Professional Autonomy vs. Political Control: how to deal with the dilemma. Some evidence from the Italian core executive.

Transcription

1 Professional Autonomy vs. Political Control: how to deal with the dilemma. Some evidence from the Italian core executive. Nadia Carboni Faculty of Political Science University of Bologna Paper to be presented at EGPA Conference 2008 Study Group III Personnel Policies Sub theme 2: Professionalisation Rotterdam, September 2008

2 ABSTRACT The paper is an attempt to assess the impact of NPM inspired reforms on the trade off between bureaucratic professional autonomy and political control. It mainly aims to investigate on the extent to which administrative reforms have affected traditional political and administrative roles, by empirical accounts of the main changes into Senior Civil Service and the consequences for the public sector innovation. The empirical analysis is based on a case-study and it is conducted in the field of the Italian central government, which was involved in a significant NPM like reform process during the Nineties, which introduced the principle of separation between management and politics. The separation of politics from administration has paradoxically resulted in the search of new forms of political control and mechanism of integration between political and bureaucratic élites. The gradual introduction of reforms combined with attempts to obtain a more responsive bureaucracy by increasing political control seems to have had a positive effect on the level of performance and professionalisation of Italian Senior Civil Service.

3 1. Introduction Since the beginning of the Nineties, Italian public administration has been facing reform processes, according to two main directions (Mattei, 2007; Carboni, 2007; Gualmini, 2003; Endrici, 2001). Firstly, the New Public Management (NPM) has tried to introduce managerial rationality into the Italian bureaucracy (Rebora, 1999). This has not only redefined the role and responsibility of bureaucrats who have been increasingly required to become public managers, but also the relationship of the latter with politicians. As a consequence of reform process, the principle of separation between politicians and top executives has been affirmed by law in Politicians are expected to define policies, assign goals and responsibilities, and evaluate results; while managers have been attributed the autonomy to manage their own unit and to be responsible for implementing political plans. Hence, the NPM has challenged the traditional model of public administration by introducing private-like and managerial logics and tools (Hood, 1991). It has attempted to transform the classical bureaucrat (Putnam, 1975) into manager, by letting the managers manage it has given them greater autonomy from the political bodies. Secondly, another theme of reform concerned with Senior Civil Service is that of fiduciary relations (Mattei, 2007; Carboni, 2007; Merloni, 2006; Endrici, 2001), by the expansion of ministerial discretion in appointing top level bureaucrats, introduced in 1998 and consolidated by the adoption of a spoils system in The introduction of spoils system can be seen as a response to the greater autonomy given to bureaucrats, according to the separation of politics from administration. Politicians look for more trustable and loyal bureaucrats than in the past, by choosing who appoint at the top of bureaucracy. This impacts on the political-administrative relationship in the direction of both a higher degree of integration between the two élites and an increasing role of top executives in the decision-policy making process. Given the above framework, it seems Italian public administration has been following opposite trends. From one side, some kind of need for clarifying and strengthening political control emerges; from the other side, the development of the Senior Civil Service is towards the creation of an autonomous administrative élite (Mattei, 2007), by giving senior civil servants greater autonomy in management and by allowing the access to top level positions to professional figures provided with significant expertise, and ability to operate in an international and networking environment. Hence, the relationship between politicians and bureaucrats is characterised by several paradoxes, such as forms of party politicisation increasing the bureaucratic autonomy and reducing the scope for partisan control of the administration. Although political appointment might in practice undermine impartiality, it does not necessarily lead to partisanship or clientelism (Mattei, 2007; Peters e Pierre, 2004; Svara, 2001). One of the major thorny questions about the political control is how to avoid that the power of appointment becomes an instrument to submit the bureaucratic system to the political willingness according to loyalty rather than merit criteria of selection. By assuming a positive perspective on the political control, I argue that the political control over the bureaucracy, as the condition that strengthens the trust between the political and bureaucratic élites, might increase the bureaucratic accountability and responsiveness via the power of political appointment. In these terms, political control involves the capacity to set direction and maintain oversight, while bureaucratic autonomy involves asserting professional perspectives in policy formation and adhering to professional standards in implementation (Svara, 2001). Indeed, political appointment has served as a structural incentive to overcome the low degree of integration between political and administrative élites in the Italian case. The key reform objective of political control was to break the old pattern of relationship between politicians and bureaucrats.

4 It was one of mutual reserve and of live and let live attitude (self-restraint) resulting in an implicit exchange between political power and job security (Cassese, 1984). In that case bureaucratic autonomy was based more on the law enforcement than on the government capacity and professionalisation. The party colonization model was associated with the clientelistic practices and party patronage endemic in the First republic ( ): Italy state administration at all levels became a docile, domesticated, overstaffed, inefficient and underpaid bureaucracy, whose members tried to protect themselves against the external pressure of a single party government (Mattei, 2007). The impact of reforms on the relationship between politicians and bureaucrats was therefore to move from self-restraint to complementarity pattern. The idea of complementarity better depicts the complexity of a relationship that includes distinctions and overlaps, distinct perspectives, but also interdependency and reciprocal influence (Svara, 2001). This model seems to partially solve the main paradox emerging from administrative reforms in Italy: how can politicians exert control over bureaucracy and giving it at the same time autonomy and responsibility? The empirical relevance of the above concepts is founded on the basis of a comprehensive research carried out between the end of the Nineties and the beginning of the millennium at the Italian central government. The aim of the overall study was to reconstruct the portrait of Italian Senior Civil Service after administrative reforms, by focusing on the changing relationship and political control pattern between politics and administration within the core executive. Focusing on a single level of government allows making comparisons easier, by controlling the effects of historical, cultural and social differences among different levels of government. The results discussed in this paper are therefore part of that extended research and are specifically based on qualitative data collected between 2004 and For that I used in-depth semi-structured interviews with both top officials and (former and current) ministers and deputy ministers. The interviews average about one hour in length and were all recorded and transcribed. Open-ended questions were asked about the respective perceptions and expectations concerning politicaladministrative relationship, bureaucratic and political role, political control, administrative reforms, human resources management, etc. By a qualitative analysis, this study aims to obtain insights into the role conceptions ( theories in use ) of ministers and top departmental officials, and into the perception they have about their interrelationships under the changing environment. This is to put light on the effects of NPM-like reforms on the professionalisation of management in public administration, dealing with the trade off between professional autonomy and political control. The paper will be structured as follows. The first paragraph will review the theoretical background about the evolution of the political-administrative relationship in contemporary democracies; the second one will provide a summary of Italian Senior Civil Service s reforms; the fourth one will present and discuss the results of the empirical analysis; the last one will draw some conclusions about the effects of administrative reforms on the professionalisation and core competences of management in public administration. 2. Theoretical background on the political-administrative relationship The relationship between politics and administration has been one of the most central topics in public administration since the writings of Woodrow Wilson and Max Weber. For many years, the dominating perspective was that there was, or at least should be, a clear distinction and hierarchy of labour between politicians and bureaucrats: the politician works as a sovereign representative of political values and interests; the bureaucrat is a subordinate policy executor, whose major concern is efficiency. This classical dichotomy has long been challenged. Several studies have suggested that in reality the respective role conceptions and interaction patterns between politicians and

5 administrators are more differentiated (Suleiman, 1984; Dogan, 1975; Putnam, 1975; Aberbach, Putnam, and Rockman 1981; Panebianco, 1986; Peters, 1987; Isernia, 1995; Svara, 2001). Firstly, the most recent systematic research effort on the topic dated back to the beginning of the 1980s. At this time Italy along with Britain, France, Germany, Netherlands, Sweden and US was part of a comparative study undertaken by Aberbach et al. (1981) on the attitudes, values and patterns of behaviour of governmental élites in Western democracies. Aberbach et al. (1981) found out a growing involvement of civil servants in what had traditionally been described as political role. Of their famous four images to describe the relationship between politicians and administrators, image IV (the complete blurring of roles) seemed to be the dominant pattern of political-administrative interaction in the Eighties. Secondly, Peters (1987) identifies five ideal-typical models of interaction on a continuum goes from the traditional Weberian separation and hierarchy to the administrative state, in which bureaucrats dominate the policy process thanks to their expertise, making the role of political leaders marginal. In between both ends of the continuum there are the intermediate categories of village life, functional village life and adversarial politics. On one hand, the notion of adversarial politics refers to a strongly politicized relationship in which politicians and bureaucrats compete for control over public policy; on the other hand village life means a cooperative and consensual based relationship between the two governmental élites, who are moved by the same goals. Thirdly, Svara (2001) proposes an alternative framework for conceiving contemporary politicaladministrative relationships. His key notion is one of complementarity, founded on the assumption that politicians and administrators are highly dependent upon each other for getting their respective jobs done (Svara, p, 2001). For interpreting political-administrative interactions, Svara adopts two dimensions: political control and professional independence. The control dimension refers to the capacity of politicians to set directions and maintain oversight, while the independence dimension focuses on the professional capacity of bureaucracy in policy formulation and implementation. The author suggests that a high level of political control may actually co-exist with a high level of professional independence. Svara calls this a state of complementarity: it entails reciprocal influence and mutual deference between elected officials and administrators. Bureaucrats are involved in shaping policy by giving it specific content and meaning in the implementation process. Politicians oversee implementation, controlling over bureaucratic performances. In this way politicians and bureaucrats maintain distinct roles based on their perspective and values, and their formal positions, but they behaviours necessarily overlap. Complementarity seems to solve a typical dilemma in public administration life. How can politicians keep control and, at the same time, allow bureaucratic independence in terms of professional values and standards and responsiveness to the public? The solution might be in recognizing the reciprocal values, role and influence that underlie complementarity. Political élites could in theory dominate administrative action, but they are bounded by a respect for bureaucratic competence and commitment. Bureaucratic élites could use their relevant resources to become self-directed as well, but they are constrained by a commitment to accountability. These various typologies were the starting point for our analysis of Italian political-administrative relations. Like the aforementioned scholars, we focused on both the role conceptions of ministers and top officials, and their life at the top.

6 3. The changing role of Italian Senior Civil Service at central national government Political and institutional context First, we need to outline the context of political-administrative relations in Italy. The Italian administrative reform is enclosed into the general transformation process the political system has been faced since the beginning of the 1990s. Broadly speaking, the Italian political system has been characterized since its constitution by the following factors: the dominance of the Christian Democratic Party (DC) and its satellites for almost 50 years, the tactical exclusion of the second largest political party (and culture) the Italian Communist Party (PCI) from national power until 1990s, the systematic colonization of the state machine; the routinisation of what is called illicit governance, based on extensive network of exchange spanning the public administration, public sector, and political parties (Bull and Rhodes, pp. 5, 1997). This traditional model has been undergone a deep crisis mainly due to conjunctural elements triggered by the scandal Tangentopoli and the consequent collapse of traditional parties between 1992 and 1994, giving a way to the change of the overall political-institutional system and regime (from First to Second Republic). Firstly, the changing government élite in terms of values, ideologies, and social background has been mainly reflected in the new party system, but also in the administrative logic of action. Secondly, the introduction of the plurality electoral system in 1993 (which has significantly downsized the number of political forces), and a quite stable bipolar competition among parties have reduced the distance between bureaucracy and citizens (Bartolini and D Alimonte, 1997; Pasquino, 2002; Fabbrini, 2004). Indeed, this process has required a higher degree of bureaucratic accountability and responsiveness, that is a closer relation between who is directly elected the politicians and who is responsible for the implementation of the program people vote the bureaucrats, challenging the traditional interaction pattern between the two élites. Without such a scenario, any reforms would have been considerably watered-down. Administrative reforms In Italy, the reform cycle of the 1990s was much more radical than in other European countries, due to certain specific factors: the need to downsize public debt in order to enter the European Monetary Union (EMU); scandals and misconducts inside the political class, the reform of the electoral system, etc. First of all, we need to review the main features of Italian bureaucracy before the reform process. According to the description depicted by Aberbach et al. in the Eighties and by the well-known Italian scholar Cassese, the Italian senior civil service was distinguished by: - underrepresentation of women - southernization of jobs - high average age - dominance of law backgrounds - system of promotion linked to the length of office and seniority - careers organized on a formal-legal basis - low degree of public/private mobility - limited use of flexible employment contracts - weak representative bureaucracy - compliance to formal rules and procedures - prevalence of ex ante controls - no evaluation of civil servants. Indeed, the emerging picture was that of senior civil service as an ossified structure (Cassese, pp. 59, 1999), where access was restricted through internal promotion and the career pattern ruled by

7 age and length of service: the Italian senior civil servants has therefore resulted as aged, with a low degree of professionalization, limited mobility, marked underrepresentation of women and a high percentage of law graduates. Two different kinds of pressures seem to have changed so far this ossified world: increasing political control by the power of appointment and stronger bureaucratic autonomy by giving top officials more power and responsibility. As we see in the next paragraph, it looks like that Italian bureaucracy has successfully been managing these two conflicting tensions. The Italian SCS, although many attempts to reform it since it has been built in 1972, has been challenged late, compared to other western bureaucratic élites. The first significant reform dated back to 1993, with the d.lgs. n. 29/1993 on the privatisation of the public roles, and it has been recently reorganized by the Testo Unico n. 165/2001 and the L. n. 145/2002. The aim of the reform process was to redefine the role, the skills, the professional expertise, and the career pattern of the top bureaucrats. Briefly, this process has been made up with continuous normative refinements focusing only on the institutional design, underestimating the role and perceptions of the main actors involved in the reform. In detail, the 1993 reform has significantly reviewed powers of senior officials. As a result the senior civil servants have got both more autonomy over expenditure and responsibility for technical and administrative implementation of policy. In addition, increased flexibility in public service employment contracts; greater mobility both within and outside the administration; decentralization of recruitment and training, were introduced within the public sector at that time. By taking as an example company-like HR management styles and practices, a number of major innovations marked a break with the past (Gualmini, 2007). Firstly, the special public law regime for civil service employment was dismantled in favour of collective bargaining: a private regulation of civil servants employment conditions and wages, based on centralized collective bargaining with the trade unions, was introduced. Decentralized and individual bargaining were included in the reform process, in order to link productivity/performance with the salary. Indeed, assessment bodies were set up for performance evaluation. Openness to external recruitment was actively promoted, as well as mobility within the public sector and between the private and public sector. Furthermore competitive training courses have been introduced and opened to all those passing an initial competition (not only to those already employed in the public sector, but also to those under 35 years of age with a university degree). The candidates, who pass the initial competition, are supposed to attend one training year at the High School of Public Administration, included a six months internship in the public or private organization. In 1998, legislative decree no. 80 completed the reform process by extending collective bargaining to top level civil servants, and by introducing a kind of spoils system for those senior civil servants (grade 1) who had to be confirmed or removed from office within the first three months of each new legislature. In 2002 the spoils system was extended to grade 2 senior civil servants as well. The minimum term for senior civil servants contracts was also abolished, and the percentage of external access to senior positions was increased. However, looking at the turnover within national core executive in the 1998 and 2005 (respectively Prodi and Berlusconi government), it is misleading to talk about spoils system like in the American contest. In 2005, 55% of senior positions was confirmed; while 23% was removed, that it means moved to another position in a different department. Data from the Prodi government are quite similar, since the 46% of top level positions were confirmed (Department of Public Function, 2005).

8 To recap, traditional ways of blending political control with professional policy advice have been recently challenged in Italy. These challenges are primarily related to the quest for modernizing administration and efforts to restore the trust of citizens and civil servants in the political system. Structural reforms seek to strengthen professional policy-making within the civil service, but the new interfaces between politics and administration and greater flexibility in civil service appointments clearly reinvent mechanisms for political control. The following table summarizes the major changes within the Italian bureaucracy after administrative reforms, under the transition of the political-institutional setting. Tab. 1 Features of Italian Bureaucracy before and after administrative reforms ITALIA ITALIA I REPUBLIC II REPUBLIC ( ) ( ) Recruitment Centralized Centralized Introduction of decentralized recruitment in public functional bodies Selection Competitive exam Competitive exam + limited use of short- term and ad personam contracts Mobility Low mobility career pattern inside the same department Limited mobility inside and outside public administration Training General and law training General and law training, but more differentiated educational background Exchange with the private sector None Limited by 1998 senior positions could be appointed to people outside bureaucratic career, within given percentages Administrative structure Hierarchical Hierarchical - Decentralized Political Control Party colonization Spoils system Organizational culture Self-restraint Pattern Complementarity Pattern

9 4. Political control and professional autonomy within the Italian core executive: an empirical analysis The purpose of the qualitative analysis I carried out between 2004 and 2007 at the Italian central government, was to find out how politicians and bureaucrats have been actually facing the process of reform and to what extent they have been implementing innovation. The political - institutional setting as well as the rule of law are certainly important in order to establish any change. However, they are not by themselves sufficient to create a new model of managerial leadership. The logic of action, values, cultural processes of those who are at the top of the political-administrative system senior civil servants and political leaders are definitely to be taken into account. They proceed in the interpretation and implementation of reforms by the vision they have about processes and reality. Their actions are the means through which they implement the innovation process. I confine the following account of interaction at the top in the Italian core executive to the relationship between ministers and their chief departmental officials. Although the ministries/top bureaucrats I interviewed had their own organizational characteristics, in general the variations in role conceptions and interaction experiences of the office-holders did not seem to differ systematically along departmental lines. The differences are more nuanced across institutional levels of government. There is substantial variation in governmental structure, political dynamics, and cultural values among different institutional levels (Mouritzen and Svara, 2002; Capano and Gualmini, 2006; Rebora, 1999). Both of these sources of difference are likely to affect how politicians and administrators interact with each others. The interviews were held in order to uncover the norms and codes guiding the behaviour of both groups of actors. The risk of questioning role expectations is, however, that they may produce socially desirable answers. To reduce these effects I asked respondents to report not only about their own role (expectation), but even to describe the behaviour and image of their counterparts. In addition, all respondents were assured that they would not be personally identified with any quotations. First we focus on the two parties accounts of their respective role conceptions. Role perceptions Interviewees largely agree that the weberian ideal-type of separation between the sphere of politics and the sphere of administration should be the principle which shapes the distinction of roles and tasks between politicians and bureaucrats. However, both ministers and top officials state that this is not always the case, because bureaucrats tend to assume a political role, and politicians interfere in administration field. Hence, while bureaucrats mention primarily interference in administrative issues as the main point of weakness of politicians, politicians similarly accuse bureaucrats to escape their sphere of competence playing a decision role that is not up to them. At the same time both groups of actors recognize their respectively points of strength: the top officials identify as elements of force the ability of politicians to define the policy guidelines and the legitimacy that comes from their electoral mandate, as well as the capacity to transform political preferences into public policies. Politicians themselves admit the superiority of bureaucrats as far as the knowledge of the administrative machinery and the technical competence. An interesting aspect that emerges from the considerations of some politicians, is the idea of an hybrid profile, that is a politician who has, in addition to the capacity of defining the vision, a certain degree of technical knowledge: I do not assume any drastic distinction between politicians and bureaucrats. I hate classify minister as somebody who knows only politics and nothing else. If you have any competence, it is worthy to use it. I am used to

10 discuss policies with top administrators and it is certainly good to have an administration made up of people who have an adequate level of educational and technical background. As far as role expectation, cabinet ministers expect civil servants to be responsive to their guidelines, while top bureaucrats expect politicians are able to set clear direction. Ministers strongly demand for collaborators with whom they have close relationship. Indeed, the top executive is expected to harmonize political goals with organizational action. In this regard, administrators demonstrate responsiveness to politicians and their programs. From interviews I identify some key qualities that both ministers and top officials perceive as essential for each other in order to perform their roles as well as what each party ideally should bring to the relationship. A highly professional policy development and the capacity to deliver intended outcomes in policy implementation are emphasized as valuable elements of the bureaucratic role. Shifts in the political accountability doctrine and a more politically exposed executive branch have developed so far ministerial ability to manage the department. Political-administrative relationship Although most of interviewees describe the political-administrative relationship in terms of dichotomy citing the legislative decree of reform (dlgs.vo 29/1993), when they are asked for day-today interaction, they figure out a pattern of relationship more based on integration than separation. According to respondents view, bureaucrats are technical experts, who control politicians work, thanks to their skills and competence in the field and politicians are decision makers who need top administrators professional advices in order to define policy issues and problems. The system seems to be ruled by a check and balance logic of action. I believe in the political-administrative interdependence, that means policy decisions are taken by both politicians and bureaucrats. The former identify the set of values and goals, the latter bring expertise, knowledge based rationality and available means A politician says: It often happens to me that I need technical competence which only the bureaucrat has. For instance, there could be decision-making issues demanding knowledge of the sector and of the administrative machinery to which only bureaucrat can contribute : Indeed, top administrators offer both professional and political advice and thus their roles overlap with politicians. However, collaboration sometimes is not easy going a minister says - it depends on personal issues. The relationship between politicians and bureaucrats actually ranges from conflict and tension on one hand, to collaboration and cooperation on the other hand: Cooperative pattern is more usual when you deal with people you trust and who have outstanding personal qualities he goes If you surround yourself by excellent colleagues, you won t have any problem in the relationship As far as the personal dimension of the relationship, almost all the interviewed politicians agree with the importance of the individual personal attitudes beside professional skills, not only for the nature of the interaction, but also for the effectiveness of the administrative action: A good top official is who serves any minister and effectively works for any government, irrespective of its political identity. In the same way, top officials recognize that when the political-administrative relationship at the top are deemed to be good, they produce an ideal setting for more successful policy-making at large: In the case of good relationship, you know, mutual expectations are clear, mutual trust is self-evident, and the transaction costs of the relationship are low. Finally, even if the weberian ideal-type of separation keeps to be the prescriptive model for political-administrative relationship, in practice ministers and top department officials overwhelmingly emphasize the cooperative character of their interaction. Both politicians and bureaucrats questioned on their life at the top seem to outline a relationship mainly oriented towards complementarity of roles and functions. The norms governing the relationships of ministers and top officials reflect the growing awareness of interdependency: both sides stress professionalism, teamwork, collaboration.

11 Furthermore, the administrative reforms, one of the interviewees says, have increased the level of administrative performance and professionalisation, making the relationship closer and closer to the complementarity model drawn by Svara: The profile of top administrator as manager appointed to top positions on the basis of both political and merit criteria is no more unrealistic within public administration. Especially in local governments, he has showed to work well for the good governance of the territory. Political control Since the recent reform of senior civil service in Italy has significantly increased political control over bureaucracy by the political appointment of senior positions, a political debate has been going on the fear of the Americanization of the Italian civil service. Among the interviewees, there are those who believe that the use of spoils system is potentially an effective tool to increase the level of overall performance of politico-administrative system, as it builds up a trust relationship between political leaders and top administrators: The spoils system makes the bureaucratic machine responsive to the changing political environment. It is a means for providing government with trustable and loyal people at the top, in order to get bureaucratic compliance. Especially among the interviewed senior civil servants, there is a common agreement with making appointment process as transparent as possible, by giving evidence of the selection procedures and recruitment policies. Work experience and achieved results should be the essential elements to be evaluated in the appointment. With regard the point of view of politicians, they broadly say that having a trust relationship with the chief executives helps in implementing public policies. There may be some relevant political changes that is not possible to realize without a liaison expressing those directions. For instance, we cannot claim that Thatcher should have kept top positions appointed by the previous Labour party, in order to make reforms. It is clear that Thatcher needed senior administrators who were sensitive to her ideology and policy Although partisan views or personal preferences of civil servants should not interfere with their job, an essential element that ministers feel top officials should have is properly political sensitivity. The concept involves political trust and policy feeling. Trust is not defined in party-political terms but as ministers come increasingly to rely on developing personal loyalties among officials rather than simply on party membership. Furthermore, a politician stresses that appointment process does not always relies on political criteria, by citing examples of highly skilled managers who were not removed because of their capacity: When one proves to be good, it does not make any sense to remove him - underlies one of our respondents -, the effectiveness of administrative action depends mostly on the professional qualities of the manager. Indeed, it is essential to choose the right people to be placed at the top of the bureaucratic structure. The use of the spoils system in Italy was also favoured by the openness to external recruitment introduced in It gives the chance to appoint to senior positions professional figures coming outside public administration. These external profiles (the so called In-and-Outers ) are less aged than traditional senior civil servants, and come mainly from public bodies (Italian Institute of Social Security, Bank of Italy, University, etc.) or from private enterprises (usually by consulting companies). As far as in-and outers managers, opinions of respondents are divided between those who see positively them as they bring innovation practices inside the administration, and those who conceive them as a threat to the right functioning of the system. Broadly speaking, the common thought among interviewees is that spoils system is a potential tool for increasing the professional level of administration, for instance by allowing direct entry of qualified and well trained people at the top of the system. However, it should be used cum grano salis, otherwise it could become a threat for democracy.

12 Opinions about reforms The majority of our respondents perceive the effect of reforms as positive at large, citing few innovative elements arising from the administrative change of the last twenty years. First, the reforms have allowed well educated and trained young people (the so called high fliers ) to get fast into the system compared to the past. One of the interviewed chief executive who has flown to the top, by passing competitive exams at the High School of Administration says: We have been trained to manage economic, financial, personnel resources in a innovative way. We have learned to work in a international network, and to use writing and speaking skills in the right way. We have learned to be a manager in public administration Secondly, the same logic applies to in-and outers, since they potentially bring innovation and know-how inside the public sector as well. Generally, it seems that the most significant change perceived by interviewees is the increased professional level and core competences of top administrators after reforms: Today we have very capable managers at the top of administration compared to the past. Especially in some technical departments, such as the Department of Finance, there is a significant mobility between public and private sector a politician says. He cites examples of charismatic bureaucratic leaders who have been going in and out administration - according to the American model of in-and-outers - and who have worked for prestigious worldwide consulting companies. In conclusion, the effects of reforms are positively perceived by both politicians and bureaucrats (being the former a little be more enthusiastic than the latter), although all the respondents stress that the implementation of innovation still needs time to be completed. It takes time to make changes within the logic and rules of administrative action. Thanks to recent reforms, top civil servants have started to assume more responsibility than in the past. Somehow I could say that the famous culture of results has begun to be implemented. Today bureaucrats pay much more attention to result than ten years ago. It is a big step towards the managerialization of public administration. A long way has been passed over, but still a few steps need to be done. By summarising, the interaction of elected officials and administrators that have been observed in the Italian case, shows the following characteristics (tab. 2): - both élites maintain distinct perspectives based on their unique values and the differences in their formal positions; - bureaucrats have partially overlapping functions as elected officials provide political oversight of administration and administrators are involved in policy making; - there is interdependency and reciprocal influence between elected officials and administrators. The result is a pattern of complementarity, that presumes distinction, as well as interdependence. The former includes distinct background and values of politicians and administrators, respect for political supremacy by bureaucrats, and not politicians involvement in administrative management and practices; the latter means administrative involvement in policy making and autonomous exercise of discretion. Complementarity is grounded in a pattern of overlapping roles in the political-administrative relationship, but at the same time it draws on models of separate roles, administrative autonomy and political responsiveness as well (Svara, 1999). Furthermore, evidence from the Italian case, as well as from other western democracies (Peters and Pierre, 2004; Page and Wright, 1999, 2007), points out that more than really a spoils system regime we find subtle new forms of politicization, as ministers seek to make administrators more responsive to their direction. The parts must be distinguishable but they are tied together in an interdependent relationship often cooperative, but sometimes contentious and each complements the other to form the whole of the governmental process.

13 Tab. 2 Components of political-administrative relationship at central government Politicians Bureaucrats Selection procedure Appointment Merit + Political criteria Pattern of behaviour Political accountability Responsive competence Values and standards Political commitment Ideology Vision Values Professionalism Commitment to public interest Accountability Expertise Role Formulation of mission Policy approval Oversight Staff evaluation Consensus building Policy advise Administration Management Policy development Discussion of results The empirical analysis of the Italian case has showed us: (a) an emerging pattern of relationship between politicians and bureaucrats more oriented to managerial and professional competence than in the past; (b) a different model of political control (from the party colonization model to a type of spoils system, which recalls the American one, although under different political-institutional conditions). From an overall point of view, the political control has therefore increased in line with the purposes of reforms and the demands of the changing political-institutional setting; bureaucratic autonomy, understood in terms of professional independence, has increased as well. This supports our initial hypothesis that political control and bureaucratic autonomy are not two opposite, but strictly intertwined concepts. The increase in management skills is particularly attested by the new manager profiles emerging from reforms ( the high fliers and in-and-outers ). The different ways of access to senior positions gradually introduced by law have begun to produce effects, albeit relative and limited, but still visible: - access to senior position in public administration starts to be considered attractive even by those who come from the private sector; - access of well educated and trained young people ( the high fliers ) is gradually changing the old-fashioned bureaucratic culture into a new pragmatic-professional one. While in the pre-reform regime, systems of selection and career, based on exogenous factors (titles, examinations, good relations, etc.) have prevailed, in the post-reform systems of selection and career are more oriented to take into consideration endogenous factors (professionalism, performance, experience, etc.). It is clearly evident by our analysis that the traditional bureaucratic model of leadership has undergone significant changes: professional competence, work experience outside the public administration, goal achievement, level of performance have all become essential elements for career development. Furthermore, the traditional patronage model has been gradually replaced by a system of spoils aimed to promote greater mobility not only internal but also external to the public organisation.

14 We can now draw some speculative insights for our initial question, on the basis of the aforementioned results. A) The influence of institutions in shaping innovation First, the analysis of the Italian case confirms that changes in political administrative relations remain path dependent (Page e Wright, 1999, 2007; Rhodes and Weller, 2001; Peters and Pierre, 2001, 2004). Each country has a unique set of experience of state and nation building as well as the role that bureaucracy plays within these processes. Bureaucratic forms and structures tend to reflect national experience. This partially explains why we have different answers to two fundamental questions of bureaucracy: efficiency and control across western democracies (Page e Wright, 1999). There has been considerable agreement in terms of shared ideas about reforms, managerial styles of administrative processes and behaviour across different countries; however, there has been less convergence when it comes to structural arrangements and civil service organization (Gualmini, 2007). The NPM reform concepts (i.e. the model of separation between politicians and bureaucrats) are evidently filtered, interpreted and modified through the combination of nationally based processes. The national political-administrative history, culture, traditions and style of governance, developed in an evolutionary manner, combined with the instrumental actions taken by political and administrative leaders to further collective goals through administrative design and active national administrative policy, is an important factors in shaping the reforms implementation; In some cases it has had paradoxical effects such as in Italy, where the increasing autonomy given to top administrators has resulted in a more politicized senior civil service. As our analysis has shown, the separation of politics from administration has led to the search of new forms of political control and mechanism of integration between political and bureaucratic élites. This apparent contradiction could be explained by taking into account the effects of the changing political and institutional environment, which has been demanding more and more accountability and responsiveness attitude by both politicians and bureaucrats. Hence, the actual balancing of professional autonomy and political control results path dependent. B) Organizational Culture as a powerful explanatory variable Organizational culture is also an important factor in explaining changes within organizations. The concept of organizational culture comes from organizational studies (Schein, 1992), which define it as the set of values, norms, attitudes and beliefs making up every organization. Since this set of values is increasingly rooted inside organizations, it shapes members identities and practices over time. Hence, organizational culture can contribute substantially to the cohesion of the whole organization, while at the same time either favouring or hindering evolution and change (Egeberg, 1998). Indeed, the characteristics of administrative systems themselves, as reflected in the specific organizational-administrative culture, playing a leading role in implementing innovation. Comparative studies have pointed that where organizational culture is shared and has become institutionalized among civil servants, this could limit desired change or it could act as a filter of selection among alternative reforms (Gualmini, 2007). In Italy the deep-rooted institutionalization of a legal and juridical culture prevented the initial implementation of extensive reforms. The dominance of a red-tape philosophy, traditional compliance to formal rules, and the presence of ex ante controls, contribute to explain the delay with which NPM reforms were introduced in Italy compared to Anglo-Saxon countries. However, this old-fashioned bureaucratic culture has been gradually dismantled by the increasing awareness of both politicians and bureaucrats that they need to adapt to the changing environment and develop new logics of action, practices, values, etc.

15 It does not mean bureaucratic culture is going to disappear, but simply it is in a challenging and updating process. In the Italian case, the new professional and managerial profiles who have recently entered public administration have considerable helped to disseminate innovative cultural approaches and modernization within public sector. This has built up a favourable context for implementing reforms more effectively than in the past and for improving political-administrative interaction at the top. Finally, turning to our question, we can conclude that the trade off between professional autonomy and political control mainly depends on both political-institutional and organizational variables. Evidence from the Italian case allows us to argue that the balancing of professional autonomy and political control is more likely to be when the following political-institutional and organizational conditions are satisfied: i) a stable political-institutional system, whose fragmentation degree is low; for instance, in the case of stable executives based on a cohesive parliamentary majority, politicians are resulted to be more able to set direction, address and control bureaucracy (Panebianco, 1986; Chiarini, 2000; Gualmini, 2007); ii) an autonomous bureaucratic élite, where the degree of autonomy refers to the level of institutionalisation and professional independence of the bureaucracy. In other terms it means a bureaucratic élite provided with legitimacy, innovative shared culture, and especially with the capacity to offer politicians professional advice and problem solving (Freddi, 1989; Svara, 2001; Peters and Pierre, 2004; Page and Wright, 2007). 5. Conclusions Civil service changes In the last two decades administrative reforms, new public management, politicization and political changes have created new demands affecting the roles and workings of ministers and top officials. Several comparative studies indicate similar shifts in the structural and cultural incentives governing the role conceptions of politicians and bureaucrats and, consequently, the nature of their relationships (Peters and Pierre, 2001, 2004; Page and Wright, 1999, 2007; Rhodes and Weller, 2001). In the Italian case, administrative reforms such as agencification and civil service managerialism arrived comparatively late; in addition, compared to many Anglo-Saxon countries, they were incremental and limited in scope (Gualmini, 2003). Nevertheless, they have undoubtedly stimulated demographic and cultural changes. Demographically, Italian bureaucracy has witnessed an increasing number of outsiders (from business, local/regional government, non-profit), as well as women and comparatively younger people, reaching the top 2 ranks in the ministries. Culturally, new approaches to government and governance have been affecting politicians and bureaucrats, both called to manage an increasingly complex environment. Political changes According to the political-institutional dimension, the degree of fragmentation of the Italian political system has consistently decreased in the last fifteen years. The introduction of a plurality electoral system has favoured the creation of a new party system structure, making the basis for an alternation of the political power and a clearer division of majority and opposition in parliament. Hence, two developments in the political domain have affected political-bureaucratic relationships most clearly. The increasing volatility of the Italian voter and the fear of political punishment by the electorate have made both politicians and bureaucrats to be more responsive to the public and more performance and policy oriented than in the past.