Acceso desigual al poder: Barreras de representación política para grupos indígenas en México.

Transcription

1 Acceso desigual al poder: Barreras de representación política para grupos indígenas en México. (Unequal Access to Power: Political Representation Obstacles for Indigenous Groups in Mexico) Rodrigo Elizarrarás A. New School for Social Research Paper prepared for delivery at the 2009 Congress of the Latin American Studies Association, Rio de Janeiro, Brazil June 11-14, 2009.

2 Introduction. In the last decade we have witnessed wars, civil movements and guerrilla struggles seeking for some sort of cultural or ethnic recognition. At the same time, the multicultural debate has raised different claims and proposal to a philosophical discussion, where many contemporary political theorists debate the nature of the identity (or identities) of human beings and their recognition by formal political, social and economic institutions. In the last two decades, most of the world s new conflicts are more concerned with religion, race, culture or any other ethnic difference rather than with traditional class or political struggles. In this sense, from Canada to Bolivia and from Mexico to India, all types of indigenous and ethnic groups are fighting for the recognition of their true identities by national states. In this context, Mexico is one of Latin America s countries with the largest indigenous population that lacks political representation. There are approximately more than 6 million indigenous, spread along the national territory; without the possibility to obtain access to power. Since the colonial period, racism, liberalism, mestizaje, communism, modernity and some other forms of assimilation discourses, practiced by the national elites, have diminished the presence of the indigenous peoples in the political institutions. Beyond the recognition of ethnic plurality and indigenous rights, one common answer has been the political representation of the ethnic minorities in the Legislative Power, to try to solve a long history of exclusions. The creation of reserved seats for the indigenous populations has been applied, just to mention some, in New Zealand, India and Colombia. Furthermore, a similar arrangement has been made in Nicaragua s Atlantic Autonomous Region, where an autonomous region was built providing seats in the National Assembly to the indigenous groups inhabiting this region. A second possibility, like in India, Bolivia and other Andes countries, is the existence and conformation of ethnic parties contesting in the elections for the votes of their minorities. The presence of these ethnic parties has brought a certain amount of representatives from the ethnic minorities to the National Assemblies with relative success. Nevertheless, the measures mentioned above have not taken place in the Mexican political institutions. The question about the political representation for the indigenous minorities in this country is still out of the discussion of the main political actors. While some countries efforts contribute to the inclusion of their minorities in the institutions capable of political decisions, Mexico s state has done a minimal effort to include the indigenous minorities in the legal and political institutions. In 1992, the constitution was amended to modify the 4 th Article to recognize the plurality of the Mexican society; yet, the correspondent Law that should give effective and instrumental use to this article remains pendent. In this sense, the indigenous guerrilla in Chiapas demanded (in the San Andres Agreements) to the Mexican Government the consolidation of an Indigenous Law, as well as some other proposals concerning collective rights, one of which provides political representation to the indigenous groups in the Congress. In 2001, the government s naive effort to come up with an indigenous law 2

3 became a huge failure for the involving parts: indigenous and government. The political elites showed, once again, that the indigenous representation would continue to be suspended for indefinite time. This paper focuses on the political lack of representation for indigenous populations in Mexico. Its main purpose is to explore: Why is there an absolute lack of indigenous representation in the Mexican political institutions? Why haven t there been reserved seats or indigenous parties to compete in the national elections? I will try to answer them by comparing a number of interesting cases Colombia, Nicaragua, India and Bolivia that faced the same problem, but somehow managed to solve them successfully. My conclusions point towards the idea that the mestizo post-revolutionary discourse has contribute largely to neutralizing ethnic identities; plus the liberalism tradition promoted by the elites and state institutions, had diminished every effort to build up a real recognition of the plurality of Mexican society. In this connection, I consider some other structural factors that are crucial for these measures to be successful: the size and proportion of these groups, and the diversity and dispersion of the indigenous population. These characteristics become strong difficulties for the collective action; it is also important to consider the electoral institutions and laws, the party system, entry-barriers for new parties, magnitude of the electoral districts, pluralism formulas and some other mechanical instruments that seem to facilitate or difficult the representation of minorities in the Legislative Power. In the first part, I make a brief introduction of the indigenous situation in Mexico; secondly, I discuss the reserved seats measure, taking as examples the case of Colombia and Nicaragua. Third, I discuss the relevance of the indigenous parties, in the case of India and Bolivia; and in the last section, I conclude with a brief explanation of the ideological discourses that shape the Mexican political institutions and had drain the formation of indigenous parties and their political representation. 1. Mapping the indigenous reality in Mexico. According to the Mexican National Survey Institution (INEGI, 2000) there are little more than 6 million indigenous citizens in Mexico. 1 This number represents less than the 8% of the total population in the country, which is close to 100 million. In terms of absolute numbers, Mexico has one of the largest indigenous populations in the whole Continent. In fact, Mexico, Guatemala, Ecuador, Bolivia and Peru gather almost 90% of the total amount of indigenous in the Americas. However, the relative numbers vary a lot according to each case: while indigenous in Bolivia represent 71.2%, in Guatemala 60.3%, Peru 38.6%, and in Ecuador 38.6%, in Mexico this is only 12.4%. 2 Besides the low proportion in Mexico, the indigenous population doubles Guatemala s. In the case of Colombia, where there is political representation for the indigenous populations, this population is a tiny minority (nearly 600,000, representing 1.5% of the population) concentrated principally in two provinces of the country, while 3

4 present in two other provinces but in very low proportion. Could the size of the population be a relevant factor to obtain political representation? Is it easier to gain political representation when the population is a tiny minority? Does the achievement of political representation become harder as the size of the indigenous population increases? Like all other Latin American countries, affected by the multicultural wave in the early 1990 s, Mexico s constitution recognized in 1991 the plurality of its society and the intrinsic value of the indigenous populations. All Latin American states finally recognized the abandoned indigenous populations that were a historical forgotten category (Clavero; 1994: 47-52). Most of these states did it just in a formal and ornamental fashion. In a certain way, they were responding to International Treaties like the Convenio 169 of ILO, or to some type of internal pressure, like guerrillas or separatist groups. (Díaz Polanco; 1999: 83-88). The Mexican Constitution states in his Article 4 th that: The Mexican Nation has a pluricultural composition originally supported on its indigenous peoples the Law protects and will promote the development of their languages, cultures, uses, customs, resources, and specific ways of social organization. It will further guarantee effective access to the State s Jurisdiction to their members. During agricultural trials and procedures here indigenous parties are a party, their legal practices and customs shall be considered in the terms provided for by the law. Nevertheless, the Mexican state has faced two difficult conditions for the application of indigenous policies: an elevated plurality and a high dispersion. The plurality of Mexican ethnic groups is enormous; there are hundreds of ethnic groups with their corresponding languages and dialects. To give an example, just in the State of Oaxaca there are 16 different ethnic groups, each one with their own language. In Chiapas the number is around 12, and in some northern states, there are one or two groups, like Tarahumaras in Chihuahua or Yaquis in Sonora. The second thorny factor is that these groups are highly dispersed around the territory; there are a numerous arrays of indigenous groups and ethnicities in almost all states of the federation. In this sense, this makes the Mexican case closer to India, than to Colombia or Nicaragua. As a result, these conditions imply a collective action problem that arises from such a diverse and disperse population, and that makes almost impossible to organize in one single movement or to form a political party. In this sense, the category of indigenous is a colonial term that generalize a whole set of different ethnic groups; to embrace all these groups under this single label was somewhat erroneous. Before colonial times, the ethnic groups were strongly divided and lived in constant struggle with each other (interethnic conflicts, some of them still present today). Actually, each group constructed their own ethnic identity towards the presence of the others. In this way, as it is commonly understood, Spanish language and Catholicism provide the cement to these divided and conflicting societies. 4

5 In the post-revolutionary period, in terms of the ideological party preferences, all the indigenous were aligned to the official party, the PRI, for decades. They were included as peasants, and were treated like one of the sectors of the party, as equals to workers, army and industry. In the Lázaro Cárdenas presidential period ( ) they formally began to be part of the corporative hegemonic state-party apparatus (Medin, 1974). Though, in the 1970 s, some of these groups started to join the multiple left-wing parties (Partido Comunista, Partido Socialista Mexicano, etc), or to form part of some rural guerrillas, basically in the states of Guerrero, Hidalgo, Oaxaca, Michoacán, Puebla, Veracruz and Chiapas. The usual state reaction, as an authoritarian regime was either to co-opt the leaders, most of the times, or to practice massive killings to deal with stubborn leaders or fierce movements (Trejo, 2004; Ochoa, 2002). At present, most of the indigenous populations have joined mainly two of the three principal parties in Mexico: the Partido Revolucionario Institucional (PRI) and Partido de la Revolución Democrática (PRD). Most of them continue to be affiliated to the State-party, but the dissident movements and opposition groups joined the PRD. This last party gathered all the distinct left-wing parties (PC, PSUM, PSM) in the late 80 s, and became a center-left political coalition that nowadays occupies the third place in the Congress. These two parties have a strong presence in rural areas, especially the PRI, due to an aggressive and longstanding clientelistic relationship with the peasants. On the other hand, the PRD has some presence in other more educated, middle class urban sectors (mostly all Mexico City is under PRD governments since 1997). There are almost no indigenous members that join the PAN, the middle urban class right hand party. Yet, there was an exception in the last presidential elections in 2000, where many votes for Fox came also from rural areas that suddenly broke their typical electoral behavior pattern. After this election, the normal PRI preference was present again in the 2003 mid-term elections. All the previous characteristics were stated just to demonstrate that the indigenous population is a diverse and complex group, difficult to gather in a simple way. For these reasons, what is usually called the indigenous movement (indigenismo) is a diversified and disarticulated movement, without one single leader and with many different interests and goals. So, it is impossible to talk about one single indigenous thought or movement, because there is not such thing. Some of their members are in favor of the government or political parties intervention; while others prefer to keep a distance from these political institutions. Some of them want political representation in the cameras, while others prefer to gain political and territorial autonomy. Nevertheless, there is a group of coincidences present in all groups that could allow them to work together. But, until now, these common interests have not been enough to form an indigenous party. Why is there not an indigenous party in Mexico? What have been the obstacles for the formation of an indigenous party? Will it found a political viability if it only represents less than the 10% of the total population? At least, it could compete for 50 seats in the Congress, enough seats to become an important minority in nowadays congress composition, and also be an important veto player in the cameras. All this situation is worsen by a couple of ideological factors: liberalism and mestizaje. Political and legal institutions in Mexico have traditionally been shaped in a 5

6 radical liberal ideology. Since the Constitution of 1857, the liberal tendency of the political institutions has been the preferred ideology to give cohesion and congruence to the political context; it was the most suitable ideology for criollos to build up a national state practically out of nothing. Actually, liberalism had been present in Mexico since the beginning of the XIX Century, and the presence of a neutral and individualistic legal and political ideology had inevitably shaped the political realm. Though, the legal space for the recognition of collective rights had been a difficult and almost impossible fight (Clavero, 1994). In second place, there is the strong mestizo discourse that permeates all sectors of Mexican society. The mestizo category, build up after the Mexican Revolution, was the state identity label to give cohesion (again) and unity to a highly diverse and conflictive society. After the fierce faction struggles in the Revolution, the post-revolutionary period was characterized by the construction of unity and cohesion under two things, an inclusive political group (the PNR, the previous version of the PRI) and a powerful nationalist discourse, which in a certain way, praised the uniqueness of the Mexican race, the mestizos, the cosmic race, as José Vasconcelos proclaimed it in These two ideological discourses liberalism and mestizaje have been the principal barriers for the recognition of the indigenous category; and yet have diminished any attempt to gain representation in the name of the indigenous populations. First, it would be seen as an anti-national intention; secondly, because it would result on a threat to the unity of the state, or to the individual rights, both sacred institutions under a liberal conception of the state. However, due to the relevance of these factors in the destiny of the indigenous populations, I will return to explain this concern in the last section. 2. The Reserved Seats : Symbolic or Ornamental Representation? In the case of political representation, there are two typical answers to allocate minority groups in the legislative institutions: 1) to grant quotas of representation according to some criteria; 2) to grant reserved seats to members of a determined community. In fact, which measure is implemented depends on the nature of the group; as Mala Htun points out, women tend to receive more often candidate quotas in political parties, while ethnicities are granted reserved seats in legislatures. Quotas, which make space within existing parties, suit groups whose boundaries crosscut partisan divisions. Reservation, which create incentives for the formation of group-specific parties and permit them direct legislative representation, suit groups whose boundaries coincide with political cleavages. (Htun, 2004: 439). In this respect, there is also a less popular solution because of its technical difficulties and potential manipulations. In some countries like the US the solution has been the coincidence of ethnic lines with district borders to facilitate a descriptive representation (Davidson & Grofman, 1994). However the mechanism the state applies, it results important to explain, under what conditions this kind of arrangements facilitates the ethnic representation in the Congress? How can we explain cases as contradictory as Colombia and Mexico, where we find a tiny indigenous minority with access to representation, and a 6

7 huge minority without this possibility? What institutional, political and ideological factors fortify or weaken the political representation of ethnic minorities? And, under what circumstances political elites open the political institutions to certain minorities historically excluded from power? In the early 90 s, Colombia as many other countries in the region included several indigenous rights in their new Constitution. In comparative with other Latin American countries, the Colombian case was the only one that gave reserved seats in the Senate to the indigenous population. Actually, these measures were made in the middle of a national political crisis that was solved with the call for Constitutional Assembly. Thus, these measures were part of a set of new political and electoral reforms, intended to change the political dynamic and legitimacy of the regime; as Marco Palacios argues: Siguiendo las oleadas de una opinión pública agobiada por la violencia y la corrupción, los Constituyentes decidieron formular preceptos constitucionales para que líderes honestos y competentenes pudieran gobernar el estado, asegurar la paz, liquidar la impunidad y ensanchar los ambitos de la democracia. (Palacios, 1995: 333) A profound political crisis in Colombia coincides with the moment where all Latin American countries were including the recognition of their own indigenous populations in the Constitutions. The Colombian elites were looking forward to have a new legal framework in order to solve some of their historic political conflicts, and at the same time they were trying to legitimate an excluding regimen. Con la nueva carta se fraguaba, o así lo pretendieron los protagonistas, una nueva dirigencia política dispuesta a mandar por los próximos cuarenta años (Palacios, 1995: 336). The historical differences between the liberal and conservative party in Colombia, have lead to a polarized society. Also, many groups without political representation used their force outside the formal political institutions ; thus, violence and clientelism were the two major problems of the Colombian society. In this respect, the electoral reform was intended to diminish the clientelar practices and corruption from the big parties, to modify the nature of the political system, by building a national district for the Senate that contributes to the formulation of nationwide policies, and to promote the inclusion and participation of excluded sectors of the society, especially ethnic and indigenous minorities. Nevertheless, some authors argue that after a couple of elections the effects intended to spread the votes and gain national policies hadn t the expected success (Crisp & Ingall, 2002; Botero, 1999). In terms of the indigenous identities, Palacios points out that in many regions, peasants started to name themselves as indigenous to seek the attention of the State s policies and from the public opinion and press to their demands and needs (Palacios, 1995: 338). In this context, many politicians were against the indigenous representation, but elites were trying to build up an including and progressive constitution, and so some politicians against these measures were afraid to reject them for being accused of conservatives (Htun, 2005: 7). In this respect, Ana María Bejarano provides another important clue: For the first time, the traditional parties were not able to monopolize the decisions concerning the future of Colombian politics. The historic bipartisan coalition did not operate in this Assembly. 7

8 For the first time, also, leftist movements and some social minorities usually excluded from the national debate had access to a decision-making entity of vital importance. (Bergquist, 2001: 58-59). These measures were forcing a more pluralistic presence in the cameras, in order to diminish the permanent conflict between the radical poles of Colombian society: guerrillas and paramilitares. This effort was intended to open the political space to those groups historically left out from the legal institutions. In this sense, the inclusion of indigenous population could also have been an attempt to diminish their probability of joining to the guerrilla, but assuring at the same time the stability of the majority parties in the Congress. Actually, it seems that some indigenous candidates are winning more votes than in the regular districts, but they can t win more seats. Also it is being tougher to win in the virtual district, and some leaders are willing to change the electoral rules in order to gain more representation (Htun, 2005: 18-20). Similarly, Htun shows that the black populations don t have the same privileged situation as the indigenous in Colombia. Blacks, with a considerable major population (around 20% of the population) are even or worst represented than indigenous, who only represent 1.5% of the total population. The indigenous and black differences are attributable in part to the dispersion and size of the population. The wide dispersion of the black population makes more difficult to give them more seats, thus it would be a problem with other type of populations. While indigenous are overrepresented in the Congress; blacks continue to be underrepresented. As Daniel Posner (2002) points out, the relative size of a minority brings absolutely different outcomes for the salience of cultural identity in different national arenas. In his case study of Zambia and Malawi, the same minorities have complete different relation towards the majority group and the state, according to the relative size of these minorities. He implies that a bigger minority becomes a major threat to the ruling majority, while a tiny minority is harmless, and it will become easier to grant them with political rights. If this is the case, we have in the same national state a radical distinct treatment for two different disadvantaged minorities. What is the reason for having such variable solutions for two different groups? Apart from the higher dispersion, a worse organization and group cohesion than the indigenous, what it seems salient is that blacks are a larger group but they face more problems to achieve a larger representation in the political institutions. Also, internal divisions and difficulties to draw the line between blacks and non-blacks could also be diminishing their political representation. At the end, one of the major contributions of these reforms was The mere recognition of Indians and blacks as subjects of not just individual but also collective rights contradicts decades of liberal ideology and official efforts to build a homogeneous national citizenry. (Htun, 2005: 2). It was a significant step that many other countries like Mexico don t even think of doing. Apart from Venezuela and Nicaragua, no other countries in the Americas have granted researved seats to their ethnic minorities. 8

9 In Nicaragua, in the mid 80 s, the Sandinista government planned a complete reform for the Atlantic Coast Region. The government was facing a political restructuring and the construction of a new constitution, yet they decided to recognize the ethnic and cultural difference of the populations inhabiting the Atlantic Coast Region of Nicaragua. The total population of Nicaragua is around 4 millions; the Pacific Region is more dense populated than the Atlantic, where the ethnic population is calculated to be from 150,000 to 250,000 4, and is formed with an extreme pluriethnic population with many different historical and cultural backgrounds. Since the colonial period, the actual Nicaraguan territory has been divided in two main coastal regions with different historic and cultural backgrounds. In the Atlantic territory the presence of Miskitos, Sumos and Ramas and other ethnic communities as creoles and black cribs, interacted with the mestizo population, and also receives constant immigrants from the west. This region was never under a real sovereignity of the Spanish crown due to the occupation by the British in certain periods of time. In this respect, the main mestizo culture of Nicaragua inhabited the Pacific Region, leaving some ethnic groups alone in this more isolated region, where different cultures, historical traditions, customs, language, religion, social organization and economic conditions were formed. These minorities were under a severe repression until 1979, when they recovered their ethnic identity and openly presented their demands during the first years of the revolutionary government. The formula that the Sandinista government applied to this recognition was the regional autonomy with political representation in the local and national Assemblies. The formal establishment of regional autonomy initiated in 1984, but it was until 1987 when the regional autonomy became a legal and political reality. In this process, several institutions, research centers, organizations and the active participation of the indigenous populations were vital elements for the constitution of the autonomous region. 5 The establishment of the National Commission for Autonomy (Comisión Nacional de Autonomía) was fundamental to begin the first draft that included the basic elements of the regime of regional autonomy, the historical rights of the people and communities, national unity, and the principles of the Sandinista Revolution. The Autonomy Statute established two autonomous regions, that have participation in the elaboration of the region s national development projects, managing health, education, culture and other regional programs. They were granted the following political organs: a regional council, a regional coordinator, municipal and communal authorities and other authorities corresponding to the administrative subdivision of the municipalities (Díaz Polanco, 1997: ). The regional council is formed with 45 members including representatives of all the ethnic groups, elected by universal vote for a four year term; the region s deputies of the National Assembly have to be members of the regional council. This council is the maximum authority concerning this region that elects a board of directors, where every ethnic community must be represented and whose functions are to coordinate the council 9

10 itself; so the regional coordinator, elected by the council is the executive representative of the region and the maximum authority. After the design and implementation of this reform, the first electoral process for these new institutions was a huge challenge. In the national arena the FSLN (Frente Sandinista de Liberación Nacional) was defeated by a 14 parties coalition (UNO): 41% of the votes were for the FSLN and 52% for the UNO; this was a highly competitive and polarized electoral process. In the Atlantic Region, the council was constituted by 48 members: 23 from the YATAMA (Unidad de los hijos de la tierra), group formed with the former fighters against the revolution, and 22 from the FSLN. In the south, 47 members, 26 from UNO plus one deputy, and 18 from FSLN plus one deputy and one YATAMA member. The electoral results were highly tight, but the Sandinistas loss the majority. In 1994, were the second elections after the reform. Some of the huge problems of the region are the isolation, underdevelopment, impoverishing of the region and the growing of drug traffic by the South American cartels. The government of Violeta Chamorro had taken some administrative and political measures to diminish the real autonomy of this region. In fact, nowadays the executive has refused to follow the Regional Agreements, the regional councils have diminished their power, and some other central authorities have taken this roll (González & Roitman, 1996). As well, there are problems with the delimitation and limits of the regional government and the central administration; with the amount of resources destined to the region. In consequence, the relevance of the autonomy have decreased. There have been abuses from the central government to this region, in natural resources and concessions to foreign economic interests. To some extent, instability and political conflicts in this region have provoked the majority of the population to diminish their support to the autonomic regions. As it can be seen in the cases of Colombia and Nicaragua, the facility for the construction of political arrangements for the indigenous representation depended strongly in the concentration and size of the groups, but also in the political context: when these demands coincide with a significant political crisis we can expect that the political elites open the doors of the political representation to certain minorities. In the case of Mexico none of these three factors are present. For these reasons, it would be difficult to give political representation to indigenous unless they are strictly confined to determined regions, yet the situation of most indigenous is similar to the black population in Colombia, where many indigenous are now living in urban areas and the least of them are concentrated in well determined regions. The reserved seats could be granted to determined minorities but in the local Assemblies; it would be easier in the north of the country, in Sonora or Chihuahua, where these groups live in almost well defined regions. Although, there is the potential danger that these regions could be politically kidnapped by drug-cartel leaders. Lastly, the creation of the indigenous district in Colombia raises the question about the accountability of these indigenous representatives. If they are elected in a nationwide district, where any citizen can vote for them, they no longer represent the communities that supposedly represent, but the median voter. Any citizen can choose to vote for them, 10

11 though they supposedly represent the indigenous communities to whom they don t have any political responsibility. In this sense, they could easily become virtual or ornamental representatives, without a political attachment to their constituency. However, these representatives are gaining their seats with larger number of votes from other non-indigenous voters; while their natural voters could still be voting for the traditional parties engaged or not in an old clientelistic relationship. They are winning more votes than some other senators, but indigenous representatives are constrained to only two seats. Thus, these represent violations to the republican principle of one man, one vote, which is pursued by building districts looking for equal number of voters. However, these results are being in debate and as Htun (2005) brings out, some indigenous leaders are willing to do something about the virtual district. Besides these critiques, indigenous in Colombia can use their customs, and can talk in their native tongue in front of the National Assembly; while in other regions of the continent thousands of indigenous are hiding their faces behind pasamontañas in the jungles and mountains, without a close possibility to obtain political representation in the legislative branch. 3. Indigenous parties in comparison: India, Bolivia and Mexico. One of the most common solutions, under a liberal democratic regime, for the representation of a specific group is to constitute a political party and compete in the elections for representation in the Legislative Power; however, the formation of ethnic parties have always been seen as a threat to the unity of the state and nation. In the last decades, ethnic parties are gaining political spaces all over the world: the Vasques and Catalans in Spain, Quebequois in Canada, indigenous parties in Bolivia, Ecuador and Peru, ethnic and caste parties in India, are examples of parties competing for public spaces in favor of specific minorities almost in every country. The Latin American most relevant case of indigenous parties success is certainly Bolivia, where the indigenous population rate is around 62%. In this connection, as Donna Lee Van Cott (2003) demonstrates the formation of indigenous parties has been so successful in the recent year that now it has become one of the main political forces in the National Assembly, with 27% of the votes in , and the IPSP-MAS party holds the second majority in both houses of congress and one third of the seats in the 157-member body are occupied by indigenous representatives with strong ties to indigenous and peasant organizations. In fact, Van Cott explains this suddenly increase due to five structural and contextual factors: some institutional decentralization reforms, the maturity and consolidation of the indigenous movement, the political crisis of the actual Banzer-Quiroga government, the political party system realignment, and some national sentiment against interventionist US policies. Thus, the combination of political structural factors, as institutional reforms that allow the participation of these groups, and the realignment of the political parties propelled 11

12 these indigenous groups to become a better option against bad governments. These groups also used a well-articulated national discourse and became an option against corrupt governments. The indigenous movement in Bolivia has taken good advantage of the recent political crisis; it has known how to become a reliable option for the voters. Nonetheless, the Bolivian political institutions are highly uncertain and volatile. In the last weeks we have witness again the resurgence of a national political crisis; and the social actors are looking forward to turn down the actual government. Bolivia is an unstable and not so institutionalized democracy, where we find high volatility in the electoral preferences as well as a changeable party system. 7 Van Cott agrees that Bolivia s political party system lack(s) of a formal political party structure and their reliance, instead, on social movements for organizational, ideological and human resources. (Van Cott, 2003: 754). In fact, parties depend strongly in certain important figures, that if they died or disappear the political party system changes dramatically. In this context, these is an important reason to wait until we can see if the indigenous movement succeeds to maintain the same level of political representation in the future. In all Latin American cases, Colombia, Bolivia and even Nicaragua, the increase of indigenous political representation has been an output of a political national crisis. A legitimate crisis leads to 1) the opening of the legislative institutions to some previously excluded groups or 2) to the switch in the electoral behavior in favor of alternative options (indigenous parties and movements). As I have mentioned before, this particular context has been completely absent in Mexico. The several political crisis and the following electoral reforms have favor the opposition parties and the indigenous minorities have been kept a side of this benefits. Furthermore, after the Zapatista upheaval in Chiapas, the political elites have been reluctant to open the political institutions or recognize collective rights for these minorities. On the other hand, India is one of the most representative cases for the formation and success of ethnic parties that could be an interesting comparable case with Mexico. The case of India is extremely interesting and puzzling in the study of ethnic politics, since it has a uniquely complex society, divided in ethnicities, castes, classes, religions and languages, all set in an enormous territory, and with regional differences that become difficult to agree in a simple explanation. As Paul Brass defines: India is a multiethnic society in which there are a large number of ethnic groups which vary in size from highly localized caste and tribal groups to great language and religious groups, in which no single group is clearly dominant, and in which the boundaries between groups are not entirely fixed (Brass, 1974: 14). While some groups are well organized, some others are not; while some groups are concentrated in a well defined region, others are spread all along the territory; while some have been granted with reserved seats, others have aligned in ethnic parties. Due to the complexity of this case, I will focus only in the different possible causes of the success of the ethnic parties in India from a general perspective. As in Mexico with the PRI, the Congress Party in India worked as a grand coalition party in the Parliament (Lijphart, 1996: ); while these parties ruled without competition, they functioned as centrally oriented all embracing political agencies. After 12

13 the decline of the Congress Party, a number of ethnic local and national parties have become more prominent in the India s political context. In contrast, the democratization of the Mexican regime brought new parties to the Congress, none of them representing any ethnic group. 8 Why hasn t the indigenous cleavage been reflected in the Mexican party system? And why, in the contrary, we found a proliferation of ethnic parties in India? From my point of view, the main factors that must be considered to respond these questions are: 1) the decentralized federalism in India, 2) the Westminster Parliamentary system, and 3) the caste category versus the class identity. On the other hand, some common characteristics are present in both cases: 1) a strong clientelistic relation between poor groups and the parties or government, 2) a highly dispersion of the minority groups and multi-divided society, 3) a patronizing government. 1) The decentralized federalism in India has granted language, cultural and other regional policies to the states to maintain the unity and cohesion of the national state. Giving more power to the states and directing preferential policies to certain regions and determined groups, solved the tension between the regions and the national government. 9 In contrast, the centralized federalism in Mexico has maintained a strict control of all federal and state policies, from education to taxes, with the state party (PRI) as its principal political instrument. Authors like Arend Lijphart (2002) argue that India, besides his deeply divided society and wide territory, is one succeeding case of the consociational model. Lijphart argues that power-sharing is present in many important moments, when it is more consociational than other times, and that this model had effectively diminished the ethnic conflicts in this country. However, Wilkinson believes that the periods where Lijphart argues to be more consociational are the worst periods in India s history, with more violent confrontations than other periods. He provides enough evidence to prove that violence has been increasing, and that we should focus more in the local conflicts. Wilkinson points out that Preferential policies in India encourage a violent backlash from members of groups excluded from ethnic quotas, violent resistance from those whose share is likely to be cut, and violence from those backward segments within favored groups who argue that they constitute a separate ethnic group that deserves its own benefits. (Wilkinson, 2002: 771). In other words, preferential policies, far from moderating conflict, encourage it. Wilkinson article provides new data from local and state sources to demonstrate that the raise in ethnic parties and policies have increased conflict and violence in the Indian political arena. This is the principal reason for the Mexican authorities to deny any kind of preferential policies or loosing control over federal policies. The unity of the national state is strongly held from the federal government by a highly centralized federalism. Instead, the Mexican political elites found that the common factor to all the indigenous groups was their economic practice. Most indigenous people have one thing in common: they are peasants. Thus, the government used the peasant identity to include them as part of the state and the economic life. There were never preferential policies in favor of some ethnic group afraid that this could raise interethnic conflicts; in the contrary, policies were directed to the peasants, a common category to all these groups. 13

14 2) The Westminster-Parliamentary system brings out a complete different Congress composition than a Presidential system. In a Parliament it is easier to accommodate a wide range of groups and maintain the stability of the government, while presidential systems tend to diminish the pluralism and to promote a single party majority in the Congress. 10 It also depends on the electoral formulas and district magnitude and the whole set of electoral rules, but from a general perspective, Parliaments tend to form multiparty coalitions in government, while presidential systems do not. In this connection, in the Indian Parliamentary system it is easier to accommodate all sorts of minority groups through ethnic or regional parties, while in the Presidential system in Mexico, even with the PR seats, the number of parties represented in the Congress is considerably lower. Since the 1970 s, there have been several electoral reforms to accommodate the opposition parties in Mexico (pluralistic rules to favor the minority parties), but none of these reforms included the indigenous groups. And it is until the 1990 s that the parties included a quota law for women (Mala & Jones, 2002). 3) The caste category gives a particularity to the Indian case that no other county has. The saliency and relevance of this characteristic is central in all spheres of Indian society, and determines a grand quantity of Indian policies. Some caste groups coincide with class categories, but this is not a perfect match. We can find different socio-economic levels within castes, and viceversa. The caste system was abolished and banned in Mexico since the struggles for independence in the late XVIII century. The abolition of slavery was declared in the Apatzingan Constitution in 1816, and the caste system was therefore prohibited. In the XX Century, after the Mexican revolution and with the socialist ideas, the class identity became the most notably identity factor to differentiate all groups in Mexican political arena, and the party system is divided along the socio-economic cleavage. While the caste is a fix category, given by born, or by religious beliefs, the class category is a flexible category, that could somewhat be modified. If someone is a member of a lower caste, he will remain member of the caste all his life; the only possibility of economic improve is bias a state policy. By contrast, if someone born in a lower class, he has the possibility of improve his economic condition, and not all depends in the state policies to develop their social condition. Concluding, in the case of Mexico, the most favorable solution would be to find regional solutions as in India. There should be some local and national measures to allocate the different indigenous populations. For example, in Chihuahua we find over 150 thousand indigenous concentrated in a definite territory, that could be easily granted a couple of seats in the local congress, and would be not only a symbolic but a descriptive representation of those groups. In the case of Oaxaca or Chiapas where there are dozens of groups, the solution must be different, in order to give voice to all the groups and to represent their higher percentages (32% and 20% respectively). 14

15 Actually, the only local electoral reform with a relative success in Mexico was made in the state of Oaxaca, where the local government amended the state constitution and electoral code to incorporate indigenous practices as a part of the legal electoral rules. Since 1995, the municipal elections in Oaxaca are organized in two different groups: 1) the political parties municipios, or 2) the usos y costumbres municipios, where the parties are prohibited to participate and each municipality chooses their authorities depending in their customs and tradition. This was an efficient solution to give answer for indigenous demands, diminish the electoral conflicts in some regions, and undermine the advance of the opposition parties in the state and the influence of the Zapatistas (Elizarrarás, 2002); but at the same time, has brought a lot of new problems that were unseen in the 90`s. Until now, Mexico is the only case where a local government acted in favor of the indigenous groups, in order to give some recognition to their traditional governments and electoral rules. Nevertheless, there is still pendent some political representation of the indigenous in the local Congress, but the PRI strongly rejects the application of this measures. One of the major problems to achieve a representation of the ethnic minorities in Mexico, is the difference between the ethnic and political lines. The state, district and municipal lines do not coincide with the ethnic boundaries, and thus, this complicates the representation of those groups, and the application of preferential policies to certain territories (Barabas, 1998). In other sense, in Mexico, it seems that the barriers to form a political party are extremely high, and that the willingness to give reserved seats is not a possibility yet. It is true that the indigenous groups are distributed among all the political parties, mainly two of them: PRI and PRD. So in this case, like in some crosscutting groups as the case of women, a possible solution is to include indigenous (not peasant or proletariat members, or lower class representatives) in their parties by a quota system according to an average national population. In this sense, all parties must guarantee a certain amount of candidacies and seats in the congress for indigenous, as they do for women. This could make sense in the case as Mexico, where the indigenous are a crosscutting cleavage in the Mexican party system. Unless they could organize a national or many local indigenous parties, they could represent those populations and groups as indigenous with the introduction of a quota system. Nevertheless, somehow nowadays it seems to work like that, both PRI and PRD have indigenous members in their files, active members representatives of those groups, but they set a side their indigenous identity, and come closer to the party interests and ideology. So in some way, they loose their indigenous identity in order to come closer to the mestizo or the party ideology, where in must cases, this ideology is highly permeated with a liberal and national discourses that neutralizes their ethnic values. 4. Conclusions: Neutralizing the indigenous identity. As I mention earlier, liberalism and mestizaje discourses have been two strong forces that neutralize the indigenous identity, and therefore the possibility of gaining any kind of 15

16 collective rights in favor of the indigenous populations. In this section, I am going to explain how these two discourses are so rooted in the Mexican political institutions that they became fundamental principles of the contemporary state. As almost all States in the world, the Mexican State is build up in many myths. In the early years of the independent Mexico, the criollos had the need to make a distinction from the colonial regimen under the Spanish crown. Those who builded up the first attempts to have an independent state faced two contradictions: they wanted a divorce from the colonial institutions and legacy, but they had no attachment with the pre-hispanic institutions, traditions and values. The criollos were bastards of both cultures; they denied their parents and were willing to build up a new State based in two antagonisms: Spanish and indigenous. As Simón Bolivar said Nosotros no somos europeos ni tampoco indios, sino una especie intermedia entre los aborígenes y los españoles. Americanos de nacimiento, europeos de derecho, así nuestro caso es el más extraordinario y el más complicado. (Ramos, 1951: 33). To build up this new state, the criollos needed to disappear two worlds: the Spanish and the Indigenous; none of them was easy to erase. 11 Some authors will argue that the most suitable ideology, and a fashionable one, was the French republicanism and liberalism, as well as the American federal and liberal ideas that were covering the entire continent like a refreshing wave (Clavero, 1994). Thus, in the lack of any other source, the majority of criollos adopted the liberal ideas and institutions; they used the neutrality of the state and law to cover all the differences and divisions in these postcolonial states. To do so, the world of the indigenous had to be sacrificed. Carlos María Bustamante, a congressmen in those years, defending the indigenous status declared in the Congress: Paréceme que oigo el retintín de que ya no hay indios; de que todos somos mexicanos... Valiente ilusión a fe mía para remediar males efectivos y graves. Ya no hay indios, pero sí hay las mismas necesidades que aquejaron a los indios. Qué bobería alimentarse con ilusiones y por medio de ellas querer engañar a los pueblos. (Chavez, 1943: 37). To continue the status of República de indios for the indigenous populations signified to remain the colonial legacy. If they were a new nation, a nation of Mexicans, no Mexican could have an excluding regime or be governed under a different legal order. Thus, all must be treated as equals under the same legal and political system. In the second half of the XIX Century, the liberal governments of Benito Juarez and Lerdo de Tejada set the Reform Laws and started the liberalization of the Mexican economy. Some of this laws were intended to dismantle the economic power of the Catholic Church, however, the Church was the principal benefactor of the indigenous populations. These laws were a severe punch to the basis of the indigenous economic and political local power. These governments also dismantled the indigenous only source of resources: their lands. These liberal governments wanted to set the land to a free market, and indigenous were forced to sell their lands. Indigenous survived, and as a defensive reaction they isolated themselves and tried to keep their local autonomy (Velasquez, 2000). After all the Reform laws, indigenous were in a complete disadvantage, all this laws hit the basis of the indigenous institutions and their strong ties with the church. In Conclusion, after the first hundred years of governments in an independent state, liberalism has been the ideology that 1) erased the indigenous category as an existing world in a new state formed 16