EXTERNAL RELATIONS OF THE EU: LOOKING AT THE BRICS

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1 EXTERNAL RELATIONS OF THE EU: LOOKING AT THE BRICS 2018 Policy Brief n. 2 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY This policy brief focuses on the European Union (EU) external relations with a particular look at the BRICS. Considering the current complexity of the international system, where the multiplicity of actors and formats for relations is evident, this discussion seems fundamental to understand on the one hand, the world vision that the EU promotes in the context of its external relations, and on the other hand, the particular vision that the BRICS bring to the international order, following the logic of club diplomacy, as well as more individualized dynamics. Moreover, it is pertinent to think the formats for cooperation that have been developing between the EU and the BRICS, within the BRICS format, as well as to reflect on the limits of current relations, both at the bilateral and multilateral levels.

2 External Relations of the EU: Looking at the BRICS Key Elements in the Contemporary International System The current international system has been characterized by widening numbers and types of relevant dynamics and actors. To the more traditional dominant powers in the system, new emerging powers and developing countries have become more assertive in the affirmation of their interests, committed to changing their positioning and capacity of action in global governance mechanisms. In this diverse system, the local, national, regional and global levels coexist and become more and more interdependent and hard to autonomize. This becomes clear in the complex mosaic of geopolitical, geoeconomic and geostrategic interests that leads to fundamental imbalances in the international order. In this scenario, these distinct actors seek to establish different forums for cooperation and dialogue to manage dynamics of cooperation and competition, and to pursue their own political agendas. It is in this context that we might understand the emergence of the BRICS, initially referred to as BRIC from the acronym used by Jim O Neil, in the Goldman Sachs Report of 2001, as the group of economically emerging powers constituted by Brazil, Russia, India and China. It was only in 2011 that the acronym gained its current shape with the addition of South Africa. The BRICS are a group that should not be ignored in the current international context, due to their weight and economic dynamism, and to other power factors. Together they represent 42% of the world population and 1/5 of the global economy, are present in four out of the five continents in the planet, with projection of continued economic and demographic growth. However, economic growth in the BRICS has not been accompanied by political reforms or improvement in the human development index in the countries that are part of the group, limiting their capacity to become an alternative to the western liberal model. Sources: Data refers to World Bank, GDP (annual %), 2016, UNDP Human Development Index 2016, Página 1

3 Sources: Data refers to UNDP Human Development Index 2006, World Bank, GDP (annual %), 2006, ZA-CN&view=chart Despite the counter-hegemonic rhetoric and the criticism to western unilateralism, the BRICS are a by-product of neoliberal structures, benefitting from the existing institutional frameworks, but seeking to progress in the international hierarchy and win more global protection and more negotiation power in face of western powers. The affirmation of the BRICS as a new multilateral group has raised several questions regarding the need to redefine the international order, in a logic of inclusiveness and justice, around reinforced south-south cooperation. But several issues emerge in this context. For example, which alternative order would this be and in which way would it be defined? How to design a differentiated international system? How might disconnected discourses impact in the consolidation of relations at the bilateral and multilateral levels? And how do asymmetries within these groups reflect in potential lines of cooperation? The roundtable exercise at the basis of this policy brief, centered around these fundamental axis, identifying three lines of discussion and analysis. First, which international order is this, and which opportunities and challenges are associated to it, in particular in EU-BRICS relations? Second, in which way are multi-level dynamics, associated to bilateral and multilateral relations, reflected in discourses and practices? Finally, how can we think the future of EU-BRICS relations in a rapidly changing international system? EU-BRICS Relations: Opportunities and Challenges The relationship between the EU and the BRICS is marked by numerous challenges in different sectoral areas, as well as by different forms of thinking and acting in the world. If the EU has privileged an actuation based on shared values and principles and on a neoliberal posture, strongly anchored in politics of conditionality, the BRICS have followed a pragmatic approach free from economic and political conditionality in their various levels of relations. The latter might be more attractive for countries facing serious socioeconomic development problems and political fragility and which prefer benefits in the short-term, instead of investing in slow reforms whose results are only visible in the longer-run. However, the absence of conditionality might be negative in the medium and long-terms, minimizing immediate tension or conflict, but preventing an actuation at the level of the structural causes of those tensions and hampering the sustainable transformation of these conflicts. In this way, the absence of conditionality Página 2

4 might be seen as an obstacle not only to the political settlement of conflicts, but also to processes of political and democratic transition. Besides this issue, the BRICS preference for non-conditional external action renders fragile one of the pillars of European foreign policy, namely the promotion and safeguard of the values enshrined in its internal governance principles, such as democracy, rule of law, fundamental liberties, equality and social justice. However, it should be noted that the model the EU promotes is not free from criticism, namely the contradictions which are evidenced in the discourse and practices of promotion and conditioning of assistance to the respect of fundamental principles and liberties, incorporated in the EU politics directed at the poorest countries, but which are very limited in relations with the BRICS countries such as China and Russia. In these cases, commercial agreements have taken precedence over the EU s normative agenda evidencing the fragility of the articulation between strategic principles and interests of the European elites. The competing projects of the EU and the BRICS in this matter reveal the fragile basis for the consolidation of cooperation in topics of international security and politics. Another challenge when looking at EU-BRICS relations are the terms of dialogue. Which is the minimum common denominator that might allow dialogue to advance? The EU recognizes the strategic character of relations with each one of the BRICS countries, but does not perceive the BRICS as a collective group as a priority in its dialogues. This is one of the aspects that has been blocking progress in the recognition of the other as interlocutor. Misunderstandings regarding language add to this. The EU-Russia modernization partnership is illustrative in this regard. For the EU modernization is synonymous with reform, for Russia it means foreign investment to reinforce the current political and economic system. Despite apparently quite similar in discourse, the EU and the BRICS see the world differently, and the fact that there is a clear distinction if not even incompatibility in their discourses, practices, agendas and interests leads Brussels to privilege bilateral dealings to the detriment of multilateral cooperation with these countries. This is closely linked with the issue of political will. Clearly, there is no real willingness and commitment from the sides to invest in multilateral dialogue: the EU, because it considers the BRICS as a threat (mainly to its goal of becoming a global actor and diffuse its European principles and values around the globe); the BRICS, because they prefer to commit to south-south cooperation, where their margin for action and negotiation is stronger. In the last BRICS Summit that took place in Xiamen (China), it was clear that the group seeks the inclusion of other actors, and the invitation to delegations from Egypt, Guinea, Mexico, Thailand and Tajikistan exemplifies the alternative perspective they pursue in terms of strategic partnerships. However, this does not translate into a total absence of the EU in the overall project. It just means the EU prefers a strategy of developing bilateral relations where it has more capacity to introduce conditionality clauses that assure the respect for values it defines as central and that guide these countries to patterns of actuation and participation in the international scenario, which are more in line with the European vision of the world. Página 3

5 Multilevel Dynamics in a Changing International System: Bilateral and Multilateral Frameworks Among the five BRICS, the multilateral dynamic allowed the institutionalization of procedures such as annual Summits, and even a new institutional dynamic, visible for example in the establishment of the New Development Bank. However, despite these multilateral mechanisms reinforcing club diplomacy, they also evidence the existing asymmetries among the group members. The prevalence of China as the strongest actor, followed by Russia, and their capacity to define the agenda shows in a simple way the asymmetric multilateralism that characterizes relations within this format. The internal hierarchy in the BRICS, defined by the very particular differences within the group, is reflected in difficult bi- and multilateral relations. Brazil, India and South Africa feel their capacity for influence diminished in this framing of Chinese and Russian prevalence. Moreover, the China-Russia rivalry is widely discussed and felt, despite multiple alignments between these two actors, in particular regarding the western counter-hegemonic discourse and the primacy of the non-intervention principles in internal affairs and the respect for state sovereignty. Moreover, it should be noted that the understandings of these different actors about south-south cooperation, sovereignty or hegemony are not necessarily coincident, as mentioned. From this results not only disarticulation within the group, but also regarding possibilities for multilateral cooperation among the BRICS and other actors, such as the EU. This understanding points to the difficulties that have been felt in the development of a multilateral matrix in EU-BRICS relations. In the EU Global Strategy for Foreign and Security Policy, adopted in 2016, the word partnership is mentioned 35 times, reflecting an international multi-level governance system, since this wording refers to EU relations with other international organizations, with informal international frameworks, with states, and with public and private agencies. The acronym BRICS is not mentioned a single time, but all BRICS countries, to the exception of South Africa, are mentioned. Also, the fact that relations with the EU are not mentioned in any final declaration of the annual BRICS summits shows that the group is not really interested in building a Strategic Partnership with the EU, even if recognizing its central role in multilateralism. This is interesting as it shows how the multilateral dimension has been neglected in these relations to the favor of bilateral relations a duality that ends up becoming visible in the understanding that the EU has more to gain from developing bilateral relations with the BRICS countries. Political Recommendations: Think the Future of EU-BRICS Relations In face of the complex context where EU-BRICS relations develop, the roundtable discussion highlighted four main lines of political recommendations in order to frame and eventually deepen relations between the EU and the BRICS: Página 4

6 - Invest in cooperation in areas of primary interest for the BRICS and where the EU has know-how and experience (e.g. modernization of the agricultural sector or development of infrastructures), both through direct investment, and initiatives supporting local development; - Invest in ways for more constructive dialogue, building on joint and inclusive initiatives that go beyond the diplomatic path and that allow for the widening of dynamics of cooperation and development aid, to civil society and epistemic communities engagement with the goal of promoting points of convergence and mutual recognition between the EU and the BRICS; - Promote the institutionalization of relations among the BRICS and between these and the EU at the ministerial, parliamentary and societal levels. The goal is to confer more coherence and provide continuity to the strategy of these actors and to the dynamics of bi- and multilateral cooperation; - Include in the European agenda of bilateral relations with the BRICS the south-south dimension of cooperation in a proactive manner, recognizing the relevance of these dynamics and assuring bridges for dialogue and cooperation with the EU in this dimension. Maria Raquel Freire Daniela Nascimento Iuliia Krutikova Licínia Simão Olena Pozhoga Pedro Constantino Vanda Amaro Dias Faculty of Economics of the University of Coimbra Página 5