West Bank and Gaza: Governance and Anti-corruption Public Officials Survey

Transcription

1 West Bank and Gaza: Governance and Anti-corruption Public Officials Survey Background document prepared for the World Bank report West Bank and Gaza- Improving Governance and Reducing Corruption 1

2 Contents Contents... 2 Acknowledgments ) Introduction to the Survey ) Defining corruption, comparing it with other institutional governance challenges ) Ranking the manifestations of corruption in the Public Sector... 8 A. Institutional rankings: Perceptions of integrity B. Transparency in Decision Making: In General and in Human Resources C. Accountability of Staff who mismanages or engage in corrupt practices D. Budgetary decision-making and budget implementation E. Contracts and Procurement ) Reporting Corruption ). Design Considerations for Anti-Corruption Reporting Mechanisms Appendix A: Methodology Appendix B: Classification of Public Official Positions Appendix C: Figures

3 Acknowledgments This report is a component of a broader World Bank study of corruption issues in the West Bank and Gaza. The task team leader for the work is Mark Ahern, Governance Advisor for WBG working with Nithya Nagarajan, a public sector consultant. The survey was designed by a team involving Mark Ahern and Nithya Nagarajan of the World Bank, Hama Zidan and Ghada Zughayar of AMAN (Transparency Palestine) and Mustafa Khwaja and Ahmed Atiah of the Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics (PCBS). PCBS was responsible for drawing the sample frame, the conduct of the field work, and the data collation and cleaning. This report was written by David Siroky, with guidance from Mark Ahern, and Nithya Nagarajan. Appendix A was written by the PCBS. 3

4 1) Introduction to the Survey The West Bank and Gaza (WBG) public officials survey is an effort to study governance and anti-corruption issues in the West Bank and Gaza, and to understand the management of public service delivery in sectors such as health, justice and education. To this end, it surveys public officials about their experiences and perceptions involving transparency, corruption and service delivery in these sectors. The purpose of this study is to identify the practices that have developed within public institutions related to decision-making and the distribution of public services. In this way, the survey aims to diagnose, the quality of public services, and remaining obstacles to effective, accountable and transparent decision-making and public service delivery. By measuring perceptions of and experience with each public sector institution delivering services to citizens, this scientific and nationally representative survey will enable the Palestinian Authority to direct its continuing anti-corruption efforts to the sectors where they are most needed. This survey provides benchmark data that will be used for the monitoring and evaluation of the government s performance in implementing ongoing and future reforms. In addition, it prepares the ground for future interventions aimed at leveling obstacles to more responsive, transparent, accountable, and efficient delivery of public services in the West Bank and Gaza. The survey interviewed a representative sample of 864 public officials in the West Bank on their experience and general perceptions of institutional governance challenges, standards of living, the integrity and accountability of various public services providers, challenges to reporting corruption and any experiences with corruption. The report is structured in five parts. Following this introduction and highlights of the report, the next section defines and characterizes corruption in WBG and compares it to other institutional governance challenges. The third section ranks the most, and the least, prevalent manifestations of corruption in five areas: i) Corrupt Institutions, ii) Transparency in Decision Making, iii) Accountability of Staff, iv) Budgetary Decision-Making, and v) Contracts and Procurement. The fourth section discusses mechanisms for reporting corruption along with reasons why individuals sometimes choose not to report it. The fifth and final section covers design considerations for the implementation of future anti-corruption campaigns. Highlights of the public officials survey include the following findings: Respondents believe that all five categories of corruption have decreased over the past five years Of the five manifestations of corruption presented in the survey, large scale corruption and bribery are considered the least prevalent. More than 45% of respondents who expressed an opinion 1 said large scale corruption was rare or never occurred. Likewise, more than 45 % said bribery was rare or never occurred. 1 In analyzing the survey those that responded don t know have been excluded and the results reflect the views of those who expressed an opinion. 4

5 Nepotism is widely perceived as the most prevalent manifestation of corruption in the public sector, with 53% of respondents reporting that it occurs most of the times. However, respondents also believe that incidents of nepotism have decreased more than any other form of corruption during the past five years. PA public officials define corruption in a manner consistent with internationally accepted standards. At all levels of government, public sector corruption is considered only a marginal problem compared to other institutional governance challenges. While only 20% of public officials surveyed said they had ever observed corruption, nearly half failed to report the corruption to any government body. Overwhelming majorities of respondents who observed corruption did not report it because they believe 1) whistleblowers will not be protected (70%); 2) action taken to stop corrupt activities would not be enforced (62%) and 3) corrupt officials will not be punished (75 %). 2) Defining corruption, comparing it with other institutional governance challenges Defining Corruption Public officials were first asked to define corruption and were given a number of actions to judge. Almost all officials deemed stealing public funds (99.9%) and taking bribes to award public contracts (99.5%) as corrupt actions. Taking bribes for travel documents (98.1%) and obtaining a job thanks to family relationships (98.5%) followed closely in the proportion of positive responses. While these three actions were almost unanimously considered corrupt, a significant portion of the respondents considered every action mentioned in the survey as corrupt. The two behaviors least likely to be viewed as corrupt were (1) obtaining travel documents based on a family relationship (47.2%) and (2) obtaining a job that s/he is qualified for, but received through family relationship (61.5%). HH Survey Comparison: The Household (HH) survey revealed similar perceptions of corruption. Both stealing public funds (99.3%) and taking bribes to award public contracts (98.7%) were seen as corrupt. Obtaining a job thanks to family relationships (97%) followed closely, along with A person is promoted thanks to a family / geographical / factional relationship with a state secretary or high ranking public official (95%) and public official receive gifts from citizens for providing service (94%). The behaviors least likely to be viewed as corrupt were obtaining travel documents based on a family relationship (59% vs. 47% in PO), securing a health referral abroad by using his family or friends in the health ministry 5

6 (61% vs. 75% in PO), and obtaining a job that she is qualified for, but received through family relationship (67% vs. 62% in PO). In general, then, the percentage of officials responding yes, corruption was comparable across the two surveys, though three major differences between the two surveys are worth noting. First, only 61% in the HH survey felt that using family or friends in the health ministry to secure a health referral was corruption, but more than 75% in the PO considered the practice corrupt. Second, more than 88% in the HH survey, but more than 98% in the PO survey, considered bribing an official for a travel document to be corrupt. In both cases, respondents in the PO survey were more likely than those in the HH survey to consider these practices as corrupt. Third, and in the reverse direction, more respondents in the HH survey (59%) than in the PO survey (47%) considered using family or friends familiar with officials to request that a travel document be expedited corrupt. Perceptions of corruption in public sector, private sector and civil society. The next part of the survey distinguished public, private and civil society sector corruption. On the whole, public sector officials perceive public sector corruption as considerably more serious than either private sector or civil society corruption. 65% of respondents identify public sector corruption as very important. By contrast, less than half view civil society corruption (43%) or private sector corruption (39%) as very important. Furthermore, 93% view public sector corruption as an important or very important problem compared to 83% for private sector corruption and 85% for societal corruption. There was also less disagreement about public sector corruption than either private or societal corruption: the standard deviation for public sector corruption is 4, while it is 0.76 for private sector and 0.74 for civil society corruption. HQ vs. Branch: Respondents were divided into those that worked in Headquarters and those that worked in branch offices, and their responses were compared. The results were largely the same in branch offices and in the headquarter (HQ) offices. In the HQ, 65% deemed public sector corruption very important compared to 42% for civil society corruption and 37% for private sector corruption. Branch-employees saw issues similarly: 64% for public sector corruption, 46% for civil society corruption and 42% for private sector corruption. Direct vs. Indirect Interface with Public: Respondents were divided into those that worked directly with the public and those that worked indirectly with the public, and their responses were compared. Among those public officials who worked in institution that directly interfaced with the public, 64% perceived public sector corruption as important, compared to 43% for civil society corruption and 39% for private sector corruption. Among those public officials who worked in institutions that interfaced with the public indirectly, the numbers were comparable: 64% (public), 43% (civil society) and 37% (private). Levels or Rank of Public Official: The survey divided respondents into seven levels or ranks, according to their position. We then agreed to group these seven categories into three bins: high (15%), medium (35%) and low (50%). 2 Among those respondents in the high category, 60% viewed public sector corruption as very important, while 52% saw civil society corruption and 38% saw the private sector corruption as very important. Among those 2 See Appendix B for details on classification. 6

7 respondents in the medium category, 65% viewed public sector corruption as very important, while 47% saw civil society corruption and 42% saw the private sector corruption as very important. Finally, among those respondents in the low category, 64% viewed public sector corruption as very important, while 38% saw civil society corruption and 37% saw the private sector corruption as very important. Overall, then, the public official s rank does not seem to bear any strong relationship to the respondent's perception of how important public sector corruption is relative to civil society and private sector corruption. Comparison with Household Survey: The general public perceives public sector corruption as considerably more serious than either private sector or civil society corruption, a result that is consistent with the perception of public officials. 65% of PO respondents (vs. 66.5% of HH respondents, excluding missing) identify public sector corruption as very important. Less than half of the PO respondents view civil society corruption (45% vs. HH = 49.2%) or private sector corruption (46% vs. HH = 49%) as very important. Furthermore, 91.5% (vs. PO = 93%) view public sector corruption as an important or very important problem compared to 81.5% (vs. PO = 83%) for private sector corruption and 82.3% (vs. PO = 85%) for civil society corruption. There was also less disagreement about public sector corruption than either private or societal corruption: the standard deviation for public sector corruption was 1.8 (vs for PO), 2.1 for private (vs. 1.7 for PO) and 2.2 for civil society (vs. 1.7 for PO) corruption, indicating more consensus in the PO survey than in the HH survey. Institutional Governance Challenges Among twenty institutional governance challenges, public sector corruption ranks as the 7 th most serious among respondents in the PO survey. Private sector corruption ranks 18 th and civil society corruption ranks as the 15 th most serious institutional governance challenge. When asked to select the single most serious problem, 42% of respondents selected Internal Conflict, followed by Political Instability (23%) and the High Cost of Living (11%). Only 4% chose Public Sector Corruption as the most serious problem, and less than 1% chose either Civil Society or Private Sector corruption as the most important problem. In addition to Internal Conflict, Political Instability, and the High Cost of Living, Unemployment and the Low Quality of Education were also viewed as more serious problems than Public Sector corruption. These results can be interpreted to mean that public sector corruption is perceived as a relatively marginal problem compared to other institutional governance challenges facing the PA. HQ vs. Branch: Among those respondents working in HQ, Internal Conflict was the most serious problem (42%), followed by Political Instability (25%) and the High Cost of Living (10%). Only 4% selected Public Sector Corruption as the most serious problem, and less than 1% chose Private Sector as the most important problem. More serious than Public Sector Corruption were Internal Conflict, Political Instability, High Cost of Living, Unemployment, Poor leadership, and Low Quality of Education. That places Public Sector Corruption as the 7 th most serious problem out of 20 among officials working in headquarters, the same rank it received among respondents in general. Among those respondents working in branch offices, Internal Conflict was also the most serious problem (43%), followed by Political Instability (21%) and the High Cost of Living (12%). Again, only 4% selected Public Sector Corruption as the most serious problem, and none chose Private Sector as the most important problem. More serious than Public Sector Corruption 7

8 were Internal Conflict, Political Instability, High Cost of Living, Safety concerns /crime / violence, and Low Quality of Education. Among branch officials, then, Public Sector Corruption was the 6 th most serious problem out of 20, which is only one rank higher than it received among respondents in general and among HQ respondents. In both cases, only about 4% (or fewer than 20 respondents) selected public sector corruption as the most serious problem in WBG. Levels or Rank of Public Official: All three levels of public official ranked public corruption similarly (High = 6th, Med = 5th, Low = 6 th ). At most, 5% from any of the three levels selected public sector corruption as the most serious problem. Internal conflict, political instability, high cost of living, unemployment, and low quality of education, safety concerns, crime and violence was deemed far more serious problems than public sector corruption across all levels or ranks. Comparison with Household Survey: Corruption was ranked as a slightly more important problem among Public Sector employees than it was among the general public. The Household respondents ranked it the 10 th important problem, whereas public officials ranked as the 7 th most important problem. In neither survey, however, was public sector corruption considered one of the most serious problems facing the PA. When asked to select the single most serious problem, HH respondents selected the following three problems most frequently: High cost of living (29%), Internal conflict (28%) and unemployment (14%). PO respondents highlighted some different problem: 42% of respondents selected Internal Conflict and 23% selected Political Instability (23%). In common with the HH survey, the High Cost of Living was identified as a key problem, though PO respondents (11%) viewed it as less important than HH respondents (29%). Similarly, both groups of respondents considered internal conflict to be a critical problem (PO = 42% vs. HH = 28%). The two surveys agreed on two of three top problems. The HH identified unemployment as one of the top three problems, whereas the PO identified political instability as the other top issue. Only 2% in the HH survey (and 4% in the PO survey) chose Public Sector Corruption as the most serious problem, and less than 1% chose either Civil Society or Private Sector corruption as the most important problem. 3) Ranking the manifestations of corruption in the Public Sector What are the most common manifestations of corruption in the public sector? Nepotism is widely viewed as the most prevalent manifestation of corruption in the Public Sector: 53% of respondent believe that it occurs most of the time. The second most prevalent manifestation of corruption, according to respondents, is the Unauthorized Personal Use of Resources belonging to the PA. Almost 50% believe that this happens most of the time. The third most prevalent form of corruption was Conflict of Interest (46%). HQ vs. Branch: Branch officials were more likely than HQ officials to see nepotism as a prevalent form of corruption in the public sector. 62% of branch officials said that it happened most of the time, compared to 48% of respondents who work in HQ positions. In both HQ and branches, the personal use of resources (HQ = 47%, Br=52%) and conflict of interest 8

9 (HQ=44%, Br=49%) were the second and third most prevalent manifestations of corruption in the public sector. Direct vs. Indirect Interface with Public: Public official with and without direct interface with the recipients of public services viewed these forms of corruption and their relative prevalence similarly. Nepotism was again the most frequent problem across both groups (Direct = 50%, Indirect = 44%), followed by the personal use of resources (Direct = 50%, Indirect = 44%) and conflicts of interest (Direct = 47%, Indirect = 40%). Those officials employed in indirect capacities tended to underestimate the extent of corruption compared to those directly interfacing with the public. Levels or Rank of Public Official: Regardless of their level, public officials viewed the relative frequency of these forms of corruption similarly. Nepotism was the most frequent problem across groups (H = 38%, M = 47%, L = 61%), followed by the personal use of resources (H = 41%, M = 43%, L = 55%) and conflicts of interest (H = 39%, M = 38%, L = 52%). Low-level public officials tended to estimate a higher frequency of occurrence across all types of corruption. The lowest level employees estimated between 7 to 23% higher than the high level employees across all types of corruption. Comparison with Household survey: Nepotism was also viewed as the most prevalent manifestation of corruption in the Public Sector in the HH survey. 77% of respondents in the HH survey (compared to 53% in the PO survey) believed that it occurs most of the time. In the HH survey, the second and third most prevalent forms of corruption were conflict of interest (65% in HH vs. 46% in PO) and unauthorized use of resources (59.5% in HH vs. 49% in PO). The Least Prevalent Manifestations of Corruption Among all respondents, the least prevalent forms of corruption were Large Scale Corruption and Bribery. More than 45.2% said that large-scale corruption was rare or never occurred and less than 20% said it happened most of the time. Likewise, 45.4% said that bribery was rare or never occurred and less than 15% said that it happened most of the time. 3 HQ vs. Branch: Branch and HQ officials ranked Large Scale Corruption (HQ=15%, Br=26%) and Bribery (HQ=12%, Br = 20%) as the two least frequent manifestations of corruption in the public sector. Direct vs. Indirect Interface with Public: Both groups ranked Bribery, (Direct = 15%, Indirect = 13%) and Large-scale corruption (Direct = 20%, Indirect = 15%) as the two least frequent manifestations of corruption in the public sector. 3 In those rare case when it did occur, 39% said that the user would offer a bribe most of the time or sometimes, while 20% said a public official would insinuate the need for a bribe most of the time or sometimes. About 30% of officials said that both parties were usually aware of the need for a bribe and knew the appropriate amount of the bribe most of the time or sometimes. When asked about reporting a bribe (cf. Reporting Section) to another official or his superior, respondents were inclined to think that the reporting party would not receive fair treatment. 37% said yes, fair treatment and 62% no. 9

10 Levels or Rank of Public Official: All ranks viewed Large Scale Corruption and Bribery as the two least frequent manifestations of corruption in the public sector. The estimated frequency of both forms of corruption generally decreases as the level of the official increases: large-scale corruption (H = 15%, M = 15%, L = 22%) and bribery (H = 10%, M = 14%, L = 17%). Comparison with Household survey: In both the HH and the PO survey, the least prevalent forms of corruption were Large Scale Corruption and Bribery. In the HH survey, about 50% said that both kinds of corruption occur most of the time. In the PO survey, these two forms of corruption were also chosen as the least frequent manifestations of corruption in the public sector, but the numbers were drastically different (15% for bribery and 19% for large scale corruption in the PO survey, compared to 50% in the HH survey). Across the board, the HH survey yielded higher numbers than the PO survey for every type of corruption. Levels of Corruption w vs. 4 years ago All five manifestations have decreased in frequency over the past 4 years. Nepotism has decreased the most: 22% fewer respondents said that it occurs most of time now. The frequency of Bribery decreased by 19%, Abuse of Resources by 18%, and Large Scale corruption decreased by 16%. The smallest improvement was observed in the Conflict of Interest category (12%). The rank order of these forms of corruption, however, was identical today and four years ago. A. Institutional rankings: Perceptions of integrity A higher percentage of respondents indicated that the General Personnel Council (33.7%), the Transportation Ministry (32.8%) and the PLC (30.7%) lacked integrity compared to 28 other institutions. 4 teworthy, however, is that a sizable number between 15 and 40% of respondents reported don't know, which may indicate a reluctance to identify a particular institution. HQ vs. Branch: HQ officials selected the same top three institutions: Transportation (33%), General Personnel (32%) and PLC (31%). The Ministry of Health (28%), Religious Affairs (24%), Social Affairs (23%) and Civil Affairs (22%) were also mentioned as lacking integrity. Branch officials generally agreed, identifying the General Personnel (36%), PLC (33%), Transportation (32%) and Social Affairs (32%). The Ministries of Labor (29%) and Religious Affairs (27%) followed closely behind. A number of other ministries were similarly deemed corrupt: Agriculture (25%), Health (25%), Land (24%) and Education (24%). Direct vs. Indirect Interface with Public: Among those public officials who worked in institutions with direct contact to the public, the three most corrupt institutions were the General Personnel Council (35%), the Transportation Ministry (34%), and the PLC (33%). Approximately one third of these respondents characterized these three institutions as having a low level of integrity or a complete lack of integrity. Among those public officials who worked in institutions without direct contact to the public, the three most corrupt institutions were only overlapped in part. Transportation was tied with the Health ministry for the institution 4 This number includes those respondents that believe it has a low level of integrity or none at all, and includes don t knows in the total. 10

11 with the least integrity (29%), and both were followed by the General Personnel Council (28%). In sum, the two groups generally agreed on which institutions lacked integrity, and differed in their evaluation by no more than 8%.5 They disagreed by 10% or more on only two institutions: the Ministry of Social Affairs (28% Direct, 18% Indirect) and the Ministry of Youth and Sport (21% Direct, 9% Indirect). Levels or Rank of Public Officials: The high and low groups identified the General Personnel Council as the institution most lacking in integrity. The medium level officials also identified the GPC as lacking in integrity (n=96, 33%), but about the same number of respondents also identified the Transportation Ministry as the most lacking in integrity (n=100, 34%). All three groups also identified the Central Bureau of Statistics as the institution with the most integrity. The second and third spots in both categories (the most and the least) only partially agreed across the career levels of the officials. Whereas low-level officials identified the Transportation Ministry and PLC as the second and third in terms of low integrity, mid-level officials chose the Transportation and the Health Ministry, and high-level officials selected the PLC and the Ministry of Religious Affairs. Major discrepancies between the levels were few, however. The largest difference nine percent was between the low and midlevel officials evaluation of the Interior Ministry (23% vs. 12%). A seven point difference was observed in evaluations of other ministries: Low-level officials evaluated the Ministry of Local Government and the High Judiciary as more corrupt than did high-level employees (7% difference). Low-level officials also evaluated the Ministry of Labor more harshly than did either mid or high-level officials (23% vs. 16%). On balance, highlevel officials were more generous than either mid or low level officials in their evaluation of the ministries surveyed. Institutions with high levels of integrity The three departments within the Government that are viewed as having the highest levels of integrity were the Central Bureau of Statistics (CBS), the Monetary Authority, and the Water Authority. 95% of respondents said that the CBS had a high or medium level of integrity. The corresponding numbers for the Monetary Authority and the Water Authority were 86% and 82%, respectively. The following institutions were also perceived as having a relatively high level of integrity: Energy and Natural Resources Authority (81%), Ministry of Planning and Administration (8%), Ministry of Tourism (8%), Ministry of Local Government (80.1%), Prime Minister (79.9%) HQ vs. Branch: HQ officials ranked the Central Bureau of Statistics (3%), the Monetary Authority (9%), Energy/Natural Resource (9%) and the Water Authority (10%) as having the most integrity. Branch officials also ranked the Central Bureau of Statistics highly (5% said it had low level or lacked integrity). They also choose the Monetary Authority and the Prime Minister's Office (14%). In general, branch officials were more judgmental of the ministries surveyed. Levels or Rank of Public Official: All three groups identified the Central Bureau of Statistics as the institution with the most integrity. Low level and high-level officials identified the Energy 5 This metric is simply the sum of two categories - low level of integrity and complete lack of integrity. 11

12 and Natural Resources Authority and the Monetary Authority as having a high level of integrity. Mid level officials also listed the Monetary Authority, but mentioned the Tourism and Antiquities Ministry instead of the Energy and Natural Resources Authority. B. Transparency in Decision Making: In General and in Human Resources Officials were asked about the nature and extent of transparency in their institution. Almost 70% of the public official surveyed said that decisions were made in a discretionary manner in the institutions in which the respondent works, either most of the time or sometimes. Only 33% said that discretionary decision-making was rare or never [happened]. Most employees feel that they enjoy freedom and have discretionary power in their daily job: 66% strongly agree or agree, while 34% disagreed or strongly disagreed. 6 HQ vs. Branch: Officials working in HQ were more likely to identify decision-making as discretionary in the institutions in which they work (69%) compared to officials working in branch offices (61%). Direct vs. Indirect Interface with Public: 64% of officials working directly with the public felt that decisions were made in a discretionary manner in the institutions in which they work, whereas 74% officials working indirectly with the public felt similarly. This difference between the direct and indirect respondents is noteworthy indirect officials were much more likely to see decision-making as discretionary than direct officials. Discretionary Decision Making in HR Officials were asked the extent to which they agreed that human resource decisions were made in a transparent manner. 58% agreed or strongly agreed that decisions in HR were transparent, while 34% disagreed and 7% strongly disagreed. HQ vs. Branch: 57% of officials working in HQ felt that HR decisions were made in a transparent manner, whereas 56% of officials working in branch offices felt similarly. Direct vs. Indirect Interface with Public: 57% of officials working directly with the public felt that HR decisions were made in a transparent manner, whereas 54% of officials working indirectly with the public felt similarly. Levels or Rank of Public Official: 68% of officials working at the highest level felt that HR decisions were made in a transparent manner, whereas 61% officials working in mid-level positions, and 50% working in low-level positions, felt similarly. This difference of 18% between the highest and lowest levels is noteworthy. 6 Related, 76% strongly agree or agree that there were too many levels in the decisionmaking process and 67% strongly agree or agree that decision-making was too centralized. 12

13 tification of Government Job Vacancies Officials were asked how they learned about the vacancy of their first position in government and were given a chance to reply yes or no to four options. Most frequently, officials found their position through an advertisement in a media outlet (newspaper, radio, TV): 34% said yes. This was followed by 33% who found their position through a source that was not given as a choice in the survey, denoted other, and 32% who found out about the position from someone within the organization. Only 9% replied yes when asked if they found out about their position because it was posted on a bulletin board. Consistent with these results, 70% agreed or strongly agreed that position vacancies are announced within the institution. Even more, roughly 77% agreed or strongly agreed that vacancies were announced publicly outside the institution. Likewise, when officials were asked whether employment in the public sector currently is based on merit not connections, 64% agreed or strongly agreed, and the remaining 36% disagreed or strongly disagreed. HQ vs. Branch: 70% of officials working in HQ and in the branches felt that position vacancies are announced, within the institution. Even more (76% in HQ and 79% in branches) agreed or strongly agreed that vacancies were announced publicly outside the institution. Direct vs. Indirect Interface with Public: 70% of officials working directly with the public felt that position vacancies are announced, within the institution, whereas 72% of officials working indirectly with the public felt similarly. Even more (77% in Direct and 76% in Indirect Ministries) agreed or strongly agreed that vacancies were announced publicly outside the institution. Levels or Rank of Public Official: 77% of officials working at the highest level felt that position vacancies are announced, within the institution, whereas 74% officials working in midlevel positions, and 66% working in low-level positions, felt similarly. This difference of 11% between the highest and lowest levels is noteworthy. Even more (81% High, 79% Mid and 75% Low) agreed or strongly agreed that vacancies were announced publicly outside the institution - this difference here between the highest and lowest levels is less dramatic, but still worth noting for its consistency with other differences. Approximately 75% of respondents agreed that human resource decisions in their institution were based on specific criteria defined in writing rather than tacit, informal rules, and only 5% strongly agreed or agreed that HR decisions were based on the influence of bribe. More than 78% disagreed or strongly disagreed that such decisions were influenced by bribes, and a large number - 16% - said that they do not know. When asked whether such decisions were based on favoritism (Wasta / favoritism), however, some 52% agreed or strongly agreed. HQ vs. Branch: 76% of officials working in HQ felt that human resource decisions in their institution were based on specific criteria defined in writing rather than tacit, informal rules, and 74% of officials working in branch offices felt similarly. 50% in HQ and 53% in branches also agreed or strongly agreed that such decisions were based on favoritism (Wasta). Only 5% in HQ and 7% in branches strongly agreed or agreed, that HR decisions were based on the influence of a bribe. Direct vs. Indirect Interface with Public: 75% of officials working directly with the public felt that human resource decisions in their institution were based on specific criteria defined in 13

14 writing rather than tacit, informal rules, whereas 77% of officials working indirectly with the public felt similarly. 51% in direct and 50% in indirect positions also agreed or strongly agreed that such decisions were based on favoritism (Wasta). Again, only 6% in direct and 5% in indirect positions also agreed or strongly agreed that such decisions were based on the influence of a bribe. Levels or Rank of Public Official: 79% of officials working at the highest level felt that human resource decisions in their institution were based on specific criteria defined in writing rather than tacit, informal rules, whereas 80% officials working in mid-level positions, and 71% working in low-level positions, felt similarly. 38% in High level positions, 47% is mid-level positions, and 58% in low-level positions agreed or strongly agreed that such decisions were based on favoritism (Wasta). The difference in the evaluation of Wasta's role in HR decision making between low-level officials, on the one hand, and the high and mid-level official on the other is noteworthy, and indicates an inverse bi-variate relationship between the official's rank and evaluation of HR decision-making. Internal and External Audits Most officials also felt that their institution was subject to regular internal (60%) and external (61%) audits. HQ vs. Branch: 59% of officials working in HQ (and 63% in branches) felt that their institution was subjected to regular internal audits. 60% in HQ and 62% in branches also agreed or strongly agreed that their institution was subjected to regular external audits. Direct vs. Indirect Interface with Public: 62% of officials working directly with the public felt that their institution was subjected to regular internal audits, whereas only 52% of those officials working indirectly with the public felt similarly this 10% difference is noteworthy. 61% in direct and 62% in indirect positions also agreed or strongly agreed that their institution was subjected to regular external audits. Levels or Rank of Public Official: 68% of officials working at the highest level felt that their institution was subjected to regular internal audits, whereas 64% officials working in mid-level positions, and 55% working in low-level positions, felt similarly. These differences (13%) are noteworthy. 75% in high level positions, 63% is mid-level positions, and 55% in low level positions agreed or strongly agreed that their institution was also subjected to regular external audits. Again, these differences are noteworthy, but may partly reflect the fact that lower level officials are unaware of audits. The fact that, with respect to external audits, only 4% of highlevel officials responded do not know and almost 20% of low-level officials responded do not know seems to bolster this interpretation. A similar trend in do not know responses is also present with respect to internal audits. Personnel Decision Policy Most respondents agreed that policies regarding personnel decision are formally outlined and easy to understand. 89% of official responded that they strongly agree or agree that policies regarding personnel decisions are formally written. They also strongly agree (28%) or agree (58%) that the policies are easy to understand. To a lesser extent, respondents also felt that policies were well supervised (74% strongly agree or agree ). 14

15 When asked if there were too many steps in the personnel decision process, 53% of respondents either strongly agreed or agreed, while 47% disagreed or strongly disagreed. When asked if they felt that the policies were stable and not constantly being re-written, 55% strongly agreed or agreed, while 45% disagreed or strongly disagreed. And, finally, when asked if the policies were strictly applied, and that non-compliance led to negative consequences, 59.7% strongly agreed or agreed, while 40.3% disagreed or strongly disagreed. Officials are in agreement that formal policies exist and are well documented, but differ on whether the policies are enforced, consistent, and superfluous. C. Accountability of Staff who mismanages or engage in corrupt practices Officials were split when asked whether their colleagues are influenced by favoritism /Wasta when providing services: 46% agreeing and 50% disagreeing. 32% of officials surveyed agreed or strongly agreed that service provision was not based on fairness and equality. When asked if their colleagues would ask for a bribe when providing services, however, only 3% agreed and over 91% disagreed. HQ vs. Branch: 50% of officials working in HQ felt that their colleagues are influenced by favoritism /Wasta when providing services and 39% of officials working in branch offices felt similarly. This difference is noteworthy. Only 4% in HQ (and 1% in branches) agreed or strongly agreed that their colleagues would ask for a bribe when providing services. 34% of officials in HQ (and 27% in branches) felt that service provision was not based on fairness and equality. Direct vs. Indirect Interface with Public: 46% of officials working directly with the public felt that their colleagues are influenced by favoritism /Wasta when providing services, and 45% of officials working indirectly with the public felt similarly. Only 3% working directly with the public and 4% working indirectly with the public also agreed or strongly agreed that their colleagues would ask for a bribe when providing services. 31% of officials working directly with the public (and 35% indirectly) felt that service provision was not based on fairness and equality. Levels or Rank of Public Official: 44% of officials working at the highest level felt that their colleagues are influenced by favoritism /Wasta when providing services, whereas 43% officials working in mid-level positions, and 49% working in low-level positions, felt similarly. Only 5% in high-level positions, 3% in mid-level positions, and 2% in low-level positions agreed or strongly agreed that their colleagues would ask for a bribe when providing services. 27% of officials in high-level positions, 29% in mid-level positions, and 35% in low-level positions, considered that service provision was not based on fairness and equality. Higher-level officials offered more favorable evaluations than lower-level employees. 15

16 D. Budgetary decision-making and budget implementation Most public officials (82%) agreed or strongly agreed that budget administration decisions were made in a transparent manner. Likewise, the vast majority of public officials agreed that such decisions were announced and opens to public knowledge through various legal means (77%), subjected to regular audits by internal control unit (85%) and to regular external audits (88%). Consistent with these figures is the fact that an overwhelming majority disagreed that budget administration decisions were based on Wasta / favoritism (81% disagreed) or on the influence on bribe (95% disagreed). The strongest and most consistently negative reactions were in response to questions about bribes and favoritism which most officials felt was rare. Most officials agreed that the budgetary decision making policies are well documented, easy to understand and well supervised: more than 93% responded that they strongly agree or agree. 85% agreed that policies are easy to understand and that they are well supervised. Slightly fewer respondents felt that the budgetary decision making policies were strictly enforced (74% either strongly agreed or agreed). There is a relatively even split in opinion over other aspects of budgetary policy decision-making policy. 53% of officials either strongly agree or agree that there are too many steps in the budgetary policy decision-making process, while 47% disagree or strongly disagree. There was an overwhelming consensus that the budgetary policy process protocols were maintained and followed. 98.2% strongly agree or agree that original receipts are kept for auditing purposes, while 94.0% strongly agreed or agreed that payments to suppliers were based on clear regulation. Officials also felt that the financial systems were well functioning (90% either strongly agreed or agreed) and that the institution they worked in had a computerized financial system (91% either strongly agreed or agreed). There was somewhat less agreement when it came to the control system (81.9% strongly agreed or agreed) and the public availability of information (79.9% strongly agreed or agreed). Lastly, when asked if it was possible to informally influence the amount of the budget that is assigned to each area, 31% either strongly agreed or agreed that it was possible, while 57.6% and only 11.5% strongly disagreed. Although more than 30% of public officials surveyed believed that it is possible to informally influence the amount of the budget assigned to the institution in which one works, almost 70% denied such a possibility. Moreover, almost 90% of public officials surveyed believed that fraud and embezzlement in budget management was rare or never occurred. Similarly, most respondents believe that decisions of budget administration (policies, guidelines and regulations) are well supervised managers make sure that rules are followed and are strictly applied so that non-compliance leads to negative consequences. 16

17 E. Contracts and Procurement The vast majority of public officials surveyed believe that decisions related to contracting procedures were done transparently in their institution (87%) and were based on specific written criteria (94%). Likewise, more than 95% of public officials disagreed that bribes influence contracting procedures, and slightly fewer disagreed (79%) that connections influence such procedures. On balance, officials feel that decisions about public contracts are well organized, formal, and controlled. 94% of respondents stated that they either strongly agree or agree that decisions are based or written criteria, and 87% strongly agree or agree that it is done transparently. When asked about the audit process, 88% either strongly agree or agree that it is subject to external audits, and 85% either strongly agree or agree that contracting decision are subject to an internal audit process. When asked about any corruption in the contracting decision process, 96% either disagree or strongly disagree that decisions are based on bribes. The one area of concern is when official were asked about the influence of connections/wasta in the contracting decision process. While the majority of officials (79%) either disagreed or strongly disagreed that connections/wasta influenced the decision making process, some 21% agreed or strongly agreed that they indeed influenced the process. Exceptions to competitive bidding were perceived as rare. Less than 20% said it happened sometimes or most of the time (C02). Five manifestations of such exceptions were examined. The findings bolster this general result. Less than 5% felt that awarding of public contracts was influenced by illegal payments ( sometimes or most of the time, see C03_1). Less than 10% felt that modifying the terms of the contract to favor the interest of a particular company happened sometimes or most of the time (C03_2). Less than 3% felt that contracting/ presenting offers with fictitious/nonexistent companies happened sometimes or most of the time (C03_3). Less than 9 % felt that re-bidding after choosing one of the competitors happened sometimes or most of the time (C03_4). Less than 15% felt that a member committee had an interest with one of the competitors sometimes or most of the time (C03_5). 4) Reporting Corruption Overall, only 20% of the PO respondents stated that they have encountered corruption while employed in the public sector. Of the 20% that reported observing corruption, approximately one-half (56%) stated that they went ahead and reported it. This leaves about 44% who stated that they observed corruption and did not report it to any governing body. HH Comparison: In the HH survey, only 13% said that they have encountered corruption by a governmental employee. Of those that reported being exposed to corruption, 23% stated that they went ahead and reported it. This leaves 77% who stated that they observed corruption and did not report it to any governing body. In other words, significantly more public officials than HH respondents witnessed corruption and reported it. 17

18 Where to Report Corruption? Of the respondents who claimed to have observed and reported corruption, 78% reported it to the same agency in which the corruption occurred. This is by far the most likely place to report corruption. The next most common places to report corruption were the State Auditor (20%) and The Courts (16.3%). The least common institutions to which reports were delivered include Armed Groups (2%) the Media (3%) and Religious Bodies (4%) HH Comparison: In the HH survey, the same agency in which the corruption occurred was only the third most likely place to report corruption (31%). The first was the Police (52%) and the second was the Security Forces (39%). The least common institutions to which reports were delivered were State Audit & Administrative Control Bureau (5%), Independence commission for human rights (7%) and Media (7%). The State Auditor the least likely place in the HH survey - was the second most common places to report corruption in the PO survey. Why not Report Corruption? Among the respondents in the PO survey who observed corruption, but did not report it, most cited lack of faith in the system as the main reason for not reporting. The specific reasons for non-reporting included the belief that: 1) the ruling would not be enforced (62%), 2) lack of faith in an investigation transpiring (61%) of the respondents and 3) fear of retribution (60%). The lowest ranked reasons for not reporting corruption were that 1) corruption is justified (6.5%), 2) not knowing where to report it (20.5%) and 3) not wanting to betray a co-worker (21%). HH Comparison: In the HH survey, the top three reasons were the same, but a greater proportion of the respondents cited the reasons: 1) the ruling would not be enforced (69% vs. PO = 62%), 2) lack of faith in an investigation transpiring (70% vs. PO = 61%) of the respondents and 3) fear of retribution (67% vs. PO = 60%). The lowest ranked reasons for not reporting corruption were also the same, but with greater intensity in the HH survey than in the PO survey: 1) corruption is justified (33% vs. PO = 6.5%), 2) not knowing where to report it (27% in HH vs. PO = 20.5%) and 3) not wanting to betray a co-worker (25% vs. PO = 21%). Overall, then, respondents had split views on the difficulty of the reporting system. 55% said that it was very difficult or difficult, while 43% said it was simple or very simple. In the HH survey, 69% (vs. PO = 55%) said that the reporting system was very difficult or difficult, while 26 % (vs. PO = 41%) said it was simple or very simple. These differences are significant. Respondents were even more split on whether the perpetrator would be brought to justice: 43% said yes, 44% said no, and 14% did not know. However, when asked if they believed that the reporting employee would be protected from retribution, 70% said no. In the HH survey, 46% said yes, 45% said no and 9% did not know. 66% did not believe that the reporting individual would be protected from retribution. Which institutions are helpful and efficient? Of all the institutions to which someone could report corruption, the Police and the Attorney General were rated as the most helpful (84 and 83%, respectively, as helpful or very 18

19 helpful ). The least helpful were Armed Groups (83% Unhelpful or Very Unhelpful), Political Factions (62% unhelpful) and Parliament (54%). HH Comparison: In the HH survey, 72% rated the Attorney General as helpful or very helpful (vs. 83% in PO) and 86% rated the Police as helpful or very helpful (vs. 84% in PO). The least helpful were different than those chosen in the PO survey. According to the HH survey, the Security Forces (83%), Academics and Teachers (77%) and Courts (76%) were the least helpful institutions. Respondents in both surveys were also asked directly to which of these institutions it would be most effective to report corruption. In the PO survey, the Courts (15.3%), the State Audit (14.9%) and the Police (14.8%) were the three most frequent answers. In the HH survey, the Police (30.7%), the Security Forces (17.4%), and the Courts (14%) were the three most frequent answers. There are three main differences: the State Audit was chosen by 2% in the HH survey and by almost 15% in the PO survey, Security Forces was chosen by about 17% in the HH survey but only 7% in the PO survey, and the proportion choosing the Police was much higher in the HH than in the PO survey. 5). Design Considerations for Anti-Corruption Reporting Mechanisms Any discussion of mechanisms to reduce corruption should take account of its perceived causes. Overall, there is a wide consensus on the causes of corruption. All four statements provided to officials received positive responses. 80% either strongly agree or agree that a potential cause of corruption could be officials' desire for power; 80% strongly agree or agree that the media is captured by corrupt officials; 76% either strongly agree or agree that corrupt officials are never punished in the courts, while 74% feel that people not knowing where to report corruption to are potential causes of corruption and 74% either strongly agree or agree that bribery has been a long standing custom, while 73% either strongly agree or agree that low public officials salaries are a potential causes of corruption. 7 7 In the HH survey, the question was the same, but the answer options were slightly different. Instead of asking whether the respondents strongly agree, agree, disagree, etc., as in the PO survey, they were asked whether the cause was very important, important, etc. That said, the number of options was the same, and so a tentative comparison can be made. In the HH survey, respondents were more likely to issue a positive response to the cited cause across the six options presented. The most cited cause (93% cited as very important or important ) was that bribes have been a custom for a long time [in the PA]. In the PO survey, where the most frequent response (78%) was that public officials want to have power, only 72% agreed or strongly agreed bribes have been a custom [in the PA] for a long time. By contrast, this was the most cited cause in the HH survey. In general, the pattern of responses suggests more intense beliefs among respondents in the HH survey compared to the PO survey all categories received between 4 and 21 more percentage points in the HH survey compared to the PO survey. The differences in the response category labels are important to bear in mind, however. 19

20 Given these causes, in both surveys, four key issue areas in the design any future anti-corruption mechanism deserve special attention. The first is the safety of the reporting employee. To ensure reporting occurs, employees must feel safe, anonymous and protected from retribution. The second is that all claims must be taken seriously, however minor. A thorough investigation of all alleged occurrences will foster trust among employees and ensure that potential reporters of corruption feel that reporting is worthwhile. Third, the responsible institution for managing the anti-corruption mechanisms should be trusted and unbiased with no stake in the offending institution or the employees involved. The survey data suggest that Human Resources could benefit the most from this sort of mechanism, since HR appears to possess more room for discretion in decision making than Budgets or Contracts. Protection is a key issue. Respondents who observed corruption were unlikely to report it for fear of retribution. 70% of respondents claimed that they did not believe that the reporting employee would be protected. Ensuring that the reporting mechanism will protect potential reporters will create trust that the system will not turn on them if they attempt to make use of it. An employee who fears that reporting will create animosity and reduce career prospects will think twice before reporting. The absence of protection was only slightly less important than the lack of faith that an investigation would ensue or that the ruling would not be enforced. In the HH survey, nearly the same number (66%) claimed that they did not believe that an individual reporter of corruption cases would be protected Follow Up and enforcement is a second major issue. There were two top reasons for not reporting corruption: 1) lack of faith that anything would come out of an investigation, and 2) belief that the ruling would not be enforced. Enforcement should be part of any anti-corruption reporting mechanism. There should be standard follow up and enforcement protocol for every claim, including interviewing, evidence collection, and well documented findings. If every report were handled thoroughly, employees would be more likely to report the corruption that they witness. Enforcement was also a point of contention. 62% of respondents said they did not report corruption because they felt the ruling would not be enforced, while 75% feel that corrupt officials were never punished. Any anti-corruption mechanism must ensure those corrupt officials are actually punished and that rulings are enforced. There is a widespread need for an unbiased agency to handle corruption claims one with no connections to the offender or the institution involved. Needless to say, the investigating institution can have no stake in the outcome of its inquiry. 79% of respondents said that they would report corruption to agency in which it occurred, but also claimed that investigations did not occur and rulings were not enforced. Moreover, Wasta / Nepotism were listed as the most prevalent form of corruption in the PA, which implies that the institution stands to gain even more than usual by minimizing any claims made against their own employees. Personal relationships are at stake when someone accuses a co-worker. By creating an unbiased group to handle all complaints, the mechanism would remove conflicts of interest that are likely to result in underreporting of corruption. Finally, focusing on areas where there is more room for discretion in decision-making, such as Human Resources, would make the most efficient use of scarce resources. The survey indicates Budget and Contract decisions are governed by rules and transparency more than Human Resources. Although many respondents claimed that Human Resource decisions are well 20

21 documented, many also felt that HR decisions were not made in a transparent manner, compared to decisions in Budgeting and Contracting. Only 58% said that HR decisions were conducted in a transparent, compared to 81% and 87% for Budgets and Contracts. By focusing scarce reporting resources in areas where corruption is more likely to occur, interested parties should be able to implement an anti-corruption mechanism that will significantly reduce future corruption in the PA. 21

22 Appendix A: Methodology This section presents the scientific methodology that was adopted in the planning and implementation of the Governance Survey/public employees perception in the Palestinian Territory in 2010, including the methodology design of basic research instruments and methods of data collection, data processing and analysis of the survey s data. 1.1 Survey questionnaire: The survey questionnaire on Governance is the main instrument for data collection, and thus its design took into consideration the standard technical specifications to facilitate the collection, processing and analysis of data. Because this type of specialized surveys is new to PCBS, relevant experiences of other countries and international best practices were thoroughly reviewed to ensure the contents and design of the survey s instruments are within international standards. The survey s questionnaire includes the following basic components: Identification data: The identification data constitutes the key that uniquely identifies each questionnaire. The key consists of the questionnaire serial number, ministry name, and code according to the sampling frame of public servants 2007 and governorate code. The classification of localities/governorates is according to the Standard Administrative Classification that was adopted by a national committee composed of representatives of various national institutions, and applied by PCBS in the Population, Housing and Establishment Censuses Data quality control: A set of quality controls were developed and incorporated into the different phases of the survey including field operations, office editing, office coding, data processing, and survey documentation. Survey s main indicators: Main indicators cover areas based on personal experiences as well as other areas based on perceptions on different topics addressed by the survey including: living issues, decision-making in public sector, personnel administration, appointments in the public sector, budget management, services / contracts and tenders in the public sector, and reporting corruption if it occurs. 1.2 Sample and sampling frame Target population All employees in managerial positions in the ministries of the PNA in the West Bank during the survey's reference period. The target population did not include Jerusalem J1 and data collection was not possible in the Gaza Strip. 22

23 The sampling frame Listing of the number of employees of the PNA distributed by ministries in the West Bank. Sample size The sample size of the survey was estimated to be about 864 employees in the West Bank. Sample design The sample is stratified clustered systematic random sample. The design is comprised of these phases: 1. Ministries and public agencies (33) 2. Grade: Includes head of division, Department director (B, C, D), Director General (A, A1) 3. Sex (male, female) 1.3 Pretest As part of the work plan for the survey on the perception of Households servants 2010, a pretest was conducted to examine the survey's instruments, training manual, implementation plan, data collection procedures, selection and training of fieldworkers, time estimates for various stages, and data entry program. Pretest schedule: The pretest was conducted in the remaining West Bank in three days during the period 07/03/2010 till 09/03/2010. The sample: A selection was made of public officials from the total population of PNA employees. This selection was designed to have a higher representation of senior officials, officials from branch offices, and of those working on budget procurement and human resource issues. To report results against a target population of all employees in managerial positions in the ministries of the PNA in the West Bank the results could be weighted to adjust for the greater weighting of certain types of officials. This was not done for the analysis. In reviewing the data the variance between weighted and unweighted responses was generally small although in some specific questions it was as high as 6 percent. However as is reflected in the following tables, where the results for two of the questions are presented, the difference between weighted and unweighted results is small when those who responded don t know are excluded from the analysis (therefore when the analysis focuses only on those who expressed an opinion). This was the approach taken to the analysis of the survey. The reason for this is that those with greater weight in our sample are more familiar with the systems than the average PNA employee. Therefore reducing their influence has the effect of increasing the number of don t know responses. 23

24 Budget Decisions are made in a transparent manner Strongly Agree Agree Disagree Strongly Disagree Don't Know % % % % % Weighted Unweighted Excluding "don't know" Weighted Unweighted Budget decisions are based on the influence of a bribe Strongly Agree Agree Disagree Strongly Disagree Don't Know % % % % % Weighted Unweighted Excluding "don't know" Weighted Unweighted Sample size of pretest: The sample size of the pretest was estimated to 30 public employees in the West Bank. Training: Five trainees were recruited for the pretest. The training for the pretest was for two days started on 03/03/2010 and ended 04/03/2010. The selected fieldworkers have experience in household surveys. Achievement rates: The daily achievement rate for each fieldworker is 4 completed questionnaires. The time estimate for the completion of one questionnaire was 35 minutes. Response rate: The total number of questionnaires collected during the pretest amounted to 30, which is equal to the designated sample size. In addition, 28 questionnaires were completed and 2 were partially completed. The completion rate of questionnaires is due to the survey's methodology which was based on area sample. 24

25 Evaluation of data entry and editing procedures Data entry programs were tested in advance using sample questionnaires. Improvements and corrections were added to the data entry program as part of the preparation for the data capturing of the pretest's questionnaires. In the actual data capturing of the pretest data, minor improvements were added to the data entry program to ensure user friendly interface and proper validation routines. A general assessment of the experience Strengths: 1. Effectiveness of training during the experimental period. 2. Effectiveness of fieldworkers in the field to fill in questionnaires with high quality and minimal number of errors. 3. Cooperation of respondents with fieldworkers was good. 4. Appropriate survey's tools, including the questionnaires. Weaknesses: 1. Some of the questions were ambiguous to respondents 2. Lack of documentation regarding non-response cases (number and reasons) General recommendations: Proper documentation of non-response cases Illustrate the methodology in consistent manner regarding the substitution of employees. Rephrasing of some of the questions that were unclear or ambiguous. Rearrangement of some of the questions on the questionnaire to ensure consistency and smooth interview. Reflect changes to the questionnaire on the data entry program. 1.4 Fieldwork operations: The purpose of fieldwork operation is to collect the required data from its primary sources, and considered the most important stage in the implementation of any survey. As a result, greater attention was given to the details of the fieldwork operations of the Governance survey to ensure the implementation is within the standards. These details included all of technical and administrative requirements, fieldwork procedures, recruitment procedures, training of fieldworkers, and provision of necessary physical requirements to successfully implement the survey. Fieldwork procedures Fieldworkers were instructed to work according to the following instructions: 1. Locate ministry by its name 2. Obtain listing of employees whose grade/position as head of division or above from the personnel department in the Ministry. 3. Include head of finance, procurement, and personnel units within the sample 25

26 4. Allocate 33% of the sample for branch offices of the ministries if available and by supervisory categories using a table of random numbers to select staff from these categories. 5. Use of the table of random numbers of employees, regardless of the geographical location of the place of work of these employees. 6. The identification of employees who have been selected. 7. Set an interview date with the employees who have been selected. 8. Select a place to conduct the interview with the employees who have been selected. Training and selection of fieldworkers Qualified fieldworkers with previous experience in statistical data collection were selected to work in the data collection of the survey. Fieldworkers participated in specialized fieldwork training in which the details of the survey s questionnaires were explained thoroughly along with practical exercises to ensure clarity. A special attention was given on the uniqueness of the survey of Governance, including the questions, terminology, and concepts. The training program of fieldworkers included: Introduction to the Governance survey and its objectives Explanation of used terminology Procedures for data collection using the designated questionnaire Distribution of the field work team: The fieldwork team consisted of fieldwork coordinator, supervisors and fieldworkers. Every five fieldworkers were supervised by one supervisor. Fieldwork offices were used to facilitate the administration of fieldwork activities including the distribution and delivery of questionnaires, fieldwork editing during data collection, and preparation as well as submission of daily progress reports. Data collection Fieldwork activities had started on 23/03/2010 till 20/04/2010. The sample of the survey reached 864 employees in the West Bank. Fieldworkers were provided with all necessary requirements (i.e. questionnaires, sample list). 1.5 Data processing Data processing phase includes many interdependent activities that aim to electronically capture the collected data to be ready for analysis. These activities are: 1. Office editing: Questionnaires were reviewed according to rules specified in special editing manual specifically designed for the survey. The purpose of this activity was to ensure that the questionnaires had no consistency errors, and no uncompleted questionnaires. 2. Programming and data entry stage: This stage included preparation of the data entry programs, setting up the data entry control rules to avoid data entry errors, and validation queries to examine the data after its being electronically captured. 26

27 Appendix B: Classification of Public Official Positions 1 = HIGH = { a.deputy/assistant for the Minster/president/ head of ministry/ institution + b. Director General in the ministry/ institution} 2 = MIDLEVEL = 3 = LOW = { a. Director//deputy of department} { a. Head of division/office + b.. Other senior management/ professional/technical + c. Junior management + d. Supporting staff /administration} 27

28 Appendix C: Figures All substantive questions have accompanying figures, which are appended to the end of this document, and are presented in the order in which they were asked in the survey. All graphs were produced using the Statistical programming language, R. 1. General Perceptions of Corruption I: G011 G019 (p. 30) 2. General Perceptions of Corruption II: G0110 G0120 (p. 31) 3. Which is currently the most serious problem in the WBG? : G02 (p. 32) 4. Perceptions of Corruption: G031 G039 (p. 33) 5. Perceptions of Corruption: G0310 G0314 (p. 34) 6. Frequency of Corruption in Public Sector I: G04A1 G04A3 (p. 35) 7. Frequency of Corruption in Public Sector II: G04A4 G04A5 (p. 36) 8. Frequency of Corruption in Private Sector I: G04B1 G04B3 (p. 37) 9. Frequency of Corruption in Private Sector I: G04B4 G04B5 (p. 38) 10. Frequency of Corruption in Civil Society Sector I: G04C1 G04C3 (p. 39) 11. Frequency of Corruption in Civil Society Sector II: G04C4 G04C5 (p. 40) 12. Integrity of Institutions I: G051 G0512 (p. 41) 13. Integrity of Institutions II: G0513 G0524 (p. 42) 14. Integrity of Institutions III: G0525 G0533 (p. 43) 15. Decision Making Process: How frequent are decisions made in a discretionary manner?: D01 (p. 44) 16. Decision Making Process: Employees enjoy discretionary power: D021 D023 (p. 45) 17. Personnel Management: Policies are...: P 011 P 016 (p. 46) 18. Personnel Management: HR Decisions are...[i]: P 021 P 014 (p.47 ) 19. Personnel Management: HR Decisions are...[ii]: P 025 P 018 (p. 48) 20. Personnel Management: HR Decisions are...[iii]: P 029 P 0111 (p. 49) 28

29 21. Recruitment: How did you hear of the vacancy?: A011 A014 (p. 50) 22. Recruitment: Employment based on merits & Civil service reforms (2005/6) improved recruitment: A021 A022 (p. 51) 23. Recruitment: How frequently do officials rotate from the public to private sector?: A03 (p. 52) 24. Budget Administration: decisions are... : M011 M016 (p. 53) 25. Budget Administration: decisions are... : M021 M029 (p. 54) 26. Budget Administration: Implementation [I]: M031 M033 (p. 55) 27. Budget Administration: Implementation [II]: M034 M037 (p. 56) 28. Budget Management: Fraud and embezzlement a problem? M04 (p. 57) 29. Services Provided: S011 S014 (p. 58) 30. Contracting Decisions: C011 C016 (p. 59) 31. How frequent are exceptions made to competitive bidding?: C02 (p. 60) 32. Contracting Decisions: How frequently...?: C031 C035 (p. 61) 33. Contracting: Mechanisms of Corruption: C041 C043 (p. 62) 34. Reporting: R01 R02 (p. 63) 35. Reporting [I]: To which entity did you report it?: R031 R039 (p. 64) 36. Reporting [II]: To which entity did you report it?: R0310 R0320 (p. 65) 37. Reasons for not reporting corruption I : R041 R046 (p. 66) 38. Reasons for not reporting corruption II: R047 R0410 (p. 67) 39. Rate the difficulty of reporting corruption: R05 (p. 68) 40. Reporting Consequences: R06 R08 (p. 69) 41. Causes of Corruption: R091 R096 (p. 70) 42. Combating Corruption [I]: How helpful are...?: R101 R109 (p. 71) 43. Combating Corruption [II]: How helpful are...?: R1010 R1018 (p. 72) 44. Which institution would be most effective to report corruption to?: R11 (p. 73) 29

30 30

31 31

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