New Media, The Internet, and a Changing China Abstracts

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1 2014 Penn China Center Conference New Media, The Internet, and a Changing China Abstracts The Co-evolution of the Internet, (Un)Civil Society & Authoritarianism in China Min Jiang, UNC Charlotte This paper extends Guobin -evolution of the Internet and civil society in China. It argues the Internet has both facilitated the growth of civic spaces and empowered authoritarianism. Not only has the Internet amplified civic discourses and group formations, it also has augmented the influence of the authoritarian state as well as uncivil interactions online, leading to a greater degree of fragmentation and cynicism of public opinion. Although social media platforms such as the Twitter-like Sina Weibo can serve as a critical space for expressing and channeling public opinion, especially during times of crisis, they are unlikely to be the ultimate game changer. aspects: 1) real-time activism, 2) online political jamming, 3) weibo celebrities, and 4) the rise of an - vism; the role of weibo celebrities fostering plurality and fragmentation by introducing new identities, information and distinct worldviews; and the uncivil ideological discourse exchanges that have led to public brawls in the street and popular rejection political consequences of new forms of mediated activism, the control regime has implemented a variety of new measures besides filtering and employment of pro-government commentators to forestall or pacify collective actions: 1) real name registration policy and 2) anti-rumor campaigns. The paper argues that a progressive transformation of public spaces and power relations in China relies as much on reformative macropolitics as it does on the micropolitics of local transformation and changes in subjectivity developed through personal identity in everyday life. While the Internet mediates such negotiations and is increasingly indispensible to the parties involved, it does not determine their outcomes. The contextualized use of the Internet and new media, shaped by the social, cultural, and political protocols surrounding such technologies, ultimately does. New Media Empowerment Perspectives in State and Social Relations Zengzhi Shi, Peking University The public communication era initiated a new chapter in state and social relations. Technological empowerment exists between organizational empowerment and social empowerment. The relationships between communications and power, and between communications and society under the new media environment is the basis for researching state and social changes, proposing concepts of public communication, 1

2 exploring their operating mechanisms, pointing out the possibility of imagined micro communities arising in the country and society under new media empowerment, analysing the expression and movement of public spaces where state and social powers operate in both directions, further propose the concept of empowerment tools, analyse how, as new media empowerment moves towards decentralisation and disorganisation, it also empowers while surpassing the knowledge created and spread through time and space, explain how organisational empowerment and social empowerment under technological empowerment deconstructs and reconstructs social structures and social empowerment, and propose that the implementation of social empowerment originates -redemption. Connectivity, Engagement and Witnessing on Weibo: Understanding New Forms of Civic Engagement and Connective Action in China Marina Svensson, Lund University There was much hype in the West about the potential of social media for social and political mobilization in connection with events in North Africa and the Middle East in 2011, although many scholars are sceptical of the role of social media for both civic engagement and political mobilization. They argue that it encourage weak ties that do not necessarily translate into the off- front of one's computer that defuse or escape off-line engagement and activism (Morozov 2011). Chouliaraki (2013) have also raised concern over global mediated solidarity and new forms of humanitarian engagement and communication, and how images of suffering are communicated in this context. On the other hand, scholars such as Bennett and Segerberg (2013) argue that social media has allowed for new forms of connective action that needs to be understood on their own terms. They differ from traditional collective action in that they are more personalized, fluid, less political, based on personal sharing, and do not build on formal organizations to the same extent. An important feature of connective action on social media is also the ubiquitous use of images and videos by ordinary citizens, activists and organizations. Witnessing and sharing images addressing social issues and suffering however also raise important questions regarding how suffering and solidarity are mediated in the social media age. In this paper I address both the possibilities and challenges that social media offer for civic engagement in China. I do this by looking at some weibo-based campaigns and charities/ngos. The fact that civil society is relatively weak in China, and that many people are vary of or sceptical to formal organizations, including NGOs, makes civic engagement on social media more attractive and may encourage new groups of people to become engaged in social issues. But, on the other hand, such engagement could also provide a safe haven of critical social analysis, as well as embody more problematic forms of mediated solidarity as discussed by Chouliaraki. 2

3 Privileged Speech and New Media: Conceptualizing Communications Law in China in the Internet Age Rogier Creemers, University of Oxford It is undeniably the case that the Internet has brought profound change to many areas of the Chinese polity, economy and society. As in other places in the world, new media enabled forms of public communication, social organization and commercial interaction that had heretofore not been possible. But this novelty should not overshadow the important influence exerted by the context in which it has developed. Politically, the objectives and imperatives of CCP rule have remained largely the same: the realization of a modernization and development programme, buttressed by an approach that combines pragmatic technocracy with ideological monism. This programme requires social stability and political continuity, which has led to the development of a regulatory structure in which speech is a privilege, not a right. This privilege is accorded on the basis of the identity of the speaker, the content of the message, the platform for publication, the scope of the audience and a number of other factors. This structure finds its roots in the Party system as it was set up during the 1940s, and its core tenets have remained the same, even as communications technology has evolved and Chinese society has changed beyond recognition. To regulate Internet media, the Party-State at first expanded the regulatory structure that governed traditional media. As the Internet grew, this model was no longer sufficiently effective, and in recent years, the regulatory framework has been restructured in order to better respond by the challenges thrown up by the Internet. Chief among those challenges is the fact that the Party has lost its monopoly over the publication of factual information. As a result, Chinese citizens are ever more exposed to the negative consequences of economic growth, as well as the rampant corruption of its ruling elite. This has systemic implications. The mutual escalation of Internet media capacity and strict media management are only one part of a much larger process of political restructuring that is taking place in China, and outcomes in media governance will fully depend on where this restructuring will lead. It also has serious implications for foreign actors who are in some way connected to a country that has become the second largest economy in the world. Foreign media enterprises remain largely barred from the Chinese markets, as they are largely mistrusted by the Chinese leadership. Academics and NGOs sometimes meet with the same fate, and engagement with Chinese counterparts may, in a tense political climate, bring more i harm than good to their cause. Intergovernmental conversations on Internet policy have, to a significant degree, stranded on the Snowden revelations. International society is confronted with a China that is self-absorbed, prickly and defensive, and about which it knows little. This does not mean that engagement is impossible. It does mean, however, that foreign actors within China must be aware of the environment in which they move. Presence, like speech, is a privilege. 3

4 The Battle of Microblogging for Legal Justice in China Anne S.Y. Cheung, The University of Hong Kong The essence of victimhood in all the legal stories covered in this Internet study is injustice. D landed him in prison. Yet the injury inflicted is not only to the victims concerned but is a collective harm to society as a whole. The netizens are compelled to voice out as they see themselves being the potential victims in each story. And the Internet has lent voice to the public opinion, allowing it to be expressed directly. Through public opinion, citizen awareness of issues is mobilized to act as a check against the state, to influence court decisions, or to push for legislative or policy reforms. It becomes a constant struggle to articulate the fear and concerns in ordinary life, to establish new rules on what is permissible to say, and to define justice. At times, netizens act to restore justice and take on the jury role to re-shape social and legal order. But this cry for justice needs the assistance of law and the court for only the latter are the emblems of power and official authority. Injustice must be acknowledged and addressed openly in the court. Indeed, Perry reckons the long tradition of Chinese citizens of seeking help from the courts in imperial time and in authoritarian regime. Only when such failed, large scale protests might break out. In light -approved discourse. In this sense, the Chinese court plays a critical role not only in resolving social conflicts and legal disputes, but also in softening oppositional voices, and in soothing the rising discontent in society. As the common dictum says, justice must not only be done but must be seen to be done. When the judiciary conducts public opinion survey, or refers to such, -healing impulse. It gives hope to the public when the judiciary responds to public sentiment. But the Chinese judiciary can only do it in a cautionary way for all the institutional constraints that define it. Perhaps, to a certain extent, public opinion has lent also legitimacy to the For now, with the Internet and the power of microblogs, public opinion monitoring can come direct from the citizens, forcing at least a daily relationship of direct engagement with the authorities, training the judiciary and the authorities to be attentive to the monitoring power. Regardless of the risk that such monitoring will be supervised, the Web and its promise of a voice and a site for all has become the unknown sea that lures travelers of different kinds with the temptation of discovery and conquest. Legal Hegemony in China: The Contestation and Valorization of Law in Networked Public Sphere Ya-Wen Lei, Harvard University Xiaodan Daniel Zhou, University of Michigan Most studies of legal consciousness in China suggest that the law continues to enjoy a majestic façade among most citizens, thanks in large part to state propaganda and the fact that most citizens lack direct experience with the law. Other studies, however, suggest that 4

5 legal populism has contributed to put pressure on the Chinese state and actually threaten the rule of law. This inconsistency motivates us to study to what extent and in what ways law is hegemonic in China. To avoid an oversimplified understanding of legal hegemony, we conceptualize concrete experiences with the law and general accounts of law as a continuum instead of a dichotomy. We postulate that when individuals can aggregate and extrapolate specific experiences through interaction, they are likely to challenge existing general accounts of law. Accordingly, we investigate encounters networked public sphere, a space rife with legal interactions. Through semantic network analysis and qualitative analysis of official news and a major online forum from 2008 to 2010, we reveal a more nuanced picture of legal hegemony and identify three mechanisms cross-temporality, cross-locality and shift in focus by which citizens collectively construct legality. We find that whereas the official conceptions of law and the rule of law as an ideal detached from the Chinese context remains pure as the public perceives the Chinese case as an exceptional, failed case of the rule of law. Images of New Media: How Foreign Policy Attitudes A re Connected to Domestic Ideologies in China Chuanjie Zhang, Tsinghua University Scholars of foreign policy attitudes studies in the United States more or less agree that the nd international politics differ significantly. While the conservatism liberalism continuum efficiently on a variety of domestic political issues, the explanatory policy attitudes are both more complicated and uncertain. However, in China, there is much evidence that foreign policy domestic ideological positions. This is particularly true regarding the perceptions of DPRK. There are a variety of DPRK images in China, from DPRK being a model of anti necessity for China to be tougher to DPRK, to abhorrence their own people, etc. The new media, especially internet forums, weibo (microblogging) and weixin (Chinese version of twitter), have increasingly become a mass rally for the ideological right. A review of the new media contents shows that only some DPRK images are dominant, while other images are nearly non existent. foreign policy attitudes are linked to domestic ideologies, which need further empirical confirmation through survey data. James Reilly, University of Sydney Chinese increased in recent years? This article argues that the emergence of new media in China has bolstered public awareness of external events and eased popular mobilization on pressure on Chinese leaders to protect their citizens overseas. However, such concern is 5

6 the least protection. This article examines these dynamics in the realm of Ch concluding with several policy recommendations. Netizen Nationalism, New Media, and China's Japan policy: The Diaoyudao/Senkaku Islands Controversy, Peter Gries, University of Oklahoma 2012 witnessed a renewed flare-up of anti-japanese sentiment in Mainland China. In April 2012, right-wing Tokyo Governor Shintaro Ishihara proposed that Tokyo Prefecture purchase three of the five Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands ( ) from their private Japanese owner. Chinese nationalists were outraged. In mid-august, activists from Hong Kong landed on one of the islands, and were promptly detained by the Japanese Coast Guard. Chinese nationalists responded by protesting not just online, but on the streets of Beijing, Shenzhen, and other major Chinese cities. In early September, the Japanese government purchased the t claim to the islands. On the weekend before September 18, the anniversary of the Mukden Incident that led to the Japanese occupation of Manchuria in 1931, there were street protests in scores of cities across China. Demonstrators carried portraits of Mao Zedong The Chinese government then took the unprecedented step of sending armed naval warships to the disputed Islands. In December, a PLA patrol plane buzzed the islands, and Japan scrambled jet fighters. In January 2013, Chinese and Japanese jets appear to have played chicken near the islands, and a Chinese frigate locked its weapons-targeting radar onto a Japanese helicopter and a destroyer. policy decision makers wise Mandarins with the smarts to fully manage popular nationalism, perhaps even strategically manipulating it to improve their bargaining position with the Japanese? A lack of transparency in elite Chinese decision-making puts definitive answers to these questions beyond our reach. This paper argues, however, that the circumstantial evidence is compelling: nationalist opinion is a powerful driver of e situations that they have confronted so far have been relatively manageable. Instead, Chinese elites have been lucky that events beyond their control such as the accidents of history that led to the Belgrade bombing and spy plane collision incidents of 1999 and 2001 with the US have not yet occurred in the context of Sino-Japanese relations. Should one or more Chinese die at the hands of the Japanese navy or air force accidentally or not the pressure for escalation and war will likely be more than.! 6