THE HUNGARIAN QUESTION

Transcription

1 CHAPTER V THE HUNGARIAN QUESTION REPORT OF SPECIAL COMMITTEE ON THE PROBLEM OF HUNGARY On 10 January 1957, at its eleventh session, the General Assembly set up at Special Committee on the Problem of Hungary, by resolution 1132 (XI). The Assembly thereby charged the Special Committee with the duty of providing the Assembly and all United Nations Members with the fullest and best available information regarding the situation created by the intervention of the USSR, through its use of armed force and other means, in the internal affairs of Hungary, as well as regarding developments relating to the recommendations of the General Assembly on this subject. 1 The Special Committee, consisting of representatives of Australia, Ceylon, Denmark, Tunisia and Uruguay, submitted an interim report to the General Assembly's eleventh session on 20 February a Its full report was circulated to United Nations Members on 12 June In this report, the Committee expressed regret that, owing to the attitude of the Hungarian Government, it had not been in a position to establish and maintain direct observation in Hungary as enjoined by General Assembly resolution 1132 (XI). After hearing witnesses at United Nations Headquarters in New York, the Committee had held hearings in Europe from 11 March to 16 April at the European Office of the United Nations, in Geneva, and thereafter in Rome, Vienna, London, and again in Geneva. The Committee heard 111 witnesses: 35 in New York, 21 in Geneva, 16 in Rome, 30 in Vienna, and 9 in London. The main conclusions presented by the Committee were as follows: (1) What had taken place in Hungary in October and November 1956 was a spontaneous national uprising, due to long-standing grievances such as the inferior status of Hungary with regard to the USSR. The system of government had, in part, been maintained by the weapon of terror, wielded by the AVH, or political police. USSR pressure had been resented in other respects also. (2) The thesis that the uprising had been fomented by reactionary circles in Hungary and had drawn its strength from such circles and from Western "imperialists" had failed to survive the Committee's examination. From start to finish, the uprising had been led by students, workers, soldiers and intellectuals. Many of them had been Communists or former Communists. The majority of political demands put forward during the revolution had included one that democratic socialism should be the basis of the Hungarian political structure and that such social achievements as the land reform should be safeguarded. At no time had any proposal been made for the return to power, or to the Government, of any figure associated with pre-war days. (3) The uprising had not been planned in advance, and events had actually taken participants by surprise. 1 For an account of the consideration of the question by the Security Council, and at the General Assembly's second emergency special session and at its eleventh session between October 1956 and March 1957, see Y.U.N., 1956, pp See Y.U.N., 1956, p. 83.

2 (4) Although there was no evidence of advance planning, and although the whole course of the uprising bore the hallmark of continuous improvisation, it would appear that the USSR authorities had taken steps as early as 20 October 1956 to make armed intervention in Hungary possible. The evidence showed that Soviet troops from outside Hungary had been used even in the first intervention; it was also to be noted that the Warsaw Treaty contained no provision for intervention by armed forces of the USSR to dictate political developments within any signatory's frontiers. (5) The demonstrations of 23 October 1956 had at first been entirely peaceable. No evidence had been discovered that any of those who had voiced political demands or had joined the demonstrators had had any intention to resort to force. The transformation of the demonstration into an armed uprising had been due to the action of the AVH in opening fire on the people outside the Radio Building in Budapest. Within a few hours, Soviet tanks had been in action against the Hungarians. The appearance of Russian soldiers in their midst, not as friendly allies, but as enemies in combat, had had the effect of still further uniting the people. (6) Imre Nagy, the Prime Minister, had denied, with every appearance of truth, that he had issued any invitation to the USSR authorities to assist in quelling the uprising by force or had even been aware that such an invitation had been issued. Since Soviet tanks had appeared on the streets of Budapest at about 2 A.M. on 24 October 1956, it would have been 'impossible for him to have addressed any official message to the USSR authorities, since he had held no government post at the time when the tanks must have received their orders. Until further information came to light, the Special Committee said, it would be wise to suspend judgement as to whether an invitation had been issued at all. Similar considerations applied to the invitation allegedly addressed to the USSR authorities before the second intervention on 4 November. Janos Kadar had remained a member of Mr. Nagy's Government when it was reconstituted on 3 November. The Committee was not aware of his having given any recorded indication of his disapproval of Mr. Nagy's policies. Mr. Kadar's movements at that time were not THE HUNGARIAN QUESTION 61 fully known, and his own claim to have called for Soviet help in the name of the Government could not be considered to have been substantiated. In any event, there was abundant evidence that USSR preparations for a further intervention, including the movement of troops and armour from abroad, had been under way since the last days of October. Mr. Kadar and his ministers had been absent from Budapest during the first few days after he had formed his Government, and administrative instructions to the people of Hungary had been issued by the commanders of the Soviet troops. (7) Mr. Nagy had not at first been free to exercise the full powers of the premiership. Only when the grip of the AVH had been loosened by the victory of the insurgents had he been able to take an independent stand. Seeing that his countrymen were united in their desire for other forms of government and the departure of Soviet troops, he had thrown in his lot with the insurgents. (8) The few days of freedom enjoyed by the Hungarian people had provided abundant evidence of the popular nature of the uprising. A free press and radio had come to life all over Hungary, and the disbanding of the AVH had been the signal for general rejoicing which revealed the degree of unity achieved by the people. (9) There had been a number of lynchings and beatings by the crowds, concerning, in almost all cases, members of the AVH or those believed to have co-operated with them. (10) Steps taken by the Workers' Council during that period had been aimed at giving the workers real control of nationalized industrial undertakings and abolishing unpopular institutions, such as the production norms. During the days of freedom, while negotiations had continued with the USSR authorities for the withdrawal of Russian troops, the Committee added, attempts had been made to clear the streets of Budapest and life had begun to return to normal. (11) In contrast to demands put forward at that time for the re-establishment of political rights was the fact that basic human rights of the Hungarian people had been violated by the Hungarian Government prior to 23 October 1956, especially up to the autumn of Such violations were resumed after 4 November 1956.

3 62 POLITICAL AND SECURITY QUESTIONS The Committee was convinced that the numerous accounts of inhuman treatment and torture by the AVH were to be accepted as true. On the evidence, it was also convinced that, in an attempt to break the back of the revolution, numbers of Hungarians had been deported to the USSR and that some might not have been returned to their homes. (12) Following the second USSR intervention on 4 November 1956, there had been no evidence of popular support for Mr. Kadar's Government. Mr. Kadar had successively abandoned most of the points from the revolutionary programme which he had at first promised to the Hungarian people. On the central question of the withdrawal of USSR troops, he had moved from complete acceptance of the nation's wishes to a refusal to discuss the subject in present circumstances. He had proceeded, step by step, to destroy the power of the workers. Strong repressive measures had been introduced and general elections had been postponed for two years. Only a small fraction of the 190,000 Hungarians who had fled the country had accepted his invitation to return. (13) In the light of the extent of foreign intervention, the Special Committee concluded, consideration of the Hungarian question by the United Nations had been legally proper and, moreover, had been requested by a legal Government of Hungary. In the matter of human rights, Hungary had accepted specific international obligations in the Treaty of Peace. Accordingly, the Committee did not accept as valid the objections based on Article 2, paragraph 7, of the United Nations Charter (which precludes intervention in essentially domestic matters). A massive armed intervention by one power on the territory of another, with the avowed intention of interfering in its internal affairs, the Committee maintained, must, by the USSR's own definition of aggression, be a matter of international concern. CONSIDERATION AT ASSEMBLY'S RESUMED ELEVENTH SESSION On 10 September 1957, the eleventh session of the General Assembly was reconvened, in accordance with resolution 1119 (XI) of 8 March 1957, to continue consideration of the Hungarian question. Nine plenary meetings were held between 10 and 13 September. The Assembly had before it, in addition to the report of the Special Committee, a joint draft resolution submitted by 36 Members. Another delegation subsequently joined the sponsors, making a total of 37, as follows: Argentina, Belgium, Bolivia, Brazil, Canada, Chile, China, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cuba, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, France, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Liberia, Luxembourg, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Norway, Pakistan, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Portugal, Spain, Turkey, United Kingdom, United States, Venezuela. By this 37-power proposal, the Assembly, regretting that the USSR and the present authorities in Hungary had failed to co-operate in any way with the Special Committee, would endorse its unanimous report. It would also note the Committee's conclusion that the events which had taken place in Hungary in October and November 1956 constituted a spontaneous national uprising. Further, the Assembly would find that the Special Committee's conclusions (reached on the basis of all available evidence) confirmed that: (a] the USSR, in violation of of the Charter, had deprived Hungary of its liberty and political independence and the Hungarian people of the exercise of their fundamental human rights; (b) the present Hungarian régime had been imposed on the Hungarian people by the armed intervention of the USSR; (c) the USSR had carried out mass deportations of Hungarian citizens to the USSR; (d) the USSR had violated its obligations under the Geneva Convention of 1949; and (e} the present authorities in Hungary had violated the human rights and freedoms guaranteed by the Treaty of Peace with Hungary. The Assembly, in addition, would: (1) condemn these acts and the continued defiance of its resolutions; (2) reiterate its concern with the continuing plight of the Hungarian people; (3) call upon the USSR and the present authorities in Hungary to desist from repressive measures against the Hungarian people, to respect the liberty and political independence of Hungary and the Hungarian people's enjoyment of fundamental human rights and freedoms, and to ensure the return to Hungary of those Hungarian citizens who had been deported to the USSR; (4) ask the President of its eleventh session, Prince Wan Waithayakon,

4 THE HUNGARIAN QUESTION 63 acting as the General Assembly's special representative on the Hungarian problem, to take such steps as he deemed appropriate, in view of the findings of the Committee, to achieve the objectives of the United Nations in accordance with various specified resolutions of the Assembly and to report and make recommendations as he might deem advisable to the Assembly. The 37-power draft made provision, too, for placing the Hungarian item on the provisional agenda of the Assembly's twelfth session. The Rapporteur of the Special Committee introduced the report at the beginning of the discussions at the resumed eleventh session. The report, he pointed out, was not based simply on the testimony of witnesses; equal weight had been given to contemporary documentation provided by the Hungarian press and radio during the uprising and to the statements of the present Hungarian Government. The Committee had also had access to information provided to it by Governments with diplomatic representatives in Budapest at the time. The Committee, he added, was confident that its account, while it might be supplemented on specific points, would stand the test of future investigations. The representative of Hungary, speaking on a point of order, reiterated his Government's position that the events which had taken place in Hungary in October and November 1956 fell exclusively within the domestic jurisdiction of Hungary and that no organization or international committee could have any right to investigate the domestic affairs of sovereign and independent Hungary. The establishment of the Special Committee had been illegal. His Government protested against the activities it had undertaken. Moreover, the Special Committee had not followed the Assembly's directives to carry out an objective study. Instead, it had proved its hostility towards the People's Republic of Hungary and its social system. His Government therefore asked the General Assembly to condemn the Special Committee for its activity, to reject its report, which falsified the truth, and to delete the so-called Hungarian question from the Assembly's agenda. This position was supported by the representative of the USSR. In his view, the urgent reconvening of the eleventh session of the Assembly to discuss the provocative so-called Hungarian question showed that the ruling circles of certain countries, particularly the United States, had not yet abandoned their attempts to carry out inadmissible intervention in Hungary's affairs. Nor had they abandoned their attempts to use the United Nations to increase international tension and to indulge in hostile propaganda against Hungary, the USSR and other socialist countries. They were seeking to divert the attention of world public opinion from their own aggressive acts in the Near and Middle East and other parts of the world. They were also trying to divert attention away from their refusal to reach agreement on the prohibition of atomic weapons, and from their unenviable position on a number of questions on the agenda of the twelfth Assembly session. The President ruled that the General Assembly would proceed with the discussion. Most representatives taking part in the debate endorsed the report of the Special Committee. Repression in Hungary was continuing, they stressed, and the General Assembly must continue its efforts. Among the other points they made were the following. The USSR and the régime which it had installed in Hungary had done their best to conceal the contents of the report from their own people. In view of the attitude adopted by the USSR and the Kadar Government towards the Special Committee, there were no grounds for complaint that the report did not take account of information which those Governments could have provided. Indeed, it was worthy of note that the report included a full summary of the official Soviet and Kadar Government version of the events. The Kadar Government should be judged by the fact it had broken, or failed to carry out, a series of promises made to the people of Hungary after the attack of 4 November 1956, including promises for withdrawal of USSR troops, promises that there would not be any reprisals against the freedom fighters and workers, promises for the establishment of a multi-party system, for free elections, for observance of the right to strike, for an end to Soviet economic exploitation, for freedom for writers and artists, and for freedom of religion. That record could not be passed off as a merely internal Hungarian affair, for it involved violations of human rights guaranteed by the Treaty of Peace as well as acts of a régime forcibly

5 64 POLITICAL AND SECURITY QUESTIONS imposed on Hungary by the military forces of the USSR. The representative of Hungary said that his Government, confronted by the inaccuracies and slanders contained in the Special Committee's report, considered it necessary to make the following points: (1) The armed insurrection between 23 October and 4 November 1956 had been designed to overthrow by violence the constitutional and social order of the Hungarian Republic and to restore the old Horthyite fascist régime which had been directed against the social progress of the Hungarian people. Consequently, there had been a counterrevolution in Hungary during that interval. (2) The counter-revolutionary rebellion had been prepared, launched and maintained by Western imperialistic circles. (3) In Hungary, the organizers and leaders of the counter-revolution had been members of the former privileged classes and of the Horthyite fascist elements that had been driven from power. (4) The counter-revolutionary insurrection had been assisted by the traitorous and anti-constitutional activity of Imre Nagy and his group, which had also infiltrated the Government. (5) The measures taken by the Revolutionary Workers' and Peasants' Government during and after the counter-revolution had been based on the obligations that were made compulsory for any Government of the country in the Constitution which expressed and guaranteed the interests of the Hungarian people. Those measures served to protect legal order in the country. (6) The international obligations of the Hungarian Government, as embodied in article 4 of the Treaty of Peace, also required the Government to prevent the rebirth of fascism. (7) The United Nations Charter provided the same obligations for any Hungarian Government to prevent the rebirth of fascism. (8) In conformity with its obligations, the Revolutionary Workers' and Peasants' Government of Hungary, taking account of the fact that the counter revolutionary insurrection, instigated by Western imperialistic circles, constituted a serious threat to peace, had, as one of the signatories of the Warsaw Pact, asked the USSR Government to place at its disposal the USSR troops stationed in Hungary under that Pact. With the support of USSR troops, the Hungarian armed forces had liquidated the counter-revolution and restored legal order in the country. The liquidation of the Hungarian counter-revolution was a domestic matter within the jurisdiction of Hungary. (9) In contrast to the distorted picture given by the Special Committee, the truth was that the Hungarian Government and the working people of Hungary had re-established the legal and constitutional order of the country. The political, cultural and economic life of the population had returned to normal. Similar views were expressed by a number of other representatives, including the USSR representative. They described the 37-power draft resolution as an attempt to continue to use the United Nations for the purpose of crude interference in the internal affairs of Hungary. Some representatives questioned the desirability of a further condemnatory resolution. Thus, the representative of Ceylon said that his Government regretted that, owing to lack of assistance from the USSR and Hungarian Governments, the report of the Special Committee might not be complete. Recalling that Ceylon had voted for the earlier General Assembly resolution involving condemnation (resolution 1131 (XI), of 12 December 1956), he stated his Government's view that a renewed condemnation might not improve the situation and might even tend to hinder the emergence of a climate conducive to a speedy solution. Suggesting a number of changes in the 37- power draft resolution, he thought that, rather than place the President of the Assembly in the same situation as the Special Committee, the Assembly might ask the Secretary-General (who had been invited by the Hungarian Government to go to Budapest) to report on compliance with the requests envisaged in the joint draft. Burma proposed three amendments. By the first, the Assembly would find that "the main conclusions" (rather than "the conclusions") of the Special Committee confirmed the various points set forth in the 37-power draft about the USSR's actions with regard to Hungary and about the violations by the present Hungarian authorities of the rights and freedoms guaranteed by the Treaty of Peace with Hungary. The Assembly rejected this amendment by 40 votes to 4, with 31 abstentions. By the second amendment, the Assembly

6 would "deplore" rather than "condemn" the acts of the USSR and the present Hungarian authorities with regard to the situation in Hungary. This, too, was rejected, by a vote of 45 to 2, with 30 abstentions. The third amendment was intended to delete the request in the 37-power draft that Prince Wan Waithayakon, as the Assembly's Special Representative on the Hungarian problem, should consult as appropriate with the Special Committee in the course of his endeavours. Forty-two Members voted against this amendment, 3 for, and 32 abstained. On 14 September 1957, the day after it rejected Burma's amendments, the Assembly approved the text of the 37-power draft as resolution 1133(XI). It did so by a roll-call vote of 60 to 10, with 10 abstentions. REPORT OF THE ASSEMBLY'S SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE On 9 December 1957, Prince Wan Waithayakon, the Special Representative of the General Assembly on the Hungarian Problem, reported to the Assembly's twelfth session on the steps which he had taken in connexion with the request made by the Assembly on 14 September. He stated that he had tried to pursue the following objectives: (1) humanitarian treatment in Hungary; (2) return of deportees from the USSR; (3) withdrawal of Soviet troops from Hungary; and (4) free elections in Hungary. Aware of the difficulties of his task, he said, he had realized that he would have to proceed step by step. His first step was to concentrate on humanitarian treatment in Hungary; on 30 September, he contacted the Foreign Minister of the USSR and made an appeal in this connexion. The reply was that that matter did not concern the USSR Government. He then made a humanitarian appeal for the return of deportees from the USSR to Hungary. The USSR Foreign Minister replied that reports about the existence of deportees were fictitious, that the item on Hungary constituted an interference in internal affairs and was "illegitimate", and that he could, therefore, not discuss it. The Special Representative added that he had made a similar approach to the Foreign Minister of Hungary on 10 October by appealing for more lenient treatment of prisoners, persons detained in concentration camps, and persons THE HUNGARIAN QUESTION 65 awaiting trial, and by appealing for due judicial process in trials, for admission of students to universities without discrimination, and so on, and, finally, for an amnesty for political offenders. The Foreign Minister replied that these were matters for the Hungarian Government to determine by virtue of its sovereign rights. The Special Representative then pointed out that this did not preclude an exchange of information and views in the United Nations, as a centre for harmonizing the actions of nations. Finally, the Hungarian Foreign Minister agreed to provide information on questions to be set forth by the Special Representative in a memorandum. The Special Representative offered to proceed to Budapest to pursue the discussion, but was informed that the Hungarian Government could not give him a visa as it could not admit observers from the United Nations. Subsequently, on 15 November and on 2 December, the representative of Hungary informed the Special Representative that he had been instructed not to accept the memorandum of questions because the Hungarian Government could not negotiate on a matter which was an internal affair of Hungary. The Special Representative also told the Assembly that he had had no occasion to consult with the Special Committee on the Problem of Hungary as no question involving it had arisen. He regretted that he had been unable to find an opportunity for negotiations. He could not, however, believe that the Hungarian and USSR Governments would remain insensible to the voice of world opinion and the conscience of mankind which continued to make an insistent and righteous appeal for the freedom of the Hungarian people. He therefore hoped that, as international tension relaxed, he would be given an opportunity to help establish full international co-operation in promoting respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms in Hungary. On 14 December, at the closing meeting of the Assembly's twelfth session, the President of the Assembly voiced the hope that the parties concerned would give the Special Representative the necessary co-operation if he continued his efforts. In the discussion which ensued reference was made by the representatives of the Netherlands,

7 66 POLITICAL AND SECURITY QUESTIONS the United States and Uruguay to reports of trials of participants in the 1956 uprising in Hungary, and it was urged that the work of the Special Committee should continue. The representatives of Czechoslovakia, Hungary and the USSR, however, reiterated the view that Assembly discussion on Hungary's domestic matters was contrary to the Charter as were the appointment of the Special Representative and the activities of the Special Committee. QUESTION OF CREDENTIALS On 10 December 1957, at its twelfth session, the General Assembly considered the report of its Credentials Committee, which stated that it had adopted (by 6 votes to 1, with 2 abstentions) a United States motion to "take no decision regarding the credentials submitted on behalf of the representatives of Hungary". The representative of Hungary protested against what he termed a United States attempt at discrimination and interference. The credentials of his delegation, he declared, had been issued in conformity with the requirements of the Hungarian Constitution and the General Assembly's rules of procedure. Several other representatives expressed similar views. Other speakers, however, contended that the General Assembly could not, in the light of the Special Committee's report and its own resolutions, accept the credentials of the Hungarian delegation. The Assembly finally approved the report of the Credentials Committee by 77 votes to 1, by resolution 1183 (XII). LETTER FROM SPECIAL COMMITTEE TO HUNGARIAN FOREIGN MINISTER On 20 December, the Special Committee on the Problem of Hungary approved a letter addressed to the Foreign Minister expressing its concern about continuing reports of trials GENERAL ASSEMBLY 11TH SESSION (RESUMED) Plenary Meetings A/3592. Report of Special Committee on Problem of Hungary. A/3658 and Add.l. Argentina, Belgium, Bolivia, Brazil, Canada, Chile, China, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cuba, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El of participants in the 1956 uprising, and asking for further information and assurances that the highest humanitarian standards would be applied in the treatment of all who participated in the uprising. It had also decided to inform the Assembly's Special Representative of that action. In a press communiqué which it issued about this letter, the Special Committee said it had also decided to inform the Assembly's Special Representative about the decision to send the letter. The communiqué also said that the Special Committee would continue to watch the situation in Hungary under its mandate from the General Assembly. On 21 December, the Permanent Representative of Hungary to the United Nations returned the letter. In doing so, he said that the Hungarian Government did not recognize the Special Committee, since the Assembly resolution setting it up was contrary to the United Nations Charter. The Permanent Representative said he was therefore in no position to transmit communications and requests by the Special Committee. RELIEF TO THE HUNGARIAN PEOPLE A programme of relief to the Hungarian people in Hungary was called for by the General Assembly in November Such relief, in the form of food, clothing, medicine and other similar supplies to the value of $20,000,000 was distributed by the International Committee of the Red Cross, which acted as the sole agency for the distribution of aid furnished through the United Nations. This international relief programme was formally concluded on 30 September For information about provision of assistance to Hungarian refugees throughout 1957, see below, ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL QUESTIONS, CHAPTER XI. DOCUMENTARY REFERENCES 3 See Y.U.N., 1956, pp Salvador, France, Guatemala, Haiti, Hounduras, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Liberia, Luxembourg, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Norway, Pakistan, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Portugal, Spain, Turkey, United Kingdom, United States, Venezuela draft resolution. A/L.223. Burma amendments to 37-power draft resolution (A/3658 and Add.l.).

8 RESOLUTION 1133(XI), as submitted by 37 powers, A/3658 and Add.l, adopted by Assembly on 14 September 1957, meeting 677, by roll-call vote of 60 to 10, with 10 abstentions, as follows: In favour: Argentina, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Bolivia, Brazil, Burma, Cambodia, Canada, Chile, China, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cuba, Denmark, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Ethiopia, France, Ghana, Greece, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Iceland, Iran, Iraq, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan, Jordan, Laos, Lebanon, Liberia, Libya, Luxembourg, Mexico, Morocco, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Norway, Pakistan, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Portugal, Spain, Sudan, Sweden, Thailand, Tunisia, Turkey, United Kingdom, United States, Uruguay, Venezuela, Against: Albania, Bulgaria, Byelorussian SSR, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Poland, Romania, Ukrainian SSR, USSR, Yugoslavia. Abstaining: Afghanistan, Ceylon, Egypt, Finland, India, Indonesia, Nepal, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Yemen. "The General Assembly, "Recalling its resolution 1132(XI) of 10 January 1957, establishing a Special Committee, consisting of representatives of Australia, Ceylon, Denmark, Tunisia and Uruguay, to investigate, and to establish and maintain direct observation in Hungary and elsewhere, taking testimony, collecting evidence and receiving information, as appropriate, "Having now received the unanimous report of the Special Committee on the Problem of Hungary, "Regretting that the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the present authorities in Hungary have failed to co-operate in any way with the Committee, "1. Expresses its appreciation to the Special Committee on the Problem of Hungary for its work; "2. Endorses the report of the Committee; "3. Notes the conclusion of the Committee that the events which took place in Hungary in October and November of 1956 constituted a spontaneous national uprising; "4. Finds that the conclusions reached by the Committee on the basis of its examination of all available evidence confirm that: "(a) The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, in violation of the Charter of the United Nations, has deprived Hungary of its liberty and political independence and the Hungarian people of the exercise of their fundamental human rights; "(b) The present Hungarian régime has been imposed on the Hungarian people by the armed intervention of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics; "(c) The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics has carried out mass deportations of Hungarian citizens to the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics; "(d) The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics has violated its obligations under the Geneva Conventions of 1949; "(e) The present authorities in Hungary have violated the human rights and freedoms guaranteed by the Treaty of Peace with Hungary; THE HUNGARIAN QUESTION 67 "5. Condemns these acts and the continued defiance of the resolutions of the General Assembly; "6. Reiterates its concern with the continuing plight of the Hungarian people; "7. Considers that further efforts must be made to achieve the objectives of the United Nations in regard to Hungary in accordance with the Purposes and Principles of the Charter and the pertinent resolutions of the General Assembly; "8. Calls upon the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the present authorities in Hungary, in view of evidence contained in the report, to desist from repressive measures against the Hungarian people, to respect the liberty and political independence of Hungary and the Hungarian people's enjoyment of fundamental human rights and freedoms, and to ensure the return to Hungary of those Hungarian citizens who have been deported to the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics; "9. Requests the President of the eleventh session of the General Assembly, H.R.H. Prince Wan Waithayakon, as the General Assembly's special representative on the Hungarian problem, to take such steps as he deems appropriate, in view of the findings of the Committee, to achieve the objectives of the United Nations in accordance with General Assembly resolutions 1004(ES-II) of 4 November 1956, 1005(ES-II) of 9 November 1956, 1127(XI) of 21 November 1956, 1131 (XI) of 12 December 1956 and 1132(XI) of 10 January 1957, to consult as appropriate with the Committee during the course of his endeavours, and to report and make recommendations as he may deem advisable to the General Assembly; "10. Decides to place the Hungarian item on the provisional agenda of the twelfth session of the General Assembly." GENERAL ASSEMBLY 12TH SESSION Plenary Meetings 678, 684, 726, 731. General Committee, meeting 112. A/3773. Report of Credentials Committee. A/3774. Report of General Assembly's Special Representative on Hungarian Problem. RESOLUTION 1183(XII), as recommended by Credentials Committee, A/3773, adopted by Assembly on 10 December 1957, meeting 726, by 77 votes to 1. "The General Assembly "Approves the report of the Credentials Committee." OTHER DOCUMENTS A/AC.88/1. Letter of 20 December 1957 from Special Committee on Problem of Hungary to Minister for Foreign Affairs of Hungarian People's Republic. A/3571. Note by Secretary-General transmitting text of resolution and conclusions adopted by Governing Body of ILO. A/3578 and Corr.1. Note by Secretary-General transmitting at request of Hungarian Minister of Foreign Affairs text of communication of 16 April

9 68 POLITICAL AND SECURITY QUESTIONS 1957 concerning certain recommendations made by Governing Body of ILO. A/3742. Note by Secretary-General transmitting text of conclusions adopted by Governing Body of ILO on 1 November 1957.