For over thirty years, the Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis, Inc. (IFPA), has conducted studies, workshops, and conferences on national security

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2 For over thirty years, the Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis, Inc. (IFPA), has conducted studies, workshops, and conferences on national security and foreign policy issues and produced innovative reports, briefings, and publications. IFPA s products and services help government policymakers, military and industry leaders, and the broader public policy communities make informed decisions in a complex and dynamic global environment. With core staff in offices in Cambridge, Massachusetts, and Washington, D.C., the Institute maintains a global network of research advisors and consultants. The Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis: innovative strategies for new security challenges.

3 Denuclearizing North Korea Exploring Multilateral Approaches to Risk Reduction and Peace Regime Building September 2011 Report by Mr. Weston S. Konishi, Associate Director of Asia Pacific Studies Project Principal Directors: Dr. Jacquelyn K. Davis, Executive Vice-President Dr. Charles M. Perry, Vice-President and Director of Studies Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis A publication of the Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis

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5 CONTENTS Executive Summary and Key Points vii Introduction 1 Peace, Denuclearization, and the Growing North Korea Problem 4 Deterrence on the Korean Peninsula 9 Trilateral Consensus Building 12 Implications for the Six-Party Talks and Other Regional Security Mechanisms 15 Harmonizing Trilateral Approaches to North Korea 18 Korean Peninsula Peace Regime 21 Characteristics of a Peace Regime 25 Developing a Peace Regime Consensus: Themes and Perspectives 29 Korean Peace Regime Consensus Building in Support of Denuclearization 37 The U.S.-ROK Alliance Factor and Regional Considerations 38 Conclusion 41 List of Acronyms 44 References 46 Appendices 50 Concise Chronology of the Events on the Korean Peninsula Trail of Documents Related to Korean Peace Regime Development North-South Joint Agreement on Reconciliation, Nonaggression, and Cooperation and Exchange (Basic Agreement), 1991 Agenda from January, 2011 Workshop Participants from January, 2011 Workshop app:1 app:11 app:13 app:16 app:19 v

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7 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY AND KEY POINTS With support from the Carnegie Corporation of New York, the Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis (IFPA) collaborated with the Institute of Foreign Affairs and National Security (IFANS) and the US Institute of Peace (USIP) to organize a trilateral Track 1.5 dialogue in Seoul, South Korea on January 19, 2011 entitled Risk Reduction and Confidence-Building on the Korean Peninsula: Challenges, Opportunities, and Implications for Regional Stability. The dialogue brought together approximately 50 prominent policymakers and experts from the United States, China (People s Republic of China, or PRC) and the Republic of Korea (ROK, or South Korea) for in-depth discussions focusing on the current security situation on and surrounding the Korean Peninsula and prospects for greater cooperation among the three nations represented at the workshop. The event built on earlier workshops that IFPA has organized with Carnegie Corporation support to examine a variety of regional security challenges in Northeast Asia, including the likely impact of nuclear and ballistic missile proliferation trends, the potential value of multilateral risk reduction and confidence-building measures on the Korean Peninsula, and the prospects for developing over time a Korean Peninsula peace regime (KPPR) based in part on the denuclearization of the Democratic People s Republic of Korea (DPRK, or North Korea). The following is a brief summary of the workshop and subsequent research findings: 1 North Korean provocations over the past year have had a considerable impact on the strategic environment in Northeast Asia, negatively affecting a range of bilateral ties. For instance, strains have deepened between South and North Korea, South Korea and China, and China and the United States. At the same time, the region is once again polarizing into two main camps (U.S.-ROK- Japan versus PRC-DPRK). The leadership succession process in North Korea appears to be promoting more defiant and aggressive behavior by the regime and adds further unpredictability to the already tense regional security environment. The nature of deterrence on and surrounding the Korean Peninsula may be shifting, with the North seemingly emboldened to act out with impunity and the South declaring a new policy of proactive deterrence in response to further provocations. South Korean anxieties about the reliability of the U.S. extended nuclear deterrent have been heightened by the North s provocations and by 1 Note that this summary does not represent the opinions of all workshop participants or their organizations. It is not a consensus document, nor has it been reviewed by the participants prior to publication. IFPA has drawn its own conclusions from this exercise. Exploring Multilateral Approaches to Risk Reduction and Peace Regime Building vii

8 proposed policy changes outlined in the Obama administration s 2010 Nuclear Posture Review (NPR). Washington should continue to reassure South Korea and other regional allies about the U.S. commitment to extended deterrence. In the absence of the Six-Party Talks, the U.S.- ROK-China strategic triangle has become an increasingly salient mechanism for managing regional crises in the short term and for shaping a future security structure in Northeast Asia over the long term. Enhanced cooperation and coordination among these three nations can lead to a more effective diplomatic approach to negotiating the denuclearization of North Korea. The three countries have diverging priorities, with the United States and South Korea emphasizing denuclearization and China emphasizing peace and stability on the peninsula. Harmonizing these priorities is a fundamental requisite for adopting a common approach to the North Korean problem, including achieving a denuclearized Korean Peninsula. China s deepening economic engagement with North Korea is frustrating U.S. and South Korean attempts to isolate and pressure the regime. As this engagement continues, it is becoming increasingly difficult to sanction North Korea without impinging on Chinese commercial and economic interests. Washington and Seoul should explore ways to persuade Beijing to join initiatives to curb North Korean provocations and nuclear development in return for clearer assurances about allied intentions on the Korean Peninsula over the longer run, especially in the context of a reunified peninsula under the leadership of the South. The United States, South Korea, and China should improve trilateral security coordination and cooperation through enhanced CBMs and other risk-reduction measures. Opportunities to cooperate with China in deterring North Korean provocations and weapons of mass destruction (WMD) development should be pursued whenever possible. Over time, regional CBMs and risk-reduction mechanisms can lead to a new regional security architecture and/or a potential peace regime on the Korean Peninsula. There is an ongoing debate over whether a KPPR would be an end-state, such as an updated version of the 1953 armistice, with a formal end to the war and a framework for reconciliation, or a process leading to some form of North-South reconciliation and, possibly, a Korean confederation. Regardless of the scenario, denuclearization of the peninsula should be a prerequisite for the formation of a peace regime. The development of a KPPR should not in any way impede or detract from the U.S.-ROK alliance, which will remain a critical element of regional security for the foreseeable future. viii Denuclearizing North Korea

9 INTRODUCTION After a turbulent 2010, the security situation on the Korean Peninsula has settled into a relatively stable although still tense and tenuous stasis among the relevant regional players. This is a somewhat welcome development, given the alarming series of events of 2010, when North Korea mounted deadly conventional attacks on South Korea while revealing significant progress on its nuclear weapons program. In March 2010, North Korea torpedoed the ROK navy corvette Cheonan, killing forty-six South Korean sailors. 2 In November, the DPRK launched an artillery attack on civilianpopulated Yeonpyeong Island, killing two South Korean marines and two civilians. Both incidents were among the most violent and deadly actions by the DPRK since the end of the Korean War. Adding to the already tense security environment, North Korea disclosed in late November 2010 the existence of a new uranium enrichment program (EUP) and a light-water reactor, signifying substantial advancements in the country s nuclear development. These actions occurred against the backdrop of the DPRK s leadership succession process, from Kim Jong-il to his young son and heir-apparent, Kim Jong-un. At a conference of the Workers Party of Korea (WPK) in September 2010, Kim Jong-un was 2 Pyongyang denies responsibility for the sinking of the Cheonan and refutes the results of a ROK-led multinational investigation that found evidence of North Korean torpedo parts linked to the attack. China, which was not a member of the multinational investigation, has raised doubts about the accuracy of the investigation and has refused to blame North Korea for the attack. made a four-star general and given several senior party posts, necessary steps in building his legitimacy as the country s next leader. Kim Jong-un s profile has subsequently become more prominent and the regime appears increasingly prepared to make him the nation s figurehead at some future date. The delicate, and largely opaque, succession process likely played some part in the North s provocations in 2010 and has added yet another unpredictable variable to the lingering tensions on and surrounding the peninsula (Kim Jin-Ha 2010). Taken together, the developments on the Korean Peninsula since the first half of 2010 have had a significant impact on the regional security environment, including heightened tensions across a series of bilateral state-to-state relations. In addition to the increasing acrimony between North and South Korea, the past year has also seen U.S.- China, China-ROK, and China-Japan relations suffer (although the latter rift between Beijing and Tokyo is mainly a result of a bilateral spat over the disputed Senkaku/Diaoyutai Islands). The collapse of the Six-Party Talks, after North Korea s abrupt withdrawal from them in April 2009, has also left the region without a functioning multilateral mechanism for managing the ongoing crisis through diplomatic means. Through the summer of 2011, preliminary attempts were made to restart the Six-Party Talks, 3 3 In July 2011, DPRK Vice Foreign Minister Ri Yong Ho met ROK chief nuclear negotiator Wi Sung-lac on the sidelines of the Exploring Multilateral Approaches to Risk Reduction and Peace Regime Building 1

10 but the prolonged breakdown of the talks over the past few years has cast renewed doubts about the feasibility of a new regional security architecture that might emerge from the six-party process a prospect that was much discussed in the middle part of the decade when the talks reached a peak of activity. At that time, the notion of a Korean Peninsula peace regime was also raised as a potential mechanism for directly related parties to address the many unresolved political, diplomatic, and national security issues in Korea that contribute to North Korea s nuclear ambitions. After all, North and South Korea are still technically at war with one another, and the armistice agreement that has governed the cease-fire for over fifty-five years was never intended as a long-term resolution of the Korean War. Yet despite the obvious importance of a potential Korean Peninsula peace regime the idea has never been fully fleshed out and at least as many interpretations of its meaning remain as there are directly related parties. A peace regime has alternately been described as a mechanism to create peace; a framework for ameliorating the mutual distrust and the hostile relationships [and] a foundation for peaceful coexistence and mutual prosperity between the two Koreas ; an institutional device for legal termination and prevention of wars and maintenance of peace ; and a process of building peace, not the ultimate state of peace (O 2007; Lee Sanghee 2007; Lee In Ho 2008; Cho 2007). Each of the parties sees the peace regime in light of its own strategic interests, often with competing goals, objectives, and purposes vis-à-vis the other regional players. In order to shed further light on the conceptual parameters of a Korean Peninsula peace regime, the Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis (IFPA), working with partners in South Korea, the United States, and China, embarked on a multi-year project (from Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN) meeting in Bali the possibility of resuming the Six-Party Talks. A follow-up meeting between DPRK First Vice Foreign Minister Kim Kye Gwan and U.S. counterparts in New York later that month did not produce a breakthrough on restarting the talks to 2011) exploring peace regime building on the Peninsula in ways that support and facilitate the denuclearization objectives of the Six-Party Talks. The project, formally titled Peace Regime Building for a Nuclear Weapon-Free Korea, was funded by a major three-year grant from the Carnegie Corporation of New York. Our aim was to combine research and dialogue in a mixed academic/ policy (track 1.5) environment among the relevant parties to explore the linkages mentioned above, and to develop a broader consensus regarding the potential synergies between armistice management, peace regime building and denuclearization.the series of workshops conducted by IFPA and its partners have yielded some of the most comprehensive and far-reaching work that has yet been done on the subject of a Korean Peninsula peace regime. Over the course of this undertaking, we have mapped out the many definitional and conceptual aspects of such a regime, providing a much clearer picture of a peace regime for the consideration of policy makers from all relevant nations. Areas of convergence and divergence have also been illuminated by workshop discussions, leading to further understanding of the complex geostrategic dynamics affecting peninsular and regional security. Yet, paradoxically, as our research has produced a clearer picture of what a Korean Peninsula peace regime might look like, events on the peninsula over the past year have made the prospect of a peace regime appear all the more distant and out of reach. Instead of progress toward peace talks on the peninsula, the region has seen a troubling escalation of tension and a heightened level of brinkmanship on the part of the North. Rather than moving toward a revitalized six-party process, the parties have splintered in the wake of the North Korean regime s provocative actions. And, as these trends continue, positions have polarized among the key strategic actors shaping the regional security environment. Indeed, perhaps the most dangerous aspect of this unwelcome development is the divergent reactions by the United States and South Korea on the one hand, and China on the other. The ROK and 2 Denuclearizing North Korea

11 In many ways, China over the past few years has become part of the problem rather than part of the solution to the many security concerns on and surrounding the Korean Peninsula. United States have maintained diplomatic pressure on Pyongyang in response to its recent provocations. Beijing, however, has shifted from sanctioning North Korea for its nuclear tests in 2006 and 2009 to accommodating and even enabling the regime s development and proliferation of nuclear technology. China has also refrained from openly criticizing Pyongyang for its role in the Cheonan and Yeonpyeong incidents, further straining Beijing s ties with Seoul and Washington. In many ways, China over the past few years has become part of the problem rather than part of the solution to the many security concerns on and surrounding the Korean Peninsula. It is evident that the primary cause of the divergence in the US-ROK-China triangular dynamic is a widening gap in priorities among the three powers in relation to the North Korean problem. While the United States and the ROK emphasize the importance of denuclearizing the peninsula, China has increasingly come to emphasize maintaining stability within the North Korean regime in order to, among other objectives, preserve a buffer from perceived allied encroachment along its border. 4 In particular, China is underestimating near-term risks from proliferation and conflict escalation, in part 4 For a thorough analysis of China s priorities vis-à-vis the DPRK, see International Crisis Group (2006). because of Beijing s wariness regarding the longterm implications of pressing harder for substantial change on the peninsula. As the stakes get higher, the main players are moving in opposite directions, even if recent rhetoric from Beijing highlights the concerns it shares with the allies over North Korea. Given the growing role of the US-ROK-China dynamic in managing the North Korean crisis, IFPA dedicated more focused attention to the trilateral relationship in the last phase of our peace regime project. Recognizing that the three countries have not engaged in a comprehensive dialogue that focuses on managing near-term nuclear and deterrence challenges and developing a shared vision for the future of the Korean Peninsula, the project came to address this deficiency in the context of broader implications for peace-regime building. A track 1.5 project workshop held in Seoul in January 2011 primarily included highlevel representatives from all three nations, yielding important trilateral dialogue on common approaches to confidence building, denuclearization, and regional security mechanisms leading to a potential peace regime on the Korean Peninsula. The following report is a summary of key findings and points of discussion over the course of our workshop meetings, beginning with a review of our most recent workshop, held in Seoul in January 2011, and its focus on the trilateral U.S.-ROK-China dynamic. The report then turns to the conceptual dimensions of a Korean Peninsula peace regime and how such a regime might facilitate the denuclearization of North Korea and the creation of a new regional security architecture. 5 Some may question the relevance of studying a peace regime at a time when tensions in the regional security environment remain relatively high despite a recent push to restart the six-party process. Yet, as out of reach as such a regime may appear at the moment, recent events on the peninsula should not distract from long-term thinking about how to get to an eventual peace process and a denuclearized 5 James L. Schoff, Director of Asia-Pacific Studies at IFPA, contributed substantially to this report before his secondment to the Office of the Secretary of Defense as Special Advisor for East Asia Policy. Exploring Multilateral Approaches to Risk Reduction and Peace Regime Building 3

12 North Korea. Further, if the past pattern of behavior is any indication of the future, tensions on the Korean Peninsula have a tendency to diffuse just as suddenly as they flare up sometimes leading to unexpected opportunities for engagement and dialogue on the diplomatic front. After a year or more of heightened anxiety in the region, a swing back in the direction of peace building is in due order, barring any further escalation of tension perhaps one reason why there is renewed interest in restarting the Six-Party Talks. Even in the darkest of times, it behooves policy makers and intellectual leaders to stay ahead of the curve so as not to lose sight of long-term goal of a stable, peaceful, and denuclearized Korean Peninsula. Indeed, however intractable problems on the Korean Peninsula appear to be, they are not static. The prospects for lasting peace in Korea will rise and fall, and policy makers must be ready to take at least one step forward each time they rise. Just as in building a house, even in winter one can begin to design, seek approvals, and prepare for logistical challenges long before hitting the first nail with a hammer in the spring. Like any negotiation filled with complexity and historical significance, solving the security dilemmas surrounding the Korean Peninsula requires time, patience, and a clear view of the promises and perils that lie in the road ahead. This report is intended to be a contribution to the latter endeavor. Peace, Denuclearization, and the Growing North Korea Problem The pendulum swing between peace building and potential conflict on the Korean Peninsula has occurred many times since the armistice agreement was signed in An initial round of talks aimed at the peaceful settlement of the Korean question broke down in In 1972, allusions to a final Korean political settlement resurfaced with the release of the North-South Joint Communiqué, but North Korea circumvented the ROK just two years later by appealing directly to the Americans for North Korea s Major Naval Bases and Artillery Deployments in the Yellow Sea Yellow Sea (West Sea) NORTH KOREA Northern Limit Line (NLL) Yeonpyeong Island SOUTH KOREA 76mm, 130mm artillery North Korean artillery barrage Nov. 23, 2010 Silkworm, Samlet missiles 4 Denuclearizing North Korea

13 peace talks. Hope for moving past the armistice was renewed in 1991, when top officials from Seoul and Pyongyang signed the South-North Joint Agreement on Reconciliation, Nonaggression, and Cooperation and Exchange (the so-called Basic Agreement), but largely as a consequence of North Korea s ambivalence regarding implementation, that agreement has remained an unfulfilled promise. Throughout the late 1990s and the 2000s, other attempts have been made to officially end the Korean War and to introduce various confidencebuilding measures, but the few gains achieved have eroded significantly in recent years to leave just the joint industrial zone at Gaesong and a handful of cultural exchanges. Most recently, North Korea s shelling of Yeonpyeong Island in November 2010 pushed inter-korean relations as close to war as they have been in at least seventeen years. Since the shelling, both sides have taken steps to avoid further armed conflict but they continue to trade harsh rhetoric back and forth across the DMZ and a general sense of anxiety persists in the region. The current situation, moreover, is potentially more dangerous than past periods of tension and hostility for three main reasons. First, North Korea continues to develop and improve its nuclear weapons and missile capabilities, and when combined with its stockpiles of other WMD and North Korea s deteriorating conventional military assets, the potential for WMD use and horrendous casualties in a conflict on the Korean Peninsula is unacceptably high. North Korea s programs are expanding, and much remains to be uncovered. For example, a recently leaked report of the so-called UN Panel of Experts monitoring compliance with UN sanctions against North Korea highlighted not only the regime s advancements in nuclear and missile development, but also its ability to circumvent international efforts to control its proliferation of WMD-related technology. 6 There is also an increased risk of a wider conflict involving the mainland United States, as the 6 The Panel of Experts report has not been officially released yet, reportedly thanks to China s efforts to block its publication. See Charbonneau (2011a). U.S. government now estimates that at its current pace of nuclear and ballistic missile development, North Korea could become a direct threat to the United States within five years, with the implication that Washington must take more concerted steps to address this threat (Dombey 2011). Comments by Chinese participants at the IFPA trilateral workshop in January 2011, however, indicate a more fatalistic and to some extent cavalier view from Beijing, with one attendee from China actually suggesting that a weapon leaves an arsenal only when it is replaced by another weapon such as the aircraft carrier replacing the battleship. For North Korea now, this participant went on to argue, the only acceptable replacement for their nuclear weapons is probably U.S.-North Korea normalization, which is why he believed that dialogue and attempts at reconciliation with North Korea would be more productive than girding for a fight. Other Chinese attendees offered variants of this advice. The second worrisome trend is that the process of leadership transition in North Korea may lead to more aggressive or at least even more unpredictable behavior on the part of the North Korean leadership and especially the military, as evidenced by the attacks on the ROK navy corvette Cheonan and Yeonpyeong Island, revelations about the North s covert UEP facility, and recent reports of an increase in public executions and stricter border controls in the DPRK (Chosun Ilbo 2010). North Korean demonstrations of strength and control might seek to contradict incipient internal or external doubts regarding the new regime s ability to govern and protect the country, but in the short term this approach is also undermining the regime s ability to reform the economy and make use of outside investment. This, in turn, is a problem at two levels: first, the North s provocative behavior could spark an escalation of conflict that neither side can readily predict or control, and second, the DPRK s deteriorating economy could lead to a genuine political and humanitarian crisis in the North, or it could be weakened enough to tempt conservative ROK policy makers into thinking that they can push the North Exploring Multilateral Approaches to Risk Reduction and Peace Regime Building 5

14 over the edge through their own form of brinkmanship. Either way, both China and the United States would have much at stake in the outcome. Indeed, whether it is an economic breakdown of the North s own making or one prompted by outside pressure, the tenuous nature of North Korea s economic and political viability over the mid- to long term is a source of potential conflict between the allies and China, as each seeks to manage the situation and promote its own interests. The North Korean reality today is that the ruling regime s predictions just a short time ago that it would establish a great, prosperous and powerful country by 2012 have already given way to a ten-year plan to rank among the advanced countries by 2020 (Kyodo News 2011). North Korea is struggling to feed its whether it is an economic breakdown of the North s own making or one prompted by outside pressure, the tenuous nature of North Korea s economic and political viability over the mid- to long term is a source of potential conflict between the allies and China, as each seeks to manage the situation and promote its own interests. Public Opinion Comparison between Cheonan and Yeonpyeong Incidents This chart shows the percentage of people who responded positively regarding the administration s change of attitude towards military retaliation after the two incidents report to UN Security Council economic sanctions suspend North-South relations limited military retaliation people and boost productivity, and a significant failure on this front could seriously undermine the new regime. The World Food Program (WFP) indicated that North Korea is heading for a new, chronic food crisis in 2011, with a need to import over 860,000 tons of cereals to help serve an estimated five million people facing food shortages (World Food Program 2010). North Korea has requested food aid from all three countries, 7 and it is seeking additional economic investment as well. Faced with these trends, could China, the United States, and the ROK ever agree on common strategies to provide humanitarian or economic assistance to North Korea? Should a crisis erupt, can they avoid challenging each other as they seek to influence 7 The Obama administration sent a fact-finding mission to North Korea in May 2011 to assess the regime s food situation. At this writing, the administration is weighing whether or not to provide food aid over objections from the Lee government in Seoul poll taken 4/24/2010 poll taken 11/27/2010 Data source: East Asia Institute 6 Denuclearizing North Korea

15 Percentage of South Koreans National Security Concerns Since George W. Bush innauguration 06/2001 DPRK withdraws from NPT 08/ /2002 IAEA inspectors expelled 09/2000 1st inter-korean Summit 07/2004 2nd and 3rd rounds of Six-Party Talks DPRK s first nuclear test 12/ /2007 2nd inter-korean summit Yeongpyeong island incident 11/2010 DPRK s second nuclear test 06/ /2010 Cheonan incident 03/2009 prior to DPRK missile test Data source: East Asia Institute events? Are there steps they could take together before any potential crisis to reduce the impact and speed recovery? Could progress on one policy front open the door to wider trilateral collaboration on Korean security on other fronts, including cooperative threat reduction in the nuclear arena? More importantly, might the three countries learn in this way to coordinate their various sticks and carrots to achieve a common purpose with regard to Pyongyang? Whatever the answers, further North Korean aggression and North Korean collapse are two quite plausible scenarios during the political transition now unfolding in the North, which is why there is now an added degree of uncertainty on the peninsula and increased anxiety with regard to its future trajectory. The third reason that the security situation on the peninsula is more volatile is that ROK public attitudes toward the North are changing, and there is increased political pressure on the ROK government to be tough in its response to North Korean aggression or even its charm offensive tactics. After the Yeonpyeong Island shelling in late 2010, nearly 70 percent of South Koreans supported limited military action in response, compared to less than 30 percent after the Cheonan sinking, and public concerns about security in general are at their highest level in fifteen years (with a quadruple increase in South Koreans being very concerned or slightly concerned about security, up from 19 percent in 1999) (Lee and Jeong 2010). South Korea is now looking to divert defense funds to strengthen a new West Sea command, and the stakes over the controversial Northern Limit Line (NLL) have risen (Chosun Ilbo 2011b). Where just a few years ago, under President Roh Moo-hyun, Seoul demonstrated flexibility regarding the NLL s status as a de facto maritime border, the ROK government now appears willing to risk war over nearly any encroachment of this demarcation. The predominant South Korean perspective in the wake of recent events is, quite understandably, that restraint has only encouraged the North to continue its provocations, and that a firm response to the next attack will be necessary to enhance deterrence for the longer term. President Lee Myung-bak has called this a proactive deterrence approach 8, and the ROK military is backing it up with invest- 8 In response to the Cheonan incident, ROK President Lee Myung-bak announced on May 24, 2010, From now on, the Republic of Korea will not tolerate any provocative act by the North and will maintain the principle of proactive deterrence. If our territorial waters, airspace or territory are violated, we will immediately exercise our right of self-defense (2010). Exploring Multilateral Approaches to Risk Reduction and Peace Regime Building 7

16 ROK Public Opinion on Aid and Long-Term Policies with DPRK Aid to DPRK minimize/abolish maintain/increase South Korean Public Opinion on Military Responses and Government Response to Yeonpyeong Island positive assessment of government response agree with strong military response disagree with strong military response negative assessment of government response Data source: East Asia Institute 01/2010 Long-Term Policies with DPRK 05/2010 Cheonan incident Data source: East Asia Institute 05/2010 Cheonan incident 11/2010 Yeonpyeong incident reconciliation/cooperation hardline policy 11/2010 Yeonpyeong incident ments in Joint Direct Attack Munition missiles (JDAMs) and more concerted efforts to relax range and payload limits on its ground-based missile force. 9 No one really knows whether Pyongyang will perceive these measures as credible steps by 9 South Korea is looking to develop missiles with ranges up to one thousand kilometers, more than three times the range allowed under a current U.S.-ROK bilateral pact. The two countries are in the process of discussing options at this time. See JoongAng Daily (2011). Seoul to respond to and deter future North Korean military action, so the allies will be tempted to (and must) prepare for further retaliations. Unfortunately, such preparations could also lead North Korea to believe that a larger-scale attack was being planned, perhaps leading to a miscalculation on Pyongyang s part. In this regard, China and the United States share the risk that they can potentially be drawn into a conflict of someone else s making. Indeed, even if a broader conflict is avoided, recent developments on the peninsula have also made China increasingly nervous about its security interests in the region. Chinese participants at the January 2011 workshop acknowledged the severity of North Korea s provocations and said that these acts, along with the regime s nuclear development, pose a serious dilemma for Chinese security interests as well. As one Chinese participant pointed out, We are all in the same boat regarding North Korea s potential to destabilize the region. The DPRK s provocations, it was admitted, serve to undermine Chinese security interests by, among other things, driving Japan, the United States, and South Korea closer together, increasing interest in all three countries in missile defenses that may degrade China s ballistic missile capabilities, and raising the overall prospect of the very instability within the region that China hopes to prevent As Zhu Feng writes, China worries that North Korean actions will lead to deeper defense and security cooperation among South Korea, Japan and the US. Perceptions that China protects North Korea could lead to the emergence of a powerful Washington-Tokyo-Seoul axis directed, not only against North Korea, but also implicitly at China (2010). 8 Denuclearizing North Korea

17 DETERRENCE ON THE KOREAN PENINSULA The events of 2010 have, indeed, raised new questions about the nature of deterrence on the Korean Peninsula, and what the appropriate allied response should be toward the North. Workshop participants from South Korea and the United States argued that a robust allied response to North Korea s recent provocations was called for and was necessary to deter further aggressive acts by the regime. South Korean experts argued that President Lee s proactive deterrence policy is necessary to ensure that further provocations from the North will not be tolerated indefinitely. They added that the policy is meant to send three messages to the North: 1) that South Korea will retaliate proportionately to another attack; 2) that although the South does not want war it will not avoid one if it is inevitable; and 3) that South Korea will continue to strengthen the alliance with the United States beyond the 2015 deadline for transferring wartime operational control from the U.S. to ROK command. Still, not all participants at the IFPA workshop agreed with Seoul s new proactive deterrence policy. An American participant argued that the new policy is dangerous for several reasons. Among them, he said, is that President Lee may be held politically hostage to future provocations from the North by being forced to retaliate or else risk losing his credibility. This situation also binds U.S. policy makers to any actions that President Lee would take in response to another attack, without taking a more coordinated, alliance-oriented approach to the next provocation. The potential for an escalation of hostilities is all the higher in the context of the DPRK s succession process, which makes Pyongyang less willing to back down in a contest of wills with Seoul. The North, meanwhile, is likely to continue attacks as part of its own deterrence strat- ROK Public Opinion on the Future of the R.O.K-U.S. Alliance independent foreign policy maintain current levels reinforcement of alliance 1/2010 7/2010 Data source: East Asia Institute 11/2010 Exploring Multilateral Approaches to Risk Reduction and Peace Regime Building 9

18 egy, which is to demonstrate that it is not afraid of conflict with outside powers. Chinese participants said that Beijing s behindthe-scenes diplomatic efforts have successfully kept North Korea from making any further provocations since the Yeonpyeong incident somewhat contradicting their claims throughout the day that China has less leverage over North Korea than is commonly assumed. An American participant conceded that the reduction of tensions on the peninsula through the winter of may have been a result of behind-the-scenes measures by China or U.S.-ROK demonstrations of deterrence but wondered whether the current state of relative calm is sustainable over time. Nonetheless, the debate over deterrence on the peninsula has intensified in South Korea of late, spurred not just by the DPRK s provocations and the debate over the appropriate means of responding to them but also by anxieties over the Obama administration s 2010 Nuclear Posture Review (NPR). The NPR outlines five key objectives for U.S. nuclear weapons policy and posture: 1) preventing nuclear proliferation and nuclear terrorism; 2) reducing the role of U.S. nuclear weapons in U.S. national security strategy; 3) maintaining strategic deterrence and stability at reduced nuclear force levels; 4) strengthening regional deterrence and reassuring U.S. allies and partners; and 5) sustaining a safe, secure, and effective nuclear arsenal (U.S. Dept. of Defense 2010). Some South Korean scholars and policy makers, however, worry that the proposed changes in the U.S. nuclear posture may negatively affect South Korean security interests and undermine deterrence toward the North. In particular, South Korean critics point to two elements of the 2010 NPR that are of potential concern. 11 First is the question of whether the planned reduction of the overall U.S. nuclear arsenal might, in effect, reduce the credibility of the U.S. extended nuclear deterrent over South Korea. A second concern relates to the so-called negative securi- 11 See, for instance, Cheon (2010). ty assurance (NSA) as outlined in the new NPR. Under this clause, the United States pledges not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against nonnuclear weapons states that have joined the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT) and are in compliance with those treaty obligations. South Korean analysts worry that this could create a loophole for the DPRK to attack the ROK with chemical, biological, or conventional weapons without fear of nuclear retaliation from the United States, even though the NPR lists North Korea and Iran as current exceptions to the NSA policy (Cheon 2010). Concerns about the reliability of the U.S. extended nuclear deterrent have triggered calls in some South Korean circles for the United States to reintroduce tactical nuclear weapons into South Korea or for the ROK to develop its own nuclear weapons capability (Cheon 2010). The United States has reportedly not deployed nuclear weapons on the peninsula since 1991, when former President Concerns about the reliability of the U.S. extended nuclear deterrent have triggered calls in some South Korean circles for the United States to reintroduce tactical nuclear weapons into South Korea or for the ROK to develop its own nuclear weapons capability 10 Denuclearizing North Korea

19 George H.W. Bush ordered the withdrawal of overseas tactical and theater nuclear weapons. Some South Korean experts advocate the reintroduction of tactical U.S. nuclear weapons as a way to extract North Korean concessions on denuclearization and to deter further acts of aggression from the North. The reintroduction of tactical U.S. nuclear weapons, these experts argue, could also put pressure on China to rein in the North s belligerent behavior and induce the regime to return to negotiations over denuclearization. However, many U.S. experts argue that reintroducing tactical nuclear weapons on the peninsula would not produce the positive outcomes that South Korean advocates predict. To the contrary, U.S. experts warn that reintroducing nuclear weapons would likely feed into DPRK propaganda claims that the United States is adopting a hostile policy toward the regime perhaps then leading Pyongyang to accelerate its nuclear weapons development (Cossa 2011). Further, the pursuit of indigenous South Korean nuclear capabilities would constitute a major departure from the ROK s nonnuclear posture, with significant repercussions for South Korea s international prestige and for regional security in general (Cossa 2011). In light of the ongoing debate over extended deterrence, the need for the United States to reassure South Korea (and other regional allies such as Japan) about its continued strategic commitments remains a top priority. Indeed, one of the central tenets of the 2010 NPR is to strengthen regional deterrence while reassuring allies and partners as the U.S. nuclear posture evolves. The Obama administration consulted closely with Seoul and Tokyo during the nuclear review process and both allies were, of course, included in the follow-up Nuclear Security Summit (NSS) in President Obama reinforced the U.S. commitment to extended deterrence in a joint statement with President Lee Myun-bak in 2009, stating, We will maintain a robust defense posture, backed by allied capabilities which support both nations security interests. As the United States and its allies seek to bolster deterrence on the Korean Peninsula they should also engage China in order to reduce risks and explore opportunities to enhance regional strategic dialogue and cooperation The continuing commitment of extended deterrence, including the U.S. nuclear umbrella, reinforces this assurance (U.S. White House 2009). The U.S.-ROK Extended Deterrence Policy Committee (EDPC) was subsequently formed in December 2010 in order to coordinate bilateral deterrence policies visà-vis the DPRK (Yonhap News Agency 2011a). Last year s provocations by North Korea, however, highlight the complex challenges facing allied deterrence strategies in Asia, including the dilemma of how to deter conventional attacks from the North. Pyongyang s brazen acts of aggression in 2010 were apparently based on a calculation that allied retaliation would not eventually lead to the use of nuclear weapons. Indeed, in the case of limited conventional conflicts, the use of nuclear weapons is out of the question, given the moral hazards that that would create. Thus, the U.S. nuclear deterrent did not prevent the two conventional attacks by the DPRK, and may fail to do so again in the future. At the same time, however, the potential use of nuclear weapons may have kept all sides from allowing a conflict to escalate into all-out war. This has created a so-called stability-instability paradox on the Exploring Multilateral Approaches to Risk Reduction and Peace Regime Building 11

20 The divergent policies taken by China on the one hand, and the United States and South Korea on the other, may continue to magnify current dangers if not more squarely addressed Korean Peninsula whereby mutual deterrence prevents an escalation of conflict but does not prevent the outbreak of low-intensity hostilities such as the Yeonpyeong Island incident (Jimbo 2011). For the time being, there is little recourse in the face of the North s aggressions other than to seek stronger United Nations Security Council (UNSC) resolutions condemning North Korean behavior and bolstering allied defense coordination, primarily by conducting joint U.S.-ROK military exercises and enhancing U.S.-ROK-Japan defense cooperation. The United States, in particular, must demonstrate to friends and foes alike that improvements in conventional capabilities can offset a reduced role for nuclear weapons while maintaining credible deterrence levels, as outlined in the 2010 NPR (Bunn and Manzo 2011). As the United States and its allies seek to bolster deterrence on the Korean Peninsula they should also engage China in order to reduce risks and explore opportunities to enhance regional strategic dialogue and cooperation. A nuclear dialogue with China, for instance, could address common concerns about North Korean WMD development and proliferation as well as mutual concerns about each other s long-term nuclear strategies (Bush 2011). A strategic dialogue with Beijing along these lines could enhance trust in the region and potentially lead to unexpected avenues for joint defense cooperation vis-à-vis North Korea. 12 China s participation could also be incorporated into a broader deterrence strategy, as Ken Jimbo writes: China also has the capacity to augment deterrence. North Korean fear of abandonment from China continues to grow as indicated by the frequent visits by Kim Jong-il and other high-ranking officials to China. Given the stability-instability paradox, the role played by China in terms of deterring low-intensity aggression and supporting escalation control seems pivotal. China s unusually active, intense and public degree of engagement after the Yeonpyeong incident showed how alarmed Beijing was by crisis escalation (Jimbo 2011). Trilateral Consensus Building In some ways, the North Korea problem underscores the common security concerns among the regional players, at times serving as an impetus for enhanced security cooperation among the United States, South Korea, and China. 13 Yet, while the three countries may all be in the same boat regarding North Korea, they may be rowing in different directions, as an American participant at the workshop pointed out. The divergent policies taken by China on the one hand, and the United States and South Korea on the other, may continue to magnify current dangers if not more squarely addressed. The allies remain concerned that China s stance allows the first problem of North Korea s nuclear and missile programs to persist, provides political space for the more destabilizing aspects of 12 For instance, one Chinese scholar, Shen Dengli, has outlined how China could potentially join allied military exercises: To prevent China from viewing U.S.-ROK naval drills as provocative, the U.S. and South Korea could invite China to join. Forging a China-U.S.-ROK trilateral naval exercise would carry great political symbolism and expand the international coalition to deter the aggression that has led to recent regional instability (2011, 2). 13 Scott Snyder and See-Won Byun write: The evolution of regional approaches to North Korea ironically reveals North Korea as the primary source of insecurity and as a catalyst for enhanced security cooperation among Northeast Asian players over the past two decades (2011, 62). 12 Denuclearizing North Korea

21 political transition in the North, and exacerbates in the process the third problem of a more confrontational political atmosphere in the South. For its part, China believes that the allies more aggressive stance in the wake of Yeonpyeong has actually made each of these problems harder to resolve. North Korea wants to change its external relationships to support transition, said one Chinese participant in IFPA s January 2011 trilateral, but we need to facilitate this in a peaceful manner. If we get too confrontational, it will be more difficult. Moreover, China continues to decry what it sees as the strengthening of the Cold War structure in East Asia, stimulated by various US-ROK and US-ROK-Japan initiatives to coordinate and bolster their deterrent capabilities. Indeed, Chinese participants criticized the U.S.- led alliance system in Asia as moving backward in the direction of a Cold War security structure that Beijing and Pyongyang perceive as threatening and counterproductive. According to one Chinese participant, Beijing s attempts to transcend the Cold War security paradigm have been repeatedly set back by allied responses to events on the Korean Peninsula, which have stressed joint military cooperation and strategic solidarity. Moves to strengthen U.S.-ROK-Japan defense ties following the Cheonan and Yeonpyeong incidents only deepen the sense of insecurity in North Korea and raise Chinese concerns about strategic encroachment by the allies (Zhu 2010, 1). This also feeds into the perception in Beijing that the United States and its allies are creating a regional security structure that is balancing against China rather than seeking ways to incorporate China s legitimate security interests into a broader regional architecture. It is important to keep in mind, moreover, that China is not simply providing North Korea with political and diplomatic cover, it is investing heavily in North Korea s future in the hopes of promoting economic development and enough political confidence in the North to allow Pyongyang, so China s Merchandise Trade with the DPR ($ in millions) China s Exports China s Imports Data source: Congressional Research Service Exploring Multilateral Approaches to Risk Reduction and Peace Regime Building 13