1- The Brazilian Foreign Policy and its historical nuances

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1 Marcial A. G. Suarez 1 The following study analyses the recent Brazilian foreign policy proposing the question: has this policy been favoring regional integration? To answer this, we develop a split on Brazilian stocks on the international scene starting from two concepts: selective engagement, by Robert J. Art and Soft Power by Joseph Nye Jr. The work s hypothesis is that the Brazilian foreign policy has been walking between trying to balance central actors on the international scene by selecting occasions in order to maximize their relative position - thereby introducing a foreign policy based on realism and, on the other hand, without giving up an agenda focused on promoting the regional integration of South America based on a project that strategically uses the idea regionalism. In this analysis we propose a debate between the Brazilian positions based on these two concepts and to test that hypothesis with South American Defense Council as an object. In short the article proposes a view of recent Brazilian foreign policy and to evaluate to what extent this helps or not regional integration. Key Words: Brazilian Foreign Policy, Regional Security, South American Defense Council. 1- The Brazilian Foreign Policy and its historical nuances 1 Professor do Political Science and International Relations at the Fluminense Federal University.

2 When treating the theme of Brazilian Foreign Policy (BFP), one can think about a few approaches, such as historical, phenomenological or personalistic, among so many others. For this study, however, it seems interesting to go through a broad view of BFP or Brazilian diplomatic policy so one can explore, with greater clarity, the distinct adaptations which it has passed throughout distinct historical contexts. Cervo and Bueno (1992), in their study História da PolíticaExternaBrasileira, offer an interesting introduction to the general milestones of BFP. The authors develop their analysis in three distinct points in which they explore Imperial Brazil ( ), Old Republic or Oligarchic Republic ( ) and the following period between the world wars and, at last, the historical context after the Second World War. Taking Cervo and Bueno s study as one of the references, it must be emphasized that special focus will be given to the last two points discussed by the authors. It is important to highlight that our study does not rely on the rhetoric of BFP being shaped by the major powers on the International System, on the contrary, BFP was build by the Brazilian attempts of finding its space in the International Scene. If the Imperial Period was characterized by a search of redefinition of Brazil s role and its autonomy vis-à-vis the old colonial days, the period of Old Republic can be defined as extremely interesting because Brazil and its foreign policy were strongly shaped by the performance of the Minister of Foreign Affairs Barão do Rio Branco. His return to the foreign ministry between 1902 and 1912 outlines a transition in Brazilian Foreign Policy, from an aspect very idealistic and legislative to a more realist perspective, based on national interests understood as the relative growing of the State Power, pointing out Brazil s search for becoming a regional actor great relevance. Cervo and Bueno bring to the debate the period of time considered an interstice between the death of Rio Branco (1912) and the Revolution of 1930 in which Brazil shifts its diplomatic axis, from London to Washington. It is important to note that, since the BFP, over the twentieth century, consisted on different grades (sometimes more, sometimes less) of approaching the actions of the United States of America. Thus the BFP goes from an alignment to a balance that is evident during the 1930 s, in which president Getúlio Vargas proves interest in the game of power between the fascists and the States led by the United States and England. This game unfolds and

3 the result is the Brazilian participation in World War II on the Allied side against the fascist axis. The post Era Vargas, reflects the redefinition of the BFP and an almost automatic alignment with the North American foreign policy in the context of the Cold War. This attitude clearly presents itself during the government of Eurico G. Dutra ( ), and examples of this position are the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance (Rio Treaty) and the rupture of diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union. The return of Vargas to power in 1951 does not significantly change the status of the BFP, though it brings the element of external pressure for opening to foreign capital and investment, this period can be roughly translated by the clash between nationalism and defeatism ( in Portuguese, Entreguismo ). The Independent Foreign Policy (IEP), developed between 1961 and 1964, was an attempt to obtain greater autonomy vis-a-visthe pressure of the international system and its central actors. Some points were important for this foreign policy, such as the abandonment of the automatic alignment to the U.S., more Universalist approach to international actors and nationalism. However, with the revolutionary process of 1964 there is a break with this process and a redefinition of the BFP in relation to the international system and especially regarding the bipolar disorder, placing Brazil back on a pragmatic and ideological alignment with regard to U.S. foreign policy. This relationship, almost paradoxical - ideological and pragmatic - is given in order to produce and support Brazilian economic interests in the context of a state of emergency internally and bipolar context externally. Thus, military governments were characterized by several postures: automatic alignment of CastelloBranco ( ), Costa e Silva ( ) with his "nationalism of ends" and "pragmatism means", Médici ( ) which absorbs the elements predecessors and adds the National Security Doctrine, Geisel ( ) with his "responsible pragmatism" and finally with the Figueiredo government, that finds a need for reform and adaptation to the already strained economic model in a context of inflation and severe economic crisis due to external economic conjuncture. The democratic period in Brazil and the PEB restarts in 1985, although extremely shy considering the domestic political context. Hirst and Pinheiro (1995) address the inflection of the period of Collor and Itamar, delimiting the period from 1990 to 1994 period as a resumption of Brazilian inclusion in the international system. The agenda of this period was characterized, according to the authors, by: 1) updating the international agenda of country according to new issues and new international momentum, 2) build a positive agenda with the United States, and 3) loose the characteristics associating Brazil with the movement of third world countries.

4 This process will find echo in the neoliberal agenda of the 1990 s, characterized by more than just ideological or programmatic in terms of long-term planning, yet and predominantly economic alignment. The economic opening takes place at an accelerated rate over the decade and an important factor in terms of foreign policy is the "distancing" between the foreign ministries of the United States and Brazil and "return" of Brazil to its regional partners. MERCOSUR presents itself as a major instrument created in this period. To Vigevani and Cepaluni (2007) the foreign policy that marked the beginnings of the decade of and especially the period LuizInácio Lula da Silva, can be characterized as guided by "the autonomy through diversification strategy," according to the authors: Many of the initiatives of the Lula da Silva government are located in part of international trade negotiations and the search for policy coordination with developing countries and emerging economies, notably India, South Africa, China and Russia. (Vigevani and Cepaluni, 2007 : 275) According to the authors there are certain characteristics which demonstrate the hues between the period of the government of Fernando Henrique Cardoso and LuizInácio Lula da Silva. So CepaluniVigevani and claim that Lula da Silva government has made changes in emphasis and tone in his foreign policy (adjustments), seeking new forms of international integration for the country (program changes). Following the analysis of the authors, they present the following distinction: (...) Cardoso's foreign policy championed the idea of "autonomy through participation" in the international system, in contrast with the pursuit of "autonomy through distance, paragdigm that prevailed until the end of the Sarney government (VIGEVANI; OLIVEIRA, 2004; FONSECA JR., 1998), while Lula da Silva government in Brazil tried to enter the world stage emphasizing autonomous forms, diversifying the partners and the strategic choices in Brazil. Though there were elements of change in the direction of the country still in the Cardoso administration, Lula da Silva uses a strategy that could be called "autonomy through diversification", emphasizing South- South cooperation to seek greater balance with the countries of the North, making adjustments increasing the country's international role and consolidating program changes in foreign policy. (Ibid, 2007, 283) There is a clear diversification of BFP in the Lula government from the viewpoint of Vigevani and Cepaluni. There is a privilege of relations between different actors, both at regional and international levels in this context we see the Brazilian diplomacy working in different forums at different levels. Simultaneously, Brazil takes 2 The term of Fernando Henrique Cardoso, was not mentioned because it is considered, somehow an extension of the policy of expanding markets of the of Itamar Franco government.

5 part in actions by the G8; it acts in G20 works together and enhances its participation within the BRICs (Brazil, Russia, India and China). 2 Soft Power and Selective Engagement: is it possible to combine? 2.1 Soft Power: Choice or Condition? It is not possible to understand some features of international politics without considering the role of institutions in this process. Both Robert Keohane and Joseph Nye Jr. have been working the liberal institutional 3 approach over the past few decades, and more specifically the question of complexity and interdependence. In the analysis proposed, we address the concept of soft power, which Nye has developed first in the 1990s in his article whose title has the same name. According to the author, the concept of soft power stands diametrically opposed to what he calls hard power- which, as a realist sense assumes the use of force instead of conviction for cooperation and gravitation around common values. In Nye s words: The dictionary tells us that power means an ability to do things and control others, to get others to do what they otherwise would not. Because the ability to control others is often associated with the possession of certain resources, politicians and diplomats commonly define power as the possession of population, territory, natural resources, economic size, military forces, and political stability. (Nye, 1990; 153) Nye, following the tradition of liberal institutionalism, endorses the preeminent challenge of the United States of American post the decline of the Soviet Union, said not necessarily by military factor but as a horizon beyond his enemy the U.S. can harness the support of international actors for their political agenda: Thus, the critical question for the United States is not whether it will start the next century as the superpower with the largest supply of resources, but to what extent it will be able to control the political environment and get other countries to do what it wants. (Ibid, 1990; 153) 3 Nye Jr. Joseph S.Soft Power (1990); Keohane and Nye.Realism and Complex Interdependence.(2001); Nye Jr. Joseph S.The American National interest and global public goods. (2002).

6 The projection of a scenario where state are not the only actors to be taken into account in the calculation is a strategic strength of the institutional liberal theory, however, is usually poorly understood, that is, indicating that Nye disqualifies the position of the State. What really happens is the maintenance of the States, but in a unique position in which these should dialogue organically with non-state actors; the issue, for Nye, is not whether state or nonstate actors are more important - states usually are. That is the point in modern times, more complex coalitions affect outcomes.(ibid, 1990; 154). Joseph Nye, Jr. s fundamental point is the need for a redefinition the concept of power and the way it is used in international scene. In an interdependent world, economically, politically and culturally, power equation must be solved outside the scope of the relationship of military force applied by the actor on top on the players below. For Nye, the relevant aspect of the strategic calculus is defined by the ability of an actor to engender a special interest group that can be generalized: This second aspect of power--which occurs when one country gets other countries to want what it wants--might be called co-optive or soft power in contrast with the hard or command power of ordering others to do what it wants. (Ibid, 1990; 161) An update of the concept, if one can call it, is made by Nye in 2008 against a background of significantly different to the 1990s, in his article Public Diplomacy and Soft Power, in which he again explores the concept of soft power: The ability to establish preferences tends to be associated with intangible assets such as an attractive personality, culture, political values and institutions, and policies that are seen as legitimate or having moral authority. If I can get you to want to do what I want, then I do not have to force you to do what you do not want. (Nye, 2008; 94) A more precise analysis of the concept of soft power leads our analysis leads to a point of contact when Nye assumes as the matrix of Brazilian foreign policy throughout twentieth century, paradigm of low aggression and that has become the example for establishing communication channels using only Brazil s diplomatic prestige to some extent. Nye then claims that the result of soft power promotes itself. I.e. there is a degree of legitimacy which requires that an actor is recognized as such by acting in a certain way and its power (persuasively) that results from this process feed itself:

7 Soft power is not merely influence, though it is one source of influence. Influence can also rest on the hard power of threats or payments. And soft power is more than just persuasion or the ability to move people by argument, though that is an important part of it. It is also the ability to entice and attract. In behavioral terms, soft power is attractive power. (Ibid, 2008; 95) The nearest term that can be used to analyze the concept of soft power would be that of gravitation, ie. an actor has such condition (prestige), which would cause the other players to become attached to its peripherals and greater ability to attract, strength resulting from this appeal that the former would have various levels of political and social organization on the various actors. There is, however, a clear gap that highlighted by Nye that is, what can be explained by the context in which actors differ in their moral-rational basis and can make distinct judgments about a phenomenon: But if the content of a country s culture, values, and policies are not attractive, public diplomacy that broadcasts them cannot produce soft power. It may produce just the opposite. Exporting Hollywood films full of nudity and violence to conservative Muslim countries may produce repulsion rather than soft power. (Ibid, 2008; 95) One can consider that the array of Brazilian foreign policy and diplomacy in recent decades have performed a strategy that could be described in terms of using a soft power, given the disabling conditions for the exercise of military power due to material limitations and of regional balance, Brazil played strategies of action aimed at a decision-making process legitimated in its capacity as actor "regional giant hence important per se. So we can to highlight in Nye: Public diplomacy is an instrument that governments use to mobilize these resources to communicate with and attract the publics of other countries, rather than merely their governments. (Ibid, 2008; 96) It can be considered - starting from what Nye proposed - that soft power lies on three main elements, namely, culture, values and foreign policy. The Brazilian foreign policy has exploited its image regionally and globally "peaceful giant "hence there is a certain incongruity between their size and their actions on the international scene, i.e., Brazil, for example, is not a member of the G8 while Canada is (obviously this is not due to a simple political Manichaeism but the prevailing interests of the actors of the system). Brazil enters into the equation together with the other actors from the BRIC countries (Brazil, India and China) plus Mexico and South Africa in the so called G8 + 5.

8 A brief summary can be visualized at the following chart: Soft power 4 Sources Legitimizing ActorsAudience Targeted Foreign Policy Agenda Governments, media, nongovernmental organizations (NGO s), Intergovernmental Organizations (IGO s) Foreigngovernments and audience Internal Values and culture Media, NGOs and IGOs Foreigngovernments and audience High Culture 5 Governos, ONGs, and IGOs Foreigngovernments and audience PopularCulture Media and markets Foreign audience 2.2 Selective engagement or games of political chance The theoretical framework presented here is part of the neorealist assumption that States tend to maximize their relative position in an international system structured according to the power and with anarchy (i.e. absence of ruler of all units) as its organizing principle. Obviously, the States are not blind players or not seen at all solipsistic, however, relations,including those of integration, often driven by motivations connected to relative position in the international system. We can hardly think of anarchy in the international system without mentioning two immanent concepts, namely, security dilemma and balance of power. Robert Jervis (1978) presents an analysis focused on comparing gains and losses with respect to noncooperation and cooperation, both motivated by a greater ability to players trust each 4 Table extracted from the Nye article, pg Nye establishes the following distinction: Culture is the set of practices that create meaningfor a society, and it has many manifestations. It is common to distinguish betweenhigh culture such as literature, art, and education, which appeals to elites; andpopular culture, which focuses on mass entertainment.

9 other or not. Through a simple combinatorial analysis 6 the author discusses the variables guided on the security dilemma. Among the points discussed by Jervis, there are different understandings that actors have of the very substance of the security dilemma, from aspects of the greatest advantage lying on the capacity to attack or defend.maybe we can translate the author s central propositions when relating the offensive as non-distinguishable from the defensive posture and, on the other hand, the defensive posture is distinguishable from the offensive one as dependent variables. Jervis states that the attack has edge and on the other hand, the defense has advantage. The most unstable scenario is the one where a State cannot conclude about the intentions of others and believes that attack is the best strategy, so we have a high possibility of conflict. In the extreme scenario in which it is possible to distinguish the position of another State and the defense is the privileged strategythere is no security dilemma and the system becomes stable, as the conflict becomes unlikely. In Glaser (1999) we are presented to the Contingent Realism, an attempt to overcome the limitations of structural realism of K. Waltz while trying to extricate himself from the institutionalism of R. Keohane. Glaser s Contingent Realism appears as a soft version of Waltz's structural realism and even more if we take Mearsheimer 7 (1998) into consideration.however, it shares of three theoretical sources, namely, Structural Realism, Arms Control Theory and Theory of Cooperation. Realism tries to push the boundaries (thus nominated by the author) of both the neo-institutionalist and structural realists. Glaser considers necessary a certain degree of understanding among the States, and here again we face a fundamental question: Under what criteria would be that understanding? One possible answer, according to Glaser, is given through three strategies: arms control, defense a unilateral and unilateral containment. Glaser uses the concept of contingency 8 to escape from accusations of determinism experienced by structural realism of Waltz, but at the same time, does not 6 Example: We have two elements A - B with dependent variables (cooperate and not cooperate): A and B cooperate, A cooperates and B doesn t, A doesn t cooperate and B does, both A and B do not cooperate. Under these combinations, Jervis builds three examples of games: Hunt deer (N / C), Prisoner's Dilemma (C / C), "Chicken" (C / N). 7 Mearsheimer (1998) The Tragedy of Grate Power Politics. 8 Which in the Latin tradition, has translation of the term made by Boethius ( ), who considered the concept of contingent related to what is possible, even thoughthere is a distinction to be established -

10 seem to realize that by using the concept of that concept, he is required, because of its strength, to be in contradiction, and his restrictions on the security dilemma (for example),if placed in a contingency scenario, are projected to return in the future, where the degree of uncertainty is unknown. In order to continue our discussion, we highlight within the neorealist theoretical framework, the ideas of J. Art in his study The Strategy of Selective Engagement (1999) : the author offers an analytical path guided by the definition of basic interests and political positioning being determined by these national interests in the context of the international system. Art s mentioned work has in its central core on six points, again drawn up in the capacity for power projection of States, particularly the USA, but the kind of behavior can be translated as follows: a) Ensuresecurity; b) To prevent conflicts that threaten international stability c) Keep the flow of goods and raw materials (mainly energy) d) Keep an open international economic system; e) Increase democracy and human rights; f) Develop a green agenda 9 3 South American Defense Council (SDC) Brazilian diplomacy has been paying attention to issues beyond matters relating to a commercial approach only. Under inter-state realm, UNASUR (Union of South American Nations) is undoubtedly the achievement of greater regional political strategic relevance and, within this integration project lies the CDS. The Union of South American Nations (UNASUR) is constituted by twelve countries of South America and had its origins in 2004 with the creation of the "South ie: When we think about possibility of an event, however we can consider its impossibility, however, to think about the contingency of an event, we cannot think its "incontingência" or uncontingency. 9 A simple definition quite simple of a green agenda would be the provision of regulatory frameworks regarding the emission of "greenhouse gases", for example.

11 American Community of Nations" at the Third Meeting of Heads of State and Government of South America, held in Cusco, Peru. In 2007, during the First South American Energy Summit (Isla Margarita, Venezuela) it was decided to adopt the name "Union of South American Nations", denoting a high degree of commitment to be achieved. Of course it is a long-term project and in which regional integration is its amalgamator element. The SDC was created out of proposal of the Brazilian Defense Minister Nelson Jobim, in order to provide greater regional environment interaction in defense and security issues. This project was launched in 2008 and has as one of its most significant challenges integrating actors according to the equalization settings for security and defense agendas. One can consider that one of the most visible barriers to this process concern the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia. This question arises in a unique way because, to Colombia, the FARC are a threat to integrity and national security even though other regionalsouth-american partners don t usually share that perception. The status of the SDC in its Article 4 establishes the general objectives: a) Consolidate South America as peace zone, the basis for democratic stability and comprehensive development of our peoples and as a contribution to world peace. b) Build South American identity on defense issues, taking into account the specific sub-regional and regional characteristics and contribute to the strengthening of the unity of Latin America and the Caribbean. c) Generate consensuses in order to strengthen regional cooperation on defense issues. The dichotomy "the Colombian Question versus general objectives" already demonstrates the complexity of the task to which SDC is designed. Among the specific objectives we can point out two points: a) Move gradually toward the analysis and discussion of the common elements of joint vision on defense issues. b) Promote the exchange of information and analysis on the regional and international situation, with the purpose of identifying risk factors and threats that may affect the regional and world peace.

12 The SDC has a broad range of actions that seek, through the integration of defense agendas, to set up South American identity. However, the foreign policies of member states must have, with each other, a high degree of commitment to their goals. 4 Brazilian foreign policy and the South American Defense Council The degree of perception of the relative position of the actors in the international system is given especially by their economic status, meaning what is its role in the production and circulation of wealth in the international system. Thus, the Brazilian diplomacy is currently facing a favorable environment in economic terms. GDP growth may indicate this position: Gross Domestic Product (U.S.$1.5 Trillions) EUA Japão China Alemanha França UK Itália Espanha Brasil Source: World Bank and International Monetary Found (World Economic outlook) Brazil went from a gross domestic product of less than one trillion dollars in 2005 to a GDP of 1.5 trillion dollars in This relative position allows Brazil to set new agendas, including security and defense. There is no doubt that, in this agenda, SDC represents an important factor to be analyzed. Thus, it is understood that Brazil has played dual action in SDC that is, while it playing important role in its driving, Brazil also represents a major impediment to the deployment of policy of greater integration, whether in the spheres of economy or defense and security. This paradoxical position can be understood if we analyze recent Brazilian foreign policy, particularly in two specific times, namely, the deposition of Honduran President Manuel Zelaya (2009) and in the case of Brazil's inclusion on the tentative agreement with Turkey on the Iranian nuclear issue (2010).

13 In the first case we have a position of the Brazilian Foreign Ministry clearly defined by the interests to guarantee that authoritarian political processes do not become usual again in Latin American environment. This attitude reflected the position of most the members of UNASUR which characterized the episode as a military coup. Brazil has practiced in this sense an exercise to expand the sphere of influence over Central America, and it worth considering that the mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH) already goes through Brazilian presence in the poorest country of American continent. There is realist bias in this position, because the Brazilian Foreign Ministry realized they could expand its regional political capital acting jointly with regional players in order to restore democratic order in Honduras. Thus, we may characterize this action as an exercise in soft power, saying then, that the Brazilian disposal was motivated by reasons of regional stability and at the same time expanding its sphere of influence which would result in maximizing Brazil s relative power in the region of Central America. Our second example is where the paradoxical character presents itself more clearly: Brazil s attempted to mediate an agreement jointly with Turkey in order to ensure expand the debate on Iran's nuclear program. In this action, the Brazilian Foreign Ministry was not backed by the set of political actions of the CDS or UNASUR, since this action went far beyond the sphere of projection of the institution. Brazil has acted in regional terms, with an almost unilateral view and this allows the understanding that Brazilian strategic planning is beyond the scope of the CDS. In the Iranian case Brazil clearly practiced a selective engagement indirectly waging battle for political space and dialogue with the central actors in the international system. The fact that this analysis is meant to point out is that Brazil has the characteristics that lead to realist because of its economic, political and geostrategic condition. And so this condition briefly described as paradoxical, can also be considered as a factor that may generate complexity for regional integration os South America, given the structural differences of the actors.

14 5 Final Considerations Throughout this study we tried to approach the debate on an issue that still seems to be cloudy, understood as the incompatibilities that can arise in the process of regional integration because of the displacement volume that Brazil leads the region and the way it has handled international issues. While the South American players need to integrate with Brazil and vice versa, there is a positive outlook in terms of agenda for the insertion and integration of the actors. However, given the different perceptions, capabilities and interests of these actors the integration process can be slowed by institutional inertia. Brazil "play the game" of international politics using some letters of realism, however, these letters may not get along well with the regional integration, since a realist policy has, at its heart, the clear need by the State to maximize its relative position, expand its sphere of influence, the balance of power principle and denial of the emergence of rival regional powers besides the potential need for the practice of power politics. Thus, this study attempted to present more questions than answers, since we outline in growth potential of Brazil, we find that it tends to separate itself from some regional south-american partners and this process of detachment can be accelerated by an excessively realist bias in this position, especially in what concerns power projection We do not understand Power not only military terms, but also economic, political etc. Power to the extent that its user can influence the decisions of other actors in order to impose its will.

15 Bibliographic References ART, R. The Strategy of Selective Engagementin - Art, R &Watz, K (ed) The Use of Force Military Power and International Politics. NewYork: Rowman&LittlefieldPublishers - INC CERVO L. A.; BUENO C. História da Política Exterior do Brasil. São Paulo. Ed. Ática VIGEVANI T;CEPALUNI G. A Política externa de Lula da Silva: a estratégia da autonomia pela diversificação. CONTEXTO INTERNACIONAL. Rio de Janeiro, vol. 29, no 2, julho/dezembro 2007, pp. ( ) GLASER, Charles L. Realists as Optimists: Cooperation as Self HelpInTheories of War and Peace, (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1999), pp. (94-134). FLEMES, D. O Brasil na iniciativa BRIC: soft balancingnuma ordem global em mudança?rev. Bras. Polít. Int. 53 (1), pp. ( ), HIRST M.; PINHEIRO L. A Política Externa do Brasil em dois tempos. Rev. Bras. Polít.Int. 38 (1). pp.(5-23) JERVIS, R.Cooperation Under The Security Dilemma.World Politics, Vol. 30, nº 2, (Janeiro, 1978), pp. ( ). LAYNE C.From Preponderance top offshore Balancein - Art, R &Watz, K (ed) The Use of Force Military Power and International Politics. NewYork: Rowman& Littlefield Publishers - INC NYE JOSEPH JR. Soft Power.Foreign Policy, Fall90, Issue , pp. ( ).. Public Diplomacy and Soft Power.The ANNALS of the American Academy of Political and Social Science.2008, pp. (94-109) Ministerio de Defensa Nacional de Chile. El Consejo de Defensa Suramericano de La Unasur: crônica de su gestación

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