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1 University of Tennessee, Knoxville Trace: Tennessee Research and Creative Exchange Tennessee Department of State, Opinions from the Administrative Procedures Division Law DEPARTMENT OF SAFETY, vvs.one 1998 Mercedes C23 VIN: WDBHA23G4WA629671, Seized From: Wanda Goodridge, Seizure Date: 7/ 31/11, Claimant: Billie P. May Seizing Agency: Bradley Co. S.D., Lien Holder: None Filed Follow this and additional works at: Part of the Administrative Law Commons This Initial Order by the Administrative Judges of the Administrative Procedures Division, Tennessee Department of State, is a public document made available by the College of Law Library, and the Tennessee Department of State, Administrative Procedures Division. For more information about this public document, please contact administrative.procedures@tn.gov

2 BEFORE THE COMMISSIONER OF THE TENNESSEE DEPARTMENT OF SAFETY IN THE MATTER OF: ] DEPARTMENT OF SAFETY, ] ] vs. ] DOCKET # J ] D.O.S. # L8573 One 1998 Mercedes C23 ] VIN: WDBHA23G4WA ] Seized From: Wanda Goodridge ] Seizure Date: 7/31/11 ] Claimant: Billie P. May ] Seizing Agency: Bradley Co. S.D. ] Lien Holder: None Filed ] INITIAL ORDER This contested administrative case was heard in Chattanooga, Tennessee on February 29, 2012, before J. Randall LaFevor, Administrative Judge, assigned by the Secretary of State, sitting for the Commissioner of the Tennessee Department of Safety. Mr. Robert Ingram, Staff Attorney for the Tennessee Department of Safety, represented the State. The Claimant appeared pro se. The subject of this hearing was the proposed forfeiture of a 1998 Mercedes C23, based on the Seizing Agency s assertion that it was used to facilitate a violation of the Tennessee Drug Control Act. Upon full consideration of the record in this case, it is determined that the proposed forfeiture should be denied, and the vehicle should be returned to the Claimant. This decision is based on the following Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law. FINDINGS OF FACT 1. On the afternoon of July 31, 2011, an officer with the Bradley County Sheriff s Office stopped the subject vehicle for traveling at a speed of 57 mph in a 45 mph zone. The Driver was Wanda Goodridge ( Goodridge ).

3 2. Subsequent investigation by the officer revealed that Goodridge had an assortment of illegal drugs in her possession, including 49 Oxycodone (Schedule II) tablets; 3 Dihydrocodeinone (Schedule III) tablets; and one partial Alprazolam (Schedule IV) tablet. Goodridge was arrested and charged with illegal possession of the controlled substances. 3. A check of the vehicle s registration revealed that it was owned by Billie P. May, with whom Goodridge had lived off-and-on for several years. Based on Goodridge s use of the car to transport illegal drugs, the officer seized the vehicle. He later sought and obtained a Forfeiture Warrant for the vehicle. 4. Billie P. May ( Claimant ), the registered owner of the Mercedes, filed a petition for the return of the car, and this hearing was scheduled to consider his claim. 5. During the hearing, the Claimant testified that he and Goodridge had had been together off-and-on for about the last five years, and that they had worked together for a short time. He knew that Goodridge was addicted to pain pills, but she was enrolled in a methadone program, which he believed was helping her to overcome her addiction. He was unaware that she was in possession of illegal drugs. 6. The Claimant purchased the seized vehicle for his parents use. When he later learned that they rarely drove the car, he removed it to his home and used it as his own vehicle. It was registered exclusively in the Claimant s name, and Goodridge contributed nothing toward its upkeep. Goodridge had her own van, and was only allowed to drive the Mercedes occasionally, and only with the Claimant s specific permission. On the date of its seizure, the Claimant was in Chicago on business, and had not given his permission for Goodridge to drive the vehicle. When he returned home, and found that she had been lying to him about her drug rehabilitation, and that her illegal drug use had caused his car to be seized, he ended their relationship, and severed all ties with Goodridge. 7. There was no evidence that the Claimant was ever involved in any illegal drug activity, or that he condoned the use of illegal drugs by Goodridge; his only involvement 2

4 in her drug activity was to support her in her medical methadone program to try to end her addiction. He had never authorized her to use his car for any illegal purposes, either on July 31, 2011, or on any other date. His testimony throughout the hearing, and especially on those issues, was highly credible. CONCLUSIONS OF LAW and ANALYSIS 1. All conveyances, including... vehicles... which are used or are intended for use, to transport, or in any manner facilitate the transportation, sale or receipt of controlled substances in violation of the Tennessee Drug Control Act are subject to forfeiture. TENN. CODE ANN (a)(4). 2. On behalf of the seizing agency, the State of Tennessee Department of Safety bears the burden of proof in forfeiture proceedings, and must therefore prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the seized property is subject to forfeiture, pursuant to law. Failure to carry the burden of proof operates as a bar to the proposed forfeiture. TENN. CODE ANN (d)(2); Rule , TENN. COMP. R. & REGS., Rules of the Tennessee Department of Safety. 3. The State s proof established, by a preponderance of the evidence, that Goodridge used the Claimant s vehicle to transport an assortment of illegal drugs. 4. When Goodridge used the vehicle to transport illegal drugs, any interest she may have owned in the car became subject to forfeiture as a vehicle used or intended for use, to transport... controlled substances in violation of the Tennessee Drug Control Act. TENN. CODE ANN (a)(4). In this case however, Goodridge owned no interest in the car. 5. Although he did not challenge the facts surrounding Goodridge s arrest, the Claimant did contest the proposed forfeiture of his car, arguing that he is the sole owner of the vehicle, and, since Goodridge had used it for an illegal purpose without his knowledge or consent, he is therefore entitled to have it returned to him. The law provides that, when the owner of the vehicle is not present at the time of the seizure, 3

5 his/her legal interest is not subject to forfeiture without proof that the owner knew that the vehicle was being used in a manner making it subject to forfeiture and consented to its use. TCA (c) [Emphasis added]. In order to sustain the forfeiture of the Claimant s car, the State has the burden of proving that he knew that Goodridge was going to use his car to transport illegal drugs, and gave his consent for that use. TCA (a). 6. The Claimant did not grant his permission for Goodridge to drive his car on the day of its seizure. The Claimant testified that he was not aware that Goodridge was still involved in illegal drug activity, and that he was supporting what he believed to be her sincere efforts to end her addiction. He testified that he had never authorized her to use his car for any illegal purposes, either on July 31, 2011, or on any other date. The State offered no evidence contradicting that evidence. Although the arresting officer may have believed Goodridge was acting with the Claimant s knowledge and consent, he offered no evidence to back up that belief, other than the fact that the two had lived together off-andon for several years. Due to their co-habitation, he assumed the Claimant knew of Goodridge s illegal activities. Forfeiture of a citizen s property based on nothing more than an officer s unsupported assumptions and belief would be highly improper. 7. In the absence of evidence in the record that Goodridge was transporting drugs in the Claimant s car with his knowledge and consent, or proof of facts from which such a reasonable inference can be drawn, it must be concluded that the State failed to prove that the Claimant knew that the vehicle was being used in a manner making it subject to forfeiture and consented to its use, as required by TCA (c). The Claimant therefore retains his status as an innocent owner who is entitled to the return of his property. 8. In summary, while the State s proof established that the car, while being driven by Goodridge, was used to transport illegal drugs, no evidence connected that activity to the Claimant, who was the sole owner of the vehicle. As provided by the statutes cited above, the State s failure to prove both (1) that the seized vehicle was being used in a 4

6 manner making it subject to forfeiture, and (2) that the absent owner knew of, and consented to such use, operates as a bar to the proposed forfeiture. 9. And, finally, although it was not raised as an issue during the hearing, an independent review of the Drug asset Forfeiture Warrant and the Affidavit in support of that Warrant, reveals that only the ownership interests of Wanda Goodridge were subject to forfeiture in this proceeding. The Warrant, itself, only bears her name as the purported owner of the car, and authorizes the initiation of proceedings to forfeit her interests. The Affidavit in Support of Forfeiture Warrant declares that, A search of the title history and testimony from witnesses has established that Billie P. May has an ownership, coownership, or secured interest in the seized property which is not subject to forfeiture. [Bold emphasis in original document.] Therefore, the Claimant s interests in the vehicle cannot be forfeited as a result of these proceedings. Accordingly, it is hereby concluded that the State has failed to meet its burden of proof. Forfeiture of the vehicle is barred, as a matter of law. It is therefore ORDERED that the Vehicle Forfeiture Warrant is DISMISSED, and the subject 1998 Mercedes C23 shall be returned to the Claimant, Billie P. May. And, IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Seizing Agency shall not charge the Claimant any storage fees or other fees associated with its seizure, as long as he contacts the agency to pick up his vehicle within five (5) days following receipt of this Order. Entered and effective this 23rd day of March, J. Randall LaFevor, Administrative Judge 5

7 Filed in the Administrative Procedures Division, Office of the Secretary of State, this 23rd day of March, Thomas G. Stovall, Director Administrative Procedures Division 6