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1 University of Tennessee, Knoxville Trace: Tennessee Research and Creative Exchange Tennessee Department of State, Opinions from the Administrative Procedures Division Law TENNESSEE DEPARTMENT OF SAFETY vs. One 1992 Plymouth Voyager, VIN NO.: 1P4GH54R9NX135694, Seized From: George Spears, Date of Seizure: December 14, 2007, Claimant: Eula Spears, Lien Holder: N/A Follow this and additional works at: This Initial Order by the Administrative Judges of the Administrative Procedures Division, Tennessee Department of State, is a public document made available by the College of Law Library, and the Tennessee Department of State, Administrative Procedures Division. For more information about this public document, please contact administrative.procedures@tn.gov

2 BEFORE THE COMMISSIONER OF THE TENNESSEE DEPARTMENT OF SAFETY IN THE MATTER OF: TENNESSEE DEPARTMENT OF SAFETY v. DOCKET NO: J (D.O.S. Case No. G9150) One 1992 Plymouth Voyager VIN NO.: 1P4GH54R9NX Seized From: George Spears Date of Seizure: December 14, 2007 Claimant: Eula Spears Lien Holder: N/A INITIAL ORDER This matter was heard on July 2, 2008 in Memphis, Tennessee, before Margaret R. Robertson, Administrative Judge, assigned by the Secretary of State, Administrative Procedures Division, and sitting for the Commissioner of the Tennessee Department of Safety. Mr. Joe Bartlett, Staff Attorney for the Department of Safety, represented the State. Claimant Eula Spears represented herself. The issue in this case is whether Claimant s interest in the above referenced vehicle should be forfeited. After consideration of the record in this matter, it is determined that the 1992 Plymouth Voyager should be returned to the Claimant. This decision is based upon the following Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law.

3 FINDINGS OF FACT 1. The subject of this hearing is the proposed forfeiture of a 1992 Plymouth Voyager. The vehicle was seized from Claimant s son, George Spears, the driver, on December 14, 2007 by Officer Stan Ivey of the Memphis Police Department, who was initially stopped for driving a vehicle with out of date registration.. A check on Mr. Spears driving record revealed that he was driving without a valid license, his driving license having been revoked for prior DUI convictions on 6/5/92, 8/4/93 and 1/25/97. On 7/19/99 Mr. Spears was sent a notice that he had been declared a habitual traffic offender. At that point, the date after which he was eligible to reinstate his driver s license was made indefinite as a consequence of his habitual offender status. Thus he was not eligible to reinstate his license when he was stopped on December 14, Mr. Spears was arrested and the vehicle was transported to the city lot. The registered owner, Claimant Eula Spears, 78, was contacted by telephone. She filed a claim to recover the vehicle. 3. At the hearing, Ms. Spears acknowledged that she was aware that her son had been convicted previously for DUI. However, she disputed that she had been aware that he was unlicensed and ineligible to obtain a valid license today. She said he might have known what situation he was under, but she did not. She offered to supply proof that the vehicle belonged to her. Her ownership of the vehicle was not disputed by the State. She admitted allowing her son to drive her vehicle on the day of the seizure to get medicine for her. She had recently returned home from a hospital stay and was unable to drive herself. 2

4 4. Ms. Spears disputed that the vehicle s registration was out of date, and supplied copies of the registration receipt issued on March 28, 2007 to which the renewal stickers are usually attached. Her tags are up for renewal by the end of April each year. She testified that she stood and watched while an older son put the 2008 stickers on her license plate after she obtained the renewal. If they were missing at the time of the stop, she speculated that they would have had to have fallen off. Photos she provided of the license plate on her vehicle show stickers valid until April of Officer Ivey stated that he and his partner believed that the tags were out of date. Officer Ivey s partner did not appear at the hearing. Officer Ivey s name is not on the forfeiture warrant and accompanying affidavit. 5. Ms. Spears knew that her son George did not regularly drive, because he did not own a vehicle and because someone would bring him to visit her or take him to work. They lived on different streets at different addresses. She said she would not ordinarily let him or anyone else drive her car, because she would drive. She was concerned for her safety and the safety of her car. She said she did not know her son George did not currently have a license. That was not her reason for not letting him drive her car usually. 6. Officer Ivey testified that the vehicle contained tools that George Spears used in his work, including a generator and saw. So that the police would not have to inventory the tools, Officer Ivey said that he called a family member, possibly a brother of George Spears, to pick up the tools. CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 1. The law provides that it is illegal for a person to operate a motor vehicle at a time when one s license to drive has been revoked unless one has a restricted license. It further 3

5 provides that, if the revocation was ordered due to a DUI conviction, any vehicle driven by the offender during the period of revocation is subject to seizure and forfeiture. TCA (a)(1) and (h)(1). 2. The State has the burden of proving, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the seized property fits within the statute defining its illegal use, thereby rendering it subject to forfeiture. Rule (4), TENN. COMP. R. & REGS., Rules of the Tennessee Department of Safety. 3. In order to prevail in this case, the State must prove that the vehicle was being driven by a person whose license to drive had been revoked for prior DUI conviction. The State s evidence proved that George Spears license was revoked due to his January 25, 1997 (and previous) conviction(s) for driving under the influence of an intoxicant and for his July 19, 1999 conviction as a habitual offender of the DUI law.. While his license was still revoked, he was found to be operating the subject vehicle on December 14, Under these circumstances, the law provides that the vehicle driven by the Claimant in violation of the law may be subject to forfeiture. 4. However, the law also provides that, when the owner of the vehicle is not present at the time of the seizure, his/her legal interest is not subject to forfeiture without proof that the owner knew that the vehicle was being used in a manner making it subject to forfeiture and consented to its use. TCA (c). This provision exists to prevent the forfeiture of the property of innocent owners who are not responsible for the illegal conduct that led to the vehicle s seizure. 4

6 5. The State has the burden to prove that Ms. Eula Spears, owner of the vehicle, knew at the time she permitted her son to drive her vehicle that he did not have a license to drive and that to allow him to drive her vehicle was a violation of law subjecting her vehicle to forfeiture. The State failed to meet its burden of proof in this regard. Ms. Spears, whose testimony and demeanor were that of a credible witness, testified that she did not know her son s situation. The State s witness cited her awareness of George Spears 1992 incarceration as evidence that Ms. Spears knew he was not licensed and that it was illegal for him to drive. More than fifteen years have passed and many changes in Mr. Spears status could and have taken place. The State was unable to meet its burden regarding what Ms. Spears did or did not know on December 14, 2007 when Mr. Spears was stopped. 6. Claimant Eula Spears is an innocent owner under the facts of this case. The State was unable to prove that she knew that her vehicle was being used in a manner making it subject to forfeiture and consented to its use. TCA (c). As stated previously, without such proof, the owner s legal interests in the vehicle are not subject to forfeiture. 7. It goes without saying that the legislature never intended the DUI Forfeiture laws to become a means by which Seizing Agencies can appropriate the lawful property of legitimate owners who are not involved in criminal activity. Rather, their purpose is to remove vehicles from persons who have shown a pattern of operating them in violation of the law, and to the actual or potential detriment of the public. Under the facts of this case, granting the proposed forfeiture would do nothing to further the interests of the State or the public. 8. However, Ms. Eula Spears is now on notice that her son, George Spears, has been decreed a habitual offender of the DUI law and, as such, will never be eligible to obtain a 5

7 driver s license. It therefore would be illegal for her to allow him access to her vehicle or to permit him to drive her vehicle, and if he is again found in possession of her vehicle, it would be subject to forfeiture. It is therefore concluded that the State has failed to meet its burden of proof. Accordingly, it is hereby ORDERED that the subject 1992 Plymouth Voyager shall be returned to the Claimant, Eula Spears. This Initial Order entered and effective this 21st day of January, Margaret R. Robertson Administrative Judge Filed in the Administrative Procedures Division, Office of the Secretary of State, this 21st day of January, Thomas G. Stovall, Director Administrative Procedures Division 6