Gabriella Ilonszki Éva Ványi Corvinus University of Budapest Expert ministers in Hungary in the Context of Political Government

Transcription

1 Gabriella Ilonszki Éva Ványi Corvinus University of Budapest Expert ministers in Hungary in the Context of Political Government (draft, please do not quote) Paper prepared for the panel Experts and Non-Partisan Ministers in European Democracies Convenors: Prof. Pedro Tavares de Almeida and Dr. Antonio Costa Pinto within the Session on Political Elites IPSA World Congress Madrid, 9-13 July,

2 I. Introduction. The Research question. We think that under a highly politicised setting - like the Hungarian case it is an interesting phenomenon that expert ministers do exist, and they exist in relatively high proportion. Do expert ministers fit the context of political government or do they fit only temporarily? This seemingly simple question raises three problems one and the same time. Clarification of political government, differentiation between expert and political ministers, and exploration of the connection between political government and ministerial traits should be pursued. While academic literature is very rich in these fields, its approaches and conclusions are not necessarily in harmony. The interaction between the representative and administrative faces of government is well defined in the examples of democratic countries (Cotta, 2000: 88-92). Within the framework of democratic systems the different role and importance of representation versus administration on the government level is acknowledged and also tied to differences to ministerial traits, like their career background or intra-cabinet position moves (Blondel and Thiebault, 1991). More particularly, as country examples, at the two extremes the UK and the Netherlands are mentioned: the former has more concerns about channeling party representational patterns to the government level while the latter in a multi-party framework takes government as administering affairs and as a consequence their ministerial types are different. Admitting simplification, this implies more political ministers in the former and more administrator ministers in the latter case, which often collides with more expertise oriented ministerial careers in the Netherlands. Assuming and accepting that governments have indeed two faces and that these faces do relate to the actors involved what if the two are not in harmony, what can be the source of discrepancy? More particularly, what can be the background of the nomination of a relatively high proportion of expert ministers among the conditions of political government? 2

3 We have to acknowledge that it is difficult to define ministerial expertise. Entirely amateur ministers are hard to imagine - although in our case, particularly in the very first governments (between 1990 and 1994) amateurs were not exceptional. Systemic change has brought about conditions when members of the new political elite did not have any former public experience. Nevertheless, ministers capacity requires and includes political skills as well as professional expertise, or as it is sometimes called technical and political expertise (Andeweg and Bakema, 1994; Bakema and Secker, 1998) thus the separation of types in this respect is not easy. Even minisiters who are nominated to the post as a result of their former political career and positions have acquired not only political skills but often policy skills before, learnt a policy field in their party, in a parliamentary committee or in local politics. Admitting the combined nature of the ministerial condition we shall make an attempt to define political professionals and experts as the two ideal types. In academic literature an increasing attention can be observed concerning the position and functions of expert ministers. What are the most often heard reasons behind? A/ Experts can be better used in crisis resolution. They are not under similar pressures than a regular party politician would be (Aslund, 2012). The public would not blame a particular party for austerity measures, for example. Thus in a way, experts in this context appear as avoiding accountability and responsibility. B/ Another approach claims that expert ministers can better fulfil the demand of personalization (Verzichelli, 2010), which is a widely observed phenomenon of current politics (Poguntke and Webb, 2005; Garzia, 2011). Expert selection will be more distanced from the party paraphernalia and seems to be more personal - and when the public does increasingly distrust parties and wants to have non-political (or less political) faces this is an asset. C/ Experts can be selected to increase the pool of available persons (Laver and Shepsle, 2000). This has been a theme for a long time in academic literature on the grounds that parties, and particularly small parties do not necessarily have ample good candidates for ministerial posts. More recently it has acquired special attention in such unexpected cases like the UK, where the nomination of GOATs (government of all talents) to ministerial posts among the context of large parties and an exampler case of political government has raised attention (Yong and Hazell, 2011). Obviously, expert ministers do appear in these contexts as a means to avoid old style representation problems and respond to a 3

4 kind of public demand not unrelated to the representation deficit. We expect that all the three possible reasons can be found in the background of expert ministers nomination in the Hungarian case but in addition to these some concrete politicalinsitutional explanations prevail. The reason for our interest in this particular focus is based on two grounds: first, on the claim of every single Hungarian government since systemic change, that their work will be based on expertise, and second the governments under-perfomance and even policy failure. What has been the function and dynamics of expertise in the development, consolidation and performance of governments? We argue that political systemic transformation and institutional transformation provide a changing context and it is an obvious question to what degree has this changing context influenced the profile of cabinet ministers. Can we observe a dynamic presence of expert ministers, is there a variation in their nomination and resignation. How has the changing institutional environment influenced the composition of governments in this respect? In an attempt to answer these questions first we shall describe the increasing tendency towards political government in Hungary, then the understanding of expertise will be clarified, to be followed by the analysis of the expert ministerial condition and concluded with the paradoxes of this expert condition. II. The formation and the changing faces of political government in Hungary. In this section we shall provide an overview about the developments of the past 20 years with a focus on how the transformation of the political and institutional environment implied the movement towards political government and potentially towards a political understanding of the ministerial role. 1. party institutionalization Institutionalization covers several (if not all) elements of the newly evolved regime. The development of parties, parliament, and the executive and their changing connection do certainly influence the ministerial condition. Parties identities, party programmes and policy positions have become clearer as a result of consolidation. Thus we can assume that parties could and would control 4

5 their ministers to an ever larger degree. Parties can ensure the implementation of their policies or at least make them explicit and visible on the government level by occupying the portfolio responsible for that policy area. the occupation of specific government departments provides the best chance for a party to influence the respective government outputs, as Müller argued about the Austrian case (Müller, 1994: 32). It does not follow however whether expert ministers are the better nominees to make the party programme clear and easier to sell or strong party politicians are the assets to create support for the given policy area? Other party attributes, particularly parties organizational strength can be indicative in this respect. As centralized and leader oriented parties dominate we can expect a political orientation towards the ministerial positions. 2. institutionalization of the executive The executive and parliament connections have gone through fundamental changes, and the power of the executive has increased over the parliament. Also, cabinet decision-making has become more institutionalized (Ilonszki and Jáger, 2011) but the executive departmental structures have not become more transparent or more stable as we proceed with time. The elevated role of the government might make it more attractive for strong politicians or politicians with vision, who can be more often found among genuine politicians than experts. 3. an ever stronger prime minister From the very beginning of the democratic period the newly formed constitutional structure supports strong prime ministers with two measures: the constructive no confidence vote stabilizes prime ministers because they can only be removed by parliament if parliament agrees on an alternative prime ministerial candidate; also, individual ministers cannot be made accountable by parliament, it is the Prime Minister who holds responsibility for his government. This implies that the Prime Minister has a high level of authority in selecting and deselecting his ministers. Amongst the conditions of party system bipolarization and highly centralized parties the power of the Prime Minister has further increased. This turn is explicit in the power of the Hungarian Prime Minister in comparison to other ECE countries, as it has been widely observed (Goetz and Margetts, 1999; Müller-Rommel, 2008; Zubek and Goetz, 2010;) When the Prime Minister s Office developed into a real ministry 5

6 in 1998 this elevated role of the Prime Minister was confirmed. We assume that this represents a tendency towards the support of the expert minister because it is not in the interest of the Prime Minister to make any of his political rivals highly visible either from his own party or from a coalition party although the intentions of the latter might prove an obstacle in this respect. 4. coalition formation Since block politics has evolved there has not been any flexibility in coalition formation: either left or right governments have been formed even if in policy terms an alternative solution could have been possible. This development would also imply that the function of expertise and the role of expert ministers would decline during the two decades. Coalitions in Hungary have never been policy blind but the importance of policy-seeking versus office-seeking has not remained stable, it has varied between governments and even between governments with the same composition. For example, the Smallholders party required the agricultural portfolio in the governments they participated in (Antall-Boross, , Orbán I ); their party leader (and not an expert) occupied the position. On the other side of the political spectrum in the centre-left governments the Liberal party required first of all the cultural, environmental and in the last instance the healthcare portfolios with clear policy aims and visions. They also nominated largely politicians. A major exception was the Ministry of Healthcare where they sent experts in the context of the healthcare reform and its failure. We should note however this happened at a time when the party was shrinking electorally and organizationally. Thus a coalition party s strong policy preference does not automatically conclude in the nomination of expert or political ministers as the Smallholder and the Liberal examples demonstrate but with a clear preference towards political ministers. 5. europeanization Here our question is whether the entry to the European Union had any impact on the government from the perspective of its political or expertise base and composition. Goetz and Meyer Sahling (2008) have warned that the EU impact has been interpreted controversially: some do observe growing bureaucratisation, as national bureaucrats dominate domestic EU-related policymaking, (while others).. the opposite, i.e., politicisation, as executive politicians take control of the EU policy 6

7 process. (in addition) increasing centralisation in national governments, with the emergence of powerful EU core executives, and the opposite, i.e., progressive diffusion of integration effects throughout the political and administrative parts of the executive (Goetz and Meyer- Sahling, 2008: 5). At the same time there is an agreement that the EU strengthened prime ministers and also contributed to the centralization of the executive. In more concrete terms our question could be how the EU expectations or incentives provided some basis for institutional transformation on the level of the executive and particularly in ministerial selection/deselection? The impact of the EU regularly appears as a) political conditionality, b) improvement of governance capacity and c) in concrete policies. (for an overview see Sedelmeier, 2006, 2011). Entra to the European Union expectedly can strengthen the expertise line in the government particulary in important and EU sensitive economy related portfolios. 6. changing regulation of expert and political government positions The first after systemic change aimed to separate political and expert decisionmaking and competencies on the government level. These original goals have been influenced by political reality and the legal-constitutional and the political have not developed in harmony. From a legal-constitutional perspective 1990, 1997, 2006, and 2010 can be regarded as the turning points while in political terms a constant attempt can be observed to gain more elbow-room for the political. At the beginning, in 1990 the tasks of the prime minister and ministers were not regulated upon as opposed to the role of political state secretaries and administrative state secretaries and vice-state secretaties. Under each minister a political and an adminsitrative state secretary served. The latter was to represent the perspective of the ministry and buraucracy, to embody beraucratic control. Political state secretaries were nominated from a different party of the coalition than the respective ministers thus their role was to exert a kind of political control (Law XXXIII/1990). In 1997 a general regulation was put in place concerning both the members of government (cabinet ministers) and state secretaries (Law LXXIX/1997). The prime minister, the ministers and the political state secretaries were regarded as political while the administrative state secretary and the vice secretaries as administrative leaders and accordingly their nomination and removal as well as their tasks and responsibilities were regulated differently. This separation of political and expertise 7

8 tasks did not work in practice however. The removal of those on the top of the administrative hierarchy became an increasing tendency from the Orbán government onwards (1998) but already as early as 1994 (at the Horn government) only three administrative state secretaries were maintained out of those who had been nominated during the first democratic government period.. The politicization of the administration continued in 2006 by a new law which regulated the status of government members and state secretaries (Law LVII/2006).The new rationale of the law was that government work is fundamentally political The ministers became both the political and administrative leaders in their ministry and became responsible for both areas. More recently, the 2010 parliament again accepted a new regulation (Law XLIII/2010). In the first place the number of ministers was reduced to 8 and the 25 state secretaries are all political nominees while they are also subdued to ministers. We can rightly claim that the politicization of the government structure and the actors function has been clear tendency. 7. politicization of bureaucracy It has been found that governments (below the ministerial level) have become increasingly politicized (Lőrincz, 1997; Szente, 1999; Meyer-Sahling, 2008). Meyer- Sahling explicitly claims that replacement of ministry level bureaucracy has been transformed from bounded politicization through open politicization to partisan politicization in which latter respect an overaching replacement is taking place and clearly partisan considerations are at stake. Ministers are not supported by a long serving government staff (experts, bureaucrats) to develop a ministerial autonomy thus this context seems to support a political ministerial condition. 8. majoritarian turn Finally, we can diagnose a fully blown majoritarian turn of the political system. Majoritarian regimes are thought to have rather political governments while consensus regimes tend to have bureaucratic-administrative governments both in the sense of ministers career background and their (and the governments ) focus. In the Hungarian case, a clear turn towards majoritarianism can be observed. While after systemic change consensus building and consensual institutions had a high profile this has changed soon. The main reason lies in the bipolarization of the party and the political scene. The effective number of parties decreased from 6,71 to 2,82 8

9 from 1990 to 2010, and between 1998 and 2010 two large parties faced each other in the electoral and parliamentary arena, in % of the vote was cast for these two parties. Majoritarian and consensual regimes (Lijphart, 1999) are distinguished on the basis of how accountability and representation function and are organized. Majoritarian regimes tend to be more focused on political representation while in consensual systems interest accommodation allows more room for diversity. On the basis of the above description Figure 1 demonstrates that the large majority of institutional developments show towards the political ministerial condition. The exceptions are the Prime ministerial powers and europeanization. As a single remaining internal factor is the role of the Prime Minister in this process. Accordingly, we shall concentrate on his functions to undersand the particular position of expert ministers among the conditions of political government, but before that, in the next section the definition of ministerial expertise will be outlined. Figure 1 The potential impact of the changing contextual factors on the ministerial condition in Hungary expert minister political minister party institutionalization + coalition formation + power to the executive + prime ministerial effect + europeanization + legal regulation + politicization of bureaucracy + majoritarian turn + 9

10 III. Definition of expert and political ministers Experience and expertise are different concepts (Riddell, Gruhn and Carolan, 2011:29). Ministers acquire different types of experience in their pe-ministerial life and they might have a particular expertise related to their ministerial portfolio. Country variations prevail in the latter respect. For example, as they note to be a medical doctor is regarded as an expertise background in some countries in the social/health affairs portfolio in some countries while in others experience/service for example in the chamber of social security is thought to be an expertise qualification for the position. In our conceptualization both experience and expertise understood in this sense are covered. Having said that, still due to their changing and various careers as well as to their often multiple functions the creation of the the types was not always easy. The prenomination and the post-de-selection career traits provided the basis of the typology. Political ministers are those, who are members of a political party have occupied a party leadership position have pursued some political activity (posts) o have been MPs for an extended period, o have occupied local political posts o have had government posts before after deselection they pursue their career in party or representative posts. We have also inluded the pre-1990 political posts as indicators of being political ministers like membership in the leading organs of the communist party, its youth organization and the trade unions. Our typology is highly constrained: one out of these traits sufficed to put the person in the political group. Expert ministers are those, who are not members of a political party have not occupied political positions (like party leader, MP, local politician) before their nomination have pursued a professional career after deselection have returned to their profession and found a job outside the political realm. 10

11 The qualification of ministers who served in more than one government might change between the positions. An expert minister first, might develop a political career later including a governmental political career in different portfolios or by the acquisition of political posts. These are however relatively rare examples, the main pattern is that a minister typically follows either a political or an expert career. Those ministers who got into a government as experts and they maintained the same portfolio in the next government remain in the expert group. Table shows the broad government picture between 1990 and 2012, May, including the number and proportion of expert ministers based on the above criteria. Table 1 The number and share of expert ministers in Hungary by government, government type of government date Antall and from oversized 05/1990- Boross+ majority to mwc 07/1994 Horn supermajority 07/1994- coalition 07/1998 Orbán I from oversized 07/1998- majority to 05/2002 minority coalition Medgyessy mwc 05/ /2004 Gyurcsány I mwc 10/ /2006 Gyurcsány mwc 06/2006- II 04/2008 Gyucsány III minority one party 05/ /2009 no of ministers (including the Prime Minister) no and % of expert ministers no and % of expert ministers in executive departments (44%) 7 (50 %) 26 4 (15 %) 4 (100 %) (38 %) 6 (54%) (40 %) 4 (40 %) 22 8 (36 %) 5 (62 %) 19 6(32 %) 3 (50 %) 17 4 (23%) 3 (75 %) 11

12 Bajnai minority caretaker 04/ / (39 %) 5 (70 %) Orbán II super majority 05/ (23 %) 3 (100 %) sham coalition + Due to the death of the first PM the second government just followed the personal line of that government, what justifies to handle them together (Müller and Strom, 2000:13) Since our criteria are very strict, we regard the proportion of expert ministers as high. It is at or above the 1/3 rd level in most governments, the exceptions being the two supermajority coalitions, one with a Socialist (Horn) and the other with a Conservative flavor (Orbán II) and a Socialist minority government (Gyurcsány III). We have also included the figures for the executive departments only which show even higher levels, on average close to 2/3 rd. 1 In the first government the political ministers group mainly includes those who played a role in the transition, indeed they became politicians at that time. Otherwise an even larger number among them could have been placed into the expert group. Among the experts we can find ministers whose particular knowledge and expertise was highly needed and also a group of ministers without portfolio whose particular experiences the Prime Minister needed badly (Müller 2008: ). The first Socialist government after systemic change (1994, Horn) brought about the smalles proportion of expert ministers during the two decade period of Hungarian democracy. This was an obvious legacy in the successor party and was also reinforced by the junior coalition partner Liberals. The government worked under the influence of the parties particularly under the influence of the Socialists who enjoyed more than 50% of the parliamentary seats but because only 4 years had passed since systemic change they rather chose not to take government responsibility alone. The well organized Socialists, virtually the only party with a strong extra-parliamentary party at that time chanelled party interests and positions into the government. 1 For a more detailed discussion of expert and political ministers see Ilonszki and Ványi,

13 The next government (Orbán I, 1998) and particularly its leading force the Fidesz represented a clear turn not only politically but in government rationale as well. Government decision-making became more centralized and the Prime Minister enjoyed an elevated role. In this change we have to note the function of party organization in the first place. Fidesz is a highly centralized and leader oriented party. The government had its party and the not party its government. In addition to that the coalition context also contributed to a new understanding of the function of politics and expertise among ministers. The Fidesz had policy (and even political) conflicts with both of the two junior parties of the coalition (by the end of the term even the government s majority status collapsed), thus it served the interest of the Prime Minister to nominate ministers with clear professional reputation and not under the influence of the coalition parties. This increased his elbow room in highly important policy areas (economy, finance, culture): it was not necessary to seek and establish compromise with the coalition partners but he could confide in ministers of his own choice. In parallel with this the Prime Minister s Office became the central organ of government work (Stumpf, 1999). Even the head of the PMO was an expert who streamlined government work with a strong hand thus supporting the Prime Minister. The same motivation might apply in case of the next Prime Minister, (Medgyessy, 2002) who also nominated non-partisan professionals to important portfolios. He, as a non-party person (although a nominee of the Socialsits), did not have a clear support in the Socialist party, and even less so in the coalition partner Liberals thus the nomination of expert ministers was a means to ensure solid government basis. This did not succeed however, vague or missing party support undermined his position, he had to resign too years early and in the incoming Socialist based governments we can observe the increasing presence of political ministers again. This is also related to the new government rationale enacted in 2006 as introduced above, which defined government in political terms. Finally, in 2009 amongst the conditions of political and economic crisis the new government again contained more expert ministers than before although the PM did not get a free hand from the Socialists in managing the crisis. The 2010 Fidesz government meant a new start from the government structural perspective. Only eight portfolios have been created, but important executive 13

14 portfolios have gone to experts although it must be noted that two of the experts have already the cabinet, a phenomenon that we shall return to below. IV. The paradoxical position of the expert ministers Our main argument is that expert ministers are in a paradoxical position. Although they can be regarded as experts on fundamental criteria, they are indirectly politicized via the influence the Prime Minister has in their nomination and dismissal. Very many expert ministers have emerged from among the personal staff, advisers, or even friends of the Prime Minister. The majority of the expert ministers in several governments (from Orbán I to Orbán II) belonged to the close circle of the PM before the nomination of the PM. The Prime Minister s authority in nomination seems to be curtailed only by the coalition partners. First of all, the written coalition agreements in case of the Horn, Orbán I, Medgyessy, Gyurcsány I and Gyurcsány II governments determined which party of the coalition was entitled to nominate a minister to a certain portfolio. When the PM attempted to neglect this agreement, this led to a government crisis in two cases, both in left wing governments: Medgyessy failed when he wanted to remove the minister of economy (nominee of the junior partner of the coalition and an expert minister), and Gyurcsány II failed when removing the minister of the junior member of the coalition again an expert. These are interesting examples not only because they demonstrate the constraints under which PMs operate but also because they show the policy conflicts between coalitions partners and that expert ministers can be deselected due to complex political and policy issues. Indeed, politics and policy are hard to analytically separate. In the Conservative governments coalition conflicts in this regard did not lead to government crisis due to the given Prime Ministers different leadership style and differencies in party organization. Expert ministers cabinet position is particulat. The proportion of expert ministers is exceptionally high in the economic ministries, altogether 1/3 rd of expert ministers worked in these fields. Experts are overrepresented in the finance portfolio as well, altogether 45% of experts were nominated in these two areas. Thus at first glance it shows that Prime Ministers prioritized expertise in areas that matter most from the 14

15 perspective of the implementation of the government programme. Nevertheless this statement needs qualification. When we go into details it turns out that in several governments expert finance ministers left the government early and the incoming (replacement) ministers tended to be political ministers. We can observe a similar trend in the case of economic ministers. In half of the cases the expert minister was replaced by a political minister. All ministers, and we try to argue particularly the expert ministers depend on the Prime Minister with respect to nomination and dismissal alike. Why does he let them go? They might lose face, and a conflict might develop between expertise and political considerations. This is proven by the fact that when elections approach, these portfolios are in safer hands with political ministers who will probably accept a more politically based economic programme and budget. A large proportion, close to 70 percent of expert ministers are replaced by political ministers, what draws attention to varying government rationale (and performance) in different time periods of the government cycle. Also, the internal dynamics of different governments can be observed: a larger proportion of expert ministers in a government does not necessarily mean harmonious expert-based policy-making. Expert ministers are often struggling hard to get their views and their portfolio s interests accepted in daily government routine. The relatively larger share of expert ministers in the positions without portfolio is due to the fact they often get a particular professional task to fulfill. In addition to finance and economic ministries expert ministers can be found in larger numbers in areas where specialized knowledge is an asset, like health, social policy or the environment. In contrast to the former points, the classical portfolios (with the exception of finance), that is internal, and foreign affairs, justice, and defense can be regarded as political ministries. For example, as an important symbolic step, the ministry of defense has been always led by a political minister since systemic change. In addition to portfolio the time framework of their service is also indicative about the profile of ministers from a governance perspective. The length of service and particularly whether they served until the end of the government period after nomination can be revealing about cooperation and about the internal dynamic of government terms. 15

16 Overall, 38% of expert ministers as opposed to 55% of political ministers served the full length of a government cycle, at least until Orbán II, because this government is still in office. This difference is quite substantial. Moreover, expert ministers spend less time in government during the cycle. Thus, the fluctuation of expert ministers has been more pronounced during the past 20 years, and their career pattern typically evolves between the two extremes: they either spend relatively short period of time in government or fill in the entire cycle. Although it is sometimes claimed that it does not make much sense to try to differentiate very precisely WHY a minister has left because while Ministers leave office for a variety of reasons,... when they leave, even voluntarily, it is because they realize they are unlikely to progress further or will soon be asked to leave (Berlinski, Dewan and Dowding, 2010: 559). Still, a modest context of deselection can be outlined. Among the reasons we can find institutional (constitutional), political and personal ones. The end of government is an obvious constitutional reason. Party political considerations, changing responsibilities between the coalition partners, or even conflicts between them, new government orientation, and several other strategic reasons can be found in the background. And of course, personal motivations, conflicts, new life conditions can also explain deselection (Dowding- Dumont, 2009). Close to 3/4 th (73%) of all nominations have been concluded by the actual end of the government, but the reasons of deselection are different concerning the expert and political ministers. The position of political ministers is more stable overall as well as within each government irrespectively of the proportion of expert ministers in the given governments. After the constitutional reason (end of government) deselection appears to be the most important reason behind the removal of expert ministers, thus the decision of the Prime Minister stands in the background. When we looked into the details of the deselection of expert ministers this view has been confirmed. Media often comments expert ministers professional approach as a reason of their deselection. Even some ministers admitted that they could not fulfill their task because politics sought to exert too much influence on their field. In contrast, many political ministers initiated their own resignation, often they were elvated to important leadership posts in their respective parties. 16

17 Overall, the patterns of ministerial selection and deselection prove that the governments activity has been fundamentally political, which however in some special areas (like economy, finance, planning) has been open for a more expertise oriented rationale. The governments of the 1990s were political governments in the stricter sense of the word; the large majority of ministers were politicians, even considering the particular conditions of the first government after systemic change. In the first Orbán government ( ) a new government perception was advocated: the Prime Minister strengthened his own position, the PMO became a central decision-making organ, and more expert ministers were nominated than earlier. This new structural approach was suitable for the next Prime Minister (Medgyessy, ) as well, being a non-party person. While Orbán nominated experts to ensure expertise foundations amongst coalition and political conflicts Medgyessy tried to broaden his own support base with this instrument. The first Gyurcsány government (2004-6) largely inherited this government but in Gyurcsány II (2006-8) and Gyurcsány III (2008-9) a new government rationale gathered strength: government should be political first of all. Ministerial nominations followed from party and coalition reasons. Lastly, the share of expert ministers increased again in the Bajnai government ( ), quite naturally due to their crisis-management task. In Orbán II due to the concentration of different policy fields two large portfolios have been created, one with respect to economic development and the other concerning human development, and both were occupied by expert ministers. It should be noted however that both of them resigned by the middle of 2012, being the only personal changes in portfolio allocation in the government. On the basis of the above data and analysis we can develop a framework about the sources of the nomination of expert ministers. Among the sources we can identify particular career traits, first of all a sound professional background but also personal career traits and positions, like close working (or even friendly) connections with the Prime Minister. Among the (broader) reasons of their nomination we can identify the interests of the Prime Minister to gain party-independent still reliable partners who have personal loyalty towards him. Some clear policy interests of a coalition party might also put an expert into the cabinet. In these cases they hope that an expert might be able to sell the policy more easily than a well-known party figure. Finally, among the reasons we can find another policy consideration: the really important 17

18 portfolios that determine the opportunities and constraints of the others are often filled in by experts. V. Conclusion Returning to the points mentioned in the introduction the three general reasons behind the nominaton of expert ministers can be observed also in the Hungarian case. They have been nominated to handle crisis situations from the first government on this has been unhappily on high demand. Also, some of them have been thought to be more able to sell a policy than a party person would. This expectation has not always proved right: the majority of expert ministers in important portfolios could not convince the public about their policies although we should add that these policies related to finance, economy portfolios - are generally difficult to sell. Finally, expert ministers have certainly enriched the selection pool although small parties, as we have seen did not use this opportunity to the degree as it was available for them on the basis of coalition agreements. Altogether important political stragetig reasons can be found behind their nomination. Expert ministers are less dependent on parties (they are not party members at all, according to our typology) but more dependent on the Prime Minister. They are more dependent on the PM both in their selection and deselection. They are often invited by him to increase his own elbow room but when political and expertise considerations get into conflict it is often the latter to lose. This explains why the main reason of expert ministers deselection is dismissal while political ministers tend to go by government change or by their own will that is by resignation. Two groups of ministers can be distinguished according to the portfolios and length of service. Obviously, expert ministers are struggling with their role: how much independence do they enjoy? The background of their nomination and the pattern of their fluctuation indicate that ministerial autonomy is possibly lower in their case than among purely political ministers. Although Andeweg rightly notes that from the perspective of democratic delegation ministerial autonomy is inherently bad... (Andweg, 2010:389), still personal dependanc does not help performace either. Andeweg describes the potential cures claiming that to the extent ministers are their own agents they may feel a moral obligation to pursue policies that are desired by the democractic 18

19 majority, more particularly if and when they look for promotion to higher office or on the grounds of their personal political values. The nomination and dismissal patterns that we have found do not offer an opportunity for the former (they are dismissed) or the latter (they choose to leave) when a conflict emerges with the prime minister. Still, in this respect a difference between expert ministers in the Socialist and Conservative governments can be observed: while both used the expert ministers for special purposes their dependence on the Prime Minister is more obvious in the Conservative governments or to put it more positively, the individual standing of the expert ministers in Socialist governments was on a higher level. According to the legal formulation (the 2006 turn towards declared political government and the confirmation of this route by the 2010 law and then the Basic Law) ministers are to fulfil the tasks defined by the cabinet or the Prime Minister. Since with the possible exception of the first government and then the Socialist coalition governments between cabinet decisions mean Prime ministerial decisions. Expert ministers do not function according to their policy vision, or if they try to they mostly have to go. Moverover, they are not generally successful to provide a good face to the government. They are less visible and they underperform in the media. They are not active in parliament they often send the junior ministers to answer to questions and interpellations. Certainly, expert ministers come to solve a problem, sell a solution, or be a scapegoat. In the Hungarian case we cannot really expect ministerial autonomy of the expert ministers to be to any learger degree than in case of political ministers but the principal is different: it is the party for the political minister and the prime minister for the expert minister. Thus a more personalized dependency prevails. In the former sections we have seen the relative vulnerability of expert ministers as compared to political ministers. Political ministers are more embedded in and thus defended by the party-political-coalition context. It remains a question whether ministers expertise (for example the share and function of expert ministers in government) can be connected at all to broader governance issues like the good or bad performance of a certain government. There are governments full of politicians who perform very well and there are governments packed with experts who fail in their programme. Still, personal dependency does not seem to be a good entry into genuine decision-making. 19

20 Prime Ministers nominate expert ministers to reach out for areas ouside politics and avoid some political constraints coming form either their own party or the coalition partners. As a result, expert ministers are stuck in a controversial situation: they have been nominated becase they stay further away from politics but since their nomination (and service) depends on the Prime Minister they end up not only in a political context but also in personal dependency. When parties are organizationally weak, overcentralized and leader oriented thus they do not aggregate and present diverse interests a truncated format of political government prevails. Personal dependency, lack of transparency, in addition to accountability and representation deficit provide the background for governmental expertise. Experts are more than welcome. References Andeweg, Rudy B. (2000) Ministers as Double Agents? The delegation process between cabinet and ministers. European Journal of Political research 37: Andeweg, R. B. and Bakema, W. (1994), The Netherlands: Ministers and Cabinet Policy, in Laver, M. and Shepsle, K. A. (eds.) Cabinet Ministers and Parliamentary Government. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Åslund, Anders (2012) Lessons from Reforms in Central and Eastern Europe in the Wake of the Global Financial Crisis. Peterson Institute for International Economic, Washington DC, WP Berlinski, Samuel Torun Dewan Keith Dowding (2010) The Impact of Individual and Collective Performance on Ministerial Tenure. The Journal of Politics, 72(2): Bakema, W. E. Secker, Ineke P. (1988) Ministerial Expertise and the Dutch Case. European Journal of Political Research 1988(16): Blondel, Jean and Jean-Louis Thiebault eds. (1991) The Profession of Government Minister in Western Europe..New York:St.Martin s Press Cotta, Maurizio (2000) Defining Party and Government. In: Jean Blondel and Maurizio Cotta eds. The Nature of Party Government. A Comparative European Perspective. Palgrave:Houndmills, Basingstoke Dowding, Keith and Patrick Dumont (2009) Structural and strategic factors the hiring and firing of ministers. In: Keith Dowding and Patrick Dumont eds. The Selection of Ministers in Europe. Hiring and Firing. London and New York: Routledge,

21 Garzia, Diego (2011) The personalization of politics in Western democracies: Causes and consequences of leader-follower relationships. The Leadership Quartely 22, Goetz, Klaus H. and Jan-Hinrik Meyer-Sahling, (2008) The Europeanisation of national political systems: Parliaments and executives, Living Review, European Governement, Vol. 3, No Goetz, Klaus H. and Margetts H. (1999) The Solitary Centre: The Core Executive in Central and Eastern Europe, Governance 1999(12):4, Ilonszki, Gabriella Krisztina Jáger (2011) Changing Government Advantages the Consolidation of a Dominant Executive in Hungary. in: Bjorn Erik Rasch and George Tsebelis eds. Role of Governments in Legislative Agenda Setting. Routledge, Ilonszki, Gabriella and Éva Ványi (2011) The political and policy context of ministerial turnover. The case of Hungary.paper Prepared for the ECPR Joint Sessions of workshops, St. Gallen, April, 2011 Laver, Michael and Kenneth A. Shepsle (2000) Ministrables and Government Formation; Munchkins, Plazers and Big Beasts of the Jungle. Journal of Theoretical Politics, 12,1: Lőrincz, Lajos (1997) A független és semleges közszolgálat lehetősége Magyarországon: eredmények, hiányosságok, perspektívák. Társadalomkutatás, 1-2. szám, Meyer-Sahling, Jan-Hinrik (2008): The changing colours of the post-communist state: The politicisation of the senior civil service in Hungary. European Journal of Political Research. Vol. 47. No.1, January Müller, C. Wolfgang (1994) Models of Government and the Austrian Cabinet. In: Shepsle, Kenneth and Michael Laver eds. (1994) Cabinet Ministers and Parliamentary Government. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press Müller, Wolfgang C. and Kaare Strom (2000) Coalition Governance in Western Europe: An Introduction. in: Wolfgang C. Müller and Kaare Strom eds. Coalition Government in Western Europe. Oxford: OUP, Müller, György (2008) Kormányról kormányra a rendszerváltás utáni Magyarországon. Antalltól Gyurcsányig. Budapest :Magyar Közlöny Lap-és Könyvkiadó. Müller-Rommel, Ferdinand (2008) Prime Ministerial Staff in Post-Communist Central and Eastern Europe: A Role Assessment of Cabinet Ministers, Journal of Communist Studies and Transition Politics 2008(24):2, Poguntke, Thomas and Paul Webb (eds) (2005) The Presidentialization of Politics. A Comparative Study of Modern Democracies. New York: Oxford University Press 21

22 Riddell, Peter Zoe Gruhn and Liz Carolan (2011) Ministerial Effectiveness. London: Institute for Government. Sedelmeier, Ulrich ( ) Europeanisation in new member and candidate states. Living Reviews in European Governance, vol.1, no. 3: renewed version 2011,1. Shepsle, Kenneth and Michael Laver eds. (1994) Cabinet Ministers and Parliamentary Government. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Stumpf, István (1999) Kormányzásváltás 1998-ban. In Kurtán, Sándor, Sándor Péter, Vass László (eds.) [1999] Magyarország politikai évkönyve 1998-ról. DVD változat. Budapest: Demokrácia Kutatások Magyar Központja Alapítvány. Szente, Zoltán (1999) Közigazgatás és politika metszéspontján: a miniszterek és az államtitkárok rekrutációja Magyarországon, Verzichelli, Luca (2010) New Political Careers in Europe? An Exploration of the Effects of Personalisation on Ministerial Recruitment and Circulation. Paper presented at 2010 PSA conference, Edinburgh. Yong, Ben Robert Hazell (2011) Putting Goats amongst the Wolves. Appointing Ministers from outside Parliament. University College London, The Constitution Unit. 22