Security Council Background Guide

Transcription

1 Security Council Background Guide Dear Delegates, My name is Max Kober, and I would like to welcome you all to the Security Council at TUMUN 2016! To give you a little information about myself, I am a senior at Tufts University in Boston, majoring in International Relations and Spanish. The UN has been a part of my life for over six years; three years ago I was the Assistant Director of the Security Council at NHSMUN 2013 and two years ago I was the Council s Director. Last year I served as Director of the Arab League at NHSMUN I am an active member of the Tufts Model UN team, and I have attended seventeen conferences during my MUN career. This body will seek to address the political turmoil of Syria, where civil war has torn the region apart for years. The world as a whole has a clear obligation to address this topic, and it has far-reaching consequences that have affected and will affect the international community. Over the course of your research, the Background Guide will serve as an important source of knowledge. It is by no means an exhaustive analysis of the topic presented, but it provides a comprehensive and thorough base from which to gather research. I can be reached 24/7 at max.kober@tufts.edu to answer questions, address concerns, and help out. You should feel free to contact me with anything you need, or just to introduce yourself! Sincerely, Max Kober Director, Security Council max.kober@tufts.edu

2 What is the Security Council? The Security Council is widely regarded as the most influential and farreaching of all UN bodies. Created in Chapter V of the original United Nations Charter and ratified in October 1945, the SC is granted extended powers and a wide purview, including the primary responsibility of "maintaining peace and security" in the international community. This makes the Security Council the de facto deliberating body when violent political or economic crises arise. The SC is relatively small, consisting of fifteen member states, two-thirds of whom are elected for two year terms. The remaining five countries comprise the P5, or Permanent Five members: the United States, the United Kingdom, France, China, and the Russian Federation. Made up of the victors of World War II, the P5 is unique in that its members hold veto power in all substantive Security Council decisions. Without the approval or abstention of all permanent members, no resolutions can pass in the Security Council. Most importantly, the UN Charter requires its member states to adhere to all decisions of the Security Council, affirming the authority of the body. This, along with the outlined duties of the SC, empowers the body to both "demand" and "condemn" in its resolutions, language that is unavailable to other organs. Historically, the UNSC has taken responsibility for expressing the opinions of the UN's member states, or at least a majority of those states, and this responsibility is facilitated by the geographic distribution of Security Council temporary members. The ten countries elected to the Security Council for two-year terms are, in accordance with the UN Charter, evenly distributed across the five geographical areas: Latin America and the Caribbean, Asia and the Pacific, Africa, Eastern Europe, and Western Europe/Others. Distributing the membership by region ensures that the opinions expressed in the SC are equally represented. However, member states have expressed concern that the Western Europe and Others group is overrepresented, considering that three fifths of the P5 comes from that region. Additionally, Africa and Latin America may not be represented enough, because neither region is represented by a P5 member. The accomplishments of the Security Council are numerous, and almost every major multilateral UN achievement has come through the actions of the SC. Most notably, the SC has established dozens of peacekeeping missions (as the only body with the authority to do so, considering its focus on international security) with the purpose of acting as a buffer zone between the parties of a conflict, or to aid in rebuilding efforts following a conflict. For example, the current peacekeeping missions in Kashmir and the Golan Heights, abbreviated UNMOGIP and UNDOF respectively, were designed and implemented following ceasefires of bilateral conflicts, and are still in place today. Additionally, the Security Council has historically established the desire of its member states to impose sanctions against countries or organizations deemed dangerous to the international community, a process that has allowed the UN as a whole to express an international consensus approving or disapproving of states' actions. The implementation of sanctions against Al Qaeda and the Taliban around the turn of the 21st century was landmark legislation for the SC, specifically because it involved leveling economic sanctions against an organization not tied to any country. This action established the modern precedent for SC action against violent non-state actors, including terrorist organizations.

3 Introduction Of the political crises facing the world today, the Syrian Civil War is the most destructive and far-reaching. Now well into its fourth year, the conflict is in part the result of the wave of pro-revolutionary demonstrations known as the Arab Spring, which has shaken the entrenched political systems of the Middle East and North Africa since early Syria, which began experiencing pro-democracy protests and calls for reformation around the same time, has collapsed into a failed state with no coherent national government. The conflict s core, the military engagement between those forces in favor of and those against the administration of President Bashar al-assad, does not limit the ongoing crisis to political instability. Rather, it extends economically and diplomatically as well. The civil war affects the Arab World in its entirety, both as a catalyst for debate and political change, and because of its very real effects that radiate today in and around Greater Syria. Some of these include serious refugee overpopulation, economic stress resulting from the Syrian collapse, and the prevalence of extremism in the region. Today, the incredible momentum of the Syrian Civil War is what stands out the most. Despite efforts from the United Nations, the Arab League, special diplomatic representatives, and joint Russo-American led multilateral peace talks, the conflict s various sides are no closer to ceasing military operations nor to beginning the rebuilding process. Part of this process is returning those civilians who have been forcibly moved from their homes as a result of the conflict. The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees estimates that, as of January 2014, 1 Mervat Rishmawi, The League of Arab States in the Wake of the Arab Spring, Cairo Institute for Human Rights Studies, September 2013, there are approximately 2.5 million refugees of the Syrian Crisis, with over one million of those in neighboring Lebanon, as well as an astonishing 4.2 million internally displaced persons (IDPs). 2 While the refugee status refers to stateless civilians fleeing across international borders, IDPs are those contained within the country but equally without a home. Despite these differences, both groups require extensive attention. Accompanying the refugee crisis that threatens to exhaust the resources of surrounding Arab states, insurgency and militancy have become commonplace in Syria. Al Qaeda-affiliated groups, especially the militant Islamist terrorist group Jabhat al- Nusra, threaten the region s already tenuous stability, and the newly-established Islamic State (formerly ISIS/ISIL) has declared a 21 st century Islamic Caliphate in the uncontrolled regions of Syria and Iraq. 3 Historical Context The Arab Spring and Syria The wave of popular demonstration and political changes known as the Arab Spring was instrumental in bringing about the Syrian Civil War, just as it has sparked other outbreaks and aftershocks across the Middle East and Africa. While the Arab Spring is technically ongoing, and there is no internationally agreed-upon scope for the movement, it can be classified by its numerous effects in Arab countries since late Beginning as peaceful protests but escalating into calls for governmental reform, movements in Egypt, Tunisia, Libya, and 2 UNHCR Global Appeal Syrian Arab Republic, United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, last modified 1 December 2013, 3 Zachary Laub and Jonathan Masters, Islamic State in Iraq and Greater Syria, Council on Foreign Relations, last modified 12 June 2014,

4 Yemen ousted standing administrations, not always to the benefit or interest of surrounding Arab states. 4 One such example of a less-than-desirable Arab Spring change was the cycle of revolution in Egypt bringing to power the Muslim Brotherhood under Mohammed Morsi, to which many Middle Eastern administrations are opposed. As revolts continued, the Brotherhood was overthrown by the military rule of General Abdel Fattah el-sisi. 5 In this instance and many others, the Arab Spring has proven completely unpredictable, and following the initial wave of protests Syria was suddenly drawn into the movement. When addressing each of the Middle East and North Africa crises of the Arab Spring, we can see that the Security Council s member states classified each emergency categorically. Specifically there were two categorizations: revolutions that called for the push towards governmental transitions and revolutions that spurred controversial responses among member states and very little action. Revolutions in a state like Libya were met with active calls for the government s peaceful transition because few governments found an ally in Libya s Gadhafi. In contrast, uprisings in powerful linchpin states like Egypt would be met with a less decisive stance, with most states calling for observation rather than action. Whichever of the two categories a revolution might fall under, one constant throughout the Arab Spring has been the SC s absolute refusal to condone any kind of foreign military intervention on Arab soil. 6 This style of problem solving, in which national sovereignty is encouraged but the regime in power not necessarily endorsed, does extend 4 Mervat Rishmawi, The League of Arab States in the Wake of the Arab Spring, Cairo Institute for Human Rights Studies, September 2013, 5 Ibid. 6 Ibid. to Syria, and understanding how Syria fits in the puzzle pieces of the Arab Spring states is vital to interpreting the conflict as it is seen by the Security Council. International response to the Arab Spring has been varied, with the majority of Western countries in support of the prodemocracy uprisings, at least towards the beginning of the conflict. As it has become more apparent that the regime changes brought about by the Arab Spring do not necessarily foster stable Middle Eastern democracies, Western views have shifted towards the negative. At this time the Middle Eastern states desired more sovereignty for states experiencing Arab Spring uprisings to allow for domestic resolution of the issues there. Concurrently, the region has been fortunate in dealing with a United States whose popular support for Middle Eastern intervention was hamstrung by the end of two protracted wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. These efforts have helped lead the Arab Spring states largely to develop the results of their revolutions in a regionally contained environment. 7 That is not to say that each conflict has been without outside influence, far from it; but what influence has permeated has largely come from nearby geographical sources. Such has also been the case in Syria, where the trend of limited Western involvement began in the conflict s earliest days and the United States is still hesitant to entangle itself yet again in the Middle East. 8 State Fracture and International Diplomatic Efforts The roots of Syria s eventual degradation and fractionalization into contested zones of control began with the Assad government s repression of popular protests in early Following the ignition of region-wide pro-democracy protests, 7 The Middle East at Crossroads, American Foreign Policy Interests, last modified 9 August 2013, Ibid.

5 similar uprisings in Syria demanded an increase in freedoms and democratic organizations from the government. While the objective of these protests remained largely stable and peaceful in nature, the face of the uprising changed radically when Assad-aligned security forces began violently repressing and attacking protesters. 9 A report compiled by the United Nations Human Rights Council (UNHRC) in September 2011 found that the Assad government was guilty of multiple human rights violations, including widespread attacks on non-combatants, stating that, the Syrian Arab Republic has grossly violated the non-derogable right to life. 10 The report also stated a disproportionate use of lethal versus nonlethal methods of crowd control, and conceded that, while limited civilian violence against the military had taken place, the numbers of pro-assad attacks were far more prevalent and deadly. 11 While the list of violations continues, the most important factor drawn from the UNHRC report is that the government used indiscriminant force against civilians on a number of occasions, fueling the protests that would soon turn violent and divide Syria into factionalized zones of influence. After several months of protests, accusations of government crackdown, and the September report on human rights violations, the League of Arab States decided to offer an ultimatum. In October of that year, the LAS proposed a ceasefire between Assad and the rebels, contingent on the Syrian government s release of political prisoners and 9 Mervat Rishmawi, The League of Arab States in the Wake of the Arab Spring, Cairo Institute for Human Rights Studies, September 2013, 10 A/HRC/18/53, Report of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights on the situation on human rights in the Syrian Arab Republic, 15 September Ibid. opening of free media. 12 League of Arab States Council Resolution 7442 instituted an array of sanctions against the Syrian government, affecting its mobility, economic solubility, and political power, in an attempt to hamstring the regime s strength amid the crisis. 13 The sanctions were largely seen as an effort to quell the government s aggression against civilians, already condemned by the majority of the international community. By December 2011, what was a series of protests had evolved into a full-scale revolution. With the death toll exceeding 4,000 by that time, a conservative estimate, the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights was comfortable classifying the situation as a civil war, noting the extent to which political stability had dissolved. 14 Although the conflict at this time was a civil war that threatened the integrity of the entire country, it had not yet evolved into the fullscale destruction that exists today. As such, there were significant efforts to contain and mitigate the early crisis. For example, the League of Arab States by that time had installed peacekeepers in the region, in a manner similar to the power afforded to the UN Security Council. Rather than helping to curb the violence growing between government and revolutionary forces, the presence of Arab League observers had little effect. For the most part, Syria s opposition parties, working to oust President Assad from office, accused the observer mission of lacking a strong mandate, leading to an 12 Mervat Rishmawi, The League of Arab States in the Wake of the Arab Spring, Cairo Institute for Human Rights Studies, September 2013, 13 League of Arab States Council Resolution 7442, Following Developments of the Situation in Syria, 27 November Syrian crisis reaching stage of civil war, UN human rights chief says, UN News Centre, last modified 1 December 2011, 595#.U_Zdq1bfEds.

6 inability to enforce a ceasefire. 15 The other side of the conflict did not appear much better: while the Assad administration praised the presence of the Arab League mission, the international consensus was that he was using the League s presence to buy time and establish legitimacy while working to oust the rebels. 16 With this in mind, the immediate effects of the observer mission failed to develop a lasting ceasefire or bring either party to the negotiating table. Following the apparent lack of progress of the Arab League peace plan, major efforts were undertaken by the United Nations to encourage Syria s compliance with the League, including a resolution adopted by the General Assembly and approved by most every Member State. Almost a month after the Arab League s observer mission withdrawal, the GA issued a condemnation of violence on both sides of the conflict, urging both to negotiate towards a coalition government in talks to be facilitated by the LAS and a United Nations Special Representative. 17 The international initiative, although implicating both parties in the perpetration of violence, identified the Syrian government as the primary party needing to stop the hostility, and was nearly unanimously passed. 18 Notable dissension included China, Russia, and Iran, three states that, despite opposition from the international community, continue to support the Assad regime in some regard. 19 The result of this forceful UN resolution was the initiation of the Kofi Annan peace plan for Syria, with former Secretary-General Annan serving as the UN 15 Arab League suspends Syria mission Nabil el- Arabi, BBC News, last modified 28 January 2012, Ibid. 17 A/RES/66/253, The situation in the Syrian Arab Republic, 16 February Ibid. 19 Voting Record for A/RES/66/253, United Nations Bibliography Information System, 16 February Special Representative in the process. As the conflict s momentum grew and its scope expanded into its second year, it took on qualities associated with an international political disaster, including the involvement of foreign organizations. From mid-2012 on, the international community became increasingly more involved, the regime more extreme, and the country itself more factionalized. Major Military Campaigns and the Internationalization of the Conflict Once the United Nations was truly involved in the Syrian peace process by March 2012, Representative Annan began in earnest his peace plan for the country. 20 As special representative of the United Nations to Syria, Annan hoped to institute a ceasefire that would precipitate diplomatic talks among all factional groups and the regime facilitated by the Arab League. Annan s UN monitoring forces arrived to implement the ceasefire in mid-april, and the process was proceeding as anticipated until violence broke out, the agreement was broken, and the ceasefire suspended. 21 A complete lack of progress led the United Nations to brand the Annan peace plan a failure by May of that year, with the fighting between the government and its opponents only increasing. This major international failure illustrated the dangers of attempting to implement a ceasefire in the middle of the conflict, and helps emphasize the current power of Syria s growing momentum, precipitating the need for more creative solutions. With the lack of credibility and effectiveness of multiple peace plans in Syria as of mid-2012, and due to the stagnant and entrenched nature of combat between the multiple sides of the conflict, military 20 Syrian Civil War, Encyclopedia Britannica, last modified 16 January 2014, 1/Syrian-Civil-War. 21 Ibid.

7 movement began to de escalate. 22 However, rather than signaling a possibility for negotiation or cessation of hostilities, the lack of a clear victor between the two largest factions (Bashar al-assad s government and the Syrian National Coalition) served to internationalize the civil war and drive outside regional forces to intercede to varying degrees. One significant entity that has emerged in Syria as a result of the chaos created in the wake of the civil war is Jabhat al-nusra (JN), also known as the al-nusra Front: the Syrian branch of al Qaeda. JN became prevalent in Syria in early 2012, but only began military operations and gained international attention towards the end of that year. 23 As an extension of the larger terrorist network al Qaeda, Jabhat al-nusra represents a security threat birthed directly from the conflict, as it has become a major political power controlling several Syrian municipalities and has a stated mission of international jihad. 24 The United Nations, and especially the Western bloc, began to identify Jabhat al- Nusra as a terrorist organization affiliated with al Qaeda in early 2013, and the Security Council took steps to add the group to its al Qaeda sanctions list in May of that year. 25 However, because JN fundamentally opposes the Assad regime in a similar manner to other Syrian opposition forces, they have been able to gain limited support from factional, less extreme Syrian rebels. JN now represents only one of the multiple groups that formed as a result of the Syrian conflict, albeit the one most directly affiliated with organizations widely classified as terrorist in nature. The 22 Ibid. 23 Noman Benotman and Roisin Blake, Jabhat al- Nusra: A Strategic Briefing, Quilliam Foundation, 24 Ibid. 25 SC/11019, Security Council al-qaida Sanctions Committee Amends Entry of One Entity on its Sanctions List, 30 May civil war itself precipitated JN s rise, but only with domestic support from other rebels and international support from worldwide al Qaeda did it truly thrive. The concept that the Civil War has been destructive enough to midwife a new branch of al Qaeda is worth noting as it poses a new internal concern that must be addressed to protect Syrian security, but also regional security as a whole. It raises questions regarding the extent Syria can tolerate further fracturing before it breaks entirely. In addition to those factions directly associated with al Qaeda, by late 2012 Syria saw an influx of military aid on both sides from the surrounding region. There is widely distributed information indicating the involvement of the Iranian government, especially the Iranian Revolutionary Guards, and the Hezbollah group in aiding the Assad regime. 26 The United States and many Western bloc countries classify Hezbollah as a terrorist organization, and its involvement in aiding Assad was troubling to a number of states that feared it would precipitate increasing militant activity and influence in the region. The international involvement in Syria also caused a change in calculus, especially for the United States, when considering future engagement in the conflict. Potential military incursions against Iranian fighters in Syria would be disastrous for United States diplomacy and political stability, and this consideration represented a shift in U.S. policy in early 2013 with respect to Syria. 27 Because Iran and Hezbollah had become involved, the United States became increasingly reluctant to intervene. Despite the continuing internationalization of the civil war in Syria, by mid-2013 the conflict was no 26 Syrian Civil War, Encyclopedia Britannica, last modified 16 January 2014, 1/Syrian-Civil-War. 27 The Middle East at Crossroads, American Foreign Policy Interests, last modified 9 August 2013,

8 closer to being resolved, either by diplomacy or by military means. Neither the Assad regime, nor the opposition coalition, nor any insurgent group could turn the tide, and all diplomacy had failed at bringing the sides to the table. The Assad government, under pressure to make military progress, faced a choice that culminated on 21 August 2013 in an administration-led chemical attack that killed hundreds of unarmed civilians and set the stage for a global controversy. 28 Chemical Weapons Controversy and Aftermath Until 21 August 2013, the warfare implemented on all sides of the Syrian conflict was conventional in nature; that is to say, it was mainly through the use of small arms and light weapons, artillery, and armored warfare on the ground. The Syrian government was known to have possessed some degree of chemical weapons munitions in the past, but early international appraisals of the Syrian conflict specifically condemned the use of such weapons. However, in late August reports surfaced that such weapons had indeed been used, although on what scale and by what side was contested. According to an investigative committee of the United Nations, victims of the 21 August attack in the Ghouta area of Damascus reported experiencing artillery shelling followed by uncommon symptoms, which resulted in death or grave illness. 29 These signs were consistent with a chemical weapons attack, and it was indeed the report of the investigative mission in their September 2013 statement to the Secretary-General that 28 Syrian Civil War, Encyclopedia Britannica, last modified 16 January 2014, 1/Syrian-Civil-War. 29 Report on the Alleged Use of Chemical Weapons in the Ghouta Area of Damascus on 21 August 2013, United Nations Mission to Investigate Allegation of the Use of Chemical Weapons in the Syrian Arab Republic, last modified 13 September 2013, Secretary_General_Report_of_CW_Investigation.pdf. chemical weapons were deployed against civilians, including children, in the Ghouta area. 30 With this truth established, and other independent verifications of the incident underway, it had become clear to the international community that the Assad administration perpetrated an internationally condemned category of attack against its own civilians. On 14 September 2013, one day after the United Nations investigative mission s report was made public, U.S. President Obama announced that the option of diplomacy had become open in the Syrian Conflict. 31 This was a shocking turn of events following the international outrage over the Assad administration s universally condemned chemical weapons use. Previously, the only U.S. involvement discussed was limited military engagement or economic sanctions, and the President noted that there was no other recourse because of America s military intimidation of Syria. However, new developments, notably the willingness of Russia and its Foreign Minister, Sergey Lavrov, in organizing talks with the U.S. and Syria, helped encourage the Obama administration. 32 While the U.S. Congress was prepared to vote on the use of military force prior to Russia s proposal, it was through Russia that the United States announced its willingness to attempt a diplomatic solution instead. 33 These trilateral negotiations represented a possible step forward in the solution to the Syrian Civil War, whereby Assad might be tempted to relinquish his chemical weapons in exchange for protection when stepping down as President. 30 Ibid. 31 Barack Obama, Weekly Address: Pursuing a Diplomatic Solution in Syria, Office of the Press Secretary, last modified 14 September 2013, 32 Ibid. 33 Ibid.

9 The same day of these trilateral talks, the Assad government ratified the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling, and Use of Chemical Weapons and on their Destruction. 34 Also referred to as the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC), this major international treaty is the most recent formalization of a global anti-chemical weapons consensus dating back to the Geneva Conventions. 35 The Syrian government s accession to the CWC represented an additional step forward, and the progress culminated in the announcement that the United States and Russia would jointly propose a framework for dismantling Syria s chemical weapons arsenal. 36 Such radical steps forward were poised to ensure the total destruction of Syria s arsenal and open Assad to diplomatic options, a feat that was accomplished in its entirety on 18 August However, the breakthrough had little effect on the still ongoing civil war, and while it represented the resolution to an international controversy it did little to encourage further diplomacy. It should be noted that the chemical weapons controversy was, in effect, an effort by the United States and Russia to focus the seemingly out-of- 34 Report on the Alleged Use of Chemical Weapons in the Ghouta Area of Damascus on 21 August 2013, United Nations Mission to Investigate Allegation of the Use of Chemical Weapons in the Syrian Arab Republic, last modified 13 September 2013, Secretary_General_Report_of_CW_Investigation.pdf. 35 Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling, and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction, United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs, 3 September Laura Spark-Smith and Tom Cohen, U.S., Russia agree to framework on Syria chemical weapons, last modified 15 September 2013, 37 Thomas Gibbons-Neff, Declared Syrian chemical weapon stockpile now completely destroyed, The Washington Post, last modified 18 August 2014, p/2014/08/18/declared-syrian-chemical-weaponstockpile-now-completely-destroyed/. control Civil War on a single issue. While the final agreement was a success and Syria is in the process of disarming and destroying its stockpile, the conflict has not abated, and success in one area does not necessarily translate to success in all areas. Issues to Address Refugee Crisis and Human Rights Violations Among the most prevalent of the permeating subtopics within the Syrian Civil War is the expanding number of refugees and internally displaced persons. In addition to the previously cited 2.5 million refugees and 4.2 million IDPs, the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on Syria, a branch of the United Nations Human Rights Council (UNHRC), estimates that as of February 2014 more than 250,000 Syrians are besieged and under attack daily. 38 According to UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) figures, there are in total over nine million atrisk civilians as a direct result of the Syrian Civil War, and while a large percentage of those are being assisted by UNHCR, the organization is not all-encompassing. 39 Current aid to IDPs is maintained by the United Nations exclusively, with strained resources. 40 Nearly 1.6 million refugees are concentrated in nearby Lebanon, which shares a large border with southwestern Syria and whose refugee numbers now make up nearly a quarter of the Lebanese population. 41 Most refugees feel they cannot return to their 38 A/HRC/25/65, Report of the independent international commission of inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic, 12 February UNHCR Global Appeal Syrian Arab Republic, United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, last modified 1 December 2013, 40 Ibid. 41 UN Humanitarian Chief calls for greater support for affected Lebanese communities and Syrian refugees in Lebanon. OCHA. 4 April 2014.

10 homes, and the economic burden placed on Lebanon by the influx is crippling. UNHCR estimates that it requires an additional USD 1 billion for the continuation of refugee operations; funding that currently is not in the budget. 42 The situation has led many in the international community and UNHCR to cite lack of funds and infrastructure as serious detractors for continuing to host refugees. 43 In addition to the prevalent crisis of refugees, IDPs, and civilians under siege, as well as the lack of resources available to aid them, there is a clear trend of human rights violations that have been reported out of Syria to date. The February 2014 UNHRC report cites slaughter of non-combatants, execution without due process of law, detainment without cause, torture, and gender discrimination as only some of the practices on all sides of the conflict that should be immediately addressed. 44 The report identifies all sides as guilty of a lack of distinction between military and civilian objectives; that is to say, military operations are carried out against combatants and non-combatants alike. 45 Today, the restoration of a legitimate national Syrian government would be capable of containing these ongoing human rights violations. Short of this strategy, it may be possible for the Security Council to intervene with action in a limited capacity such as setting up transitional courts of law or other measures to ensure the protection of those trapped within the conflict. Continuing Prevalence of Extremism 42 Syria Regional Refugee Response: Funding Requirements, United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, 5 August UN Humanitarian Chief calls for greater support for affected Lebanese communities and Syrian refugees in Lebanon. OCHA. 4 April UNHCR Global Appeal Syrian Arab Republic, United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, last modified 1 December 2013, 45 Ibid. Today, as the conflict in Syria rages on, the factionalism that resulted from the momentum and influence it has gathered permeates in extremist elements. Jabhat al- Nusra still operates as the official al Qaedaendorsed cell group of Syria, but over the past year and a half it has come in contact and clashed with a rival organization vying for military supremacy in the conflict zone. The Islamic State, formerly known as ISIS or ISIL (the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria/the Levant), is a transnationally operating insurgency whose stated objective is to establish a 21 st century Islamic Caliphate across Iraq and the Levant (modern-day Syria, Lebanon, Jordan, Israel, and Palestine). Thus far, the organization has gained swathes of territory on the Syria/Iraq border, taking advantage of the growing instabilities of the Syrian Civil War and Iraqi insurgencies to establish a foothold that now includes major cities in both countries, including Iraq s Mosul and Tikrit. 46 While the earliest insurgent operations that would evolve into the Islamic State were originally sponsored by al Qaeda in U.S.-occupied Iraq, the Islamic State today has moved away from al Qaeda supported policies and towards a unique extremism that includes the targeting of Shiite cultural sites and various Muslim sects. 47 This disagreement is what fuels the tensions between the Islamic State and al Qaeda-supported Jabhat al-nusra in Syria today. Whether or not the groups conflict can be used against them by outside sources is unknown, but the destruction wrought by each group s extremism is absolute. Ultimately, the SC must work to prioritize which organization is more threatening as well as in what way their extremist tendencies can be combatted. In the past, Security Council 46 Zachary Laub and Jonathan Masters, Islamic State in Iraq and Greater Syria, Council on Foreign Relations, last modified 12 June 2014, 47 Ibid.

11 member states have reaffirmed as a bloc their continuing efforts to counter terrorism in the Middle East and North Africa, but with the Islamic State declaring itself a sovereign state with legitimate political power, calling it a factional group may not apply for long. If and when the Islamic State does move beyond the workings of a terrorist movement, the Council may need to entirely readdress how it confronts the group and its leaders. Ongoing Conflict Mitigations Of the past attempted peace solutions for this ongoing crisis, the only one currently enacted is the Geneva II Peace Conference proposed in late 2013 and to be implemented in early The talks are led by special emissary Lakhdar Brahimi, with multiple rounds expected throughout the year. Member states should reach an agreement on whether or not to prioritize the strengthening of Geneva II considering the failure of the initial Geneva Plan. Committee Format Timeline This incarnation of the Security Council will operate according to the rules of procedure of a crisis committee, with events proceeding on an accelerated timeline. The committee will begin on 1 March 2014 and is expected to run through at least October of that year. As a matter of course, the Dais will determine the speed of the committee to match the pace of debate and committee focus. During the conference, developments will be introduced to the committee in the form of crisis updates. Delegates will be expected to respond quickly and efficiently in the form of emergency Security Council resolutions. It should be noted that whenever emergency resolutions are submitted, or any other substantive matter, they require both a majority of the Council s member states and all of the Permanent Five members: United States of America, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, France, Russian Federation, and China. Discussion Questions 1. What policies has your country s government expressed with respect to Syria? Use these statements to drive your research, especially policies closest to the beginning of Has your government expressed opinions on the other Arab Spring revolutions? 3. Does your country have a history of contributing troops or resources to international conflicts? How might the answer to that question affect your country s policy? 4. With which other members of the Security Council has your country agreed in policy with respect to the Syrian Civil War? With which has it disagreed? 5. Does your country provide funding or resources towards the accommodation of refugees, or does it contribute refugees to other countries? How might these factors affect the question of the Syrian Civil War? 6. How has your country s government responded to international agreements based on humanitarian norms (i.e. human rights treaties and/or chemical weapons treaties)? Security Council Member States At TUMUN 2016, the Security Council member states will be as follows: Permanent Five (5): United States, United Kingdom, France, China, Russia. Non-permanent Members (10): Morocco, Lebanon, South Africa, Pakistan, India, Brazil, Colombia, Germany, Portugal, Turkey.

12 With all members accounted for, a majority shall consist of eight votes. A two-thirds majority shall consist of eleven votes. All permanent members hold veto power on substantive matters. Bibliography the Syrian Arab Republic. 15 September A/HRC/25/65. Report of the independent international commission of inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic. 12 February A/RES/66/253. The situation in the Syrian Arab Republic. 16 February Al-Muslimi, Farea. Yemen divided over Syria conflict. Al-Monitor. Last modified September /yemen-syria-conflict-divisions.html. Arab League suspends Syria mission Nabil el-arabi. BBC News. Last modified 28 January Arab League Council Resolution 7370, Extraordinary Session, 27 August Arab League Council Resolution Following Developments of the Situation in Syria. 27 November Arab League Council Resolution Monitoring of developments in the situation in Syria. 22 January A/HRC/18/53. Report of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights on the situation on human rights in Baghdadi, George. Syria peace talks in Geneva end in failure. CBS News. Last modified 14 February peace-talks-in-geneva-end-in-failure/. Benotman, Noman and Roisin Blake. Jabhat al-nusra: A Strategic Briefing. Quilliam Foundation. wp/wpcontent/uploads/publications/free/ja bhat-al-nusra-a-strategic-briefing.pdf. Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling, and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction. United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs. 3 September Gibbons-Neff, Thomas. Declared Syrian chemical weapon stockpile now completely destroyed. The Washington Post. Last modified 18 August ws/checkpoint/wp/2014/08/18/decl ared-syrian-chemical-weaponstockpile-now-completely-destroyed/. Harris, William. Bashar al-assad s Lebanon Gamble. Middle East Quarterly XII No. 3 (33-44), Summer Jordanian Public Perceptions of the Syrian Crisis. Arab Public Opinion Index. Last

13 modified September e/1af52ed1-e0ea-43af-b0a3- d55fce2e64dd. Kohut, Andrew. Widespread Condemnation for Assad in Neighboring Countries. Pew Research Center. Last modified 21 June /widespread-condemnation-forassad-in-neighboring-countries/. Laub, Zachary and Jonathan Masters. Islamic State in Iraq and Greater Syria. Council on Foreign Relations. Last modified 12 June Main bloc quits Syrian National Coalition over Geneva. The Times of Israel. 21 January address-pursuing-diplomatic-solution- syria. Report on the Alleged Use of Chemical Weapons in the Ghouta Area of Damascus on 21 August United Nations Mission to Investigate Allegation of the Use of Chemical Weapons in the Syrian Arab Republic. Last modified 13 September tent/slideshow/secretary_general_re port_of_cw_investigation.pdf. Rishmawi, Mervat. The League of Arab States in the Wake of the Arab Spring. Cairo Institute for Human Rights Studies. September content/uploads/2013/09/arab- Leage.pdf. SC/ Security Council al-qaida Sanctions Committee Amends Entry of One Entity on its Sanctions List. 30 May Masrour, Amira. Syria Claims Tunisian Government Support for Fighters in Syria. Tunisia Live News. Last modified 21 June Obama, Barack. Weekly Address: Pursuing a Diplomatic Solution in Syria. Office of the Press Secretary. Last modified 14 September Syria Regional Refugee Response: Funding Requirements. United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees. 5 August Shabaneh, Ghassan. Geneva II Middle East Peace Conference. Al Jazeera Center for Studies. Last modified 4 December Gallery/media/Documents/2013/12/ 4/ Geneva%20II %20Middle%20East%20Peace.pdf. Spark-Smith, Laura and Tom Cohen. U.S., Russia agree to framework on Syria

14 chemical weapons. Last modified 15 September olitics/us-syria/. Syrian Civil War. Encyclopedia Britannica. Last modified 16 January ed/topic/ /syrian-civil-war. Syrian crisis reaching stage of civil war, UN human rights chief says. UN News Centre. Last modified 1 December asp?newsid=40595#.u_zdq1bfeds. Tawil, Fadi. Syria militants withdraw from Lebanese border town after days of clashes. Associated Press. Last modified 7 August Tamani, Salim. The Syrian crisis viewed from Algeria. Aspenia Online. Last modified 10 September online/article/syrian-crisis-viewedalgeria. /articles/2014/08/07/lebanese-free- 7-soldiers-held-by-syria-militants. The Middle East at Crossroads. American Foreign Policy Interests. Last modified 9 August / / UN Humanitarian Chief calls for greater support for affected Lebanese communities and Syrian refugees in Lebanon. OCHA. 4 April UNHCR Global Appeal Syrian Arab Republic. United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees. Last modified 1 December ml. Voting Record for A/RES/66/253, United Nations Bibliography Information System, 16 February 2012.

15 Parliamentary Procedure Workshop Parliamentary procedure is the set of rules that governs a committee session. The Chair or President presides over the chamber. There is a difference between procedural matters and substantive matters: Procedural matters are those that relate to the workings of the committee, e.g. voting on voting or voting for a moderated caucus, etc. All delegations must vote yea or nay on procedural votes. Substantive matters are those that relate to the real world, e.g. the content of resolutions or amendments. Abstentions are allowed on substantive votes. Points Point of Order: A point of order is used when a delegate wishes to draw attention to procedural errors made by other delegates or the Chair. At most conferences, the point must be raised immediately and may interrupt a speaker, but you should check the rules for each conference or committee, as they vary. Point of Parliamentary Procedure: This point is used to ask a question about what you should do, if you are confused about the rules of parliamentary procedure. It should not be confused with a point of order, which is correcting someone else s misuse of the rules. Point of Information: This point can be asked to the speaker (usually a delegate) or to the Chair. A speaker may yield to points of information after a speech, and the Chair shall recognize delegates who have questions. The speaker and the delegate

16 should never enter into a dialogue, and all questions, clarifications, and responses should be directed through the Chair. Speaker: The Commonwealth of Uphill believes that Carmichael dining hall is better. I yield my time to questions. Delegate: Point of information? Chair: The delegate from the Republic of Downhill is recognized. Delegate: Mr. Chair, would the delegate not admit that Dewick has far superior food and the lighting in Carm is absolutely terrible? Speaker: Mr. Chair, I would say the delegate has her priorities off: the pizza uphill is so much better. Chair: Thank you, please step down. Point of Clarification: This point does not exist. Don t use it. The point you re looking for is a point of information (e.g. Point of information to the speaker? or POI to the Chair? ). Point of Personal Privilege: A delegate may rise to a point of personal privilege if he or she experiences some personal discomfort (e.g. could the lights be turned down? I had a crazy night in Times Square. ). The point may interrupt a speaker only if the delegate cannot hear the speaker. The point may never be substantive. Motions Motion to Set the Topic/Agenda: In a General Assembly, or some committees with multiple set topics, the committee will vote to set the order of the topics. Requires a simple majority. Motion for a Moderated Caucus: In most committees (not crises), the committee may choose to enter closed debate on a topic. I.e. instead of a speaker s list, where anyone may speak about anything, the topic is confined and the Chair will choose speakers. The motion requires a fixed time limit and a simple majority to pass. Motion for an Unmoderated Caucus: This motion is in order during debate. The delegate must include the length of the moderated caucus and the motion requires a simple majority. During an unmoderated caucus, delegates may leave the hall, mill around, talk, write, etc. It is generally proposed in order to talk in groups and to respond to crisis updates.

17 Motion to Introduce a Working Paper/Resolution/Amendment: This motion brings a resolution (which usually has the support of a number of signatories and sponsors), a working paper (which is a resolution without signatories) or an amendment to the floor for consideration. The sponsors may read it and answer questions and a movement to call the previous question or close debate on it would result in a vote. There is typically no vote on this motion. Motion to Close Debate/Motion to Call the Previous Question: This motion normally requires a two-thirds vote to pass and, if passed, the committee will move into voting procedure on the topic currently on the floor. At some conferences, it s called Motion to Close Debate and at others, Motion to Call the Previous Question. Either way, it requires speakers for and against, and if it passes, all debate ends and all current resolutions and amendments on the topic are brought to a vote. Motion for a Roll Call Vote: When the committee moves in to voting procedure, a delegate may motion for a roll call vote, which requires each delegate to vote yea, nay, or abstain (if the matter is substantive). Some conferences vote on this motion, some do not; check the rules. Motion to Divide the Question: This motion, if passed, allows the body to vote on each clause of a resolution or amendment separately. This motion typically requires a simple majority. Motion to Table: Tabling a resolution or topic requires a simple majority (in most cases; not at UPMUNC, which requires 2/3) and, if it passes, the resolution or topic may not be discussed unless a motion to reconsider is passed, which requires a 2/3 majority. There are other motions, such as the motion to appeal the decision of the Chair, motion to suspend the meeting or the motion to adjourn the session, but these will likely be used only once or twice a session, if at all, and only then by that one really annoying delegate who sits in the front and probably goes to Georgetown. You should always read the rules of parliamentary procedure for your conference and committee, as they are often different from the general rules we have laid out here. Sources: UPMUNC parliamentary procedure guide, CMUNNY parliamentary procedure guide, McMUN parliamentary procedure guide, personal experience