RESEARCH Volume 8 Issue 1 Spring Amanda Fang Harvard College 18 Political. 28 the harvard undergraduate research journal

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1 Myanmar s foreign policy towards China : To what extent has Myanmar s foreign policy towards China been determined by global geopolitical concerns in the period ? Amanda Fang Harvard College 18 This paper addresses the question of how far Myanmar s foreign policy towards China has been determined by global geopolitical concerns in the period , or whether domestic political factors have been more important. It begins by providing an overview of the relationship between Myanmar and China in the period 1988 to 2012, focusing on the diplomatic and economic ties between the two countries before critically engaging with the academic debate surrounding Myanmar s relationship with China. This debate has predominantly argued that Myanmar s foreign policy has been determined chiefly by global geopolitical concerns; namely the country s efforts to maintain its autonomy within an international political system dominated by the US and China, a policy which it is believed encouraged Myanmar to seek a close relationship with China throughout the 1990s and start of the twenty-first century, before seeking to loosen the ties with its powerful neighbor as it became concerned of its increasing dependency on China. Although there is some validity in this argument, this paper concludes that in order to understand Myanmar s foreign policy towards China, far greater focus must be on the domestic political concerns of the Myanmar government. Perspectives that claim Myanmar-Chinese relations are significantly dependent on geopolitics actually misrepresent the country. By neglecting how domestic issues shape Myanmar s international actions, this misrepresentation could blind international understanding of the East Asian political situation. By analyzing these domestic political factors, which are explored in the third and final section of the essay, I argue that contrary to the predominant viewpoint, Myanmar s foreign policy towards China has been determined by geopolitical concerns to only a limited extent, with domestic political concerns having a much more significant role. Alongside an extensive review of secondary literature the arguments developed in this paper are based upon an extensive set of face-to-face interviews conducted by the author with Myanmar and Chinese political and economic elites, international non-government organizations (INGOs), UN representatives and Myanmar civil society organizations in Yangon, the capital of Myanmar, in August A full list of interviews conducted by the author is provided in the References. Introduction The 1988 pro-democracy protests marked a pivotal moment in Myanmar s post-colonial politics. The government s brutal repression of these protests and its subsequent annulling of the 1990 election, in which democratic leader Aung San Suu Kyi had won a landslide victory, led to huge outcry in the West. It marked the beginning of a prolonged period of western pressure against the country, including sanctions and action at the United Nations Security Council. Since 1988 there has been a growing debate surrounding the motivations behind Myanmar s foreign policy towards China. The majority of academics and political commentators have argued that Myanmar s foreign policy towards China has been driven by its global geopolitical concerns: limit the impact of international sanctions, to protect the country within the UN, to discourage any form of US military pressure against the country and to overcome its vulnerable position tucked between China and India. However, other academics, notably Jurgen Haacke, have challenged this dominant viewpoint by emphasizing the domestic political factors that have shaped Myanmar s relationship with China (Jurgen Haacke, 28 the harvard undergraduate research journal 2006). This paper seeks to engage with this debate. In particular it challenges the tendency to analyze Myanmar s foreign policy towards China solely through a geopolitical prism. Instead, it argues that Myanmar s foreign policy towards China has been shaped far more by a set of clear domestic political strategies, explicitly the promotion of national unity and the defeating of the armed insurgent groups, which continue to challenge the state s authority in the country s borderlands. The importance of addressing the nature of the relationship between Myanmar and China is threefold: firstly, China s emerging status as a global superpower has been one of the most significant developments in international relations since the end of the Cold War therefore, it is important to understand the ways in which less powerful countries have sought to manage their relationship with China. Secondly, understanding the ways in which Myanmar has managed this relationship provides important insights into how Myanmar may look to manage its growing ties with the west over the coming years. Finally, the difficulties of conducting research in Myanmar over the past twenty-four years have meant that the country s domestic politics have often been under-analyzed and poorly understood, strongly justifying the importance

2 Volume 8 Issue 1 Spring 2015 RESEARCH A map of southeastern Asia. Source: Trans National Institute (2010) 29

3 of developing a deeper engagement with Myanmar s foreign policy strategy towards China. An overview of Myanmar-China relations Pre-1988 relations between Myanmar and China: Support and Suspicion In order to understand the nature of Myanmar s contemporary foreign policy towards China it is important to first understand the long and complicated relationship between the two countries, especially in the period since Myanmar gained independence in Historically, Myanmar and China have long been interconnected. The earliest official encounter between the two countries was in 139 B.C. when a Chinese official named Zhang Qian set off on a mission to find allies for China against their barbarian enemies; during this trip, Zhang Qian discovered a long established trade route between China down to the Irrawaddy Delta and beyond (Jacques Gernet, 1999). This sparked a long complicated relationship of friendships and hostilities with historical implications that still deeply affect relations between the two countries today. Since Myanmar gained independence from the British, successive governments have attempted to pursue an independent foreign policy of non-alignment in which the country claimed to be everybody s friend but nobody s ally (Jacques Gernet, 1999). Having overcome the subjugation of colonialism, the country s leadership was determined to prioritize internal nation-building and avoid becoming a battleground during the Cold War Myanmar s decision to become a founding member of the Non-Aligned Movement in 1961 (Jurgen Haacke, 2006) reflects this. However, Myanmar viewed its position between China and India as extremely vulnerable and was acutely aware of the need to manage its relationship with China extremely carefully. (Thant Myint U, 2011). At times since independence it was possible for Myanmar to develop close links with China and maintain its own domestic priorities. Myanmar became one of the first countries outside of the communist bloc to recognize the People s Republic of China (PRC) and in 1960 signed a border agreement with the PRC and a bilateral Treaty of Friendship and Mutual Non-Aggression (Thant Myint U, 2011). Myanmar was also the first country to patch up foreign relations with China after the Cultural Revolution was officially declared over in 1977 (Sudha Ramachandran, 2005). However, at other times the political relationship between the two countries remained fraught with mutual suspicion as China s interference in Myanmar s politics undermined the Myanmar government s attempts to develop a foreign policy that ensured it maintained complete autonomy over domestic policies. This was particularly apparent throughout the 1970s and 1980s when China treated Myanmar s pseudo-socialist policies and penchant for anti-chinese violence with suspicion and provided weapons and money to the Communist Party of Burma, the largest insurgency group fighting against the Myanmar government : Closer Ties Since the late 1980s, however, increased trade links and economic and political ties replaced the mutual distrust that had developed between the two countries following China s support of the CPB. For Myanmar, the aftermath of the military government s brutal suppression of the mass pro-democracy protests in 1988 which left 30 the harvard undergraduate research journal the country ostracized by the West and scrambling to improve its international image was what had motivated the surge in relations. Myanmar thus sought to develop greater trade links with neighboring countries by increasing cross border trade, the procurement of military equipment and attempts to secure ceasefire agreements with ethnic insurgent groups in its borderlands which had been fighting against the central government since Myanmar s independence. China played an important role in Myanmar s political makeover as it provided valuable protection in the UN (due to its power to veto in the UN Security Council) and enthusiastic economic support between 2001 and 2007 cross border trade between China and Myanmar rose by 250% (Toshihiro Kudo, 2008) Present day: Winds of Change in Myanmar (Mridu Kumari, 2012) By the mid-2000s, however, many academics argued that the Myanmar government was becoming concerned of its increasing dependence upon China and sought to change its unique Paukphaw (fraternal) relationship (Burma Centrum Netherlands, 2012) with China in order to avoid becoming a dependent 24th province (Andre Boucaud & Louis Boucaud, 2006) and economic colony of China (U Aung Kyaw Zaw, 2006). Following the promulgation and highly managed approval of a new constitution in 2008, the subsequent General Election in 2010 and the release of Aung San Suu Kyi and other political prisoners, Myanmar s relations with the West have greatly improved, generating a flurry of diplomatic and economic envoys from the USA, Japan, Australia and the United Kingdom. Contrarily, tensions have flared up between Myanmar and China following Myanmar Army offensives against ethnic groups in the Myanmar-China borderlands, such as the Kokang conflict (September 2009) and the ongoing clashes against the Kachin Independence Army (KIA), which both led to a large influx of refugees into China. Furthermore, the shock decision by the Myanmar government to suspend the Myitsone Dam project in 2012, in which Chinese companies had already invested $300 million of a planned $3.6 billion (and 90% of the power from which was expected to be sent to China 2 ), has created political friction. The popular belief within Myanmar that China has been exploiting Myanmar s natural resources has also catalyzed political discord, and China s increasing apprehension over Myanmar s apparent desire to generate closer ties with the US and other western countries. The global geopolitical concerns shaping Myanmar s foreign policy towards China Academic analysis and political commentary have predominantly argued that Myanmar s foreign policy towards China is best explained through a geopolitical lens. This was reflected in both academic analyses of Myanmar s international relations, notably the works of Johan Malik (1998) 3, Renaud Egreteau (2003) 4, Ian Storey (2011) 5, and Tin Maung Maung Than (2003) 6, as well as in 2 Some of the 90% destined for China could be bought by the Myanmar electric company. 3 Johan Malik, Burma s Role in Regional Security Pawn or Pivot? in Robert Rotberg, Burma: Prospects for a Democratic Future (Washington D.C. Brookings Institution Press, 1998) 4 Renaurd Egreteau, Wooing the General: India s New Burma Policy (Delhi: Authorspress, 2008) 5 Ian Storey, Southeast Asia and the Rise of China: The search for security (Abingdon: Routledge, 2011) 6 Tin Maung Maung Than, Myanmar and China: A special relationship?, in

4 Volume 8 Issue 1 Spring 2015 RESEARCH a wide array of media articles. They argue that this international relations approach is able to explain why Myanmar developed a close political and economic relationship with China between 1988 and 2008 and also why Myanmar has sought to loosen its ties with China over the past four years. Overcoming western economic and diplomatic pressure There is certainly some validity to these arguments. Firstly, it seems clear that to some extent the Myanmar military government s decision to develop close ties with China through the 1990s was a result of its determination to avoid being forced to bow to western diplomatic and economic pressure to enact democratic reforms. These accounts rightly emphasize that the tough international sanctions imposed upon Myanmar by Western countries gave Myanmar no other choice but to look to other countries which would be willing to support the government s attempts at economic revitalization and development. Myanmar s search for new allies aligned well with China s own determination to ameliorate its two oceans 7 and coast-interior divide (which saw the South West area of China steeped in poverty due to its distance from the sea and the lack of easy access to international trade) and its Malacca-Strait dilemma (fear that its essential energy resources could be easily blockaded in the Malacca-Straits during times of conflict 8 ). By establishing close ties with Myanmar, China gained unrivalled access to vast natural resources including jade, teak, nonferrous metals, and oil and natural gas for which a pipeline has bisected the country from Myanmar s offshore reserves to Kunming in Yunnan. Myanmar s desire to pursue a foreign policy in which it could overcome western pressures and retain its own autonomy by aligning more closely with China was also aided by the fact that the two countries shared a belief in the importance of non-interference in domestic politics (Forum 2000, 2011) meaning that political ideology did not appear to hinder trade deals, especially controversial ones such as the sale of military equipment to the regime between 2002 and 2010 (Michael W. Charney, 2009). This was demonstrated very clearly in 1990 when China initially prevented the first attempt by the UN on drafting a resolution on the human rights situation in Myanmar and in 2007 when China vetoed a resolution criticizing Myanmar s human rights record (Colum Lynch, 2007). Overcoming the geopolitical vulnerability of being situated on China s doorstep (Democratic Voice of Burma, 2011) In some ways the geopolitical analysis of Myanmar-China relations also provides an explanation for why Myanmar has seemingly looked to re-calibrate its foreign policy from 2008 by launching political reforms designed to improve its diplomatic and economic ties with the West. The close relationship that developed between Myanmar and China led many to believe that Myanmar had succumbed to China s political embrace, had become an economic satellite and political dependent of the People s Republic of China, and had ultimately become a puppet of China. (Storey, 2013). Many political commentators have argued that the belief Myanmar was losing its autonomy was also held by some within the Myanmar government. Southeast Asian Affairs 2003, (Singapore: ISEAS, 2003) 7 Wai Moe, Beijing s Two Oceans Policy Looms Large, Politics Forum Website, 3/9/ Researcher at the Institute of World Economics & Politics, Chinese Academy of Social s, China can help guard lifeline through Strait of Malacca, Global Times Online, 6/9/2011 This geopolitical concern, they argue, offers a clear explanation for the changes in Myanmar s diplomatic relations with China after The decision to embark upon a set of (possibly cosmetic) political reforms and to re-package them as a democratic government has been widely perceived as an attempt by the Myanmar government to re-engage with the West and reduce its reliance upon China (Bertil Lintner, 2012). This policy has been aided by the Obama administrations eagerness to reaffirm US strategic interests in South East Asia (David I. Steinberg, 2011) as US policy makers felt that the focus on the Middle East under George Bush had come at the cost of American interests in the Asia-Pacific. Myanmar s foreign policy towards China has thus been viewed as being fundamentally shaped by a geopolitical strategy, in some ways akin to Cold War politics, in which Myanmar has sought to retain its autonomy by playing off the tensions between two global superpowers, China and the US. Critique of the geopolitical explanation of Myanmar s foreign policy towards China However, the claim that Myanmar s foreign policy towards China has been founded upon these global geopolitical concerns is deeply misleading. This is because it focuses solely upon external perceptions rather than a deeper understanding of the reality in Myanmar, and as a consequence ignores the underlying fundamentals that have shaped Myanmar s approach to China since The geopolitical explanation of Myanmar-China relations is based almost exclusively upon a simplistic analysis of international relations which attempts to place Myanmar at the center of the journalistic sensationalism surrounding the global contest for power between the US and China. The concept of a US-China Great Game (David I. Steinberg, 2011) has misleadingly colored the way that outsiders have perceived Myanmar-China relations. Furthermore, the journalistic coverage of Chinafrica (Paula Akugizibwe, 2012), the phenomenon surrounding China s attempts to dominate access to resources across Africa, has simplistically designated Myanmar as being the next country to suffer at the hands of China s apparent neo-colonial strategy, further solidifying the idea that a change in foreign policy and a new type of relationship with China was needed in order to enable Myanmar to break away from being another Chinese satellite state and to retain its autonomy in the international sphere. Finally, this thesis has rarely been challenged because of the difficulty and reluctance to conducting research within Myanmar itself. In order to develop a more nuanced analysis of Myanmar s relations with China, two factors are necessary: firstly, different methodological approach focused on conducting research within the country rather than relying upon external media; secondly the need to analyze the domestic political considerations which have shaped consistently underpinned Myanmar s foreign relations (Zhou Jiangting, 2013). By undertaking these alternative approaches this paper argues that in reality Myanmar s foreign policy towards China is explained far more comprehensively by understanding the domestic political strategies, which Myanmar has consistently pursued since Domestic political strategies underpinning Myanmar s foreign policy towards China, Following the 1988 pro-democracy protests Myanmar s military regime faced arguably the greatest threat to its sovereignty since 31

5 independence; the government continued to be challenged by ethnic insurgent groups in the country s borderlands and now faced widespread political unrest throughout its major cities. Furthermore, the failure of General Ne Win s Burmese Way to Socialism had resulted in the collapse of the country s economy (Mark Tallentire, 2007). Therefore, although western outrage was a cause of considerable apprehension, the Myanmar military junta s primary focus was rooted far more in domestic political fears, namely how to improve the economy and overcome its opponents within the country. Myanmar s diplomatic activities in the period since 1988 have therefore been founded upon the core concept of domestic political security and the government s determination to consolidate its control over its territory (Jurgen Haacke, 2006). These domestic political considerations are underpinned by two central tenets: i) the prioritization of national unity; ii) the creation of a unitary state that rejects any form of autonomy. 9 It is these domestic political strategies that have underpinned the country s foreign policy towards China more than geopolitical concerns. Prioritization of National Unity The prioritization of national unity has been essential to the Myanmar government in the period due to the prodemocracy movement and the on-going insurgency activity in the borderlands, where numerous armed groups continue to fight for greater federalism and autonomy over local policy. Both of these movements have been perceived by the government as a threat to its own national unity ideology which embraces an intolerance of diversity and the creation of a single cultural identity under strong government, a policy surmised most famously by former Head of State General Ne Win s famous motto: one blood, one nation, one voice. Although this ideology has in many ways become selfdefeating, with the government s coercive policies merely arousing further hostility amongst many ethnic groups in the country s borderlands, it has remained a central tenet of the military government s political ideology. The prioritization of developing a single national unity has consistently shaped Myanmar s foreign policy towards China during the period in a number of ways. Firstly, the desire to improve ties with China was in part driven by the belief that this would ensure that China would not support insurgent groups in the borderlands. This was especially important in the light of the fact that China had a history of supporting the Communist Party of Burma and many insurgent groups (such as the Wa State Army) retain close linguistic and cultural ties with Yunnan Province due to decades of intermingling and border trade between the two (Thant Myint-U, 2007). Millions of Yunnan business people have even moved into Myanmar and bought identity cards, entrenching this Chinese presence. This strategy appeared to be successful and the Myanmar government s ability to win Chinese support may have been a contributory factor in the decision by many insurgent groups to sign ceasefires with the government in the 1990s as they became aware that in future they would be unable to gain weapons or finance from China. The insurgent groups were also given portions of drug smuggling and resource revenues by Khin Nyut (Prime Minister ), a protégé of General Ne Win. However, two major issues emerged during the mid-2000s, which 9 In the past these objectives have been publicized as the government s mission statement on the cover of New Light of Myanmar, the government-controlled leading newspaper in Myanmar. 32 the harvard undergraduate research journal undermined the symbiosis between close relations with China and the Myanmar government s attempts to forge national unity, which help to explain why Myanmar has sought to loosen its ties China since Firstly, there has being growing unrest within Myanmar society regarding the apparent dominance of Chinese people in the business sector and in ethnic states (Tsa Ji, 2012). The growth of a class of rich Chinese businessmen, especially in Mandalay and Yangon, has been resented by many poorer communities because of the popular view that these businessmen are getting rich through the unfair exploitation of Myanmar s resources. 10 Therefore, the Myanmar-China relationship has gradually begun to lose its usefulness, and had instead become a source of tension and unrest rather than a foundation upon which the government could overpower the armed groups still fighting the Burma Army in the country s ethnic states. 11 Secondly, the Myitsone Dam Project, in which China was heavily involved, threatened to undermine national unity as it led to the creation of a united front against the government, bringing together Aung San Suu Kyi, pro-democracy supporters, ethnic opposition and environmentalists who all argued that the government was sacrificing the Irrawaddy River for short-term economic gain. 12 Furthermore, the Myitsone Dam project was tainted by rumors of secret deals cut between the old junta and oligarchs in Myanmar with the Chinese corporations. These secret deals were said to not benefit Myanmar as a whole and played into the new leadership s desire to win popularity at home and weaken the positioning of the old junta. From the information gained in interviews conducted in Yangon with the Chinese Embassy and Chinese companies involved with the project 13, it seems that the government s suspension of the Dam project was a populist decision and one that clearly demonstrated the government s continued prioritization of national unity and domestic stability irrespective of what effect it had upon Myanmar-China relations. 14 The cultivation of close ties with China in the 1990s and the start of the 21st century was actually an effort by the Myanmar government to prioritize its ideological policy of national unity. However, events in the late 2000s clearly demonstrated that Myanmar was willing and able to loosen diplomatic ties when these ties appeared to threaten the government s core principle of national unity. It is therefore clear that through an understanding of the domestic political considerations driving Myanmar s foreign policy relations with China, the past twenty-four years have been marked by the Myanmar government s continuous efforts to prioritize its ideological policy of national unity, rather than solely due to wider geopolitical concerns. Non-Disintegration of the country and the creation of a powerful centralized state The creation of a unitary state which rejects any form of regional 10 Interview with Yang Zhi, Financial Affairs Principal and Cun Ting, Business Affairs Liaison - Yangon Representatives of Yunnan Machinery Import and Export Company (YMEC), Yangon, Friday 3rd August, 12.30pm (See Appendix) 11 Interview with U Aye Lwin, Joint General Secretary, The Republic of the Union of Myanmar Federation of Chambers of Commerce and Industry, Friday 3rd August, 3pm (See Appendix) 12 Interview with Zhou Jiangting, Chief Representative of SinoHydro, Myanmar Office, Thursday 2nd August, 7pm (See Appendix) 13 Interview with Mr Zhi Yang, Charge de Affairs, The Chinese Embassy, Friday 3rd August 2012, 7pm; Interview with Zhou Jiangting, Chief Representative of SinoHydro, Myanmar Office, Thursday 2nd August, 7pm (See Appendix) 14 Ibid

6 Volume 8 Issue 1 Spring 2015 RESEARCH autonomy, and which is at the very core of the Myanmar s army s political ideology, is the second major domestic political concern that has consistently shaped Myanmar s foreign policy towards China since This fear is borne out of a history of ethnic insurgency groups fighting the government to create their own independent states. Even when many ethnic insurgency groups changed their demand for full secession to a plea for greater federalism in the 1980s, the government has continued to interpret any form of compromise as a sign of weakness that could eventually lead to the country falling apart. This included the Chin, Kachin and Shan states which although were never under Myanmar rule prior to 1800, were considered the property of Myanmar after the British colonialists deemed them a part of Myanmar. Myanmar has a long history of empire building Emperors that are still revered in the country today. Emperors such as Anawrahta ( ), Bayinnaung ( ) and Alaungpaya ( ) embodied the stories of a nation naturally inclined to fracture but which through heroic action can be welded together (Thant Myint-U, 2008). The current Myanmar leadership continues to be influenced by these ideas, regardless of the lack of support they have across much of the country. The priority placed upon the non-disintegration of the country first shaped Myanmar s foreign policy towards China in the period when the government felt a tactical relationship with China would eliminate any chance of China further funding insurgents. The military government viewed China s ties with the United Wa State Army (UWSA) and the Kachin Independence Organization (KIO) with suspicion (International Crisis Group, 2010) and believed the instigation of diplomatic relations would deter possibilities of Chinese support for insurgents. Much more importantly, increasing trade with China in the border regions helped to create cease-fire capitalism, a phenomenon which allowed the government to secure areas over which the government s sovereignty continued to be challenged by ethnic opposition groups through business deals (Kevin Woods, 2011). By directing transnational finance into resource-rich upland areas where state control has historically been extremely weak and where access to land and resources remains highly contested, the state has been able to establish military-private partnerships. Within these partnerships national and transnational corporations have sought to strengthen the government s administrative capacity, viewing this as the most viable way to protect their own private interests (Kevin Woods, 2011). The links between the Myanmar government and foreign, mostly Chinese, companies has thus served to convert the states de jure sovereignty into de facto control (Kevin Woods, 2011). Furthermore, China s friendly relations with both the ethnic states and the military regime allowed it to act as a useful and meaningful mediator to lessen conflict in the region. China was viewed as useful as a bargaining tool for ethnic states and China was a key factor in ensuring tension did not boil over in peace talks (International Crisis Group, 2010). However, the role that China could play in fulfilling the Myanmar government s determination to establish a unitary state gradually weakened by the mid-2000s, which provides a major insight into why Myanmar has gradually re-defined its relationship with China since The primary reason for this has been China s deteriorating relationship with ethnic groups in the Myanmar-China borderland regions. The leadership of many ethnic groups felt they have been betrayed or abandoned recently as China sought to protect her own security and commercial interests by sacrificing their historical ties with these regions (International Crisis Group, 2010). Armed groups increasingly see themselves as pawns in China s game with the junta 15, which makes China s role as a mediator and middleman less useful. China s reputation with ethnic states has further deteriorated due to the damage their investments have caused upon local communities, their traditional ways of life and the environment (Yao Jian, 2009). The Myanmar government, realizing the worsening of ethnic ties with China, has begun instead to use China as a common enemy to attempt to forge greater unity with the ethnic states. As China was viewed increasingly as the root of Myanmar s many ills, the military regime began taking counter-diplomatic actions, notably suspending the Myitsone Dam. Therefore, whilst China served to help Myanmar s domestic political objectives, the growing tension within the ethnic states, fuelled by conflict over natural resources and environmental damage (notably the resurgence of civil war in Kachin State), now make China s presence a growing hindrance to the government s political strategy of maintaining national unity and non-disintegration of the country. Conclusion Overall, it is clear that Myanmar s foreign policy towards China has been determined by geopolitical concerns to only a limited extent. The focus on geopolitics crucially fails to recognize the core domestic political considerations that continue to shape Myanmar s relationship with its larger neighbor. The impression that Myanmar s change in diplomatic relations with China was due to its efforts to reposition themselves on an international stage (Bertil Lintner, 2012) (David I. Steinberg, 2011), is misconstrued. Over the past twenty-four years Myanmar s overarching geo-political strategy has consistently been shaped by the government s determination to prioritize its ideological, and often coercive, commitment to the development of national unity, and to create a powerful unitary state. Throughout the 1990s and the early twentieth century the Myanmar government viewed the development of a close relationship with China as beneficial to achieving these aims. However, by the mid-2000s the Myanmar government began to view its close relationship with China as increasingly detrimental to its own sovereignty and thus began to believe that its domestic political objectives would be more easily attained by adopting a more balanced foreign policy in which it loosened its close ties with China and balanced these ties a renewed engagement with the West. This analysis provides an important insight into how the Myanmar may look to manage its re-opening of relations with the West and strongly suggests that its cautious policy of political and economic liberalization will continue to be moulded around its own domestic political objectives. References Primary research Interview conducted by the author with Zhou Jiangting, Chief Representative of SinoHydro in Myanmar, Yangon, Myanmar, 2/8/ Crisis Group interview, KIO official, Kachin State, June

7 SinoHydro is a Chinese state-owned construction company, which specialises in hydropower engineering. The Corporation is involved in a number Empty Chair in Oslo, 11/12/2011 Forum 2000 (2011), Democracy and Human Rights in Asia: One Year After an of very large dam construction projects in Myanmar, designed to generate Fuller, T. (2011), Myanmar Backs Down, Suspending Dam Project, The New hydro-electric power. York Times Online, 30/10/2011 Interview conducted by the author with Shihab Uddin Ahamad, ActionAid Gernet, J. (1999), A History of Chinese Civilisation (Cambridge: Cambridge Country Director, Yangon, Myanmar, 3/8/2012 University Press, 1999) ActionAid is an international non-governmental organisation (INGO). Haacke, J. (2006), Myanmar s foreign policy: domestic influences and international implications, (UK: Routledge) ActionAid started to work in Myanmar after Cyclone Nargis in 2008, providing emergency relief. It has now established a permanent office in Yangon. 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