Network Analysis as a Method for Studying Elite Coherence: The Case of Finland

Transcription

1 Network Analysis as a Method for Studying Elite Coherence: The Case of Finland Ilkka Ruostetsaari School of Management/Politics FI University of Tampere, Finland ilkka.ruostetsaari@uta.fi A paper prepared to be presented at the ECPR General Conference, 4-7 September 2013, Bordeaux, France, Panel Advanced Research Methods for Elite Studies Abstract The purpose of the present study was to assess, by applying network analysis, the extent to which the Finnish elite structure and its coherence have changed in terms of interaction networks in Based on network analysis we may outline whether the type of the Finnish elite structure has changed since the early 1990s onwards. This study was methodologically based on the positional approach and the data was composed of postal surveys conducted to the elites in 1991, 2001, and The structure of the elite network, i.e. contacts of the elite members to various institutions was analyzed in terms of density and content. The density of interaction is a combined variable which takes account both frequency of interaction and intensity of interaction. The content variable takes account the direction of communication, i.e. distinguish a sender of information from a receiver of information and more general social interplay. The density of interaction of the power elite with domestic and foreign institutions mainly decreased and the role of general exchange of information as a form of domestic interaction increased linearly. This implies that the power elite s interaction network was fragmented and dispersed in Hence, the coherence of the power elite has decreased. To conclude, the 1

2 Finnish elite structure has moved since the early 1990s onwards to the direction of a fragmentary elite structure. In fact, the transformation of the Finnish elite structure since the early 1990s has been parallel with the changes that have occurred in Scandinavian elite structures: openness of the elites has increased but their coherence has decreased. Introduction According to the classical elite theory, an essential criterion for the existence of an elite is not the accumulation of power in the hands of a small group of people who take care of day-to-day decision-making; rather this group must constitute a cohesive and self-conscious group. These characteristics are to be found in almost all elite definitions, and theories of elites and empirical research on such groups have typically described a closed elite in terms of the three Cs (Meisel 1958, 361), i.e., group consciousness, coherence, and conspiracy, the last-mentioned term referring to a common will to action rather than secret machinations (Parry 1969, 31-32). This paper focus on the cohesiveness of the Finnish elite structure in terms of interaction networks of the elites in C. Wright Mills referred to interlocking between various elites as a source of cohesion among the power elite. According to his theory, elite cohesion is clearly determined by the intensiveness of the connections between institutional hierarchies. If several mutual connections and joint interests exist between institutions, the elite members of these institutions will have a tendency to form a coherent group. Institutional closeness is most extensive when individuals frequently move between leading positions at the linked institutions. For example, Mills referred to directors of big U.S. firms who have held important public offices but returned after their resignation from government to work in business or big foundations. The ease of changing roles indicates the extent of cohesion among the power elite; i.e., as roles are changed more and the institutional closeness grows, the power elite will become increasingly united (Mills 1956, 10-11, 19, ). However, Mills elite conception was not based exclusively on the interrelationships between the elite members within the dominating institutional hierarchies but also on their social and psychological similarity and their position in the upper stratum. The coherence of the power elite can be understood by considering the elite members origin, career, and life styles. Mutual interconnections within the elites can lead to a shared lifestyle and a sense of unity (Mills 1956, 10-2

3 11, 63-66, ). Also G. William Domhoff (1990) underlines the key importance of cohesion, which is created by a shared value system and by social and institutional relations which serve to maintain that system. The tight-knit interaction networks on the elite level, which are originated, for instance, in business boards, foundations, clubs and policy planning organizations have been seen important in order to prevent internal disruption within the elites (Higley & Moore 1981, 584). The networks of communication and interaction can be regarded as mechanisms promoting and strengthening attitudinal cohesion within the elites through processes of social comparison (Knoke, 1990, 11). The characteristics of networks within the elite members have an effect on the cohesiveness and openness of the elite structure. As convergence and overlap between various elites grow stronger, we may perceive the beginnings of a monolithic elite. In contrast, if the mobility and interlocking between various elite categories is relatively weak, and if the separation generated by specialization and expertise is clear and solid, we may lean towards the pluralist interpretation of an elite configuration (Dogan 2003, 5). The openness of the elite structure may vary from low, i.e., elites being recruited from a single social stratum, to high, i.e., where elites come from multiple strata. In the latter case, the proportion of members recruited from any one stratum (e.g. the upper class) is about the same as that of this class in the general population. The degree of openness also implies the vertical circulation of elites, which is vital for their renewal from the general citizenry. The second dimension, i.e., horizontal circulation, refers to the degree of coherence. The elite structure is highly coherent if its members are closely intertwined in terms of mobility, interaction networks and self-consciousness (i.e., joint interests between the elites). An elite structure may be termed exclusive if it is recruited from one social stratum and if it is highly coherent, i.e., if its members are closely interconnected in terms of interaction networks, mobility and self-consciousness. In contrast, an elite structure is segmented if recruitment focuses mainly on one social stratum but its members share little interconnection. The term inclusive elite structure refers to cases where members of the elite are recruited from several social strata, but the elite is still coherent. Fragmentary elite structure describes the situation in which elites are recruited from many different social strata and show little or no coherence (Ruostetsaari 1993, 332; see also Higley and Moore 1981; 2001). The elite theorists have agreed that democratic regimes are subject to regular, systematic elite competition, ascent (Schumpeter), mobility (Weber), and circulation (Pareto) (Pakulski & 3

4 Körösényi 2012, 16). The importance of competition between elites as a necessary condition for democracy has been accentuated by democratic elitism (see Etzioni-Halevy 1993; Higley 2007; Engelstand 2010). However, critics of democratic elitism have stressed that it does not exclusively meet the classical criteria for democracy as the control from the citizenry directs only to the political elite, not other elite groups (Bachrach 1967). In fact, rival elites may be internally oligarchic since they are closed to citizens involvement. We argue that the degree of democracy ultimately depends both on the openness of the elites (i.e., active vertical circulation and interlocking) as stressed by Pareto and Mosca, and the unconnectedness of the elites (i.e., slight horizontal circulation and interlocking), as depicted by Mills and democratic elitism, more than elite competition per se. Hence, autonomy between the elites is seen herein as an important precondition for democracy (Etzioni-Halevy 1993, ). In short, in terms of the elite typology, the exclusive elite structure is inadequate, whereas the fragmentary elite structure offers best model for the criteria of classical democracy (see Ruostetsaari 2006). Purpose of the Study The purpose of the present study is to assess, by applying network analysis, the extent to which the Finnish elite structure and its coherence have changed in terms of interaction networks within various elite groups in Other elements of the elite coherence such as recruitment (Ruostetsaari 2012), horizontal mobility (Ruostetsaari 2013a) and attitudinal unanimity (Ruostetsaari 2013b), which have been analyzed previously, will not be considered in this paper. On the basis of network analysis we may outline whether the type of the Finnish elite structure has changed since the early 1990s. The elite networks do not encompass only domestic actors but also actors in Europe and outside Europe. All these levels will be analyzed here. The period under study, , was characterized in the Finnish society and the operating environment of the elites by important social changes such as deregulation, great recession and bank crisis ( ), the collapse of Soviet Union, and hence, bilateral trade between Finland and the Soviet Union (1991), affiliation with the European Union (1995) and the European Monetary Union (2002), international financial crisis (2008), the crisis of euro zone (2009-) and political scandals (Ruostetsaari 2013a, ). In fact, several scandals have loomed large in the media during the period under study, and all of these scandals have focused on the elites in politics, administration, and business and their activities 4

5 since the 1970s. The number of scandals involving the elites has grown from 4 in the 1970s, 10 in the 1980s, to 21 in the 1990s, and finally to 37 in the new century. To a growing extent, these scandals have led to the resignation of elite members from their positions of leadership (Kantola and Vesa 2011, 43; see also Uimonen 2009). In particular, the political elite were shaken by the electoral funding scandal of 2008, which is the most serious political scandal in Finland to date as measured by publicity surrounding the events (Kantola 2011a, 165). The scandal undermined the legitimacy of the major political parties and affected the results of general elections in 2011, i.e., the landslide victory of the populist party: electoral support of The True Finns increased from 4.1% (in 2007) to 19.1%. Most of the Finnish scandals have focused on the relationships between the elites in politics and those in business; therefore, these scandals may have disrupted cohesion and mutual trust among the elites. Now, the elites are being treated much more firmly than they were in the 1970s, i.e., when the ascendancy of the decision-makers in politics and the economy was more stable and accepted vis-à-vis publicity and the mass media. Moreover, the moral standards that have been applied to the elites have tightened. In fact, an elite member who has been hit by a scandal can no longer be sure of exoneration by the old boys. In fact, an elite may manifest its autonomy by revealing damaging information about other elites, or by publicly criticizing and vilifying them (Etzioni-Halevy 1993, 100). Therefore, scandals may pave the way for newcomers, especially when they bring down well-established power wielders (Kantola et al. 2011, 88). Indeed, the exposed scandals have been seen to erode the ascendancy of the elites and augmented democracy (Kantola 2011b, 31; Kantola & Vesa 2011, 51). Moreover, gentlemen s agreements, dating back to the period before deregulation, the great recession, and the bank crisis, lost their relevance, which may have caused the disintegration of interaction networks, especially among the business elite but also between the elites of business, administration, and politics (Kiander & Vartia 1998, 73). This new era characterized by liberalized financial markets, increased competition, European integration, and globalization necessitated new modes of operation. As such networks and rules of the game derived from the time of the regulated economy were no longer operational in their typical forms. For instance, the new Stock Exchange Act in the early 1990s introduced the concept of insider regulations, which imposed new conditions on the interplay between the business elite and other elites (Ruostetsaari 2003, 39). 5

6 Network Analysis Network analysis do not focus on organizations per se, but the interplay between them. An important premise for the structural analysis is that the pattern depicting relationships between social positions helps to explain the functioning of the system and its components (Knoke 1990, ). The nature of a social network cannot be outlined by analyzing solely actors direct contacts but also the characteristics and structure of the whole network should be considered (Scott & Griff 1984, 9; Marsh 1998). The studies based on network analysis share two joint premises. Firstly, the analysis focus on organizations or institutions and positions or roles within them, not individuals holding these positions or roles (Lauman & Knoke 1989, 22-23). The roles can be seen as a set of prerogatives, obligations, imperatives and expectations, which directs the behavior of individuals holding these positions. The role also anticipates how its holder is expected to interact with other actors in certain state of affairs (Knoke 1990, 7). Secondly, actor s structural position in the network is connected to its influence. According to Galaskiewicz (1989, 82-83), the influence of an organization is not just a function of resources or important processes which it controls but also dependent on its access to resources of other organizations. By contrast, Knoke (1983) explains the connection between actor s structural position and its perceived influence a little bit differently: influence, actual or potential, is directly linked to structural autonomy. The influence is included in all interaction relationships (Giddens 1981, 28) due to that interaction means production and reproduction of the structure which brings about rules and resources (Clegg 1981, 141). In fact, the resource dependence theory underlines the relationships between organizations as a basis of influence: an organization tries to avoid dependence on other organizations and make other organizations dependent on itself. In order to avoid dependencies and constraints organizations seek to manipulate the flow of information from its own activities. The more an organization interacts with several organizations, the less it is dependent on one organization. The availability of alternative sources of resources will strengthen organization s ascendancy. Conversely, the dependent other organizations are on scarce resources controlled by one actor, the more influence an actor has (e.g. Aldrich 1979, 199; Pfeffer & Salancik 1978, 216). The interaction relationship is composed both of form and substance, the first one referring to the characteristics of interaction relationship irrespective of its content. Both the form and content of 6

7 the social interaction have pivotal effects on the formation of political attitudes and behavior (c.f. Knoke 1990, ). Scholars have distinguished at least two indicators for measuring the significance of actors positions in the interaction network. Firstly, the indicator of centrality do not differentiate the role of a sender from that of a receiver but considers all links as symmetrical. The most central actors in the network are those, who have several reciprocal links to other actors. The actors situated in the center of the network have influence as a result of that other actors are dependent on their participation in terms of transmission of information and resources. This kind indicator of significance is useful for the assessment of positional influence in the context of symmetrical exchange network (Knoke 1989, 10). In reality, however, all organizations are not equal as channels of interaction. One part of organization s contacts may direct to actors, which are in central positions in the network while the other part focus on actors with more peripheral positions. The interplay with central actors, who have links to several actors, contributes more to organization s importance than links to actors who are isolated from other actors. Contacts to actors which have central network positions open up for the organization access to the important communication arena, which will strengthen its influence in the network (Bonacich 1972, 177; Barnes 1979). Secondly, if actor s position in the network is measured in terms of prestige, the interaction is interpreted as asymmetrical. The actor is seen as influential, if it receives several contacts (e.g. information, resources) but sends itself only few contacts. In other words, not only the frequency of interaction is important, but also its form, i.e. direction: the significance of actor s contacts determines its own importance. In fact, actor s centrality in the communication network has been seen as a synonym of its influence. This kind of prestige significance is particularly useful for the assessment of influence linked to positions and roles in the network, where information and resources are not exchanged reciprocally (Knoke 1990, 10-13). As our study focus on the elites which are influential by definition the interaction between the elites and societal institutions can be interpreted as asymmetrical in nature. 7

8 The Method and Data This study was methodologically based on the positional approach (see Hoffman-Lange 1987, 31). The first step was to outline the Finnish elite structure in 1991 (Ruostetsaari 1993) by analyzing the power structures and the roles of institutions and organizations in various societal sectors based on information from previous studies and official documents. Secondly, the elite members were identified based on the highest ranking positions that individuals have held in a wide array of institutional fields. The elite structure in 2001 (Ruostetsaari 2006) and 2011 were constructed identically, i.e., by analyzing changes in society and organizational structures. The figures in Table 1 refer to the numbers of elite positions included in the elite groups, not the number of individuals holding them. For instance, a MP leading a parliamentary committee and chairing an important NGO is included twice in the elite structure, i.e. the elites of politics and organizations. Table 1: Composition of the Finnish Elite Structure in Elites and sub-elites Number of positions The government Parliament Party organizations Political state secretaries Municipal councils and boards Regional councils * MEPs and a commissioner * POLITICS TOTAL Ministries Governmental bureaus Judiciary Armed forces Church Regional state administration

9 Municipalities Regional council s administration * EU civil servants * ADMINISTRATION TOTAL State-owned firms and public utilities Cooperatives Private business Property BUSINESS TOTAL Wage-earner organizations Business organizations Civic organizations Organizations in local and provincial administration 46 * * ORGANISATIONS TOTAL Daily press Other papers TV, radio MASS MEDIA TOTAL Universities Governmental research institutes Private research institutes Foundations Associations Academy of Finland SCIENCE TOTAL Art administration Fields of art

10 Influential personalities Honorary art professors and academicians CULTURE TOTAL ELITES TOTAL *= organizations were not included in the elite structure A precondition for the research framework was that the questionnaire that was to be presented to the elites must be as similar as possible in all surveys. The first postal survey was conducted among elites in November- and December of 1991 (with a response rate of 66.9%), and the second was conducted in September- and October of 2001 (53.5%) and the third one in September- and October of 2011 (postal survey and Internet inquiry, 34.3%). The response rates from the various elite groups were as follows: political elite 60%, 52% and 25%; administrative elite 62%, 62% and 47%; business elite 55%, 46% and 21%; organizational elite 70%, 55% and 35%; mass media elite 67%, 44% and 31%; scientific elite 64%, 61% and 34%; and respectively, cultural elite 63%, 53% and 35%. These response rates indicate that the data do not cover all interaction networks within the Finnish elites but it enables the assessment of the changes in terms of the elite networks. The decrease of the response rate which concerns very similarly all the elite groups, reflect the general trend of studies based on postal survey. As the respondents were given anonymity, the loss of respondents within various elite groups cannot be specified. However, the loss is possible to analyze from that point of view that the respondents were asked their occupation. However, the membership of all respondents in the elites do not base on their occupation but it may base on their elective offices. Hence, the analysis of the loss remains only indicative. The response rate of the members of the political elite, who functioned in political party organizations even increased from 1991 to 2001 but decreased afterwards. The response rate of the business elite members, who worked in co-operatives, increased until 2001 while that of the elite members functioning in private business was in 2011 lower than in 1991 and Similarly, within the organizational elite the response rate of the elite members who were hired or had an elective office in NGOs was the lowest in Even if the loss was clearly higher in 2011 than in previous surveys, the rate of response has decreased very uniformly in all elite groups since the early 1990s onwards. However, the loss was 10

11 lower in the elites of administration and culture compared to other elite groups. Despite the fact that the response rate decreased more sharply in some sub-groups, the whole data covering the period is not substantially and systematically biased to such an extent which could prevent comparative analysis. It is important to note that our elite surveys do not base on random sample such as surveys focused to the citizenry but focus on whole population, i.e. all respondents are included in the elites and influential by definition. Hence, the loss is a smaller problem in this study than in studies based on random sample. The loss of sample cannot be explained by any single reason. However, it is possible, that lower response rates among the elites of politics and business compared to other elites in 2011 may be a result of the electoral funding scandal which has got a lot of publicity in the mass media since 2008: the focal point of the scandal has been interweaving of decision-makers representing politics and business. Density of the Elite Network We may begin by looking at the structure of the networks of interaction prevailing among various elite groups. The challenge for our approach was that it was impossible to analyze directly contacts between the elite members. The reason for this was, firstly, that is was impossible, because lack of space, to list all elite members, i.e. more than one thousand names, in the questionnaire and to inquire about respondent s contacts to all other elite members. Secondly and more importantly, the respondents were guaranteed anonymity in order to enhance willingness to respond the inquiry. Hence, we cannot analyze elite members contacts to other individuals included in the elites but to institutions which were included in the elite structure. The respondents were presented with a structured question: "The following is a list of instances and institutions with which you may have had contact in connection with your job, positions of trust, leisure pursuits, etc. Please state for each the 'frequency of your contacts' and the 'nature of your contacts'." Next we may consider the positions occupied by different organizations or institutions in the interaction network of the power elite which covers different elite groups (Table 2). This is done by using an index created on the basis of responses to the question of frequency of interaction. The three response alternatives, "at least once or twice a month", "a few times a year" and "less often or not at all", were scored on a scale, the mean being treated as "frequency" and the mean reflecting those respondents who scored above 0 being treated as "intensity". This index, which can 11

12 be called density, is a combined variable which takes into account both the frequency of interaction and its intensity. 1 Table 2: The Density of Interaction Network between the Power Elite and Various Institutions in by Index Institution Year The mass media The government University/of applied sciences Private firm Municipality and federation of municipalities Other research institute Central government agency Entrepreneur or business organization Political party: national organization Employers organization Ministry of Education and Culture Other association Bank Ministry of Finance Parliamentary group Wage-earner organization To calculate the intensity of interaction, different coefficients, i.e. weights, are assigned to the frequency of contacts. The coefficient for the option "at least once or twice a month" is 100; for the option "a few times a year" 50; and "less often or not at all" 0. Based on this approach the same level of interaction (frequency) can be achieved in several ways, e.g. a few who have many contacts as well as many who have few contacts. The concept of intensity separates these cases. This means that the weight of frequent contacts (at least once a month) in the intensity of interaction is twice as high as in relatively infrequent interaction (a few times a year). The frequency of interaction in the last option is so low that it carries no weight at all in the intensity measure. The intensity of interaction between the power elite and institution A is obtained by multiplying by 100 the portion of those who have had contact with A at least once or twice a month and by adding to this figure the percentage, multiplied by 50, of those who have had contact with A a few times a year and by dividing this sum by the total number of contacts, i.e. the percentages of both those with a few monthly contacts and those with few contacts. The maximum intensity value is 100, which is obtained if all members of the power elite have had interaction with A at least once or twice a month. The index describing the density of interaction is obtained by multiplying the total number of contacts by intensity divided by 100. The latter division by 100 is done simply in order to obtain a comparable figure. The maximum value for this index is thus also 100; the higher the score, the more frequent the interaction of the power elite with institution A (see Petersson, 1989, 36-37). 12

13 Ministry of Employment and the Economy State regional administration * Cultural organization Parliamentary committee State-owned firm or public utility Prime Minister s Office Ministry of Social Affairs and Health Political party: regional organization Regional Council Ministry of Transport and Communications Political party: local organization Armed forces Ministry for Foreign Affairs Cooperative firm Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry Ministry of the Interior Agricultural producers organization Church Ministry of Defence Ministry of Justice Ministry of the Environment Judiciary (courts, police) Environmental protection organization The President of the Republic Women s organization Consumer organization N= At the beginning of the 1990s the most central institution in the power elite s network, i.e. covering all elites groups was the mass media, whose position in the interaction network can be characterized by the index value 75. Until 2011 the mass media maintained its most central position even if it dropped to the second, lower circle in the network (index value 68 in 2001 and 67 in 2011). At the same time the third circle in the interaction network (index 50-59) was occupied by three institutions, i.e. the government (52), private firms (50) and banks (51). Of these the government 13

14 dropped to the fourth circle (48) in 2001 but rejoined third circle in 2011 (53). Private firms maintained their position in 2001 (51) but dropped clearly to the fourth circle in 2011 (41). Especially the role of the banks was weakened in the interaction network: while it was included in the third circle in 1991 (51), it dropped to the fourth in 2001 (49) and to the fifth in (30). In 1991 the fourth circle of intensity was composed of two institutions, central government agencies (42) and universities/of applied sciences (48). Since then the first-mentioned institution dropped to the lower circle (39 in 2001, 33 in 2011). By contrast, the density of the universities increased in 2001 (52) and 2011 (50). This notwithstanding, the density of three fifths of institutions in the power elite s interaction network decreased since the early 1990s. The few exceptions were the judiciary (+3), the Ministry of Justice (+3), the President of the Republic (+2), the Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry (+2), the Ministry of Social Affairs and Health (+2), regional councils (+2), and municipalities and their federations (+2), universities (+2), the density of which increased slightly since the early 1990s. The density of interaction decreased most with banks (-21), state-owned firms and public utilities (-10), the Ministry for Foreign Affairs (-9), central government agencies (-9), private firms (-9), the Ministry of the Environment (-8), the mass media (-8), wage-earner organizations (-7), and cultural associations (-7) All in all, the interaction networks of the Finnish elites dispersed since the early 1990s and the number of institutions with which they interacted very intensively decreased. In other words, the interaction network links elites to each other more and more loosely. Furthermore, the number of institutions included in the inner core of the interaction network reduced and partially changed after the early 1990s. Within the elites there were only slight deviations from this general trend. However, the density of contacts of the mass media elite and also a lesser extent that of the scientific elite with various institutions increased more than those of other elites. This also indicates the centrality of the mass media as a hub of the communication network of the elites. Next we will focus on various elite groups. In the case of interaction network of the political elite the most central institutions in terms of density in 2011 were national organizations of political parties (87), the government (83), local organizations of political parties (83), parliamentary groups (82), the mass media (82), regional organizations of political parties (81), and municipalities (72). The density of interaction decreased since 1991 in terms of three fourths of institutions, excluding the government (+9), regional councils (+14), municipalities (+9), church (+7), entrepreneur or business organizations (+2), 14

15 universities (+2), the President of the Republic (+1), and the mass media (+1). The density decreased most in the cases of the Ministry of the Environment (-25), central government agencies (-23), cooperative firms (-22), banks (-21), and the Ministry for Foreign Affairs (-20). The most common targets of interaction of the administrative elite in 2011 were the mass media (68), the government (57), universities (48), state regional administration (48), central government agencies (44), municipalities (44), and Ministry of Finance (41). The density of interaction decreased since the early 1990s onwards in terms of almost a half of institutions but increased especially with Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry (+11) and municipalities (+10) but also with regional organizations of political parties (+7), parliamentary groups (+6), regional councils (+6), Prime Minister s Office (+5), the Ministry of Social Affairs and Health (+5), the judiciary (+5), agricultural producers organizations (+4), the Ministry of Employment and the Economy (+4), the President of the Republic (+3), parliamentary committees (+2), national organizations of political parties (+2), environmental protection organizations (+2), women s organizations (+1), the Ministry of Transport and Communications (+1), and entrepreneur or business organizations (+1). The density decreased most in terms of banks (-13), wage-earners organizations (-11), the Ministry of the Interior (-10), and the mass media (-10). The contacts of the business elite focused most densely in 2011 on private firms (59), the mass media (56), banks (51), employers organizations (44), and the government (40). The density of interaction decreased since the early 1990s in the case of four fifths of institutions. The only organizations to which business elite s contacts increased were municipalities (+13) and other associations (+8), but also state regional administration (+5), the judiciary (+4), local organizations of political parties (+4), the Ministry of Transport and Communications (+4), cooperative firms (+4), and regional organizations of political party s (+1). The density decreased surprisingly most as regards institutions close to business: state-owned firms and public utilities (-22), banks (-22), private firms (-18), the Ministry of Employment and the Economy (-21), entrepreneur or business organizations (-17), and the Ministry of Finance (-16). The most common targets of the contacts of the organizational elite were in 2011 the mass media (71), employers organizations (57), the government (54), wage-earners organizations (48), private firms (44), and entrepreneur or business organizations (43). The density of interaction increased most with the President of the Republic (+8), the Ministry of Employment and the Economy (+7), employers organizations (+6), and Prime Minister s Office (+5), while it decreased in terms of agencies (-18), the Ministry of the Interior (-16), and state-owned firms and public utilities (-14). 15

16 The contacts of the mass media elite focused in 2011 most densely on the mass media (82), private firms (64), the government (55), universities (50), other research institutes (44), banks (43), and other associations (40). The mass media differed from other elite groups in that sense that the density of its contacts increased in with two thirds of institutions, most with the government (+14), the Ministry of Finance (+14), other associations (+14), private firms (+13), local organizations of political parties (+12), the Ministry of Social Affairs and Health (+12), parliamentary groups (+12), and other research institutes (+12). By contrast, the interplay decreased only in the case of a quarter of institutions, most with cultural organizations (-6), banks (-6), the President of the Republic (-4), and the mass media (-4). The scientific elite interacted most densely in 2011 with universities (84), the mass media (52), the Ministry of Education and Culture (41), the government (38), and private firms (36). The interaction of this elite group changed modestly in : the density of contacts increased in the case of a half of institutions, most with municipalities (+12) and parliamentary groups (+10) while it decreased with two fifths of institutions, most the mass media (-12), central government agencies (-11), cultural associations (-11), and banks (-11). The contacts of the cultural elite focused in 2011 most on cultural associations (67), the mass media (57), the Ministry of Education and Culture (47), universities (44), and private firms (34). The interaction decreased with two thirds of institutions, most with banks (-20), the Ministry of Education and Culture (-17), the mass media (-16), cultural associations (-12), and the Ministry for Foreign Affairs (-12), and private firms (-11) By contrast, the density increased most with the President of the Republic (+9), national organizations of political parties (+8), the Ministry of Employment and the Economy (+5), and other research institutes (+5). The Direction of the Elite Contacts After analyzing the density of interaction networks of various elite groups we focus on the form, i.e. the direction of the elite members contacts. The respondents were presented with three alternatives concerning all institutions to which they may have contacts: mostly you provide information with the other party for its decision-making, mostly the other party provides information with you for your decision-making, and more general exchange of information or social interaction. If the respondent did not answer the question dealing with the nature of interaction with an institution, a 16

17 missing value may be interpreted by different ways. For instance, she or he did not want to give information of her or his interaction with this institution, or she or he did not have had interaction at all with this specific institution. We prefer the last mentioned interpretation: if the respondent was willing to answer to the inquiry, including questions dealing with her or his socio-economic position, the question concerning interaction networks could not have been particularly sensitive to the respondent. All in all, this kind of formulation of the question means that we can analyze the elite network as bidirectional, i.e. the question measures the direction of interaction by dissociating the sender from the receiver. Secondly, it differentiates important information, which contributes to decisionmaking, from more general information exchange or social interplay, even if also the last mentioned form of interaction may have effect on power wielding (Table 3). Table 3: The Direction of Information Flow between the Power Elite and the Institutions in 2011 (%) and the Change in (Percentage Points) Mainly Mainly More No self the other general answer Institution party The mass media 59 (-4) 6 (+1) 20 (+3) 16 (+1) The Government/minister advisor 47 (-2) 11 (+3) 21 (+4) 21 (-5) University/ of applies sciences 27 (+3) 20 (-3) 31 (+2) 22 (-2) Private firm 20 (-2) 19 (-3) 26 (+4) 35 (+1) Municipality and federation of municipalities 26 (+4) 12 (-1) 25 (+7) 38 (-10) Other research institute 16 (-1) 22 (-3) 26 (+6) 37 (-1) Central government agency 23 (-10) 15 (+2) 24 (+4) 38 (+3) Entrepreneur or business organization 17 (-) 18 (-2) 30 (+5) 36 (-3) Political party: national organization 29 (-2) 9 (+3) 23 (+3) 39 (-4) Employers organization 17 (-) 18 (-3) 27 (+6) 39 (-2) Ministry of Education and Culture 23 (-8) 19 (+7) 23 (+4) 35 (-3) Other association 17 (+5) 13 (-2) 31 (+7) 40 (-8) Bank 13 (-8) 22 (-2) 24 (+3) 42 (+7) 17

18 Ministry of Finance 24 (-7) 18 (+4) 18 (+3) 41 (+1) Parliamentary group 32 (-1) 9 (+3) 22 (+6) 37 (-8) Wage-earner organization 15 (-2) 16 (-4) 29 (+5) 41 (+2) Ministry of Employment and the Economy 25 (-) 15 (+2) 19 (+2) 41 (-4) Cultural organization 11 (-2) 13 (-5) 35 (+7) 41 (-) Parliamentary committee 44 (+1) 7 (+2) 13 (+4) 36 (-7) State-owned firm or public utility 13 (-4) 16 (-4) 26 (+6) 45 (+2) Prime Minister s Office 19 (-2) 13 (+1) 23 (+7) 45 (-7) Ministry of Social Affairs and Health 18 (+1) 13 (+1) 24 (+7) 46 (-8) Political party: regional organization 18 (+2) 6 (-1) 26 (+7) 50 (-8) Regional Council 17 (+4) 13 (+1) 25 (+6) 46 (-10) Ministry of Transport and Communications 18 (-1) 13 (-) 20 (+5) 48 (-5) Political party: local organization 18 (-) 7 (+2) 24 (+4) 52 (-5) Armed forces 10 (-) 15 (-2) 30 (+3) 46 (-) Ministry for Foreign Affairs 14 (-7) 14 (-3) 26 (+7) 45 (+1) Cooperative firm 9 (-1) 12 (-2) 27 (+4) 52 (-1) Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry 14 (-) 11 (+1) 25 (+5) 51 (-6) Ministry of the Interior 14 (-4) 16 (+3) 20 (+4) 50 (-3) Agricultural producers organization 9 (-) 12 (-3) 26 (+2) 53 (+1) Church 10 (+3) 10 (-2) 30 (-) 50 (-2) Ministry of Defence 11 (-3) 14 (+3) 25 (+3) 50 (-3) Ministry of Justice 13 (-) 13 (+3) 24 (+6) 50 (-9) Ministry of the Environment 16 (-4) 12 (-) 21 (+3) 51 (+1) Judiciary (courts, police) 12 (+3) 11 (-) 27 (+6) 50 (-9) Environmental protection organization 6 (+1) 12 (-5) 28 (+7) 54 (-4) The President of the Republic 13 (+3) 3 (-2) 41 (+10) 43 (-11) Women s organization 5 (-) 9 (-1) 30 (+8) 56 (-8) Consumer organization 5 (+1) 8 (-5) 29 (+9) 58 (-6) N=431 As regards the power elite, i.e. all elites together the elite members sent more often than received information to 24 institutions in 1991, 17 institutions in 2001, and 23 institutions. Conversely, they received more often information than transmitted from 16 institutions in 1991, 22 institutions in 18

19 2001, and 15 institutions on All in all, the contacts of the power elite became more general in nature: more general exchange of information or social interaction was the most common content of information in the case of 20 institutions in 1991, 29 institutions in 2001, and 33 institutions in Sending of information was the most common content of interaction of the elite members since the early 1990s in the cases of following institutions: parliamentary groups, parliamentary committees, the government, national organizations of political parties, the Ministry of Finance, the Ministry of Education and Culture, the Ministry of Employment and the Economy, and the mass media. Moreover, in 1991 the sending was the most common content of interaction with the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, the Ministry of the Interior, the Ministry of Transport and Communications, and the Ministry of the Environment. In the cases of central government agencies and Prime Minister s Office sending was most common content of interaction in as well as in the case of municipalities and their federations in 1991 and It is evident that transmitting information is connected to influence on the elite level. The list of institutions to which elite members most commonly sent information was very similar than the list of most influential social institutions in the Finnish society. Namely, according to the elite members evaluation in 2011, the most influential institutions out of 24 were in order the government, Parliament, TV and radio, the press, political parties and big business (the ministries were not inquired) (Ruostetsaari 2012, 279). Although Knoke (1990, 10-13) argued that the actor is influential, if it receives several contacts but sends itself only few, it seems evident that the situation is the reverse on elite level: active sending of information to societal actors can be seen as a way to get other actors to adapt to elite s objectives. However, the sending of information as a form of elite communication increased only in terms of 12 institutions while it decreased in the case of 20 institutions since the early 1990s. Conversely, receiving of information was the most common content of interaction in the case of any institution during the whole research period of The receiving was most common content in in the cases of employers organizations, other research institutions, banks, and private firms. However, in the case of private business all forms of interaction were equally common. Moreover, in the case of state-owned firms or public utilities in 1991 receiving and more general exchange of information were equally common. The receiving of information as a form of elite communication increased in terms of 17 institutions while it decreased in the case of 21 institutions since the early 1990s. 19

20 By contrast, the role of more general exchange of information or social interaction increased as a content of interaction between the elite members and all societal institutions. Hence, we may conclude that not only in terms of density but also in terms of the content of interaction the power elite s network was fragmented and dispersed in Next we focus on the content of interaction of various elite groups. Members of the political elite transmitted more often than received information to 7 institutions in 1991, 9 institutions in 2001, and 9 institutions in Conversely, they received more often information than transmitted from 34 institutions in 1991, 32 institutions in 2001, and 31 institutions on Hence, the political elite was clearly a receiver of information, i.e. a target of influencing and lobbying as a policy-maker and legislator by various institutions. The role of more general exchange of information or social interaction increased significantly: it was the most common content of information in the case of 6 institutions in 1991, 11 institutions in 2001, and 23 institutions in Transmitting of information was the most common content of interaction of the members of the political elite since the early 1990s in the cases of parliamentary committees, the government, political party organizations on national, regional and local levels, the mass media, parliamentary groups (excluding 2011) but also municipalities in It is noteworthy that the role of sending of information compared to other contents of interaction increased importantly in the cases of the government and all levels of political party organizations. In other words, the political elite tried to exert more and more influence on these institutions. During the whole research period receiving was the most common content dealing with the Ministry of Finance, the Ministry of Education and Culture, wage-earner organizations, employers organizations, entrepreneur and business organizations, agricultural producers organizations, other research institutes, and state-owned firms or public utilities. Many of these institutions are lobbying organizations. Moreover, the political elite transmitted mainly information to several ministries, associations, cooperatives, private business and banks until 2001, after which the interplay with these institutions changed by nature to more general exchange of information. The members of the administrative elite sent more often than received information to 30 institutions in 1991, 24 institutions in 2001, and 36 institutions in Conversely, they received more often information than transmitted to 10 institutions in 1991, 16 institutions in 2001, and 4 institutions on The role of more general exchange of information or social interaction increased 20

21 significantly in the 1990s: it was the most common content of information in the case of 16 institutions in 1991, 26 institutions in 2001, and 26 institutions in Transmitting of information was the most common content of interaction of the members of the administrative elite since the early 1990s onwards in the cases of parliamentary committees, parliamentary groups, the government, central government agencies, regional councils, the mass media, and most of ministries. In fact, the administrative elite was mainly a sender of information: receiving information was the most common content of interaction only in the cases of wage-earner organizations, other research institutes, state-owned firms and private business in The pattern may be explained by that the role of the administrative elite, i.e. senior civil servants is to prepare policy proposals for political decision-makers and coordinate policy planning between various branches of administration. On the other hand, it is a target of influencing for lobbying groups. The members of the business elite transmitted more often than received information to 34 institutions in 1991, 30 institutions in 2001, and 23 institutions in Conversely, they received more often information than transmitted to 7 institutions in 1991, 8 institutions in 2001, and 12 institutions on The role of more general exchange of information or social interaction increased significantly in the 1990s: it was the most common content of information in the case of 17 institutions in 1991, 29 institutions in 2001, and 29 institutions in The sending of information was the most common content of interaction of the members of the business elite in in the cases of parliamentary committees, the government, the Ministry of Finance, the Ministry of Employment and the Economy, the mass media, and private firms. All of these institutions exert important influence on operational conditions of the business. Moreover, the sending was more common than receiving concerning parliamentary factions, Prime Minister s Office and the Ministry of Transport and Communications in , and all organizational levels of political parties, several ministries, entrepreneurs organizations, other research institutes and banks in 1991 as well as central government agencies and municipalities in 1991 and The business elite was mainly a sender of information: receiving information was the most common content of interaction only in the cases of employers organizations in and entrepreneurs organizations and banks in In fact, the role of the business elite as a sender of information decreased and that of a receiver increased since the early 1990s. The members of the organizational elite transmitted more often than received information to 34 institutions in 1991, 32 institutions in 2001, and 40 institutions in Conversely, they received more often information than transmitted to 6 institutions in 1991, 9 institutions in 2001, and only 21