the Presidency in May 1998, and another in Ngadiredjo shortly after Abdurrahman Wahid had replaced him in October A public rejection of all nominated candidates successfully forced the Sumbersari DPRD to agree to restart the election process. 770 For the first time after thirty-two years, twenty-six applicants were openly registered although, after being sorted by a Technical Committee chaired by a military Colonel, the number was cut by a half to thirteen. A senior military officer who had been nominated previously and favoured by the military headquarters remained in the new list. However, although the Committee still had enough authority to determine who were eligible or who were not to continue to the next stage of the process, the effort to secure the victory of that officer was getting harder. In the DPRD voting to nominate five of the thirteen eligible candidates, of the total forty five members of the DPRD only eleven voted for him, with the same number of votes for his main challenger, a (civilian) Golkar cadre. Again, the Ministry of Internal Affairs and the East Java Governor used their authority to remove this challenger s name from the approved list, but then Golkar shifted its support to another candidate of its own, 771 so Golkar kept challenging. To secure the officer s victory the military then had to use direct intervention including distribution of money (amplop, envelopes ) and intimidation (ancaman), such as a secret invitation of all forty five members of the legislature to the office of a military territorial commander, and the distribution of two million rupiah for each person, as well as a warning to comply with the military s preference. 772 When the election was held, of the forty five members of DPRD, only F-ABRI and F-KP [Golkar] (twenty- 770 Five Mayoral Candidate nominees announced by the DPRD on May , only two days before the resignation of Suharto were cancelled. See p Eleven votes were also given to Edi Rusdi (Golkar), eight to Iman Harun (Golkar), eight to Colonel Harris, (military) and three to Dedi Taher (PPP). In fact, Edi Rusdi, a Golkar member, gained increasingly strong public support. See p The respondent said that Kodam did no longer tell exactly what to do and how the F-TNI/POLRI would be able to secure the victory of the military Bupati candidate, although Kodam should have been able to ask Chinese business partners close to it to help them with money needed to bribe the voter with bigger amount of money. See footnote 43, p

364 six altogether) complied with the instruction to vote for the officer, while the sixteen members of the PPP and the three of the PDI abstained. So, despite the end result, the F-KP members different line from the military s at the early stage, and the abstaining by the F-PP and F-DI members at the voting stage marked a real new challenge to the local military power over the Pilkada. A year and a half later in Ngadiredjo, the local challenge to the military was even stronger. A Bupati candidate proposed by Golkar defeated a military officer proposed by the F-TNI/POLRI. The military s efforts to influence the Golkar (F- Golkar/F-KP) members failed. Even threats and intimidations were no longer effective. Phone messages sent to the houses of the Chairman of Golkar (my respondent) and the Golkar Bupati candidate s, saying that [their families] would be killed if that military officer failed to become the Bupati were ignored. Meanwhile, the amount of bribe money that the local military could pay was too small to defeat Golkar s candidate. 773 Moreover, in Ngadiredjo, as a result of the policies operating after the 1999 national election, the number of the military representatives in the local assembly had been cut down by half (to only five of the forty-five members), and they failed in competition against F-Golkar to gain support from the other factions, especially the F-DIP that held nineteen seats and the F-KB with seven seats. Lastly, as a military respondent said, the F-TNI/ POLRI members were ignored by their higher Headquarters, although they knew that the institutions expected them to bring the victory for the candidate from the military (mensukseskan calon dari KBT). 774 The Ngadiredjo Election case was the only one in East Java where the new DPRD accepted the nomination process prepared by the previous DPRD, while in another five elections (Lamongan, Surabaya City, Jember, Situbondo, and Gresik) the new DPRD decided to restart them. From 2000 onward the military position in the Pilkada was no longer dominant. Up to December 2003, from twenty nine 773 This respondent of mine said that he was also then invited to the Ngadiredjo s Kodim office to meet the Commander who angrily blamed him as the main cause of the failure of the military Bupati candidate because he was the Chairman of the F-KP. See footnote 63, p See the last paragraph on p

365 District Head (Bupati or Mayor) elections, only in four elections did the military faction s role seem to have been significant in achieving victory for the candidates of the group or groups with which it had affiliated itself. 775 In most cases, the military was a minor player. 776 One of the important factors that limited the military s political influence in local elections had been the local emergence of a majority party after the 1999 election. 777 Military respondents said that the F- TNI/POLRI had not much choice other than supporting the majority, otherwise the faction would create difficulties in relationships with the Bupati, not only for the faction itself but also for the military units stationed here. Another important factor was that the military was left out by powerful coalitions when it became an unimportant player. 778 Despite a promising picture shown by this declining trend of the military influence, there was a more gloomy part of the picture shown by active involvement at individual level, as discussed in Chapter Eight. There were some indications that the political activities of those appointed to the local DPRD supposedly to be military representatives were not effectively controlled by the military institution. In the Sumberwaras Bupati election in 2000, for example, the voices of the F- TNI/POLRI members were divided into two blocks: three officers siding with the F- KB (the faction of the Awakening Party, PKB) and two with the F-PP (the faction of the United Development Party, PPP). The Dandim of Sumberwaras, who was supposed to supervise the F-TNI/POLRI members, was busy with his own ambition to register as a Bupati candidate - who these faction members did not support. Meanwhile, a senior officer in the provincial Kodam Headquarters secretly promised the F-KB that the members of the F-TNI/POLRI would support 775 These regencies were Lamongan, Jember, Ponorogo, and Madiun, see Table VII.3, pp , 776 In eight cases, the military faction members were divided, indicating that the institutional control and internal solidarity was weakening. For more information about the election cases see Table VII.3, p In East Java the PKB became the majority party in four districts: of the total forty five seats of each DPRD it occupied thirty in Situbondo, twenty five in Sumenep, twenty five in Bangkalan and twenty eight in Bondowoso. For more information about the election results in these four Districts see p See the election cases of Trenggalek (2000), Malang (2000), and Nganjuk (2003), on pp

366 the F-KB. 779 As seen in Table VIII.1, in at least seven cases the military faction s members were divided into different competing groups. Personal considerations seemed quite dominant in creating such divisions. In Sumberwaras, for example, the reasons included, first, a personal debt to the Bupati candidate, who had helped the son of the officer (who supported the Bupati candidate) to get accepted as a student of AKPOL, the prestigious Police Academy; and second, a personal attachment to the Bupati candidate, the officer who supported had once been a direct subordinate officer, when they were both serving at the AKPOL. Both of these F-TNI/POLRI members disobeyed the instructions from a senior officer of Kodam to support the F-KB, that is, to vote for another candidate who once had been this officer s personal assistant. 780 Various personal considerations for having political positions by the officers were found in the Pilkadas in different Districts, yet personal economic gains from the money provided by the Bupati candidates seemed to be a common account. 781 There was a common perception in the interviewed officers minds that members of the local F-TNI/POLRI did gain money from the Pilkada. In my interview with a member of the F-TNI/POLRI from Talang Sari, the respondent said that the Talang Sari case was admired by the officers in other Districts as a good example; because they could play kanan-kiri oke (they received money from all competing sides). As the personal financial gains were very important, the position of the military representatives in each local election became very unpredictable. In fact, as Table VIII.1 shows, the military could affiliate with any party, big, small, nationalist, or religious faction. As one military respondent told me, siding with the 779 Similar divisions occurred in other Districts, such as in Pringgodani (2003), and in Buluhlawang (2003), see Table VII.3, p. 169, where the military was divided (symbol ) in Chapter Seven, and sections 4, 5, 6 and 7 in Chapter Eight, pp Different personal reasons can also be seen in Pringgodani case, especially for the two members of the F- TNI/POLRI who supported the F-PP, as well as for Major Police Agung Sukarman, a member of the F- TNI/POLRI in Mangunredjo. See Section 5, pp , and Section 7, pp , in Chapter Eight. 781 This is suggested by information by a relative of a Bupati candidate who said his relative was defeated in the election because the victor spent much more money, including for bribing the voters, as well as information from a former member of the F-TNI/POLRI in Ngantang who said that the officers in territorial units complained about him because he did not share (send) the money gained from the Ngantang Pilkada, (sub-section 3.6, pp , Chapter Seven); and information by Lt.Tjan Santos, a member of the F-TN/POLRI of Buluhlawang, who believed that no Pilkada was free from money politics (in Section 6, pp , Chapter Eight). 334

367 small groups, although it was more likely to be defeated, was preferred when the groups possessed bigger financial resources and were more generous. Beside the considerations of personal or financial gain, it seemed that the perceived degree of risk that might be faced from taking personal positions by the officers were also important. Most of the officers who took different positions were non-army officers. It seems that there was also a nuance of the decline of the Army s influence over the other branches of the military; the Navy, Air Force and Police. 782 In Mangunredjo, for example, an Air Force officer was actively and openly involved in a coalition group consisting of small factions against the F-DIP which held 22 of the 45 seats in the DPRD. As the most senior officer among the five members, he not only tried to control internal F-TNI/POLRI decisions, but was also directly involved in secret lobbying to fragment the FDIP members 783, as well as providing a place in an Air Force base for the karantina (quarantine) of the coalition members a week before the voting. In addition, as mentioned earlier, the one who betrayed the coalition was a Police Major, giving an indication of a greater political freedom that non-army officers had in Pilkada. On one hand, the divisions in the military may be democratically good in the sense that there were difficulties within the military to rebuild a solid political power that could undermine the civilian power. On the other hand, however, the divisions meant that the previous internal control of the military institution over the political activities of the military officers who behaved erratically or in pursuit of solely personal interests (for example, economic gains mentioned before) was becoming ineffective. Such an outcome could similarly undermine the civilian authority As noted earlier, in Pringgodani the two officers who took different positions from the faction s internal consensus were Air Force and Naval officers; in Mangunredjo it was a police officer; while in Buluhlawang it was the Air Force officer who actively steered the other members to oppose the local territorial commander. In my interviews in Mangunredjo and Buluhlawang those officers suggested that their different political choices were reported and approved by their own superior officers (Police and Air Force Headquarters) and they were backed up their commanders. 783 In page 192 I described how he approached some members of F-DIP to break up the faction. 784 One clear example of where the security could not be properly handled as it was a part of a political conflict was where the military and the police, in one way or another, were linked to different conflicting parties, see the case of Sumberwaras in Chapter Eight, pp

368 As mentioned earlier, the situation was not simply one of undemocratically dominant and disruptive activities of military representatives in an otherwise stable and democratic civilian politics. Instead, the civilians shared the responsibility in keeping the officers remain involved in politics. For example, a Campaign Team of the PKB in late December 1999 visited the Surabaya Makodam (Kodam Headquarters), and met with Colonel Suharno. The Team requested that Kodam instruct the members of the F-TNI/POLRI in the Sumberwaras DPRD to support the F-KB and, in return, the PKB would elect any Bupati candidate from the military who was appointed by Colonel Suharno. This was contradictory to the efforts of getting the military out of politics as the deal drew this institution back toward the electoral competition. 785 The visits by the politicians to Kodam for support show that short-term political interests of the civilian factions contributed to undermining the idea of minimizing the military involvement in politics. 786 Furthermore, the involvement of the civilian politicians, for example, in trying to influence the replacement process of the F-TNI/POLRI members in several Districts; or bribing the officers for their support in the elections, such as was described by Andi Sochib in Buluhlawang, kept the military trapped in politics. In Chapter Eight, I also asked further questions - what were the impacts of these new features of the military s involvement on the quality of the elections and on local governance? The answer was that the spirit of choosing the best civilian leader through the Pilkada was frequently overcome by the passion for short term interests, for money and power. For these interests, seeking a military backing was one of the important choices to be made, simply because the members of the F-TNI/POLRI had the right to vote, especially when there was no single majority faction in the DPRD or when a simple majority faction existed but was not solid. So, despite the diversification of elite group sources, the former New 785 Similarly, the chairman of the F-TNI/POLRI in Pringgodani suggested that he himself was asked by the competing faction to show the way to the Kodam in order to get support from there. Similar information was given by a member of the F-TNI/POLRI in Tulungagung; that he become the guide for the competing faction when they wanted to lobby the Kodam, to request the Kodam to give an instruction to support their sides in the forthcoming Pilkada. 786 This is what is described as the lack of loyalty of democratic actors to the democratic system; they failed to avoid knocking at the barracks door for support from the military. Quoted from Diamond, Larry and Marc F. Plattner (eds.)., Civil Military Relations and Democracy, (Baltimore and London: The John Hopkins University Press, 1996), p. xxix 336

369 Order officials had not been totally excluded, although they are no longer dominant. 787 Limiting their choosing of their own cadres to the Vice District Head candidatures was common for these civilian factions unless the faction was an absolute majority. As not all members agreed to propose a non-party cadre, the disagreements produced internal conflicts, either within a faction, between the faction and the local party leadership, or between the central and the local leaderships. Not only did the considerations about money and power undermine the quality of the candidates but, when they were elected, political conflicts between or within parties (or collusion between parties) narrowed the spaces for the new leaders to be able to perform good leaderships in their Districts. Solving these problems will be important in smoothing any efforts to complete the further agenda of reforming military politics. Within the military, the disintegrating institutional control over political activities of individual officers needs to be re-strengthened and, within the new civilian politics, the pursuit of short-term political and personal interests must not undermine the idea of minimizing military politics. 5. Impacts on (former) karya personnel when our turn is about to come, the doors [to the chances of having politically/financially-profitable jobs] are closed, that is not fair. 788 The institutional reforms, especially the withdrawal from civilian jobs, affected thousands of military personnel in East Java from Colonel to rank and file soldiers. 789 After being withdrawn from their lucrative civilian jobs to the Kodam headquarter in Surabaya, they were stationed for months 787 To be supported by the military, the new parties chose retired military or (former Golkar) bureaucrats as Bupati/Mayor Candidates, then businessmen (with financial strengths and/or sponsors) as Vice Bupati/Mayor Candidates. If a party s retired military or bureaucrat District Head candidate already had adequate financial sponsors, usually business leaders, the position of Vice District Head candidate would be given to a party cadre. As Table VIII.3, p. 206 shows, of the thirty six elections in East Java, fifty one percent of the District Head candidates proposed by the F-DIP were (former Golkar) bureaucrats, only twenty percent were F-DIP members. In the F-KB list, forty six percent were bureaucrats, and thirty seven percent party cadres. 788 This expression in my interviews with military respondents was commonly used by young officers. See p This section based mainly on the more detailed materials in Chapter Nine. 337

370 without active jobs, then posted to new (but non-lucrative) jobs within the military units. Various reactions were found in my interviews with some of those personnel, but commonly they were shocked by the withdrawal policies, and they blamed the democratization (that had brought about the withdrawal) that made their personal lives harder. Therefore, as the above quote shows, their views about democracy were usually negative. 790 A contrasting opinion was given by a former senior officer interviewed who had chosen to become a civil servant (one of only two from more than a hundred officers withdrawn from civilian jobs in East Java) for a personal reason; an uncomfortable feeling about the past political involvement of the military, especially his experience as the Head of Kansospol when he was involved in some dirty political games on one side, and a feeling as being more a civilian politician than a military officer since he had become the head of the Kansospol, on the other. He viewed democratization as the way that should have been followed, in contrast to those returning-tothe unit officers views that saw it just as a matter of power struggle, defeat or defeated, not good or bad. 791 His views about democratization, thus the military political withdrawal, was rarely found among those who were still active duty officers. 792 Officers near to retirement commented on the withdrawal more positively, it seemed simply as they had less to lose. 793 In contrast, several young officers who have not been involved in politics, but seemed to have been looking forward to it, complained of having missed out (see the above quote). So, the reactions were varied from one person to another, apparently depending strongly on the effects that the withdrawal had on each of them personally. 790 See similar comments on p. 213 from many sergeants or privates who had been village headmen or appointed to positions in local economic sectors such as in terminals or markets. 791 I never believed that a democratic system would be good for this country [Indonesia]...democracy is not better than other systems, if now democracy is on top it is just because of the time cycle different generations sometimes want to live in different ways from their predecessors. See footnote 18, p At the time of the interview he was the Head of the Badan Kepegawaian (Employment Division) of a District Government. See footnote 23, p See footnote 21 and 22, p

371 Another group of karya officers who experienced a direct impact of the military withdrawal was made up the former military Bupatis and Mayors who decided to retire early, keep their current positions and continue their political careers as civilians. Fourteen of the eighteen who kept their positions attempted to run for a second term in the office through the next Pilkada local elections while the other four did not, either because of having no signs of significant support from the local DPRD faction or because of having completed the maximum allowed two periods of office. The outcomes of the political struggles of these fourteen officers varied from one District to another but, as detailed in the second section of Chapter Nine, it is possible to classify them into five categories. 794 The first category is of the direct victims of the democratic movements they left the Bupati positions after having been pushed to step down by the public after The second category is of those whose current positions did not face significant disruptions from the reformasi movements but they were prevented from participating in the next elections. 796 The third, majority, category, were of those who were allowed to participate in the Pilkada but were unsuccessful in it. In some cases the elections involved competition among former officers or against active officers, 797 but in most cases the military (now retired) Bupatis failed to get the majority s support. 798 In the fourth category were the military (retired) Bupatis who won the election for a second term but subsequently suffered from crippling or serious conflict, indicating that (former) military rulers could not govern as easily as they could in the New Order era. 799 Lastly, 794 The number of case in each category varied, but most of the fourteen cases fell into the third category. See pp , see also Table VIII. 2, p See the cases of Banyuwangi where the Bupati was accused of involvement in the Dukun Santet murders, and of Situbondo where the Bupati was accused of being involved in fifty KKN cases. See p In Tunggal Redjo, the Bupati in 2000 failed to register for a second term because of an accusation of corruption in a market renovation project. In Bandulan the Bupati lost his right to register after the DPRD rejected his LPJ (Final Accountability Report). As with those in the first category, the military as an institution was unwilling to protect them, arguing that the matter had nothing to do with the military institution, but only with them as rough individuals (oknum). See pp Such as between two officers in Godean, two officers in Jambangan; three officers in Ngadiredjo; and two retired officers in Jabung Anyar See Table VIII.2, p See the cases of Godean, Sumedang, Pancang Tanggul and Pisang Candi Districts, pp See the cases of Sumber Yasin, and Sumberwaras on p

372 the only former military officer successful in a Bupati election was in Buluhlawang As also discussed in detail in Chapter Nine, the Buluhlawang case showed two things. First, the military territorial commanders could no longer even fully control the political position of the F-TNI/POLRI members in a Pilkada, let alone control its outcome. This was simply because the military institution no longer formally endorsed these commanders in taking such a control, although on some occasions the commanders did use their institutional positions to justify their personal actions. Second, the military institution did not always prefer a retired military candidate over a civilian; and personal political networks have determined the political careers of the officers more than institutional relations have. Chapter Six, pp , described how the structural changes have weakened the DPRD military faction. In Chapter Nine I reported that, although being a member of the military faction in a Legislative Assembly was no longer being seen as a good stepping stone for a military-politicalrelated career, after 2000 the jobs became more attractive because of a dramatic increase in the salaries of local Assembly members (for example, in Surabaya, from around two million to around thirty five million rupiah [US$ 3500] a month). Athough the members of the F-TNI/POLRI were now recruited mainly from non-career officers, the competitions to get the DPRD positions became tougher but also more corrupted. According to information I was given by some officers in East Java, the amount of money spent for paying pelicin (the smoothing or bribe) to the officers in charge of selection became much more important than before (from 1998 to 2000). Consequently, once getting the jobs most of the new Assembly members thought mainly about earning money. 801 In addition, some 800 Unsuccessful in the 2000 Pilkada of Sidikalang, as he was not supported by either the Kodam or the F- TNI/POLRI, two years later he participated in and won the Buluhlawang Pilkada. Although he was still not supported by the Kodam, he managed to get the full support from the five members of the local F-TNI/POLRI (which was affiliated with both F-KB and F-Golkar) who took a different position from that of the local territorial commanders. See pp As described in more detail in the summary section of Chapter Eight, one of the biggest chances to get their money back was through the Pilkada. 340

373 officers serving in the DPRD in several Districts refused to step down from their appointed position when they retired, using political lobbying within their DPRD in order to try to be able to keep earning the large income. 802 Looking at the reactions of military personnel withdrawn from civilian posts, the political behaviors of former military Bupatis or Mayors who attempted to keep their positions, and the attitudes of the remaining military representatives in the DPRD, it seems that their attitudes toward the democracy were very personally and practically motivated. Therefore, it is vital for the newly established democracy to maximize the systemic restrictions (by rule of law) that would minimize the opportunity for the military s political involvements, because to merely rely on the willingness of the individual military officer is not likely to be completely effective. There are still many military personnel, especially those who had tasted the fruits of political power, who may be ready and willing to return to politics whenever it seems possible. 6. Impacts on local military units 803 The main indicators of being successful in doing my territorial job in the New Order era were: first, the Golkar Ruling Party won the election within my commanding area; second, no security instability that was an obstruction to the government s development programs; and third, my superiors (especially at the centre) were kept happy about my territorial capabilities (kemampuan nge-ter) [e.g. giving money or securing their business]. Now a Dandim [military district commander] does not have to worry anymore about all of this, well except perhaps the last one. 804 In the past, a Dandim was very rich (kaya-raya) because money came from all directions [various sources], now I feel ashamed to see the Dandim has to beg everyone (mengemis kemana-mana) for security funds assistance See Table IX.1 on p Section based mainly on the detailed material in Chapter Ten. 804 Interview with a retired Dandim in East Java. See pp Interview with a Chairman of the Golkar faction in the DPRD of a District in East Java. 341

374 Although institutional reforms did not change the basic structure of the Territorial Command it remains parallel with and present at every level of the government bureaucracies from the province to the village yet its ability to control local politics (and security) decreased significantly, due especially to the demolition of the Koter political networks mentioned above. One of the important reasons was that the financial resources of the local military units that had streamed through these networks also dried up. Even though it is difficult to estimate an exact amount of such financial loss, it seems to have been large. 806 However, there is no sufficient indication that this loss has significantly affected, or threatened the existence of, local units as the money was usually used to fund socialpolitical activities that now have also been minimized. What also seems promising is that there is no evidence about any systematic attempt by the military to deal with this financial loss, for example by channeling the Koter s financial interests systematically to retired military active in DPRD or political parties. Despite this there were various personal, instead of systematic, approaches between the Koter Commanders and the local government officials or local political elites (especially the F-TNI/POLRI in the DPRD) in attempts to get security fund assistance from the local government budgets (APBD). 807 Also, in many Districts, the security fund that was allocated in the government s annual budget was now not distributed directly to the security units; it was kept instead by the Bakesbang office, the division that replaced the Kansospol in According to a Dandim, it was distributed little by little (kincrit-kincrit ) to the units when they applied with proposals for financial assistance. It also seems that between those who distributed the money and those who received it there was a 806 A former Dandim told me that the Kodim could lose at least five hundred million rupiah (US$ 50,000) a year which used to be received through social-political-related programs. This did not include the losses from losing access to the local government s resources that used to be channeled through strategic positions occupied by the military officers, now withdrawn. Furthermore, another serving Dandim informed me that, as the military no longer holds strong political power, the territorial units had lost many business partners who previously needed the military to support lobbying for their business projects. See section 2, p There was a case in Mantingan where the Commander was, in one politician s words, being too vulgar by proposing to the DPRD that a FWD Nissan Terrano (costing around 300 million rupiah, about US$ 30,000) should be bought as an official car (Mobil Dinas), effectively for his use. See p

375 vagueness, either about the sources of funds, the amounts, or the levels of recipients. 808 The amounts of funds provided by the APBD varied from one District to another. Higher PAD/Pendapatan Asli Daerah (Local Government Revenue), good relations between the District Commander and the District DPRD s F-TNI/POLRI, or better capability of the F-TNI/POLRI members in lobbying other factions in their DPRD and the leaders in their District Government, were generally favorable for the District s military units to be allocated large security funds. 809 Personal approaches could also go the other way around. The F- TNI/POLRI members offered an assistance to bring the needs of military units to the DPRD forum even when the units did not ask in the first place, and then, these members could benefit from it by involving themselves in the development projects (such as military housing or office renovations) being funded by the local government s security assistance fund. 810 However, it is also important to note that the impact of these changes in the economic opportunities available to members of the local military personnel did not change the fact that the Koter remains the favourite place to work for most of the Army personnel. Partly because of this, as shown in my interviews with local military officers and soldiers, their reactions when asked about some central military elites idea of abolishing the Koter, was an irritated or outraged what about us?. 808 See the case of Mangliawan for example, where the Dandim, the Head of the Finance Sub-Division, and the Secretary of the Mangliawan Government, made different claims about the amount, the sources and the receivers of the money. See pp Security budgets were quite large in Malang, Surabaya and Banyuwangi due to their big PADs, in contrast to the Districts of Ngadiredjo, Panorama, Sumber Manjing, Ngayarsari, and Bandulan which had much smaller PADs. In Situnggal District, where the PAD was not big, but the lobbies are effective (as the F-TNI/POLRI members claimed), the security budget for local military and police was allocated 1 billion of the 9 billion rupiah PAD in the 2003 budget. As a comparison, in the Panorama District which had a slightly bigger PAD, in the same year the security budget was only two hundred million rupiah (one fifth of that in Situnggal). See p An indication was found for example in Banjar Wetan. Lieutenant Colonel Markus, Deputy of the Chairman of the Banjar Wetan DPRD, claimed that when he offered the security assistance to the local security units he insisted that it was not in cash (to avoid resistance from other factions) but in projects which he could also take advantage from. See p

376 The soldiers formal salaries have always been very small 811 and the only way for them to solve this problem was to get additional income outside working hours. Some of them acted as Satpam (private security guards) at entertainment centres or shopping centres, private parking attendants, brokers (makelar) for vehicles or properties, backing gamblers or prostitution, or even being involved in crimes when they found no other ways. The problem with serving in the regular units is that they did not provide enough time to leave the base. Therefore, moving to a territorial unit, where there is no such restriction on going out, thus providing more opportunities to become involved in social interactions and business activities, was regarded as a way of having a chance to achieve a better economic life. Especially for rank and file soldiers a move to territorial units was seen as a preparatory step for retirement. This is despite, as described more detail in Chapter Ten, the difficulties in the path of moving to the territorial units. 812 The most favoured position for the soldiers in the Koter was Babinsa (Village Development Sergeant). One Babinsa normally covered one or more villages. Although this was the lowest position in the territorial hierarchy, being the only member of the military in villages which are distant from the Commander s supervisory base, the existence of a Babinsa appeared very independent. Usually a Babinsa was treated as a person with a higher social status (dituakan) by the village people, similar to and sometimes even higher than the village s official leader. To get these particular positions was just as difficult as getting in the Koter units. All these sacrifices to get the desired jobs would influence their working performance. Then the capability of ngeter (making money through social or business interactions) would be most important in having Koter jobs. Setoran ke atas (sending money to the superiors) becomes a must. This pattern of setoran ke atas does not stop at the Babinsa level, but goes higher. This is why a job as a Koter Danramil is more favourable than 811 See footnote 44, p See pp

377 a regular Danki company commander or than other jobs with the same Captain rank in regular units, or a Koter Dandim than the same-ranked Lieutenant Colonel jobs in regular units, and so on. That is, service in the Koter means receiving more setoran than in regular units. Unlike the lower rank soldiers who mostly want the money for their retirements, for career officers the money means not only an improvement to their standard of living, but also a vital support for subsequent promotion to higher positions. Given the condition of the Koter described above, how could Koter have been more professional, even after the withdrawal? Firstly, the Koter personnel who were invalid soldiers, characterized by nearly-retired, physically unhealthy (Status A3), married and thus under greater economic pressures, and less disciplined, were disposables (apkiran/buangan) from regular units and could not be expected to have a high military professional capability. Secondly, Koter units have much lower standards of continuing training than the regular units. There were so many non-program activities ranging from TMD to ceremonies of units anniversaries to security operations to back up police including in elections, soccer competitions or entertainment concerts that they did not have much time for training. Soldiers liked these activities more than training because they usually got food allowances (uang makan) and the jobs are much more relaxed. Furthermore, as was reported, the limitations in weaponry equipment, this being too old or too few, also made the training more a formality. Moreover, due to the budget constraints, creating fictive programs became a common way to save the money, or if the training had to be done, then it would have to be undertaken as economically as possible. Low-rank officers, especially intelligence staff officers, were motivated to search for rekanan or partners to fund their units programs. As such, the training was used mainly to satisfy the periodical reports that were required or to save the face of the unit and the commander in the eyes of the higher commanders. Most personnel knew the game and were compelled to play 345

378 it properly. Inspections from above were mainly procedural as the inspection reports could be compromised if the pocket money (sangu) or service (pelayanan) from the inspected units was good enough. A strong negative habit of an unwritten practice of setoran or uang mengalir ke atas (money flows upward) in its internal management and leadership practices is likely to continue distorting the military s internal governance. Besides, the limitation or even elimination of the external financial sources previously accessed through politics-related activities would make inside-sourced corruption worse. For example, if previously a commander could insist his officers not use a program fund for a training program but to rely on money from ngeter results and save the program fund (for the unit or himself), now with ngeter getting difficult the program fund would have to be divided (for the training and for the commander). So, despite a decreased political involvement, the military s professional capability or expertiseness, its organizational governance or corporateness, and the quality of security service provisions or the profession s social responsibility are not likely to improve significantly. Another important issue regarding professionalism was the separation of the military from public security matters that were closely related to political affairs. Despite an organizational separation of the police from the military, due to the high challenges of internal security and the weakness of the police, the military backup was still needed. Firstly, the number of police personnel has not met an ideal ratio of one police officer per five hundred population. For example, one Balinmas/Village NCO-Police should be responsible for only one village, but in reality, such as in Malang Regency, each is responsible for from four to seven villages. Besides, the public trust in the police is very low. The Tempo Interaktif s 3 July 2000 polling indicated that more than seventy percent of the public did not trust the police, and did not believe that the military-police separation would improve the police performance. My interviews conducted in East Java in 346

379 2003 confirmed similar distrust. 813 The continued involvement in public security reduced the opportunity for the military to concentrate on its own professional (defence) matters. Another question is whether the military backup has solved the security problems. The data shows that as the implementation was poorly designed, both the military and the police were confused, as the military s backup was not quite effective. Before the separation a Dandim could quickly coordinate the troops (of military and police units) in his area, and ask for financial support from the local government or business partners. Now, after the separation, the procedures for asking the military troops had to pass up longer bureaucratic ladders and the logistical support creates problems. 814 If in the New Order era, a Dandim could deploy his troops, or other troops under his coordination, within minutes, after the military-police separation it could take hours, days, or produce no deployment at all. Nevertheless, despite the ineffectiveness of the backup, leaving the police alone could make the security management much worse, so the back-up from the military seems to need to continue in the long run and will remain an obstacle to the military professionalization. Then, regarding the logistics for the operations, on one hand the local government was responsible for providing financial assistance for security operations in its local area, but it was unclear which operations, on what scales, and of what amount. On the other hand, the security forces (military or police) were centralized forces, thus the responsibility of the national government. After several experiences of the units not getting their reimbursements after the backing-up operations, when the units were asked to back-up again, the units replied with various excuses for being not ready for deployment, such as having training programs or other activities. Also, to find out which unit (if any) was ready was also wasting time. Besides, practical considerations, including how lucrative the jobs 813 See pp See sub-section 4.2, p

380 were expected to be, also influenced how the back-up would be given, and indicated also that there were problems of jealousy over material gains. 815 In addition, a police respondent told me that, while the economic crisis had increased the crime rate, the separation of the police and the military had ruined the existing intelligence networks, unofficial informants had disappeared as the military had no more money to pay them, and so the efforts of handling the crimes became more complicated. 816 Moreover, tensions between the military and police were getting serious. 817 Whatever the causes whether because of too much solidarity among the soldiers, as the Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces General E. H. Sutarto told the press, or the police having become arrogant as some military personnel claimed, or the military personnel not understanding the new position of the police as police said - the effectiveness of security management after the military-police separation had deteriorated. The military-police separation has not been followed by the establishment of an effective police force that would be able to fully take over the national domestic security. If democracy is to go on the right track, the problems of building effective but civilianized police forces have to be given a higher priority. The military back-up for the police should be seen as only a temporary arrangement. In the longer term letting the military be involved in public security matters means leaving open the door for the military to be involved in security-related political issues. 7. Impacts on civilian politicians, civil society and uncivil politics without TNI See sub-section 4.2, pp An MP Officer revealed that the military and police personnel at the rank and file level were involved in curanmor (vehicle theft), known in the East Java Province as alap alap (the name of a black, aggressive bird). NGO respondents and the Kompas newspaper reported the military and police s involvement in drug (ecstasy and putaw) trading and in illegal logging in Madiun. See p The newspaper Pikiran Rakyat on 2 October 2002 reported that from 2001 to 2002, there had been twelve incidents occurring in Ambon, Sampil Port, Central Kalimantan, Jambi, West Aceh, Serui Irian Jaya, Palu, Central Sulawesi, Madiun, Bogor; and Flores, East Nusa Tenggara, where casualties among the military and police units resulted (alth9ough it should be noted that only one of these, Madiun, is in East Java). See footnote 73, p Section based mainly on the detailed material in Chapter Eleven. 348

381 When joining Pos Gotong Royong activities in 1998, especially when there were demonstrations, I was paid fifteen thousand rupiah per day, I had a free lunch box (nasi kotak), and the job was so much fun and easier, while being a labourer in a roof factory (pabrik genteng/asbes) I was paid only ten thousand rupiah and the job was very dusty, so my friends and I left the factory and joined the PGR. 819 joining politics has made me a much bigger cassava businessman rather than a great politician 820 Ideally, the military withdrawal from politics results in a strong democratic system characterized by a high public political participation and effective democratic institutions. This character, according to many scholars (see Chapter Two), is essentially preventive against a future military political involvement, and a vital precondition for civilian control over the military. In this regard, without (or with the reduced presence of) the military in the civilian political environment, what has the East Java case shown? The case of the PGR described in Chapter Five has shown that there was an increased involvement of the lower level grassroots in political activities around 1998/1999. Street-singers (pengamen), pedicab (becak) drivers, beggars, unemployed, or homeless people were groups who dominated the public activities in the PGR. However, it was short term economic rewards in their struggles against economic crisis, more than interest in democracy, which mainly drove them to participate. They were paid from the money collected from travelers passing the area where shelters had been built, or from organized beggars collecting money in the cities. In addition, not only because many travelers were forced to give donations but also because of the messy ways of building the PGR and the ways they functioned, there were many complaints alleging an anarchic more than a democratic character of participation Interview with Sumarno (pseudonym), a former PGR activist in Malang in July Interview with Titan Osman (pseudonym), a member of the F-DIP in Tunggal Redjo (pseudonym) District. See more in p Abdurrahman Wahid, Chairman of the PKB, complained that they were too many ; the local government complained that they were built on the government s property without license. It was claimed that PDIP members gathered, stayed awake overnight, played gambling and got drunk there, sometimes with loud dangdut (traditional music). As these activities were so disturbing in Islamic communities, such as in Pasuruan, some shelters were burnt down by the local community. See Chapter Five, p

382 Chapter Nine showed in more detail that the political participation or mobilization was incidental, the product of fluctuations in personal, social or emotional ties between followers and leaders, within a traditionally sectarian culture and leaderships. Here, supports for the leaders were understood as a social obligation which was thus taken for granted. This made it easier for the elite, the leaders, to mobilize supporters. The PKB as the biggest party in East Java, and the PDIP, the second biggest, exemplified political participation where the followers reactions to certain political developments were mainly reflections of what the supporters perceived as unjust treatments of their leaders. After Megawati s success in bringing the PDIP to become the biggest party in the 1999 national election, NU leaders, using the Islamic teaching interpretation that forbids a female president, declared a Female President Ban on 1 July 1999 in Pasuruan, East Java. Megawati s supporters responded by launching a bloody thumb-prints petition as an expression of a loyalty to death (kesetiaan sampai mati) to Megawati. The PDIP in East Java also formed several militia groups, the Banteng Sumber Nyowo, Panji Tengkorak and Mangkubumi, that mobilized supporters prepared for mass rallies for Megawati. Instead of Megawati, the leader of the largest single party, the Upper House (MPR) of the national Parliament in Jakarta elected Abdurrahman Wahid (Gus Dur), the leader of the PKB, as President. Two years later, in 2001, the supporters of Gusdur acted similarly (or worse) than had Megawati s supporters in responding to what they perceived as a conspiracy against their leader, the impeachment and sacking of Gusdur by the national Parliament. In East Java, from February to June 2001 Gusdur s supporters attacked, ruined or burned dozens of offices belonging to Golkar, PDIP, PPP and PAN (parties that initiated the impeachment), government buildings, churches, security posts, blockaded roads by cutting down trees, and stoned shops in Surabaya, Pasuruan, Probolinggo, Jember, Banyuwangi and Situbondo. As in Megawati s case, the violence failed to secure Gusdur s presidency. 350

383 The cases of the attempted Female President Ban and the Bloody Finger Print Campaign or Gusdur Crisis are not sufficient to represent all of the features of political participation in East Java, not even those of these two major parties. However, such cases reflected some important pieces of a discouraging picture of local political participation. They re-emphasize the violent nature of political participation on one hand and the ineffectiveness of security arrangements in general on the other. They also give an insight into the issue of how the reformist groups at the grassroots began to abandon their common target, the New Order elements, as their leaders began another battle among themselves in the competition for power. 822 It also seems that the politics had not departed far from its elitist nature, and the majority of East Javanese were remaining passive politically for the same continuing reasons, too busy with economic struggles and too sceptical about the politics. Despite this elitist nature, the sources of members of the political elite groups changed significantly from groups dominated by the military or military-associates to civilian elites from more diversified sources. Stories (in pages ) about three successful organizers of PGR activities in 1998 in their areas, where they were previously a poor painter labourer in a furniture factory, a poor cassava farmer, and a vegetable street seller (gerobak sayur) are a good example. After the 1999 election the painter was elected as a DPRD member and then the DPRD Speaker, and since then became a rich man, owned two big luxury houses, drove expensive European cars and attended VIP entertainment centres regularly. 823 Similar stories were found among the newly elected District Heads. A story about a junior security guard at a private university who was then elected 822 See also footnote 65, page 294, a view of Jim Schiller, a Flinders University scholar of Indonesian local politics. Schiller suggested that lacked of democratic experiences, and they were supposed to learn from the past democratic failures. 823 See similar story about the cassava farmer who was elected as a member of DPRD, then expanded his cassava business to a much larger scale, becoming one of the biggest cassava traders in his district, as joining politics has made him a much bigger cassava businessman rather than a great politician. Likewise, the vegetable seller who became a DPRD member from the PDIP and, at the time of my mid-2003 interview with him, had established and was managing new vegetable storage cooperatives (koperasi pengepul palawija) in three different Sub-Districts. See more on sub-section 3.1, pp

384 a member of DPRD from PDIP in the 1999 election, then the Vice Bupati in 2000 and the Bupati in 2002, presented in the same sub-section also exemplifies this. 824 Despite their life styles having changed dramatically, their original personal integrity had not seemed to change significantly. The former painter, now the Speaker of a DPRD, was caught in the sweeping operations carried out by the police against ecstasy drug users in entertainment centres. Later, he was sentenced to four years in jail by the local court because of a corruption charge. In many cases however, loyalty to the party or constituents could easily be bartered with money or power by which party s internal conflicts were tangled up. 825 The two District Heads, presented in sub-section 3.1., who had been PDIP members disagreed with the policy line of the Party and had their PDIP memberships suspended but still became District Heads. After having been proposed by another faction of their respective DPRD, the FKB, as its candidates for Vice District Head positions they were both elected in 2000 then, two years later, both moved up to be the District Heads when the elected ones died. The suspension of their memberships in the PDIP was then lifted. In one case the District Head had his hostile relations with some members of the PDIP faction, led by the (former painter) DPRD Speaker who had not voted for him in the 2000 election, were not settled. The conflicts developed for years into deadlocks in executive-legislative relations. The DPRD attempted to impeach the District Head because the latter refused to give an accountability speech regarding an allegation of corruption by the previous District Head, but the attempt failed as the Ministry of Internal Affairs would not support it. In turn, the District Head 824 As another example was a teacher at a state university before 1998, but then joined the PDIP and in 1999 was elected as a member of the DPRD, elected as Vice Mayor in 2000 and as the Mayor in There was a similar case in another District a lecturer at a state university was elected as a PDIP member of the national DPR, and in 2003 was elected the Mayor. They are all new members of the political elite groups. See pp The former poor cassava farmer (now was DPRD member) was among the eleven local PDIP legislators (out of fourteen) whose party membership was suspended by the PDIP national leadership in 2003 because of their being accused of disloyalty to party policy over the Pilkada by supporting different candidates in the District Head elections. See pp

385 managed to bring the DPRD Speaker to court on a corruption charge that put him in jail for four years. During conflicts inside the PDIP were common in East Java Pilkada. A Golkar politician, Mudjono, who was a Deputy of the Chairman of the Mojokerto DPRD (where PDIP had been the major faction but gained only two votes for its official candidate for Bupati), remarked to me that the PDIP s internal conflict was because the PDIP politicians lacked maturity in running an organization. However, the evidence suggests that such an immaturity was not the basic cause. Instead, this was that the real motive to join the organization had been more economic (personal profit) than political (to enhance a better political system). Being a politician had increasingly been seen as a way to get connected to large sources of money, despite there being some politicians who worked for their ideologies. So, how would people believe their capabilities in establishing stable democratic institutions into the new political arena with this apparent lack of personal integrity or disloyalty of politicians to their parties because of personal interests in power and money? This happened not only in the PDIP. The PKB whose politicians were recruited from Islamic Boarding Schools (pesantren) and their affiliated Islamic organizations was not so different. When they came into and interacted with politics, as a member of the Bandulan District DPRD said, it becomes a livelihood matters (urusan perut) [and] the kiyai acted just as badly as the others who were not kiyai, and some of them were even worse than crowds of petty extortionists (korak), corrupt and deceitful. The politicized kiyais sometimes used their higher social status to manipulate their followers, and develop democratically unhealthy politics, such as the use of violence, as in the 2000 Sampang case where PKB masses burned the DPRD buildings because of disappointment over the result of the Bupati election. Moreover, internal conflicts within the PKB, regarding the Pilkada for example, were much the same as what happened in the PDIP; most of the conflicts were resolved, or left unresolved, by power competitions, rather than democratic internal mechanisms. 826 As in the PDIP, interests in power and money could be more important than loyalty to the party. 826 See the Pilkada case of Prambanan District (on p ), where former-president Abdurrahman Wahid, as the National Chairman (DPP) of PKB, was in conflict with Abdul Hamid, a PKB member and the DPRD Speaker over the Bupati candidate to be supported. An interesting role was played by Iwayan Bandoro, an East Javanese businessman who supported Abdul Hamid by providing 200 million rupiah (about Aus$ 3,000) per voter in the DPRD. 353

386 Lastly, executive-legislative relations, although varying in some ways, were discouraging. Unlike the New Order s DPRD which acted mainly as a rubber stamp of the executive, four variations of relations were found in different Districts of East Java: executive domination, legislature domination, collusive and conflicting. An executive domination was found in Tunggal Redjo, where the District Head election was won by Golkar, which also held the Speaker s position in the DPRD. Advantaged by an internal conflict within the FDIP, the biggest faction eleven of the fourteen PDIP legislators had their party memberships withdrawn and joined the Golkar group two thirds of the legislature s members were loyal supporters of the current (Golkar) executive leader. The only difference with the past was that, while the previous regime used military oppression as a means, the current one used money. Legislature domination was found in Malang where the legislators went too far, intervening even into the technicalities of bureaucracy, including into the career development of some of the lower level non-political officials. The collusive type was found in Ponorogo, where the executive and legislature agreed to carry out unpopular policies, such as development projects, because the DPRD leaders were personally involved in the projects. In Surabaya and Sampang conflicting relations were found as the legislators used their controlling role destructively, such as in exaggerating the executive s mistakes with the aim of toppling the existing executive leaders, while the executive did not respond properly to the complaints advanced by the legislators. The above features of political participation and the institutionalization of local political institutions in East Java exemplify two major problems in building a strong democratic institution. These problems need to be solved in order to achieve a maximum or lasting impact of a military withdrawal from politics. 8. Concluding Remarks How should this case study of military political withdrawal in East Java be interpreted? In one sense, it is a portrayal of the post-1998 development of local politics in a major region of Indonesia that demonstrates the prospects for as well as the challenges to civil democratic control of the military in the future. Prospects The prospects have been advanced by the promising stories of the implementation of the post-1998 policy to withdraw the military from politics, which was an important part of the commitment and effort to establish both an apolitical, professional, military and effective civilian politics, the two essential preconditions for democratic civilian control. 354

387 Two compelling situations the economic disaster and the collapse of law and order that de-legitimized and demoralized the military meant that the Indonesian military was forced, and did not voluntarily withdraw, from politics. Yet, the military s response to the pressure was quite positive by pursuing a systematic withdrawal from formal politics that dismantled the military territorial units political networks. So, for the military, the strong external factor of civilian resistance to a military rule and the internal factor of its own willingness or at least acceptance were key factors that allowed this withdrawal process to happen, and to produce further impacts on the establishment of civilian control of the military. 827 The dismantling of the previous agencies of Sospol, Wansospolda, Bakorstada/Litsus and Kansospol as well as the withdrawal of the military officers from the civilian positions in the local government bureaucracies and from local parliament present a successful story of military-politics separation at the local level. The system of integrating military/civilian bureaucratic/parliamentary political relations, and the previously twin, interacting, military and social-development/administration functions, which had been the nature of the Dwifungsi military-civil relations of the New Order at the local level, was over. In addition, the process of democratization has made some initial gains from the political decentralization away from tight central control. The power of local politics and the local branches of political parties in East Java have increased visá-vis the provincial and central politics. Local elites have been more independent and much less influenced by the activities and effectiveness of the military hierarchy, down to the village levels. Moreover, as reported, the changes in the size, processes of recruitment/appointment and the interactions of the F-TNI/POLRI made its position and role increasingly less important. The military institution seems 827 It seems that any single model of military withdrawal (discussed in Chapter Two) can not be easily or neatly fit on to the East Java case. A combination of two or more patterns as shown in Appendix 4, p. 372, is probably more useful. 355

388 to be less willing (and certainly less able) to channel its interests through the various local assemblies. It appears that even before 2004 the military dominance in local legislatures was effectively over, with the fragmentation, personal interests, and lower quality of the supposedly military representatives; so the transition to local Assemblies with no military faction in 2004 was not a sudden change. There is no evidence suggesting that this system will be maintained or revived in some ways through ex-military personnel being put into the parliaments as Golkar or PDIP or other representatives. It appears that there is too much continuing suspicion and antagonism about anything to do with military influence to make this possible. I have also reported that no evidence was found that previously profitable formal 'civilian'-military links had been transformed into informal ones by military personnel 'resigning' and being selected as civilian leaders or bureaucrats who then continued to channel resources to themselves and to the military as an institution. This is despite, as also reported, some few individual cases of personnel who had resigned and transferred to civilian positions; yet, no military units continued to be significantly assisted as a result of such transfers. The allocating of 'security assistance' in some local government budgets had become one of the few avenues of extra funding now open to operational units other than central military budget allocations. However, again, this was happening while there were still F- TNI/POLRI representations in the assembly (although, as reported, with civilian local assembly members being the influential arrangers in at least one case). So, this possibly temporary nature of these civil-military arrangements was not likely to effectively continue in the post-2004 situation when all military representation within the DPRD would have stopped. Anti-military civilian politicians and/or parties would likely to be eagerly on the watch for any such support for the military, looking to uncover, condemn, loudly protest and stop it. The separation of political and military institutions undertaken at the local level has effectively minimized, and is likely to continue minimizing, the 356

389 area of civil-military political interactions at the local level, and made the interactions much more manageable and controllable than they were in the New Order era. 828 Therefore, there are substantial grounds to be optimistic about the future civilian control of the military. Challenges There are also serious challenges to the transition and democratic deepening. 829 Dismantling the territorial units political networks is not enough to make the military more professional. The territorial command s basic structure remains parallel with and present at all levels of local government, from the province to the village; and the continued emphasis on the traditional people s total defence strategy requires continued interaction between the territorial units and the local authority and communities. 830 There is a need for careful and active planning about minimizing the military s political involvement that may have a tendency to expand through defence and security management links. Another challenge is future funding of the military. In Chapter Eight I referred to the armoured and artillery units as of chronically very low quality because of equipment age and insufficiency, and that some of the 'support in kind' from local businesses, (I normally labelled these ethnically as 'local Chinese businesses') were of the limited transport, communications equipment, snacks and pocket money variety. As the military at local levels are cut off from their previous local 'private' funding, this suggests that there would be some more serious institutional operating problems, such as the maintenance of this equipment, training 828 It is relevant here to remember Huntington s classifications of levels and forms of national security policy. The East Java case shows that the form of situational security policy especially at operational level has formally been significantly reduced. See Table II.4 in Chapter Two. 829 Democratic deepening or democratic consolidation, according to Juan Linz and Alfred Stepan, have three criteria. One of them is that when democracy is the only game in town. See the summary more in Chai-Anam and Paricahrt Chotiya, Beyond Transition in Thailand, in Diamond, Larry and March F. Plattner, Democracy in East Asia, (Baltimore and London: The John Hopkins University Press, 1998), p See the original article, Linz, Juan J, and Stepan, Alfred., Journal of Democracy,. Vol. 7, Iss. 2, Apr 1996; pp One of important continued forms of interaction is the TMD (TNI Masuk Desa/ Tni enters the village) programs, and other similar, but smaller civic action activities conducted by local units. There was not much change of this in terms of forms and procedures of the actions in the post-1998, except the name changed from AMD to TMD. A cover of a civic action procedure for a district level is shown in Appendix

390 and the effectiveness of the deployments of these units. So, there is also a need to plan and organise future funding which will be adequate to provide for a modern, professional military posture. This should remain prioritized in the military reform agenda. The big cuts in the territorial units outside financial resources seem to have had major and permanent impacts on military individuals and local institutions. These could worsen corruption and complicate the efforts to improve the military s internal governance, and also reduce the capability of the military to fund its professional external defence activities. Also, despite this loss, as reported in Chapter Eight, the commonly-held image that the territorial units provide easier money-making opportunities than the regular units is not likely to change soon, and the existing sequence for military personnel of "Regular -> Territorial -> Retirement" will remain. Moreover, the discouraging political behaviour of individual officers who tried to intensify personal financial gains during the local elections indicate that there has not been a significant impact of the systemic change of military politics on transforming the mentality and attitudes of the officers from political to professional. It seems that the TNI Internal Reform seemed to have been quite successful in reforming its external involvement in politics. For the next steps of the reform, the military should think of how to put more stress on developing concepts of internal good governance and of an apolitical military culture within the TNI as essential to the establishment of military professionalism. Accommodating such concepts in the training and education centres of the military in all levels would probably be one of possible ways to start this. On the other side of the same coin, the sectarian and violent features in some forms of the public political participation pose a serious problem in establishing an effective democratic civilian politics. My research found that corruption, self-interested individual or group instead of national orientations, and inabilities to solve political conflicts, were common features of civilian politics in East Java. Moreover, given the increasing role of the POLRI and the declining role of the TNI in local 'security' 358

391 activities, and the negative images of the police and the politicians, the arranging of mutually advantageous relationships with civil society and money politics has a great potential to expand, posing problems that need to be solved in the civilian politics. In the short run, there would be only minor problems as long as this does not fall into a serious political chaos with an escalation of security threats. If it does, this could massively increase the tendency for an increased military security role and therefore increase the military s political involvement. Yet, in the long run, the absence of capable civilian politics could eventually re-legitimize the return of the military (many of whose officers still have political ambitions) to politics. So, these optimistic stories about the military political withdrawal at the local level are preliminary this it has only led and opened the way to but has not yet been able to establish the two preconditions military professionalism and strong and effective democracy essential for a sustained civilian control over the military. The review in Chapter Two of general theories pertinent to military political withdrawal suggested that withdrawal is a very complex process. It frequently develops and interacts with the ongoing, broader and multifaceted political processes of a regime change toward a fully democratic civilian rule. Chapter Three s review of the history of military politics of the previous Indonesian regime showed that there has been a long and systematic involvement of the military in Indonesian politics. At the end of this chapter, the table in Appendix 1 is an attempt to draw up an outline of what, on the basis of this research, appear to be the positive and negative impacts of the post-1998 military political withdrawal in East Java. Also based on this case study, the diagram in Appendix 2 is a diagrammatic interpretation of the complexity of the interrelations between regime change and military withdrawal that happened in the East Java case. Seeing how complex the process has been, the achievements so far should not be underestimated, but it should be seen optimistically as a crucial impetus and an opportunity to achieve a stable civilian control. Nevertheless, future efforts must be aimed at solving the problems both of further professionalization of the military and of democratizing and making 359

392 the civilian political system effective, in response to the negative side effects of the post-new Order military withdrawal from politics or the legacies of the previous regimes, including the New Order, having not been completely solved simply by the withdrawal. An essential element of any such future efforts must be a continuing study and monitoring of the cultures and practices of the military, and their possible interactions with the politics of the civilian society, at the local levels. Only through this can an adequate picture and understanding be achieved. This study, hopefully, has suggested the usefulness of a more extensive exploration of local case study of military politics in Indonesia in the future. It has described the complexity of changes in Indonesian military politics in terms of the process and the impact of the military s political withdrawal in East Java during the period from 1998 to More studies, however, will be definitely needed. As I said earlier, this study is not intended to be a representative sample of Indonesia s geographical diversity, nor of all aspects of local military politics. There might be some similarities between the cases from one area to another, but there is also great potential for difference. For example, political behaviour of the local elites and local military officers and soldiers varies because of different personal interests as that this study has demonstrated in East Java. One factor that needs to be researched in different provinces is whether or not a systematic effort was made by the local military to revive lost political networks as found in the East Java case. Such research would need to consider the possibly different nature of the military s political and economic interests in different areas. In addition, the changing timeframe of the studies will produce new areas of attention. From 2003 onward, many changes have happened, for example, the military has been completely withdrawn from local parliaments since 2004, and new bupatis/ mayors have been elected directly by the people. Further changes have occurred in military politics at the local level, and this should be matched by further study across the archipelago and over time. Not only will this give a more comprehensive picture about the changing nature of Indonesian military politics, in the 360

393 long run, this will also enable us to build better theoretical models of the process and impact of the military withdrawal from politics. Appendix 1 Positive and negative impacts of the withdrawal of the military from politics in East Java Pre-withdrawal local events and Impacts on Military-society relations 361

394 (-) Collapse of Law and Order Examples: - Mass strikes, demonstrations burning and looting of government offices - Mob attacks on Chinese - Land reclaimed by villagers - Sorcerer (Dukun Santet) and Ninja murders) (+) Emergence of civilian social forces from what had been floating mass Example: Mushrooming of PGR communication post shelters ~ representing a strong social force independent and resistant to the military Demoralization of military : - Lost self confidence or unwillingness to take responsibility. - Worries about taking wrong side (pro or anti-reform). - Cynical, apathetic and reluctant to carry out security tasks. - Cynical and anxious toward the emergence of strong groups of social forces resistant to military. - Confused leaderships and increased competition between the military and police. - Weakening institutional control over the involvement of military rogue personnel in crimes. (+) restrained the local military from using coercive power, (-) worsened security. So, (+) De-legitimized military political power, opened more space for political participation (mobilization) and increased the pressure on the military to withdraw from politics. (-) violent, chaotic forms of political participation, mobilization, competition and ineffective security forces complicated efforts to restore effective democracy. De-politicization of Territorial Command s key political elements ~ Sospol, Wansospol, Bakorstada and Litsus. (+) dismantling of political elements of military territorial units. - Sospol was replaced by Komsos ~ reducing political function from controlling political activities of Koter to helping administration aspects of F-TNI/POLRI at DPRD. - Abolition of Wansospol ~ removing the authority of territorial commanders to determine the occupation of the positions of Bupati/ Mayor or other government positions. - Elimination of Bakorstada ~ removing one of the territorial command s political element with strong control over all local socio-political aspects of local politics. - Elimination of Litsus ~ removing a security screening useful fro monitoring and controlling political aspirations and activities. 362

395 Demilitarization of local government bureaucracy and local parliament. (+) Removing military s presence in and direct controls over the local government bureaucracy and its policies ~ a big cut in political and economic power. Impacts on (former) karya officers Loss of non-military lucrative jobs ~ (+) reducing attractiveness of civilian (political or economic) jobs to military personnel. (-) created military institution s burden to provide jobs for organization thousands of personnel just withdrawn to the headquarters. (-) negative views of these personnel who blamed democratization and reformasi for their harder situations. (+) Collapse of political career of (former) military bupati/ mayor ~ could discourage other military personnel to involve in politics. (+) Minimizing the power of the military (F-TNI/POLRI) faction at the local parliament/ DPRD - seat number halved to ten percent of the total seats in 1999; and all gone in no more military officer held the position of the Speaker of the DPRD or the Head of DPRD Committees; - the jobs of F-TNI/POLRI members were treated by the military institutions as less important, recruited from lower rank officers,; - public resistance/ isolation to the F-TNI/POLRI grew). Impacts on territorial units (Koter) (+) Loss of financial sources for political activities. (-) there were still various personal (temporary) approaches among the military commanders, F-TNI/POLRI members or other faction members of DPRD, and local government officials. (-) no significant change in Army personnel s views about Koter as easy money-making jobs needed to compensate small formal salary, to prepare for retirement for the rank and file soldiers (e.g. Babinsa s political function was deactivated but the structure was still there, can be revitalized when needed) and to gain financial supports for career development for career officers ~ individual reactions to the abolition of Koter was negative and partly was influenced by intention to maintain this personnel s economic reason. (-) professionalization of Koter has become more difficult ~ - while the outside sources of money dried up, the fund for military professionalism development get shorter ; the inside-sourced corruption is likely to get worse; - uncompleted separation of the military and police reduced opportunity for the military to concentrate on its professional matter; it also let the door to security-related political issues remain open for the military. 363

396 (+) Lifting obligation of the local military to support the national ruling party (Golkar) and its programs. Decentralization of government administrative (+) Reducing control of provincial and central military headquarters over local politics. (+) Reducing military s control through the executive leader over other local institutions (legislative or judiciary). (+) Increase the DPRD s control over the security fund assistance provided the local government for the local military. (-) Increased the salary of the DPRD members dramatically, and this made the jobs of F-TNI/POLRI became more attractive as easy money-making jobs for the officers and consequently, contributed to the conflicts between the Kodam headquarter and DPRD over the replacements of F-TNI/POLRI members who 364

397 refused to be replaced. (+) Elimination of social political office (kansospol), a militaryheaded office, within the local government, thus removing the military s channel whose authority to supervise political activities of government employees, social and political organizations, and local societies. Impacts of pre-withdrawal events and withdrawal policies on military roles and ability to control the outcomes of Bupati/ Mayor Elections (Pilkada) (+) Stronger control of local politics by civilian - Consistent decline of military roles and ability to control the outcomes of the Pilkada ~ military faced serious challenge from civilian faction in 1998 Pilkada where the intimidation and bribe was effective to steer the election result; military defeated in 1999/2000 Pilkada as threat and bribe was not effective to influence the civilian factions; since 2000 Pilkada the miliary became the minor player either because of existence of single majority civilian faction or because of military being left out by civilian big factions affiliation. (-) Weakening control of the military institution over the political activities of local military officers involved in Pilkada (F-TNI/POLRI members and some territorial officers) ~ - military factions were divided and conflicting because of personal reasons, mainly to gain economic benefits fro the elections, and as the result the military position in the elections were various and unpredictable. - Civilian politicians and local branches of political parties seeking the backup from the military officers were also responsible in keeping these military officers deeply and actively involved in the elections. The spirit to find the best leader through the Pilkada was undermined by the short term interest for money and power by the politicians and political parties. Impacts of pre-withdrawal events and withdrawal policies on civilian politics without TNI (+) Increased involvement of grassroots political participation (mobilization) (-) Apart from a wider freedom in electoral participation, the involvement was still characterized by money-making driven involvement, chaotic, violent, elite-manipulated forms, such as in the PDIP s PGR shelter 1998 activities, PKB s 1999 anti-female president ban, PDIP s 1999 blood thumb print, or PKB s 2001 Gusdur impeachment crisis. (+) A significant change in local elite sources from a militarydominated elite group toward more diversified civilian elite groups including former painted labourer, former vegetable street vendor, former cassava farmer, former security guard despite the fact that local politics was still strongly dominated by elites. 365

398 (-) Weak institutionalization of major political parties ~ politicians lacked moral standard, unable to solve internal conflicts democratically, lacked internal solidity and loyalty to their own parties, and parties weak control over the political activities of their cadres. (+/-) More variation in local government (Pemda) local parliament (DPRD) relations ~ executive dominated politics was still found, but there are other three new patterns of relations were emerging, e.g. legislature domination, collusive, and conflicting relations. (+/-) So, political participation has broadened, but still need to be more organized by political institutions that has began to institutionalize, yet in a limited way. Appendix. 2 Possible links between military political withdrawal (in post-1999 East Java case), past military political intervention, and various degrees of civilian control and democracy Greater pressures from international community for democratization Reversal Impacts (Against democratization): e.g. - Less fund for military professionalism - Deterioration of internal security management - Self-seeking civilian politicians and political parties (Detail in Appendix 1) Positive Impacts (For democratization): e.g. Limited military involvement in politics and in internal security. Greater political freedom and stronger control of local politics by civilian. Detail in Appendix 1. Chart Democratization IV.1: Model / Process of Possible of Military Shifts Political between Withdrawal Military and Democr Illiberal democracy Military regime Democratic regime Semi-authoritarian (Stronger Military Control) (Stronger Civilian Control) Semi-democracy Previous Militarization/ Military Political Intervention 366

399 Negative impacts (Against democratization): e.g. - Undemocratic political system - Too strong military political power - Lack of democratic experiences -Undeveloped civilian political culture Reversal Impacts (For democratization): e.g. Stronger domestic pressures for democratization Institutionalization of state bureaucracy Strong military institutional control over political activities of individual officers Negative Influence of Historical Legacies, e.g. The nature of nation-state building: depends heavily on military power The nature of military establishment which is too independent from the government. The low level of (democratic) socio-political culture Appendix. 3 Composition of Interviewees from East Java Groups of Interviewees Local Military Jobs/ Positions Number of interviewees Territorial Commander 6 unit officers Staff 9 Combat unit Commander 3 officers Staff 5 F- Chairman 26 TNI/POLRI of District DPRD Member 8 Rank and File Soldiers 8 Retired Officer/ Soldier 5 Police Officers 6 Speaker of DPRD/ Deputy of the Speaker 24 (both military and civilians) Total and Reference Codes in Footnotes 78 M Included in the fractions codes F-DIP Chairman

400 Civilian members of 36 District DPRDs (Note: 2other Districts were not visited: Bondowoso and Jombang) Bureaucrats of District Members Member 3 D F-KB Chairman 8 13 Members Member 5 K F-Golkar (F- Chairman 6 13 KP) Member 7 G Members F-PPP Chairman 4 5 Members Member 1 P F-PAN Chairman 3 4 Members Member 1 A Bupati/ Mayor 5 Senior Officials 5 30 Government Secretary of DPRD 13 B Village Heads (in Regencies of Malang, 8 14 Pasuruan, and Jember) V Villagers (in Malang Regency only) 6 NGO Activists/ Journalists/ Academics 9 9 O Total

401 Democratic Transition Appendix. 4 Possible changes in patterns of military withdrawal PACK-LIKE DICTATED (The military is politically stronger than the civilian opposition) Phase 1: Seeks some electoral legitimacy Phase 2: Liberalization and Promise of limited democratization Phase 3: Resurrection of civil society (with possible mild and short popular upsurge) PACT (The military is in equal strength with the civilian opposition) Phase 4: Explicit or implicit negotiations (mutual guarantees) and agreement pact Phase 5: More liberalization and wider democratization Phase 6: Growing civil society with perhaps more popular upsurge Phase 7a: Full democratization (with securing of some military s vital interests) ABDICATED (The military is politically weaker than the civilian opposition) Phase 7b: Full democratization through relinquishment (without securing any military s vital Tendency toward Transformation Tendency toward Replacement model Tendency toward Transplacement in abdicated stage interests) Democratic Consolidation Sources: The table is modified from Brooker s Figure 8.2, Three basic (non-personalist) types of transition to democracy, which Broker had modified from its original form previously produced by O Donnell, Schimitter and Whitehead s 1986 s work, Transition form Authoritarian Rule: Prospect for Democracy. See Brooker, Paul., Non-democratic Regimes: Theory, Government and Politics (London: Macmillan Press, 2000), p

402 Appendix. 5 Security fund assistance to local military and police units in ten selected regencies Districts Malang City. Ngawi Regency Ponorogo Regency Sumenep Regency Banyuwangi Regency Assistance - Trucks for police (2002 budget) - Patrol Cars for Kodim & Koramil (2002 budget) - Computers for Kodim (2002 budget) - FWD Nissan Terrano for Dandim (being proposed for 2003 budget). - 1 billion rupiah for police (being proposed for financing 2003 Mayor election) - Total Security Budget for 2003: 1.15 billions. - TMD ( Soldiers Enter the Village ) program funded by the local government. - Cash money: 75 million rupiah/ year. - Security budget for 2002 only 50 million rupiah. - 1 Kijang LGX (FWD Light Truck) for Mobil Dinas (Official Car) for Dandim, through Commission A (Commission for Public Service) - In 2003 increased to 200 millions rupiah units Motor Cycles for Danramil and Kapolsek (2002 budget). - Mobil Dinas (Official Cars) for Dandim (District Commander) and Kapores (Police Chief). - Patrol Funding: 210 millions rupiah/ year (700,000 rupiah each Koramil/Polsek, 2003 budget) - Joint Patrol: 90 million/year (2003 budget). - Ambulance for Police. - Speed Boat for patrol (being proposed for 2004 budget). - Mobil Dinas (Official Car) for Naval Base Commander. - Van L-300 Mitsubishi for Persit (Soldiers Wives Association) of District Command HQ. - Land and buildings for Sub-District Command s observation posts. - Building Renovation for District Command HQ s offices. - Housing Renovation for Naval Base. - Renovation of Rumah Dinas (Official House) of Dandim. - Building Sea Security Posts for the Naval Unit Communication tools (mobile phones) for Kodim. - Financial Assistance for Military and Police Units: 500 million rupiah/year. Batu Regency - Vehicles for territorial Commander of Batu. - Building new offices for Batu Police (2001: 100 million rupiah, 2002: 150 million rupiah, 2003: 350 million rupiah). - TMD since 2000 was funded by the local government 370

403 Bangkalan Regency Nganjuk Regency Jember Regency Situbondo Regency every year : 45 million rupiah for Kodim and 60 million for Polres. - FWD Kijang LGX for Mobil Dinas for Dandim : 200 million rupiah for Kodim : only 50 million rupiah for Police : 270 million rupiah for TMD. - TMD: 160 million/year. - Land for Koramil HQ. - Motor cycles for Sub-District Command. - Communication tools: Mobile phones for Sub-District Command. - A brand new FWD Kinjang LGX for Dandim - A patrol sedan for District Police. - Housing renovations for Naval Base. - In 2002 TMD program: rehabilitation of police housings. - For 2003 the security assistance budget is 1 billion, out of 9 billion of the Government s total revenue. Sources: Collected from various interviews with DPRD members during

404 Appendix. 6 Monthly Report of the F-TNI/POLRI of a Provincial DPRD (Cover only) 372

405 Appendix. 7 Monthly Report of the F-TNI/POLRI of a District DPRD (Cover only) 373

406 Appendix. 8 The Election Committee of the 1994 Jember Bupati Election Military Officers 374

407 Appendix. 9 The Election Committee of the 2000 Sumenep Bupati Election A military officer 375

408 Appendix. 10 The F-KB Criteria for the Bupati/Vice-Bupati Candidates in the 2000 Gresik Election Translates: Purely civilian 376

409 Appendix. 11 The F-DIP Criteria for the Bupati/ Vice-Bupati Candidates in the 2000 Gresik Election - Purely civilian, non-military serving or retired. - Out of the New Order regime 377

410 Appendix. 12 A Local Newspaper Clipping: A Pedi cab driver registered as the Vice Bupati Candidate in the 2003 Madiun Bupati Election 378

411 Appendix. 13 The Complete Documents of the Election submitted for an approval of the Bupati/ Vice Bupati of Situbondo Regency (Cover only) 379

412 Appendix. 14 Chronology of the Impeachment of Drs. Bambang Dwi Hartomo, M.Pd. as Surabaya Mayor (Cover only) 380

413 Appendix. 15 The Decision of Surabaya Court on the Sampang Bupati Election Dispute (Cover only) 381