治 大 學. 7. Case Analysis 1 The Oka crisis

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1 7. Case Analysis 1 The Oka crisis The Oka crisis was the outcome of over two hundred and fifty years of land disputes between the Mohawks of the Oka region and the white settlers (Govier, 1997: 199 and Morris, 1995: 76). The Mohawks, like all the other First Nations population of Canada have always had a well-founded distrust for the Catholic Church, the French Canadian settlers, both the federal and provincial government, as well as the Québec Provincial Police (called Sureté du Québec or SQ) (Govier, 1997: 199). In the few decades prior to the Oka Crisis of 1990, the provincial government of Québec had held a series of conferences on the issues pertaining to the Indigenous issues, but all had failed. These failures prompted the Native leaders to lose faith in the political process, and, at a watershed national meeting held in 1987, chiefs from across Canada officially endorsed the concept of direct action to assert their land rights and sovereignty (Morris, 1995: 76). When the Oka crisis occurred, the Indigenous nations across Canada strongly supported any actions taken by the Mohawks. Before we start our description of the events at Oka, we must briefly overview the community structure of the Mohawk nation as it pertains directly to our claim that their social capital levels are high and enabled them to take collective action and cooperate. The Mohawk clan is part of the greater Iroquois nation. The Mohawks nations are composed of a network of five nations living in various territories of Québec, Ontario and the State of New York (U.S.A.) (Pertusati, 1997: 127, Obomsawin, 1993: 27:50 and Who are the Mohawk, 2004). This network integrated people from within each, as well as among, the Mohawk territories based on family and friendship ties, and it created an effective communication system. This type of network facilitates a multi-level sense of commitment and responsibility to living friends and relatives, as well as ancestors or historical actors, by movement participants. (Pertusati, 1997: 130) 國 立 政 治 National Chengch 大 學 i University The Iroquois Nation s tradition of networking without a doubt facilitated collective action at a national level. Further on, the Mohawk community was able not only to mobilize people, but they were also able to have access to food and financial support, most notably, they had access to heavy weaponry (Pertusati, 1997: 130). The land the Mohawks had lived on for centuries had been taken away from them in the early 18 th century and had been sold by the Catholic Church to French Canadian settlers 48

2 (Govier, 1997: 199). In 1945, the Canadian Federal Government purchased land on behalf of the Mohawks but the area constituted only 1 per cent of the original total. (Govier, 1997: 199). Needless to say the Mohawks were disappointed, even more so as they had not been consulted beforehand (Govier, 1997: 199). In 1961, in suite of trying to resolve the matter, the Canadian government organized a committee to look into the matter, while the Mohawks hired lawyers on their side (Govier, 1997: 199). The trouble was that by then, the town of Oka had already well developed and part of the land claimed by the Indigenous people had been turned into a golf course (Govier, 1997: 199). The federal committee nevertheless concluded that the natives claims were justified and that they had undeniably received a bad deal. In their conclusion, the Commission declares that the issue must be resolved; unfortunately, the advice of the committee was disregarded (Govier, 1997: 199). By 1990, the issue was still unsolved and the Mohawks were still stuck in a status quo situation. However, in the summer of 1990, things were going to change. The mayor of the municipality of Oka agreed to extend the golf course: it would extend on parts of the Mohawk sacred burial land in the municipality of Kanehsatake (Govier, 1997: 199, Salée, 2004: 100, and Morris, 1995: 75). The Mohawk people had not been consulted on the issue and when they heard about the news they decided on March 10 to form a small barricade on a dirt road leading to the golf course to prevent the construction work to continue. (Govier, 1997: 199, Morris, 1995: 75 and Obomsawin: 1993: 00:50). The Oka mayor, Mr. Ouellette, informed the citizens of Kanehsatake they had until July 9 to take down their barricade or he would be forced to call the Sureté du Québec according to an injunction he issued (Obomsawin: 1993: 1:15). On the 9 th, the Mohawks had still not abandoned their position and continued to manifest non-violently (Govier, 1997: 199 and Lavery and Morse: 1991). Two days later another community of natives, the Warriors of Kahnawake decided to support their brothers and sisters cause and blockade all roads leading to their reserve, including the Mercier Bridge which services an average of people on a daily basis (Obomsawin, 1993: 4:48). The police officers at the Kanehsatake blockade decided to take action and throw tear gas and small bombs towards the protesters (Obomsawin: 1993: 5:02). Shots were fired on both sides: in a dramatic turn of events, SQ caporal Marcel Lemay, was killed, although there is no proof as to where the shot came from (Govier, 1997: 199 and Obomsawin: 1993: 5:39). 49

3 After this incident, the crisis escalated: the natives of Kanehsatake moved their barricade to a central road (road 344) whereas the provincial government called upon the Canadian Army to take over the security of the Oka people and Mohawks as well as try to dismantle the barricade (Govier, 1997: 199). This only led to more violence and a strong solidarity among the native people of Kanehsatake (Govier, 1997: 199). An additional native community of the region came to the town to support the efforts. A peace camp was set up by over 2,500 indigenous and non-indigenous people: they came from as far as Vancouver, Mexico and South Dakota (Obomsawin: 1993: 6:36, 14:15 and 86:26). All across the country, Indigenous people blocked the way to roads and railways (Obomsawin: 1993: 9:41). Further on, Warriors came from Akwesasane, a reserve on the border of the United States, Ontario and Québec (100 and Obomsawin, 1993: 7:00). The Mohawks from Kanehsatake and Kahnawake asked the Warriors to help, especially in matters involving the defense of the barricade and confrontations with the Armed Forces and the Sureté du Québec. At that point 1,000 police officers are posted in the town of Oka and at the border of the Kanehsatake municipality; Oka s population is of souls (Obomsawin, 1993: 7:50). On August 12, 1990, the Mohawks finally have their first negotiations with the provincial, federal and municipal government representatives. It is agreed that negotiations will start if: 1. The International Federation of Human rights has chosen and appointed twentyfour representatives to observe the negotiation, 2. Spiritual leaders, Tribal leaders, counselors and lawyers are allowed to free movements within the region 3. The population of Kanehsatake and Kahnawake receive all necessary supplies to live on. (Obomsawin, 1993: 20:55) All terms are accepted and signed upon, the negotiations start. Only three days after the negotiation process has started, the Canadian Armed Forces moves in and surrounds the municipality of Kanehsatake (Obomsawin, 1993: 24:59). The Mohawks see this as a break of trust, the governmental representatives say they were not aware the army had decided to move in. The Mohawk people are frustrated by the events, but they do not want to be the ones who stop the negotiations and thus the consensus building continues nonetheless. However, after almost a month of difficult negotiations, the governmental representative choose to stop further negotiations: the Warriors do not want to back away and remove all their weapons, on the other 50

4 hand, the Sureté du Québec will not leave, and finally, the representatives do not have sufficient powers over the matter to be able to resolve the matter (Obomsawin, 1993: 44:51). The Mohawks, even once assured they would receive immunity from the prosecution were afraid the authorities would still find a way to step in and arrest members of their community: the Mohawks could not come to trust the Canadian Law (Morris, 1995: 81). The legal system in effect had oppressed the Natives too many times. Finally, the barricades were broken down by the Armed Forces, without the Mohawks or Warriors fighting back, during the night of September 26 (Obomsawin, 1993: 114:15). The armed conflict will have lasted 78 days. The media coverage of the event was intense and lasted the entire time. It was even in competition with the coverage of the Gulf War debut (Morris, 1995: 79). The confrontation and its outcome helped fire the radicalization and political mobilization of other Indigenous communities across Canada (Salée, 2004: 101). Many other clashes occurred in other regions of Canada in the following days, and each clash has been a: constant reminder to the state- and Canadian society in general of frustrations, the dissatisfaction, and the profound malaise of Indigenous peoples with respect to their socio-economic status. In Québec, ( ), there were also public accusations from some Indigenous leaders against the Québec government ( ). (Salée, 2004: 101) What had started off as a simple land claim, accompanied with non-violent protest became a grave and pressing issue for the governments of Canada. The Indigenous peoples around Québec and Canada decided that they had waited long enough for the government to recognize their nations and demanded self-determination (Morris, 1995: 74, 80). The stability of the government and its international image of respecting human rights were at stake. With such an important crisis on their hands, accompanied by a tenacious media attention, the Canadian and Québec governments were forced to awaken to what appeared during the 1990 s to be the Indigenous problem (Salée, 2004: 101). The Mohawks and their supporters felt the power they now held in their hands. As Morris states: The Mohawks, ( ), were very conscious of suddenly being able to sit down with the government officials as well as talk to the country as a whole. This new found opportunity to communicate their grievances and demands about selfdetermination to the highest levels could not be passed up. (1995: 80) 51

5 If the power asymmetry had not been balanced, the crisis would have never escalated to such level, it could have been dismissed easily by force if necessary. The people of Kanehsatake were surrounded by the Armed Forces, by tanks and helicopters, high-ranking officials were on the grounds; all the natives had on their side was their small community and their supporters. The governments of Canada had lost all legitimacy in being the authority and unless an entirely new discourse was found one that truly represented the democratic and pluralistic views the Canadian government (and population) held so dear the Indigenous peoples would continue to rise and demand that the issues be resolved (Salée, 2004: 101 and Morris, 1995: 77). Even though there was no agreement per say between the Mohawks of Kanehsatake and the government during the crisis, their rioting proved to have important consequences for all the Indigenous people, especially for those living in Québec. The governments and the population of Canada had listened to the new Indigenous voices. The most notable undertakings of the federal government were the establishment in November of 1996 of a Royal Commission on Aboriginal Peoples: the Commission brought forth 440 recommendations (Salée, 2004:101). This Commission lead to an action plan called Gathering Strength initiated in January of 1998 (Salée, 2004:101). The plan not only acknowledged (once again) that the Indigenous peoples of Canada had suffered great injustices, but it also established an Aboriginal Healing fund (of $350 million) (Salée, 2004:101). It further committed the government, in partnership with native people, to preserve and promote Indigenous languages and culture (Salée, 2004:101). Moreover, the plan called for helping the Indigenous people govern themselves, financially and politically (Salée, 2004:101). In the spring of 1998, the provincial government acted in a similar fashion when it published a new policy framework under the title Partnership, Development, Achievements (Salée, 2004:101). The initiative included a five-year development fund as well as a fiscal agreement between the provincial government and the various Québec Indigenous nations (Salée, 2004:101). Through the use of distrust, the Native nations social and trust networks would steadily be integrated into the democratic government of Québec. The most concrete change however was the founding of Kanehsatake s own police unit. The unit became effective in May of The most intense collision had always been 52

6 between the Sureté du Québec and the Mohawk community, even before the crisis there had been reports of police officers being particularly aggressive towards the Native people (Branswell, 1997:1). It also had been in part because of the distrust towards the SQ that the crisis had escalated and that the negotiations had failed in the first place. The agreement to establish a special police unit for the native community was signed in December of 1996, and was going to cost the government $1,25 million dollars per year (Branswell, 1997: 1). Cooperation between the Mohawk police unit and the Sureté du Québec has been easier since then; the new police force even declared that there now existed a good working relationship between both groups (Branswell, 1997:1). The fact that the Mohawks were able to mobilize a large group of people was tantamount to the policy changes and consensus building that occurred after the events (Salée, 2004: 111 and Morris, 1995: 81). The governments of Canada must now face the fact that the Indigenous people and their issues are important ones and they must now face the fact that they have the means and mediums to have their voices heard: Indigenous resistance is not likely to fade away (Salée, 2004: 117). Discussion This case demonstrates the relationship between social capital and distrust fairly well. The combination of the trust networks and social networks allowed for an organized and sustained social action (Pertuasi, 1997: 133). It must be recalled that the non-violent protests latest for three months and the armed conflict lasted for another 78 days during which the community was limited in action, and at a certain point, even food was short. The Mohawks of Kanehsatake distrusted the government officials and chose to act to bring change to the situation. During the negotiation process, and because often the governmental agents had showed they were untrustworthy, they made sure they had people from outside both parties to look over the mediating process. Because of their collective action, and their distrust in the government, the native community was able to finally be heard. Not only that, but innovative commissions, action plans, and laws have been passed. These will not only protect the rights of Indigenous people in Canada, but the government will have a harder time ignoring the issues and demands. The trustworthiness and goodwill of the governmental actors can now 53

7 only heighten. Further on, as an outcome of the crisis, the community was given their own police unit as they could no longer trust the provincial one. There is still much work to be done for the First Nations of Canada, but thanks to their tenacity and hard work, the first real step towards bettered conditions was taken. 54