Ványi, Éva assistant professor Institute of Political Science Corvinus University of Budapest

Transcription

1 Ványi, Éva assistant professor Institute of Political Science Corvinus University of Budapest What happened in cabinets? Formulating and transforming of ministerial elite in Hungary after the regime change (First draft, please do not quote) Paper prepared for the panel Roles and Functions of Political Elites, Section: Elites and Political Leadership: Moving Ahead ECPR General Conference Charles Univesity Prague, 7-10 September, 2016 Abstract: Democracies in Central Europe became reality before a quarter of century and immediately after regime changes some theory formulated about roles and places of old and new elite groups in new democracies. Most of them dealt with Members of Parliament and showed a large-scale elite change process at this level. One can know less about how did ministerial elite formulate and what happened with this elite group in the new democracies in Central Europe. The aim of this paper is representing the findings about composition and transforming of the Hungarian ministerial elite after the regime change. The results come from a database that contains social-demographic and career data about all members of Hungarian cabinets from 1990 to The database is suitable for making comparative examination among cabinet members: who were they, were they party delegated, professional politicians or technocrats were they in long-term period in their office or not, what can we know about their post career path in Hungary. The paper wants to investigate the ministerial elite within constitutional and institutional framework: what was the impact of the changeable institutional environment on cabinets and cabinet members. Are there trends in the composition of the Hungarian ministerial elite or is it influenced generally by party and coalition politics? keywords: ministerial elite, Hungary, minister, political secretary, government composition, elite circulation, elite transformation 1

2 Introduction Democracies in Central Europe became reality before a quarter of century and immediately after regime changes some theory formulated about roles and places of old and new elite groups in new democracies (Szelényi, 1994, Szelényi-Szelényi, 1995, Higley, 1992, Higley et al, 1998). Most of them dealt with Members of Parliament and showed a large-scale elite change process among them. Hungarian scholars published same findings (Ágh, 1994, Ilonszki-Kurtán, 1999, Ilonszki, 2005, 2009) about parliamentary elite group. The elite circulation and elite reproduction theories (Szelényi-Szelényi, 1995) presented the first empirical results about the early 90s but were not tested later on. The question was open whether these theories are valid or nor describing the dynamic of elite changes in new democracies, and whether they work within ministerial elite, too. One can know less about how did ministerial elite formulate and transform after the regime changes. Based on literature the parliamentary elites are more investigated also currently (Semenova-Edinger- Best, 2014) and the research of ministerial elite seems generally unexplored in the political science (Kerby, 2009, Stolz-Fischer, 2014). Some books (Dowding-Dumont 2009, Dogan,1989, Blondel, 1985, Blondel-Thiébault, 1991, Blondel-Müller-Rommel,1997, Nikolényi-Fettelschloss, 2009) are summarized comparative findings and some authors are engaged in special field for instance women s career path in cabinets (Müller-Rommel- Kubbe-Vercesi 2014), non-partisan governments (McDonnell-Valbruzzi, 2014; Pastorella, 2014a, b,), recruitment of members of governments or the role of technocrats in cabinets (Verzichelli, 2010; Verzichelli-Cotta, 2012). These concentrate rather Western and Southern Europe and less the Central European countries (Nikolényi-Fettelschoss, Blondel-Müller- Rommel, 2001, Blondel-Müller-Rommel-Malová, 2006, Ilonszki-Ványi, 2011). These facts indicate the question what happened with the ministerial elite in the new democracies. The aim of this paper to represent the Hungarian findings about composition and transforming of the ministerial elite after the regime change. The framework of the analysis is the changeable constitutional and institutional environment and their impact on the government elite. Hungary is a parliamentary democracy from 1990 but the structure of the political institutions is not constant, of course. The challenges of international and domestic politics were with permanently effect not only on the Hungarian political structure but the political elite, too. This paper wants to represent the connection between the constitutional and institutional changing and the transformation of ministerial elite groups tested the premised theories about elite change in East Central Europe. Researches often examine prime ministers and ministers as member of cabinets. Based on Putnam (1976:14) the definition of elite can be varied according to the subject of investigating. Following this option I analysed not only ministers but political state secretaries as a member of ministerial elite group due to their permanently increasing influence to the government decision-making process in Hungary. Examination political state secretaries enable to make comparisons between two type of government political leaders and shows whether ministers and state secretaries follow same career paths or there are different patterns between these groups. To ask questions I investigated prime ministers, ministers and political state secretaries in ministries between 1990 and My results are based on an empirical database which concludes data about top ministerial executive bodies. The paper is organized as follows. Tested elite theories, methodology and the Hungarian constitutional and institutional framework are presented in the first part of the text. The case study section shows the empirical results and the last section presents conclusions. 2

3 Definition of government elite group Prime ministers, ministers and political state secretaries were investigated as a member of government elite in my research. Based on Hungarian Constitution (Law XX/1949) after the regime change and also in the new Fundamental Law (The Fundamental Law of Hungary, 2011) the members of government are the prime ministers and ministers. However the laws (Law LXXIX/1997 and Law XLIII/2010) that regulated the status of members of governments and state secretaries distinguish two levels of leaders at the top of ministries. The prime minister, ministers and political state secretaries were regarded as political and the administrative state secretaries and deputy state secretaries as administrative (executive) leaders. Between 2006 and 2010 all of ministerial leaders were appointed as a political leaders based on the political governance idea of Prime Minister Gyurcsány and the Law LVII/2006. Even so the special state secretaries after 2006 are not investigated as political leaders due to their different status at ministries. They had the same rights and tasks as former deputy secretaries and they could be appointed by the special educational conditions. According to these rules the political state secretaries play important role at the government decision-making since Their tasks have developed progressively from substitution of minister to having their own policy responsibility nowadays (Ványi, 2011). Case studies often concentrate only ministers but literature gives an opportunity to enlarge the ministerial elite group. The ministers and the concept of members of government do not mean the same necessarily. The expression members of government can involve political leaders of ministries bottom cabinet ministers like political state secretaries (Blondel, 1985) or teams of ministers advisors and other consultant (Dogan, 1989). Political state secretaries act decisive part of the work of government in Hungary but their job and status at the cabinets get less attention. I was very motivated to know more about analogies and differences between two political leaders group. Data and methods My findings based on a database about members of all governments in Hungary from 1990 and The dataset includes prime ministers, ministers, political and administrative secretaries at the end of the 2 nd Orbán government period. Data were collected from biographies published in Hungarian Government Almanacs (Kajdi et al 1994, Kiss et al 1998, Kovács n.d, Ughy 2006) and on the Internet. Database includes elite member s gender profession before and after age field of study and degree ministerial appointment party membership position in cabinet nomenclature position before ministry regime change number of days in position 3

4 Database is appropriate to compare recruitment policy of cabinets, fluctuation within and across the cabinets and investigating the pre and post career path of cabinet members after the regime change in Hungary. Total number of individuals who filled government positions is 393 there were 147 ministers 1, 195 political state secretaries and 100 administrative state secretaries in different governments altogether. The numbers in each position are more than number of persons in cabinets. The discrepancy is caused by method of data collection and analysis. Each person who filled more different positions at one or more governments was considered in all governments and all positions through the analysis. Based on the Hungarian Constitution and Fundamental Law government is formed by appointment ministers and is governing until the new election or until the end of the prime minister s mandate. The scholarly literature understands government cycles in a different way. New government is formed after the new election, changes the prime minister or change a party composition of government (Müller-Strom 2000, Woldendorp et al. 2000). In this sense there were ten governments in the examined period in Hungary. Early elite theories Theories about role of old and new elite groups in the new democracies were born in the most East Central European countries around 1990s (Eyal et al, 1998, Higley-Pakulski, 1999, Staniszkis, 1991, Hankiss, 1990, Szalai, 1999). The elite circulation vs. elite reproduction theory (Szelényi, 1994, Szelényi-Szelényi, 1995) was curious about how to develop the status of the old and new elite groups and how can emerge the new elite within the new political framework. This question is interesting especially concerning the new political elite. Whether an elite circulation process will be passed off and the members of former (communist) elite will be out of the political power or as a part of an elite reproduction process the old elite group will have influence on the political decision-making. Iván Szelényi and colleagues made a research to test this process in six East Central European countries 2. The results have represented the large-scale elite changing in Hungary called as dysfunctional fast elite changing (Szelényi, 1994:43). New politicians have tried to appoint persons without political past in the one-party socialist system. There was a disadvantage of this policy: some positions were filled with amateurs and non-expertise office holders that have caused effective working problems in the economy, bureaucracy or culture. The another research led by John Higley has compared Southern European and Central European elite transformation described the Hungarian elite changing process as a classical elite circulation immediately after the regime change (Higley et al, 1998). Hungarian scholars have drawn hypothesis (Hankiss, 1989, Szalai, 1994) about elite change. Theories assume survival of the post-communist elite groups but not only in politics but rather in economy leader positions. 1 Included 7 prime ministers: József Antall, Péter Boross, Gyula Horn, Viktor Orbán, Ferenc Gyurcsány and Gordon Bajnai. 2 Russia, Poland, Czech Republik, Slovakia, Hungary, Bulgaria 4

5 Based on late Hungarian research an alternate picture can be drawn. The Hungarian parliamentary elite have changed largely after the regime change (Ágh, 1994, Ilonszki- Kurtán, 1999, Ilonszki, 2005, 2009) but position of the economy and cultural elite was different. Kolosi and Lengyel have demonstrated that the former post-communist political leader position did not result automatically to an economic leader position in a new system (Kolosi, 2000, Lengyel, 2003). Furthermore Kristóf has represented in her own research that one third of cultural elite were leader in post-communist period, too (Kristóf, 2014). Mentioned theories and research based on examination of members of parliament as political elite in majority. The ministerial elite are less investigated in East Central Europe nevertheless the members of government play important role in political decision-making. The most of laws and rules are prepared and initiated by cabinets in modern democracies and being in government position means being in the power. The aim of this paper presenting findings about Hungarian ministerial elite: who they are, what does socio-demographic data show, what one can know about ministerial career path in Hungary. The first research question is inducted by early elite theories: whether the elite circulation was a linear process in Hungary also in the government elite or there were breaks in recruitment in a long-time period. Constitutional and institutional framework The legal status of ministerial political leaders in Hungary Powerful prime minister There was an idea immediately after the regime change that executive body must be very strong having an opportunity to manage the process of social, economic and political process of transformation. That is why, - onto the sample of the German Fundamental Law-, the renewed Hungarian Constitution (Law XX/1949) after regime change and later also The Fundamental Law (The Fundamental Law of Hungary, 2011) declares the Prime Minister s very powerful role in the political system. The mandates of government and positions of ministers depend on the Prime Minister. The constructive no confidence vote stabilizes Prime Ministers because they can only be removed by parliament if parliament agrees on an alternative prime minister candidate; also, individual ministers cannot be made accountable by parliament, the Prime Minister holds responsibility for government. The mandate of government ends when the Prime Minister leaves his office. Ministers are appointed by the Head of State but suggested by the Prime Minister. The Prime Minister can propose removal of ministers to the Head of State. This gradually strong status of Prime Ministers has been further strengthened by laws which regulated the status of leaders of ministries in 2006 and Ferenc Gyurcsány in 2006 and Viktor Orbán in 2010 have declared political governance meaning that the policy of government is defined by Prime Minister. The law which regulated the status of government members and state secretaries (Law LVII/2006 and Law XLIII/2010) states that The Prime Minister defines the general direction of policy within 5

6 the framework of the government's program., and minister lead ministry within the framework of government s general policy. 3 Prime minister has right to give normative directions for ministers (14.. (2)). This regulation emphasises definitely the role of Prime Minister in the framing of government policy and indicates the prime minister s powerful status at the cabinet. The job of ministers is subordinated the implementation of general government policy: ministers lead the ministries within the framework of overall government objectives. The mentioned rules about competencies of prime ministers and ministers in cabinets have added to the Fundamental Law in 2011 so the prime minister s central role in government decision-making is regulated on the highest level in the Hungarian political system. This process shows the chancellor democracy has been formed in Hungary that has consequences on cabinet composition. Changeable institutional framework After the regime change the first government did not change the system of government fundamentally. In the last one-party cabinet there were 13 ministries and The National Plan Office which was responsible to implement the Five Years Plans which were also mentioned as ministry in law in this time (Law 1987/VII). From 1990 to 2010 the government generally consisted of ministry with its own portfolio regarding the economic and social structure of the country. (see Table 1 in Appendix) This structure has begun to change in 1998 when the 1 st Orbán cabinet took office: although there were 14 ministries at the cabinet some ministries had more complex and mixed portfolio (for example the Ministry of Industry and Trade was changed to Ministry of Economic with more complex policy field. Its portfolio was complemented with economic development.) The 2 nd Gyurcsány government made significant changes in the government structure compared to the previous one in The table clearly shows the decreasing number of ministries. More coherent ministerial portfolios were integrated in one ministry (for example economic affairs and transport, social affairs and labour). There were only 11 ministries at the cabinet. The 2 nd Orbán cabinet represents an interesting picture due to having there the fewest ministries. At the 2 nd Orbán government there were 5 integrated ministries from 8 that included more portfolios within one ministry. The Prime Minister s Office was changed in this cabinet, it was not a separated ministry because it worked as a cabinet of Prime Minister led by political secretary. There was the Prime Minister s Office (PMO) in all cabinets but until 1998 it was not a ministry and it was led by the administrative state secretary during the first three government periods. Development of PMO represented the increasing power of prime minister. It always worked as a central government office but its function was rather bureaucratic in the government decision-making than political at the beginning. It organized the decision-making process technically (bureaucratic way) and helped the Prime Minister s job. PMO became a ministry with responsibility not only for bureaucratic but also political aspect of decisionmaking during the 1 st Orbán government. More and more political task was placed at the PMO and prime minister had opportunity to involve important policy field under his control. 3 Translated by author 6

7 The PMO worked as a chancellery where the most important political decisions were determined besides coordinating the executive work of government. There was an exception period between 2010 and 2012 when the generally executive tasks of government were separated from the Prime Minister s Office. PMO was the small office dedicated to organize directly the Prime Minister s job and the government executive work was placed at Ministry of Public Administration and Justice. This model did not work effectively due to central role of prime minister in the decision-making process so the control of political decision-making was replaced into the Prime Minister s Office later on. This process connected to the political governance attitude of 2 nd Orbán government after The main focus of the government decision-making process within the political governance framework is: making effective and faster decisions that can be made visible the work of cabinet and thereby indicate its success. The second research question refers to the impact of constitutional and institutional changes on the composition of cabinets assumed that the composition of cabinets indicate a trend according to the changeable political environment. Political state secretaries increasing influence The role of political state secretaries at the cabinets has transformed gradually since Replacement of ministers at the Parliament was the original task of political state secretaries immediately after the regime change. They were entitled to a fully substitute for ministers and were able to participate only with advisory entitlement at the cabinet meetings. This rule was included in a temporary law in 1990 (Law XXXIII/1990). The new law about ministers and state secretaries status in 1997 has distinguished two type of ministerial leaders of ministries. Prime ministers, ministers and political state secretaries were regarded as a political and executive secretaries (administrative and deputy state secretary) as bureaucratic leader. The tasks of political state secretaries were reregulated (Law LXXIX/1997): besides substitution for ministers at the Parliament they have become a full deputy minister in each ministry unless minister has provided other way 4. Moreover prime minister and ministers have had opportunity entrusting political state secretaries to having responsibility for special policy fields. Therefore more political state secretaries could be appointed in each ministry. Another change in political state secretaries status has occurred in 2006 within the political governance attitude of the government. Not only the status but the name of secretaries was changed in the Law LVII/2006. The political attribute was cut from the name of political secretaries connected to the redefined task of secretaries. On the one hand (political) secretaries continued to be a substitute 5 of her/his minister and the other hand they became the administrative leaders of ministries because of deleting the former administrative state secretary position 6 by Law LVII/2006. The secretaries were the second leaders of 4 Ministers may appoint a deputy minister also out of portfolio ministers to substitute him/her at the cabinet meetings based on Law LXXIX/ This law regulated only the political state secretaries as substitution of ministers. 6 Administrative state secretaries were the leaders of bureaucracy of ministries from 1990 to

8 ministries immediately under ministers. However they were in a dual position: they were politicians as a substitution of minister and they had to be bureaucratic leader in one person with expected political and professional abilities. This mixed system of leading ministries did not work in practice so the new government restored the political and administrative levels of leading of ministries in The main work of political secretaries was the substitute ministers but two special types of political secretaries were distinguished within the framework of new integrated government structure. Parliamentary secretary was responsible for managing contact between ministries and Parliament and policy state secretaries were accountable for different policy fields connected to the portfolio of ministries. They have given a very strong power in preparing government decisions without being real member of cabinet. The third research question about different career path of ministers and political state secretaries based on mentioned changes above: whether is their recruitment and ministerial career the same or follow different patterns. Who they are? Social-demographic data Between 1990 and spring of 2014 altogether 393 persons served in ten cabinets in Hungary. The Table 1 shows the number of cabinets in political and bureaucratic leader positions. In Hungarian governments served 7 prime ministers, 140 ministers and 195 political state secretaries. (Ványi, 2015) However Table shows not only these numbers because the members of governments served many cases not only one position in the government. One can filled more office in the same cabinet (e.g. political state secretary and minister, more secretary positions etc.). Due to this fact the numbers in following table refers to members of cabinets in each positions persons are not too much compared with other Central European countries where only ministers were appointed in the same rate. 327 ministers served in Romania in ten cabinets between 1989 and 2008 (Laurentiu, 2009:9) and 399 ministers in Poland between 1991 and 2007 (Raciborski, 2007). Who governs, who are the members of Hungarian ministerial elite? Asking these questions is important to represent the basic socio-demographic data, - gender, age and qualification. The shortest answer for questions is: they are highly-qualified middle-aged men. 7 Cf. all double-positioned person is counted in each position in all government but the number of double positions less than 10 % so this variance does not influence disfigure results. 8

9 Num ber of cabin et Term and Prime Minister Number of Ministries Table 1 Hungarian cabinets Number of Number of (Political) Ministers* State Secretaries Number of Admin. Secretaries Number of Deputy. Secretaries Number of members of cabinets Political leaders Bureaucratic leaders Antall, József 05/ / Boross, Péter 12/ / Horn, Gyula 07/ / Orbán, Viktor 07/ / Medgyessy, Péter 05/ / Gyurcsány, Ferenc 10/ / Gyurcsány, Ferenc not relevant not relevant / /2008 data data 49 Gyurcsány, Ferenc not relevant not relevant / /2009 data data 41 Bajnai, Gordon not relevant not relevant / /2010 data data 40 Orbán, Viktor 05/ / *: included Prime Ministers source: author s research dataset Figures below show in detail the typical characteristics of government elite. The most of them were in their middle-age. The average age dispersed between years (see Figure 1). High level of this age-group is not surprised regarding the nature of ministerial position. Being a member of government is one of the top positions of political career that can be reached generally not at the beginning of the career-path. The Figure 2 represents that the average age of political state secretaries is lower in all cabinets than ministers. This indicates the other characteristic of ministerial career namely the political secretary position can be considered a springboard position. Figure 1. Average age of cabinets source: author s research dataset 9

10 Figure 2. Average age of political leaders of cabinets * ,2 49,1 48, ,6 42,8 51,4 49,1 49,9 47, ,9 52,8 46,6 51,3 47,5 54,1 47,3 Minister Political State Minister Political State Minister Political State Minister Political State Minister Political State Minister Political State Minister Political State Minister Political State Minister Political State Minister Political State Antall Boross Horn 1st Orbán Medgyessy 1st Gyurcsány *: prime ministers are included ministers data source: author s research dataset 2nd Gyurcsány 3 rd Gyurcsány Bajnai 2 nd Orbán The gender composition of the Hungarian ministerial elite group is similar as Hungarian parliamentary elite. Women are filled in government positions low proportion. Women has been appointed only 8,21 % as ministers and 10,95 % as political state secretaries in examined period (see Figure 3). The rate of women in Hungarian parliament was 9,5 % between 1990 and 2006 (B. Kelemen, 2008, p. 69) and approximate proportion of women is parliament elected in At the present time there are 20 women from 199 MPs (10,05%.) 8. Hungary has never had woman Prime Minister yet and women filled in larger number the second rather top positions in government except in the Medgyessy cabinet (see Figure 4). Women ministers served in all governments except Boross and Bajnai government, although their rate just 17 person (8,21 %) is low in important decision-making positions (Ványi, 2016). 8 Data s source : ifecycle=1&p_p_state=normal&p_p_mode=view&p_p_col_id=column- 1&p_p_col_count=1&_pairproxy_WAR_pairproxyportlet_INSTANCE_9xd2Wc9jP4z8_pairAction=%2Fintern et%2fcplsql%2fogy_kpv.kepv_rip%3fp_mezo%3dnull%26p_biz%3dnull%26p_datum%3d %26P_SORREND%3Dnull%26P_ORSZAGOS%3DI%26P_EGYENI%3DI%26P_CALL_MOD%3DKEPV_RI P_DATE_%26P_NEME%3D2%26P_TERULETI%3DI%26P_CKL%3D40%26P_PARAM%3DI downloaded: 14. Nov

11 Figure 3. Women among political leaders of cabinets (%) 12 10, , Prime Minister Minister Political State Secretary source: author s research dataset Figure 4. Women in Hungarian cabinets (%) ,51 16,36 19, ,25 4,85 10,71 12,5 12,24 12, source: author s research dataset The qualification of elite is very important because it can represent well the closeness and openness of this group. The members of Hungarian ministerial elite are definitely highqualified. Only 4 persons did not have had diploma (2 ministers and 2 political secretaries) despite of Hungarian laws allow to fill political leader positions at cabinets without higher education degree. There are many reasons behind this: first of all there is an unspoken expectation (in the Hungarian society) that the politicians must be high-qualified. This point is related to the nature of the politics. Expertise is needed to make good governance. But it is 9 The Figure includes data not only political but bureaucratic leaders (administrative and deputy state secretaries) of ministries based on my own research. 11

12 also true that someone can be good political leaders not only by graduates. Persons may be appointed based on professional work and experiences before cabinet position 10. The type of qualification draws an interesting picture. The most of political leaders of cabinets had law, economy or technology university degree that can be useful more policy field. Individuals with law (30,5 %) and economy degree (23,5 %) have been appointed as minister in large number. The qualification of political secretaries is more mixed. They came around similar rate (20-25 %) from lawyers, economists, masters of arts (Ványi, 2015). There is another interesting context of qualification of members of Hungarian ministerial elite: the most of members of right-wing cabinets had law university degree (Antall 30 %, Boross 39 %, 1st Orbán 31 %, 2nd Orbán 31%) while members of left-wing government had rather economy and technological degree (next to 30 % at all left-wing cabinets). This phenomenon demonstrates the importance of social network connected to the university studies. Common alma maters and university studies are well invisible in many cases investigated the biographies. Data shows that the Hungarian ministerial elite are rather a closed elite group. Not too many individuals had chance to be appointed at cabinets and although the constitutional rules and laws allow filling political leader position without high educational degree, the generality has diploma. There is a gender gap compared to the European countries. Women can reach mostly the second political and/or administrative leader positions at the cabinets (Ványi, 2016). Late elite reproduction in the ministerial elite The role of members of one-party nomenclature in the new political life is not completely investigated in Hungary. In the 1990s a debate started how the nomenclature system became a political fault line (Körösényi, 1996, 1997, Gazsó, 1996, 1997), but the party-state past has not yet been scientifically evaluated. We know relatively little about the continuity or fluctuation of the political, and more specifically the government elite after the regime change. The aim with testing the early elite-change theories to examine whether the old elite members could have decisive influence on government decision-making in a longtime period. What happened after publishing large elite circulation theories especially in the ministerial elite in Hungary? Database includes elite members pre-career data referred also their filled nomenclature position. The top leader positions of Hungarian society were coded as nomenclature positions based on list of state-party position published in early 1990s (T. Varga-Szakadát, 1992) and the list of the leaders of public offices and companies in 1987 (Harcsa, 1993). The following categories have been established: Top political leaders of the state: top leaders of the Hungarian Socialist Labour Party (state-party) and the Communist Youth Alliance (the youth organisation of the state-party), ministers, 10 For example László Teleki as a roma man was politcal secretary of equal opportunity affairs at Medgyessy and Gyurcsány cabinet. He was a member of the PPG of the Hungarian Socialist Party. 12

13 deputy ministers, state secretaries, local government leaders, Members of Parliament Top leaders of bureaucracy: top administrative leaders at ministries and local governments, head of departments, deputy head of department Top leaders of academic, culture and media: leaders of high education and research institutes, directors of theatres, museums and press, television and radio Top economic leaders: leaders of public companies and financial institutions Top healthy leaders: directors of hospitals, head physicians Political leaders nomenclature positions Government political leaders former nomenclature positions before 1990 were coded in the dataset based on state leaders lists. The Table 2 shows the filled positions in each cabinet. Altogether 152 persons have been appointed in cabinets from the nomenclature system. Compared data may be seen well that the proportion of nomenclature members is significant higher in left-wing than in right-wing cabinets. (The lowest proportion is at the 2 nd Orbán 7,57 % and the highest is at the Horn cabinet 67,43 %.) Table demonstrates also the decreasing number of nomenclature members moving away from the regime change. It is caused not only by political but generation reason: more and more cabinet members have started their political career after 1990 time after time. Examination the data in details is clearly visible that connected to the Hungarian Socialist Party, the successor party of former state-party, political leaders positions at governments are filled by former political leaders in many cases. Prime Minister Gyula Horn, Péter Medgyessy and Ferenc Gyurcsány were top leaders during the communist political system. Gyula Horn was the member of executive body of the Communist Party and he was the minister of Foreign Affairs at the last government before Péter Medgyessy was the last communist finance minister and Ferenc Gyurcsány was the top leader of the youth organisation before the regime change. Their political network definitely has had an impact on the recruitment pool of members of government so the old elite members had opportunity to participate high rate in the political decision-making in the democratic political system, too. You can see one more interesting fact on the table: although Gyula Horn was the first excommunist prime minister after the regime change the number of top former communist party leaders (includes youth organization s leaders) was the lowest among them. The other mentioned Socialist Party prime ministers were braver to nominate former top nomenclature members at the cabinets. This situation indicates a duality in the Hungarian society. One the one hand there is a not discussed dilemma about role of old elite members in a democracy but the other hand the appointment former elite members to political decision-making positions in many cases did not cause any opposition. 13

14 Table 2 Political leaders nomenclature position * Antall (N=59) Boross (N=35) Horn (N=46) 1st Orbán (N=66) Medgyessy (N=56) 1st Gyurcsány (N=51) 2nd Gyurcsány (N=49) 3rd Gyurcsány (N=41) Bajnai (N=40) 2 nd Orbán (N=66) person % person % person % person % person % person % person % person % person % person % Top state leaders ,3 5 7, , ,3 9 18, , ,26 (state party leader) (youth organization leader) (Patriotic People's Front)** 2 (Deputy Prime 1 1 Minister) (minister) 2 1 (deputy minister) (state secretary) (local government leader) (Member of Parliament) 1 (Interest group) Bureaucratic leaders 2 3, ,04 1 1,5 6 10, ,1 2 4, ,26 Economic leaders 8 13,5 4 11,4 4 8,7 3 4,5 1 1, ,4 2 2,5 Academic, culture and media leaders 4 6,8 2 5,7 2 4,3-1 2,5 1 1,26 Total (152 person) 14 23,7 6 17, , , , , ,5 5 7,57 *: included Prime Ministers **: this was a special umbrella organisation included the state-party, interest organisation and other different cultural organisations. Its main task was the preparation and transaction of national elections. source: author s research dataset 14

15 Compared my data regarding to the results of early elite theories I suggest to introduce the concept of late elite reproduction for the Hungarian case. The elite circulation idea and the large elite circulation process after the regime change is valid the parliamentary elite group in Hungary. The ministerial elite show a mixed picture. The right-wing cabinets represent an elite circulation process based on their ideological attitude to the former one-party political system but political career of more leaders in left-wing governments has started in former regime. Their social network and social capital has had impact on the composition of cabinets so these governments can be characterized by the late elite reproduction. The old elite members were changed immediately after the regime change but not forever; they had opportunity to come back in the top political decision-making position for a long time. Ministerial career in Hungary Recruitment pool, post career patterns are eligible categories to ask questions about the impact of the changeable institutional framework and differences between ministers and political state secretaries career path. Examination of this is able to well demonstrate the selection and deselection of ministerial elite and their political and/or professional career after government position. The aim of investigating recruitment pool and post career positions of cabinet members is to light the context of the political and professional aspects of governance. Government decision-making is a political act; as a result, those who are given positions in a given cabinet also act in a political field. The literature draws attention to the fact that governmental work requires not only political but special professional knowledge as well (Dowding-Dumont 2009: 5.), a minister leading a cabinet is supposed to be the specialist of his/her field, a good manager and a good politician at the same time (Blondel 1991:7.). The question is how the changeable constitutional and institutional framework has influenced the composition of cabinets. On one hand who makes government decisions in a long-time period, politicians or experts and other hand what is the impact of government (political) position on the post career path: to stay in the politics or leave it. Based on Blondel s question whether the ministerial career can be considered as a career (in a general sense of this world) or only a condition since the maximum tenure of government positions compared other professional positions is not too long. One can fill cabinet positions only 4-5 years or less in parliamentary democracies. (Blondel, 1985:17.). Recruitment pool of political leaders Table 3 shows which sector come ministerial elite members from. 15

16 Table 3. Recruitment pool of ministerial political leaders Antall (N=59) Boross (N=35) Horn (N=46) 1st Orbán (N=66) Medgyessy (N=56) 1st Gyurcsány (N=51) 2nd Gyurcsány (N=49) 3rd Gyurcsány (N=41) position recruitment pool 11 prime minister politics economy 1 education-culture 1 other minister politics bureaucracy economy interest group education-culture justice other 3 1 Total* political state secretary *: included Prime Ministers source: author s research dataset Bajnai (N=40) politics bureaucracy economy education-culture justice media interest group 1 1 other Total nd Orbán (N=66) 11 Politics: MP, minister, political state secretary, mayor, vice-mayor, party officials, Public office: bureaucrats in ministries and in local government, civil servants; Economy: employers in economy; Interest group: leaders and employers in interest groups; Science-culture-education: employers all type of education and culture institution, scientists; Justice: lawyers; Defence bodies: soldiers, policemen; Other: pensioner, NGO employers. 16

17 One can see on the table the most important features of the political leaders profession directly before appointment. First of all table demonstrate that not all prime minister was politicians before his office. In case of József Antall it was expected because of he was the first Prime Minister immediately after the regime change. Péter Medgyessy was nominated as Prime Minister not from politics in 2002 due to a political bargain within the Socialist Party. He was an old-new man without political experience after 1990 but mixed expertise past. He was already member of government at the last cabinet before the regime change and a successfully bank leader after it. The political leaders of cabinets have been appointed from politics to the government position. This way to become a cabinet member is normal in democratic regimes. Parliament and parties are the natural recruitment pool of governments. These areas are the best place to socialize as politician and learn the politician s skills. However, ministers and political state secretaries were selected not only from politics but large number from another non-politics sphere. Mostly economic, bureaucratic and academic experts were nominated to the cabinets. Their especially expertise can be needed to implement policy programs for example healthy, economic or education reforms. The table demonstrates that the most of cabinet members were amateurs during the first two government period. It is not surprised at this time: former nomenclature members had only political experience and there was a very strong idea of the new political elite to separate the old elite members. The picture of Horn cabinet shows a remarkable contrast of the Antall and Boross cabinets. This includes the highest number of politicians both at ministerial and political state secretarial level. As I mentioned before Prime Minister Horn was also a former nomenclature member he was minister, too. Based on his former experiences he wanted to make politics with politicians. Table 3 represents the effect of the changeable government structure and emphasises on the change of composition of ministerial elite. The proportion of politicians and experts at cabinets has become mixed after the beginning of the prime ministerial-turn in Hungary after The rate of politicians among ministers was decreased in line with increasing number of technocrat ministers. Politicians have been appointed the lowest number at the 1 st Orbán cabinet (44 %) but their number at more cabinets was not significant (52-63 %). This rate was not changed on the impact of political governance attitude of 2 nd Gyurcsány and 2 nd Orbán cabinets and interestingly the rate is the same at Bajnai cabinet that is referred often as technocrat government in the literature (Pastorella, 2014 a, b). The increasing number of experts in government indicates the growing power of Prime Ministers. Non-politicians ministers position without political background depend on the Prime Minister and since generally they are requested to implement a special policy program and if it is not successful prime minister can deselect them without party endorsement. So nominating technocrats ministers provides latitude of Prime Minister in government. It is really important in coalition cabinets 12. Political governance attitude of 2 nd Gyurcsány and 2 nd Orbán cabinet had on impact on political state secretarial level. Table shows that political secretary position was rather politicians position. Most of them at all government were politicians before appointed (app. 12 Coalition composition of Hungarian governments see in Appendix Table 2. 17

18 70 % before 2006). Political governance further enhanced the role of prime minister in the government political decision-making by determining of government's program and effect on composition of government not only ministerial but state secretarial level. The proportion of politicians among political state secretaries in these governments has decreased significantly while the rate of secretaries selected from bureaucracy has increased in large number along with the mentioned change political secretaries task and responsibility. One can see that prime ministers strengthen influence on the political decisions of governments has caused fundamental change among political secretaries of these governments. This process has led to change of basis political character of governments. Ministerial political leaders are formed a mixed group. Only few political leaders (prime minister and some high-prestige ministers and political secretaries) had impact factually on the political decision making and other political leaders play role rather in the policy implementation process recently. Post ministerial career patterns in Hungary Post career path of ministerial elite members is a part of knowledge about ministerial career. Investigating cabinet members post career positions can demonstrate the influence of politics to ministerial elite group especially to experts in governments. Did the political job have an impact on technocrats career or not and the other side the cabinet position is eroded or made successful professional politics. Two types of data were collected in the dataset. First of all the political leaders direct exit positions were recorded that cabinet members could fill immediately after leaving the government. However, since more than 25 years have already spent from the regime change post career positions were examined in a long-time period, too. I was very curious to know that the post ministerial career path is rather permanent or can show varieties. Although I collected data from many sources (government almanacs, media, newspapers and different public internet sites) some post career data miss referred Antall, Boross. Bajnai and 2 nd Orbán cabinets. If someone has not continued his/her career in the public sphere data collection was harder. I try to use same categories to direct and long-time career stations but I have to use multiple classifications (see Table 5) to represent post career patterns in a long-time period. Direct exit positions Table 4 shows direct exit positions filled by former political leaders of Hungarian cabinets immediately after leaving government. It is not surprised that the most of ministers and political secretaries have stayed in politics regarding the political nature of former cabinet positions. Most of them were elected as a Member of Parliament or were appointed at the government again. Only some former cabinet members have continued their career as a representative of local authority or mayor. Compared the starting and exit positions is well apparent the impact of politics to the first post career positions. Including the amateurs of first two governments ministers have become politicians after cabinet position larger number than those who were selected among politicians until

19 Table 4 First post career positions of ministerial political leaders position post career arena 13 Antall (N=59) Boross (N=35) Horn (N=46) 1st Orbán (N=66) Medgyessy (N=56) 1st Gyurcsány (N=51) 2nd Gyurcsány (N=49) 3rd Gyurcsány (N=41) Bajnai (N=40) 2 nd Orbán (N=66) prime minister politics other 1 departed 1 minister politics 23 (76 %) 11 (61 %) 20 (77 %) 14 (48 %) 18 (72 %) 18 (81 %) 12 (63 %) 13 (76 %) 7 (38 %) 8 (61%) politics and other 1 bureaucracy economy education-culture justice other non data 2 Total* political state politics 22 (76 %) 9 (52 %) 17 (85 %) 24 (64 %) 30 (96%) 21 (72 %) 22 (73 %) 22 (91 %) 15 (68 %) 34 (64,15 %) secretary politics and other 1 bureaucracy economy education-culture justice media 1 interest group other non data Total *: included Prime Ministers source: author s research dataset 13 Politics: MP, minister, political state secretary, mayor, vice-mayor, party officials, Public office: bureaucrats in ministries and in local government, civil servants; Economy: employers in economy; Interest group: leaders and employers in interest groups; Science-culture-education: employers all type of education and culture institution, scientists; Justice: lawyers; Defence bodies: soldiers, policemen; Other: pensioner, NGO employers. 19

20 Only the ministers of Bajnai cabinet has continued in smaller number their career in politics connected to on the one hand the election defeat of Socialist Party in 2010 and returning technocrats to their original professional. Prime Minister Bajnai was the only one who has not became politician immediately after his political leader position. He established a foundation dealt with policy analyses and came back to the politics in 2012 within a new electoral movement (Együtt ). However his role in politics was not successful so he entered aside from politics in The rate of political entering and exit positions of ministers at 2 nd Orbán government is the same. Political state secretaries have filled political position in large number after leaving governments, too. Staying in political position in their case represents a more linear tendency than was able to see among ministers. This fact also confirms political state secretaries deeper political embeddedness. The other exit spheres of political leaders are the economy and higher education. Bureaucracy is also a potential post career opportunity after cabinet position but not the most preferred among political leaders. Only the political secretaries of 2 nd Orbán government have continued their career in this field larger number. It follows from the government structure of this cabinet. Non-politician secretaries were adapted to fill bureaucracy leader positions not only at ministries but in other public office. Post career positions in long-time period The aim with investigating post career positions in long-time period to represent whether politics can influence cabinet members post career for years. Members of cabinets had various pathways and the most of them had jobs not only in one professional. Politics was just one of the possible career paths but not the only one. Following table (Table 5) includes data without 2 nd Orbán government due to members of this cabinet do not have post career data in long-time period yet. Table demonstrates that politics was potential post career possibility also in long-time period but in decreasing rate. The proportion of political post career has decreased in high degree in the case of Antall and Boross governments. Many amateur politicians have come back to their private life. However the number of politicians in long-time period has fallen back in other cabinets, too. One can see the tendency that many former ministers have varied jobs between different sectors but even so the number of those who has arrived at cabinets from politics is close the same as the number of those who has chosen from politics for years. It indicates the closure and political embeddedness of Hungarian ministerial elite group. 14 Together 2014 Election Movement. It was re-establised as a poitical party in