The making of a land market in Tenso irrigation system, Eastern Burkina Faso

Transcription

1 The making of a land market in Tenso irrigation system, Eastern Burkina Faso La construction d'une «marché» foncier dans le district d'irrigation de Tenso (Burkina Faso) Charlotte van der Schaaf, Department of Political and Cultural Change, Center for Development Research (ZEF), Walter-Flex-Strasse 3, Bonn, Germany. charlottevander.schaaf@uni-bonn.de Abstract This paper deals with the question how the relationship between the state and the local population is changing due to the ongoing decentralisation processes, and explicitly what influence this process can have on the regulation of land and water management. I try to grasp how people cope with a growing institutional uncertainty, which seems to be a feature of local political arenas in West Africa. One of the paradoxes of the African state is that government control capability is limited, but as the locus for the distribution of rights and resources the state is central (Lund 1998: 25). And with democratisation the chieftaincy has been able to establish a formally ambiguous but very effective position as a legitimate authority (Lund 2003: 18-19). I argue in this paper that in Burkina Faso, the ongoing decentralisation process has opened up opportunities for certain actors to capture the process and take advantage of the institutional change and resulting uncertainty, in this particular case to gain access to and control over valuable natural resources. On the basis of a case study in the centre-east of Burkina Faso, I will show how legitimacy issues, manipulation of the regulations and weak internal regulation capacity has resulted in centralisation of power on the local level and a consequential increase of land insecurity for farmers in the irrigation system. Keywords: State, cooperative, irrigation system, land, land markets, legitimacy, decentralisation, institutional change, tenure insecurity. Colloque international Les frontières de la question foncière At the frontier of land issues, Montpellier,

2 Résumé Ce texte trait la question comment le rapport entre l état et la population locale change par suite du processus de décentralisation, et explicitement, lequel est l influence de ce processus sur la régulation de la gestion foncière et de l eau. J essaye de saisir comment la population fait face à une incertitude institutionnelle croissante, laquelle semble d être une caractéristique des arènes politiques locales en Afrique d ouest. Une des paradoxes de l état Africaine est que la capacité d autorité du gouvernement est limitée, mais l état est essentiel comme lieu de distribution des droits et ressources (Lund 1998 :25). Et avec démocratisation la chefferie a été capable d établir une position d autorité légitime formellement ambigu mais très effective (Lund 2003: 18-19). Je raisonne qu en Burkina Faso, le processus de décentralisation a s ouvris des opportunités pour certains acteurs de capter le processus et profiter du changement institutionnel et l insécurité consécutive, dans ce cas particulier pour avoir accès aux et contrôler les ressources naturelles de valeur. Dans ce article, par suite d une étude de cas au centre ouest de Burkina Faso, je montrerais comment les questions de légitimité, la manipulation des règlements et une régulation interne faible ont aboutis à une centralisation de pouvoir dans l échelon locale, et une accroissement consécutive de la sécurité foncière pour les producteurs dans la plaine irrigué. Colloque international Les frontières de la question foncière At the frontier of land issues, Montpellier,

3 THE MAKING OF A LAND MARKET IN TENSO IRRIGATION SYSTEM, EASTERN BURKINA FASO This paper deals with the question how the relationship between the state and the local population is changing due to the ongoing decentralisation processes, and explicitly what influence this process can have on the regulation of land and water management. I try to grasp how people cope with a growing institutional uncertainty, which seems to be a feature of local political arenas in West Africa (Le Meur 1999). One of the paradoxes of the African state is that government control capability is limited, but as the locus for the distribution of rights and resources the state is central (Lund 1998: 25). And with democratisation the chieftaincy has been able to establish a formally ambiguous but very effective position as a legitimate authority (Lund 2003: 18-19). I argue in this paper that in Burkina Faso, the ongoing decentralisation process has opened up opportunities for certain actors to capture the process and take advantage of the institutional change and resulting uncertainty, in this particular case to gain access to and control over valuable natural resources. The managing and regulating role of the state technical services has diminished in Burkina Faso due to the ongoing decentralisation process. Officially the decentralisation process should assure the decentralisation of decision-making and responsibility powers to the local population, supported by the state administration (Gouvernement de Burkina Faso 2001). In the case of irrigation management the user groups and cooperatives have to take over the responsibilities for the regulation of water distribution, land use and production processes in general, including the commercialisation of products. The state administration, next to its purely administrative tasks, is meant to work as an advisor and regulator in the case of conflictive situations or non-conformation to rules and regulations. Politico-legal institutions 1 in Burkina Faso have overlapping fields of jurisdiction, multiple purposes and are platforms for political competition 2. These institutions are not neutral, independent authorities that rule according to laws and regulations, though are knowledgeable actors that (can) use their knowledge and their legitimate power to earn money through the marketing of legal and administrative decisions (Lund 2002: 8). Also the politico-legal institutions constituting forums for dispute settlement use disputes for their own, mainly local, political ends, they are so-called shopping forums (see von Benda-Beckmann 1981: 117). The necessary reproduction of the authority of the politico-legal institutions depends on their legitimacy, on the institution s ability to operate vis-à-vis its clientele as well as other politico-legal institutions (Lund 2001: 864). On the basis of a case study in the centre-east of Burkina Faso, I will show how legitimacy issues, manipulation of the regulations and weak internal regulation capacity has resulted in centralisation of 1 Term taken from Lund (1998) 2 See Sawadogo (2001), van der Schaaf (forthcoming)) Colloque international Les frontières de la question foncière At the frontier of land issues, Montpellier,

4 power on the local level and a consequential increase of land insecurity for farmers in the irrigation system. The status of land within an irrigation system in Burkina Faso Secure access to and control over land is seen as one of the basic principles for sustainable management and production of resources. The outcome of irrigated agriculture in Africa has been disappointing and land tenure issues are one of the essential causes for this situation (Mathieu 1990; Koppen 2000; Meinzen-Dick and Nkonya 2005). The organisation and regulation of land tenure within irrigation systems in francophone West Africa reflect two principles: land belongs to the state and the plots are only allocated to the farmers, but they are not owners of the plot. Often the allocation is temporary, conditionally and egalitarian (Mathieu 1990; Koppen 1998; Mathieu et al. 2001). The development of land for the construction of irrigation schemes has changed the security of land rights for the irrigators. In the Burkina land reform law, Réforme Agraire et Foncière (RAF) (Gouvernement de Burkina Faso 1998), the producers are put in the position of sole users with usufruct rights (MAHRH 2003). The RAF defines the conditions of occupation and use of hydroagricultural land. Although customary land tenure arrangements remain valid at the local level, they are not sufficiently taken into account by the RAF (Ministère de l'environnement et de l'eau 2001). Users groups and cooperatives have been initiated for the management of the irrigation schemes and the products of the scheme, under law n 014/99/AN, regarding the instruction of cooperatives and users groups in Burkina Faso. The idea of these users groups and cooperatives is based on concepts of solidarity and collective decision-making and they have to be self-sufficient (Tcha-Koura 1995; Abernethy and Sally 2000). The aim of the agricultural land law (within the RAF) is that the control over land by the state assures that the cultivation by the farmers equals the investments made by the state (see Mathieu 1991: 62, in: Le Bris et al. 1991; Dialla 2002). The plots are only attributed to cultivators conditionally, as far as they respect the cultivation regulations and fulfil the obligations as defined by the agricultural services. The agricultural services hereby were, especially in the 1980s and 1990s, the means to expel the cultivators that did not follow the objectives of the irrigation system and the regulations (Mathieu 1991: 65, 66; Tcha-Koura 1995). Being the state : attempt to institutional change and legitimacy discourses The Tenso reservoir was constructed in 1958, mostly for cattle watering and fishery activities. In 1974 the first part of the irrigation system was constructed, ha and in 1980 the second part, with about the same size. The system was constructed along an extended riverbed, on land that belonged to five neighbouring villages, of which Tenso was the first comer village. At the construction of the first part only inhabitants of Tenso acquired plots, the second time around all villages were able to apply for a plot. The inhabitants of the villages were requested to provide labour and in exchange for the Colloque international Les frontières de la question foncière At the frontier of land issues, Montpellier,

5 labour and the lost agricultural land all family heads acquired an irrigated plot within the scheme 3. The villagers had to deposit a demand for the plot, but no financial donation was made. After the initiation of the irrigation system, a farmer user group was established, with all plot holders as members, and in the beginning of the 1990s the user group turned into a cooperative, following the initiative of an agricultural extension officer. Institutional adaptations: the enforcement of rules and regulations The rules and regulations that are applicable for the cooperative were established during the formation of the first user group with the support of the agricultural extension officers at that time. These regulations did not change significantly over the years and the producers had proper knowledge of these rules and the consequences of their acts. One of the more severe sanctions executed in this scheme by the cooperative management committee, in cooperation with the prefect, was the withdrawal of land as part of the exclusion regulation. The cooperative regulations stated that the plots could be withdrawn from the producers when they did not produce sufficiently. In the past, producers had been able to successfully defend their rights to the plots and had avoided that their plots would be withdrawn permanently, by negotiating with the agricultural extensions officers and the management committee. The withdrawal of land was used as a control mechanism by the agricultural agents and the management committee to assure the production standards of the system. The threat to lose land had often been sufficient. In cases where the concerned farmer had persisted in his irregular activities, his plot would only be temporarily withdrawn not to lead to a permanent food and income insecurity for the cultivator and his family. The pressure on land had increased in the area and the plots had started to play a larger role for the income opportunities of the local population. A local strategy to acquire extra land for rice cultivation was the creation of new irrigated plots on land that was situated next to the irrigation system. As this land was flooded by drainage water from the irrigated plots and no sorghum could be cultivated, in this way the land could still be used for cultivation. As the land was slant, they put labour into the levelling of the land. In this sense, officially, some of the plot holders had several plots instead of one plot only. Former prefects and the agricultural extension services had connived at this strategy. With the arrival of a new prefect these strategies were no longer overlooked. He decided to rearrange the practices and norms that were accepted at the irrigation system. This also affected the security of land. During a general assembly of the cooperative he asked the producers who was the owner of the irrigation system. The farmers answered that the government was the owner. He then asked them how it was possible that some people had several plots and got more than 60 sacs of rice, while others did not have any land to 3 See van Koppen (1998) on plot distribution policies in Burkina Faso in the 1980 and 1990s. Colloque international Les frontières de la question foncière At the frontier of land issues, Montpellier,

6 cultivate. He ordered the committee to give him a list of people that had several plots and he declared that he would withdraw all these extra plots. State land or not: tenure security claims When the prefect and the management committee consequently declared that the farmers that had several plots should choose between one of those plots, the concerned plot holders consequently chose the plot that they had constructed themselves. They claimed to have put labour in the creation of the plot and they did not want to loose that land. Although plots within the system were informally perceived as belonging to the plot holders, i.e. they had never been completely withdrawn, and the usufruct title officially should give tenurial security, this security was questioned by the producers. A central argument of the concerned farmers was that they no longer perceived the land within the irrigation system as being secure, as the prefect, being a representative of the state, had claimed his right to dispossess the holders of their land because it was state land. As the self-created plots were situated outside the irrigation system, they felt that the state had no say on the application and disposal of the concerned plots and therefore these were perceived as more secure. The prefect was able to establish a powerful alliance with the management committee, by calling new elections and assuring the election of two migrants that had returned to their village of origin, Tenso, and who belonged to the main royal family in the department 4. They were promised support from the prefect in return for their loyalty and from that point onwards the management committee and the prefect cooperated closely together and the cooperative members were put offside. By providing access to plots within the system, by confiscating the extra plots the prefect claimed that he wanted to increase the productivity of the irrigation system and at the same time provide access to irrigable land for the inhabitants of the region that did not have access yet. By using this idiom, in the two years after these initial withdrawals the committee, in cooperation with the prefect, confiscated plots from farmers accused of not producing according to the standards. Although no numbers were officially made public, farmers claimed that the committee withdrew 20 to 30 plots a year and distributed them to others against cash. Moreover, the cooperative s general assembly was no longer notified or involved in the decision-making regarding the withdrawal of the plots and hereby had no voting right in order to alter or consent to the decisions taken by the committee. The farmers consequently lived in uncertainty as it was unclear until the start of the new season whether or not their plot would be confiscated. They claimed that the sanctioning was extremely influenced by the social relations with the board members. The committee and the prefect also did not have trouble with withdrawing plots from chiefs, although this ran counter to customary 4 This is extensively described in Van der Schaaf (forthcoming). Colloque international Les frontières de la question foncière At the frontier of land issues, Montpellier,

7 norms and values. The prefect wanted to set an example for the population that he did not accept their traditional authority and that the state was the only authority in his perception. The farmers saw no opportunity to complain at the provincial administrative level about these practices as for outsiders it appeared as if the prefect and the management committee were strict but fair because the withdrawal of land was one of the accepted sanctions 5. Meanwhile, the land insecurity resulted in a decrease of productivity within the system as the farmers were awaiting the decisions of the prefect and the management committee regarding the use and control rights of their plots. Due to this insecurity the farmers no longer invested in their plots, they had stopped the rice transplanting activities and the production had come to a halt. A local land market appears Depersonalisation of land: capitalisation on authority Kourittenga is one of the densely populated provinces in Burkina Faso and agricultural land is increasingly becoming a scarce resource. Requests for land had been a reoccurring issue within the department of Tenso and the neighbouring departments. Due to the return of migrants to the area in 2003, following up on the civil war in the Ivory Coast, the requests for land augmented within a few months in the area. When the committee and the prefect realised that there existed a high demand from outside the department for agricultural land, the management committee reacted by informally selling withdrawn plots on highest bids, including people from outside the department. To legitimise the distribution of plots to outsiders, the prefect went a step further in his strategy to depersonalise the land within the irrigation system. He announced in a general assembly that from this year onwards every single plot holder had to submit an application for his plot. The application cost 4650 francs CFA per plot 6 and had to be paid at the prefecture. Three different kinds of applications were ordered. With the application the farmers had to show their plot number and indicate whether they wanted to stay on the plot or request another plot in return. The third application form was for interested outsiders that did not yet hold a plot within the system. The application procedure opened up the land market to outsiders. During the meeting inhabitants openly opposed the applications for their plots. But the prefect did not accept the refusals. He argued that the irrigation system belonged to the government and that he ordered the farmers, as representative of the state, to apply for the continued use of their plots. The concerned opponents argued that they had not heard of any applications being submitted in other irrigation systems in the province and that they did not understand why they should submit a new application for the plots that they had been using for so many years. The prefect answered that every 5 In a neighbouring irrigation system the story of the strict prefect who was finally making sure that producers functioned properly was spreading. Its management committee stated that they wished they had a prefect in their department that would intervene like that. At the provincial agricultural extension office the agents even spoke of the great example the prefect was setting for other irrigation systems francs CFA equals one euro. Colloque international Les frontières de la question foncière At the frontier of land issues, Montpellier,

8 village had its way of working: Every chief has his way of ruling, that this was his decision as representative of the state and would be carried out. The main argument voiced against the practices of the prefect was the insecurity concerning access and control over land for the native population. The village inhabitants complained about the fact that their land, with which they had nourished their families and which they had cultivated for so many generations, was now sold to outsiders. The land that they had lost at the time of construction and the labour they had spent on the construction of the system, had been compensated by the acquirement of an irrigated plot. The villagers felt that the withdrawn plots should be distributed among their own inhabitants because as formal landowners they had priority rights to these plots. Social alliances and the resulting lack of solidarity Although all members of the cooperative were touched by the implementation of this new regulation and opposed it during individual discussions, there existed no signs of open resistance concerning the decisions of the committee and the prefect. The fact that the actions of the prefect were not opposed had partly to do with the position the prefect still held in the eyes of some of the villagers. The villagers in general still feared the state representatives and the administration in general 7. The alliances that resulted from the social relationships between the inhabitants of the different villages and the main actors, the members of the management committee and the prefect, were another reason for the lack of opposition. The relatives of the management committee members defended their decisions and activities to the other inhabitants and the management committee was smart enough to share their revenues with their relatives in order to ensure their continuing support. The uncertainty of who was supporting them and the resulting distrust that was developed with regard to others, even near relatives, made it impossible for the opposing cooperative members to organise themselves and defend their rights against the decisions of the management committee. The members wanted to avoid social repercussions within their respective family circles and feared that they would lose their land if they were exposed as critical opponents 8. Two chiefs wanted to oppose the activities of the prefect but were hampered because the other chiefs were divided and influenced by the existing alliances, especially because the management committee s vice-president was the confidant and representative of the main chief in the department 9. Moreover, 7 For many farmers he remained the commandant. 8 The inhabitants even stated that there were spies among the population, engaged by the prefect, and therefore criticisms were rarely openly uttered. 9 This chief worked as civil servant in another area of Burkina Faso and therefore had left his responsibilities to his nephew and the elders of the village. Colloque international Les frontières de la question foncière At the frontier of land issues, Montpellier,

9 the committee and the prefect did not shun withdrawing the plots of the chiefs 10 and this was as much a threat for the chiefs as for the other inhabitants. The power of the land: expropriation of a new terrain and a revolt As a result of this plot application policy many outsiders had filed requests for a plot and the committee and the prefect argued that the demand could not be met by the amount of available plots. Therefore it was decided that a large piece of land, adjacent to the irrigation system, would be expropriated, parcelled out and sold to the interested persons. Attracting national funds for personal accounts: using national projects and vague history The concerned area was cultivated by villagers from two neighbouring villages, Komtenga and Dasin. The land belonged to the chief of Komtenga and had been lent out to the inhabitants of Dasin. Extensive drainage from the irrigation system hampered the continuous cultivation of the main staple crops and an agricultural extension agent had advised the farmers to start cultivating rice during the dry season. The farmers divided the land in plots and were very successful in cultivating rice. The cooperative s management committee had discovered the suitability of the land for irrigation and its members developed the idea of turning the land into a managed irrigation system and to add it to the irrigation scheme area. The planned reallocation of the land for irrigation was triggered by the fact that a state-managed reservoir rehabilitation project, PPB, had visited the area several times 11. The committee members and the prefect perceived the intervention of the project as a profitable opportunity and hoped to acquire financial support in the near future for the proper development of the new terrain. As they foresaw that the project could take over the arrangement of the terrain afterwards, they reckoned that, when they would initiate the initial distribution of the plots, these financial benefits would be directed to them. The management committee sold the story to the inhabitants of the villages in a different way. It called a general assembly with the prefect, in which the committee explained the cooperative members that they wanted to extend the irrigation area and to expropriate the owners of the concerned land adjacent to the irrigation system. They explained the farmers that these measures were necessary because they intended to support the migrants that had returned from the Ivory Coast to their province, by providing them with land to cultivate 12. Any refusal or opposition to the plans were therefore stigmatised as asocial and negative concerning the well-being of others. 10 The example of the chief of Komtenga whose plot was withdrawn after he had been ill and not able to cultivate his plot well nourished this fear. 11 Project Petits Barrages de Centre-Est 12 At the time of the civil war in the Ivory Coast, after many migrants had returned, the Burkinabe government established new irrigation systems in other regions of the country in order to provide long term migrants that had no family or land rights, with arable land for cultivation. Colloque international Les frontières de la question foncière At the frontier of land issues, Montpellier,

10 They based the legitimisation of the expropriation of the particular piece of land on the argument that the area had been foreseen to be parcelled out at the time of construction. They reasoned that one white indication mark in the prolongation of the irrigation system designated that an extension in this direction had been planned 13 and that the entire area in between the irrigation system and a tar road at a few kilometres distance in this sense officially belonged to the irrigation system. They argued that hereby the land automatically came under the order of the cooperative s managing institution, namely the committee, and the prefect as state representative. After the meeting a heated discussion started off concerning the validity of the committee s claim, which ended up in an even more divided population, the opponents from the two concerned villages, and the supporters who were looking forward to the opportunity of acquiring a plot for rice cultivation. The main objection of the opponents was that the concerned land was cultivated at the time of expropriation. The families were depending on the harvest of these lands, on which at the time ground nuts and sorghum were cultivated and its immediate expropriation was perceived as an indirect death penalty. However, the prefect openly agreed with the plans of the management committee and started the expropriation and reallocation procedure. Legitimisation and validation: mobilising the technical services Officially, in order to be able to arrange a certain terrain for irrigated agriculture, a land title has to be given out for the concerned land. Moreover an extensive management plan has to be developed by the agricultural extension services and all state authorities, at the provincial and departmental level, have to be informed before steps are taken. The prefect claimed that he had deposited a request for expropriation at the High Commissioner s office, which was an official procedure only to legalise the expropriation. With his help the committee also set up a contact with the provincial director of the agricultural extension services in order to present him the plans and to request for technical support. The prefect, SY and the president of the management committee personally went to the provincial director and asserted that the land was not used for agriculture momentarily and that the concerned land owners had agreed with the development of the terrain. The extension services agreed to develop a management plan for the terrain. The deal was made informally, in the sense that the request remained oral and no documents were drafted to ratify the expropriation and development. The cooperative claimed to have few financial means to their disposal for the drafting of the documents and the land title certificate. Consequently the provincial director agreed with the plans of the cooperative and without verifying the claims of the management committee that the land was unused, he charged the responsible technical agent with the development of a simple outline of the terrain and the division into plots. He officially charged a fee of francs CFA for the development of the 13 According to the story a white engineer, who had constructed the irrigation system, had said that they were planning to extend the system by pointing at the white indication mark. Colloque international Les frontières de la question foncière At the frontier of land issues, Montpellier,

11 management plan and levied an additional francs CFA for his cooperation in dealing with the case unofficially. The deal was made in the shadow of the law (von Benda-Beckmann 1992), the authorities were informed but nothing had been put on paper. The payment of the director assured the regulation of the expropriation to take place in a simple and informal way. No official inquiries would be made and in this way resistance could prevented and a long process avoided. On the other hand the arrangement could never been proven if it would be legally opposed, as no documents were available. Resisting and reassuring authority After the agricultural agent visited the area and measured and delineated the concerned terrain, the chief of Komtenga, ordered the farmers to take out the pickets as he had not given permission for the delineation and expropriation of the land. He decided to resist the expropriation because his irrigated plot had already been withdrawn by the committee and he had (literally) nothing to lose. This resistance eventuated in a physical battle between supporters of both sides, after which the management committee called the support of the gendarmerie. Consequently the gendarmerie prohibited the farmers to continue cultivation activities on the piece of land and left the further resolution of the conflict to the villagers. The agricultural agent, while travelling to deliver the plan to the committee, got into an accident and subsequently refused to return to the village due to suspected witchcraft. The opponents of the management committee and the prefect were strengthened by this incident as they felt that they had recovered some of their influence on the situation. The chiefs of the two villages subsequently informed the superior chief of Kourittenga about the situation and explained that the particular piece land was being cultivated that time and that he therefore opposed the immediate expropriation of the terrain. The superior chief acknowledged their claim and sent his sub-chief as his representative to the area in order to investigate the claim. The representative informed the superior chief that the land was indeed cultivated and consequently the superior chief decided to mingle in the affair. He visited the provincial director of agricultural services and told him to halt the expropriation process and leave the farmers on their land as the claims of the management committee that the land was not used for other purposes were incorrect. And he requested the director to investigate whether the concerned terrain had indeed been subject of development in the past, as the prefect and the cooperative committee claimed. He informed the director that his instructions for the two chiefs of the villages would depend on the outcome of these investigations. The provincial director first denied the inconsistencies, but looked into the case at the Ministry of Agriculture with as result no documented evidence that an enlargement of the irrigation system had been foreseen. He informed the superior chief and told his extension officer to leave the case. The chief subsequently went to the High Colloque international Les frontières de la question foncière At the frontier of land issues, Montpellier,

12 Commissioner to enquire about the decision to sign the expropriation of the land, who consequently denied to have signed any expropriation papers. The chief made clear that he did not agree with the way in which the prefect had forced the population to pay for their plots and expropriate landowners for a false purpose. After this audience he informed the chief of Komtenga that the expropriation of the land had been cancelled and that the farmers should continue to cultivate their land. A few days after the interference of the superior chief, the inhabitants were informed that the prefect would be taken off his post and replaced by another prefect. As a reaction the opponents of the management committee claimed that they would carry out a coup as soon as the prefect had left and that they would change the committee. The prefects and inhabitants of neighbouring departments claimed that the prefect had been replaced due to the interference of the chief. By informing the High Commissioner he had made sure that he would take up his responsibility and bring back social peace in the area by arranging the prefect s immediate transfer to another area. The attempt of the village chief to have his rights to the land recognised invoked change. Although everything had been arranged according the [state] law, another politico-legal authority, namely the chieftaincy, was mobilised and intervened in the conflict. With help of the chief s acknowledged authority in land issues and the resulting respect for his position, he was expected to be able to halt the process and redefine the power relations and the property rights of the inhabitants. He, however, did not base his claim on his customarily recognised authority, but he went the official way, by approaching the various institutions involved and by staking a claim on the basis of the formal procedures that, in his eyes, were not met. Hence he successfully countered the legitimacy claims of the prefect and the management committee. Moreover, he functioned as an advocate of the population by bringing out the information concerning the prefect s practices in the open. Finally he used his political connections to assure the replacement of the prefect with immediate effect. Conclusions In the literature it is argued that the changeability and negotiability of relationships and rules is a fundamental characteristic of African societies (see Berry 1989, 1993; Lund 2002; Bierschenk and Olivier de Sardan 2003). This case study confirms such a statement. I agree however with Lund (2002: 27) that this characterises many societies but that what distinguishes each case from the other is the form in which the negotiability and changeability is assumed. Especially since the jurisdiction and the mandate of the technical services have been diminished the role of the state administrator as regulator has gained importance in Burkina Faso. I argue that this ongoing institutional change can have a local centralisation of power as result, resulting from the ambiguity of the legislation and the unclear jurisdiction of the state administrators. In line with Bierschenk and Olivier de Sardan (2003: 147), I feel that decentralisation can result in the emergence of new forms of informal local despotism. Colloque international Les frontières de la question foncière At the frontier of land issues, Montpellier,

13 Although it is argued that in many cases the state does not have a large influence on the functioning of rural life (Bierschenk and Olivier de Sardan 1997), yet concerning the distribution of rights and resources this case shows the opposite (see also Lund 1998). The state institutions and formal rules play a role at the local level, but which role they play depends on how they are used and abused by the different actors in their attempts to legitimise their actions and authority. Lund argues that the state, or rather the way the state is imagined, is central to the production of property (2003). As we saw in this paper, the imagination of the state as the overruling power played a large role in the acknowledgement of his power by the population. The administrator claimed that as representative of the state he was the state, and in this sense he could enforce the land law in a manner which was beneficial for his interests, this idiom gave legitimacy for his actions. Consequently we saw that when the prefect, the implementing state actor, tried to intervene in the local arena, the extent and the source of his legitimacy became important. The population s own regulation power was weak due to competing social alliances and, partly due to a lack of knowledge, they were not able to resist institutional change (Lavigne Delville 1992; Blundo 1994; Olivier de Sardan and A.Elhadji Dagobi 2000). The prefect was able to capture the existing power struggles and use them for his own benefit by establishing alliances with the most powerful group. He generated an increasing insecurity as he manipulated regulations and invented new ones. The cooperative was instrumentalised for the capture of resources and consequently the prefect literally marketed his decisions. Another point is that Le Meur (1999) argues that institutional pluralism in African countries generally generates insecurity. According to the motive for decentralisation, the reduction of jurisdiction of the state technical services should simplify the regulatory process and give local organisations the opportunity to decide on their own actions. However, as a result, in this case the forum-shopping opportunities (von Benda-Beckmann 1981; Pradhan and Pradhan 1996) of the local population had diminished. Even forums such as protests were difficult to achieve as withdrawal of land was a serious threat for the producers. Only when this was no longer a threat for one of the chiefs, he organised resistance and sought support within his institutional network. Hence I would argue that insecurity is not caused by pluralism or centralism, but it is about having the power and the opportunity to negotiate and arrange matters with the available institutions to secure access and control over resources. Colloque international Les frontières de la question foncière At the frontier of land issues, Montpellier,

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