A Northeast Asia Nuclear Weapon-Free Zone at the New Stage of the Development in Global Nuclear Disarmament and Non-proliferation

Transcription

1 963 A Northeast Asia Nuclear Weapon-Free Zone at the New Stage of the Development in Global Nuclear Disarmament and Non-proliferation Hiromichi Umebayashi* Tatsujiro Suzuki** Given the increased tension in the Northeast Asia region, dependence on nuclear deterrence is becoming stronger among countries in the region. There is now a new urgency to look at North Korean nuclear weapon program with serious attention. The DPRK has signaled it may be ready to resume negotiation. It is clear that engagement of the DPRK is essential to resolve this stalemate and such engagement cannot be limited to just nuclear and missile issues but should extend to a more comprehensive agenda. This paper proposes a comprehensive approach towards establishing Northeast Asia Nuclear Weapon Free Zone, in which three countries (the DPRK, the ROK and Japan) declare non-nuclear weapon status and the other three nuclear weapon states (the United States, Russia and China) provide negative security assurances under the * Hiromichi Umebayashi is Visiting Professor and former Director of the Research Center for Nuclear Weapons Abolition, Nagasaki University (RECNA). He is also Special Advisor, former President and Founder of Peace Depot Inc., Japan. cxj15621@nifty.ne.jp. ** Tatsujiro Suzuki is Director and Professor at the Research Center for Nuclear Weapons Abolition, Nagasaki University (RECNA). Before joining RECNA, he was Vice Chairman of Japan Atomic Energy Commission (JAEC) of the Cabinet office from January 2010 to March suzukitatsu@nagasaki-u.ac.jp. KOREA OBSERVER, Vol. 47, No. 4, Winter 2016, pp by INSTITUTE OF KOREAN STUDIES.

2 964 Hiromichi Umebayashi and Tatsujiro Suzuki legally binding treaty. The comprehensive approach also includes agreement on; 1) termination of Korean War, 2) equal access to all forms of energy 3) establishment of a permanent Northeast Asia Security Council. It is essential for non-governmental actors to initiate regional confidence-building process on Track 2 level. The authors hope such process, called the Nagasaki Process will become a new platform for security dialogue among interested parties in the region, eventually leading to peace and security of Northeast Asia, contributing to global efforts to achieve a world without nuclear weapons. Key Words: North Korea, nuclear weapon, Northeast Asia, nuclear weapon free zone, confidence building, Nagasaki Process I. Introduction The 71 st session of the U.N. General Assembly (UNGA) marked historic progress in the global multilateral nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation efforts. A UNGA resolution entitled Taking forward multilateral nuclear disarmament negotiations, which was adopted at the First Committee of the UNGA (which deals with disarmament, global challenges and threats to peace that affect the international community and seeks out solutions to the challenges in the international security regime ) in October 2016 and is due to be adopted at the plenary session in December 2016, decides that the U.N. shall convene in 2017 a conference to negotiate a legally binding instrument to prohibit nuclear weapons, leading towards their total elimination. The conference will be the first in history that will negotiate a treaty to explicitly outlaw such weapons. When this takes place, global nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation will enter a new stage. All the nuclear weapon states but China, which abstained, voted against the resolution at the First Committee. As for nuclear weapons holders

3 A Northeast Asia Nuclear Weapon-Free Zone at the New Stage of the Development in Global Nuclear Disarmament and Non-proliferation 965 outside the NPT, Israel voted against, India and Pakistan abstained, and the Democratic People s Republic of Korea (DPRK, or North Korea) voted in favor. Most of the NATO member states and U.S. Asia Pacific allies including Republic of Korea (ROK, or South Korea), Japan and Australia voted against the resolution under intense pressure applied by the United States. The negative vote by the government of Japan caused fierce resentment among the public in Japan, including hibakusha, survivors in Hiroshima and Nagasaki atomic bombings in The political dynamics that this new development will set in motion remain to be seen. However, it will be unavoidable that policies of the non-nuclear weapon states under extended nuclear deterrence or nuclear umbrella will be placed under stricter scrutiny now that the illegality of nuclear weapons will be highlighted in the course of negotiations for the legal prohibition of such weapons. In this respect the policy alternatives to nuclear umbrella, such as the establishment of a nuclear weapon-free zone (NWFZ), will draw more attention from practical point of view. It will be especially true in the region like Northeast Asia, where substantial non-governmental works have already been accumulated in order to realize a Northeast Asian NWFZ (NEA-NWFZ). In contrast to this progress in the field of global nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation, attempts by the international community to restrain and reverse the DPRK s nuclear weapons program have been stalemated since the end of 2008, when the last meeting of the Six Party Talks was held, involving the DPRK, the ROK, Japan, China, the United States, and Russia. Also, no official bilateral talks between the United States and the DPRK have taken place since the failed 2012 Leap Day agreement despite the latter calling for talks on several occasions. To make matters worse, we have witnessed an accelerated deterioration of the situation in Northeast Asia caused by events such as the fourth and the fifth underground nuclear tests by the DPRK, which happened in 2016 after three years without any nuclear tests. Now is the time to refocus and revitalize a process in which peace and security flowing from a NEA-NWFZ will be realized and

4 966 Hiromichi Umebayashi and Tatsujiro Suzuki maintained. Such process will respond not only to the urgent, even critical situation in Northeast Asia but also to the emerging new stage of the global nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation efforts. The Research Center for Nuclear Weapons Abolition, Nagasaki University (RECNA), was founded in 2012 in a university suffered from the 1945 atomic bombing. RECNA has commenced a project to materialize the concept of a NEA-NWFZ, based on past accomplishments by academics and civil society. Since mid-1990s, there were various proposals on potential configurations of a NEA-NWFZ, including a scheme called three-plus-three, where three nonnuclear-weapon states, DPRK, ROK and Japan would constitute the zone and would be provided security assurances by three surrounding nuclear-weapon states, the United States, China and Russia (Umebayashi, 2005). In 2011, a conceptual breakthrough occurred when Morton H. Halperin, a renowned international political scientist and former special advisor to the US President, was commissioned by Nautilus Institute to provide a framework whereby states could establish the geo-strategic conditions that would realistically achieve a NEA-NWFZ. Halperin proposed establishing a NEA-NWFZ as an element of a comprehensive agreement on Peace and Security in NEA (Halperin, 2011). This concept was quickly adopted as a basis for implementing a NEA-NWFZ strategy by various groups of different countries including Japan. RECNA convened a series of international research workshops in 2012 to 2014, and published an outcome document in 2015 (Umebayashi 2015), in which the authors proposed a Comprehensive Framework Agreement for the Denuclearization of Northeast Asia. This essay expands upon that publication. In sum, we find that Northeast Asia faces increased tension and that dependence on nuclear deterrence is becoming stronger among countries in the region. It is urgent to address North Korea s nuclear weapon program. The DPRK has sent signals about starting possible negotiations with the United States and other parties. It is clear that engagement of the DPRK is essential to resolve the stalemate over its nuclear weapons. Moreover, such engagement cannot be limited to just nuclear and

5 A Northeast Asia Nuclear Weapon-Free Zone at the New Stage of the Development in Global Nuclear Disarmament and Non-proliferation 967 missile issues but should extend to a more comprehensive security agenda. To this end, we propose a comprehensive approach towards establishing Northeast Asia Nuclear Weapon Free Zone, in which three countries (the DPRK, the ROK and Japan) declare non-nuclear weapon status and the other three nuclear weapon states (the United States, Russia and China) provide negative security assurances under the legally binding treaty. The comprehensive approach must also include agreement on; 1) termination of Korean War, 2) equal access to all forms of energy 3) establishment of a permanent Northeast Asia Security Council. It is essential for non-governmental actors to initiate regional confidence-building process on a Track 2 level. The authors hope such process, called the Nagasaki Process will become a new platform for security dialogue among interested parties in the region, eventually leading to peace and security of Northeast Asia, contributing to global efforts to achieve a world without nuclear weapons. II. Increasing Nuclear Dependence and Stalemate in Northeast Asia: No way out? The Northeast Asian region s nuclear confrontation is severely aggravated in large part because the DPRK s nuclear weapons development program has increased Japan and ROK s dependence on U.S. extended nuclear deterrence. The result is a heightened risk of nuclear weapon use, whether intentional or not, and diminishing international efforts towards achieving a nuclear weapon free world. This trend is directly contrary to the historical work underway at the global level outlined above. There are many intertwining elements creating the current situation. These elements include the DPRK s perception that U.S. nuclear weapons are a threat to its regime, a risk that there will be a growing base of Japanese and ROK proponents for developing their own nuclear weapons should their trust in depending on U.S. extended nuclear deterrence be rattled, and the fact that strengthening of the missile defense system in the region as a means of extended deterrence could be seen as a threat to China. In order to resolve

6 968 Hiromichi Umebayashi and Tatsujiro Suzuki recent nuclear tensions in the Northeast Asian region, it is necessary to consider resolving all these issues. Given the increasing tensions in Northeast Asia, especially with regard to the nuclear threats posed by the DPRK, Japan s security alliance with the United States has become stronger. Japan s position, while facing the dilemma of nuclear abolition and nuclear deterrence, is even clearer now, as shown by its statement from April 14, 2016, at the meeting of the United Nations Open Ended Working Group: Nuclear disarmament must be promoted based on two basic understandings, the first being a clear understanding of the humanitarian impacts of the use of nuclear weapons and the second being the objective assessment of the reality of the security environment... At the same time, severe security environment, especially that of Northeast Asia as it faces the clear and present security challenges such as the recent nuclear testing and ballistic missile launches by the Democratic People s Republic of Korea, must always be taken into consideration in promoting nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation. (United Nations 2016) Even though Japan has non-nuclear weapon policies in place, the fear of Japan gaining its own nuclear arsenal does not go away. The demeanor of a small fraction of politicians and certain government bureaucracy s attitudes towards nuclear weapon dependence cause these anxieties. One reason for suspicions over Japan s intent towards nuclear armament is that Japan is incapable of producing a logical explanation for its plutonium policies. Concerns over reprocessing programs are spreading across Northeast Asia. The government of the ROK, during bilateral negotiations with the United States, strongly insisted on its sovereign right to conduct reprocessing, like Japan. While criticizing Japan for holding large plutonium stockpiles, China is planning to build a commercial reprocessing plant imported from France. Reprocessing plutonium has thus become an issue of regional security and needs to be given serious attention (Sakolsky 2016). After it was revealed that North Korea was developing nuclear weapons, South Korea worked closely with the United States to carry out diplomatic efforts aimed at reversing this program. South Korea

7 A Northeast Asia Nuclear Weapon-Free Zone at the New Stage of the Development in Global Nuclear Disarmament and Non-proliferation 969 simultaneously strengthened its dependence on U.S. extended nuclear deterrence. In 2016, after the two nuclear tests by North Koreas and more than twenty tests related to ballistic missiles that can be used as delivery vehicles for nuclear weapons, there were more reinforced US-ROK joint military exercises, flight operations by the U.S. strategic bombers from the U.S. continent and Guam, and DPRK s Korean People s Army launched landing and anti-landing drills (North Korea Leadership Watch, 2016). The agreement between the United States and the ROK to deploy THAAD systems in South Korea has raised tension in the area beyond the Korean Peninsula. In October 2016, the Presidential Advisory Council on Democratic and Peaceful Unification of Korea suggested to the President that U.S. tactical nuclear weapons should be returned to the ROK. In addition, there are increasing voices within South Korea to have an independent nuclear weapon capability. On September 12, 2016, 31 representatives of the Saenuri governing Party signed a statement that the Parliament should discuss launching an independent South Korean nuclear program (Asmolov 2016). III. North Korea s Nuclear Policy and Weapon Program: Possibility of Negotiation Given the fact that North Korea conducted five nuclear tests, plus numerous missile tests, there is now a new urgency to look at North Korean nuclear weapon program with serious attention. In the past, many experts believed that North Korea s nuclear weapon programs were not meant for immediate military purposes, but rather to use nuclear weapon as to extract concessions from foreign governments, that is, as tools for coercive diplomacy to obtain various benefits for the DPRK. But a growing number of experts suggest that North Korea is seeking a real, functioning nuclear weapon program for genuine military purposes. Jeffrey Lewis recently concluded that North Korean s nuclear weapons are not a mere totem or a symbol. They are a real military capability that North Korean believes will deter as US inva-

8 970 Hiromichi Umebayashi and Tatsujiro Suzuki sion of North Korea. (Lewis 2016) On the other hand, it should be noted that the DPRK repeatedly sent signals calling for a negotiation. In January 2015, the DPRK proposed that, in exchange of the U.S. temporary suspension of joint military exercises in the ROK, the DPRK would be ready to take responsive measures such as suspending nuclear tests. Moreover, on July 6, 2016, the DPRK presented five concrete points of conditions for possible negotiation with the US (Carlin 2016, July). The five points are; 1) all nuclear weapons of the US in South Korea must be publicly disclosed; 2) all nuclear weapons in the South Korea should be dismantled and verified; 3) Washington must guarantee that it will not deploy offensive nuclear weapons in South Korea and its vicinity; 4) the US must commit not to use nuclear weapons against North Korea; and 5) Washington must declare its willingness to withdraw from South Korea all troops holding the authority to use nuclear weapons. Such conditions are worth considering for all interested parties, in particular, for the U.S. government. It is now a good time for new U.S. president-elect Donald Trump to take new initiatives to bring a possible breakthrough, abandoning its past strategic patience policy which has not been working at all to prevent North Korean nuclear weapon programs and substituting a policy of strategic impatience aimed at all parties, not just the DPRK. IV. A Comprehensive Approach is Needed: Nuclear Weapon Free Zone in Northeast Asia (NEA-NWFZ) Now it is clear that engagement of the DPRK cannot be limited to just nuclear and missile issues, but should extend to a more comprehensive agenda including a peace treaty to end the Korean War and establishment of a NEA-NWFZ which will provide security assurances to a denuclearized DPRK, and to non-nuclear ROK and Japan. Considering the history of past, failed joint statements among North Korea, the United States and other countries, Halperin proposes a

9 A Northeast Asia Nuclear Weapon-Free Zone at the New Stage of the Development in Global Nuclear Disarmament and Non-proliferation 971 methodology where a legally binding outline of the final agreement should be made first and then followed by negotiations for details (Halperin 2011). In principle, our proposal agrees with Halperin s methodology. When political leadership is weak, however, it can be difficult and take too much time to go through parliamentary processes necessary to ratify legal instruments. Based upon such considerations, the Comprehensive Framework Agreement for the Denuclearization of Northeast Asia (CFA) is proposed in our Proposal as an instrument to be concluded and effectuated by signatures of state heads of the Six-Party Talks. It would also be possible, in this case, to include specific provisions within the CFA to be ratified and become strictly legally binding. Appointing an independent non-governmental, authoritative expert group for support and verification of CFA processes could alleviate concerns regarding the CFA being overruled by changing administrations. The expert group will be deeply involved in the process leading up to manifesting the CFA, and work for support and verification to ensure continuity of negotiations after an initial agreement is reached. Specific Chapters of a CFA are divided into Declaratory or Actionable categories and are composed of the following four key items: (1) Declare to terminate the Korean War and provide for mutual nonaggression, friendship, and equal sovereignty among CFA state parties. States lacking diplomatic relations will endeavor to succeed in normalizing its diplomatic relations. Encourage negotiations among states party to the Korean conflict to draft a Korean War Peace Treaty. (Declaratory) (2) Assure equal rights to access all forms of energy, including nuclear energy. Establish a Northeast Asia Energy Cooperation Committee that is dedicated to contributing to the stability of Northeast Asia and the peaceful reunification of the Korean Peninsula. The invitation for committee members extends beyond the six parties and is open to any state or state groups supporting the cause. Participation of Mongolia and Canada would be welcome. (Declaratory. Actionable details will be decided by the Committee.)

10 972 Hiromichi Umebayashi and Tatsujiro Suzuki (3) Agree on a treaty to establish a Northeast Asia Nuclear Weapon-Free Zone. It will include requirements to join the NPT and other details mandated to achieve a NWFZ, such as those discussed below. Signatory states are obligated to join the Chemical Weapons Convention. The agreement will protect the rights of signatory states for peaceful space exploration in accordance with the 1967 Outer Space Treaty. An article will be provided to place collective sanctions on states in violation of the treaty, while restricting any unilateral sanction imposed by an individual state party on account of treaty matters. (Actionable) (4) Establish a permanent Northeast Asia Security Council. The primary objective of this council will be to ensure the implementation of the CFA. The secondary objective will be, when appropriate, to serve as a platform for discussions involving various Northeast Asian security issues. In the future, the council is expected to deal with more comprehensive security issues. The council could host the verification mechanisms of the NEA-NWFZ. The Six-Parties will form the initial members of the Council, while member states of the Energy Cooperation Committee and any other states offering cooperation in Northeast Asian security are welcome to be general members (Actionable). V. Nuclear Weapon Free Zone in Northeast Asia (NEA-NWFZ) The proposed Northeast Asia Nuclear Weapon Free Zone Treaty includes characteristics unique to the region, as shown below: (1) State Parties: A six party treaty in a Three-plus-Three Arrangement (ROK, DPRK, and Japan are Intra-zonal States and the United States, China, and Russia are Neighboring Nuclear Weapon States ) would be the most likely to succeed in the current state of affairs. It would be even more desirable for Mongolia, a country with recognized nuclear weapon-free status, to join the NEA-NWFZ as a diplomatic strategy following up its 20th anniversary of its nuclear weapon free declaration in 2012.

11 A Northeast Asia Nuclear Weapon-Free Zone at the New Stage of the Development in Global Nuclear Disarmament and Non-proliferation 973 (2) Flexibility in Effectuating the Treaty: Doubts over achieving a NEA-NWFZ repeatedly point towards the lack of mutual trust between the states within the region. As the Treaty of Tlatelolco, which overcame difficulties between Brazil and Argentina to enter into force, demonstrates, however, the system in which articles enter into force can be flexible in order to facilitate achieving a NEA-NWFZ. For instance, the entry-into-force requirements of the NEA-NWFZ treaty can be provided for through ratification by the three nuclear weapon states (the United States, Russia, China) and two non-nuclear weapon states (Japan and the ROK). It may be plausible to provide an option for Japan and the ROK to withdraw from the treaty after three to five years, if the DPRK continues not to join, or joins but does not comply. By ratifying the treaty under this scheme, Japan and the ROK will enjoy security assurances sooner against the potential threats from nuclear weapon states other than the United States. As for the benefits to the DPRK, an article can be included to provide it with a certain period of time to dismantle its nuclear weapons and related facilities, while the United States provides immediate security assurances in exchange for the DPRK s ratification. (3) Requirements Prior to Negotiations: Considering that states with nuclear weapons are involved in negotiating a NEA-NWFZ Treaty, there is a need to address the issue of guaranteeing that negotiations are held in good faith once the negotiations commence. For example, North Korea would be requested to commit to a moratorium of nuclear weapon tests and other nuclear weapon related activities. The United States, South Korea, and Japan would likely be requested to commit to a moratorium of joint military exercises around the Korean Peninsula. Such mutually agreed prior moratoriums should be adopted before negotiations. The prior moratoriums could also explore alleviating current sanctions imposed on North Korea in a manner calibrated to the pace and depth of its verified nuclear disarmament. (4) Eliminating Dependence on Extended Nuclear Deterrence: When a NWFZ treaty is fully implemented, international law prevents the threat or use of nuclear weapons against the zone. This

12 974 Hiromichi Umebayashi and Tatsujiro Suzuki implies that non-nuclear weapon states within the NWFZ do not need extended nuclear deterrence or a nuclear umbrella. This is why a NWFZ is a mechanism that builds cooperative security that does not depend on nuclear weapons. (Because the proposed CFA includes a non-aggression agreement, non-nuclear weapons states in NEA- NWFZ are protected from attacks and threats by conventional weapons, as well as by nuclear weapons. Considering past negotiations for a nuclear weapon-free Korean Peninsula, the possibility of including conventional weapons in the security assurances exists in a possible NEA-NWFZ.) Nonetheless, there are many concerns and fear over losing the nuclear umbrella. The argument for the fear is that states will be defenseless if one state violates the treaty and either attacks or threatens to attack other states. However, once a state violates the treaty, the treaty becomes null and void; the state of affairs will return to pretreaty conditions, thus they will not be defenseless. To further alleviate anxieties, the treaty could provide that states may take sanctions against the offender in accordance with international law and their individual national constitution. VI. Conclusion: Starting the Track 2 Nagasaki Process Following up on the report, RECNA held a workshop in November 2016 inviting key experts from the region where an independent, non-governmental Panel on Peace and Security of Northeast Asia (PSNA) was established. Given the difficult security environment, it is essential for non-governmental actors to initiate regional confidence-building on the Track 2 level. Its primary mission is to facilitate political processes, through timely policy recommendations and public engagement, to create a NEA-NWFZ as part of establishing peace and security in the region. It also provides venue for frank exchange of opinions among experts involving policy makers, academics and civil society. In order to achieve the above mission, the Panel holds a

13 A Northeast Asia Nuclear Weapon-Free Zone at the New Stage of the Development in Global Nuclear Disarmament and Non-proliferation 975 series of workshops, as necessary, which will involve experts as well as diplomats and officials from the region and relevant countries and international organizations. It is our intention that this series of workshops will become an effective Track 2 process in the Northeast Asian region. The Panel will collaborate and coordinate with other similar activities in the region and the world, such as Ulaanbaatar Process and Pugwash community activities in Northeast Asia, as well as the U.N. process to negotiate a legally-binding instrument to prohibit nuclear weapons globally. This whole process, aiming at promoting peace and security of Northeast Asia through establishment of a NEA-NWFZ, is called the Nagasaki Process. We hope the new Nagasaki Process will become a new platform for security dialogue among interested parties in the region to enhance confidence building, and eventually leading to peace and security of Northeast Asia and denuclearization of the region. The Process will thus contribute to the global efforts at a new stage to achieving and maintaining a world free from nuclear weapons. References Asmolov, Konstantin, Nuclear Weapons in South Korea under Discussion, New Eastern Outlook, October 11, 2016, ([ Carlin, Robert, North Korea Said It s Willing to Talk Denuclearization (But No One Noticed), The Diplomat, July 13, 2016, ([ thediplomat.com/2016/07/north-korea-said-its-willing-totalk-denuclearization-but-no-one-noticed/]). Halperin, Morton H., A Proposal for a Nuclear Weapons-Free Zone in Northeast Asia, Global Asia, Vol. 6, No. 4 (Winter 2011). Originally presented at East Asia Nuclear Security Workshop, November 11, 2011, Tokyo, cosponsored by Nautilus Institute, Mansfield Foundation, and Asia-Pacific Leadership Network for Nuclear Non-proliferation and Disarmament

14 976 Hiromichi Umebayashi and Tatsujiro Suzuki (APLN). Lewis, Jeffrey, Security Challenges and Denuclearization of Northeast Asia, Lecture given at the Public Symposium, How to Respond to Nuclear Threats? Peace and Security in Northeast Asia, Nagasaki, November 21, North Korea Leadership Watch, Kim Jong Un Commands and Observes Landing and Anti-Landing Drills, March 21, 2016, ([ -jong-un-commands-and-observes-landing-and-anti-landingdrills/]). Sokolski, Henry, Can East Asia Avoid a Nuclear Explosive Materials Arms Race? Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, March 28, 2016, ([ (accessed September 8, 2016). Umebayashi, Hiromichi, Proposal of A Model Northeast Asia Nuclear-Weapon Free Zone Treaty, in Peace Depot Working Paper No.1 E, A Model Treaty on the Northeast Asia Nuclear- Weapon-Free Zone, Peace Depot Working Paper, November Umebayashi, Hiromichi, Hirose, Satoshi, Nakamura, Keiko, and Suzuki, Tatsujiro (eds.), Proposal: A Comprehensive Approach to a Northeast Asia Nuclear Weapon-Free Zone, Research Center for Nuclear Weapons Abolition, Nagasaki University, March 2015, ([ ac.jp/recna/bd/files/proposal_e.pdf]). United Nations General Assembly, Effective Measures towards a World Free of Nuclear Weapons, Working Paper submitted by Japan (A/AC.286/WP.22), April 14, 2016, ([ reachingcriticalwill.org/images/documents/disarmamentfora/oewg/2016/documents/wp22.pdf]) (accessed September 8, 2016).