DOWNLOAD PDF TAIWANS MAINLAND POLICY : NORMALIZATION, YES ; REUNIFICATION, LATER JEAN-PIERRE CABESTAN

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1 Chapter 1 : Table of contents for Library of Congress control number Taiwan's Mainland Policy: Normalization, Yes; Reunification, Later - Volume - Jean Pierre Cabestan Skip to main content We use cookies to distinguish you from other users and to provide you with a better experience on our websites. Downloads Download data is not yet available. China on the Eve of Communist Takeover. State-Building in Modern China: The Kuomintang in the Prewar Period. Guanxi, Patronage, and the State in Local Politics. Normalization, Yes; Reunification, Later. Democratic Consolidation and External Relations, edited by Bruce. Dickson and Chien-Min Chao, â Chao, Linda and Ramon H. The First Chinese Democracy: Political Life in the Republic of China. Johns Hopkins University Press. The Government and Politics of China. Women in Taiwan Politics: Implications for Contending Political Economy Paradigms. A New History, edited by Murray Rubinstein, â Party Politics in Taiwan: Party Change and the Democratic Evolution of Taiwan, â State and Society in the Taiwan Miracle. My Kingdom for a Horse. Looking to the Mainland. The Kuomintang and the Democratization of Taiwan. The Taiwan Conundrum in U. Identity Politics and Collective Action since University Press of America. Makeham, John, and Hsiau, A-Chin, eds. The Organizational Basis of Politics. The Politics of Formosan Nationalism. University of California Press. Institutions, Institutional Change, and Economic Performance. Between Assimilation and Independence: From Opposition to Power: Plenty of Clouds, Few Silver Linings. Taiwan in World Affairs. Huntington and Clement H. Democratization and the Politics of Financial Liberalization in Taiwan. Political and Social Change in the Republic of China. Riding the Third Wave. National Identity and Democratization. From Hard to Soft Authoritarianism? Forces Behind the New Momentum. Page 1

2 Chapter 2 : Studies on Contemporary China Ser.: Contemporary Taiwan (, UK-Paperback) ebay Taiwan's Mainland Policy: Normalization, Yes; Reunification, Later Author(s): Jean-Pierre Cabestan Source: The China Quarterly, No., Special Issue: Contemporary. Normalization, Yes; Reunification, Later Author s: The China Quarterly, No. JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms of scholarship. In the first stage of change, in late, the Taipei government authorized ROCOT citizens to travel to mainland China through a third country or area mostly Hong Kong. On the diplomatic front, soon after Lee Teng-hui succeeded Chiang Ching-kuo, the Taipei government qui- etly moved to a de facto "dual recognition" policy. Conversely, in, when Saudi Arabia recognized Beijing, Taipei did not close its embassy in Riyadh before China forced the Saudi government to do so. The China Quarterly, This content downloaded from Though the Taipei government still pays lip service to the "one China principle" and does not officially recognize the PRC, it acknowledges - and claims - the co-existence of two Chinese political entities which after a planned transitional period and under certain conditions are due to unify. The German unification in and the end of the Cold War have certainly encouraged President Lee to make these moves. But the Tiananmen crackdown in and lingering ideological and strategic confrontation in East Asia have forced him to remain more than cautious. On the other hand, it assesses the domestic and outside constraints exerted on this policy. This new situation has forced the ROCOT government on the one hand to frame a comprehensive and updated discourse on its relations with mainland China and unification and, on the other, to set up channels of communication and negotiation with the PRC. The Guidelines for National Reunification March In late, Lee Teng-hui convened a National Unification Council, officially representing the political society though appointed by himself, which adopted in February a three-page text entitled "Guidelines for National Unification" tongyi gangling. These Guidelines were approved by the Executive Yuan in March However, the conditions mainland China have to meet to move from one stage to another are so difficult that the Guidelines give the impression that Taiwan militates for a long-term peaceful co-existence of two Chinese governments and relegates the eventual unification of the country to the distant future. For instance, to move from the first stage, which Taiwan considers to be current, and which is defined as "a phase of exchanges and reciproc- ity," up to the second one - "a phase of mutual trust and co-operation" - not only should both sides of the Strait end the state of hostility and respect each other in the international community, but the existence of Taiwan as a political entity zhengzhi shiti should not be denied and in the mainland area "the expression of public opinion should gradually be allowed, and both democracy and the rule of law should be imple- mented. And, the unification process should "first respect the rights and interests of the people in the Taiwan area" and be achieved under the principles of "parity and reciprocity. Relations Across the Taiwan Strait July Although in August the National Unification Council published an authorized explanation of the "one 3. This content downloaded from However, the former tends to go further than the latter: For instance, "one China" is for the first time clearly dissociated from the Republic of China. Now, "one China" just "refers to China as a historical, geographical, cultural and racial entity. As for their relationship with each other, it is that of two separate areas fenlifenzhi zhi liangqu of one China and is therefore "domestic" yiguo neibu or Chinese Zhongguo neibu in nature. Moreover - this point is often misun- derstood - the ROCOT government accepts the fact that relations between the two sides of the Taiwan Strait are domestic and not inter- national "in nature. Nevertheless, Taipei cannot approve the "one country two systems" formula: In essence, the relationship between the two systems is one of principal and subordinate: Under this arrangement, Taiwan will be forced to give up its freedom and democracy, and to accept entirely the system prescribed by the CCP Chinese Communist Party regime. Xingzhengyuan dalu weiyuanhui, July, pp. English version, p. Both sides of the Taiwan Strait should adopt moderate unification policies; it is inappropriate to be too impatient as more Page 2

3 haste will only mean less speed Once the ideological, political, economic and social gap between the two sides is bridged as result of our joint effort, the unification will come naturally For the time being, the two sides of the Taiwan Strait should intensify their exchanges and resolve conflicts by means of negotiations on functional matters. Only when a certain amount of experience has been accumulated and certain successes achieved through such negotiations will it be possible for the two sides to start political contacts and talks. A consensus has gradually been formed among the people of Taiwan that we are "all in the same boat" and that Taiwan is a Gemeinschaft, or community shengming gongtongti. Another manifestation of this feeling of community is the way in which public opinion plays a guiding role in government policy-making. In the course of formulating its mainland policy, the ROC government must periodically consult a wide range of public opinion. In a sense, yes. Though the concept of nation is not used, the KMT acknowl- edges today that all Taiwan residents share a common destiny. Probably influenced by his own academic and professional background, he offered to assist mainland China agricultural development, an initiative highly emphasized by the Taipei authorities. He agrees to negotiate an end of the state of hostility with Beijing but refuses to start such a negotiation formally before mainland authorities renounce the use of force against Taiwan though he indicates that in the meantime his government "will carefully study and make plans concerning issues connected with ending the hostility". This will be made clearer by Lee in August Continued prosperity and life under freedom and democracy are the common aspiration of the people of Hong Kong and Macau; they are also a major concern for Chinese around the world as well as all countries. What is more important, they are a responsibility both Taiwan and the mainland cannot shirk. For instance, Lee invited Beijing leaders "to come [to Taiwan] to take a look for themselves. Zhongyang ribao Central Daily News, 9 April, p. Zhongguo shibao China Times, 4 September, p. As a first step, Taipei hopes that the non-governmental talks with the PRC can be resumed in the near future so that more agreements can be signed such as on the protection of Taiwanese investments, another proposal made by Jiang in January. Then, as Lee Teng-hui put it himself, Taiwan "will try to forge a national consensus and make a priority of ending cross-strait confrontation with a peace accord. And the missile crisis could only feed the sentiments on which this strategy is based. Towards Government to Government Negotiations? In February, just a month after the establishment of the Mainland Affairs Council, the government agency in charge of planning and conducting mainland policy, Taipei set up the Straits Exchange Foun- dation SEF. This non-governmental organization was founded to "handle practical issues arising from cross-strait relations. The China Post, 24 February, p. Free China Review, Vol. Relations Across the Taiwan Strait, p. On the one hand, the SEF is formally a non-profit-making private organization whose objective is to "promote contacts and exchanges among Chinese from both sides of the Taiwan Strait. Moreover, its chairman, Koo Chen-fu, the fourth richest man on the island, sits on the KMT Central Standing Committee, and its vice-chairman and general secretary, Chiao Jen-ho since December, must implement the mainland policy defined by the MAC and constantly consult this govern- ment agency. During the first stage November to March, the organizations learned about each other. It was only in May that the two sides "agreed to disagree" on their respective interpretation of the "one China" concept and to leave this question aside. The SEF, although invited to Beijing, preferred Singapore for this first historic encounter between unofficial representative of the two Chinas. SEF,, p. Zhongshi wanbao China Times Express, 17 October, p. These documents were signed twice, once in original Chinese characters for Taipei, once in simplified charac- ters for Beijing. The major achievements of the Koo-Wang talks were to break the ice between the two Chinas, to show the world that Taipei and Beijing were actually negotiating and able to reach and sign accords - to date the only ones ever signed by the SEF and the ARATS22 - and to institutionalize the relations between these two unofficial organizations vice-chairmen or secretaries general should meet at least every six months while emer- gency contacts can be set up at deputy secretary general level. However, there is a blatant discrepancy between the technicality and a narrow scope of the agreements signed by the ROCOT and PRC representatives in Singapore in April on the one hand, and the impact this summit had not only on the Taiwanese public opinion but also on numerous policy- makers in the Asia-Pacific area and the West on the other. The optimism Page 3

4 caused by the Singapore summit did not last long. In March, the Qiandao lake incident - in which 24 Taiwan tourists were slaughtered, probably by demobilized soldiers at a Zhejiang beauty spot - froze for four months the SEF-ARATS talks, which started again in late July in a much less relaxed atmosphere. When they were sus- pended by Beijing in June, these negotiations had not produced any new agreements. Soon after the Singapore meeting, conflicting views appeared in Tai- wan on the mainland China policy. Thus, the Qiandao lake incident substantially slowed down the negotiation process. Two other agreements had been signed by the PRC and Taiwan before: Both agreements are still in force; cf. Westview Press,, pp. The main reason was disagreement over the delicate phrasing of the respective zones of jurisdiction for handling fishing disputes. However, later in May, when Chiao Jen-ho and Tang Shubei met again, they were sufficiently confident to announce a second Koo-Wang summit due to take place in Beijing around 20 July. On that occasion, the three documents under discussion for nearly two years would have been signed and talks on an agreement on the protection of Taiwanese invest- ments in mainland China would probably have been initiated. Several military manoeu- vres took place in October and in February-March in Fujian, a province facing Taiwan, the Nanjing military region was ostensibly turned into a "war zone" zhanqu, and through well-chosen Hong Kong newspapers the CCP published a number of alarming invasion or attack scenarios. Conversely, this accord would mean for Taipei a recognition by Beijing of a similar zone off the Taiwan shores. So, this point would have to be included in the agreement per se in one way or another. Interview with Chiao Jen-ho, 10 February Xinhua, 16 June For instance, in July the latter sent a message of protest to the former about fishing incidents which had occurred in the South China Sea. Later in the month, after having been hurt in a car accident, Chiao Jen-ho received from Tang Shubei a letter of regards and wishes for a prompt recovery. And the SEF sent a message of sympathy for the victims of a major flood which devastated the Yangzi basin. But lower-level visits took place, in particular before the end of This trend will probably be confirmed when and if political and security negotiations open. China News, 19 July, p. China News, 11 July, p. Lianhe bao, 15 September, p. China News, 9 December, p. Zhongyang ribao, 5 March, p. Zhongguo shibao, 29 August, p. Since, both Taipei and Beijing have used various channels to communicate. But since early, these channels have diversified substantially. Vincent Siew seems to have militated for this policy. In late November, the MAC announced specifically that Beijing government vice-ministers would be authorized to set foot on Taiwan. Chapter 3 : Prof. Jean-Pierre Cabestan GIS HKBU Jean-Pierre Cabestan & Jacques delisle eds., Political Changes in Taiwan Under Ma Ying-jeou. Partisan Conflict, Policy Choices, External Constraints and Security Challenges, Abingdon, Oxon & New York, Routledge,, p. Chapter 4 : Culture Unbound The Rise of Modern China (Sixth Edition)C The Hong Kong University of Science and Technology HUMANITIES - Fall The Rise of Modern China (Sixth Edition)C 2 pages notes on Early Republic Yuan SK May 4 etc The Hong Kong University of Science and Technology HUMANITIES - Fall notes on. Chapter 5 : Taiwan - Wikipedia The most comprehensive and up-to-date study presently available of the dynamic island republic of Taiwan. Drawing on a broad range of documentary sources and on-site research, a group of writers including many of the world's leading specialists on Taiwanese affairs provide in-depth and expert analysis. Chapter 6 : Studies on Contemporary China: Contemporary Taiwan (, UK-Paperback) ebay Page 4

5 Bibliographic record and links to related information available from the Library of Congress catalog Information from electronic data provided by the publisher. May be incomplete or contain other coding. Chapter 7 : Hong Kong Baptist University Government and International Studies - theinnatdunvilla.com The "moving wall" represents the time period between the last issue available in JSTOR and the most recently published issue of a journal. Chapter 8 : Contemporary Taiwan - David Shambaugh - Oxford University Press Abstract. This article examines the impact of China's liberal political reforms on its reunification with Taiwan from the perspective of linkage theory. Chapter 9 : Taiwan's Mainland Policy - [PDF Document] Mainland Affairs Council" was drafted and passed by the Legislative Yuan on January 18, 3 The promulgation of the Act by the President ten days later led to the establishment of the "Mainland Affairs Council" (MAC) - an authorized agency. Page 5