The 1993 'Velvet Divorce' Re-visited

Transcription

1 York University From the SelectedWorks of Jan Krouzil Winter December 12, 2012 The 1993 'Velvet Divorce' Re-visited Jan Krouzil, York University Available at:

2 The 1993 Velvet Divorce of Czechoslovakia re-visited As a matter of historical fact, the dissolution of Czechoslovakia on 1 January 1993 is an event that saw the self-determined separation of the federal state of Czechoslovakia. The Czech Republic and Slovakia, entities which had arisen in 1969 within the framework of Czechoslovak federalisation, became immediate subjects of the international law in The event is sometimes known as the Velvet Divorce, a reference to the bloodless Velvet Revolution of 1989 that led to the end of the rule of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia and the formation of a democratic government. As an émigré to Canada from Czechoslovakia in 1970 I am still puzzled and troubled by the divisive trace of that historical event. While personally disappointed I also realize that perhaps the political and economic costs of keeping the country together would have been too high. Yet, seeing it as not entirely inevitable I still wonder why the so-called Velvet Divorce happened in the first place and whether it has since then yielded anything that can constructively be deemed of current relevance. In that unsettling state of inquisitive befuddlement, here I set out to decipher the multi-layered meaning of that historical event by way of an incomplete and partial personal story narrated with a sense of being 'neither here nor there'. From being here to being there Born in 1943 in the middle-part of Czechoslovakia called Moravia, my early childhood memories are shaped by idyllic, 'petty bourgeois' family experiences. In-formed by my parents life experiences and their recollections of the First Czechoslovak republic under the leadership of its celebrated political and intellectual 'liberator' Tomas Garrigue Masaryk I grew up somewhat sheltered in splendid detachment from socialist realities. On my part, those early experiences, extended later on in school and during the two year army service in the Sudetenland region, were blended, rather un-smoothly I must add, with the 'communist' regime's prescribed ideological flavors. Only a mind-opening glimpse into the open spectrum of western cultural values and liberal democratic ideas, gained from diligent reading of the early 1960s nascent sources such as the periodical World Literature and later on the samisdat literature, gave an awakening jolt to my intellectual slumber and enlarged my capacity to frame historical events in more worldly contexts. So it was not until a few years before the 1968 Prague Spring that I was able to articulate my experience of life under the socialist regime as starkly incompatible with my own, yet still maturing, political and moral awareness. That posture of self-assumed diffident resentment was strongly reinforced by the influence of Alexander Dubcek's vision of 'socialism with a human face' that raised the prospect of transformative change to be imminent or at least possible. As appalled by the abominable Soviet army-led invasion of Czechoslovakia in August 1968 as I was, my decision in the spring of

3 to depart from the country was ridden with deep ambivalence about the future of my homeland and agony over severing my direct ties from its soil perhaps for good. Upon departing, however, I assured myself of having no reason to doubt the country s unified political continuity or of harboring any wish for a change in its status quo. Content on a personal level to leave with the tacit acknowledgment of genuine respect and a sense of true brotherhood toward my Slovak neighbors, I believed those affective ties to be mutual and hoped they would so remain intact for a long time to come. On a larger political scale, of course, while still living on the Czechoslovakian soil, I could not but be influenced by the media propagated renditions of the Czech-Slovak relations. While still firmly convinced that on balance what unites us is greater than what divides us it was with those partially internalized directly personal and mediated impressions that I embarked on my journey to Canada. From being there to being here Arriving in Canada in the spring of 1970 I found myself in a country convulsing at the brink of the FLQ crisis in Quebec. What a warm and unexpected welcome, I thought with a bit of irony. Little did I know at the time that the stormy event in the history of Canadian federalism awaits in a more innocuous form yet with an ominous outcome at stake for the very co-existence of my home country fellow co-habitants. Often introducing myself in Canada as being a Moravian from Czechoslovakia has felt like selfreferencing to being an (undocumented) alien coming from nowhere. Ironically, that in fact has formally turned out to be the case. While struggling to establish my own existence in Canada and working my way to eventually becoming employed at the lower-level ranks of academia, I confess that contact with the still politically precarious situation in my former homeland has been all but infrequent and sporadic. That, I hasten to add, has not been for a lack of interest since even my professional calling demands that I be informed. Separation Looking back, my sense is that even at the time of the separation in January of 1993 many Czechs and Slovaks desired the continued existence of a federal Czechoslovakia. As I try to briefly recall them in sequence, the rapid velocity of events has nevertheless prevailed in overwhelming the political status quo. At the outset of the separation debate, some major Slovak parties advocated a looser form of coexistence and the Slovak National Party complete independence and sovereignty. While new political parties emerged in the interim, Czech parties had little or no presence in Slovakia, and vice versa. In order to have a functional state, the government demanded continued control from Prague, while Slovaks continued to ask for decentralization. In 1992, the Czech Republic elected Vaclav Klaus and others who demanded either an even 2

4 tighter federation ("viable federation") or two independent states. Vladimir Meciar and other leading Slovak politicians of the day wanted a kind of confederation. The two sides opened frequent and intense negotiations in June. On 17 July, the Slovak parliament adopted the Declaration of independence of the Slovak nation. Six days later, Klaus and Meciar agreed to dissolve Czechoslovakia at a meeting in Bratislava. Czechoslovak presidentvaclav Havel resigned rather than oversee the dissolution which he had opposed; in a September 1992 poll, only 37% of Slovaks and 36% of Czechs favored dissolution. The goal of negotiations switched to achieving a peaceful division. On 13 November, the Federal Assembly passed Constitution Act 541 which settled the division of property between the Czech lands and Slovakia. With Constitution Act 542, passed on 25 November, they agreed to the dissolution of Czechoslovakia as of 31 December The separation occurred without violence, and was thus said to be "velvet", much like the Velvet revolution in 1989 which was accomplished through massive peaceful demonstrations and actions. Going separate ways From what I can gather many of those who pined for a united Czechoslovakia saw the division as the work of two men: Czech Prime Minister Václav Klaus and his Slovak counterpart Vladimír Mečiar. At the time, the state was a federation with one president Václav Havel but a prime minister for each Republic. On assuming power in 1992, Klaus and Mečiar tried to negotiate the terms of the federation. Mečiar was angling for a looser federation. Klaus apparently found the demands surprising; despite the fact Mečiar had been quite open about his desires. But it wasn t just nationality which divided the men. Klaus was and remains an advocate of free-market economics (at least in theory). Mečiar wanted to retain some level of state support for the Slovak economy. Havel, who wanted to keep the federation, resigned in July 1992 when separation looked inevitable. Given the supposed unpopularity of the decision to split at the time, it is tempting to see the separation as due to the actions (or ineffectiveness) of these men. Through 1991 and 1992, support for a united federation remained high, especially in the Czech lands. In Slovakia, it had majority support in 1991 but waned by July No wonder the two leaders were against a referendum. Though the view is tempting, it ignores the cultural differences and points of conflict between the two nations. While Czech and Slovak relations were not on the whole marked by the ethnic tension seen in other post-communist states, the level of discontent was both immediate and long reaching. Slovaks worried about Czech privatization and wild capitalism which, in hindsight, were well-founded given the scandals that emerged over the voucher system. Some Czechs resented supporting Slovakia and saw shedding Slovakia as a means of getting into Europe. Ironically, it was Slovakia which integrated more fully, joining the Eurozone in 2009 while the 3

5 majority of Czechs are against joining. This is not the only matter in which Czechs have changed their mind. Reasons for the division Many different reasons are given for the split of Czechoslovakia. Debates around the reason for the dissolution of Czechoslovakia, as far as I can follow them, centre around inevitability versus events that occurred between the Velvet Revolution of 1989 and the end of the joined state in Those who see the split as inevitable, point to the stereotypes between the two nations, problems with the shared state during communism, the failure of the communist state in Czech lands and its success in the Slovak lands, and the 1968 constitution that had a minority veto. Others, who argue for the salience of events between 1989 and 1992, point to international factors such as the breakaway of the Soviet satellite nations, the lack of unified media between the Czech and Slovak republic, and most importantly the actions of the political leaders of the two nations. Given my incomplete and partial recollection I confine myself to briefly recounting only what I take to be the four most salient reasons. The first reason refers to mutual historical grievances. The Slovaks did not embrace the concept of Czechoslovakism, which was advocated by Czech leaders after Although many appreciated economic and educational assistance that the Czech lands offered during the first republic (and before), they were critical of the patronizing attitudes of many Czech leaders and the unwillingness of Czech political elites to grant Slovakia more autonomy. The Czechs, on the other hand, never forgot what they saw as a betrayal on part of Slovakia in 1939, when Slovakia formed a state of its own under Nazi protection. Later, the fact that after WWII the Slovaks did not show enough gratitude for not ending up on the list the defeated nations because Slovakia was included in Czechoslovakia again was also occasionally criticized. During the era of communism, many Czechs believed that the Czech lands were paying through huge transfers for the economic development of Slovakia. Many also did not see the creation of the Czechoslovak federation in 1968 favorably. Common wisdom had it that the Slovaks were punished much less after the invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968 and that, in fact, Slovakia benefited from the invasion. The era of normalization was closely associated with Gustav Husak, a Slovak. A political asymmetry was created in the form of the Slovak Communist Party that had no counterpart in the Czech Republic. The Slovaks, on the other hand, complained of Prago-centrism, which did not diminish even during the communist era. The second key reason points to the asymmetrical nature of a two-state federation. A federation consisting of two states of unequal size would be a difficult concept even for highly developed democracies. The Federal Assembly, as created by the constitutional amendment of 1968, was 4

6 set up in a way that was bound to produce serious problems once the country has regained democracy. The deficiencies of a two-state federation were suppressed by the centralized communist rule between 1968 and However, once the federal institutions were able to work in a politically free environment, they began producing problems. First, there was initially a serious lack of clarity with regard to the division of powers between institutions on the republican level and federal institutions. Second, the upper house of the Federal Assembly the House of Nations could in effect block meaningful reforms. The growing inability of the Federal Assembly to pass necessary federal laws was perhaps the most visible symbol of a growing decision-making paralysis. At the same time, power was gradually shifting from the federal government to the republican governments. The authority of the country s president was also gradually shrinking. The third salient reason stems from the incompatible political spectrums after the 1992 elections. Soon after the fall of communism certainly after the June 1990 elections it became obvious that the two republics were developing different political spectrums. Slovakia s spectrum was shifted more to the left, and Slovak political parties accentuated more openly national demands or even an outright nationalist agenda. While in the Czech Republic the Communist Party did not reform itself, and the Social Democratic Party was newly (re)created from below, the Slovak democratic left was represented by the reformed Communist Party. In the 1992 elections, political parties that described themselves as center-right prevailed in the Czech Republic, while leftist and nationalist parties were the winners in Slovakia. It became virtually impossible to create a functioning federal government. The fourth key reason involves the strands of Czech and Slovak nationalism. Although much has been said and written about Slovak nationalism, there was also a version of Czech nationalism. The Czechs seemed to identify much more than the Slovaks with the idea of Czechoslovakia, but it can be argued that Czechoslovakia was more acceptable for them, among other reasons, because the Czechs had a privileged position in the two-state federation, in which the other nation was half the size of the Czech nation. While Slovak nationalism was active an expression of nation-building in a country that had not had the kind of historical experience with its own statehood that the Czechs had, Czech nationalism was defensive. In other words, while no significant Czech political parties actively strove for independence or greater autonomy, many Czech politicians were intellectually invested in the idea of Czechoslovakia in which the Czechs by definition are the more senior nation. Some Czech politicians also believed that Slovakia is an economic burden for the Czechs. This version of Czech nationalism was based on the belief that the Czechs are superior more advanced, more urbanized, and therefore, better equipped to cope with market reforms. 5

7 Both Czech politicians and the public did not abandon the traditional Czech paternalism in attitudes toward Slovakia after Some Slovak demanded for example, modifications in the name of the country were ridiculed by the Czech media and understood as petty by Czech politicians, who did not appreciate the symbolism of such steps for the Slovaks. Some of the most important Czech politicians, including President Vaclav Havel, did not read the situation in Slovakia well, partly owing to the fact that they, as former dissidents, maintained contacts mainly with their dissident counterparts, who were predominantly pro-federalist. The final key reason adduced here to explain the Velvet divorce is due to a lack of democratic experience in both countries. Perhaps the growing Czech-Slovak rift could have been solved by giving the Slovaks more autonomy, or by transforming the federation into a confederation. The Belgian or the Canadian models of coexistence (however imperfect) of two nations within one state could have been used, but problems in the Czech-Slovak relations took place at a time when there were many other pressing tasks to solve. Also, Czech and Slovak politicians were only learning the basics of democracy. Hence, there was a natural proclivity on both sides to accelerate the process. Democratic solutions were not explored to the utmost. In order to situate the reasons contextually, it might be useful to provide a bit of historical background. Both the Czech and Slovak nations were part of Austria-Hungary and after World War I they managed to establish the first Czechoslovakia. As the Czech part had always been more industrialized, being under Austrian jurisdiction before, it was only natural that the Czechs had a more developed economy and that they were also able to provide more intellectuals who would come to Slovak schools and help the Slovak regions. However, it might be somewhere there that the Slovaks started to feel as something lesser, as the little, less capable brothers of the Czechs. As the relationship developed, this became more obvious. Slovaks began to feel that the Czechs and the Czech part of the republic were being privileged; as if the Slovaks were put in second place. For all instances, let me mention the so called hyphen war' in which the Slovaks insisted on calling the republic Czecho-Slovakia or Czecho-Slovak Federative Republic instead of Czechoslovakia, thus emphasizing the same position of Slovaks and their uniqueness as a nation. In other words, the Czechs were in this sense perceived as the arrogant ones who thought of Slovaks as something lesser and of the Slovak region as good only for its mountains. It may be argued that this was among the primary reasons why the two split. Yet had there been a referendum, the majority of Slovaks would never have agreed with the split. It remains a widely held belief that it was the political decision of the two prime ministers at the time - Mečiar and Klaus, who did not ask for people's consent. This creates a favorable feeling that the people have always got along well, which I dare suggest would be supported by the majority of Slovaks if they were asked. Furthermore, as Slovakia and the Czech Republic are in the EU, the differences there might have been could now more plausibly be disregarded. The eager cooperation appears even exemplified by the political leaders who come to support their counterparts at political 6

8 rallies and often are reported saying that now that both countries are in the EU, it is almost as if they had never split. The process of dissolution In the end, the dissolution of Czechoslovakia can be deemed a success in terms of the mechanisms and procedures used. It was a peaceful, negotiated process that did not produce any of the upheavals and bloody conflicts as witnessed in the former Yugoslavia or some parts of the Soviet Union. The main point of contention was and still remains, as far as I can tell, the question of whether Czechoslovakia was to hold a referendum. It is possible today to argue that the decision not to hold a referendum was fortunate. First, in a country consisting of two nations of unequal size, one referendum, on a federal level only, would not work. Holding two referendums, one in each republic, was also problematic, however, as no one seemed to know what would happen if one republic voted in favor of the country s split and another would be against it. Aside from the issue of a referendum there were also very different ideas about what kind of a common state Czechoslovakia should be if it survived. Public opinion and politicians were divided: some people supported the idea of a federation, some campaigned for a confederation, and others even advocated the renewal of a unitary state. There were also proposals to turn Czechoslovakia into a three-state federation, consisting of Bohemia, Moravia-Silesia, and Slovakia. It seems something of a historical achievement that the Federal Assembly in the end approved the dissolution of the federation (and itself), and that the two sides agreed on a civilized division of federal assets (and eventually) also the split of the monetary union. What about today? On balance it seems that the split of Czechoslovakia has worked better for Slovakia than for the Czechs. Many Czechs accepted the dissolution of Czechoslovakia as something of a defeat, a partial loss of their national identity. The split has provoked a strange brand of Czech nationalism, which is a mixture of the idea of Czech exceptionalism, on the one hand, and the provincial xenophobia of a small nation, afraid of a large neighbor, on the other. Much of the anti-european rhetoric in Czech politics today appears driven either by the belief that we could do it better than Europe or by the fear of Europe, especially Germany. The Slovaks, on the other hand, appear to be, at least at this point, a more confident nation, although Slovakia suffers from its own version of provincialism and, lately, also the belief in its own exceptionality. In my incomplete and partial view it seems, in comparative terms, that Slovakia is ahead in forming social consensus about the state direction. It has developed a consensually-based view of 7

9 its future in the EU. The Czechs appear lagging behind not only in that they have a different trajectory, but in that by seeking to detach themselves from the EU they go in the opposite direction. In view of the politically unlikely prospect of territorial re-unification or, of at least normatively more plausible mutual reconciliation, I consider this divergence in foreign policy and in the choice of strategic objectives of the two states as unfortunate, if not ominous. I say this because despite of being neither here nor there I still consider the relationship between the Czechs and the Slovaks as truly special. Out of all the neighbors they have, the Czechs and the Slovaks are the closest. This is so, I still believe, not only because of the proximity of Czech and Slovak languages, but above all because of the historical and affective ties and the way in which our two nations are culturally interconnected. In March 1920 Tomáš Masaryk had the Hussite or, better said, Biblical inscription The Lord s Truth Wins written on the presidential banner. He said that it does not necessarily mean that he will speak Czech. Jan Krouzil December 11,