Éva Ványi Corvinus University of Budapest

Transcription

1 Éva Ványi Corvinus University of Budapest Political Sack or Personal Loyalty? The background of the highly politicized senior civil servant in Hungary (Draft, please do not quote) Paper prepared for the panel Greasy Poles towards Queasy Roles? The Politics of Selection at the Top of Ministerial Bureaucracies IPSA World Congress Montreal, July, 2014 Abstratct The politicization of senior civil servants is an old topic in political and administrative science because the connection between politicians and bureaucracy impacts the political decision making. In theory, based on Max Weber bureaucrats should be neutral but in practice the top level of bureaucracy is high politicized. The goal of this paper is to examine a Hungarian case. What is the background of a politicized senior civil servant and what is caused it in the Hungarian political system? Is there an institutional reason or special human resource policy behind it? Is this phenomenon part of party patronage or more important to the people's loyalty towards the government and the minister? Based on examining of career path administrative and deputy state secretaries between 1990 and 2014 the Hungarian case can interpret politicization as political loyalty. Keywords: Hungary, politicization, senior civil servants, administrative state secretary, deputy state secretary, political loyalty.

2 I. Introduction The politicization of senior civil servants is an old topic in political and administrative science (Dogan 1975, Peters 2009, Aberbach et al 1981, Hojnacki 1996) because the connection between politicians and bureaucracy impacts the political decision making. In theory, based on Max Weber (1992 [1922]), bureaucrats should be neutral : they are not elected by citizens, they have their own special, professional carrier path, they work in a well-organised, hierarchical civil service system, and their most important task is to execute decisions of politicians. From Weberian perspective bureaucrats are independent and professional. But in practice top civil servants connect close to policy making. In modern democratic states most of the decisions go out from governments but the role of preparation of the rules is not only for politicians, MPs and ministers, but also for the members of top bureaucracy. They have expertise of different policy areas and professional skills to make ready laws and regulations. Through this work the civil servants became part of the political decision making. Of course it does not mean that bureaucrats would be per definitionem policy-makers, but it is very hard to draw the border between policy and administrative sphere from this point of view. Regarding literature and case studies (Dahlström 2009, Nahtigal-Haček 2013, Zubek 2005, 2006, Gwiazda 2008, Szente 1999, Raciborski 2007) you can see that politicization of bureaucracy appeares also in Western and East Central Europe as well. After the regime changes in Central European countries there was an idea that in the new formulated states politicians and executives must be separated clearly from each other. There is a historical reason behind it: the organisation of decision making in the communist states, where all decision making process were dominated by state party (Meyer-Sahling, 2008, Ványi 2013a). All the important regulations were made in the party organisations and governments were literally the only executives. However a few years later democratic regime consolidation could have been observed a high degree of politicization of civil service system. The goal of this paper is to examine a Hungarian case. What is the background of a politicized senior civil servant and what is caused it in the Hungarian political system? Is there an institutional reason or special human resource policy behind it? Is this phenomenon part of party patronage or more important to the people's loyalty towards the government and the minister? My hypothesis is that in the Hungarian case the most important reason of politicization is an expected political loyalty. To ask questions I investigated the administrative secretaries and deputy state secretaries in ministries between 1990 and My results are based on an empirical database which concludes data about top ministerial executive bodies. The paper is organized as follows. In section II the concept of politicization as analytical framework and methodology are presented. Section III introduce the 2

3 Hungarian political and institutional framework and section IV deals with case study presented empirical results. Finally section V. is presents conclusions. II. The analytical and methodological framework The concept and models of politicization In scholarly literature cannot be found one widely accepted definition of politicization. Literature refers this phenomenon but explains it different ways. However it is a common sense in these interpretations: politicization is a pressure from politicians to senior civil servants; politicization is a threat on the neutrally status of civil servants and their professional values; politicization is when a civil servant participates in political decision making; politicians want to be influence civil servants work; members of top bureaucracy are appointed by politicians; members of top bureaucracy come from politics (MPs or elected local government positions). (Aberbach et al 1981, Hojnacki 1996, Nahtigal-Haček 2013) Based on the presented representation of politicization bureaucrats and politicians represent two areas with far different values. On one hand politicians want to be reelected and have an impact on decision-making, to carry their political program in execution. As it is impossible for all politicians to have all the professional skills and expertise that is needed to formulate political decision making, they need professionals who have them. On other hand civil servants job is the implementation of decisions so they must be neutral. Regarding the nature of democratic systems, politicians can be de-elected but operation of state could not be finished because of it. Bureaucrats have the responsibility to guarantee continuity. Civil servants independence is a very old and substantive value and it is important not only when government change but also in different government cycles. The members of senior civil services must not boycott political decisions because their faith or conviction is not range with actually parties of government. However on the other hand politicians main goal is to be re-elected and they want to work with loyal individuals. They have trust in people with similar values. You could assume that politically loyal civil servants agree with political conceptions, and understand the political goals better. But these two dissimilar worlds of values, aspects and tasks in policy process cause the differences between politicians and bureaucrats. 3

4 In academic literature some models concerning the ways of politicization of senior civil servants can be observed. At the beginning of the research of this phenomenon Aberbach, Putnam and Rockman (Aberbach et al 1981: 4-24) wrote about four types of politicization investigating the interaction between the actors in the political decision making process. The theory s fundamental is that bureaucrats and politicians are policymakers; they are main actors in the political decision making but their aims are different. Authors reflect different connections between them in their models. The first (Policy vs. Administration) based on Weberian perspective, assume that jobs could be absolutely separated: politicians make politics, and executives implement it. Authors have already noted in 1980 s that the model is ideal-typical and is not operated in practice. The second model (Facts vs. Interests) refers to rationality of actors. Both groups have different motivations: the politicians are motivated by political rationality and bureaucrats by administrative rationality. Politicians are interested in values and interest, and officials role in decision making is to represents neutrality and expertise. In the third model (Energy vs. Equilibrium) politicians and bureaucrats are both concerned with politics but not with the same role. Politicians are ideological, passionate, partisan and idealistic, and seek publicity while civil servants are practical, pragmatic and professional. Simplified, politicians are innovators and bureaucrats are managers. The fourth is a hybrid model (The Pure Hybrid) in which politicians and officials both have administrative and political skills. In practice the mentioned two rationalities appear together in ministerial work, especially for top civil servants. This model is the bureaucratization of politics and the politicization of bureaucracy (Aberbach et al 1981: 19). Jan-Hinrik Meyer-Sahling (2008) wrote about other politicization model types especially for post-communist senior civil services. He also highlights that depoliticization of public administration was a particularly important question after regime changes in Central Europe because of the control of the communist party in the one party political system. Meyer-Sahling develops four ideal modes for comparative analysis of civil service politicization in Western and East Central Europe. The first model based also on Weberian perspective, is a de facto non politicization in which new government do not replace members of top civil service and vacancies in top positions are filled from officials based only on criteria of professional competence. The bounded politicization respects new government s replacement of civil servants but vacancies are filled based on official carrier paths from lower-ranking officials. The third model is the opened politicization. New government assumes replacement of top officials and fill vacancies not from ministerial or other bureaucratic positions 4

5 but from outside the core structure, eg. the private sector, academic sphere, nongovernmental organizations or interest groups. Finally the fourth model is a partisan politicization in which new government replaces senior officials and fills vacancies with partisans, whose carrier path connect to parties (MPs, party organizations members). (Meyer-Sahling 2008: 3-9) Nowadays Nahtigal and Haček (2013: 110) examined what type of models are presented in Slovenia. They have tested three forms of politicization regarding their functional, role and personal nature. 1. Politicization as political participation of civil servants. 2. Politicization as control over appointments and careers. 3. Politicization as civil servants participation in political decision-making. After the regime change Hungarian scientists have reflected on the problem of politicization and authors wrote about a paradox situation that the theoretical framework based on laws and practice are not compatible. Lőrincz (1997, 2000 a-b) as administrative scientist mentioned that really independent civil service system has never created bureaucracy opposite laws in Hungary. The case studies confirm this fact. The high level of top bureaucrats change when government changes in Hungary (Szente, 1999, Ványi 2013 b). György Müller, who was a Deputy State Secretary from 1990 to 2006 argue that the political loyalty is an important consideration for appointing of civil servant. Politicans and bureaucrats are influential actors of policy making and to make a good program politicians need loyal executives (Müller 2010). In this paper I want to examine how the Hungarian case based quoted definitions and models can be classified. Methodology This paper is a case study designed to investigate the nature of politicization of the Hungarian civil servants in long term after the regime change at the end of 2 nd Orbán government. The database includes all government s administrative state secretaries and deputy state secretaries from 1990 to June 2006 and from 2010 to June Between 2006 and 2010 based on the law which regulated secretaries legal status there weren t any administrative state secretaries in ministries and deputy state secretaries had other legal status in ministries than earlier. The precise of the legal environment will be introduced in the following section. Data were collected from civil servants biographies that were published in Hungarian Government Almanacs (Kajdi et al 1994, Kiss et al 1998, Kovács n.d, Ughy 2006) and on the Internet. Database includes state secretaries gender 5

6 age position (administrativ or deputy secretary) ministry number of days in position profession before ministerial appointment profession after ministerial appointment party membership nomenclature position before regime change. Total number of data is 553, 100 administrative state secretaries and 453 deputy state secretaries. There are 36 people who were both administrative and deputy state secretaries in different governments. Based on the Hungarian Constitution and Fundamental Law government is formed by appointment ministers and is governing until the new election or until the end of the prime minister s mandate. The scholarly literature understands government cycles in a different way. New government is formed after the new election, changes the prime minister or change a party composition of government (Müller-Strom 2000, Woldendorp et al. 2000). In this sense there were ten governments in the examined period in Hungary. III. The Hungarian political and institutional framework Political framework The renewal of the Hungarian Constitution (Law XX/1949) after regime change and later The Fundamental Law (The Fundamental Law of Hungary, 2011) declares the Prime Minister s very powerful role in the political system. The mandates of government and positions of ministers depend on the Prime Minister. The constructive no confidence vote stabilizes Prime Ministers because they can only be removed by parliament if parliament agrees on an alternative prime ministerial candidate; also, individual ministers cannot be made accountable by parliament, it is the Prime Minister who holds responsibility for government. The mandate of government ends when the Prime Minister leaves his office. Ministers are appointed by the Head of State but suggested by the Prime Minister. The Prime Minister can propose removal of ministers to the Head of State. Other aspect of the political framework is the bipolarization of the political system. In the Hungarian case, a clear turn towards majoritarianism can be observed. While after systemic change consensus building and consensual institutions had a high profile this has changed soon. The main reason lies in the bipolarization of the party 6

7 and the political scene. The effective number of parties decreased from 6,71 to 2,82 from 1990 to 2010, and between 1998 and 2010 two large parties faced each other in the electoral and parliamentary arena, in % of the vote was cast for these two parties. Moreover, even block politics has evolved. There has not been any flexibility in coalition formation: either left or right governments have been formed even if in policy terms an alternative solution could have been imagined. (Ilonszki-Ványi, 2011) Still, amongst the conditions of party system bipolarization and majoritarian turn even the concept of leader democracy has been formulated (Körösényi 2005) meaning that Prime Minister- party leaders dominate formal and informal politics as well. The framework of chancellor democracy has been formed and when the Prime Minister s Office developed into a real ministry in 1998 this elevated role of the PM was confirmed. The impact on presidentialisation (Körösényi 2001) of politics and leader democracy has changed the style of governance. Ferenc Gyurcsány in 2006 and Viktor Orbán in 2010 have declared political governance meaning that the policy of government is defined by Prime Minister. The law which regulated the status of government members and state secretaries (Law LVII/2006 and Law XLIII/2010) states that The Prime Minister defines the general direction of policy within the framework of the government's program., and minister lead ministry within the framework of government s general policy. 1 Institutional framework 1. Laws The appointment and de-selection of members of government and state secretaries are regulated laws in Hungary. Based on status laws politicians play role in appointing executive state secretaries. Parties had goal after systemic change to separate political and expert decisionmaking and competencies on the government level. These original goals have been influenced by political reality and the legal-constitutional and the political have not developed in harmony. The first law (Law XXXIII/1990) was accepted in Political and executive secretaries tasks and rights were clearly separated in law. Administrative state secretary and deputy state secretary were delegated as executive leaders of ministries. Administrative secretary guided bureaucracy of the Ministry under the direction of the Minister, the legal and professional requirements. The exact task of deputy state secretary has not been stated in this law. The appointment of executive secretaries was regulated different way: administrative state secretary was appointed by the Head of State based on the nomination of the Prime Minister which happens before the Prime Minister gets the portfolio minister s 1 Translated by author 7

8 opinion. Deputy state secretary was appointed by minister suggested by administrative state secretary. Duration of the two positions was indefinite. In 1997 a general regulation was put in place concerning both the members of government (cabinet ministers) and state secretaries (Law LXXIX/1997). The Prime Minister, the ministers and the political state secretaries were regarded as political, while the administrative state secretary and the deputy secretaries as administrative leaders. The ways of the appointment of executive secretaries were the same as in the first 1990 law. The second law regulated the conditions of nomination and removal of executives in detail. Only those ones could be appointed in these positions who graduated and had a special administrative exam. To guarantee the neutral civil service executives, no one of them could be the member of leader group of parties or interest groups or representative body of local governments. Based on law the party and interest group membership is not illegal for secretaries. The law provided possibility of more public service career for executives if they were removed from their positions with offering a new administrative top position or paying some monthly severance. This rule would have guaranteed continuity of secretaries in their positions after government changed. With regards to the above laws meant a change of attitude the newest status law for members of government and secretaries (Law LVII/2006). The new rationale of the law was that government s work is fundamentally political. The ministers became both the political and administrative leaders in their ministry and became responsible for both areas. The administrative state secretary position was terminated and was nominated to special state secretaries. Based on law they had the same rights and tasks as former deputy secretaries and they could be appointed by the same educational conditions. However it was two important changes regarding special state secretaries positions in law. They term in office was adapted to government's term i.e. the special state secretaries were nominated for defined time until the government cycle. Connected to political government attitude of Ferenc Gyurcsány the special state secretaries were appointed by the Prime Minister. Having this authority the the Prime Minister had influence over all levels of government: ministers and political secretaries were personally recommend to the Head of State by the Prime Minister and special secretaries shall be appointed by him based on the suggestion of the portfolio minister. The Law XLIII/2010 old-new ways regulated the legal status of members of the government. On one hand the law distinguished again political and administrative levels of ministerial leaders (see in law 1997). But on the other hand it incorporated the changed system of appointing from the 2006 status law. Administrative secretary and deputy secretaries were nominated again in all ministries for indefinite time with special education conditions. (Ványi 2011) 8

9 2. Session of Administrative State Secretaries In the Hungarian governmental decision making a special body of administrative state secretaries plays important role. The Session of Administrative State Secretaries (SASS) was the highest level of administrative conciliation about governmental decisions before cabinet meeting until 2006 and is the same from 2010 again. All of the administrative secretaries are the members of SASS and it is led by administrative state secretary of the Prime Minister s Office until 2006 and from 2014 again. Between 2010 and 2014 it was led by administrative secretary of Ministry of Public Administration and Justice because the scope of bureaucratic authority was delegated to this ministry. The task of this body control proposals that ministers suggested to discuss in cabinet meetings. If proposals were not prepared properly based on laws and former negotiations in ministries they would not be presented in cabinet meeting. In this gate-role administrative secretaries are between politics and neutral civil service because they have to weight up based on also political interest not only on clear bureaucratic consideration (Pesti 2000). 9

10 IV. Empirical findings Between 1990 and individuals were appointed as administrative and deputy state secretaries. This number does not include special state secretaries between 2006 and 2010 based on status law 2006 in which this group as a part of political appointment connected to theory of political government was declared. Number of cabinet Table 1 Hungarian cabinets and number of state secretaries Term Prime Minister Number of Ministries Number of Admin. Secretaries N=100 Number of Deputy. Secretaries N= / /1993 Antall, József / /1994 Boross, Péter / /1998 Horn, Gyula / /2002 Orbán, Viktor / /2004 Medgyessy, Péter / /2006 Gyurcsány, Ferenc / /2008 Gyurcsány, Ferenc not relevant not relevant 12 data data 8. 05/ /2009 Gyurcsány, Ferenc not relevant not relevant 13 data data 9. 04/ /2010 Bajnai, Gordon not relevant not relevant 13 data data / /2014 Orbán, Viktor Table 1 shows the number of ministries and state secretaries in all relevant governments. The numbers on the table are not aggregated regarding individuals who have filled state secretary positions in each cabinet. As I mentioned above 100 people were appointed as administrative state secretaries and 453 people were nominated as deputy state secretaries and there are 36 people who were both administrative and deputy state secretary in different governments. However these positions were filled by large number of returnees who were counted in each cabinets. The following findings refer to the number of secretaries in each cabinet in the paper. After the regime change the first government did not change the system of government fundamentally. In the last one-party cabinet there were 13 ministries and The National Plan Office which was responsible to implement the Five Years Plans which were also mentioned as ministry in law (Law 1987/VII). From 1990 to 2010 the government consisted of ministry with its own portfolio regarding the economic and social structure of the country. There was the Prime Ministers s Office in all cabinets 10

11 but until 1998 it was not a ministry and it was led by the administrative state secretary during the Antall, the Boross and the Horn cabinets. It can be seen from the number of administrative state secretaries of the Boross cabinet because the composition of the government did not change at all. In Boross cabinet served 14 administrative secretaries:13 people in ministries and 1 person in the Prime Minister s Office. A similar tends shows in the number of administrative secretaries in the Medgyessy and in the first Gyurcsány cabinet. After the resignation of Prime Minister Péter Medgyessy the competition of the following cabinet changed only a bit on all levels of government. This showed in the number of forming deputy state secretaries in mentioned governments after the new government took office. The 2 nd Orbán cabinet represents an interesting picture because there are fewest ministries but the even more deputy state secretaries. In the 2 nd Orbán government there were 5 integrated ministries from 8 that included more portfolios within one ministry. The state of the Prime Minister s Office was changed in this cabinet, it was led by political secretary. Compared to the previous governments this was a new solution. The low number of administratives and high number of deputy state secretaries indicates a changed centralized government system and opposite the fragmentation of tasks in ministries. Table 1 shows that the number of deputy state secretaries is significantly higher than administrative state secretaries. It linked the tasks of different secretaries. Administrative secretary leads bureaucracy office of ministry and deputy secretaries have special portfolio for whom they are responsible for. In each ministry one person was nominated as administrative state secretary and 3-5 people were appointed as deputy secretary until In the 2 nd Orbán government 3-13 people were nominated as deputy state secretaries. To be able to ask my question and make my hypothesis whether the Hungarian case of bureaucracy politicization connects to partisan politicization and party patronage or either to political loyalty, I tested three attributes of Hungarian state secretaries. 1. Do they have experiences in ministerial bureaucracy before the appointment? 2. In which sector have they worked directly before the appointment? 3. Did they finish their top bureaucracy career after the government changed or returned when their bloc of parties formed government again? 1. Former ministerial experience Executives former ministerial experience based on former career data. I examined whether secretaries had ministerial job before their appointment. Ministerial job before appointment means that secretaries have worked in any ministry before the government cycle. 11

12 Table 2 includes data regarding this question. It have to remark that data from the 2 nd Orbán government are deficient because I cannot collect all secretaries biography until now, that is why I can only publish findings about 80 individuals in this paper. former ministerial experience person (%) Table 2 Former ministerial experience Cabinets Administrative state secretaries Antall Boross Horn Orbán Medgyessy 1 st Gyurcsány YES nd Orbán NO 11 (40,7 %) 7 (50 %) 2 (10 %) 13 (41,9 %) 4 (16,6 %) 6 (27,7 %) Total Deputy state secretaries 5 (38,5 %) former ministerial YES experience person (%) NO (51,1 %) (46,3 %) (21,56 %) 53 (42 %) (28,9 %) (15,2 %) 38 (47,5)* non data Total *: Percent is counted from 80 persons Self elaboration Table 2 represents that the first two cabinets are different from others. The reason is that the first Prime Minister, József Antall declared that the members of former nomenclature could not be members of the new government. Of course it could not implemented systematicly in all levels of bureaucracy. The expertise and bureaucratic professional skills were accepted on secretaries level. However it can be seen from the table between 1990 and 1994 the number of former ministerial officials was the lowest among administrative and state secretaries, too. Since 1998 the majority of executive secretaries had former ministerial experiences. However data indicates from 1998 that the degree of politicization increased in the 1 st Orbán cabinet. In this government the number of appointment secretaries out of ministerial sector was the highest. It is connected to the changing political environment, presidentialization and bipolarisation and indicates tendency of open politicization but in this cabinet majority of secretaries had former ministerial experience. Based on available data the same trend can be observed during the 2 nd Orbán government. To summarize: majority of executive secretaries were ministerial officials, most of them worked as head of department or as deputy head of department. 12

13 2. Profession before ministerial appointment The second aspects that will be investigate executives profession directly before nominating. Which sector do secretaries come from? What is the most important recruiting pool of them? Table 3 shows data in detail. Table 3 Recruiting pool of executive secretaries position recruiting pool 2 Antall Boross Horn 1 st Orbán Medgyessy 1 st Gyurcsány 2 nd Orbán Cabinets Administrative politics 1 2 state secretary public office (74 %) (71 %) (60 %) (55 %) (66 %) (95 %) (46%) economy science, education, culture justice soldier interest group health 2 other Total Deputy state secretary politics public office 59 (65 %) 38 (70 %) 78 (76 %) 79 (62 %) 56 (57 %) 83 (90 %) 55 (68 %)* economy science, education, culture justice soldier, police health interest group media other 2 1 non data Total *: Percent is counted from 80 persons Self elaboration The table indicates that the most of the executives worked in public offices directly before nominating. This fact confirms the tendency that was mentioned in the previous section. Administrative and deputy state secretaries connect clearly to public administration sphere and the number of outsiders significantly lower than officials. 2 Politics: MP, minister, political state secretary, mayor, vice-mayor, party officials, Public office: bureaucrats in ministries and in local government, civil servants; Economy: employers in economy; Interest group: leaders and employers in interest groups; Science-culture-education: employers all type of education and culture institution, scientists; Justice: lawyers; Defence bodies: soldiers, policemen; Other: pensioner, NGO employers. 13

14 Remarkable data is the increasing number of outsiders from economy. They were appointed mainly in economy ministries and this human resources policy indicates also the strengthening of the Prime Minister since the 1 st Orbán government. The most remarkable fact from the table is that secretaries come from politics in some cases. This phenomenon goes really against the principle of neutral bureaucracy. In Antall cabinet there was one case and in the 1 st Orbán government there were two cases among administrative secretaries 3. Among deputy secretaries in Antall, Boross, 1 st Orbán and Medgyessy governments we can find also some cases 4. Appearance of politicization at the level of deputy state secretaries shows mostly that the principal of neutral bureaucracy does not function in practice. The number of people who was delegated from politics to executives is low, nevertheless demonstrates displacement from the Weberian model the possibility to model of partisan politicization. Other aspects of the connection between political and administrative sphere is the mobility of secretaries. Between 1990 and 2010 there were some examples when executives were appointed in political position first and politicians in administrative position. political state secretary administrative state secretary (person) administrative state secretary minister (person) administrative state secretary political state secretary (person) deputy state secretary minister (person) Table 4 Mobility between government positions same cabinet (person) 2 cabinet (person) 3 cabinet (person) 5 cabinet (person) 6 cabinet (person) Total (person) Total Self elaboration Table 4 represents that most typical mobilization way was when former administrative secretary was nominated in another government as minister. 3 One of them was MP until 1998 and other secretary was political state secretary. 4 All deputy states secretaries were MP earlier. 14

15 3. Returnees Based on status laws in which are regulated executive secretaries appointment indefinite time and based on principles that was declared after the regime change executives had a chance to be in office when government change. However based on statistical data we can find the majority of secretaries was deselected from time to time. Between 1990 and 2014 stayed in her or his office only 149 person (33 %) from 453 deputy state secretaries. They served more than one cabinet from 1990 to Average percent of returnees among deputies was around 30 % in each government, too. In Boross and 1 st Gyurcsány cabinets served deputy state secretaries higher proportion, because in these cabinets were nominated new secretaries because of the government was changed during parliamentary cycle. The new Prime Minister hold the majority of executives in office. It is the fact that the majority of executives were changed since 1994 at the beginning of Horn cabinet. Among the administrative secretaries of Boross cabinet continued work just three individuals. Total number of administrative secretaries who served more cabinets is 35 person (35%) i.e. the rate is almost the same as among deputy secretaries. However this fact does not mean that executives would serve just one government. Career path data show that executives come back to the ministerial position if their political block won in election since the end of 1990s (Meyer-Sahling 2008). The analysis administrative state secretaries post-career path demonstrates that (Ványi 2013b). This tendency can be observed among deputies, too. V. Conclusion In the paper I want to ask a question what is the background of the highly politicized civil servant in Hungary. My hypothesis is that politicians want to work together with people who understands political program and can identify with revealed goals. I argued that plays very important role the political loyalty in the selection of executive state secretaries. After the regime change political parties wanted to broke a party control over bureaucracy. This will appeared in status laws in which were separated politicians and bureaucrats from each other on top level civil servant in ministries. The long term investigating demonstrates that development of Hungarian political system have an impact on composition of senior civil servants. The majoritarian turn, presidentialization and bipolarization caused that politics blocked, either left or right governments have been formed and each party blocks built their own administrative 15

16 clientele. It is very important from point of view of political decision making because in Hungarian system administrative state secretaries play important role in preparation of government decisions. States secretaries depend on politicians another aspect because they are appointment by politicians follows from status laws. Based on examined contexts Hungarian executive state secretaries are not outsiders and not partisans. More of them have former ministerial experiences and after deselection return to senior civil servant when their party-block is in government position. Based Meyer-Sahling models the case of Hungary cannot rank clear to partisan or open politicization because they recruitment pool not limited to only politics or only private sector. Regarding examined models Hungarian politicization is a special case: politicization as political loyalty. References Aberbach, Joel D. Robert D. Putnam Bert A. Rockman (1981) Bureaucrats and Politicians in Western Democracries. Cambridge, Mass Harvard University Press. Dahlström, Carl (2009): Political appointments in 18 Democracies, QoG Working Paper Series 2009:18. June Dogan, Mattei (1975): The Political Power of the Mandarins. in Dogan, M. (ed.), The Mandarins of Western Europe: The Political Role of Top Civil Servants. New York: John Wiley & Sons, Gajduschek, György (2005): Szakértelem és/vagy politika. A magyar közszolgálat empirikus és jogi elemzése. Politikatudományi Szemle 14: (2) Goetz, K.H. and Wollmann, H. (2001): Governmentalizing Central Executives in Postcom- munist Europe: A Four-Country Comparison. Journal of European Public Policy, vol. 8, no. 6, Gwiazda, Anna (2008) Party Patronage in Poland. The Democrtaic Left Alliance and Law and Justice Compared. East European Politics and Societies, Vol. 22. No. 4. November, Hojnacki, P.W. (1996): Civil Service Systems in Comparative Perspective, Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, Ilonszki, Gabriella Ványi, Éva (2011): Miniszteri fluktuáció és intézményi változások Magyarországon Politikatudományi Szemle, Kajdi, József, Dr.-Marinovic, Endre, Dr. Müller, György Dr. szerk. (1994): Az Antallés Boross-kormány tisztségviselői almanachja május június. Miniszterelnöki Hivatal, Budapest. 16

17 Kiss, Elemér, Dr.-Tóth, András Müller, György, Dr. - Lóránt Zoltán, Dr. szerk. (1998) A Horn-kormány tisztségviselői almanachja július június. Magyar Hivatalos Közlönykiadó, Budapest. Kovács, Mónika, Dr. [én]: Az első Orbán-kormány tisztségviselői almanachja. Nyomdai példány. Magyar Közlöny Lap és Könyvkiadó. Budapest. Körösényi, András (2001): Parlamentáris vagy ''elnöki'' kormányzás? Az Orbánkormány összehasonlító perspektívából. Századvég, Új folyam, Körösényi, András (2005) Political Representation and Leader Democracy. Government and Opposition (40):3, Lőrincz, Lajos (1997) A független és semleges közszolgálat lehetősége Magyarországon: eredmények, hiányosságok, perspektívák. Társadalomkutatás, Lőrincz, Lajos (2000a) Kiválasztás a közigazgatásban. Magyar Közigazgatás, Lőrincz, Lajos (2000b) Kiválasztás a közigazgatásban II.. Magyar Közigazgatás, Meyer-Sahling, Jan-Hinrik (2008) The changing colours of the post-communist state: The politicisation of the senior civil service in Hungary. European Journal of Political Research. Vol. 47. No.1, January Müller, György (2011) Magyar kormányzati viszonyok. Dialóg Campus Kiadó, Budapest-Pécs. Müller, Wolfgang C. Strom, Kaare (2000): Coalition Governance in Western Europe. in: Müller, Wolfgang C. Strom, Kaare (eds) (2000): Coalition Governments in Western Europe. Oxford University Press, Oxford, Nahtigal, Lea- Haček, Miro (2013): Politicization of Senior Civil Servants in Slovenia. Transylvanian Review of Administrative Sciences, No. 39 E/2013, Pesti, Sándor (2000): A kormányzati döntéshozatal mechanizmusai Magyarországon. Peters, Guy B. (2009): The Politics of Bureaucracy. An Introduction to Comparetive Public Administration. Routledge. London. Raciborski, Jacek (2007) Forming Government Elites in a New Democracy: The case of Poland. Communist and Post-Communist Studies, Szente, Zoltán (1999): Közigazgatás és politika metszéspontján: a miniszterek és az államtitkárok rekrutációja Magyarországon Századvég Ughy, Tivadar szerk. (2006) A Medgyessy-kormány és a Gyurcsány-kormány tisztségviselői almanachja. Magyar Hivatalos Közlönykiadó, Budapest. Ványi, Éva (2011): A kormánytagok és államtitkárok változó jogállása, Jog és politika határán. In Pro Publico Bono Támop Speciál, 2011/ Ványi, Éva (2013 a): Elitcsere és kései elitreprodukció. Kormányzati szereplők Politikatudományi Szemle,

18 Ványi, Éva (2013 b) A magyar kormányzati elit 1990 és 2010 között. A kormányzati karrierút vizsgálata. Doktori disszertáció. Weber, Max (1992 [1922]: Gazdaság és társadalom. Közgazdasági és Jogi Könyvkiadó, Budapest. Woldendorp, Jaap - Keman, Hans - Budge, Ian (2000): Party Government in 48 Democracies ( ): Composition, Duration, Personnel. Kluwer Academic Publishers, Dordrecht, Boston, London. Zubek, Radoslaw (2005) Breaking with Post-Communism in Poland: Institutional Hurdles and Political Catalysts. DEMSTAR Research Report, University of Aarhus/Denmark. Zubek, Radoslaw. (2006) Poland: A Core Ascendant? in: Dimitrov, V, K. Goetz, and H. Wollmann (eds), Governing After Communism. Boulder: Rowman and Littlefield. 18