CDI Policy Papers on Political Governance

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1 CDI Policy Papers on Political Governance 2006/1 centre for democratic institutions Indonesia s Regional Representative Assembly: Democracy, Representation and the Regions Stephen Sherlock Introduction The Indonesian state has been in a process of transformation since the fall of the Suharto regime in The first wave of reform under the unelected Habibie government of saw the removal of restrictions on civil rights such as freedom of speech, association and assembly, the creation of a range of new political parties and organisations and the country s first democratic election in over 40 years in June The movement of the parliament (DPR 1 ) back into the centre stage of political life and the subsequent election of a new President then led to a series of constitutional reforms that were completed in The constitutional reforms strengthened the powers of the parliament and eliminated most of the powers of the previously powerful quasi-legislative body, the MPR. 2 The power to elect the President was removed from the MPR and was placed in the hands of the people through direct election. In addition, a new assembly, the Dewan Perwakilan Daerah (DPD) or Regional Representative Assembly/Council was created with the intention of increasing the role of the regions in making laws. As a new representative assembly with some quite unusual features, the DPD has not yet been analysed in any detail. This study provides an introduction to the structure and operation of the DPD and examines some of the key issues that have emerged in discussion and debate about the DPD in its early formative period. The study considers certain questions about whether the DPD is as representative of the regions as its proponents would claim, whether it has provided a new entry point for regional aspirations into political and policy debate and what problems the DPD 1 Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat (DPR) People s Representative Assembly. 2 Majelis Permusyawaratan Rakyat (MPR) People s Consultative Council. The CDI Policy Paper series focuses on pressing issues of political governance in the Asia-Pacific region. The series publishes original papers commissioned by CDI, each of which deal with important issues for policymakers interested in issues of democracy, governance and political institutions. The papers feature new research and policy recommendations, and aim to forge research-topolicy links and provide new insights and analysis on subjects of concern to CDI.

2 Indonesia s Regional Representative Assembly: Democracy, Representation and the Regions 2 faces in attempting to define a role for itself in the future of Indonesian politics. The DPD grew out of the view that Indonesia s regions should have a greater role in policy-making at the national level and that that role should be played by a second chamber of the central parliament. The argument developed in this paper, however, is that the DPD has Introduction...1 What is the DPD?...4 Constitutional role and powers...4 An advisory body not an upper house...6 An assembly for the regions...8 Structure of the DPD...8 Leadership of the DPD...9 Ad-Hoc Committees...10 Steering Committee...10 Legislation Committee...11 House Affairs Committee...12 Committee for Inter-institutional Cooperation..12 Ethics Council...12 Secretariat of the DPD...13 Who are the Members of the DPD?...14 Paths to power...17 Social and Occupational Backgrounds of DPD Members...18 The DPD electoral system: how representative?..22 Representation and politics...26 Representation in the SNTV electoral system...27 Work in progress?: The first year of the DPD...30 Making a non-party assembly work...35 Conclusion...38 Appendix: DPD Members, Provinces & Votes...42 About the Author...46 About the Centre for Democratic Institutions...46 not yet shown that it can actually provide significant input into the national legislative process or act as voice of the regions. The major problem is that the DPD is only an advisory body and its areas of responsibility are quite limited and, as yet, ill-defined. Efforts by DPD Members to increase their powers have become a major preoccupation for the assembly and have arguably diverted its attention from the more immediate task of demonstrating that it can effectively use the powers it already has. Critical issues such as the definition and extent of the DPD s powers and how the assembly should interact with the legislative deliberations of the DPR have not been seriously considered and have been dealt with on an ad-hoc basis. The result is that the DPD s only notable achievement to date is being what its leaders have called an ombudsman or a post office, gathering grievances and petitions amongst governmental and private institutions and individuals in the regions. The structure of the DPD is modelled on the DPR, but it is questionable whether the internal organisational arrangements that are appropriate for the DPR are actually the best for a very different body like the DPD. Centre for Democratic Institutions Research School of Social Sciences Australian National University Canberra ACT 0200 AUSTRALIA DPD Members are elected as individuals and are not permitted to be sponsored by political parties. Despite concerns that political parties would attempt to take over and control the DPD through indirect means, it appears that there has not been any major organised forays into the assembly by the parties. A possible exception is that of Golkar, whose members and ex-members are

3 Stephen Sherlock prominent in the DPD. This does not seem, however, to be the result of a concerted effort by the party, but instead is a reflection of the fact that the majority of people with governmental and political experience in Indonesia have had some connections with Golkar in the past. The DPD has become an alternative path through which former political operators from the New Order have been able to recreate themselves in the democratic environment and protect themselves from challenges to their influential status. 3 Apart from people with a background in the New Order, the DPD is also composed of other identifiable kinds of individuals. The large number of businesspeople elected to the DPD suggests that the assembly has become a means by which independently wealthy people can win a national office without depending on the support of political party. There is also a clearly identifiable pattern for local figures with traditional sources of status and influence to win a place in the DPD. Regions with strong localised support for religious organisations like NU, Muhammadiyah or the churches have tended to elect individuals with these backgrounds to the DPD. The election results also show that it is a major advantage to be known in certain localities as being part of an aristocratic or well connected family. Finally, the minority of individuals in the DPD with a background of involvement in academia, the law, media and community organisations indicates that it is also possible to be elected to the DPD with a profile built around professional standing and social activism. The electoral system created for the DPD has given rise to some major issues about the powers, legitimacy and representativeness of the assembly. Faced with the reality of their limited powers, most DPD Members take comfort in the view that their chamber is more legitimate and representative than the DPR because it is composed of non party representatives. This is seen as justification for the campaign to further reform the constitution in order to increase the powers of the DPD. In fact, however, the unusual features of the DPD s electoral system create serious doubts that claims for greater legitimacy and representativeness can be sustained. Moreover, the absence of the discipline, predictability and organisational direction provided by political parties can be seen as part of the reason why the DPD has so far failed to develop policy priorities or a plan of action beyond lobbying for increased powers. The first year of the DPD has been marked by drift and a lack of discernable progress.

4 In Indonesia s Regional Representative Assembly: Democracy, Representation and the Regions 4 What is the DPD? The DPD is an elected assembly designed to increase the participation of the regions in the process of law making and the oversight of executive government. It has 128 Members, with 4 representatives from each of Indonesia s 32 provinces. The DPD is the product of two parallel processes of political change occurring in Indonesia since 1998: firstly, popular and elite pressure for reform of the state to widen participation in decisionmaking and accountability and, secondly, the devolution of powers from the capital, Jakarta, to the provincial and district (kabupaten) levels of government in the regions. Constitutional role and powers The legal basis for the DPD is Articles 22C and 22D of the Constitution of the Republic of Indonesia, which were inserted into the document as part of the constitutional amendments. The Constitution states that the DPD is elected from the provinces and has the following powers: 1) Propose Bills to the DPR related to regional autonomy, central and regional relations, formation, enlargement and merger of regions, management of natural resources and other economic resources and Bills related to the financial balance between the centre and regions. 2) Participate in the discussion of Bills related to the matters in paragraph 1 above, as well as provide advice to the DPR on Bills on the State Budget and Bills related to taxation, education and religion. 3) Oversee the implementation of laws related to the matters in paragraphs 1 and 2 above, as well as submit the results of such oversight to the DPR in the form of material for its further consideration. 1 1 Article 22D, 1945 Constitution of the Republic of Indonesia. (Undang Undang Dasar Negara Republik Indonesia Tahun 1945). Author s translation.

5 Stephen Sherlock The constitutional reforms also changed the composition of the MPR, eliminating the previously unelected regional representatives and replacing them with the Members of the DPD. Article 2 (1) of the Constitution states that the MPR shall consist of the Members of the DPR and the Members of the DPD. The remaining roles of the MPR are now to amend the Constitution, to swear in the President and to be the final decision maker in what would be quite lengthy proceedings to dismiss the President. Some leading Members of the DPD were part of the regional representatives grouping in the MPR and they tend to look upon the DPD as in some ways a successor institution to the MPR. The MPR is now composed of the Members of the DPR and the Members of the DPD and two of the four Speaker and Deputy Speaker position in the MPR are held by DPD Members. 5 It is important to note that the Constitution does not explicitly state that the DPD is a legislative body. The Constitution states that the DPR holds the power to make laws, with the qualification that the DPR must reach joint approval with the President (articles 20 (1) and (2)). 2 The DPD is not mentioned at all in the context of law making powers. The constitutional amendments were embodied in Law 22/2003 on the structure and composition of legislative bodies (commonly known as the Susduk law, an acronym of its Indonesian title). The Susduk law provides a little more detail on how the powers of the DPD are put into effect, particularly by providing some guidance on its interaction with the DPR. The law states that: the DPR invites the DPD to discuss the DPD s proposed Bills, in accordance with procedures determined by the DPR. 2 It might be noted here that these two clauses could be interpreted as contradictory. If the DPR has the power to make laws, it should not be necessary for it to obtain joint approval from the President. Before the constitutional amendments, the power to make laws resided with the President alone. Removing the power from the President and explicitly stating that it resided with the DPR was seen as an important step for democratisation. In practice, however, the new formulation is ambiguous and gives executive government an effective power of veto at all stages of deliberations on a Bill. There are a growing number of Bills that have become frozen in the process because the government has refused to agree to the DPR s draft Bill. See Stephen Sherlock, The Indonesian Parliament after Five Years of Reformasi, United Nations Support Facility for Indonesian Recovery, Jakarta, 2004, pp But, in any case, the DPD cannot pass or agree to a Bill, it can only provide advice.

6 In Indonesia s Regional Representative Assembly: Democracy, Representation and the Regions 6 discussion with the DPD takes place before the DPR begins discussion on the Bill with the government. 3 advice from the DPD on matters within its purview is to be regarded as material for the DPR to take up for further consideration, including in its discussions with the government. the DPD gives advice to the DPR on the appointment of Members of the Supreme Audit Agency (BPK). An advisory body not an upper house The first thing that is most evident from a reading of the Constitution and the Susduk law is that the DPD is only an advisory body. It has a role in the legislative process in that it has the power to draft laws on regional issues, to participate in the discussion on the State Budget and Bills in certain other issues and to oversee the implementation of certain laws. But the DPR is under no obligation to pass or even to consider seriously laws drafted by the DPD or to accept its advice. As mentioned, the Constitution gives the power to make laws to the DPR and the Susduk law makes it clear that input from the DPD is taken at the discretion of the DPR. The DPD is sometimes referred to in media reports as Indonesia s Senate and many DPD Members appear keen to be called Senators, probably in an attempt to boost perceptions of the chamber s importance. This usage is, however, highly misleading because the DPD is in no way comparable to the US Senate or to upper houses in the bicameral parliaments that exist in both the Westminster tradition and in many presidential systems of government. In the US Congress, the UK Parliament and in many other parliaments, all legislation must pass through an upper house in order to be passed and, in many cases (such as the Australian Parliament) the upper house has veto powers. Even to talk of the new Indonesian system as bicameral is questionable because it suggests that all legislation passes through two houses (Patterson & Mughan 1999). But the DPD does not pass legislation, it can only introduce or give advice on a certain range of Bills in the DPR. Even the more generic term of second chamber that is often used in comparative literature is appropriate only in a strict literal sense when 3 The Constitution provides that all Bills must be discussed jointly by the DPR and government counterparts and that joint agreement between the two sides is required for a Bill to pass into law.

7 Stephen Sherlock discussing the DPD (Baldwin & Shell 2001). The fact that the DPD is an advisory body and is limited in even the areas where it can advise make it difficult to accord it even nominal or ceremonial equal status with the DPR. 7 The DPD is thus a quite unusual example of a second chamber because it represents the odd combination of limited powers and high legitimacy. Its role in law making is limited to certain areas of policy, its powers are only advisory and no Bill is actually required to pass through it in order to be passed, yet at the same time it has the strong legitimacy that comes from being a fully elected chamber. This combination does not seem to be replicated anywhere else in the world. There are second chambers that combine strong powers with the strong legitimacy of popular election, such as the US Senate and the Australian Senate, and these chambers have often played a prominent role in their countries political scene. On the other hand, there are countries, such as Canada, whose second chambers have strong powers but lack legitimacy because they are appointed by executive government. The Canadian Senate has a range of powers that sound impressive but which have historically been rarely exercised because the Canadian electorate and the Senators themselves do not regard a body composed of government appointees to have the popular authority to impose its will on the lower house (Franks 1999). There is a rich variety of forms of second chambers, but the norm is generally for their powers to be considerably or somewhat less than their lower house, particularly with regard to financial bills, and for their system of selection to be in some way indirect (either inheritance, appointment or election by other legislatures or institutions) and thus conferring a lesser legitimacy than direct popular election (Patterson & Mughan 2001). Thus political theory and actual practice in most democratic countries has tended to come to regard lesser powers for a second chamber to be a natural accompaniment to indirect election and vice versa. The design of the DPD, however, has created expectations amongst its Members and supporters that its voice should be listened to. Indeed, as shall be discussed below, many DPD Members consider that the method of election for the DPD has actually conferred a greater legitimacy on the DPD than on the DPR. But its powers are such that it does not have the capacity to force the other chamber (the DPR) or the government to accept its position on any legislative or policy question.

8 In Indonesia s Regional Representative Assembly: Democracy, Representation and the Regions 8 An assembly for the regions The DPD could be seen as akin to the second chambers of a number of countries in that its framers aimed to increase representation of the regions. Internationally, such representation is sought to be achieved in a variety of ways. In some countries, regional representation is based on the system of popular election. The US and Australian Senates are both popularly elected, but the electoral district is the state (province), with each state having an equal number of representatives, regardless of population. Other second chambers, such as the German Bundesrat and the South African Council of Provinces, aim for regional representation by having their Members elected from or by the provincial legislatures or provincial executive government. The Canadian Senate is composed of Members who nominally represent the provinces (with numbers varying according to provincial populations), but the appointments are made by the Prime Minister of the Confederation. The DPD is said to be an assembly for the regions because its constituencies are the provinces and because its Members are elected as individual nonparty candidates. In addition, to ensure that large provinces do not dominate the assembly each province has equal representation, even though Indonesia s provinces range in population from under 1 million to nearly 40 million. The voting system is by single non transferable vote (SNTV), which means that the candidates with the four highest numbers of votes are elected. Candidates for DPD election are not permitted to campaign as members of political parties or on the behalf of parties. They may, however, be members of political parties but may not be current office holders in a party. The first election for the DPD was held in April 2004, in conjunction with elections for the DPR and the assemblies at provincial and district level (DPRD I and DPRD II). The first DPD was sworn in in October Structure of the DPD The internal structure of the DPD is closely modelled on the example of the DPR, with certain important differences created by the absence of political parties. The philosophical approach to decision making and their embodiment in a number of organisational principles are clearly influenced by those found in the DPR (Sherlock 2003). These include the direction of the assembly s business by a strong collective leadership, collective decisionmaking by consensus rather than an organised majority minority division

9 Stephen Sherlock and the concentration of decision making power in specialised committees, with plenary sessions reserved for largely ceremonial endorsement of decisions made in ancillary bodies within the DPD. 9 Leadership of the DPD The operation of the DPD is overseen by the Leadership of the House (Pimpinan DPD), which is composed of a Speaker (Ketua) and two Deputy Speakers (Wakil Ketua), whose duty is not only to preside over sessions but to organise and lead the DPD. The Leadership is characterised in the Rules of Procedure as being a united collective leadership. 4 The philosophy underlying this description is indicative of the particular role of the Speaker(s) of the Indonesian parliament which has been transferred from the DPR to the DPD. In most democratic legislatures it is usually considered that the presiding officers should be impartial and above partisanship, or should at least give strong consideration to the rights of opposition parties. The Leadership of the DPD, on the other hand, is seen as representing a collective consensus of the various Members of the assembly. The Leadership is considered non partisan not in the sense of being apart from party divisions but in the sense of articulating, or even embodying, a collective expression of all the main views in the DPD. It could be seen as significant that the terminology to describe the office implies that it is one that leads rather than presides. The Leadership is elected to be broadly representative of the regions. For the purposes of electing the Leadership the country is divided into three zones and one Member of the Leadership must come from each zone. The zones are the Western Zone compromising the 10 provinces of the island of Sumatra, the Central Zone compromising the 11 provinces of Java, Bali and Kalimantan and the Eastern Zone compromising the 11 provinces on the islands of Sulawesi, Nusa Tenggara, Maluku and Papua. The Speaker is Ginandjar Kartasasmita from West Java and the two Deputy Speakers are Irman Gusman from West Sumatra and Laode Ide from Southeast Sulawesi. 5 Ad Hoc Committees Just as the main working and decision making bodies of the DPR are the Commissions and Special Committees, the real work of the DPD is centred 4 satu kesatuan pimpinan yang bersifat kolektif Peraturan Tata Tertib DPD, Article The actual election of the first DPD Leadership in September 2004 is described in some detail in Dari Daerah untuk Bangsa, Legislatif, 1 15 November 2004, pp

10 In Indonesia s Regional Representative Assembly: Democracy, Representation and the Regions 10 on four Ad Hoc Committees (Panitia Ad Hoc (PAH)) which, despite their name, are standing committees. Their role is to discuss Bills emanating from the DPR or initiated by the DPD and to execute the DPD s powers in the area of the oversight of executive government. The structure and allocation of functions of the PAH reflects the powers and authority of the DPD. PAH I: regional autonomy, relations between the centre and the regions, and the creation, dissolution and amalgamation of regions. 6 PAH II: management of natural resources, management of other economic resources, balance of central and regional finances, and taxation. PAH III: education and religion. PAH IV: the state budget, results of the audit of the State Audit Agency (BPK) and advice on the appointment of Members of BPK. Each PAH is composed of 32 Members, with one Member from each province, each Member being expected to serve on one PAH. The membership of the PAH is selected annually in a plenary meeting of the DPD, so current arrangements will mean that the membership will change each year. The Committees are headed by a Leadership, composed of a Chair and two Deputy Chair which, like the DPD Leadership is meant to be a united collective leadership. In addition to the PA, there are a range of other permanent bodies (alat kelengkapan) of the DPD which are again modelled on their counterparts in the DPR. Steering Committee The Steering Committee (Panitia Musyawarah) is composed of 32 Members (one from each province) whose function is to draw up the agenda for the sessions of the DPD and to determine policies for the operation and management of the assembly and to oversee the work of the various bodies of the DPD. It is headed by a Leadership with a Chair and two Deputy Chairs, elected by the Members of the Committee at a plenary session chaired by the DPD Leadership. The Steering Committee s roles are the same as those for the counterpart body in the DPR, which is a very powerful organ in that chamber. In 6 The word region (daerah) is used interchangeably in two senses: to refer in general to the areas of the country outside the capital and to refer collectively to the three levels of subnational government, the provinces, districts (kabupaten) and sub districts (kecamatan).

11 Stephen Sherlock remains to be seen, however, whether the Steering Committee of the DPD will be as central to the functioning of the DPD as it is in the DPR. This is one of the areas where the absence of political parties will have a crucial effect on how the DPD is able to operate. The Steering Committee in the DPR derives its powers not only from its ability to control what and when is discussed, but also from the fact that it is made up of the Leadership of the DPR, the Leadership of the Commissions and the Leadership of the party caucuses (Fraksi). It is thus composed of the most powerful elements of all the key bodies of the parliament and is the place were the party caucuses are most directly and formally represented (Sherlock 2003). 11 The composition of the Steering Committee of the DPD, on the other hand, is no different from the composition of all the other bodies of the DPD, including the PAH. The 32 Members of the Committee are selected as individual DPD Members and do not represent established power players from other bodies of the assembly. The absence of party caucuses means that the Committee is not an instrument for the enforcement of party direction and discipline along the lines of its counterpart body in the DPR. It will be important to observe what, if any, conventions come to be developed on the selection of Steering Committee members. Of particular interest will be the question of who, if anyone, is reappointed to the Committee over a number of years and is thus able to build up technical expertise and influence. Legislation Committee The Legislation Committee (Panitia Perancang Undang Undang) is a committee of 32 DPD Members (one from each province) whose function is to plan and prioritise the agenda of the DPD s deliberations on Bills and to coordinate the discussion of Bills by the PAH and other DPD bodies. The Committee can hold consultations meetings with the DPR, regional legislatures, central and regional governments and the public and is the point of contact between the DPD and the Legislation Council of the DPR (Baleg) on the deliberation of Bills. The Committee is also responsible for evaluating and developing the Rules of Procedure (Standing Orders) of the DPD and the DPD Members Code of Ethics. It is headed by a collective Leadership of a Chair and two Deputy Chairs. The Legislation Committee is modelled on the DPR s Legislation Council (Baleg), a body that has become increasingly central to the work of the DPR because the Council now oversees the production of all Bills initiated by the DPR, often including the actual drafting of the Bills. The Council has also

12 In Indonesia s Regional Representative Assembly: Democracy, Representation and the Regions 12 become an important interface between the DPR and the government. Once again, it will again be interesting to observe if the DPD Legislation Committee takes on as influential role as its counterpart in the DPR. House Affairs Committee The House Affairs Committee (Panitia Urusan Rumah Tangga) is responsible for the oversight of the internal affairs of the DPD, including the DPD s own budget. It is constituted in the same way as the other bodies of the DPD, with a membership of 32 DPD Members, selected annually and with one representative from each province. It is headed by a collective Leadership composed of a Chair and two Deputy Chairs. Committee for Inter institutional Cooperation The Committee for Inter institutional Cooperation (Panitia Kerja Sama Antar Lembaga Perwakilan 7 ) is responsible for managing and developing relations and cooperation between the DPD and other representative legislative institutions, under the guidance of the DPD Leadership. The Committee oversees the dispatching and reception of delegations from other legislative bodies, both bilateral and multilateral, under the direction of the DPD Leadership and the Steering Committee. The Committee is composed of 32 Members (one from each province) selected annually and headed by a collective Leadership with a Chair and two Deputy Chairs. Ethics Council The Ethics Council (Badan Kehormatan) is charged with the responsibility of investigating complaints made against DPD Members regarding their continued fitness for office or allegations of violation of their oath or the DPD Code of Ethics. The Council can call witness and gather other evidence, can reach conclusions about its investigations and recommend sanctions such as termination of a Member from a leadership position in the DPD or as a Member of the DPD. But it must refer conclusions and recommendations to a plenary session of the DPD for final decision. The Council is constituted in the same way as DPD Committees, with 32 Members (one from each province) and a Leadership of a Chair and two Deputy Chairs. Secretariat of the DPD 7 This translates literally as Inter Representative Institution Cooperation Committee.

13 Stephen Sherlock A major problem confronting the DPD is the fact that the financial and human resources at its disposal to support its work are completely insufficient, particularly for an assembly that is still in the formative stages of its development. The resources available to support the DPR are meagre and those it does have are poorly organised and managed, but the DPR at least has the benefit of a complement of staff and physical resources inherited from its earlier years of existence as a rubber stamp chamber during the New Order. But the DPD is not even able to call on upon such accumulated sources of support. 13 As an interim measure, the immediate administrative and specialist needs of the DPD have been met by the Secretariat of the MPR. With the great reduction in the powers and role of the MPR, and particularly since the end of the work of the MPR committee on constitutional reform, this was a logical short term move. But the MPR Secretariat was not designed for a chamber that meets on a continuous basis like the DPD. The MPR Secretariat does have the advantage that it is relatively flexible compared to the DPR Secretariat and it was reportedly able to redirect staff existing staff to new tasks. But the DPD is urgently in need of a Secretariat that is structured around its own institutional needs. Current plans are that a DPD Secretariat will be established by the end of 2005, but outside observers are sceptical that this objective will be met. A Presidential Decree will be required to establish the DPD Secretariat, but this has not yet been issued. 8 The MPR Secretariat has a staff of around 300 personnel, with the great majority of these being administrative and security staff. 9 There are around 15 staff with the qualifications to provide the kind of intellectual support necessary for a modern legislature. These include 5 legal drafters who had been brought into the MPR Secretariat to work on the constitutional amendment process. There are a number of staff with law and politics backgrounds, but none with high level qualifications in disciplines such as economics and education. These latter areas are, of course, a major focus for the work of the DPD and the absence of staff with such expertise is a glaring weakness that reflects the fact that the MPR Secretariat was not designed for 8 Interviews with MPR Secretariat staff and staff of international agencies. Jakarta, May The DPD building is located inside the DPR/MPR compound, but the MPR Secretariat is responsible for the security of the DPD building as well as the MPR Secretariat building. The DPR Secretariat is responsible for the perimeter security of the compound and for DPR facilities.

14 In Indonesia s Regional Representative Assembly: Democracy, Representation and the Regions 14 the purposes of supporting the DPD. DPD Members are provided with an allowance for one member of staff each. Most of these staff are not well qualified and tend to be regarded by Members as an opportunity to dispense patronage or to employ relatives. Who are the Members of the DPD? An important element of the discussion and debate that led to the formation of the DPD was the idea that it should be made up of people different from those that tend to fill the ranks of the DPR. It was intended that the DPD should not be dominated by the professional party politicians in Jakarta, but should contain people from a diversity of backgrounds who are strongly connected with a base in the regions. The first clear trend is the strong presence of Members with Golkar connections, with one estimate putting it at 24, or 19 per cent of the assembly. These range from former national leaders such as the Suharto era Ministers Ginandjar Kartasasmita (now the DPD Speaker) and Sarwono Kusumaatmadja, to provincial party functionaries such as the Aceh representative, Helmi Mahera Al Mujahid, to the North Sumatra representative, Raja Inal Siregar, a former Governor of that province and retired military officer, who described himself as an adviser to Golkar. 10 One of the Deputy Speakers of DPD, La Ode Ida, also worked as an adviser to the Golkar Faction in the DPR from 1997 to A large proportion of those with a relationship with Golkar appear to be from the green or Islamic elements of the party, with a number having been involved in ICMI and Muhammadiyah. The prominence of former Golkar figures is not surprising because it was by far the official party during the Suharto regime and membership was critically important to the acquisition of any kind of position of public office or influence. Golkar was the only party permitted to organise at the regional level and it was a parallel but integral part of local administrative structures. In many regions Golkar leaders make up a major proportion of the individuals with political and administrative experience and with a high public profile in their local communities and provinces. The situation is reminiscent of the hold on public life still held by figures from the Stalinist 10 Profiles of Members of the Regional Representative Council , MPR RI Secretariat General & International IDEA, Jakarta, Ibid., p. 287.

15 Stephen Sherlock parties of the former Soviet bloc. There was never anything like a purge of New Order figures after the fall of Suharto, so many appear to have used their longstanding networks and profile as a launching pad for election to the DPD. Three other Members declare themselves to have had associations with other parties, two from parties that existed under the New Order, PPP and PDI/PDIP and only one from a party launched since 1998, the Islamic PBB. 15 Possibly the most striking feature of the composition of the DPD is the prominence of business people. About 50 Members describe themselves as being entrepreneurs, in private business and so on, which makes them the largest single group in the DPD. There are some who have had previous experience in public office, but the DPD is notable in that it seems to have attracted a large number of individuals with a purely business background that have had little previous overt involvement in public politics. A large number of religious leaders or individuals with connections to an Islamic or Christian organisation were elected to the DPD. Around 30 DPD Members, or 23 per cent of the assembly, have such connections as a major part of their profile. These include prominent leaders of the Islamic modernist organisation Muhammadiyah, such as Irman Gusman from West Sumatra, as well as a number of figures who are well known in their provinces for their role in the Islamic traditionalist organisation, Nadhlatul Ulama (NU) and in Islamic schools (pesantren) run by NU. In the large provinces of West, Central and East Java, where NU is especially influential, 5 of the 12 DPD Members have a prominent background in NU pesantren. 12 There are 8 DPD Members with links to Christian organisations, mainly from eastern Indonesia where Christians are concentrated. In many cases, however, they could not necessarily be described as religious leaders because their religious affiliations are just one part of their profile. Along with religious leaders from organisations with a strong local identity, there is a group of individuals who are prominent in their province or region because their families have traditional local aristocratic or adat connections. The clearest example is probably Gusti Kanjeng Ratu Hemas, the wife of the highly influential Sultan of Yogyakarta. Two of the four Balinese Members are scions of the aristocratic families of Bali. Representing North Maluku are Nita Budhi Susanti, the wife of the Sultan of Ternate and 12 Profiles of Members, op. cit., pp

16 In Indonesia s Regional Representative Assembly: Democracy, Representation and the Regions 16 Djafarsyah, the Sultan of Tidore, while Arief Natadiningrat and Ratu Cicih Kurniasih come from traditional ruling families in West Java and Banten respectively. One of the Central Sulewesi representatives, Nurmawati Bantilan, has a family name famous in the province for its long history of occupying prominent professional and public positions. Many of the DPD Members have had a background in regional government and administration, either as civil servants, members of regional assemblies such as DPRDs, 13 or as leading officials such as provincial Governors and district heads (Bupati). Nine Members have held local government office under the Suharto regime or since 1998, 5 have been Members of provincial or district legislatures and 6 were Members of the MPR as regional representatives, meaning that they were appointed by local assemblies. Many individuals with such a background have had careers in the civil service and this is reflected in the background of many DPD Members. The heavy involvement of the military in local administration under the Suharto regime has, however, not lead to high military or police numbers in the DPD. The presence of 5 former uniformed officers in the DPD from the police and military would be considered quite unusual in most democratic countries, but it could be seen as relatively small in the context of Indonesian history. The final category of DPD Member which can be identified are those with a background in academia or the professions, particularly the media and law. The Deputy Speaker of the DPD, Laode Ide, best exemplifies this strand in the DPD membership, with a professional background in higher education combined with a public profile built around public commentary in the media and work for non government organisations (NGOs), as well as a short period as an adviser to the Golkar faction in the DPR. There are 20 Members who give their occupation as lecturer or academic, as well as 4 Members with legal qualifications and 11 with a background in the media. Female representation in the DPD is perhaps higher than many people expected, with 27 women being elected. This is 21 per cent of the assembly, a figure which compares favourably with the 11 per cent representation of women in the DPR (Bessell 2004). A couple of the women could be seen as continuing in the tradition of Megawati, Benazir Bhutto or Indira Gandhi 13 DPRD = Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat Daerah, Regional People s Representative Assembly. These exist at the provincial level, where they are known as DPRD I and at district (kabupaten) level, where they are known as DPRD II.

17 Stephen Sherlock and being elected because of their relationships with male figures. A most notable example, as mentioned above, is the wife of the Sultan of Yogyakarta who is a very popular figure in his province and the only member of one of the former aristocratic families who has a national profile. Sultana Hemas election demonstrated the great local popularity of the Sultan in Yogyakarta because she actually received the highest individual vote (in percentage terms) of any candidate for the DPD. With per cent of the vote in her province, she far exceeded the vote of any other DPD Member, most of whom received from 5 to 20 per cent. Interestingly, the candidate with the second highest vote was another wife, Aida Ismet, the wife of the Governor of Riau Islands, who won per cent. Further surveys would be required to identify the extent to which voters who supported women candidates did so because of the candidates gender. 17 Paths to power There are a number of clear patterns to the kind of people who have been elected to the DPD. Their backgrounds could be put into five categories: business, government and the bureaucracy, religion, aristocratic/traditional and professional/social activist. It is important to be clear, however, that these are not watertight categories into which each Member can be neatly placed. On the contrary, there is a large overlap between them and many Members could be identified in more than one way. The Deputy Speaker, Irman Gusman, for example, has prominent Islamic modernist connections, having been involved in both Muhammadiyah and ICMI, but he clearly identifies himself as a businessman with a modern management approach to politics, rejecting associations with sectarianism. 14 In a similar way, most of those with an aristocratic background identify themselves as businesspeople or professionals. With these reservations in mind, the following tabulation produced by the international development organisation, International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Systems (IDEA) presents a view of the composition of the DPD which gives a good impression of the relative strengths of different kinds of DPD Members. 14 Interview with Irman Gusman, Jakarta, May 2005.

18 In Indonesia s Regional Representative Assembly: Democracy, Representation and the Regions 18 Social and Occupational Backgrounds of DPD Members Source: International IDEA No Category Total 1. Golkar background Other party backgrounds (PDIP, PPP) 2 (1 1) 3. MPR (Regional delegates, Social group delegates) 9 (6 3) 4. DPR 2 5. Regional parliaments (DPRD I/II) 8 6. Business people National Executive (Ministers) 2 8. Regional Executive (Governors, District Heads, other) 6 (3 1 2) 9. NGO/activist Academia Islamic Traditionalist Islam Modernist Non Islamic religious organisations Military (TNI/Polri) Media Law 4 The usefulness of these categorisations is that they give an insight into the sources of prominence, influence and resources on which DPD Members drew in order to win election. They provide a broad picture of the paths to power for DPD candidates. Without the organisational and financial resources of political parties behind them, candidates for the DPD mobilised political and/or financial capital behind them in a number of ways. Some drew upon their standing as leaders of religious organisations or as members of families with high traditional status and were able to translate the respect of local people into electoral support. In the case of the religious leaders, this had both local and national dimensions, in that NU, Muhammadiyah and the Catholic and Protestant churches are notionally Indonesia wide bodies but actually have a strongly regional character to their patterns of adherence. Hence the DPD figures most clearly associated

19 Stephen Sherlock with NU come from East and Central Java, while those with Muhammadiyah connections are strongly represented amongst the Members from Sumatra and most of the Christian Members are from eastern Indonesia. In the case of aristocratic and adat figures, local allegiances were clearly paramount. Thus one path to the DPD was to draw upon highly localised religious and other traditional identities or allegiances, frequently referred to in Indonesian political discourse as primordial, a term that often has disparaging connotations. 19 Other DPD candidates were able to mobilise electoral support out of their background as powerful political figures during the New Order, whether as ministers, governors, district heads or prominent officials in the regional bureaucracy. Recent research has shown that there is marked trend for some new provincial legislatures and positions of district heads and mayors to be taken over by politicos from the previous regime who have been highly successful in surviving the transition and thriving in new positions of power that are, in theory at least, now democratically accountable (Robison & Hadiz 2004, Malley 2003). According to Hadiz (2003: p.5), it is an indication of the success that Soeharto era local elites have had in reconstituting their power in a more democratic environment dominated by parties and parliaments. The evidence from the DPD suggests that this new assembly has also become one of the ways in which this is being achieved. Not only is the DPD being seen as a new path to power in itself, but the assembly is also being used as a stepping stone to power in the regions. At the time of writing, direct popular elections for the positions of governor, district heads and mayors are being held for the first time. Around ten DPD Members are candidates for these elections, a fact that was greeted with acclamation by the majority of Members when it was announced by Speaker Ginandjar at the May 2005 plenary session of the DPD. 15 That such a large number of Members would stand for a new office so soon after taking on the responsibilities of a position in the DPD does not suggest that they took their seat in the DPD very seriously. Should most of those Members be successful in their bid for new offices and leave the DPD, it could have a highly disruptive effect on a chamber that has only just begun to function as a representative assembly and which, as discussed below, still has very few achievements to its name. Of equal concern is the fact that the majority of Members do not appear to view this development with any concern or 15 Observation by the author, May 2005.

20 In Indonesia s Regional Representative Assembly: Democracy, Representation and the Regions 20 opprobrium. Many Members consider that standing for other offices while still a DPD Member is justified by the fact that they could achieve a great deal more in the powerful positions of governor, district head or mayor, as compared to working in the relatively powerless DPD. 16 The relative prominence of DPD Members with a background in academia, the law, media and community organisations suggests that a further way of mobilising support for a DPD is through professional standing and involvement in professional and other organisations, activism or advocacy. This is a very diverse group and further observation and research is required here to gather insight into the manner in which such people gathered support amongst the electorate. It seems, however, that there were very few Members explicitly sponsored or supported by NGOs. The most notable exception is Muspani from Bengkulu, a lawyer by profession who has been a leading figure in human rights and environmental organisations and whose candidacy for the DPD was championed by a number of NGOs in his province. Notwithstanding the prominent role accorded NGOs and civil society organisations in international development and democratisation literature, the sector remains very weak in Indonesia and is dominated by the urban middle class, professionals and students. There capacity to mobilise electoral support has been shown to be weak in other national and regional elections. It appears that a combination of factors is often required for people with a professional or activist profile to be elected. Laode Ide, for example, is known for his media profile and advocacy work, but he has lived most of professional life in Jakarta, far from his home province of Southeast Sulawesi. In this province, however, he was able to boost his support through the strong recognition of his family name which denotes that he comes from a local aristocratic family. One might also mention the example of Ferdinanda Ibo Yatipay from Papua who is a retired civil servant, but who campaigned on a platform of supporting the establishment of the Papuan People s Council. 16 The reaction of many DPD Members at the plenary session indicated that they fully approved of the candidacy of their colleagues in the regional heads elections and saw no negative implications for the functioning and status of the DPD. A number of Members told the author that they fully understood and supported their colleagues actions, but one or two expressed surprise and disappointment.

21 Stephen Sherlock The final, and perhaps most common, path to a seat in the DPD is through a business background. The largest single grouping that one can identify in the DPD is business people and entrepreneurs. As previously noted, it is a longstanding characteristic of Indonesian politics that politicians acquire business interests during (and as a result of) their involvement in politics. But the interesting feature of the DPD is that there is a large number of Members who identify themselves as businesspeople and do not appear to have a history of previous involvement in politics, at least in the sense of being office holding politicians. 21 The most likely explanation for this is that in the absence of the patronage and financial support of political parties, business people are much more likely to have their own personal resources to mobilise. It is well known that wealthy individuals can obtain a favourable place on a party ticket for election to the DPR or a regional legislature by giving generously to a party. But this route to office, of course, means involving oneself in the internal machinations of the party and possibly being subordinated to a patron and the power brokers within the party machine. The DPD, on the other hand, may seem attractive as an independent path to personal political influence, free of party entanglements, for a person with sufficient means to pay the substantial costs of an electoral campaign. Election campaigns usually involve considerable expenditure, not only on printing, advertising etc, but also for the distribution of gifts of clothing, food packages and so on to voters and for the payment of transport and attendance money to those attending rallies. An ambitious individual without large resources must enter the political game through a party, but the DPD allows a businessman with funds and time on his/her hands the luxury of a non political entry into politics and a free hand to play the game as he/she pleases. An important observation on the composition of the DPD and the paths its Members have taken to a seat is that there really does not seem to have been a concerted effort by the political parties to move into the DPD and to control it indirectly by placing their supporters in the assembly. As previously noted, there is a substantial proportion of the DPD who are members of Golkar, have Golkar connections or a history of involvement with Golkar. But research to date does not suggest that this was an organised effort by the party. Rather, it is a reflection of the fact that Golkar allegiances were essential for a political or bureaucratic career under the New Order and, to repeat a point made earlier, the politicos or apparatchiks of the New Order are continuing to play a prominent role in post Suharto