MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING

Transcription

1 European Cooperation in the field of Scientific and Technical Research - COST - Secretariat Brussels, 7 January 2004 COST 205/04 MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING Subject : Memorandum of Understanding for the implementation of a European concerted Research Action designated as COST Action A24 "The Evolving Social Construction of Threats" Attached is the text of the abovementioned Memorandum of Understanding signed in Brussels on 20 November 2003 by Belgium, Denmark, Finland, Lithuania and the United Kingdom. COST 205/04 dm 1 C EN

2 MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING FOR THE IMPLEMENTATION OF A EUROPEAN CONCERTED RESEARCH ACTION DESIGNATED AS COST ACTION A24 "THE EVOLVING SOCIAL CONSTRUCTION OF THREATS" The Signatories to this Memorandum of Understanding, declaring their common intention to participate in the concerted Action referred to above and described in the Technical Annex to the Memorandum, have reached the following understanding: 1. The Action will be carried out in accordance with the provisions of document COST 400/01 "Rules and Procedures for Implementing COST Actions", the contents of which the Signatories are fully aware of. 2. The main objective of the Action is to improve current understandings of the social construction of threats and thereby increase the usefulness of such understandings for policy formulation. 3. The economic dimension of the activities carried out under the Action has been estimated, on the basis of information available during the planning of the Action, at 5.2 million in 2003 prices. 4. The Memorandum of Understanding will take effect by being signed by at least five Signatories. 5. The Memorandum of Understanding will remain in force for a period of four years, calculated from the date of first meeting of the Management Committee, unless the duration of the Action is modified according to the provisions of Chapter 6 of the document referred to in Point 1 above. COST 205/04 dm 2 C EN

3 TECHNICAL ANNEX COST ACTION A24 THE EVOLVING SOCIAL CONSTRUCTION OF THREATS A. BACKGROUND Threats are not givens that we all automatically recognise and identify as such. Even in situations where it would be reasonable to assume that we know an elephant when we see one, we do not automatically know whether it is a threat to us. Events cannot constitute themselves as threats: they must be understood as such. Such an understanding is, however, not something subjective. For the way in which events are understood as threats is influenced by past histories and the lessons drawn by the contending parties 1, by their respective belief systems 2, indeed by the common sense of the respective actors 3 which might, or might not, coincide. In other words, the way events appear as threats to us is the result of a social construction. Usually there are competing threat constructions. The peace-movements spent much of the cold war trying to advance alternative bases for understanding the enemy. This was done both by producing alternative data about it and by telling us in so many words that Russians love their children too, i.e. by countering the tendency to make the other appear as necessarily irrational or non-human Yuen Fong Khong, Analogies at War: Korea, Munich, Dien Bien Phu, and the Vietnam Decisions of 1965 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1992). Richard Little and Steve Smith (eds), Belief Systems and International Relations (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1988). Jutta Weldes, Constructing National Interests: The United States and the Cuban Missile Crisis (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1999). COST 205/04 dm 1

4 For threats and enmity could be the result of behaviour-patterns, which, in turn, produce selffulfilling prophecies: if we all believe we are in a jungle and act accordingly, the world will look like one. 1 This implied that there are some conflict dynamics which could have been avoided through a better reflection on threat and enemy constructions. More recently, politically difficult decisions about whether or not to intervene in a long series of conflicts (viz. Afghanistan, Bosnia, Chechnya, DRC, Iraq, Kosovo, Algeria, Rwanda, Somalia, etc.) have kept us painfully aware that one man s terrorist is another s freedom fighter and that it is of utmost importance for the development of conflicts, how events are framed and understood. The basic notion that security cannot be reduced to objective or subjective threats alone is neither complicated nor particularly new. 2 However, over the past decade, the constructivist turn 3 resulted in a spectacular growth in studies which explore various aspects of how threats are constructed, how these constructions are sustained, what their implications are and how they might be altered Stefano Guzzini, 'The Cold War is what we make of it': when peace research meets constructivism in International Relations, in Stefano Guzzini and Dietrich Jung (eds), Copenhagen peace research: conceptual innovation and contemporary security analysis (London, New York: Routledge, 2003 forthcom.); Heikki Patomäki, The Challenge of Critical Theories: Peace Research at the Start of the New Century, Journal of Peace Research, 38 (2001), pp Arnold Wolfers, Discord and Collaboration: Essays on International Politics (Baltimore, London: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1962). For review articles, see e.g. Jeffrey T. Checkel, The Constructivist T urn in International Relation s Theory, World Politics, 50 (1998), pp , Ted Hopf, The Promise of Constructivism in International Relations Theory, International Security, 23 (1998), pp and Emanuel Adler, Constructivism and International Relations, in Walter Carlsnaes, Thomas Risse, and Beth A. Simmons (eds), Handbook of International Relations (London: Sage, 2002), pp For original statements, see e.g. Alexander Wendt, Constructing International Politics, International Security, (1995), pp ; Emanuel Adler, Seizing the Middle Ground: Constructivism in World Politics, European Journal of International Relations, 3 (1997), pp ; Stefano Guzzini, A reconstruction of constructivism in International Relation s, European Journal of International Relations, 6 (2000), pp For the use of constructivism in security studies or foreign policy analysis, see e.g. Didier Bigo, Grands Débats dans un Petit Monde. Les débats en relations internationales et leur lien avec le monde de la sécurité, Culture et Conflits, 2 (1996), pp. 7-41; Didier Bigo, Polices en Réseaux. L'Experience Européenne (Paris: Presses d e Sciences Po, 199 6); Barry Buzan, Ole Wæver, and Jaap de Wilde, Security. A New Framework for Analysis (Boulder, London: Lynne Rienner, 1998); Peter Katzenstein (ed.), The Culture of National Security. Norms and Identity in World Politics (New York: Columbia University Press, 19 96); Bill M csweeney, Security, Identity and Interests: A Sociology of International Relations, ed. Steve Smith, Cambridge Studies in International Relations (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999); Jutta Weldes and others, Constructing Insecurity, in Jutta Weldes, Hugh Gusterso n, and Raymond Duvall (eds), Cultures of Insecurity: States, Communities, and the Production of Danger (1996), pp. 65; Jutta Weldes and Diana Saco, Making State Action Possible: The U.S. and the Discursive Construction of 'the Cuban Problem', , in Jutta Weldes, Hugh Gusterson, and Raymond Duvall (eds), Cultures of Insecurity: States, Communities, and the Production of Danger (1996). COST 205/04 dm 2

5 As is often the case, sensibilities differ in the various research communities. A distinction is usually drawn between US and European constructivism, where the US approaches are considered less oriented towards ethics and more rationalist, something which has contributed to the move of some US constructivists to European shores (Checkel, Weldes). Within the so-called European school, there is e.g. the English school which is at times close to constructivism 1 and a Copenhagen School of security studies which has focused on the conditions and effects of securitising particular issues. 2 There has also been a Canadian component in the Critical Security Studies approach, again from scholars now working in Europe. 3 But these distinctions tend to overstate the coherence of while understating the links between the different so-called schools. It is certainly more interesting and helpful to insist on the different versions of constructivism as a guide through this multi-faceted work. This is no place to undertake that kind of tour d horizon, suffice it to say that the major divisions are between those more interested in the micro-foundations of constructivism 4 and more holist/structuralist approaches 5, between sociologically and linguistically oriented approaches. Finally there are divisions according to the kind of construction that is of prime interest Timothy Dunne, The social construction of international society, European Journal of International Relations, 1 (1995), pp ; Hidemi Suganami, Alexander Wendt and the English School, Journal of International Relations and Development, 4 (2001). Barry Buzan, People, States and Fear: An Agenda for International Security Studies in the Post-Cold War Era, 2nd ed. (New York at al: Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1991 ); Ole Wæver and others (eds), Identity, Migration and the New Security Agenda in Europe (London: Pinter, 1993); Ole Wæver, Power, Principles and Perspectivism: Understanding Peaceful Change in Post- Cold War Europe, in Heikki Patomäki (ed.), Peaceful Changes in World Politics (Tampere: Tampere Peace Research Institute, 19 95), pp ; Barry Buzan, Ole Wæver, and Jaap de Wilde, Security: A New Framework for Analysis (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1998). For a discussion, see Jef Huysmans, Revisiting Copenhagen, or: on the creative development of a security studies agenda in Europe, European Journal of International Relations, 4 (1998), pp Keith Krause and Michael C. Williams (eds), Critical Security Studies: Concepts and Cases (London: UCL Press, 1997), working in Geneva and Aberystwyth respectively. See e.g. Alistair Ian Johnston, Treating International Institutions as Social Environments, International Studies Quarterly, (2001), pp See e.g. Alexander Wendt, Social Theory of International Politics (Cambridge: Cam bridge University Press, 1999). COST 205/04 dm 3

6 This multifaceted quality of work on the social construction of threats makes a COST Action on the topic attractive and appropriate. As the existence of multiple schools and divisions signals, there are researchers across Europe working along constructivist lines (some of them with EU financing). However, there is certainly scope for a project that has the ambition to facilitate communication and the exchange of ideas among these research communities. The fact that scholars come to the same research project from different perspectives is per se promising for exchange. It means that there can be real and beneficial exchange (and disagreement) on the research programme. Moreover, to strive to have such an exchange is especially important as the research programmes are still in their early phases and the normal channels of communication therefore do not work very well. Since the work is ongoing, a large part has not yet been published in specialised journals or books and is available only in the form of manuscripts, working papers and conference communications which are inherently more limited in their reach. The flexible and open structure of a COST Action is very well suited. It allows institutions and scholars to declare interest and hence facilitates co-operation among groups of scholars who do not know about each other as well as the engagement of scholars who are generally less visible in international conferences and publications for a variety of reasons and not least under-funding of universities. There is indeed a strong demand for this kind of network collaboration among researchers, not least in Central and Eastern Europe. B. OBJECTIVES AND BENEFITS The main objective of the Action is to improve current understandings of the social construction of threats and thereby increase the usefulness of such understandings for policy formulation. The Action aims at developing better tools of analysis and to facilitate communication between the world of academia and the world of policy-makers. This ought to make us better prepared for dealing with questions about how threats are constructed, why they are constructed differently in different places, and the implication of these differences for war and peace. COST 205/04 dm 4

7 The importance of this task has increased dramatically since September 11, Indeed, in the wake of 9/11 there has been a marked shift in the focus of political debates (nationally and internationally) towards security issues. The war against terrorism and the related policing and military actions give a particularly urgent touch to questions about how threats are constructed, why they are constructed differently in different places, and the implication of these differences for war and peace. The Action cannot, of course, pretend to directly influence or alter events taking place now (or in the future). However, it can aim at developing better tools of analysis and to facilitate communication between the world of academia and the world of policy-makers, both of which ought to make us better prepared for dealing with similar situations in the future. In concrete terms, the aim of the Action is to establish a durable network of scholars that should be useful for such development in the long term. The Action will hold a series of workshops and conferences, the proceedings of which will be published either in special issues of journals or in the form of edited volumes. The Action will also provide support for participants who directly take part in the public debate in their own context. C. SCIENTIFIC PROGRAMME The overall focus of the Action is on the social construction of threats. However, this is clearly a very broad field that needs to be narrowed down. Moreover, it is a field where there has often been a sharp division between those working on theory and those working on applied studies, and this should not be reproduced in this COST Action. A COST Conference and a related workshop held in Copenhagen (September 3 and 4, 2002) took a step in the direction of identifying unresolved problems and new topics within the research area. In continuation of this, the Action will be organised around three central questions and three topics. All of these can be approached and answered from different constructivist perspectives and they constitute useful points of departure for the kinds of exchanges that would be promoted in this COST Action. COST 205/04 dm 5

8 The questions: 1. Who defines a threat? Not everyone has an equal right or possibility to define what a threat is and usually there are competing understandings of what constitutes a threat and which threat is to be taken more seriously. This is part and parcel of political debate. There is hence a sociological question about who can take part in the discussions about the definition of threats. Additionally, there is a question about the production of the facts on the basis of which such political debates are won and lost. Statistics, images, expert statements, and quotations from those involved in a conflict are crucial for deciding whether something is a threat or not as well as how to react to it. This opens a whole range of questions about how facts are produced and what the effect is. It becomes crucial to get a grasp of how and why facts are produced as they are by the media which transmits and selects images and quotes, by the army, police or research institutions which produce the statistics and by the expert who makes informed statements. By way of example: How does the increased reliance on private companies for military, policing and surveillance influence our understanding of threats and the authority of different actors to express themselves on the topic? Are new forms of (public) co-operation, legal foundations and European policies related to the co-operation between the military, the police, the intelligence services and other organisations mobilised to counteract the new threats also partially responsible for producing those threats? What facts are produced by new technologies of identification, surveillance and control (such as the visa regime, extradition agreements, or police co-operation? Finally, threat construction is usually embedded in a wider security imaginary (Weldes) in which the central lessons of history are deposited and which is mobilised in our understanding of conflicts. What are the (gender, religion, nationalist etc) bias transmitted through our tradition of thought and influential in expert statements and interpretations of conflicts, crisis and strategies? COST 205/04 dm 6

9 2. How are threat conceptions sustained? Threat construction matters particularly more when it becomes politically influential, when action is taken on the basis of a threat be it in reaction to an understanding that 9/11 constitutes Iraq as a main threat or to the understanding that immigration is a major threat to social stability. It is hence important to ask not only who produces threats and how, but also how this construction becomes politically salient and how specific strategies to counter threats are produced. This entails asking questions about who adopts what reading, how they manage to impose it politically and why they choose the response they do to counter it. In this process linguistically oriented constructivists would emphasise the importance of metaphors and discourses which mobilise collective understandings about their own (social, national or individual) identity, about politics, and about priorities among different values. For example, one might look at the way metaphors drawing on the Second World War (Hitler or holocaust analogies) are used to mobilise support for specific threat constructions. More sociologically oriented constructivists would emphasise the role of different forms of capital (including social, political and cultural capital) in explaining the strategies for imposing certain threat constructions as well as the effectiveness of these strategies. For instance, one might ask what strategies different factions of the defence establishment are pursuing and why the strategy of a specific faction is more influential in the construction of a threat and in the production of a strategy to respond to it. 3. Whose threats are responded to? Finally, it is important to open up to the broader picture. Threats are constructed and sustained in a context. Focussing on how and why threats are constructed and sustained, it is easy to forget that by the same token alternative understandings and strategies are marginalised. Not all threats are responded to and not all strategies are followed and it clearly has profound implications whose threats are and whose threats are not. For example, to what extent is the establishment of terrorism as the major threat and the related development of surveillance techniques and redirection of security forces overshadowing other conceptions of threats or delegitimising other threat conceptions (e.g. threats to the individual rights of Muslims or asylum seekers)? And in relation to this to what extent do threat constructions in one area (e.g. terrorism) feed into the constitution of threats and understanding of security in other areas (e.g. organised crime). COST 205/04 dm 7

10 The topics: These questions are very broad and can be applied to any threat construction. Hence in order to facilitate the discussion among the participants in the COST Action, the focus of the discussion will be on specific topics. The topics presented below are selected on the grounds that they play a key role in present political debate and that (consequently) research is well underway in most European countries. 1. Proliferation of weapons of mass destruction The US plans to build a missile defence have actualised the risks related to nuclear proliferation. The Cold War left a legacy of nuclear scientists without employment and nuclear weapons and materials, which have greatly increased the risk of nuclear proliferation. The recent example of North Korea being on its way to develop nuclear weapons and having access to weapon grade plutonium is a case in point. Yet, on the other hand, proliferation has happened during the entire Cold War without necessarily undermining international security. Indeed, some researchers thought that controlled proliferation of second strike capacities would enhance international security by making its owners more prudent in international affairs. 1 Thinking in the terms just outlined above about the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction means asking questions such as: How is the threat of nuclear proliferation produced and by whom? What is the role of security institutions in crisis in producing and disseminating this information? Is Europe just taking over American images of emerging threats? How is this threat made convincing in political debates at different levels (national, international)? Which lessons of history are mobilised, whether consciously or not, in the threat construction or non-construction? Why are some countries singled out as threatening (North Korea) and not others (Israel)? What other threats are overshadowed in the process? 1 See most prominently the writings by Kenneth N. Waltz, The Stability of a Bipolar World, Dædalus, 43 (1964 ), pp ; Kenneth N. Waltz, Theory of International Politics (Reading : Addison -Wesley, 1 979). COST 205/04 dm 8

11 2. Terrorism Since 9/11 the topic tops both political and research agendas. As expressed at the COST seminar, terrorism has traditionally not been a major focus in the academic community. This is not the case any more, and a number of research projects are also under way in EU member countries. The intention of this scientific programme is not to redo these efforts, but rather to facilitate a constructivist exchange on the phenomenon. There are obvious questions about who gets branded terrorist by whom, how that branding comes to shape politics and what the effect of this branding is. And it is of course particularly interesting to think more about the shift in European public statements and practice on terrorism following 9/11 as most EU member states have long lived with terrorist threats and acts. 3. The privatisation of security In the course of the past decade we have seen a privatisation of security. Private or parastate companies provide an increasing share of the security services both at home (policing) and abroad (army operations). Moreover, in many parts of the world it is not only about outsourcing to private companies but also about control over security sliding out of state hands into private hands: this is an essential feature of most contemporary new wars. In many quarters there is hence heated debate about the implications of this privatisation of security as well as about whether privatisation is actually taking place in the first place. It is into this debate that the COST Action will tap. Asking questions about how the idea of privatised security (or a specific aspect of it) is construed as a threat and by whom; how that idea is sustained (or not) in politics; and what implications it has for actual strategies. Summary: The scientific programme is summarised in the matrix below. Participants will be encouraged to deal with all of the three questions raised with regard to their topic, but it will clearly be expected that participants will place different emphasis on them. At this stage it cannot be predicted what their answers will be, hence the empty matrix boxes. The aim of the COST Action would be to promote discussion on what should fill each of the empty boxes, but also to discuss the set up itself as well as the link between the different questions and topics. COST 205/04 dm 9

12 1 Scientific Programme Who defines a threat? How are threat conceptions sustained? Whose threats are responded to? Nuclear Proliferation Terrorism Privatisation of Security D. ORGANISATION The Action will be guided by the usual COST structure with a management committee, working groups and general conferences. The Management Committee. Working groups on each topic, hence: Working Group 1: Proliferation of weapons of mass destruction Working Group 2: Terrorism Working Group 3: The privatisation of security An introductory meeting and three general conferences will be organised. A website will be run throughout the Action, providing both general information about the topic (bibliographical references, link to related web-sites and information about related conferences and current publications) and activity about the Action specifically. E. TIMETABLE The Action will have a duration of four years. The Management Committee will meet once a year, with the first meeting initiating the actual work plan. There will be an extra meeting of the management committee in connection with the conferences. COST 205/04 dm 10

13 The Working Groups will meet once every year during the Action (in connection with a general seminar/conference). In the first year an introductory plenary meeting will be a central part of this meeting. This meeting should serve the purpose of having an exchange with all participants in the Action on the set up of the Action as well as on the concepts and methods that are to be used in it. In the last year a similar concluding plenary meeting will be organised. This could be of great advantage (but not indispensable) if the working groups could meet in parallel during years 2 and 3 so as to ensure cross cutting synergies. General conferences will be held in years 2 and 3, and a final conference concluding the Action will be held in year 4. This set up is tentative. An introductory plenary meeting has been planned precisely with the intent of getting responses and ideas from the participants and hence the set up will be altered if there seems to be good reason for doing so. Moreover, since the topics are highly dynamic, it is foreseen that there may be reason to alter the frequency of working group meetings or general conferences. This said the tentative plan is as follows: 2 Time Table Year 1 Year 2 Year 3 Year 4 Management Committee meeting Management Committee Meetings Management Committee meetings Management Committee meetings Introductory plenary meeting Working Groups 1-3 Working Groups 1-3 Concluding plenary meeting Meetings meetings General Conference General Conference Final Conference COST 205/04 dm 11

14 F. ECONOMIC DIMENSION The following COST countries have actively participated in the preparation of the Action or otherwise indicated their interest: Researchers from the following countries have expressed their interests in participating in the Action: Belgium, Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Germany, Hungary, Italy, Lithuania, Norway, Poland, Russia, Slovenia, Sweden, Turkey, and the UK (see enclosed list). On the basis of national estimates provided by the representatives of these countries, the economic dimension of the activities to be carried out under the Action has been estimated, in 2003 prices, at roughly Euro 5.2 million. This estimate is valid under the assumption that all the countries mentioned above but no other countries will participate in the Action. Any departure from this will change the total cost accordingly. G. DISSEMINATION PLAN Results of the Action will be disseminated in three directions: First, in the direction of the community of researchers. This is an important way of disseminating results of research. Through their teaching, advisory media, and conferencing activities researchers are among the most significant carriers of information in their respective communities. Outside the network itself the community of researchers will be addressed by publications (in the form of special issues of international journals and edited books). COST 205/04 dm 12

15 Second, the Action aims at disseminating results in the direction of a variety of national policy making communities. Indeed, the network has been deliberately set up to cover research communities from a large share of the European states (and will enlarge it further if there is interest) with the intention of facilitating communication not only between national research communities but also to reach the political debates in the different countries. The channels to these debates is fairly direct as researchers are very often involved in ongoing political debates in different ways (advisory activities, media debates, framing of parliamentary research activities, NGO related work). Finally, particular effort will be made to draw Central European research communities into the Action. It is seen as one of the more important aims of the network to lay the ground for regular research exchanges and also for facilitating a common understanding of political debates in the new and old EU member states on issues of security. This integration will be made a priority and a number of the meetings and conferences ought to be organised in Central and/or Eastern Europe. COST 205/04 dm 13