Asia Pacific Migration Research Network Working Papers Series ISSN

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2 Asia Pacific Migration Research Network Working Papers Series ISSN Published by the APMRN Secretariat Centre for Asia Pacific Social Transformation Studies University of Wollongong, Australia Copyright O 2002

3 Table of Contents Page Acknowledgements Contributors i.. 11 Chapter 1: Introduction: Migration Research in the Asia Pacific Carmen Voigt-Graf and Vijay Naidu 1 PART ONE: THE PACIFIC Chapter 2 : Perspectives on Population Growth, Migration and Sustainable Development in the Pacific Region Richard Bedford 7 Chapter 3: Contemporary Migration Research in Tonga, Trends, Issues and the Future Raelyn Lolohea Esau and Shogo Hirai 21 i l Chapter 4: Chapter 5: Some Aspects of Gender and Social Class within Contemporary Indo-Fijian Migration Markus Pangerl Migration of Secondary School in Fiji: Taking Stock and Introducing a Research Agenda Carmen Voigt-Graf 27 Chapter 6: The Contemporary Migration of Skilled Labour from Fiji to Pacific Island Counries (PICS) Avelina Rokoduru 43 Chapter 7: Economic Cost of Human Capital Loss from Fiji: Implications for Sustainable Development Mahendra Reddy, Manoranjan Mohanty and Vijay Naidu 49 Chapter 8: Relocating Reîugees in Developed Countries: The Poverty Experiences of Somali Resettling in New Zealand. Pauline B Guerin, Bernard Guerin -64

4 PART TWO ASIA Chapter 9: Notes on Inequality, Conflict and Forced Migration 71 In Indonesia Riwanto Tirtosudanno Chapter 10: Implications Of Globalisation of Production, Trade 79 and Finance for International Mobility of the Highly Skilled: Shifting Paradigm for Labour Requirements in India and the'host Countries Abroad LJinod Khadria Chapter 11: Irregular Migration of Chinese Workers to Taiwan 88 Ching-lung Tsay Chapter 12: Migration and Poverty in Korea Hye-kyung Lee 102

5 Acknowledgements The 5'h International APMRN Conference was held at the Naviti Resort in Fiji on September, It was organised by the Pacific Migration Research Network, especially Professor Vijay Naidu and his staff. The Conference was attended by APMRN members, scholars from the Pacific and representatives of international organisations, including UNESCO and W HO. The APMRN Secretariat at the University of Wollongong wishes to acknowledge the excellent organisation of this Conference by the PacMRN. A selection of papers from the Conference are included here. Prior to the APMRN Conference a PacMRN Workshop was held at the University of the South Pacific in Suva. This was an opportunity for young researchers to present their methodologies and some of their findings. Some of these papers have been included in this volume. W e would like to thank Kerry Lyon and Carmen Voigt-Graf for the excellent job they have done in collating and editing the papers. The APMRN is grateful for the financial support for the Conference provided by UNESCO-MOST. The designations employed, and the presentation of material throughout this publication, do not imply the expression of any opinion whatsoever on the part of the UNESCO Secretariat concerning the legal status of any county, territory, city, or area of its authorities, or the delimitations of its frontiers or boundaries. Robyn Iredale Director APMRN Secretariat 1

6 List of Contributors Bedford, Richard - Professor of Geography and PVC (Research), University of Waikato, N ew Zealand. 'Esau, Raelyn Lolohea - Masters Student, Geography Department, University, Japan. Tokushima Guerin, Bernard - Research Fellow, Psychology Department, University of Waikato, New Zealand. Guerin, Pauline B - Research Fellow, Psychology Department, University of Waikato, New Zealand. Hirai, Shogo - Tokushima University, Japan. Khadna, Binod - School of Social Sciences, Jawaharlal Nehru University, Delhi, India. Lee, Hye-kyung - Psychology Department, Pai Chai University, Taejon, Korea. Mohanty, Manoranjan - Development Studies Programme, University of the South Pacific, Suva, Fiji. Naidu, Vijay - Director, Development Studies Programme, University of the South Pacific, Suva, Fiji. Pangerl, Markus - PhD Student, Gender Relation Centre, ANU, Canberra, Australia. Reddy, Mahendra - Development Studies Programme, University of the South Pacific, Suva, Fiji. Rokoduru, Avelina - MA Student, Development Studies Programme, University of the South Pacific, Suva, Fiji. Tirtosudarmo, Riwanto - Centre for the Study of Society and Culture, Indonesian Institute of Sciences, Jakarta, Indonesia. Tsay, Ching-lung - Institute of Economics, Academia Sinica, Taipei, Taiwan. Voigt-Graf, Carmen - Australian Centre for Population Studies, ANU, Canberra, Australia. Front Cover photo by Kerry Lyon 11

7 CHAPTER 1 MIGRATION RESEARCH IN THE ASIA PACIFIC REGION Carmen Voigt-Graf and Vijay Naidu ' 1.1 Introduction This volume contains papers presented at the Pacific Migration Research Network (PACMRN) Workshop and the Fifth International Conference of the Asia Pacific Migration Research Network (APMRN) held in the Fiji Islands in September The APMRN was established in 1995 as a research project of the Management of Social Transformations (MOST) Programme of UNESCO. It is a collaborative organisation of researchers and scholars interested in all aspects of migration in the Asia Pacific region. Each regional network of the APMRN is autonomous and there are regional coordinators in Australia, Bangladesh, China, Hong Kong, India, Indonesia, Japan, Malaysia, N ew Zealand, the Pacific (based in Fiji), the Philippines, Republic of Korea, Singapore, Sri Lanka, Taiwan, Thailand and Vietnam. While the APMRN Secretariat is located at the University of Wollongong with Robyn Iredale being the Secretariat Director, the chair of the network is a rotating position which was most recently held by Vijay Naidu of the University of the South Pacific in Fiji who also convened the workshop and conference in the Fiji Islands. The APMRN provides a forum for migration scholars to engage in debates on migration trends and patterns, concepts and policy relevant issues with an emphasis on the Asia Pacific region. The region contains almost half of the world's population and witnesses increasingly diverse and complex migration patterns. Growing numbers of international migrants are only one characteristic of contemporary times. At least as important is the increasing complexity of migration patterns that is very evident in the Asia Pacific region. The region contains countries that are predominantly migrant receiving countries and others that are predominantly sending countries. Some newly industrialised countries in Southeast and East Asia have undergone a transition from being migrant sending to being migrant receiving countries. Migration occurs within the Asian region such as from China and the Philippines to Taiwan and Korea or from Asian and Pacific Island countries to Australia and New Zealand. Migration also occurs to destinations outside the region such as to North America and the Middle East and from outside the region to some Asia Pacific countries. Migration in the region is complex not only in direction but also in terms of the composition of the flows. Highly skilled migrants and labour migrants circle around the region alongside irregular migrants and refugees. While some stay permanently at their destination, the global trend of increasing temporary and circular 1

8 migration is also evident in the Asia Pacific region as is the increasing ferninisation of migration flows. The papers in this volume address a diverse range of issues, underlining the complexity of migration patterns and streams. While individuals and families have to find ways of coping with issues of separation and disruption, governments in the region are also challenged to deal with migration related issues in manifold ways, depending on the country s position in the complex migration networks. Many sending country governments attempt to put in place policies to benefit from their non resident citizens. Destination countries are concerned with keeping unwanted migrants out while opening their doors to migrant workers regarded as bringing economic benefits. 1.2 PACMRN workshop and APMRN conference The pre-conference PACMRN Workshop was designed to bring together the Pacific delegates to the main conference so that certain Pacific research and networking matters were given the undivided attention of researchers. The workshop was held on 23 September in the Centre for Development Studies, School of Social and Economic Development at the University of the South Pacific (USP). Twenty one participants were involved in the Workshop which was formally opened by Rajesh Chandra, Deputy Vice Chancellor of USP. In his welcome and opening address, Chandra raised several pertinent issues in migration research generally and especially in the Asia Pacific region, setting the backdrop to the day long symposium. The objectives of the workshop were to generate an awareness about new issues in Pacific migration; to discuss new research methods and perspectives in migration research; to share findings in migration research; to identify migration trends and set targets for future research; to identify areas of research for collaborative work; and to strengthen networks and team research activities. The Workshop started with a panel discussion in which panellists, Richard Bedford, Robyn Iredale, Vijay Naidu and Malama Meleisea spoke on the topic Contemporary Migration Research in the Pacific: Issues, Trends and the Future. Amongst the issues and trends identified were the sustainability of some rapidly depopulating Pacific island societies as a result of international migration; the shift in the cultural gravity of some island cultures to metropolitan rim countries; the loss of skilled personnel such as doctors and nurses, teachers and engineers and the crisis of development that this loss constituted; a potential for Pacific boat people as a result of the rapid increasing population of western Pacific countries and the implications of. this for political stability; the establishment of transnational communities of Pacific islanders facilitated by the information and communication technology revolution; return migrants and their impact on island environments; the situation of Asian migrant workers in island societies; the connections between internal population mobility and emigration; gender issues in migration; the feminisation of migration; conflicts, refugees, asylum seekers and Australia s Pacific Solution; security risks presented by visiting non-resident nationals 2

9 which include small arms, diseases and drug smuggling; people smuggling; the presence of crime syndicates amongst new migrants; racism towards new migrants; immigration 'rackets'; the role of remittances in island development and the situation of the emergent 'underclass' of island people in metropolitan cities. The discussion was followed by presentations of research activities and findings of current and recently completed postgraduate studies. Four of the five papers presented by young researchers are included in the first section of this working paper, which focuses on migration issues in the Pacific region. The PACMRN workshop was followed by the 5"' International Conference of the Asia Pacific Migration Research Network at the Naviti Resort on 24* and 25"' September. It was the first international conference of the APMRN held in the South Pacific sub-region and involved the active participation of 35 members of the network, other agencies and government officials. The Conference was officially opened by the Honourable, Ro Teimumu Kepa, Minister of Education in the government of the Republic of the Fiji Islands who warmly welcomed all participants and especially those from abroad. In her address she touched on several historical and contemporary dimensions of international migration and their policy implications, particularly with respect to UNESCO's long interest in the subjects of international migration and multicultural communities. The Minister also pointed to Fiji as both a sending and receiving country and her concern relating to brain drain from the country. The Conference theme was 'Poverty and Migration' and while one session was entirely devoted to this theme, poverty as an issue in migration featured in all the sessions. Paper presentations and discussions were divided into sessions on ' Migration and Sustainable Development; ' Forced Migration; 'Migration and Labour Requirements; 'Migration and Poverty' and 'The Role of the State in Migration: Of the 13 papers presented over the two days, seven are included in this volume divided between the two regional sections on the Pacific and on Asia. 1.3 An overview of migration issues in the Asia Pacific region as discussed in this volume Pacifu Section In the first of the Pacific chapters, Richard Bedford provides an analysis and comprehensive overview of the relationship between migration and sustainable development in the Pacific, adopting a regional and historical perspective. Demographic and migration patterns in Polynesia, Micronesia, Melanesia and Australasia are contrasted and the demographic situation in Oceania in 2050 is extrapolated from current vital statistics. The differences between Polynesia and Melanesia are a particular focus in illustrating the divergent relationship between population movement and sustainable 3

10 development in different parts of region. While the plight of the central atoll countries of Kiribati and Tuvalu whose fundamental survival is threatened by rising sea levels from climate change face some of the most serious challenges to sustainable development, other Polynesian countries face the challenge to continue to attract remittances and return migrants from their large diasporic populations in Pacific Rim countries, in the light of an increasing overseas-born second generation. The situation is very different in the Melanesian countries with rapid population growth rates and few emigration opportunities. Migration therefore largely occurs internally in the form of rural-to-rural and rural-to-urban migration leading to rapid urbanisation, squatter settlements and urban unemployment. This situation may contribute to a doomsday scenario where increased pressures for emigration produce a new generation of Pacific boat people. Given its regional and historical perspective, Chapter 2 introduces many issues on a broad level and therefore puts into a regional context the country level analyses in Chapters 3 to 8. In Chapter 3 Raelyn Esau focuses on Tongan migration. She is critical of past research on Tongan migration not only because there have been relatively few studies considering the large number of Tongans abroad but more importantly because its focus has been on economic aspects such as remittances. People s attitudes, socio-cultural behaviour and aspirations have largely been overlooked. In her research, of which she presents some preli&nary findings, she attempts to fill this gap by focusing on migrant decision making processes, socio-cultural and socio-economic aspects and attitudes. Chapters 4 to 7 analyse different aspects of Fiji s migration. Fiji has experienced high emigration rates largely due to political instability and insecurity since the 1987 military coups. The vast majority of emigrants are of Indo-Fijian origin. In Chapter 4 Markus Pangerl provides an analysis of the emigration of Indo-Fijians by undertaking a qualitative study. H e focuses on the pre-migration context in Fiji and discusses interpersonal relations and personal articulations in the migration process. By looking at individual experiences and perceptions, his research suggests a very important role for gender and class in the decision-making processes amongst Indo-Fijian migrants. The emigration of highly skilled workers is of particular concern to policy makers in Fiji and has also emerged as an important topic on the research agenda. This issue is dealt with from different angles in chapters 5 to 7. In Chapter 5, Carmen Voigt-Graf discusses the international and internal migration of skilled workers and its implications for human capacity building and sustainable economic development in Fiji, using teachers as a case study. The effects of the emigration of teachers are particularly severe because the resulting adverse effects on the education system have led to a drop in education standards. The situation is particularly serious in remote regions of Fiji which find it more difficult than urban areas to retain teachers and other skilled workers. Policies of the Fiji Government have so far not been able to successfully address these issues. An interesting recent trend underlining the increasing complexity of migration streams and patterns referred to above is discussed by Avelina Rokoduru in Chapter 6. A case study of Fiji nurses on Ebeye Island in the Marshall Islands demonstrates that skilled 4

11 workers migrate from Fiji to other Pacific Island countries. Rokoduru discusses the reasons, migration circumstances and future plans of Fijian nurses on Ebeye Island. In the third and final chapter on skilled migration from Fiji, Mahendra Reddy, Manoranjan Mohanty and Vijay Naidu analyse the outflow of skilled migration and its impact on sustainable development in Fiji. An overview of emigration from Fiji, its major causes and impact on Fiji s economy is followed by the presentation of a tentative formula for calculating the cost to the economy of emigration from Fiji. According to this formula, Fiji currently loses 4.5 % of its total annual revenue due to the emigration of its citizens. The formula is an important contribution to understanding the severity of the economic impact of emigration on small island countries like Fiji. By analysing the Somali refugee community in Hamilton, N ew Zealand, the final chapter on the Pacific shifts the focus from migrant sending to migrant receiving countries, from predominantly economic migrants to political refugees and from intra-regional migrants to a migrant group from outside the Asia Pacific region. Bernard and Pauline Guerin focus on the challenges and difficulties faced by Somali refugees in the integration process in New Zealand. They identify state policies, language, the situation of women and children, rigid qualification requirements, skin colour and religion as factors contributing to their difficulties in adapting to New Zealand society and in finding employment. The marginalisation of Somalis has resulted in relative poverty and a widespread frustration about their situation. Asian Section The first chapter of the Asian section looks at another group of refugees: internally displaced migrants in Indonesia. While arguing that it is difficult to separate voluntary and involuntary migration, Riwanto Tirtosudarmo analyses the complex relationship between migration, inequality and social conflict that has produced as many as 1.2 million internally displaced people in Indonesia in recent years. Ethnic diversity and competition over limited economic opportunities have resulted in increased ethnic conflict between local populations and migrants. Some of the causes and consequences of the conflicts in Aceh, Papua, Maluku and Kalimantan are outlined and the challenges that these pose for the integrity of the Indonesian state are discussed.. The focus of the remaining three chapters on migration in the Asian context is on largely economically motivated migration flows. Chapter 10 looks at the consequences of highly skilled migration from India as a sending country. Binod Khadria describes the changing patterns of migration in what he calls knowledge societies where increasing numbers of highly skilled or knowledge workers are temporary or circulatory migrants rather than permanent emigrants. H e argues that the reasons behind the growing incidence of circulatory migration are to be found largely in the destination countries policies. From India s point of view, the challenge is to productively use the resources of its overseas population. 5

12 Chapter 11 and 12 focus on labour migrants in the two newly industrialised and migrant receiving countries of Taiwan and Korea. In contrast to India, which remains a predominantly migrant sending country, Taiwan s labour shortages since the early 1980s have been met by migrant workers. Ching-lung Tsay analyses the trends and characteristics of labour flows in a fast growing economy and provides an overview and numerical estimate of migrant workers from China and Southeast Asia. Since the introduction of contract work schemes in 1989, most labour migrants have arrived from Southeast Asia. In 2000, a total of 388,000 migrants were legally working in Taiwan, while an estimated 23,000 were illegal workers from Southeast Asia and another 20,000 were illegal workers from China. The situation in Korea is similar to that in Taiwan. In the final chapter of this volume, Hye-kyung Lee provides an overview of migrant workers in Korea since late 1980s with the aim of identifying the most vulnerable groups in terms of employment conditions and relative deprivation. In 2002, some 350,000 migrants worked in Korea, the majority coming from China, Vietnam and Indonesia who migrated under the industrial training programme introduced in About two thirds of the migrant workers were undocumented making it difficult to measure their degree of deprivation. The documented migrant workers on the other hand earn more than the minimum wage in Korea and more than their non-migrant counterparts in the countries of origin. However, they earn considerably less than their Korean counterparts working in similar positions and therefore show relative high levels of dissatisfaction with their working and living conditions. By analysing a very diverse range of migration issues in the Asia Pacific region, this volume provides extremely valuable insights into the complexities and intricacies of migration processes in contemporary times as well as an overview of important migration research currently underway in the Asia Pacific region. 6

13 CHAPTER 2 THE PACIFIC PERSPECTIVES ON POPULATION GROWTH, MIGRATION AND SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT IN THE PACIFIC REGION Richard Bedford 2.1 Introduction In the mid-l960s, when I began carrying out research on migration in the Pacific Islands in the atolls now known as Kiribati and Tuvalu, a major concern confronting the colonial administrations was accommodating rapid population growth (Bedford, 1968):Resettlement of populations overseas in countries with more generous land endowments was still seen to be a policy option and between 1945 and 1969 some thousands of I-Kiribati, Tuvaluans and Tokelauans were resettled in Fiji (I-Kiribati and Tuvaluan), the Solomon Islands (I-Kiribati) and New Zealand (Tokelauan). In the early years of the new millennium, resettlement of peoples from islands in the central Pacific is again a major policy issue, this time driven mainly by concerns over the potential impact of global warming on sea levels. The governments of Kiribati and Tuvalu have made approaches to the New Zealand and Australian governments seeking assurances that if rising sea levels do result in extensive salinisation of the fresh water lenses that sustain the fragile atoll ecosystems then there wil be a home somewhere else. Of all the countries in the Pacific region, the ones that face the greatest challenges in terms of sustainable development, as development is now understood, are the atoll states of the central Pacific. They are not necessarily the islands in the Pacific with the highest poverty indices on the UNDP s Human Poverty Index ; these are found in the land-rich countries of Papua N ew Guinea and Vanuatu in Melanesia. However, they are the countries with the most constrained environmental conditions when it comes to exploring options for rural or urban development. Their very small, fragmented land areas pose major constraints on carrying capacities for people. There is a long tradition of overseas labour migration that has been a dimension of sustainable development in the central Pacific for over 100 years. Indeed, the first Pacific Islanders taken to Australia in the early nineteenth century were I-Kiribati who worked as farm labour in New South Wales in the 1840s. For most of the twentieth century I-Kiribati worked on contract overseas - in the Nauru phosphate mines, on coconut plantations in parts of Melanesia and for the past 30 years as ships 7

14 European and Asian freighters and commercial fishing boats. However, unlike the situation that exists for some of the smaller island countries in Polynesia, there are no major outlets for permanent settlement overscas for I-Kiribati and Tuvaluans. This means that the governments have to look ahead to securing steady streams of capital to contribute to the development of infrastructure and economic opportunities for a steadily growing population. One of the most important contemporary strategies for ensuring that there wil be a regular income stream to governments to sustain basic services and modest standards of living in the central and northern Pacific is the creation of Trust Funds. Throughout the atoll territories the annual returns from investment of capital invested offshore is now seen to be a critical component of strategies to ensure sustainable development. These Funds may also become the sources of revenue to purchase land in other parts of the Pacific (including Australia and N ew Zealand) for resettlement purposes in the future. I have commenced my discussion with specific reference to two centrai Pacific atoll countries because this example illustrates well the need for both a region-wide and an historical perspective when discussing migration and sustainable development in the island countries. The region-wide perspective is necessary because of the connections between populations in the different island groups and with the two countries on the southern Pacific rim: Australia and Aotearoa or New Zealand. The historical perspective is essential because there is considerable continuity in the debates both amongst policy makers and academics about migration and sustainable development in island societies. In the next section I review briefly the history of population change in different parts of the region (including Australia and Aotearomew Zealand). The main reason for including this very generalised assessment of the region s population here is to provide a crude baseline from which to consider changes in population size and distribution over the past two centuries. The discussion then turns to the roles of international migration in Polynesia and internal migration in Melanesia in order to illustrate quite divergent relationships between population movement and sustainable development in different parts of the region. The paper concludes with some speculations about future population growth in the region in the context of sustainable development. Aspects of a doomsday scenario that Rowan Callick (1993) articulated almost a decade ago are revisited in the face of an on-going grim and challenging demographic picture. 2.2 Distinctive population histories Essentially the story of the islands and their southern neighbours is one where before 1800 indigenous populations had a comparatively high standard of living. Populations throughout the region depended on various forms of subsistence agiculture for their livelihood. There were no urban places in any parts of the region and over half the estimated population of around 2.2 million was living in Melanesia (Table 2.1). The population estimates for different parts of the region come from a very wide range of sources the detail of which is not important for this paper. 8

15 ~~~ Table 2.1 The population situation around 1800 (000 s) YO Aotearoa Australia Polynesia Melanesia 1, Micronesia 1 O0 5 Oceania 2,200 1 O0 Source: Estimates by author derived from extensive review of literature on the history of population change in the region. Over the next century indigenous populations in many parts of the region declined largely as a result of the introduction of diseases by Europeans. The total populations of Aotearoa and Australia increased significantly because of extensive immigration from Europe. By 1900 it is estimated that the region s population had increased to around 6 million with the populations of Aotearoa and Australia accounting for 76 percent of the total (Table 2.2). mela ne sia"^ population had increased, largely because of the fact that large parts of Papua N ew Guinea had not been influenced by European contact at this stage. The populations of Polynesia and Micronesia, by comparison had declined significantly, largely as a result of the impact of introduced diseases (Table 2.2). Table 2.2 The population situation around 1900 (000 s) % Aotearoa Australia 3, Polynesia 1 O0 2 Melanesia 1, Micronesia 60 1.~ Oceania 6,070 1 O0 Source: See Table 2.1. During the twentieth century indigenous populations began to increase again and with continued immigration into AotearodNew Zealand and Australia especially, the region s population had grown to over 12 million by 1950 (Table 2.3). The shares of the region s population in Australia and AotearodNew Zealand increased at the expense of the Pacific island countries in Melanesia. Through the first haif of the twentieth century population growth in Melanesia remained quite modest as the impacts of western diseases and, later, improved health systems diffused slowly through the interiors of the larger islands (Bedford 198Oa). In the central highiands of Papua N ew Guinea, for example, the first sustained contact between indigenous peoples and Australians did not occur until the 1950s. Population recovery in Polynesia and Micronesia through the first half of the twentieth century ensured that their populations were at least as large as they had been in By 1950 indigenous 9

16 populations in most parts of the region were greater than they had been in 1800 (Table 2.3). Table 2.3 The population situation around 1950 (000 s) % Aotearoa 1, Australia 8, Polynesia Melanesia 2, Micronesia Oceania 12,724 1 O0 Source: See Table 2.1. I have divided the twentieth century in half because the histories of economic and social development before and after the Second World War throughout the region (including in Australia and Aotearoaew Zealand) were very different. The colonial administrations in most parts of the Pacific began preparing their colonies for eventual independence during the 1950s and there was much heavier investment in social infrastructure and economic development (Bedford, 1 980b). Population growth accelerated in all pa& of the region, and the total more than doubled by 2000 to reach 30.5 million (Table 2.4). This is more than five times the population that was in the region in 1900 and 14 times greater than the 2.2 million estimated for 1800 (Table 2.1). Table 2.4 The population situation around 2000 Aotearoa 3,780 Australia 19,140 Polynesia 590 Melanesia 6,480 Micronesia Oceania 30,510 1 O0 Source: See Table 2.1. By 2000 the distribution of the region s population had returned to that found in 1900 with 65 percent of the total in Australia and Aotearomew Zealand, 21 percent in Melanesia and the remaining 4 percent shared between Micronesia and Polynesia. Significant numbers from the latter two sub-regions were resident in the United States (around 250,000 Micronesians and Polynesians in 2001), New Zealand (230,000 mainly Polynesians) and Australia (over 100,000 Polynesians and Melanesians, especially Fijians). In the case of those living in New Zealand less than half of the Pacific peoples had been bom in the islands, the majority were N ew Zealand-bom. 10

17 Between 1950 and 2000 a significant part of Polynesian population growth especially had been transferred from the islands to countries on the Pacific rim. This largely accounts for the lower over all growth in Polynesia s population (150% increase between 1950 and 2000) than in either Micronesia (200% increase) and Melanesia (200% increase). While around 50 percent of the people iiving in Polynesia and Micronesia were resident in towns in 2000, in Melanesia only 25 percent were urbanresident. In this part of the Pacific the great majority of people still depended on a semi-subsistence liefstyle. Population growth rates remain high, especially in Papua New Guinea, Solomons and Vanuatu, and opportunities for emigration to countries on the Pacific rim are much more restricted than those living in some Polynesian and Micronesian countries. In concluding this brief overview of population transformations in the Pacific since the onset of protracted contact between indigenous peoples and Europeans it is useful to summarize the main trends and developments. It is clear from Table 2.5 that the nineteenth century was an era of population growth in the countries on the southern rim of the Pacific and virtual stagnation in the aggregate island populations. The hypothesied modest population growth suggested for Melanesia, which was largely in Papua N ew Guinea given the substantial population declines recorded for Fijians, ni- Vanuatu and Solomon Islanders during the second half of the century especially, was effectively cancelled out by declines in Micronesia and Polynesia. Table 2.5 Population change within the region, (000 s) 1900 (000 s) Change (000 s) Change (%) Aotearoa Australia 600 3, Polynesia O Melanesia 1,150 1, Micronesia 1 O Oceania 2,200 6,070 3, Source: See Table 2.1. During the twentieth century the pattern was very different. In all of the sub-regions listed in Table 2.6 the population in 2000 was more than three times what it had been in In Micronesia it was seven times the size it had been 100 years earlier. The Pacific population aggregates all grew more rapidly than that in AotearoaNew Zealand. Australia s population grew slightly more than Melanesia s in percentage terms, but not as rapidly as the populations in Polynesia and Micronesia (Table 2.6). At the level of the region as a whole, the population at the end of the century was four times larger than it had been in much more rapid growth than during the nineteenth century (Tables 2.5 and 2.6). 11

18 Table 2.6 Population change within the region, (000 s) 2000 (000 s) Change (000 s) Change (%) Aotearoa 810 3,780 2, Australia 3,800 19,140 15, Polynesia 1 O Melanesia 1,300 6,480 5, Micronesia Oceania 6,070 30,510 24, Source: See Table 2.1 As noted earlier, there are two distinct periods of population change in the island Pacific during the twentieth century -before and after Growth was particularly significant during the second half of the century. Indeed in parts of the region, especially Polynesia, reference was made to a Malthusian situation in the 1960s (Bome, 1967). It was in the 1950s and 1960s that sustained emigration from Polynesia to New Zealand began and at the time this was seen to be an essential safety-value for small island groups experiencing rapid population growth (McArthur, 1961 and 1964; Cumberland, 1962). This sort of safety-valve was also there for some of the American colonieddependencies in the northern Pacific, as well as for American Samoa. However, it did not exist for the inhabitants of most parts of Melanesia. These differences in access to residence in metropolitan countries on the rim are having a profound impact on the patterns of population change in Pacific island groups, both during latter decades of the twentieth century as well as through the early decades of the new millennium. The situation with regard to contemporary international migration in the region is examined briefly in the next section. 2.3 International migration and sustainable development: a Polynesian dilemma One cannot consider the issue of sustainable development in most parts of Polynesia without adopting a transnational perspective. Polynesian migration to New Zealand since the 1960s has produced a situation where there are almost three times as many Cook Island Maori, five times as many Tokelauans, and nine times as many Niueans in New Zealand as there are in the island countries (Table 2.7). Remittances from Polynesian populations in New Zealand, Australia and the United States contribute more to the domestic economies of the Cook Islands, Niue, Samoa and Tonga than ail of the local sources of cash income combined (Brown and Foster, 1995; Brown, 1995). The flows of people, goods, money and services between the islands and their communities on the Pacific rim are at the heart of the debate about sustainable development in large parts of Polynesia (Brown et al., 1995; Bedford, 2000; Connell, 1997). 12

19 ~ ~~- Table 2.7 Pacific people in New Zealand and their island homes, mid- 1990s. Polynesian population New Zealand Island Home Samoan 1 O 1, ,000 Cook Islanders 47,000 19,000 Tongan Niuean Tokelauan ,500 5,000 97,800 2,000 1,000 Source: See Table 2.1 The key issue here with regard to sustainable development in island countries is whether the Pacific communities living in cities on the rim wil continue to retain an identity with and commitment to their kinsfolk in the islands. In New Zealand, less half of the resident ethnic Pacific peoples have been bom in the islands; the younger population is very much dominated by the second and third generation New Zealandbom. There is considerable debate about the extent to which remittance flows to the islands wil continue as the New Zealand-bom Pacific peoples develop different senses of identity (Macpherson, 1997; Bedford et al., 2001). New patois, new music, new fashion, new customs and practices now differentiate Pacific peoples in the cities on the Nn from their island-bom kin (see Connell, 1994, and the various essays by Pacific writers in Macpherson et al., 2001). Notwithstanding the on-going debate about the sustainability of remittance flows in Polynesia, one thing seems clear at least for island-bom Pacific peoples, and that is the importance of identifying with the island home. Tongan Professor Epeli Hau ofa (1994, 15), a long-term resident of Fiji where he works at the University of the South Pacific, summed this sentiment up well when he observed: Wherever I am at any given moment there is comfort in the knowledge stored at the back of m y mind, that somewhere in Oceania is a piece of earth to which I belong. In the turbulence of life it is my anchor. No one can take it away from me. I may never retum to it, not even as mortal remains, but it will always be homeland. W e all have or should have our homelands: personal, family, national homelands. And to deny human beings the sense of homeland is to deny them a deep spot on earth to anchor their roots. The issue of return migration, like remittances, is a subject of considerable debate in the context of sustainable development in Polynesia as well. The island countries of the Cook Islands, Niue and Samoa all suffer from shortages of labour both in their rural as well as their urban economies. This has been a persistent problem for development planners in those parts of Polynesia with extensive communities living in cities in New Zealand, Australia and the United States. Although there is often an expressed intention on the part of Pacific migrants living overseas to return to their homelands at. 13

20 some stage in the future (indeed, this is one of the explanations for remitting money and goods to kin back in the islands), the reality of return is much less certain (Connell and Brown, 1995; Connell, 1994 and 1997). After reviewing much of the writing on Samoan migration to New Zealand, Connell (1994, 274-5) concludes that ultimately few definitely choose to return, and fewer succeed. Even those who visit Samoa are often glad to return to New Zealand. It seems that the closer the contact with the reality of home, the stronger is the migrant s resolve to consolidate his (sic) new life in New Zealand. Thus if the dream [of return] remains it seems likely that it is nostalgia for the past rather than a plan for the future. Ambivalence about residence overseas or in the islands remains the norm for most Pacific migrants and their children living in cities on the rim. Keeping options open for movement between multiple potential homes in the Pacific and on the rim is now accepted to be a critical strategy which drives Polynesian economic and mobility behaviour (Macpherson, 1997; Ward, 1997). Much more cosmopolitan populations of Samoans, Tongans, Cook Islanders, Niueans and Tokelauans now inhabit both the villages in the islands and the cities on the rim than was the case in the 1950s and 1960s when the most recent Oceanic diaspora commenced. These people are much more at ease with the multiple identities that are required to cope effectively with hing in locations within and outside their island homes. This is a characteristic that distinguishes a much higher proportion of Polynesians than Pacific peoples living in Me 1 an es i a. The only time when Melanesians were able to settle in large numbers in a country on the Pacific rim was between 1860 and 1900 when Pacific labour was required in Queensland s sugar plantations. Over 100,000 Papua N ew Guineans, Solomon Islanders and Ni Vanuatu went to Australia during this period (Bedford, 1973). Large numbers returned to the islands, but a Melanesian component to Queensland s population evolved out of this labour migration. The only country in the western Pacific that has large numbers of its residents living in Australia and N ew Zealand is Fiji. The military coups of 1987 and the civilian coup in the late 1990s encouraged a major exodus, especially of Fiji Indians but also extensive emigration of ethnic Fijians (Bedford, 1989; Chetty and Prasad, 1993, Mohanty, 2001). Except for Fiji, international migration from countries in Melanesia has played a minor role in the development of the region s population and economy. The movement of people for tertiary education and vocational training overseas has been important for the development of Melanesia s human capital and for many years an important part of both N ew Zealand s and Australia s overseas development assistance has been in the form of scholarships for Pacific peoples (Bedford, 1982). Many of these people have eventually returned to New Zealand and Australia, especially in recent years following political upheaval and tensions in several countries including Papua N ew Guinea, Solomons, Vanuatu and Fiji. 2.4 Internal migration anù sustainable development: a Melanesian dilemma Internal migration has been much more important in the context of the debate about sustainable development in Melanesia than international migration. Although overall 14

21 population densities in the large island countries on the continental shelf are much lower than those in the corai and volc&c islands to the north and east, there is enormous diversity in population distribution (Brookfield, 1971). In parts of Melanesia there is considerable pressure of people on the resources required for a basic subsistence livelihood. Even though the great majority of Melanesians still live in rural areas (over 75 percent in Papua New Guinea, the Solomons and Vanuatu) movement from interior locations to the coast, especially coastal urban areas, has been accelerating for the past 30 years (Connell, 1987). There is no tradition of urban places in the Pacific - all towns in this part of the world owe their origins to European settlement since the beginning of the nineteenth century, Before the Second World War there were restrictions on migration to and residence in towns by indigenous peoples throughout Melanesia (Brookfield, 1972). It was not until the 1950s that rural-urban migration began to assume significance for Melanesians (Bedford, 1980c). Population movement within rural areas was, and remains, much more important. Indeed, by the 1970s, îhe low levels of urbanisation in Melanesia were being seen by some as a major constraint on development - if the towns are stunted, so wil be the nation (Ward, 1971). By 2000 migration into towns was seen increasingly as a problem, especially given high levels of urban unemployment and the development of extensive squatter settlements on the outskirts of most of Melanesia s larger urban areas. Indeed, it has been a conflict between the people of the land and immigrants from other islands in the Solomon Islands that has produced very serious civil disorder in recent years. Similar sorts of conflicts are emerging in Vanuatu and in parts of Papua N ew Guinea, not always around urban areas. In Fiji this civil disorder has another dimension - the reluctance of Fijian landowners to renew leases of some of their land to Fiji Indian tenant farmers is creating a landless underclass that has no opportunity to obtain employment in the towns (Naidu and Reddy, 2002). The debate about sustainable development in Melanesia is much more a debate about making productive and efficient use of the land and any associated mineral and forestry resources that can be extracted for commercial gain than about mainiaining flows of resources into island economies and societies from communities based overseas. Flows of labour within countries like Papua N ew Guinea are much more important for resource development than international migration, although immigration from parts of Asia especially has become more common in recent years. In recent years, the implications of rapid population growth in Melanesia for the region s future has attracted increasing attention from researchers, policy makers and planners (Cole, 1993). Throughout the western Pacific national populations are growing at rates in excess of 2 percent per annum (except for Fiji where emigration is containing annuai growth rates to around 1.7 percent per annum), according to statistics released by ESCAP and the Pacific Commission in Nomea. Total fertility rates in Papua N ew Guinea, Solomons and Vanuatu exceed 4.3 children per woman by comparison with 1.8 and 2.0 for Australia and N ew Zealand. Over 40 percent of Melanesia s population is under 15 years of age compared with 20 percent in New Zealand and Australia. Already the next generation s options are diminished, unless there is a change in immigration policies allowing extensive movement from Melanesia 15

22 to the countries on the Pacific rim. Within Melanesia, there is less land for each clan or family, and fewer resources to go round both in the village and in the national economy as a whole (Gannicot, 1993). For much of the past century a critical development issue throughout Melanesia has been labour supply - internal migration has been essential for rural development. In the next century oversupply of labour, not shortages, wil be much more important, and increasing numbers of younger Melanesians wil be looking for opportunities for work and residence outside of their islands. Australia especially is readily accessible by sea from most parts of Melanesia, especially Papua N ew Guinea (the international boundary between the two countries skirts the coast in southern Papua). It wil not be too long before we have a new wave of Pacific boat people to countries on the Pacific rim, 1000 years after the forebears of N ew Zealand s indigenous Maori population travelled by canoe from eastern Polynesia to Aotearoa. 2.5 World enlargement and a perspective on the future The Maori settlers of Aotearoa around i O00 AD were continuing a long-established tradition of inter-island travel and colonisation. The colonial era in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries interrupted this flow of Pacific peoples between island groups, a process that Hau ofa (1994b) termed world enlargement. In the post-colonial era the flows of Pacific peoples into new resource areas, where they wil secure employment and overseas family property and develop extended kinship networks through which they will circulate themselves, their relatives, their material goods and their stories (Hau ofa, 1994b) will, again, become much more prominent. In part this will reflect pressures in island homes; in part it will reflect demands for labour overseas. Looking ahead to 2050, it can be seen that projected population growth for Melanesia especially is very significant (Table 2.8). The United Nations medium variant population forecasts for this region show a staggering 14 million residents - more than three times the size of N ew Zealand s population, and almost double the population of all of the Pacific states in Population growth in Polynesia and Micronesia is also forecast to be very significanî, although neither of these sub-regions are likely to see more than a doubling of their populations over the next 50 years. Emigration to the Pacific rim, coupled with lower levels of fertility, accounts for these differences. Table 2.8 The population situation around 2050 (000 s) % Aotearoa 4, Australia 26, Polynesia Melanesia 14, Micronesia 1.O80 2 Oceania 47,300 1 O0 Source: See Table

23 There is an enormous challenge implicit in the population estimates contained in Table a challenge clearly recognised by Rowan Caliick (1993) when he wrote his controversial Doomsday Scenario for the Pacific when the population of Melanesia was less than half it is forecast to be by Amongst other things, he suggested, with the added element of imagination, that: Young people brought up in the region s growing towns wil lose their option of subsisting on their ancestral lands, not because they are hypnotised by the bright lights but because that option of returning home permanently is closed to them. The land is already being farmed to the limit by relatives. But opportunities for formai employment in the towns have also bogged down. Young people, and the not so young, end up waiting for the previous generation to retire or die as they queue for the few jobs available, chiefly in the public service and tourism. The older generation, still hanging on, was promoted early to the best positions in the time of high hopes engendered by localization. Increasing numbers of islanders thus seek work overseas, in some desperation, to keep their families alive. But as growing numbers of the elderly return to their island homes to retire, this places new and great stresses on the formal health system and on informal social networks unused to catering for large groups of elderly people. There are still no government welfare payments, and since commodity prices have suffered a decade-long slump, relatives on the land are unable to help out. There are beggars on the streets of every town... Malnutrition is spreading, and is already endemic in squatter settlements of towns [especially in Melanesia]. While generai health levels remain high, new problems have surfaced - including, of course, AIDS - many of whose victims have returned from the towns to die in their home cillages without the disease ever bei diagnosed. The changed diet of town dwellers, dependent substantially on imported, processed food, has greatly increased the proportion of deaths from heart diseases and cancers... And so he goes on with what he sees as a nightmare based on the emerging grim statistical evidence of demographic, social, economic and environmental change in the island Pacific. This was a highly debatable scenario, but it is indisputable that life in many parts of Melanesia in the íùture cannot continue as it is now lived. Sustainable development of Melanesia s rural and urban communities wil depend increasingly on opportunities for overseas migration for employment and training by young people. In this paper, I have deliberately taken a broad perspective on migration and sustainable development - a perspective very much rooted in the demographic histories of population aggregates rather than the histories of specific islands, communities and families. This has been done deliberately given that most of those attending the APMRN s Fifth International Conference are not familiar with the complex geography and history of this part of the world. The detail of 20 countries 17

24 and temtories would only serve to confuse rather than to clarify. That said, it must be acknowledged that the links between population growth, migration and development in the region s rural and urban communities are not amenable to easy generalisation. Migration is a process that thrives on differentiation and selectivity; what is a positive outcome for one region or community is not necessarily mirrored in another, In this context it is appropriate to conclude with a reference to the increasing concern both within the region and amongst those agencies contributing development assistance to Pacific states at the deepening disparities between elites and the poor. As Mohanty and Naidu (2002) have noted in their review of the interrelationships between poverty, migration and development, the poor and the rich have very different opportunities when it comes to migration, especially international migration. As they point out in their conclusion, There is clear evidence that, at least as far as the direct effect of migration is concerned, the benefits accrue disproportionately to the richer regions, sectors and classes (IL0 1999). It may reinforce more poverty conditions and widen the inequalities between haves and have-nots. This applies as much in the countries on the Pacific rim as it does to the island states. At the heart of the debates about sustainable development in Australia and N ew Zealand, for example, are questions about patterns of population movement and the policies that governments adopt to attempt to influence or regulate flows of people between regions and countries. References Bedford, R.D. (1968) Resettlement: Solution to Economic and Social Problems in the Gilbert and Ellice Islands Colony, Unpublished MA Thesis in Geography, University of Auckland. Bedford, R.D. (1973) A transition in circular mobility: population movement in the New Hebrides, , in H.C. Brookfield (Ed.) The Pac$c in Transition: Geographical Perspectives on Adaptation and Change, Edward Arnold, London, Bedford, R.D. (1980a) 1920: the doomed races?, in R.D. Bedford Perceptions, Past and Present, of a Future for Melanesia, Department of Geography, University of Canterbury, Christchurch (Macmillan Brown Lectures, 1979), Bedford, R.D. (1980b) 1950: dependencies for ever?, in R.D. Bedford Perceptions, past and Present, of a Future for Melanesia, Department of Geography, University of Canterbury, Christchurch (Macmillan Brown Lectures, i 979), Bedford, R.D. (1980~) 1980: a Pacific way?, in R.D. Bedford Perceptions, Pasr and Present, of a Future for Melanesia, Department of Geography, University of Canterbury, Christchurch (Macmillan Brown Lectures, 1979), Bedford, R.D. (1982) International migration in the south Pacific region, in M.M. Kritz, L.L. Lim and H. Zlotnik (Eds) International Migration Systems: a Global Approach, Clarendon Press, Oxford, Bedford, R.D. (1989) Out of Fiji.. a perspective on migration after the coups, Pacific Viewpoint, 30(2), Bedford, R.D. (2000) Meta-societies, remittance economies and internet addresses, in D.T. Graham and N.K. Poku (Eds) Migration, Globalisation and Human Securiry, Routledge, London, Bedford, R.D., Macpherson, C. and Spoonley, P. (2001) Pacific communities in the information age, in V. Naidu, E. Vasta and C. Hawksley (Eds) Current Trends 18

25 in South Pacific Migration, APMRN Working Paper No. 7, CAPSTRANS, University of Wollongong, Borrie, W.D. (1967) Malthusian reflections on the South Pacific, Transactions of the Royal Society of New Zealand (General), 2 (i), Brookfield, H.C. (1971) Melanesia: a Geographical Interpretation of an Island World, Methuen, London. Brookfield, H.C. (1972) Colonialism, Development and Independence: the Case of the Melanesian Islands in the South Pacijìc. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge. Brown, R.P.C. (1995) Hidden foreign exchange flows: estimating unofficial remittances to Tonga and Western Samoa, Asian and Pacific Migration Journal, 4(1), Brown, R.P.C. and Foster (1995) Some common fallacies about migrants remittances in the South Pacific: lessons from Tongan and Western Samoan research, Paczfìc Viewpoint, 36( i), Brown, R.P.C., Foster, J. and Connell, C. (1995) Remittances, savings and policy formulation in the South Pacific, Asian and Pacific Migration Journal, 4(1), Callick, R. (1993) A doomsday scenario?, in R.V. Cole (Ed.) Paczfìc 2010: Challenging the Future, National Centre for Development Studies, The Australian National University, Canberra Chetty, N.K. and Prasad, S. (1993) Fiji s emigration, Demographic Report No. I, School of Social and Economic Development, The University of the South Pacific, Suva. Cole, RV. (Ed.) (1993) Pacific 2010: Challenging the Future, National Centre for, Development Studies, The Australian National University, Canberra. Connell, J. (1987) Migration, rural development and policy formulation in the South Pacific, Journal of Rural Studies, 3, i Connell, J. (1994) In Samoan worlds: culture, migration, identity and Albert Wendt, in R. King, J. Connell and P. White (Eds) Writing Across Worlds: Literature and Migration, Routledge, London, Connell, J. (1997) A false global-local duality? Migration, markets and meanings, in P.J. Rimmer (Ed.) Pacific Rim Development. Integration and Globalisation in the Asia-Paci& Economy, Allen and Unwin, Sydney, Connell, J. and Brown, R.P.C. (1995) Migration and remittances in the South Pacific: towards new perspectives, Asian and Pacific Migration Journal, 4(1), Cumberland, K.B. (1962) The future of Polynesia, Journal of the Polynesian Society, 71 (4), Gannicott, K. (1993) Population, development and growth, in RV. Cole (Ed.) PaciJic 2010: Challenging the Future, National Centre for Development Studies, The Australian National University, Canberra, Hau ofa, E. (1994a) Pasts to Remember, Paper presented at the Pacific Writers Forum, East-West Center, Honolulu, August Hau ofa, E. (1994b) Our sea of islands, The Contemporav Paczjìc, 10(2), International Labour Organisation (ILO)(1999) The poverty nexus: dual migration circuits, in IL0 Emigration Pressures and Structural Changes: Case Study of the Philippines, ILO, Geneva. McArthur, N. (1961) Population and social change: prospect for Polynesia, Journal of the Polynesian Sociev, 70 (4), McArthur, N. (1964) Contemporary Polynesian emigration from Samoa and the Cook Islands, Journal of the Polynesian Society, 73(3), 336. Macpherson, C. (1997) The Polynesian diaspora: new communities and new questions, in Ken ichi Sudo and Shuji Yoshida (Eds) Contemporary Migration in Oceania: Diaspora and Network, The Japan Center for Area Studies (No. 3), National Museum of Ethnology, Osaka, Macpherson, C., Spoonley, P. and Anae, M.(Eds) (2001) Tangata o fe Moana Nui: the Evolving Identities of Pacific Peoples in AotearodNew Zealand, Dunmore Press, Palmerston North. 19

26 Mohanty, M. (2001) Contemporary emigration from Fiji: some trends and issues in the post-independence era, in V. Naidu, E. Vasta and C. Hawksley (Eds) Current Trends in South Pacijìc Migration, APMRN Working Paper No. 7, CAPSTRANS, University of Wollongong, Mohanty, M. and Naidu, V. (2002) Poverty, migration and development: interrelationships, paper prepared for the APMRN s Fifth International Conference, Fiji, September Naidu, V. and Reedy, M. (2002) Na Char Ke na Ghat ke: ALTA and Expiring Land Leases, Fijian Farmers Pperceptions of their Future, APMRN Ford Emergency Fund Papers, CAPSTRANS, University of Wollonging. Ward, R.G. (1971) Internal migration and urbanisation in Papua New Guinea, New Guinea Research Bulletin, 42, , Ward, R.G. (1997) Expanding worlds of Oceania: implications of migration, in Ken ichi Sudo and Shuji Yoshida (eds) Contemporary Migration in Oceania: Diaspora und Network, The Japan Center for Area Studies (No. 3), National Museum of Ethnology, Osaka,

27 CHAPTER 3 CONTEMPORARY MIGRATION RESEARCH IN TONGA, TRENDS, ISSUES AND THE FUTURE Raelyn Lolohea Esau and Shogo Hirai 3.1 Introduction In contemporary Tonga, surprisingly few efforts have been made to promote migration research in order to keep up with the intensity of international migration of Tongans. One of the recent efforts made by the government was the modification of the arrival cards that have to be filled in by anyone arriving in Tonga from overseas in 2001 with an attached small portion intended to represent the departure information. With the improvement of the departure card in the future, it can be expected that the international movement of Tongans will be better monitored and more accurate estimations can be anticipated. The unavailability of statistics and the inaccessibility of vital information are obstacles confronting migration research (Faeamani 1993: 63, Tongamoa 1987: 171). In this article, an overview of migration trends and issues confronting Tonga as a sending country of migrants is provided followed by a summary of a recent fieldwork study undertaken in Tonga during July-August, The methodology is introduced and some preliminary findings are presented, leading to speculations about future trends in Tongan migration. 3.2 Overview of Migration Trends In the era prior to European contact, the population in Tonga was estimated at 30,000 (Campbell ). Assuming the absence of international migration, with the exception of movements between neighbouring Samoa and Fiji, the population change was determined by natural increase. However, after European contact towards the second half of the eighteen-century epidemics wiped out almost half of the population (Campbell 1992; 114,115). Europeans also introduced foreign consumer products, which many Tongans have since aspired to. The late 1950s to the early 1960s were a period when internal migration was still significant. The movement from the outer islands to the mainland and the capital Nuku alofa was due to pressure on land, the absence of employment opportunities, the need for money and the desire for secondary education in more remote parts of the country (Walsh 1964). Some three decades ago, international migration became an increasingly important phenomenon. Among the main reasons were aspirations for a better standard of living, desirable occupation, and access to education and health services (Bedford 1980a; cited in Conne : 3). New Zealand has.long been an important destination country. From the late 1960s to the mid 1970s, 24,872 people left Tonga and a total of 17,707 work permits were issued by N ew Zealand to itinerant workers on short-term workers (Edwards 1975, 1976; cited in Faeamani 1993;63). In 1986, the introduction 21

28 of a visa waiver scheme led to the influx of Tongan migrants to New Zealand. However, it was terminated already in the following year. Since the 199Os, most Tongans have entered New Zealand under the family migration category and the general skills category (Brown 2002; pers. comm.). Further statistical data on the family category is provided in Table 3.1. Table 3.1 Family Category Migration to New Zealand (Marriage and Parent sub categories) for those Pacific islands included in the top ten countries for residence approvals in New Zealand Sub-categories Samoa Fiji Tonga Family mamage 1999/ % 432 7% 435 7% Familymarriage July2000-Dec 256 9% 181 7% 142 5% Family Parent 1999/ % 345 9% 163 4% Family Parent July 2000-Dec 95 5% % 93 5% Source: New Zealand Immigration In 2002 the Pacific Access Category (PAC) was introduced according to which a quota of 250 Tongans, 75 Tuvaluans and 50 Kiribatians are granted entry to New Zealand each year. Today, N ew Zealand tops the list of receiving countries for Tongan migrants, followed by the United States and Australia. 3.3 Tongans Abroad and Pacific Islanders in New Zealand The number of Tongans abroad is estimated to exceed the resident home population in Tonga (see Table 3.2). Table 3.2 Tongans home and abroad Country Resident population Details Tonga 97, census New Zealand 40, census United States 36, census Source: Tonga Statistics Department; Statistics New Zealand ( U.S. Census Bureau ( The latest population censuses in receiving countries showed that Pacific migrants are small in number compared to migrants from Asia, Europe, Africa and Latin America (see e.g. US Census 2001). However compared to the remaining population in the home countries, a significant portion of Pacific Islanders live overseas. As a result, the overseas population of Pacific Islanders is increasing while the growth rate of the Pacific Islands resident population is declining. The New Zealand population censuses in 1996 and 2001 give proof to this trend especially in regards to the Cook Islands, Niue and Tokelau (see Table 3.3). When the aggregate overseas population residing in other countries is added, Samoa and Tonga show the same trend (see also Bedford in this volume). 22

29 Table 3.3 Pacific Islanders in New Zealand 1996/2001 compared to the home populations New Zealand Home population Countries Samoa 101, , , ,140* Cook Is 47,O 19 52,569 19,103 18,027* Tonga 31,387 40,716 97, ,673** Niue 18,477 20,148 2,088 2,088 Tokelau 4,919 6,204 1,507 1,537* Fiji 7,695 7, , ,077 Source: New Zealand Population Census 1996/2001 ( Secretariat of the Pacific Community (SPC)( * Preliminary census results provided in SPC ** 2001 projection by the Tonga Statistics Department Samoa Census provided by SPC Past research on Tongan migration Migration research in Tonga has mainly been carried out by graduate researchers. In addition to the work done by non-tongans (see e.g. Conne ), some Tongan graduate researchers have carried out research on migration and some anthropologists have studied Tongan migration to the United States. For instance, Small (1997) looked at Tongan migrants from a village on Tongatapu, migrating to the suburbs of California. Kishida (2000) examined migration from a village in Vava u to Australia and the role migration played for the churches in Tonga. James (1991) conducted research on migration and remittances in a fishing village in Vava u. Among the Tongans who have done research on migration are Fuka (1985), Tongamoa (1987) and Faeamani (1993). Their studies were based on Tongan migrants living in New Zealand and Australia and their main interest were monetary remittances sent in support of their family and kin in Tonga. Fuka (1 984) studied the Auckland Tongan community and their remittances to Tonga. Tongamoa (1987) carried out work on migration, remittances and development with a focus on Tongans in Sydney. She was able to draw some comparisons with Fuka s work on Tongans in Auckland. Furthermore, Faeamani (1993) focused on the significance of migrant remittances in fostering village and regional social and economic development in Tonga. Liava a (1999) undertook the first ever attempt to document migration patterns of Tongan migrants by carrying out a survey on departing passengers in May-June Only 55% of the departing passengers responded to the questionnaires. 48% of the respondents were Tongans and 52% were foreigners. However, the general impression emerging from this survey was the need for a commitment on all levels of society in order to boost research efforts on an international level. This would be of benefit to Tongans from the grass root level to the policy makers. 3.5 Introducing a current research project In July and August 2002, the author carried out a survey in Tonga as an academic 23

30 requirement for a Masters degree at Tokushima University on the migration characteristics of Tongan households who have family mcmbers, particularly nuclear family members living overseas. This fieldwork was built on the need to examine the socio-cultural networks of migration, since previous research mainly focused on the socio-economic aspect of remittances. The main aims were to investigate the patterns of migrants decision making from the viewpoint of the behavioural theory of migration. In addition, the socio-cultural and socio-economic aspects involved in the migration network of Tongans as well as the attitude of young adults towards migration were examined. Methodology of ílze survey The survey involved the use of questionnaires and interviews in Tonga. A total of 150 households were surveyed of which 53% lived on the main island Tongatapu and 47% on the two outer islands of Ha apai (14%) and Vava u (33%). There were three main parts to this questionnaire. The first part involved some information on the standard of living of the household, including the source of earnings, the number of breadwinners, the average income and the occupants of each household. The second part focused on details of the nuclear family members living abroad at the time of the survey, the ongoing network and the exchange of goods, services and cash between the household in Tonga and their family members abroad. The last part was directed at the migrants themselves with the aim of gaining information on the process of migration from the initial planning stages to their present status as overseas migrants. It involved the how, what, why, who and when questions behind the process of migration. About 25% of the respondents in this survey visited Tonga to attend the Free Wesleyan Church Annual Conference, the Anglican Church Centenary Celebrations, the Heilala Festival Beauty Pagent and various other occasions, which enabled the author to interview them personally. The other interviews were conducted with family members of the migrants, particularly members of their nuclear families. Migrants with addresses were later contacted for confirmation of information obtained from their families in Tonga. In addition, a different set of questionnaires for high school leavers was designed to examine the attitude of young adults towards migration. A total of 180 students, of which 67% were females and 33% males completed the questionnaires from one government school and one church school. This questionnaire was aimed at understanding the perception and aspirations of the students aged 15 to 19. They were asked if they had nuclear or extended family members overseas in order to determine a possible relationship between their aspirations to migrate and the presence of family overseas. The third part of the survey was carried out in Fiji on two categories of Tongan migrants. First, 80 Tongan students studying in Fiji answered questionnaires. The aim of this survey was to study changes in the aspiration of secondary students in Tonga compared to Tongan tertiary students in Fiji. Furthermore, the relationship between higher education and future migration was investigated. The second part of the research in Fiji focussed on Tongans working in Fiji, carried out by informal interviews with a small number of families. 24

31 3.6 Summary of results and conclusion Since the data analysis has not yet been completed, only some prelimhaw observations can be made. It was noted that the decision making process has shown a shift from the extended family to the nuclear family and even to individuals. Generally, migration was viewed as a positive contribution to the family despite the socio-cultural effects of separation of family members. It was also noted that a higher percentage of the older generation in Tonga preferred to stay there rather than to permanently join their family members overseas. They maintained a sense of belonging to the place of their ancestors. The high school students survey showed a high level of aspirations to migrate for further studies overseas whereas the students in Fiji showed a preference to continue their studies in Australia. Currently, migration continues to bring benefits to Tonga such as in the form of remittances. It is a concern and remains to be seen whether future generations of Tongan migrants wil continue their role in networks and their contributions to Tonga. There is evidence that Tongans will continue to emigrate in considerable numbers despite the lack of official data to confirm this trend. People can be expected to reunite with their families overseas and young Tongans to aspire to higher education abroad. This trend underlines the importance of research on Tongan migration that moves beyond an economic perspective and takes into account people s attitudes, aspirations and sociocultural behaviour as this study attempts to do. References Brown, R (2002) Personal communication. Manager for Immigration Services, Tonga Branch. August 6, Nuku alofa. Campbell, I.C. (1992) Island Kingdom; Tonga Ancient and Modern, Christchurch Canterbury University Press. Connell, J (ed) (1 990) Migration and development in the South Pacific, Pacific Research Monograph No.24. Canberra: Australia National University. Connell, J. (1983) Migration, Employment and development in the South Pacific. Countv report no 18. Tonga, Noumea: South Pacific Commission. Faeamani, S. (1993) Migrant remittances: the engine of village development in Tonga, Unpub. MA Thesis, James Cook University. Fuka, M.L.A. (1984) The Auckland Tongan community and overseas remittances, Unpub MA Thesis, University of Auckland. James, K.E, (1991) Migration and remittances: A Tongan village perspective, Pacific View Point, 32 (1): 1-23 Kishida, Y. (2000) Tonga no kaigai imin to hyokai, Unpub. MA Thesis, Kobe University. Liava a, V. (2000) Demography/Population Discussion Papers, Discussion Paper No. 1 : National Air Migration Survey of 1999, Noumea: Secretariat of the Pacific. New Zealand Immigration. (2001) Nm Zealand Immigration Service Fact Pack, Issue 14. Wellington: New Zealand Immigration. Small, C.A. (1997) Voyages From Tongan Villages to American Suburbs, Ithaca: Cornel1 University Press. Tonga Statistics Department. Population census 1996, Nuku alofa: Statistics Department. Tonga Statistics Department. Statistical Indicators 2001, Nuku alofa: Statistics Department Tongamoa, S.T. (1 987) Migration,.Remittance and Development and Development: A Tongan perspective, Unpub MA Thesis, University of Sydney. Walsh A.C. (1964) Urbanization in Nuku alofa, Tonga, Wellington: South Pacific Bulletin. 25

32 We bsi tes httn:// The N ative IJawaiian and Other Pacific Islander Population: serv.nsf/htmldocs/pacific+islands+profiles+íc ensus+96)+-+reference+r eports httr,:// serv.nsf/htmidocs/pacific+deoples 2001 Census Snapshot 6: Pacific Peoples cs/oceaniapo~ulation2002/ocea niapon02somenum bers/oceaniapo~2002latestcensusfi~res.xls 26

33 CHAPTER 4 SOME ASPECTS OF GENDER AND SOCIAL CLASS WITHIN CONTEMPORARY INDO-FIJIAN MIGRATION Markus Pangerl 4.1 Introduction The current large-scale migration of Indo-Fijians towards the Pacific Rim can mainly be understood as a result of an unstable political and social environment (see La1 and Pretes 2001, Lawson 1991, Robertson and Sutherland 2001), which is shaped through a specific historical and colonial context (see Gillion 1962, Kelly 1991, La1 1992, Norton 1986). At the same time Indo-Fijian migration seems to follow similar patterns of other Pacific communities towards greener pastures in the Pacific Rim. The dramatic increase in emigration since the coups in 1987 and 2000 has been analysed by various scholars from within and outside Fiji (Chetty and Prasad 1993, Gani 2000, House 2001, Mohanty 2001, Naidu 1997, Sharma 2001, Voigt-Graf forthcoming). However, most of these studies adopted a macro-approach based on quantitative methods. They can therefore not adequately grasp the interactions and expressions of the very people, who are involved in this process. Hence, it is the main objective of this paper to consider some of the tendencies and dynamics of the ongoing Indo-Fijian migration towards the Pacific Rim by qualitatively analysing interpersonal negotiations and personal articulations. In this paper, observations and preliminary findings from ongoing research, rather than final conclusions, are presented. The paper focuses on the premigration context and is based on investigations and interviews undertaken in Fiji. 4.2 Focus of analysis In Fiji, I spoke to members of a variety of Indo-Fijian communities of diverse social, economic and religious backgrounds. While interviewing or informally discussing certain aspects of migration I put a strong emphasis on individual narratives in regards to the respondents perceptions and life-experiences. Through listening to people s stones about migration and the way they are handling broken families I tried to grasp intentions, motivations, hopes, aspirations and explanations as well as potentials for conflicts related to the process of leaving one s land of birth for good. 27

34 While interviewing almost 50 people and informally speaking to a much higher number I did not come across a single Indo-Fijian who was not affected by migration in one way or another. Everybody had either friends or relatives overseas or had intentions to migrate themselves. This paper focuses on people who are in the process of leaving. It highlights (a) features of the decision-making process and (b) articulations which are used by people to explain either their intention to leave or their intention to stay. Through this approach I will show that an analysis of contemporary Indo-Fijian migration has to take into account features of social class and gender. The aims are to recognize the potential for conflict within the decision-making process, to explore how the respondents' explanations are shaped by gendered and class perceptions, and to interpret these explanations on a discourseanalytical level. Migration cannot be regarded as a smooth or unproblematic process. Migration starts long before the actual settling in a new environment and people involved in this process go through many different stages. Furthermore, in the case of Indo-Fijians, migration is, not a voluntary process. Most respondents mentioned that if the social and political life was better in Fiji, they would reconsider their intention of migrating overseas. The currently, highly dynamic situation in Fiji forces many Indo-Fijians to weigh off the advantages of leaving against their emotional attachment to Fiji. 4.3 Conflicts within the decision-making process The decision-making process concerning a possible migration is a very personal matter and is normally negotiated within the immediate nuclear family. A negotiation within the extended family was not mentioned by any of the respondents. Looking at the nuclear family level, it is important to consider whether the decision is made by mutual agreement between husband and wife and under which circumstances conflicts occur and manifest themselves. Gender relations within most Indo-Fijian communities are traditionally constructed with an emphasis on male dominance. Features of male dominance traditionally appear in many ritualised forms and are embodied in daily practices. However, urbanisation and education have created a platform for feminist thinking and an understanding of equal rights and freedom of expression within marriages. With this situation in mind, I wil argue that there is a huge potential for conflict within the decision-making process. This can only be accurately comprehended by taking into account characteristics of social class and the positioning of gender roles within each married couple. Some quotes show that conflicts are more likely to arise within married couples where there is an understanding of equality and where gender roles cannot be defined in the traditional sense. 28

35 A male Indo-Fijian journalist explained his situation: I never really wanted to go; even though it was a consideration right after May Also I don t have the necessary qualification to go under a skilled migration scheme. Only m y wife has these qualifications. And at one stage she decided to just have a go and see whether she can get a PR; and she got it, for Australia. This brought m y family and m e into a big dilemma. W e know that sometime in the next 5 years we have to decide whether to stay or whether to go. And it won t be an easy decision since my wife wants to go, and I d rather like to stay. Sometimes I wish my wife wouldn t have applied for a PR (interview, ). A 30-year old husband and father of one son made an even stronger statement: All of m y wife s family is in the States. And my wife is very keen on going as soon as possible herself. She already has a multiple-visa and getting a PR is not a big deal for her. So I a m the passive part, who is basically only on her papers as a spouse. Our son was actually born in the States. But, you know, I really don t want to go. I a m the only son of my parents. Who will look after them? I will have nobody in the States except for my wife s relatives. The main problem is, that when she will finally go, the only way for me to not be a divorced man will be to go with her (interview ). These two examples illustrate some of the main aspects under which confiicts around the decision-making process can evolve. In both cases the women had at least as much power. -. as their husbands to plan their future. This was related to the middle class background of both families, including a certain educational background of both the husband and the wife, as well as a financially secure background. In both cases, the wives were employed and financially independent, and in the first case, the wife s skills were superior to those of her husband. There were also no significant signs of male dominance. The social, economic and educational background of these families is quite different from the following example. One male student at the University of the South Pacific, from a relatively low social strata background, explained: In my family, women in a way complement the views of their husbands. The role of the husband is very dominant. He is the one who makes the decisions. It is not in the culture of our family for a women to question the husband. This is also related to the fact that in my family it s mostly that women are staying at home - it s the husbands who are the sole breadwinners. Therefore, you know, their economic position gives them the authority to initiate ideas like migration (fieldwork data ). The above mentioned examples show that there is a clear connection between the potential for conflict within the decision-making process and the social class background, 29

36 the level of education, employment factors and the role of the women in a specific family context. Conflicts seem more likely within family relations, which are not very traditional. Rather, conflicts - and thereby I refer to open conflicts, which are less likely traditional marriages - may occur when the positions of women are as strong as those of their husbands. Social class, education and profess onal employment as well as other urban demographic and social characteristics are contributing factors. While stressing an urban versus rural dichotomy in this context, it is not intended to deny that there are cases of gender equality within marriages in rural communities, albeit probably to a lesser degree than in urban environments. Also, within traditional marriages there is potential for conflict, which however is not openly dealt with. In these circumstances, women might be the ones who feel the conflict most strongly, because they are expected to follow their husbands decisions and not question their authoriíy openly. 4.4 Respondents reasoning and explanations of their migration plans The second aspect of the pre-migration context to be looked at in this paper concerns reasons and explanations given for the intention to migration or to stay. An interesting feature in this respect is that different interviewees used exactly the same reasons to explain entirely opposing intentions. In many interviews with people and particularly with men intending to leave, a better economic perspective was mentioned as their prime motivation (see also Voigt-Graf in this issue). The strength of overseas economies and higher income levels were attractive to many. On the other side, the same reason was used by some respondents to explain their intended stay, as the following statement by a 26 year-old professional shows: For me, I don t want to migrate at this stage, mainly because of economic reasons. As an engineer I was trained overseas, since Fiji does not train engineers themselves. M y work here is challenging, and even though I a m quite sure I could find a good job overseas and probably earn three times the money I am earning here, I don t want to go. The living expenses overseas are much higher, and work life there will probably mean more stress. The example of how economic motivations can be used to justify both a migration and staying in Fiji has to be understood in relation to the individual s class and employment background. On the one hand, professionals of a middle to upper class and a secure financial background are less likely to migrate as this might jeopardize their economic weil being. There is no doubt that many skilled people from a middle class background have left or intend to leave the country. At the same time, however, those sitting on top of the social ladder are also more likely to prefer to stay in Fiji. On the other hand people who expect to improve their economic position overseas, often stated this reason for their intended migration. This was particularly prevalent among unskilled workers in Fiji. 30

37 4.5 Articulations of insecurity In the final section, insecurity as one of the major reasons of intended migration is examined in relation to gender. All interviewees with the intention to leave mentioned insecurity as a main reason. Since the term insecurity is a highly multi-faceted one and also seems to be omnipresent in discourses on the contemporary social and political reality in Fiji, the discourses on insecurity have to be analysed more thoroughly. By taking into account a gender perspective new insights can be revealed. Most female respondents emphasised personal and physical insecurities. Many young females particularly are constantly aware of a possible physical threat. In this regard, it is important to emphasise that not only is the threat of physical violence terrifying, but that there is also an enduring psychological pressure involved in this consciousness. While there were other considerations related to feelings of insecurity among female respondents, physical insecurity was mostly mentioned in the first place. Such narratives by Indo-Fijian women were rather different from those articulated by male respondents. The latter related insecurity primarily to economic considerations. While Indo-Fijian men also feel the threat of and occasionally experience physical insecurity, they generally put more stress on economic security. In addition, many men womed about the well being of their wives and daughters, while rarely referring to their own physical insecurities. It became obvious through this gendered approach that males and females had different priorities regarding their perceptions of insecurity. 4.6 Conclusion It is important to emphasise that narratives of people s intended migration or intended stay are embedded in discourses, which are not always a reflection of their actual practices. Furthermore the analysis of explaining and reasoning of the migration process presented in this paper is a partial one, which does not represent the complexity of negotiating future intentions. The main intention here was to show that an emphasis on aspects of social class and gender provides important insights in.the analysis of the contemporary Indo-Fijian migration and the underlying mental processes and expressions. References Chetty, N.K., Prasad, S. (1993) Fiji s emigration: An examination of contemporary trends and issues, Demographic Report N0.4. Suva: SSED, USP. Gani, A. (2000) Some dimensions of Fiji s recent emigration, Pacific Eco BulIetin.15 (1): Gillion, ILL. (1962) Fiji s Indian migrants, Melbourne: Oxford University Press. House, W. (2001) Employment planning, the labour market and the nature and impact of skill losses on the economy of Fiji, IL0 draft report, Suva: LO. 31

38 Kelly, J.D. (i 991) A politics of virtue. Hinduism, sexuality, and countercolonial discourse in Fiji, Chicago: Oxford University Press. Lai, B.V. (1992) Broken Waves. A history of Fiji Islands in the 2ah centuty, Hawaii: University of Hawaii Press. Lal, B.V., Pretes, M. (2001) Coup: Reflections on thepolitical crisis in Fiji, Canberra: Pandanus Books. Lawson, S. (1991) The failure of democraticpolitics in Fiji,Oxford: Clarendon Press. Mohanty, M. (2001) Contemporary emigration from Fiji: Some trends and issues in the postindependence area, in V. Naidu, E. Vasta, C. Hawksley (Eds) Current Trends in South Pacific Migration, Wollongong: APMRN Press. Mohanty, M. (2001), Contemporary emigration from Fiji: some trends and issues in the postindependence area, in V. Naidu, E. Vasta, C. Hawksley (Eds) Current Trends in South PaciJic Migration, Wollongong: APMRN Press. Naidu, S. (1997) Emigrationfiom Fiji: The case of medical doctors and the eficacy of the ministry of health, unpublished MA thesis, Suva: USP. Norton, R. (1986) Colonial Fiji: Ethnic divisions and elite conciliation, in B.V. La1 (Ed) Politics in Fiji, Sydney: Allen & Unwin. Robertson, R., Sutherland, W. (2001) Government by the Gun. The unfinished business of Fiji s 2000 coup, Annandale: Pluto Press. Sharma, L.D. (2001) Indo-Fijian emigration. A case study of the children of Girmitba, unpublished MA thesis, Suva: USP. Voigt-Graf, C. (forthcoming) The emergence of an Indo-Fijian transnational community, in R. Iredale, C. Hawksley, S. Castles (Eds) Migration in the Asia Pacific: Population, Settlement and Citizenship Issues. Sydney: Edward Elgar. 32

39 CHAPTER 5 THE MIGRATION OF SECONDARY SCHOOL TEACHERS IN FIJI: TAKING STOCK AND INTRODUCING A RESEARCH AGENDA' Carmen Voigt-Graf 5.1 Introduction A country's economic performance and development are linked to the efficiency of its school system which in turn depends on the quality of teaching staff. The migration of teachers - both internationally by way of emigration and internally within countries - may adversely affect the quality of the education system. B y depriving countries or certain regions within countries of an important resource for human capacity building, the migration of teachers may have far-reaching development implications. In her opening address at the 5"' International Asia Pacific Migration Research Network (APMRN) conference held in Fiji in September 2002, the Minister for Education in Fiji, Ro Teimurnu Kepa, talked about the government's concern about the emigration of skilled people from Fiji. She explicitly singled out teachers among the professional groups whose emigration has had serious implications for Fiji. The purpose of this paper is to provide an overview of the scale of migration of secondary teachers from and within Fiji and to describe the policy responses that this migration has elicited. The paper is based on an analysis of migration statistics, a review of the relevant literature including government reports in Fiji and informal discussions with employees of various professional bodies in Fiji'. An outline of future research to fully investigate this issue is presented. 5.2 The migration of highly skilled workers Highly skilled migration represents a rapidly growing and increasingly substantial component of global migration? The bulk of this movement occurs from less developed to industrialised countries. To a large extent, this is a response to policies in destination ' I would like thank Henry Elder from the Institute of Education at the University of the South Pacific for his support, advice and encouragement on this research. * These included the Fiji Teachers Union (FTU), the Fijian Teachers Association (FTA) and the institute of Education at the University of the South Pacific. ' Skilled or highly skilled workers are usually defined as having university degrees or extensive experience in a given field. The category is not well defined and varies from one country to another' (iredale 1999: 90). 33

40 countries such as Australia, New Zealand, Canada and the United States which have introduced almost insurmountable barriers for unskilled migrants while opening their doors to highly skilled workers. Another recent phenomenon is the increasing internationalisation of professions. whereby the labour markets of some professions have become transnational in nature (Iredale 2001: 7). This implies a convergence towards international standards and procedures of regulation. In regards to the teaching profession, it is possible to speak of an intemational labour market of secondary school teachers which has emerged in the Anglophone world. Australia and N ew Zealand. for instance, benefit from the immigration of teachers from Pacific small island states while in turn losing teachers to the United Kingdom and North America. An academic debate surrounding highly skilled migration started in the 1960s and has since taken several shifts (Ouaked 2002: 155). In the 1960s, the costs of the emigration of skilled workers, the so-called brain drain, carried by developing countries was the central concern of research and policy-making. During the 1980s and much of the 199Os, this concern abated and the debate took an internationalist view of labour markets. Recently, the sheer volume of highly skilled mobility brought the loss of skilled labour back on the research and policy agendas. During a transatlantic roundtable discussion on highly skilled migration and sending country issues held in November 2001, it was emphasised that brain mobility did not necessarily mean brain drain for the sending countries (Ouaked 2002). Possibilities of a benign impact of emigration exist when migrants returned temporarily or permanently to their home countries, when they sent remittances or set up networks between home and host countries along which knowledge, new technologies, management strategies and goods are transferred. Some countries such as China, India and the Philippines have surplus numbers of skilled workers that can be used more productively elsewhere, possibly even leading to reduced unemployment. Some countries have adopted explicit policies to train an oversupply of skilled workers for export (Ouaked 2002: 156). Other countries, however, have a limited human resource capacity and a demand for skilled labour and are adversely affected by the emigration of workers. An important conclusion of the roundtable discussion was that the situation had to be studied on a country by country basis (Ouaked 2002: 157).. Fiji has a long history of relatively substantial migration to Pacific Rim countries with almost non-existent return migration to Fiji. Compared to its neighbours Tonga and Samoa which receive substantial income from migrant remittances, the amount of remittances received in Fiji from its overseas population is negligible (Mohanty 2002). Among the few benefits from emigration that have been recognised in Fiji are the fact that the vacant positions left by migrants represent employment opportunities for the 17,000 new job seekers per year whose number contrasts with a mere 1,500 to 2,000 new employment opportunities. In addition, export opportunities for local business to serve the Fijian overseas population are expanded (Reddy, Mohanty & Naidu in this volume). 34

41 In most sending countries, the policies regarding skilled migration are at an infant stage. Among the policy options to influence the adverse effects of the loss of skilled labour are protective or preventive measures to minimise the outflow of skilled labour, policies to encourage return or circular migration and the pursuing of compensation for skilled personnel who emigrate to indusîxialised countries (Iredale 1999: 108). Fiji has not put in place any of these policy options. Instead the Government has attempted to replace these workers internally by educating more of its citizens and by recruiting certain professional categories, though not teachers, from overseas. Today, Filipino doctors, Indian software engineers and Nigerian lawyers work in Fiji. Many remote regions of countries experience a particularly severe shortage of skilled personnel due to internal migration to the major urban centres. Pacific island states like Fiji stretching over vast territories are particularly confronted with a highly unbalanced geographical distribution of skilled labour, adding another obstacle to sustainable and equitable development. 5.3 The secondary school system in Fiji In Fiji, six years of primary education are followed by seven years of secondary education (Forms 1 to 7). Junior secondary teachers educated at teachers colleges4 are eligible to teach Forms 1 to 4, while senior secondary teachers teaching up to Form 7 are required to have a university degree. The University of the South Pacific in Suva offers Bachelor of Education degrees as well as postgraduate certificates, diplomas and Masters courses in Education for degree holders of other subjects. Figure 5.1 shows that the ratio of teachers to students in Fiji's secondary schools remained roughly the same between 1988 and 2000, oscillating around the 1:20 mark was the only year when it increased above the 1:20 mark. In 2000, there were some 67,000 students and 3,700 teachers (ratio 1:18) in Fiji's secondary schools. Thus, the overall situation seems to have remained the same. ' There are two private teachers colleges offering secondary teaching diplomas (Fulton missionary Teachers College and Corpus Christi Teachers College) in addition to the Fiji College of Advanced Education which was established by the Government in

42 Figure 5.1 Teachers and students in secondary schools (number) ,,,50000 E ' O000 O Total secondary students +Total -r ,., hl I o secondary school teachers Q) Source: Annual Reports of the Ministry of Education, various years. Figure 5.2 shows that teachers of Indo-Fijian background have made up more than half of the overall number of secondary teachers in Fiji between 1988 and However, as a consequence of their greater emigration rates compared to indigenous Fijians, their proportion has gradually declined throughout the 1990s. Of particular concern is the considerable number of untrained teachers in Fiji's secondary schools. Many of them are university degree holders without any teaching qualifications. In 1992, as many as 47% of secondary teachers were untrained. Even though this proportion has since declined, partly due to the increasing number of graduates from the Fiji College of Advanced Education, the existence of untrained teachers remains a concern. 36

43 Figure 5.2 Total, Indo-Fijian and untrained secondary teachers in Fiji (number) 4000 rn Total secondary school teachers Indo-Fijian secondary school teachers o Untrained teachers Source: Annual Reports of the Ministry of Education, various years. In addition to the existence of untrained teachers, a large proportion of trained teachers are young and inexperienced. A major report on the educational sector in Fiji published by the Fiji Islands Education Commission in 2000 found that 52.3% of secondary teachers had less than 10 years' work experience with 32.7% having less than five years. On the other hand, less than 20% of teachers had more than 20 years experience suggesting that many experienced teachers have moved to other employment areas or have emigrated (Ministry of Education 2000: 400). Indeed, the report raised concerns regarding both teacher quantity and quality (Ministry of Education 2000: 94), particularly lamenting the high turnover of teaching staff as a result of emigration, internal migration and choosing alternative career paths. In 1997, for instance, 14 secondary teachers left the service each month and of the 747 established Head of Department posts in secondary schools, 335 were either vacant or filled by an acting person (Ministry of Education 2000: 400). The reasons for teachers leaving Fiji's schools were seen as general frustration with the system, especially the lack of clear career paths and low pay (Ministry of Education 2000: 62,94). The following analysis of teachers' emigration will reveal further crucial factors that are involved in the process. '2 1 -, 5.4 The scale of highly skilled migration in Fiji with a special focus on teachers As Figure 5.3 shows, the number of emigrants from Fiji increased rapidly in the wake of the 1987 military coups and remains high until today. Almost 90% of emigrants from Fiji are of Indo-Fijian background: they leave Fiji for reasons of political instability, the unresolved land issue and economic measures by which they feel discriminated against. 37

44 Feelings of insecurity and political instability were given as the most important reasons for leaving Fiji in a recently conducted survey among Indo-Fijians (Voigt-Graf 2002; see also Pangerl in this issue). Due to their geographical proximity. Australian and New Zealand are the favoured destination countries of emigrants (see Rokodum in this volume on migration from Fiji to other Pacific Island countries). Australia today hosts the largest population of Indo-Fijians outside Fiji (Voigt-Graf, forthcoming). Figure 5.3 Number of citizens emigrating from Fiji moo II I -C Total emigrants -Lt indo-fijian emigrants -A- Professional emigrants I Source: Bureau of Statistics, various years. Between 1987 and 2001, a total of 75,800 citizens emigrated from Fiji, 67,277 of them Indo-Fijians and 8,669 professionals5, with the number of professionals increasing both absolutely and relatively over time. In 1987, professionals accounted for 10.5% of the emigrants, compared to 15.5% in While this proportion appears low compared to some countries where professionals make up the vast majority of emigrants, the loss nevertheless adversely affects Fiji s economy as the country already suffers from a shortage of skilled workers in several professional groups. In addition, the largest single occupational category recorded among the migrants is that of non-classifiable workers, making up more than half of the emigrants in every single year (Bureau of Statistics, various years). This category may well include some professionals Among the professionals, primary and secondary teachers are the single largest category (see Figure 5.4). Of the 8,669 professionals who left Fiji between 1987 and 2001, almost These figures are based on official emigration statistics collected by the Bureau of Statistics in Fiji. It can be assumed that the actual number of emigrants is even higher. 38

45 one third or 2,728 emigrants were teachers. In 2001, 367 of the 977 professional emigrants were teachers, twice as many as the second largest group of accountants (183). In addition to the general political and economic factors underlying emigration from Fiji, low remuneration, lack of continuing educational opportunities and training facilities, poor equipment and working conditions account for the emigration of skilled workers. Figure 5.4 The number of emigrants in various professional groups 1 O O0 O -- O Professional emigrants W Teachers O Architects and Enguiem El Acwuntants *a Medical professionals Source: Bureau of Statistics, various years There are also substantial population movements within Fiji with a considerable population drift away from rural districts. Consequently, rural areas have been drained of some of their best human resources. In regards to the educational sector, rural schools find it particularly difficult to recruit and keep qualified and experienced personnel (Ministry of Education 2000: 60). Rural students have poorer examination outcomes which can be pktly attributed to the less qualified staff, poorly equipped schools and the tendency for the brighter students to leave rural areas and attend secondary school in urban areas (Ministry of Education 2000: )... There are manifold reasons for teachers preference for working in urban areas (Ministry of Education 2000: 60, 96). In many rural areas, access to Government services and transport and communications infrastructure is restricted. In regards to the school system, the Ministry of Education faces difficulties providing, administering and monitoring its services. Rural schools are often poorly equipped and school buildings are not in a particularly good state. Expectations on teachers are generally higher in the sense that traditional norms and values are more respected and teachers are often expected to participate in community activities. Moreover, they may be required to engage in 39

46 activities such as supervising boarders or repairing equipment, with these extra duties not being recognised or rewarded. Many teachers are also concerned about the poor educational opportunities for their own children. 5.5 Implications of teachers' migration and policy responses The emigration of workers, particularly of highly skilled workers who are endowed with high levels of human capital, has severe implications for a small country like Fiji which already has to cope with limited human resources and a lack of skilled workers. Reddy, Mohanty and Naidu (in this volume) have developed a formula for calculating the financial costs of emigration for Fiji, taking into account public expenditure on education and training of migrants, the financial capital flow out of Fiji, particularly capital and productive assets through business migration, the costs of recruiting expatriate professionals with high wages and other cumulative and indirect costs, and the income foregone from migration. According to their calculation, Fiji currently loses some F$ 44.5 million every year due to emigration, equivalent to 4.7% of the Government's overall revenue. The longer term impact, if the emigrants' work was not carried out by anyone else, would amount to even more. Using the same formula without taking into account the longer term costs, the costs of the emigration of 367 teachers in 2001 amounted to some F$4.6 million! The long term cost of teachers' migration is aggravated by the fact that the majority of teachers who leave Fiji are senior teachers. The vacancies created by their resignation are often filled by junior teachers who are required to teach at a level for which they are not qualified. In addition, less experienced teachers replace more experienced ones and some vacancies are filled by untrained teachers (see above). The filling of vacancies created by the emigration of experienced and senior teachers by less experienced and junior teachers has led to falling educational standards. This situation is likely to lead to lower labour productivity in general and therefore can be expected to have serious economic repercussions. In 'several of its annual reports, the Ministry of Education has explicitly acknowledged the constraints faced by the school system due to teacher shortage at the national and regional levels. Up to the mid-l990s, Peace Corps volunteer teachers provided some relief but the scheme has not continued and other expatriate teachers have not been recruited to fill vacancies in Fiji's schools. Since the Government does not regulate emigration and has not put in place any mechanisms to attract return or circular migrants, the main factor stemming the emigration flow would be an increased level of greater political stability and general security, particularly for Indo-Fijians. Since the mid-l990s, the Ministry of Education has adopted a number of measures to overcome the problem of teacher shortage. First, an increased number of students have been sponsored at the Fiji College of Advanced Education to be trained as junior This figure is the sum of the education and health expenditure (F% ), the development and training expenditure (1.8 million) and the emigrants' transfers and legacies (Fa 2.6 million). 40

47 teachers. Second, in 1996, the Government agreed with the teachers unions to introduce incentives for teachers to work in rural areas. These include an increment on remote posting and a remote allowance of F$300 or F$400 per annum (Fiji Teachers Confederation 1996). These have however not been sufficient to balance off the disadvantages associated with remote living and have not resulted in keeping teachers in rural areas. Finally and importantly, promotion opportunities for teachers were improved with the introduction of a new classification and grading system for schools in Additional executive teacher positions and counsellor positions were created, leading to an increase in promotion opportunities from 38% to 46% in secondary schools (Fiji Teachers Confederation 1998). While these measures might have persuaded some teachers to stay in the teaching profession rather than look for alternative career paths within Fiji, they are unlikely to keep teachers in the country who plan to emigrate for reasons of political stability and security. 5.6 Conclusion and looking ahead The high turnover of teaching staff and the emigration of considerable numbers of teachers have adversely affected educational standards in Fiji and have prompted some policy responses. In order to Satisfactorily address the issue at a policy level in the future, more in-depth studies are needed on the factors behind the internal migration and emigration of secondary school teachers in Fiji. On this basis, policy recommendations can be developed to assist sustainable development in Fiji with respect to human capacity building in the educational sector... A research proposal has been prepared by Robyn Iredaie and myself that will comprise two stages. The first stage consists of in-depth interviews with school principals, teachers and students enrolled in teaching degrees in Fiji to understand their motivations and lecision-making processes. Since other developing countries in the Pacific and beyond face comparable difficulties in retaining qùalified teaching staff, a comparative study of other Pacific countries will comprise the second stage of this project., References Bureau of Statistics (various years) Fiji Tourism and Migration Report, Suva: Bureau of Statistics. Fiji Teachers Confederation (1996) Handbook on rhe Implementation of thefirstphase of 1993 job review report, Suva: FïC. Fiji Teachers Confederation (1998) The 1993 job evaluation agreement on classification and grading for the education secror, Suva: FïC. iredale, R. (1999)'The Need to Import Skilled Personnel: Factors Favouring and Hindering its International Mobility', International Migration, 37 (i): Iredale, R. (2001)'The Migration of Professionals: Theories and Typologies', International Migration, 39 (5):

48 Ministry of Education (2000) Learning Together: Directions for Education in rhe Fiji Islands, Report of the Fiji Islands Education Commission /Panel, November 2000, Suva: Government of Fiji. Ministry of Education (various years), Annual Reporfs, Suva: Parliament of Fiji. Mohanty, M.(2002)' Human Capital Resource Outflow and Development in Fiji Islands', Proceedings of the Pan Pacific Conference, Bangkok, May: Ouaked, S. (2002) Transatlantic Roundtable on High-skilled Migration and Sending Countries Issues', Internationu! Migration, 40 (4): Voigt-Graf, C. (2002) The Construction of transnational spaces: Travelling between India. Fiji and Australia, Unpublished Ph.D. thesis, School of Geosciences, University of Sydney, Sydney. Voigt-Graf, C. (forthcoming)'the emergence of an Indo-Fijian transnational community'. in R. Iredale, C. Hawksley, and S. Castles (Eds) Migration in rhe Asia Pacific: Population, Settlement and Citizenship Issues Sydney: Edward Elgar. 42

49 CHAPTER 6 THE CONTEMPORARY MIGRATION OF SKILLED LABOUR FROM FIJI TO PACIFIC ISLAND COUNTRIES (PICS) Avelina Rokoduru 6.1 Introduction - W hy this topic? Migration is as old as time itself and Fiji's many experiences of internal and international migrations are no exception. I have deliberately chosen this particular research topic because of what I perceive is an irregular trend of migration that needs closer scrutiny. Migration is usually seen as a move to greener pastures or safer havens. It is the movement of people from generally poor living or working conditions to better ones, or from developing to developed countries. The case of skilled labour mobility from Fiji to Pacific Island countries however defies this logic. It can almost be seen as a defiant move by a group of skilled people. By South Pacific standards, Fiji's economy is well developed. Yet, skilled labour moves from Fiji to countries with worse economic conditions. The question needs to be addressed whether economic, cultural, geographic or other factors are the cause of this migration. This question has become the basis of my research and the main issue considered within this paper. 6.2 Research problem Hypotheses In order to investigate the question why skilled labour migrates from Fiji to other Pacific Island Countries, several hypotheses were formulated prior to conducting fieldwork a) Men are usually the decision-makers in migration processes; b) Labour migration from Fiji is part of a process of 'step - migration' in that workers migrate to other Pacific Island Countries as a means to gain access to developed countries such as Australia, New Zealand, the United States and even the United Kingdom; c) Migration from Fiji takes place through established cultural and family connections; and d) Only indigenous Fijians migrate to other PICS (for the migration of Indo-Fijians, see Pangerl in this volume). 43

50 The research context The research has been limited to contemporary labour migration that has taken place in the decade between 1990 and Since nurses and teachers make up a large portion of professionals who have left Fiji to find work abroad (see Table 6.2 and Voigt-Graf in this volume), this research looks at these two occupational groups. Since this analysis is a preliminary report of my findings, I provide a snap-shot of nurse migration from Fiji to the Republic of the Marshall Islands (RMi) to illustrate the type of results I have collected so far. Table 6.1: Numbers of teachers and nurses emigrating from Fiji compared to the total number of professional emigrants, Total Source: Fiji Bureau of Statistics ( ), Unpublished data - various reports. Mohanty (2001), Gani (2000), Chandra (1983), Singh' (1982) and Jones' (1975) have noted the problematic nature of collecting statistical information regarding international migration in Fiji. The system of departure cards and other recording systems in Fiji cannot be regarded as a reliable source of information. The figures in Table 1 do not therefore necessarily reveal the true extent of migration. However, it can nevertheless be assumed that nurses and teachers make up the majority of professionals who have moved emigrated. In order to gain insights into the reasons of skilled migration from Fiji to other PICS, both qualitative and quantitative methods of research were used. Personal interviews using questionnaires as well as focus discussion groups were conducted with migrants in Tarawa, Kiribati and in Majuro and Ebeye in the Marshall Islands. Further, in-depth ' While this problem has been recognised a long while back, nothing has been done within the affected systems to address the problematic nature of migration record keeping in Fiji. Sister Jones effectively demonstrated this problem by using two different methods of record keeping to account for internal and international migration in Fiji for the same period. 44

51 ~~ interviews were held with government and non-government officials in all three places and archival research has also provided relevant information. In the remaining part of this paper, a summary of the results of this ongoing research is presented, focusing on a case study of Fijian nurses in the Marshall Islands. 6.3 A case-study of Fiji nurses in Ebeye, the Republic of the Marshall Islands In order to put into context the analysis of nurse migration from Fiji to Ebeye, a brief socio-economic profile of the Island of Ebeye in the Marshall Islands is provided. The total land area of Ebeye is 90 acres which is Co-owned by 11 indigenous landowners. The total population of the island was estimated at approximately 12,500 in year 2000, resulting in a population density of 139 persons per square kilometer. The main employer for the people of Ebeye is the United States military base located on Kwajalein Atoll - a 25 minutes boat ride away The Ebeye Health Centre and its nurses. A health clinic with 40 beds opened in Ebeye in May 2002, replacing the old hospital which had operated from 1962 to May There are about 60 medical staff working at Ebeye hospital, 38 of whom are nurses. These nurses fall into two categories. The Practical Nurses, most of whom are Marshallese men and women, have not received formal nursing training. They have learned about providing nursing care on the job and work under the supervision of registered nurses. Registered Nurses have completed formai nursing training and are certified as graduate nurses. According to the type of nursing care provided, Ward Nurses may be distinguished from Public Health Nurses. Ward nurses provide health care to patients within hospitals, falling under the category of Health Services. Public health nurses on the other hand provide health care and health needs information to the public, falling under the Primary Health Care Services category. _I At the time of this research, two Fijian nurses worked as public health nurses and nine worked as ward nurses on the island of Ebeye. Country of Origin Marshall Islands Total Number of Nurses 15 I Philippines 61 Fiji I 11 Federated States of Micronesia I 6 I TOTAL I. 38 I Source: Fieldwork, Ebeye Health Clinic,

52 6.4 A profile of the nurses from Fiji General Nurses have migrated from Fiji to the Marshall Islands since All the nurses in this case study had responded to media advertisements through the RMI Embassy and had gone to work in the Marshall Islands on ment, The nurses were between 28 and 45 years of age, the average age being 34 years. The nurses had between 15 and 32 years of work before reaching the retirement age of 60. The terms of their contracts demand that they work for an initial two years after which the contract may be renewed annually. They are provided housing and transport costs by the government, which also pays for or subsidises their electricity, telephone and water expenses. All 11 nurses from Fiji are indigenous Fijians. One of the nurses is a single male who works as a district nurse on Santos Island. All the nurses are qualified registered nurses with between six and 20 years of work experience in Fiji hospitals prior to their migration. Most of the nurses had worked in the Colonial War Memorial Hospital in Fiji s capital Suva though all had received training to work alone or as part of a group in remote, rural areas of Fiji. This work experience proved very valuable in Ebeye. Marital Status Even though nine of the 11 nurses were legally married, about half declared themselves as unmarried in the interviews. All in all, three declared themselves as single, one as divorced and another as separated. These answers merit an explanation. Only one of the 11 nurses had moved to the Marshall Islands with her family, while the rest had migrated alone. With the exception of the nurse who had moved in with her family and the nurses who were single, all others had faced marriage or family problems in Fiji. All had married a rural villager during their posting in remote places. The differences in intellect, income-earning capacity and general compatibility placed pressure on these marriages and the nurses were willing, if not eager, to leave Fiji and their spouses. Income and remittances In Fiji, a nurse receives an average monthly income of F$312.20, compared to US$521 in the Marshall Islands, which is the equivalent of some F$ per month. This difference is rather substantial. Nurses sent money, clothes and other gift items to Fiji. In monetary terms, they remitted between US$1,300 and $1,900 as a group to Fiji in a fortnight. This would be an equivalent of FD$2,600- to $3,800- per fortnight. These remittances were sent to close family members in order to pay for general family subsistence, for the welfare of their children and for bills, loans, fees and other traditional obligations in Fiji. 46

53 The migration process There were various reasons for the nurses' choice to migrate. All 11 respondents indicated that they had migrated to save money, nine had migrated because of the higher salaries in the Marshall Islands and eight wanted to clear their debts. In addition, other hidden reasons were shared in confidence. Some nurses particularly wanted to get away from a stormy marriage or from traditional obligations. Others migrated for travel and adventure. The hypothesis in regards to the decision-making process at the outset of this paper was that it was male dominated. This was also the conclusion of a study undertaken some 20 years ago (Chandra 1983). In the case of Fijian nurses in Ebeye, only four of the 11 had made the decision to migrate jointly with their spouses while seven had decided by themselves. There is the possibility that the differentials in wage-earning power of the nurses over their spouses could have had some effect in the decision-making processes to move to Ebeye for employment. In regards to future plans and step-migration processes, the respondents were asked what they were planning to do at the end of their contracts and whether they wished to renew their contracts3. Six nurses wished to return to Fiji after their contracts while five wished to move on to other countries (four to the United States and one to the United Kingdom). Seven nurses indicated that they would not renew their contracts in the Marshall Islands, mainly due to poor living conditions in Ebeye such as a shortage of houses and fresh water supplies. There were frequent power cuts and the cost of living was high. On the other hand, four were determined to return to Fiji at some stage and were confident that they would be able to find work in government or private hospitals due to the continuing exodus of nurses and the resultant shortage of nurses in Fiji. Meanwhile, I a m aware that at least nine nurses who had migrated to the Marshall Islands since 1995 have since returned. Of the nine nurses, eight have returned to work in local hospitals (four in government hospitals, one at a nursing school and three in Suva's private hospital), while one nurse is not working. However, they have encountered financial disadvantages compared to nurses who have continually worked in Fiji. Due to their resignation, migration and return, they have had to enter the system again at the bottom of the salary scale, the starting salary being F$ 11,000 to 13,000 per year in government and F$ 15,000 in private hospitals. : 6.5 Results - Revisiting the hypotheses Despite being married, the majority of the nurses on Ebeye had taken the decision to migrate themselves; The renewal of contracts is an important issue as migrant workers in the Marshall Islands are eligible to be granted visas for the US mainland after five years of living in the Marshall Islands.. 47

54 The migration of nurses from Fiji to Ebeye is more likely to result in return migration to Fiji rather than being part of a step migration process to developed countries; The nurses in Ebeye migrated on the basis of their previous work experience in Fiji and by merit. Cultural and family ties had no bearing on their selection. None of the nurses were related to one another, nor to any other Fijians residing and working in the Marshall Islands. Finally, at the time of this research, only indigenous Fijian nurses were working in Ebeye. In conclusion, it is important to re-iterate that the results discussed above merely provide a snap-shot of this research project as other results are still being analysed. References Bureau of Statistics ( ) Unpublished data - Various reports, Suva: Bureau of Statistics. Chandra. Rajesh (1983) Women and Migration with Special Reference to Fiji, Paper prepared for lhe APDUSPC Training Workshop on Strategies to Integrate Women in National Planning Processes in the Pacific Region, Suva Oct. Gani, Azmat (2000) Some Dimensions of Fiji s Recent Emigration, Pacific Economic Bulletin, 15 (1): Jones, Catherine (1975) Emigration from Fiji unpublished Paper submitted to the University of the South Pacific - School of Social and Economic Development as part of the requirement of the Degree on Bachelor of Arts and Graduate Certificate of Education, Suva. Mohanty, Manoranjan (2001) Contemporary Emigration from Fiji: some trends and issues in the post-independence era, in V. Naidu, E. Vasta, and C. Hawksley (Eds) Current Trends in South Pacific Migration, APMRN Working Papers Series no. 7.. University of Wollongong: Singh, Brien (1982) Country Statement - Fiji: internai and International Migration - the case of Fiji, Paper presented ar the SPC/ILo Conference on Migration, Èmployment and Development in the South Pacific, Noumea, New Caledonia, February. 48

55 CHAPTER 7 ECONOMIC COST OF HUMAN CAPITAL LOSS FROM FIJI: IMPLICATIONS FOR SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT Mahendra Reddy, Manoranjan Mohanty and Vijay Naidu 7.1 Introduction The quest for development emerged in the international arena after 1945 to rebuild economies following World War II and to develop colonies and emergent post colonial societies. During the following three decades the preoccupation with economic growth resulted in visible damages to the environment. Concern about the environmental costs of human activities led rise to the notion of sustainable development. Development, in contrast to economic growth, is a broader concept that takes into account the socioeconomic and political dimensions of the population. For a development that improves the socio-economic, political and environmental aspects of the general population over a period of time, it must fulfill certain sustainability criteria. Sachs (1999) lists these criteria as follows: social sustainability and its corollary, cultural sustainability; ecological sustainability (conservation of the capital of nature) supplemented by the environment and territorial sustainability, the former relative to the resilience of the natural ecosystems used as sinks, the latter evaluating the spatial distribution of human activities and the rural-urban configurations; economic sustainability taken in its broad meaning of the efficiency of economic systems (institutions, policies and rules of functioning) to ensure continuous socially equitable, quantitative and qualitative progress; last but not the least, political sustainability providing a satissling overall framework for national and international governance. While developing countries are becoming more and more mindful of the more salient dimensions of these criteria, new issues keep cropping up as the forces of globalisation reach their shores. Some of these issues are: reduction in the size and of the role of the state; opening up of economies and the reduction and elimination of barriers to trade and investment; a shift towards market led growth; and Paper presented at the 5& international Conference of the Asia Pacific Migration Research Network (APMRN) September, 2002 at the Naviti Resort Coral Coast, Fiji. 49

56 migration from developing countries. The Asian Development Dank (ADß), the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank have actively promoted economic reforms in the South Pacific region. This has been in response to the poor economic performance accompanied by increasing levels of unemployment, corruption and rent-seeking, high levels of borrowing and debt and lack of investment and savings. While the full impact of these reforms on economic growth and development are yet to be seen, another issue that is being faced by the small Pacific Island countries is that of migration. Migration is a significant factor in the socio-economic transformation in developing countries. Migration of people endowed with high levels of human capital is seen to be beneficial and it helps in economic growth and development in many countries of the developing world. This applies to labour surplus South, East and South East Asian nations such as e.g. Bangladesh, China, India and Philippines. Skilled human resource comprising professionals, trades people and entrepreneurial labour is critical human capital for economic growth and sustainable development. Human capital is not only a means of production but also its end (Sen, 1997:1951). Both human capital and economic growth reinforce one another. Human capital accumulation increases the productive capacity, which in turn leads to positive rates of return and thus development. Brain drain reduces the growth rate of the effective human capital that remains in the economy and hence generates a permanent reduction of per capita growth in the home country (Beine et al, 1999: 603). While the outflow of professional and skilled migrants is seen as conducive to development in some of the larger countries of Asia, but in the smaller states of Oceania, it is regarded as detrimental to sustainable development in the longer term. The outflow of human capital resource and the development nexus is critical in these small countries where human resource is very limited and the demand of skilled manpower exceeds supply. The migration issues particularly, the outflow of human capital and loss of skilled people is one of the major concerns in Fiji in the post- independence era. Many small island countries in pacific region such as e. g., Tonga, Samoa has gained to some extent by the outflow of their human capital resources. In 1992, the total recorded remittances to Tonga and Western Samoa were US27.2 and US$43.4 million respectively (Brown and Foster, 1995). The outflow has helped in economic growth and prosperity to these MIRAB economies (Bertram and Watters, 1985) as remittances from relatives abroad have been the largest foreign exchange earner. Unlike Samoa and Tonga and other developing nations, Fiji looses more through outflow of its human capital resources than she gains, as the levei of remittances by emigrants is relatively insignificant. Forsyth in his study found that there were large net negative flows of remittances in 1990 (Forsyth, :37-44). This paper attempts to throw light on the contemporary trends and patterns, causes and economic costs of loss of human capital resources from Fiji and their potential impacts on the quest for sustainable development. 50

57 7.2 Trends and Patterns Fiji witnessed waves of outflow of skilled citizens, largely professionals including architects, engineers, accountants, teachers and medical professionals after the military coups and political upheaval of 1987, which continued through the 1990s and accelerated after the coup of May, 2000 ( Mohanty, 2001). The loss of human capital resources was substantial during the last one and half decade. The official statistics indicate that about 76,000 Fiji citizens migrated with an annual average of over 5,000 people between 1987 and 2001 ( Mohanty, 2002). Unofficial independent sources estimate the aggregate figure to be over 100,000 for the period as a whole (Bedford, 1989; Chetty and Prasad 1993). Of the total official outflow, over 67,000 or nearly 89 % were Indo-Fijian. Another 6.5% were indigenous Fijian and 4.8 % belonged to other ethnic groups. The annual average emigration of people from Fiji has been increasing over the years since the coup in The average number.was 4,900 during the period In 2000 the aggregate number was over 5,200 and further accelerated to 6,300 in Fiji lost about 9,000 professionals, technical and related workers during (Table 7.1). Table 7.1 Out-flow of citizens from Fiji, Year Fijians Indo- Others Total Annual Total Fijians average Professionals* ,926 57,159 3,124 64,209 4,939 6, , ,275 5, , ,316 6, Total 4,905 67,277 3,618 75,800 5,510 8,677 Source: Mohanty, M. (2002) based on Fiji Bureau of Statistics. *Includes professional, technical and related workers. The two key human capital sectors i.e. education and health have both been greatly affected due to the continued loss of professionals. Teachers are the single most dominant professional group that Fiji has been loosing. Of the total professionals, teachers accounted for about 3 1% and architects, engineers and related technicians nearly 21% during An average of about 164 teachers left Fiji evexy year during this period. Besides, there has been a loss on an average of nearly 69 medical, dental, veterinary and related workers annually. More than 500 professionals left Fiji annually during this time (see Table 7.2). 51

58 Table 7.2 Emigration of professional and technical category, Category Total Loss Yo Loss Annual Average Architects* 1, Accountants 1, Teachers 2, Medical Workers* * Others 1, To tal 6, Source: Mohanty, M. (2002) based on Fiji Bureau of Statistics. * Includes architects, engineers and related technicians. * * Includes medical, dental, veterinary and related workers. In terms of gender, female migrants dominate the migratory process in Fiji. During the period , female migrants constituted over 52% of the total Indo-Fijian emigrants. Professional emigration was however, male dominated, the proportions of male and female professional emigrants being 64% and 36% respectively during this period (Mohanty, : 60). In 1997, a great majority of the emigrants accounting about 95% of the total entered into four countries i.e., Australia (3 1 %), New Zealand (20%), USA (33%) and Canada (i 0%). Canada, a traditional recipient country of Fijian migrants received more than half of all Fijian emigrants during the mid-1970s. In 1980, about two thirds of Fiji s total emigrants were received by Canada and the USA combined, and another 29% by Australia and New Zealand. Since 1987 this trend has reversed and Australia and New Zealand have been the major destinations for emigrants from Fiji (Mohanty, 2001:63). The migratory stream shows about 15% of the total citizen migrants are professionals. However, the skill loss seems to be much higher than the recorded data. The dominant category recorded in the data is non-classifiable workers, which constitute about 58% of the total emigrants. A definitional problem exists in the emigration data ( Connell,l987; Chetty and Prasad, 1993; Bedford, 1989; Mohanty, 2001; Naidu and Pillay, 2001). Chetty and Prasad (1993: 3) have argued that there is a serious conceptual problem in measuring migration in Fiji. Bedford has also noted that the data greatly understates the extent of population loss to Fiji since the first coup (Bedford, 1989: 143). The loss of professionals and skilled categories of people from Fiji is alarming. The trend is similar for all categories of ethnic group. Naidu and Pillay noted that proportionate to the numbers of professional and skilled ethnic Fijians, ethnic Fijian emigrants constitute a 52

59 serious loss of such personnel. Similar remarks can be made for 'other' categories (Naidu and Pillay, 200 1). 73 Causes of Migration A range of push and pull factors are at work in the emigration process in Fiji. These factors can be broadly classified into economic, political and socio-economic factors, which can also be traced over time (Figure 7.1). Socio-Economic Factors Migration is not a new phenomenon to Fiji. However, what is new is the rate of emigration. The traditional emigration of skilled and qualified people from Fiji was primarily based on unequal wages and salaries across borders. Fiji's wage rates and salary are much lower than what is offered for similar positions in the Pacific Rim destination countries. Increase in income level and higher standard of living; better social and economic opportunities such as education, health, and job opportunities in the metropolitan countries such as Australia, New Zealand, Canada and United States of America are some of the pull factors that influence migration decisions. This has been the single most factor for emigration from Fiji prior to The migration of workers also led to migration of families. Political Factors Following the military coups in 1987, another dimension to migration was added, that of insecurity and political instability. The gross maldistribution of land ownership, lack of land tenure security, ethnic tensions and political instability have been the dominant push factors in the emigration of citizens from Fiji. An empirical study on migration of professionals from Fiji to New Zealand showed that political instability in Fiji, rather than demand for professionals in New Zealand seemed to be a motivating factor behind the emigration of professionals (Gani and Ward, 1995). Naidu in her study on professional emigration from Fiji, especially of doctors, found that the poor working conditions, political and economic insecurities were the major contributing factors of professional emigration (Naidu, 1997). The military coups saw large numbers of people, particularly Indo-Fijians leaving to settle abroad (Chetty and Prasad, 1993; Bedford, 1989; Naidu and Pillay, 2001).,I' -. The effects of the 1987 military coups and the resulting political instability and insecurity began to subside with the promulgation of a new constitution, the 1997 Constitution. However, following the general election of 1999 and the May 2000 putsch, political instability seriously escalated in the country. Expiring of land leases further compounded this factor. The leases began to expire in 1997 but peaked in 2000/2001 (Appendix A and B). A schematic diagram showing the predominant factors affecting emigration from Fiji and the progressive increase in the annual average number of migrants in different phases of migration is given below: 53

60 Figure 7.1 Factors affecting migration from Fiji. 0 ( : migrants per year) Higher wage rates and living standards in to 1999 (4,900 migrants per year) Higher wage rates and living standards in metropolitan countries and a sense of impending Political instability and insecurity due to military coups I Post (5,800 migrants per year) 0 Higher wage rates and living standards in metropolitan countries Political instability and insecurity from May 2000 events. Non resolution of expiring land leases and displacement of fanners. A study carried out by Naidu and Reddy (2002) found that 42% of the sugarcane farmers do not wish to renew their leases (Appendix C). They expressed their desire to take a lump sum payout and move out of agriculture altogether. This will have serious implications for Fiji's agriculture sector, particularly arising out of the shortage of skilled labour. The urban sector will also be affected from the inflow of immigrants from the rural areas in its ability to cope to the demands for housing, water and other amenities. Furthermore, those who are skilled and qualified or have relative's abroad could migrate with the lump sum payout. 7.4 Impact on Fiji's Economy The loss of human capital resources has had serious consequences for the society and economy of Fiji. Naidu (1997) pointed out that '...the loss of thousands of skilled and professional citizens has severely weakened the Fiji's administrative, financial, legal, social, political and economic institutions'. Given the difficulty in estimating the loss of labour as a result of migration (Taylor, 1999), there is hardly any literature on this. The Fiji Employment and Development Mission Report noted that to assess the costs of human capital loss, two types of costs have to be estimated. First, the opportunity cost of 54

61 the resources spent on education and training and second, the production foregone as a result of the migrants removal from economy (Bienefeld, 1984). In some cases, these costs can be extremely high. The costs of migration can be high where the (marginal) cost of education is high, where the worker s life time income stream is high and where particular person s work would not be done at all in their absence (Bienefeld, 19845). Economic Cost of Human Capital Loss An estimation of economic cost with some degree of accuracy can be made. The costs of human capital resource loss may include: the public expenses spent on education and training of migrants in acquiring the knowledge and skills; 0 loss of financial capital flow with the migrants, particularly the capital and productive assets loss through business migration; costs of recruiting expatriate professionals with high wages and all other cumulative direct and indirect costs (if this done at a significant level); and Income foregone from migration. The public expense on education and health is computed by multiplying the number emigrated by the per capita expenditure on these two items. The training and development component is estimated by multiplying the number of professionals who received this assistance by an average expenditure of $10,000 on tertiary qualification. It is assumed that on an average, 50% received government assistance on this. The financial capital outflow data was obtained from Reserve Bank database (see Figure 7.2). The loss to the economy arising from migration of a productive worker is given by the discounted value of the output foregone over the period in which the worker is not replaced. The maximum replacement period could be the remaining working lifespan which is estimated by subtracting the age of the migrant at migration from the average retirement age. The annual income foregone multiplied by the number of work years lost will yield the total income foregone whichmust be discounted using a suitable discount rate. This, of course, assumes that the individual s annual income remains the same throughout the remaining period. A simple formula to compute the present value (PV) of the income foregone is as follows:, [3-&] Output Loss from the Economy =S where S is the annual income foregone; r is the chosen rate of discount and t is the working lifespan lost as the result of migration. Due to varying levels income for migrants, the average annual income is proxied by the per capita income. 55

62 Figure 7.2 Emigrants transfer and legacies from Fiji, E E O I Year Data Source: Reserve Bank of Fiji. 56

63 Table 7.3 Economic cost of human capital loss. ' F% Item Immediate Loss a) Education and Health Expenditure on migrants (Per Capita Education and Health 5,510 x $ ,139, Expenditure of ) b) Development and Training Expenditure Scholarships (On the basis of 50% of the 264x$lO,OOO 2,640, Professionals at a cost of $10,000) Emigrant's Transfers and Legacies Immediate Loss 39,766, ,545, ourput Loss Income foregone due to migration (i) Annual average number of emigrants 5,510 (ii) Annual income foregone per person (S) 4, (iii) Rate of discount (r ) 0.05 (iv) Replacement period (t years) (varies, see appendix7.d) (v) Present value of income foregone Output loss arising from migration 60,300,000 Source: Based on data obtained from various sources-reserve Bank of Fiji, 2002, Ministry of Education and Ministry of Health, Annual Reports. The above analysis reveal that, in the short run, Fiji losses, on an average, F$44.5million due to migration every year. Taking a conservative scenario of replacement (see appendix D), given a high level of unemployment and availability of expatriates, the output loss is estimated to be F$60.3m. These estimates are the direct impact on the economy. However, the contribution of these migrants to the economy would have also arised from the multiplier effect of the income which is lost out of the counúy which is not included in the analysis given that the level of impact is not very clear. The F$44.5m is equivalent to 4.7% of Fiji government's overall revenue, which is a very large figure for a small country like Fiji. Losing such amount every year wil have serious implication on investment and government finances. The outflow of professional and skilled people from Fiji also leads to serious impediments for sustained growth and development. It creates a vacuum in the system, adversely affecting the process of development. The gaps created by the emigrant skilled workers are mostly filled in by less efficient workers resulting in lowering of labour productivity and consequently lowering the economic growth and development. 57

64 The quality of health care services are fast eroding away due to the outflow of medical professionals including physicians, dcntists, nurses and related medical workers. The number of medical personnel such as doctors, dentists and nurses in the stock has been declining. Medical personnel and population ratios are high and show an increasing trend over the years e.g., the doctor: population ratio increased from 1 : 1929 in 1997 to 1 :2978 in 1999 (Mohanty, 2002: 365). Similarly, there was one nurse for every 453 people in 1997, which increased to 523 in The migration of teachers, nurses and engineers has severely affected educational standards, health services and public utilities such as water supply (Naidu, Vasta and Hawksley, 2001). Table 7.4 Trends in stock of medical personnel and their population ratios in Fiji, Year Medical Personnel Medical Personnel: Population Ratios Doctor Dentist Nurse Doctor Dentist Nurse ,742 1,929 21, ,576 3,167 24, ,543 2,978 25, Source: Mohaniy, M. (2002) based on Fiji Bureau of Statistics, Facts and Figures, There are however, a few positive impacts of emigration in Fiji. Emigration maybe seen as a safety valve in a situation where the supply of formal jobs have fallen short of the demand of fresh entrants to the labour force. With 17,000 new job sectors each year and only 1,500-2,000 new employment opportunities, migrants to leave behind vacant positions for younger people to fill. This obviously does not apply to senior management level personnel as well as those like doctors and engineers who require a long time to be trained. Another positive aspect of emigration is that Fiji s diaspora abroad provide a growing niche market for the countries products such as kava, fish and vegetables. There is also much scope for their periodic return as visitors. The impact of migration on the host country can be illustrated by the following figure: 58

65 Figure 7.3 Migration-poverîy and development linkages Rural- migration Pull and Push I Factors \ Migration of Skilled I increasing levels of Low levels of Development & implication on Sustainable -Extended Family -Loss of bread winners Private Sector Low levels of skilled work force Low productivity and efficiency - Movementof investible funds 4 - -Low levels of investment Loss of competitive edge and export market; - Worsening of Trade balance Public Sector - Loss of government funds on health, Education and Training. - Buildupof mediocrity and low. productivity. LowlFalling Economic Growth 7.5 Conclusion The loss of skilled manpower from Fiji has had far-reaching social, cultural, economic and political implications, which underpins the very foundations for sustainable development of any country. Small island states such as Fiji with limited resources can not afford to lose capital of a magnitude of 4.7% of total revenue particularly when there are no benefits in terms of remittances from those who migrate. The loss of experienced specialist teachers, the dominant professional group in the migratory stream, has created a vacuum in the educational system, the basic foundation of the socio-economic development of the country. Apart from the drain in human capital resources consisting of professional and managerial people, a substantial financial capital outflow takes place 59

66 through emigration. These losses may disintegrate the social and economic fabric of the country and greatly hamper future development due to a gap in investment funds. This situation makes the process of sustainable economic development harder. The migrant syndrome in Fiji has been draining both labour and financial capital from its system, which may inhibit economic growth and greatly jeopardize its process of development. With the outflow of human capital resources, Fiji is not only loosing the quality personnel but also the confidence of potential investors for future development. International migration has many adverse effects-both direct and indirect on the economy. The gaps created by the emigrant skilled workers have been filled either by less efficient and unskilled /semi skilled workers resulting in lowering economic growth and greatly affecting the processes of development. Besides, the labour emigration cause substantial loss of public funds spent on education and training migrants. The rapid decrease in the number of skilled and professional people on the one hand and increasing demands for economic growth and development on the other, may put Fiji in a difficult predicament in coming years. The resolution of fundamental problems, such as the land security question may keep decrease the current level of Fiji s professional emigration in the future. References Bertram, I.G. and Watters, R.F. (1985). The MIRAB economy in South Pacific microstates, Pacifc Viewpoint, 26, Bedford, R.D. (1989). Out of Fiji...A perspective on migration after the coups, Pacific Viewpoint,30(2), Beine, M. et al (1999). Brain Drain and Economic Growth: Theory and Evidence, University de Versailles. Bienefeld, M. (1984). Fiji Employment and Development Mission: Final Report to the Government of Fiji.Parliament Paper NO. 66, Suva, Government Printer. Brown, RP.C and Foster, J. (1995). Some common fallacies about migrants remittances in the South Pacific: Lessons from Tongan and Western Samoan Research, Pac$c Viewpoint, 36 (I), Chetty, N. K. and S. Prasad (1993). Fiji s Emigration, Demographic Report No.4, Suva, Fiji, School of Social and Economic Development, University of the South Pacific. Connell, J. (1987). Population growth and emigration: maintaining a balance in M. Taylor (ed.), Fiji: Future Imperfect?, Sydney: Allan and Unwin, Fiji, MinisQ of Education, Annual Report, Fiji, Ministry of Health, Annual Report, Forsyth, D.J.C. (1991). Migration and Remittance in the South Pacific Forum Island Countries, Unpublished report prepared for the South Pacific Forum Secretariat. Gani, A. and Ward, B. D. (1995). Migration of professionals from Fiji to New Zealand: A reduced form supply- demand model, World Development, 23 (9), Mohanty, M. (2001). Contemporary Emigration from Fiji: some trends and issues in the post- Independence era in Naidu, V., Vasta, E. and Hawksley, C. (eds.), Current Trends in 60

67 South Pacific Migration, APMRN, Working Paper No.7, University of Wollongong, Wollongong, Australia, Mohanty, M. (2002). Human capital resource outflow and development in Fiji islands, in S. M. Lee and S. Chongsithiphol (eds.), E-Globalisation in the Paci9c Age, Proceedings of Pan-Pacific Conference m, May 29-3 I, 2002, Bangkok, Naidu, L.K. (1997). Contemporary Professional Emigration from Fiji: the Case of Medical Doctors and the Eficaqv of the Ministry of Health, Unpublished MA thesis, Suva, Fiji, Centre for Development Studies, School of Social and Economic Development, University of the South Pacific. Naidu, V.(i997). Introduction in G. Chand and V. Naidu (ed.), Fiji: Coups, Crises, and Reconciliation, , Suva, Fiji Institute of Applied Studies. Naidu, V., E. Vasta, and C. Hawksley (eds.) (2001). Current Trends in South Paczflc Migration, APMRN, Working Paper No.7, University of Wollongong, Wollongong, Australia. Naidu, V. and, R. Pillay (2001). Recent Migration Trends: Fiji Country Report, Paper for 4 International Asia Pacific Migration Research Network Conference, Manila, March Naidu, V and Reddy, M (2002) Na Char Ke na Ghat ke; ALTA and expiring land leases: Fijian farmers perceptions of their future, Ford Foundation. Sachs, I (1999) Social sustainability and whole development: Exploring the dimensions of sustainable development, in Becker, E. and Jahn, T. (eds)., Sustainability and the Social Sciences, Zed Book. Sen, A. (1997). Editorial: human capital and human capability, World Development, 25 (12), Taylor, J. E. (1999). The new economics of labour migration and the role of remittances in migration process, Journal of International Migration, 37( I),

68 Appendix 7.A Expiry of all ALTA leases, Year Leases Year Leases Year Leases Total Grand Total 13,140 Source: Verification Status Report, Ministry of Agriculture & ALTA, Appendix 7.B Proportion of expired leases reissued, reissued to sitting tenants for cane and residential leases issued in the cane region Source: NLTB data supplied to the Sugar Industry, 15/3/2002 Appendix 7.C Preferences for lump sum payment, resettlement or renewal option. Options Response (YO) Lump sum 41.9 Resettlement on 5 acre plot 3.1 Renewing of lease 55% Source: Naidu and Reddy (2002) 62

69 Appendix 7.D Rate of replacement and present value of output foregone. Replacement Rate No of Persons Years Required to Present Value of Output Replace Loss (FSm) Source: Naidu and Reddy (2002) 63

70 CHAPTER 8 RELOCATING REFUGEES IN DEVELOPED COUNTRIES: THE POVERTY EXPERIENCES OF SOMALI RESETTLING IN NEW ZEALAND' Pauline B. Guerin and Bernard Guerin 8.1 Introduction Since the 1940s, the United Nations High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR) has worked to relocate refugees into host countries. These host countries are primarily developed and highly westernized countries, such as Canada, the USA, Australia, Norway, and N ew Zealand. The majority of refugees, of course, remain in camps or are moved back to their country of origin when appropriate, and only a small percentage are relocated in this way. Despite the small percentages being relocated, the problems and issues that they face can tell us much about migration experiences in general and about the role of poverty and economic standing for migrants in particular. It is offen assumed, for example, that because the refugees are not only coming from a poverty situation in their country of origin but also from refugee camps, that they should do well in their new, developed country, that they should be able to do much better than staying in a refugee camp, and that they should be happy and grateful for their opportunity in a host country, It turns out, however, that there are many problems awaiting them when they are relocating (e.g., Al- Ali, Black and Koser 2001; El-Solh 1991; McGown 1999; McSpadden 1987; Valtonen, 1999). This paper describes some of those problems, using our research experiences of the Somali refugee community in Hamilton, N ew Zealand, and the extant literature on resettlement of refugees into developed countries. We must remember through this that poverty is relative (cf. Mejía, 2000), and some of the economic woes for refugees in their new country might seem small problems compared to those left behind in camps, but the problems are real and painful nonetheless to those involved. ' This work was supported by the Foundation for Research, Science and Technology (UOWXO203, Strangers in Town: Enhancing Family and Community in a More Diverse New Zealand Society) and the University of Waikato. We would like to thank Abdirizak Abdi, Roda Omar Diiriye and Barbara Redfern for their helpful discussions. 64

71 8.2 Poverîy in Somalia According to the United Nations, Somalia is one of the poorest countries in the world. Somalia is in the category of Least Developed Country with a ranking of 172 out of 174 on the Human Development Index (HDI). Poverty can be measured by looking at literacy rates, life expectancy, and infant mortality rates. Out of the six countries in the Horn of Africa (Djibouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya, Somalia, Sudan), Somalia has the lowest Gross National Product per capita, the lowest adult literacy rates (49.7 percent for men, 25.8 percent for women), the second lowest life expectancy rate (48 years, Ethiopia has lowest rate), and the highest infant mortality rates (132/1000). Somalia also has an under4 mortality rate of 224/1000, and only 0.4 doctors and 2.0 nurses per 100,000 people. Other contributors to the poverty of Somalia are the only 1.5% of children between 1 and 2 years who are vaccinated against all childhood diseases, and of children under 5, 17.2% are moderately undernourished and 3.5% are severely undernourished. Finally, only 28% of the population has access to safe drinking water and 48.5% have access to safe excreta disposal (United Nations, 2002). Population estimates of Somalia vary from around 5 million up to an estimated 9 million people (World Bank, 2002). There are believed to be about 350,000 Internally Displaced Persons and over 450,000 refugees. Traditionally, Somalis have been nomadic pastoralists or semi-nomadic herders (60 percent of the population) and only about 15-20% of the population are town dwellers. It is estimated that 41.9% of children between 5-14 years of age are currently working. War and civil conflict in Somalia is of course the major contributor to the dislocation of Somalis. But fiom all this information, it is easy to see why so many Somalis are refugees and seeking a better life in a new country. Their arrival, however, is usually marked by a long history of poverty conditions. 8.3 Issues affecting social mobility during resettlement While the majority of immigrants or refugees experience some challenges (e.g., new language, different religions) when moving to a new country, Somalis, and particularly Somali women, generally encounter a whole range of difficulties when they are relocated to a Western developed country. The main ones include (but are not limited to) a different culture, religion, colour (race), and language but: Other critical settlement issues for African refugees include employment options, suitable accommodation, language skills, culturally accessible educational systems, adequate child-care services, financial services and information and reception services (Patrick, 2001). Many cultural practices of Somali make successful economic resettlement in a Western country difficult (Valtonen, 1999). For example, Somali need to socialize with the 65

72 members of the community where they resettle for employment and social support, but the gender constraints on socializing, and the religious implications concerning food, can often inhibit successful socializing and employment with Westerners. Being invited for a meal, a common practice in Western cultures, can be difficult with a Somali family when the men and women are meant to be separated and any meat prepared needs to be Halalkilled. Such problems can potentially be accommodated, but require cultural and religious understanding and sensitivity by host cultures (Summerfield, 1993). Another issue related to culture is that Somalia has not been a politically stable country for a very long time. This means that for many Somalis, even their own cultural practices have been diverted as they cope in transient situations, like refugee camps, which makes it very difficult to then accommodate to life in a developed Western country. For example, a 15 year old boy may have been surviving in a refugee camp with no formal education, and no training of any sort, for the last 10 years. He suddenly finds his application accepted for settlement in New Zealand and, although he has never learned English and has never been to school, he finds himself in a high school classroom, expected to behave as the other teenagers do. Obviously this presents great challenges for the students, the teachers, the family and the boy himself, and makes the chance of economic integration unlikely. The overwhelming majority of Somalis are Muslims. Generally, a person s religion is not identifiable by mere visual inspection of the follower. However, for most Muslim women, and especially Somali women, their religion is immediately identified through their dress. The majority of Somali women wear hijab, (long dresses and scarves with arms and head covered) and many Somali women wear brightly coloured hijab, thereby increasing their visibility in a primarily Christian, Western-dressing, country. Although this increased visibility can be seen as a positive contribution it also makes them an easier target for discrimination and harassment. Women are often told that they cannot have a job because of their dress, or the dress codes of certain employers prevent women from gaining employment (Shih, 2002). As black Africans, integration of Somalis into a primarily Caucasian society is further challenged and issues of discrimination and harassment abound. Whereas men are not as easily identified as Muslims (above) as women, both men and women are identified as different due to their colour. Again, this can be viewed as a positive contribution to the diversity of a Western society, but also makes Somalis targets of discrimination and harassment. For example, a young school-aged girl interviewed by us about harassment at school said that she was told once by a Maori child (indigenous people of New Zealand who usually have brown skin), You re black, really black. Her clever reply was, I happen to like that colour! Refugees are also primarily women and children, since many of the men have been killed or are missing. This means that the family s economic prospects in new countries are lessened, given the work structure available, and it also means that women often are needed to do jobs such as fruit picking or cleaning, in order to provide for their families. This is usually non-traditional and prevents them from other work they traditionally do 66

73 such as child-care. While taking on new roles and employment can be seen as a positive factor, in the households without men at all, no one else is left to do jobs like child-care and cooking except younger children. These combining factors make for poor health adjustment for both the women and the children (Allotey, 1998; Manderson, Kelaher, Markovic, and McManus, 1998). Finally, while some Somali speak, read and write English, many do not, and many only speak the Somali language and cannot read or write it. This presents a number of difficulties in a primarily paper-based, bureaucratic culture and economy (Majka, 2001; Schneider, 2000). This difficulty primarily concerns the older Somalis and less-educated youth who come as refugees. Many of the younger Somalis and the more-educated do not have as much difficulty learning the language, but for those whom language is a problem, the problems are enormous. Difficulty with English influences appropriate access to health services, education, employment, and everyday negotiation in shops, petrol stations, postal services, etc. (Stevens, 1993; Strand, 1984; Waxman, 2001; Wooden, 1991). All these factors mean that upon amval in a developed country, the refugees immediately end on the bottom of the pile for poverty conditions relative to that new country. One informal observation our Somali collaborators have told us is that many of their community seem happy and grateful when they arrive, but that after about five years some begin to have reservations (Shelley, 2001). This comes from being unemployed, not having qualifications recognized, building up some debts they find hard to pay off, wishing they had been better warned, and seeing their children not doing well at school (for reasons given above). 8.4 The effects of poverty on life in New Zealand Experience of extreme poverty conditions in Africa influences how refugees adapt to life in their host country. Many of the strategies that refugees learn when in the poverty conditions no longer work or are not appropriate in their host country. For example, parenting styles, mental (social) health, economic expectations, food choices and lifestyle are all affected by poverty conditions and all influence behaviours in host countries. Both in Somalia and in refugee camps, parenting styles are influenced by a number of circumstances. For example, mothers walk, sometimes long distances, for food and water, meaning that older children have to look after younger children, or children have to look after themselves. By Western standards, such responsibility placed on sometimes very young children verges on neglect and abuse, but is the accepted way of life in a refugee camp. Another example is the high infant mortality rates, as mentioned above, that may result in detached parenting. Specifically, a mother may make less effort to feed and care for a newly-bom baby who develops a cough. In Western standards, again, this mother may be viewed as a bad mother, but in Somalia, or in a refugee camp, the chances are that a baby with a cough has tuberculosis and wil die shortly. In context, the behaviours make good sense, but when these behaviours are carried over to a host country they 67

74 become problematic. These behaviours and experiences are not easy to change, especially when considering the length of time that many refugees have lived in camps or in poverty conditions. Most of the problems with parental styles come from the history of poverty and the current poverty situations of the families. Life on the bottom of the economic heap in a developed country also comes with a cost in mental health (Abbott, 1987; McSpadden, 1987). This applies to all people in poverty situations, not just refugees. However, one of the problems that we have encountered is that refugees are quite often automatically assumed to be experiencing trauma-related symptoms when they show signs of mental health problems (Summerfield, 2000). Our experience is that most are troubled by missing and absent family, and by untenable economic situations that inhibit helping themselves and long-term prospects, rather than anything to do with war-related trauma (although not excluding this). Many refugees have an expectation that life will be good when they get to a Western country for resettlement, and especially with regard to economic participation. What is not expected is that life is di@erent rather than better (Samarasinghe and Arvidsson, 2002). In one woman s words:...life was hard, really hard, when we lived in a refugee camp. W e had to walk everyday for food. We didn t have refrigerators to keep perishables. But life here is hard too, in different ways. Now we have refrigerators, but I have to take my children to school, pick them up, pay for petrol, car insurance, rent, doctor visits... For many, family who are left behind in camps have the expectation that their family in a Western country can now send them money for food and will be able to get them relocated as well. However, because of many of the issues discussed in this paper, many Somalis are unemployed and depend on government benefits, leaving little, if anything, to send back to Africa in the form of remittances. Even to achieve some family reunification in New Zealand, the family must supply an airfare, application costs, and other costs for the relocating relatives. Another example of the influence of poverty is on food choices. For example, sugar is a highly sought commodity in refugee camps for which women may be raped, badly injured or killed. When refugees come to their host country, the easy availability of sugar results in high sugar consumption-at least temporarily. This has been tackled in our community work by implementing exercise classes and holding seminars on nutrition and other family health issues (Guerin, Diiriye, Comgan, and Guerin, 2002). Finally, there are many lifestyle problems resulting from the relative poverty experienced by refugees in developed countries. Most activities and interests that could be engaged in previously are now found to depend upon money, and other lifestyle practices are not available in the new country or are not acceptable. For example, soccer has always been one of the key activities for Somali boys (and some girls). In New Zealand, however, we find that Somali boys limit themselves primarily to playing in a Somali league of soccer games, and not joining in with school teams. Part of this is due to the costs required to play for western soccer teams, which are mostly taken for granted by other school families. As well, many of the children wish to go to good schools but for them there are prohibitive costs of school uniforms and books, items that most western families can take 68

75 for granted. Poverty affects the schooling and development of children (Beiser, Hou, Kasper, and Noh. 2000). 8.5 Conclusions We find then that the coupling of a history of poverty with problems in making a transition out of poverty upon resettlement, lead to a number of very negative outcomes for refugees in developed countries. The causal links are many and varied; for example, not having money meaning that a child cannot go to a school with expensive uniforms meaning that their choice in education is limited which then limits their employment or further education. It is for these reasons that some families feel very poor and dissatisfied with their new countxy after a few years. To really overcome these problems w e cannot change their history that brought them the label of refugees, but we can do a lot to change their employment prospects, their education, their children s education, and their dealing with everyday life in situations of poverty. W e can also learn from other poor and disadvantaged groups about how to live and get out of poverty cycles. Some refugee families report that they see their generation as mostly a lost one, but that they are fixating on having their children in a better life situation by concentrating the family s resources on education and employment for the children (Zhou and Bankston, 2001). This does not have to be the only way out of poverty in a developed country, and w e aim to help the employment situations for all refugees, not just the children and a future generation..:y References Abbott, M. (1997) Refugees and immigrants, in P. M. Ellis and S. C. D. Collings (Eds.), Mental health in New Zealand from a public health perspective (pp ). Wellington: Ministry of Health. Al-Ali, N., Black, R., and Koser, K. (2001) Refugees and transnationalism: The experience of Bosnians and Eritreans in Europe, Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies, 27: Allotey, P. (i 998) Travelling with excess baggage : Health problems of refugee women in Western Australia, Women and Health, 28: Beiser, M., Hou, F., Kasper, V., and Noh, S. (2000) Transifions into or out ofpoverty: Impact on immigrant and non-immigrant children s developmental behaviours. Culture, Community and Health Studies, Centre for Addiction and Mental Health, Department of Psychiatry, University of Toronto. (Paper published on El-Solh, C. F. (1991) Somalis in London s East End: A community striving for recognition, New Communi& 17: Guerin, P. B., Diiriye, R O., Corrigan, C., and Guerin, B. (2002) Physical activity programs for refugee Somali women: Working out in a new country, Unpublished paper, University of Waikato, Hamilton, New Zealand. Majka, L. (2001) Working with the vulnerable but meritorious: The non-governmental and public sectors and African refugees in Melbourne, Journal of Sociologv, 37:

76 . Manderson, L., Kelaher, M., Markovic, M., and McManus, K. (1998) A woman without a man is a woman at risk: Women at risk in Australian humanitarian programs, Journal of Refugee Studies, 11: McGown, R. B. (1999) Muslims in the Diaspora: The Somali communities of London and Toronto, Toronto: University of Toronto Press. McSpadden, L. A. (1987) Ethiopian refugee resettlement in the western United States: Social context and psychological well-being, International Migration Review, 21 : Mejía, M. C. (2000) Economic recovery after involuntary resettlement: The case of brickmakers displaced by the Yacyretá Hydroelectric Project, in M. M. Cernea and C. McDowell (Eds.), Risks and reconstruction: Experiences of resettlers and refugees (pp ). Washington, DC: World Bank. Patrick, I. (2001) Responding to Female Genital Mutilation: The Australian experience in context, Australian Journal of Social Issues, 36( I): Samarasinghe, K., and Arvidsson, B. (2002) It is a different war to fight here in Sweden -The impact of involuntary migration on the health of refugee families in transition Scandinavian Journal of Caring Sciences, 16: Schneider, J. A. (2000) Pathways to opportunity: The role of race, social networks, institutions, and neighborhood in career and educational paths for people in welfare Human Organization, 59: Shelley, N. M. (2001) Building community from scratch : Forces at work among urban Vietnamese refugees in Milwaukee, Sociological Inquiv, 71 : Shih, J. (2002)...Yeah, I could hire this one, but I know it s gonna be a problem : How race, nativity and gender affect employers perceptions of the manageability of job seekers, Ethnic and Racial Studies, 25: Stevens, C. A. (1993) The school to work transition: Young Cambodians in South Australia, Australian and New Zealand Journal of Sociologv, 29: Strand, P. J. (1 984) Employment predictors among Indochinese refugees, International Migration Review, 18: Summerfield, D. (2000) Childhood, war, refugeedom and trauma : Three core questions for mental health professionals, Transcultural Eychiaby, 37: Summerfield, H. (1993) Patterns of adaptation: Somali and Bangladeshi women in Britain, in G. Buijs (Ed.), Migrani women: Crossing boundaries and changing identities (pp ). Oxford: Berg. United Nations. (2002) United Nations Somalia - Fact Sheets. Accessed Oct 9, 2002 hîto:// Valtonen, K. (1 999) The societal participation of Vietnamese refugees: Case studies in Finland and Canada, Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies, 25: Waxman, P. (2001) The economic adjustment of recently arrived Bosnian, Afghan and Iraqi refugees in Sydney, Australian, International Migration Review, 35: Wooden, M. (1991) The experience of refugees in the Australian labor market, International Migration Review, 25: World Bank. (2002) Somalia at a Glance. Accessed 29 October 2002 httv:// aag.vdf. Zhou, M., and Bankston, C. L. (2001) Family pressure and the educational experience of the daughters of Vietnamese refugees, International Migration, 39:

77 @ Paper CHAPTER 9 ASIA NOTES ON INEQUALITY, CONFLICT AND FORCED MIGRATION IN INDONESIA@ Riwanto Tirtosudarmo As one might expect in a region with deeper sources ofpolitical instability and fewer democratic traditions, the ways in which population issues and politics have intersected have been harsher. Michael S. Teiíelbaum and Jay Winter (1 998) 9.1 Introduction Generally speaking, population mobility can be classified according to the voluntary or involuntary characteristics of the movement. Voluntary movement is mostly instigated by economic opportunities as perceived by the migrants, while involuntary movement is indicated by the changing circumstances that force people to move. Yet, in some cases, movement of people cannot be easily explained as either voluntary or involuntary. In Indonesia, for example, the poor people who were moved from various areas in Java, Bali and Madura under the government s transmigration program can be considered as voluntary migrants, but at the same.time can also be seen as being forced to join the program due to lack of economic alternatives in their piace of origins. Another example, is what in Indonesia is called merantau - a common practice among some ethnic groups. Some studies have shown that the Minangkabaus young men in West Sumatra are leaving their villages to avoid social pressures embedded within the matrilineal social system. *, Poverty, generally measured in term of economic indicators and, in the literature, commonly stated to be the driving force to migrate, in fact could also be the result of the involuntary migration. Well documented, is the high incidence of poverty that is experienced by people who are forced to leave their home as a result of natural disasters (drought, earthquake, flood, volcanic eruption, etc.) as well as the breakdown of social order (violent ethnic and religious conflicts, war, etc.). Relating poverty to migration usually results in narrowing the perspective into the sole economic dimensions of population mobility. It is therefore very important to regard prepared for the Asia Pacific Migration Research Network 5th International Conference and Business Meeting, Coral Coast, Fiji,24-26 September

78 poverty as just one indicator of the wider social phenomenon, that is inequality. Inequality in this paper will not be confined to simply economics but, more importantly, will include politics. In reality, economic and political inequalities can not be separated as the two represent opposite sides of the same coin. Inequality in essence represents a power relationship between people or institutions. In this context, migration or population mobility, is basically a consequence of an unequal power relationships that is in turn, at least in many instances, a product of State policies. In the course of time, the increasing horizontal inequality that exists between migrant and local populations from different cultural backgrounds results in the formation of segregated societies prone to social conflicts. This paper is an attempt to explain the intricate relationships between migration, inequality and social conflict that has produced a large numbers of Internally Displaced Persons in Indonesia. This paper basically argues that State domination in engineering both the political and cultural life of the population is the underlying cause for the construction of current politicaldemographic tensions that have recently erupted into violent communal conflicts in various parts of Indonesia. 9.2 A brief historical background Indonesia, currently the fourth largest country in term of population, has always been plagued by the problems of mass poverty as well as economic and political inequalities. Following independence from Dutch colonialism in the mid 1940s, the national leaders who were generally obsessed by the idea of national integration, began to create the political institutions that could achieve the goal of national integration. Among the crucial decisions was the determination to mould the nation into a unitary state that obviously resulted in the centralization of power in the hands of the central government. The provincial or regional governments were, therefore, subordinate to the central government. Economic planning, to eradicate mass poverty and to achieve economic growth, in many ways therefore reflected the centralistic character of development strategy adopted by the national government and placed the regional governments merely as the extensions of the central government. Even today, voluntary and involuntary population movements are strongly related with the incidence of poverty, and are ultimately shaped by social and economic developments emanating from the unequal power relationship between the center and regional governments. The incidence of mass poverty that is partly a legacy of colonialism persists as a problem to this day. Java s rapid population growth after the mid-nineteenth century, for instance, was one of the dominant facts of the late colonial era. Java, especially in its central and eastern parts, was becoming seriously overpopulated, while there were still vast areas of unpopulated or under-populated land in the outer islands. Java s growing population was considered by the colonial government to be the underlying cause of the decline of its people s welfare. The Dutch colonial government, however, had no thought of developing policies that could directly solve the problem of population growth. The only answer they offered was emigration from Java to the outer islands. The so-called ethical policy introduced at the dawn of the twentieth century, was almost entirely concerned with raising agricultural productivity, and the colonial govcmment apparently had no serious intention to introduce drastic changes

79 in the colonial economic structure, for example, by developing large-scale industrialization particularly in the outer islands. At the beginning of the New Order period, in the mid 1960s. the conventional view among the economist-technocrats was that the rate of population growth was a significant determinant.of the success of a country's economic development efforts. Compared with the problem of rapid population growth, which at the beginning of the New Order was accorded high priority, the economist-technocrats had not generally regarded the problem of uneven population distribution between Java and other islands as an issue of urgency. Nitisastro (1970: 238), widely known as the architect of the New Order's economic development policies, strongly argued that what was needed was a massive development effort to create expanding employment opportunities, accompanied by a rapid spread of fertility control. Yet, curiously enough, the problem of uneven population distribution and the role of transmigration as a means to overcome it had long been a focus of government thinking, and became a very important policy within the national development plans during the New Order. In Indonesia, development policy has always been influenced by the dynamic relations behveen the center (Java or Jakarta) and the periphery (the regions or Outer Islands). This is partly because Indonesia is a fragmented nation of islands, with Java the most populous, and because it is characterized by marked cultural diversity. In addition to their larger numbers, the Javanese have always been the dominant cultural group and the most influential ethnic group; consequently, as noted by Bruner (1 974: 252), 'most other Indonesians see themselves as engaged in a more or less continual struggle to keep from being Javanized'. Since independence in 1945, Indonesia's development has been marked by conflict and consensus between the interests of the regions (non-javanese peoples) and the center (dominated largely by the Javanese). Transmigration policy has thus been conditioned, to a very large extent, by the dynamic relations between central and regional governments and between Java and the Outer Islands. Jones (1979: 220) argued that the implementation of the transmigration program had been affected by the state of center-regional relationships within the country: The degree to which people in the outer islands wil be willing to accept the continued organized influx of rural Javans wil no doubt depend largely on the broader political situation, the extent to which the progranune is perceived as benefiting Java or Indonesia, and the sensitivity with which the transmigration program is administered. As a major part of transmigration policy involves the distribution of land, shelter and other facilities, it can be described as a distributive policy. However, the main characteristics of transmigration policy resemble the type of program that has been labelled 'ideological'.' The various aims of transmigration policy are not only complex and immeasurable but also often mutually contradictory. As an ideological policy transmigration has enjoyed unparalleled support from the state, as the policy has provided the ruling elites a convenient tool to be used for different purposes. The Quick (1980: 42). there are several characteristics of an 'ideological program': According to ambiguous, and non-measurable goals; high expectations; resource availability; politicized leadership of the implementing organization; and immunity from public criticism ' : -,. 73

80 transmigration policy had basically lost its rationale and legitimization since the mid- 1980s. From an economic and demographic perspective, the policy to move people away from Java was against the macro-economic forces that strengthened the expansion of economic opportunities in Java rather than outside Java. The economic shift instigated by the collapse of oil prices has forced the state to adopt a more export-oriented policy, replacing the previous import-substitution strategy. The transmigration program, within the macro-economic context, therefore became a counter-productive policy within the macro-economic context, as the overall development trends clearly promoted the creation of employment opportunities in Java rather than in the outer islands. Surprisingly, however, the transmigration policy retains its status as a national priority on the state s policy agenda. The perception among the ruling elite, particularly the military, that the transmigration policy is pivotal to national security is the only rationale behind continuing the transmigration program in Indonesia? 9.3 From sponsored to voluntary migration. Based on the results of the 1971 population census, Titus (1978), using Samir Amin s (1 974) center-periphery approach, tried to show that development strategy and foreign economic activities played an important role in affecting interregional population movement in Indonesia. The most favoured foreign company investments were in the extractive industries, such as timber and oil, as well as the assembling and construction industries, followed by commerce and services. These activities had attracted a great deal of foreign capital. The development of extractive industries was almost exclusively limited to the outer islands, the other activities being mainly in the urban centers of Java. Titus classified a province as center or periphery based on the presence of such economic activities. In addition, every region was assessed on the existence of attraction factors (that is, employment opportunities, regional per capita income, urban attraction) or expulsion factors (that is, rural population pressure, ecosystem instability, lack of education facilities, political upheavals). According to Titus, the greatest mobility together with net immigration was to be found in the economic boom provinces of both the centre type (Jakarta, North Sumatra) and the relatively developed periphery type (South Sumatra, Riau, East Kalimantan). The lowest mobility and a zero migration balance were to be found in the isolated and still largely self-sufficient periphery type of provinces (that is, East and West Nusatenggara). The highest mobility together with net out-migration appeared in the highly integrated but stagnating peripheral provinces close to centre groups (that is, West Sumatra, Central Java, and Yogyakarta). The general pattern of migration trends between Java and other islands showed an interesting shift after mid-1980s. The net out-migration from Java to the other islands, between the periods and , declined markedly from 137% to only 15.7% (Hugo, 1997). This change reflected the increasing pull factors in Java and the decreasing role of transmigration as the major push factors for out-migration from Java, particularly after the mid-1980s. Eastern Indonesia, as part of the other islands, also showed a similar pattern and trends. In more recent developments, based on the An assessment of the security dimension of transmigration policy, see Tirtosudarmo

81 1995 Intercensal Population Survey, Raharto and Romdiati (1998) have shown that in-migration to the eastern Indonesia s provinces also significantly declined between 1990 and In 1990, in-migration to eastern Indonesia accounted for 54 per cent, whereas out-migration to western Indonesia was only 36 per cent. In 1995, inmigration to eastern Indonesia dropped to 49 per cent, while out-migration significantly increased to 49 per cent (Raharto and Romdiati, 1998). The changes in volume and pattern of migration between eastern and western Indonesia strongly indicated that the regional disparity between eastern and western Indonesia was increasing. The generai pattern of the migration phenomena apparently indicated that the New Order regional development had basically failed to achieve more equally distributed economic benefits between Java and the outer islands, as well as between western and eastern Indonesia. The demography of Indonesia has long been the object of the ruling elite s engineering schemes that have resulted in the establishment of the current political demographic constructions. Beside its explicit social and economic objectives, strategic and political goals have always been at the centre of the state s demographic engineering practices. Populating the empty areas in the outer islands through the former colonial emigration policy and the post-colonial transmigration policy has been the major form of demographic engineering for almost a century. After independence, national integration was the ultimate goal perceived by the national leaders as the major justification for continuing to engineer the country s demographic configuration (Tirtosudarmo, 2001). Ethnicity is apparently manifested in disguise within the state demographic engineering process as the national government suppressed the expression of. ethnicity, perceived as a danger to the national integration project. Yet, given that the majority of transmigrants are Javanese, it is only logical that Javanisation is, by and large, built into the demographic engineering of post-colonial transmigration policy. In the New Order period, President Suharto in particular perceived the Javanese as having superior cultural traits that could legitimately be transferred to inferior non- Javanese. The perception of cultural superiority among the Javanese permeates state bureaucracy, and has long complemented the centralizing and top-down approach of the New Order transmigration policy. In this context, social and cultural subjugation of the other nonjavanese peoples in the outer islands is embedded in state policy. 9.4 Forced migration and IDPs Migration, meaning movement of people across provincial boundaries, should have both positive and negative effects on the construction of national integration. On the positive side, it could strengthen national integration through assimilation and interethnic marriages; on the negative side, it could widen the gap between different ethnic groups, leading host communities to perceive migrants as unfair competition for limited economic opportunities. It therefore came as a turning point in the history of Indonesian migration policy when in the last five years reverse migration streams occurred following the social and communal conflicts in several outer island provinces in the aftermath of the economic crisis and the collapse of Suharto s New Order regime. 75

82 What is beyond the imagination is the corollary of events following the collapse of the Suharto regime that showed the breakdown of what was apparently the fragile construction of national integration and cultural harmony. The national integration was threatened as people in several paces of the archipelago, such as in East Timor, Aceh, Papua, Maluku, Kalimantan challenged the state s authority in various ways. In West Kalimantan the ethnic conflict that erupted in December 1996 between the local Dayaks and Madurese migrants continued to occur and developed even further with the involvement of the local Malays also fighting against the Madurese migrants. In February 1999 ethnic conflict erupted once again - this time between the local Malays - with the involvement of the local Dayaks - against the Madurese migrants. Then, two years later, in February we witnessed on the television news another brutal conflict which had broken out between the Madurese migrants and the Dayaks in the district town of Sampit in Central Kalimantan. The conflict then spread into other places including the provincial capital of Palangka Raya and Pangkalan Bun. Hundreds of people, mostly Madurese, were killed during this brutal conflict and thousands of them were forced to flee from Central Kalimantan to their place of origin in East Java. Ethnic and religious conflicts began to erupt on the island of Ambon in Maluku in February 1999 between the Christian locals and the Butonese Muslim migrants. This small conflict surprisingly developed into a wider and very violent communal conflict between Christians and Muslims and quickly spread to other islands in Maìuku. In Aceh and Papua the central government has been unable to contain the latent secessionists movement aspiring to a separate state from Indonesia. This series of seemingly intractable conflicts, which involved various kinds of sectarian sentiments based on ethnicity, territory and religion, clearly challenge the notion of national sovereignty and the nation-state in Indonesia. Borrowing phrases from two recent essay collections, the nation state is at bay and under ~iege.~ Given this, perhaps we should also contemplate the fate of Indonesia at the beginning of the Twenty First century. In the last five years, a series of events shows that Indonesia is wracked by many incidents of social and political conflicts that put the idea of Indonesia as a nation-state at bay and under siege. Rapid social and political transformations are currently occurring that could eventually change the reconfiguration of the original nation-state formation. The most critical phenomenon in this rapid transformation is the increasing political mobilization based on sectarian sentiments related to temtory, ethnicity and religion. Ethnicity, in a broader sense seems to be a common platform that is often strongly interwoven with the notion of territory and religion that makes the current political mobilization complex and difficult to untangle. As of December 2001, the total number of IDPs stands at more than 1.2 million. The following table describes the geographic distribution and the likely causes of migration that resulted in the burgeoning number of refugees and displaced population in Indonesia. See Young (ed) The Rising Tide of Cultural Pluralism: The Nation State at Bay? (1993). and Ferguson (ed) The Stare under Siege: Political Disintegration in the Post-Cold War Era (in press). 76

83 Table 9.1 Geographic distribution and likely causes of migration in the displaced populations of Indonesia Province Number of IDPs Causes Households Persons Aceh Aceh North Sumatera Aceh Riau Aceh Jambi Aceh South Sumatera Aceh Lampung Aceh West Java Central Java East Java Bali West Nusatenggara East Nusatenggara West Kalimantan South Sulawesi North Sulawesi Southeast Sulawesi Central Sulawesi Maluku conflict North Maluku conflict Papua Indonesia 3,588 10, ,113 2,788 39, ,078 35,178 11,255 9, ,526 38,388 19,507 51,551 23,394 3,370 14,351 48,489 3,135 2,103 1,700 1,735 12,896 11, ,732 2,974 14, ,284 58,544 36,104 46, ,367 78, , ,588 16, Insurgency/armed conflict in Insurgency/armed conflict in Insurgencyhned conflict in Insurgency/armed conflict in Insurgencyhned conflict in Insurgencyhmed conflict in Conflicts in Aceh, Maluku, West Kalimantan and Papua Conflicts in Aceh, Maluku, West Kalimantan, Papua, East Timor and Sulawesi Conflicts in West and Central Kalimantan, East Timor, Aceh, Papua, and Sulawesi East Timor independence East Timor independence East Timor independence CommunaVethnic conflicts in Sambas (West Kalimantan) Conflicts in East Timor and Poso (Central Sulawesi) Conflicts in Maluku, North Maluku, Poso (Central Sulawesi) Conflicts in Maluku, East Timor, Poso (Centrai Sulawesi), Sampit (Central Kalimantan, Papua and West Nusatenggara CommunaVreligious conflicts in Poso (Centrai Sulawesi) Local communalheligious Local communal/religious Insurgency/ethnic conflicts in Papua I' Source: SATKORLAK PBP respective provinces ' 77

84 9.5 Conclusion The causes of migration and refugee displacement, and their impacts on host populations, have their own dynamics that differ from one region to the other. However, a general observation on common denominators in other countries plagued by problems of massive refugees could perhaps also apply to Indonesia. Francis Deng, a UN representative on internally displaced persons, found that the common denominators of the causes of intemlly displaced persons is in what he calls a crisis of national identity, a crisis that generates cleavages between the affected population and controlling authorities, governments, or insurgent groups (Korn, 1999). While a general observation of the causes of forced migration is useful in providing a perspective on migration and refugee issues, it may gloss over significant regional variations, an understanding of which requires detailed study of local contexts. This is becoming more apparent in Indonesia, where the causes of forced migration must be sought, at least in part, at the local level. References Amin, Samir, 1974, Modem migration in Western Africa, in Modem migration in Western Afiica, ed. Samir Amin, pp Oxford: Uxford University Press. Bruner, Edward M, 1974, in Urban Ethnicify, Abner Cohen (ed.). London: Tavistock Publication Series: ASA Monographs / Association of Social Anthropologists of the Commonwealth, No. 12. Ferguson (ed) The State under Siege: Political Disintegration in the Post-Cold War Era (in. press). Hugo, Graeme, 1997, Changing pattern and processes in population mobility, in Indonesia asseseement: Population and human resources, ed. Gavin W. Jones and Terrence H. Hull, pp Canberra: Research School of Pacific Sudies, Australian National University. Jones, G.W., 1979, The Transmigration Programme and Development Planning. pp , in Southeast Asia: A Demographic Perspective, Oxford University Press. Korn, David A Exodus within Borders: An Introduction to the Crisis of Internal Displacement, Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press. Nitisastro, Widjojo, 1970, Population Trends in Indonesia. New York Cornell University Press. Quick. S.A., 1980, The Paradox of Popularity: Ideological Program Implementation in Zambia, pp in Gridle, M. (ed.) Polifics and Policy Implementation in the Third World, Princeton University Press, Princeton. Raharto, Aswatini, and Haning Romdiati, 1998, Mobilitaspenduduk dan Pembagunan di KTI (Population Mobility and Development in eastern Indonesia). Paper presented at the LIP1 seminar, February 18-19, at Menado, North Sulawesi. Teitelbaum, S. Michael and Jay Winter, 2000, A Question of Numbers: High Migration, Low Fertiliq, and lhe Polifics of National Iden@. New York Hill&Wang. Tirtosudarmo, Riwanto, 2001, Demography and Security: The Transmigration Policy in Indonesia, in Myron Weiner and Sharon Stanton Russell (eds.) Demography and National Security, pp, Oxford: Berghahn Books. Titus, Milan J., 1978, Inter-regional migration in Indonesia as a reflection of social and economic activities. Tijdschrifî voor Economische en Sociale Geograjie 62 (4): pp Young (ed)(1993). The Rising Tide of Cultural Pluralism: The Nation State at Bay? 78

85 ~ CHAPTER 10 IMPLICATIONS OF GLOBALISATION OF PRODUCTION, TRADE AND FINANCE FOR INTERNATIONAL MOBILITY OF THE HIGHLY SKILLED: SHIFTING PARADIGM FOR LABOUR REQUIREMENTS IN INDIA AND THE HOST COUNTRIES ABROAD Binod Khadria 10.1 Introduction and context Paradigms of international migration of the highly skilled labour have shifted globally in recent times, particularly with globalisation of production, trade and finance through the whole of 1990s and in the initial two years of the 21' century.' One of these paradigm shifts has been in terms of the bandwagon expectation of a fantasized 'return migration' of the highly skilled expatriate 'knowledge workers' home as a panacea for brain drain? Such return migration of the highly skilled to a home country like India is perceived to be an outcome of the change in emphasis from permanent migration to two types of interrelated phenomena worldwide, particularly through the developed-country immigration policies: Temporary migration, and Circulatory migration. This has taken place in the wake of a growing predominance of a 'worker-seeking' (demand-determined) mode of production, trade and finance initiated by the multinational corporations and subsequently adopted by the developed host countries themselves (e.g., leading to the large demands for the generic high-skill IT professionals). As a determinant of intemational migration, this mode has overtaken the 'work-seeking' (supply-determined) mode of production, trade and finance that offered overseas employment, in the three decades preceding the 1990s, to developing-country nationals, who supplied their specialised skills to the developed-country based world labour markets, and thereby contributed to phenomena like the brain drain. The worker-seeking mode has meant higher turnover of internationally mobile knowledge workers who are endowed with more generic human I The nature of this globalisation may be summarised by stating that the value addition in production of given commodities has spread across geographical boundaries of sovereign states, cutting across both developed and developing countries; followed by, obviously, a rise in intra-industry trade between these countries. Simultaneously, finance has also become more global and multidirectional than local and unidirectional. Discourses of this literature are, however, not referred to here, as it is a subject beyond the scope of this paper. I have elsewhere identified and commented upon at least three types of paradigmshifts that are currently taking place in the context of high-skill labour mobility from India (Khadria200la e). Two ofthese shifts are, first, in terms of the eniargedapplicafion domain offhe generic skiils of professionals, and 'semi-finished' human capital in the form of younger students, in increasing number of developed receiving countries, and second, in terms of the replacement ojthe policy objective of human-development-led 'welfare' by that of human-development-led 'growth'. 79

86 capital. These workers include teachers, trainers, researchers, innovators, and students in cutting edge areas of knowledge, such as IT, biotechnology and so on, for future build-up of knowledge societies in the developed countries. Consequently, knowledge-creation (through involvement of the expert professionals and students in research and learning) has become the frontier activity, followed by widespread marketing, leading to trade in technology through mutlilateral negotiations involving the intellectual property rights (IPRs) or the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS under the WTO). This seems to have taken the place of the free application of created knowledge across the world. At the same time, outsourcing of the services of the not-so-highly skilled has led to international immobility of the service workers. An example of this is the mushroom growth of activities like call-centres, medical transcription, back-office operations, payslip accounting, off-shore software development, etc. in the developing countries, manned by what is being termed as the techno-coolies. In a restricted global environment of intemational trade and foreign investment where movement of work across national borders was limited, the focus on permanent migration of workers was both understandable and relevant. But in a liberalised or liberalising world economic scenario, particularly in the wake of globalisation represented by GATS under the WTO, cross-national movement of temporary migrants (in US-INS terminology, the non immigrants, like intra-company transferees, trainees, and students) has assumed a heightened and crucial importance. Whereas the US trade policy makers are suspicious about providing for entry of large number of temporary migrant workers and have often taken refuge in the argument that migration is the area of Immigration and Naturalisation Service ins) under the Department of Justice, and therefore outside their jurisdiction, developing countries have aired the criticism that such attitude is counterpoised to the very idea of liberalisation and globalisation. The fact of the matter is that it is still a gray area as far as the impact of temporary immigration of workers on the world labour market - in developing and developed countries - is concerned. Traditionally, work on the subject of international labour mobility and international trade had primarily started with the textbook approach of intemational factor movements. International trade theory constructs had postulated that international labour movement narrowed down the factor-price differentials between two countries endowed with unequal resources and labour productivities, and thereby would have raised welfare in both countries. The factor endowment theory, however, assumed the factor productivities to be given and did not allow for changes in them, for example, either by technological change or education. Because both technological change and education are cost bearing activities, gains from factor movements have thus become ambiguous. Independently of economic theorisation, a large amount of sociological research has focused on various aspects of immigrant communities assimilation in the host society and culture. In contrast, there are few studies on economic assimilation of immigrants in the host-country labour markets, say in the U.S., which look at the effects of assimilation in terms of length of stay in the U.S. on average earnings in the labour market. Both socio-cultural and economic studies have pronounced on the implications for melting pot or salad bowl effects in the emerging American or other host-country labour 80

87 + ~ markets and social structures such as the EU or Australia. With body-shopping, and circulatory migration potentially replacing the brain drain, issues such as assimilation would require to be examined afresh from a new angle, e.g., when families do not accompany the natural persons moving under the terms of GATS Issues and implications It is being thought that this shifting paradigm, leading to the emergence of circulatory migration (as a kind of return migration), in place of permanent migration, of knowledge workers poses an antidote to the so-called brain drain. It is in view of this, that a number of issues may be raised in terms of research questions: Who are these continuously mobile knowledge workers of the new era if not the same as the not-sofrequently mobile qualified professionals of the previous era? Where does temporary, Circulatory, or return migration leave the developing country migrants and their homecountry labour markets? Are they better off with temporarykirculatory migration vis-àvis one-shot emigration of permanent nature? What has added to the volume of circulatory migration of professionals? What is in the interest of the receiving developed countries that promotes circulatory migration of high-skill labour? It may not be possible to immediately answer all the questions that one could raise in this context, nor is it necessary to address all of them separately or exclusively. However, let us first try to understand who these highly mobile knowledge workers are and how they are different from the brain drainees of the earlier period. Going by the 1960 definition by Peter Drucker,... knowledge workers are those who have successfully educated and or trained to reach the higher levels of proficiency in some or other branch of knowledge. H e found the term being widely used for describing people with considerable theoretical knowledge and learning: doctors, lawyers, teachers, accountants, chemical engineers, etc. This is changing very rapidly now, in 2002, with the most striking growth being in knowledge technologists: computer technicians, software engineers, analysts, and the whole genre of IT professionals. The difference between these new knowledge workers and the traditional ones is that these knowledge workers are more generic (with multiple application fields) whereas the traditional knowledge workers are more specific (with limited application field) so far as their application in the labour market is concerned! : -,, In trying to understand what is circulatory migration?, the interests of at least two of the three stakeholders need to be underlined: From the point of view of the individual migrant, it implies continuous movement between countries (could be from one hostcountry to another, but primarily between the host- and the home-country), whereas from the point of view of the receiving-country society, it implies rapid and high turnover of immigrants. While the first one has been emphasized as a boon or ray of hope for the There is little work that has been done on migration ofthe highly-skilled temporary migrant labour in the brain drain literature excepting for some on students migration. This has a correspondence with the general vs. specific skill classification provided by Gary Becker in the early 1960s. 81

88 third stakeholder, the sending developing country or countries, as high-skill nationals remain in contact with the country. What remains hidden is the stake and role of the developed host countries in dealing with the high turnover of knowledge workers in their labour markets through circulatory migration. The important questions are why circulatory migration is replacing permanent migration? and whether it is the result of the individuals freely deciding to become more nomadic 7 or whether the system is forcing them to do so?. To my mind, it is the result of a unique kind of forced migration where no particular migrant is encouraged or allowed to stay in the host country for long, a la temporary migration under the WTO regime. For the receiving country, this serves two not-so-obvious but important purposes. One is a safety valve purpose for the host-country labour markets (e.g., when the state responsibility of protecting the foreign workers interests in the labour market stands reduced because given immigrant individuals would no longer be available continuously to build up resistance groups against the native chauvinistic groups and/or the discriminating employees/govemments). In addition, there is a second, more subtle, purpose of easy and cheaper labour population replacement, which to my mind, is derived by the developed host economy in terms of three potential advantages. These three advantages could be called as those of a) Age: By lowering the ratio of older people in the population to younger people it helps correct the aging demographic structure of the population in terms of the economically active labour force; b) Wage: By replacing higher-pay-packet-drawing experienced employees with lower-pay-packet-receiving fresh entrants it keeps the overall wages bill on labour-cost low; and c) Vintage: By replacing workers of older vintage with newer vintage ones it becomes easier to maintain a hold over newer technologies and frontier research. Given this conjecture, it may seem natural that the decision-making on the demand-side of circulatory/temporary migration is highly controlled by the developed receiving countries, although it is made to look as if globalisation has triggered liberalization of immigration for all kinds and levels of labour across the board Examples and perceptions Where does this leave the developing countries? Are they better off - as far as the largescale emigration of their knowledge workers is concerned? One implication that could be drawn is that as circulatory migration gradually replaces permanent migration in terms of prevalence, it may also be argued, the phenomenon of physical presence of permanently formed settlements of temporary/circulating foreign knowledge workers would grow in importance in the developed-country labour markets, although each individual immigrant worker would cease to matter much as turnover becomes high and 82

89 rapid. This would happen if the foreign worker component in the labour market grows in size. And it may be expected that this would be so because, as Peter Drucker said,. the knowledge workers need access to an organisation - a collective that brings together an array of knowledge workers and applies their specialism to a common-end product... The greatest software designer needs a hardware producer. But the PC manufacturer also needs the software programmer. It is this collective of immigrants which is destined to keep growing. (Drucker 2001). Return migration of Indian knowledge workers has, however, shown signs of taking place in the last one year for another reason. The recession in the American IT sector has had a marked effect. The industry has already shown signs of contracting and this has precipitated the return of many US-based IT professionals to India? Western European countries in the EU, including the UK are also following suit with a lag, whereas EasdSouth East Asia is being looked at as an emerging destination for the Indian migrant knowledge workers. One has to, however, remember that these countries themselves are facing their own problems of fluctuating migration to the United States, and therefore be cautious about them as destinations of the derived demand (originating in the US) for highly qualified manpower from India! The derived demand would tend to dry up when the global brain drain to the USA slows down. Industry is also speculating on the possibility of reverse or return migration of the Indian IT professionals to India for working in companies that are being outsourcedwould be outsourced by the developedcountry-based MNCs for software development. There is, however, a great deal of uncertainty in the private sector on this issue in India. While industry s concern is mainly with the numbers, the Indian media has perceived the real problem of brain drain to be that of quality of the residual labour left behind in the domestic labour market: We may end up with a huge army of people doing second class, labour intensive software-development work and operations like managing call-centres and customer-services for foreign companies. On the great demand for Indian sohare professionals in the labour markets of Germany and other countries, the media would say, Good for them but what about India s own (labour) requirements? Germany s Chancellor Gerhard Schroeder s scheme of issuing 30,000 Green Cards to computer specialist from non-eu countries, launched on August 1, 2000 received a lukewarm response (only 5000 IT men went from India) due to street protests and the wave of xenophobia sweeping Germany. But overlooking such phenomena, every time a foreign country made an announcement or delegations came calling to recruit Indian knowledge workers, one heard a plethora of statements from the IT lobby, both in and outside the Although many in the pipeline of migration have cancelled or put on hold their plans to go, there are however reports that there is no slowing down in the issuing of H-IB visas by the US Consulate-General at Chennai in South India (The Economic Times, No slump in issue of H1B in Chennai, May , New Delhi). United Kingdom itself sends large number of immigrants and temporary visitors to the United States, including doctors, teachers and IT professionals. The Hindustan Times, 17 Sept

90 Indian Government, exulting, India may well be on the way to becoming the software superpower of the world. But, in reality, the media believes it may end up becoming the IT professionals super bazaar of the world. The media fears that India will be reduced to rolling out graduates and specialists for multinational corporations of the world, depleting scarce resources that go into India s higher education system. The trend of exporting Indian IT or software professionals to the world labour market is, however, not entirely a result of the current phase of liberalisation and globalisation. Indian companies have been at it for the last two decades. The practice, of doing on-site software development in the US called body shopping, was predominant in the 1980s and early 1990s. This was mainly because the track record of Indian software companies was not proven, and the telecom infrastructure was not fully developed for undertaking jobs in India at that time. As Indian companies made their mark in executing large and complex projects, and telecom and satellite links improved, the trend of offshore software development in India began. This trend had augured well for the industry, boosting its export earnings a great deal. What scuttles this advantage for India is the trend of foreign companies/ countries inviting Indian professionals to work there - in a way return of body shopping. The only difference is that the invitations in the later phase came from foreign governments, and not from individual companies. In addition, professionals have also been able to go on their own, instead of being sent by an Indian company to work there on a project. This is body shopping in a far more organized fashion, with government sanction on the one hand and individual compliance on the other. Citizens in a democracy have freedom of movement and freedom of employment, but an open encouragement to flight of highly skilled human capital would not necessarily bring back technology, experience of working in a global environment, and the return migrants to the advantage of the home country. It cannot be assumed that the technology and experience they bring back would be available on terms and prices favourable to the home country rather than the employer MNCs. Given this, it may again be said that the decision-making on the demand-side of circulatory migration is still highly biased in favour of the developed receiving countries, although it has been made to look as if liberalization of immigration from developing countries has accompanied liberalisation of production, trade and finance. In this broad contextual background, which one may like relating to the emerging map of the future knowledge society drawn by Peter Drucker recently (Drucker 2001), the Indian case presents an anti-thesis to the hype that has been created by the so-called circulatoxy migration as an antidote to permanent migration, and thereby an opportunity for developing countries to turn their brain drain into brain gain. Information collated from various sources show that project investment and return of personnel from abroad to * Khadria had emphasized at the Brussels Roundtable (ISM 2001) that the policy of encouraging temporary return of the highly skilled principal migrant for given duration and specifically for contributing to development in home country will be better-received for facilitating return of migrants on a macro scale. Ile argued that unlike a policy of temporary migration for ensuring return, this would not unsettle hislher family or children going to school(s) in the home or the host country and therefore not become a barrier in migration decision-making of the highly skilled. 84

91 work on productive projects in India do not appear to be very ~ignificant.~ There are three ways in which corporations use the highly-skilled Indian labour: 1. Indian companies send consultants to the US, where they use their skills and support their company; 2. for creation of R & D facilities in India, where transfer of technology goes back and forth, and 3. corporations import the skills from India with no return of investment, which is the case in the high-tech area (e.g. to fill the shortages in the US) Targets and policy Given the above emerging scenario, one can take the international political economy as a given, and argue for an endogenous solution of building up the average productivity of labour at home rather than an exogenous solution of return migration or circulatory migration. I have argued elsewhere for concentrating on a single generic long-term policy intervention-targeted at the limited fields of education and health infrastructure development, rather than a multitude of development or sectoral welfare targets, such as, for example, listed in the Report of the High Level Committee on Indian Diaspora (ICWA 2001). A holistic approach for measuring the gains from brain drain in terms of raising the longterm average productivity of the resident labour force in a sending country like India - leading to higher production, higher earnings, higher consumption, and thus the elimination of poverty could be advocated, rather than continuing to dwell on a myriad of investment avenues in the general business of production, trade and finance for the expatriates. Towards this, sectors need to be identified where the social return on expatriate investments - in terms of increases in average labour productivity of the resident workforce - is much higher and sustainable than the market return. (Khadria l999,2001a, 2001b) The two areas I have identified as qualifying for this are education and health. A strategy or model of outsourcing the Indian expatriate knowledge workers abroad for substantial and sustainable improvement in the average productivity of labour from within the developing home country would also be in the long-term optimal interest of any developed host country. The long-term optimality of policy would lie in creating the space for this kind of generic policy of endogenous growth through sustained economic participation of the Indian non-resideni labour force aimed at lifting the longterm average productivity of the resident labour force in sending countries to world 1 eve1 s. ; i 10.5 A perspective comment While migrant receiving country governments will continue to develop and implement measures aimed at increasing the participation of immigrant labour forces in the economic life of their countries, it is understood that they cannot do so without the assistance of other actors. One of the emerging other actors in this area would, no 85

92 doubt, be Non-Resident Indian workers abroad. Forward-looking governments ought to actively support the development of cross-sectoral partnerships through legislative and other measures that bring business, governmental, and non-governmental organisations together in initiatives relating the expatriate labour to labour market developments in the sending home countries. Towards this, the governments, the private sector, and the NGOs might begin to work and identify a Diaspora Policy Agenda on key matters of development in both host and home societies of the immigrants - matters which have so far remained typically confined to governmental discourses. The objectives of this could be to establish a fair and equitable legal framework and ensure that this framework allows sufficient space for voluntary efforts by the expatriates abroad. This might include the development of methods for monitoring the recruitment and advancement of immigrant employees as an achievable index of progress in the host society. This would highlight the importance of the fact that an immigrant labour force very often comprise the individuals who, as the high-skill workers, are steering the change, and are not merely the target and recipients of majority initiatives in host societies. Progress achieved in terms of this index or measure in the host country would facilitate progress and development in the home countries of the immigrants through initiatives that would endogenously raise the average productivity of workers in labour markets there. Given this perspective, the potential social returns from investment in education and health sectors are not only much higher than their market returns, thus making the system immune to the negative effects of brain drain, they are also capable of eventually correcting the structure that is responsible for brain drain in the first place. The diaspora policy option would be useful in terms of channeling the non-residents contribution, as well as the contribution of the host countries into education and health at the grass-roots level in home countries, rather than trying to aim at business and industry without first building the foundations of human capiíal that fires them through fulfilling the requirements of appropriate labour. Education and health sectors are also more suited as receptacles for the skills of expatriates as they comprise mostly the professionals: doctors, engineers, scientists, academics, and lately, high-skilled workers in information technology and, in the near future, in biotechnology. If the non-residents contributions of money, skill and vision, fuelled by appropriate support and action pians from the hostcountry governments and people, can be utilized by the home country to make a dent on the baneful cycle of the low-level equilibrium trap of productivity, it would help restore the human capital taken away from the system, and may some day even give a break from the negative effects of temporw or circulatory migration as well as of the longterm brain drain. To make these efforts sustainable, the monitoring of achievements as well as of setbacks has to be undertaken through further labour market research for the high-skill workers backed by generation and consolidation of relevant data. It would also be a rewarding effort to design appropriate strategies and supporting institutions for removing hurdles to the large-scale involvement of high-skill expatriate workers. Their involvement in transforming the quantity and quality of the home countries education and health sectors could be elicited. O See also Majumdar (1991). 86

93 References Drucker, Peter, 200 1, The Next Society, The Economist, ESC, 2001, Summary Report of the Proceedings of Roundtable, Transatlantic Roundtable On High-Skilled Migration and Sending Countries Issues, at Brussels, November 19-20, mimeo, European Economic and Social Committee. ICWA, 2001, Report of the High Level Committee on the Indian Diaspora, Indian Council of World Affairs, New Delhi. Khadria, Binod, 1990, Patents, Brain Drain and Higher Education: International Barriers to the Diffusion of Knowledge, Information and Technology, Social Scientist, Serial No. 204, vo1.18, no.5, May, pp. 3-18,New Delhi. Khadria, Binod, 1999, The Migration of Knowledge Workers: Second-Generation Effects of India s Brain Drain, Sage Publications, New Delhi. Khadria, Binod, 2000, India and Contemporary Emigration - Retrospective Culture, Futuristic Economy, International Conference on Culture and Economy in the Indian Diaspora, Organized by University of Hull, and University of Oxford, at India Intemational Centre, New Delhi, 8-10 April, mimeo. Khadria, Binod, 2001a, Skilled Labour Migration (the Brain Drain 9 from india: impact and Policies, Roundtable Seminar on Impact and Policies of Skilled Labour Migration, Institute of Public Policy Research, London, June, mimeo. Khadria, Binod, 2001b, Harnessing the New Indian Diaspora in the Age of Globalization: In Praise of A Single Generic Policy Intervention vis-à-vis Multiple Policy Objectives, Paper presented at the National Seminar on India and the Indian Diaspora: Expectations and Prospects, organized at the University of Hyderabad, September 8-9. Khadria, Binod, 2001c, Gainful Engagement of the New Indian Diaspora: Do We Need the Multiple Policy Targets or A Single Generic Policy Objective?, Paper circulated at the Transatlantic Roundtable On High-Skilled Migration and Sending Countries Issues, at Brussels, November Khadria, Binod, 2001d, Tracing the Historical Geneses of Brain Drain in Indian Polity, State Policy and Civil Society, Paper presented at the Conference on Citizenship and Those Who Leave - The Politics of Emigration and Expatriation, organized at Centre De Recherches Historiques, E.H.E.S.S. - C.N.R.S., Pans, December 6-8. Khadria, Binod, 2001e, Shifting Paradigms of Globalization: The Twenty-first Century Transition towards Generics in Skilled Migration from India, International Migration, Quarterly Review, vol. 39, No. 5, pp , Special Issue Y2001: Intemational Migration of the Highly Skilled. Khadria, Binod, 2002, A Closer Look into the Shifting Paradigm of Brain Drain: Antithesis to the Emergence of Circulatory Migration of Knowledge Workers from Developing Countries as a Built-in Remedy, Paper presented at the Symposium on Brain Drain, Brain Gain or Brain Transfer - Losing their minds, at the Federal Parliament of Belgium, Brussels, May 24. Majumdar, Tapas, 1991, Investment in Literacy for a High-Technology Society, in D. Banerjee, ed, Essays in Economic Analysis and Policy, Delhi: Oxford University Press., 87

94 CIIAPTER 11 IRREGULAR MIGRATION OF CHINESE WORKERS TO TAIWAN' Ching-lung Tsay 11.1 Abstract In the past few decades, Taiwan experienced rapid changes in many aspects of society. The transformation has been particularly dramatic since the mid-1980s when the economy started to face challenges in the international market and problems of labour shortage at home; As a result, migrant workers, including clandestine migration and imported labour from Southeast Asia, made up the most important inflows of population to Taiwan. There are also workers been transported illegally from China. The purpose of this paper is to examine the trends and characteristics of the labour flows mentioned above by using data obtained from such major source organizations as the Council of Labour Affairs, the Police Administration Headquarters, and the Bureau-of Immigration. Irregular migrant workers from China are mostly smuggled in fishing boats from the less developed area of Ping-tan in Fu-Chien Province. Some estimates and analyses were made based on the limited information gathered from apprehended irregular migrants' cases. The estimated total number of irregular migants who havae been smuggled from China in the past 13 years is 73,500. Close to 40,000 of them have been arrested and the remaining 33,500 migrants have succeeded in moving to work in Taiwan. If 40 percent of them have returned home, there are 20,000 illegal migrants from China staying in Taiwan. In sum, Taiwan currently has 51,000 illegal migrant workers, mainly from Southeast Asia and China. Most of the workers from China are males in the primary working ages. They are characterized by a low level of educational attainment and little job experience except for being labourers. With this background and their illegal status, all the migrants were labourers of various types at the time of apprehension Introduction In the past few decades, Taiwan has experienced dramatic changes in teks of demographic transition, social diversification, economic liberalization, political democratization, and the legalization of importing foreign workers. The transformation was particularly remarkable in the 1980s and 1990s. As a result of the changes, the country has become more and more involved in the process of economic globalization. One major aspect of the phenomenon is the human interaction with the ' Paper for presentation at the 9' International Conference of the Asia-Pacific Migration Research Network, Nadi, Fiji, September

95 world through migration, especially the inflows of foreigners. In the early 198Os, Taiwan entered a stage of labour shortage and rising domestic real wages. There were also challenges for the economy resulting from the appreciation of currency value and the increase of other production costs. As the economy continues to lose competitive advantage in international markets, the industries adopted such corporate strategies as 1) 2) going offshore by means of foreign direct investment and ( staying at onshore by hiring foreign workers. Consequently, Taiwan, along with Japan, Singapore, Hong Kong, and South Korea, has become a major destination of migrant workers in East and Southeast Asia. Using Taiwan as an example, this paper is to provide a critical review of the trends and characteristics of labour flows to a fast growing economy. For this purpose, the data sources of labour migration will first be ascertained. After that, two major categories of labour flows from foreign countries will be discussed. The first are the migrant workers from some Southeast Asian countries, including illegal foreign workers and the imported contract labourers.. Second is the group of workers who have been smuggled from China. Finally, the paper will conclude with a summary and some discussions on the main issues presented in the report Labour flows to Taiwan ' Since the early 1990s, the most important type of migration to Taiwan has been the labour flow from Southeast Asia. According to the latest data available at the end of 2000, the total number of foreign residents legally residing in Taiwan is 388,189. About 84 percent of this amount can be accounted for by the contract migrant workers from the four Southeast Asian countries of Indonesia, the Philippines, Thailand and Vietnam. The remaining 16 percent are people from the rest of the world who are engaged in all kinds of activities and employment other than labourers, as well as their dependents. The labour market of Taiwan was opened for the first time to accept contract workers from abroad in October With the rapid liberalization of the labour market since the early 199Os, the number of imported contract workers has increased very dramatically. The latest figure for March 2002 is close to 302,000; 41 percent are Thais, 3 1 percent Indonesians, 23 percent are Filipinos and 5 percent are Vietnamese. The workers are predominantly males, particularly among the Thais. In terms of industrial distribution, the major area has shifted rapidly in the past decade from the construction sector to the manufacturing industry, and then toward the service jobs. Currently, the proportions in the manufacturing, service and construction industries are 52,3 8 and 1 O percent, respectively. Within each ethnic group, Thai workers are mostly employed in the manufacturing industry (74%) and are rarely in the service sector (3%). In contrast, the majority of Indonesians are employed in household service jobs (87%) and only 12 percent are in the manufacturing sector. For Filipinos, two thirds are manufacturing workers and one 89

96 third are engaged in domestic service. The distribution of Vietnamese workers is much less concentrated (54% and 42% in the manufacturing and service industries, respectively). There is also a clear ethnic segregation of workers by industry. Thais dominate the construction industry (96%) and Indonesians occupy most of the service jobs (71%). While as many as 74 percent of Thais are working in the manufacturing industry, they account for 58 percent of the total contract labourers in that sector. The share of Filipinos and Indonesians in the total employment of foreign workers in manufacturing jobs is 29 and 7 percent, respectively. Before 1989, all foreign workers in Taiwan were illegally engaged in employment. The majority of them came from Southeast Asia and China. This illegal migration became noticeable in the middle of the 1980s and very evident in the late years of that decade. Based on the records of foreigners who over-stayed their visas, it was estimated that there were about 50,000 clandestine migrant workers in the late 1980s (Tsay, 1992). Malaysians workers constituted the largest group (49%), followed by Filipinos (23%), Thais (17%) and Indonesians (11%). Thai migrants represent the first arrivals and Indonesians the most recent ones while Filipinos appear to have the highest turnover rates. The illegal workers are mostly males, especially those from Thailand and Malaysia. In 1989 after the legalization of importing workers from Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, and Thailand, the illegal labourers from Southeast Asia decreased substantially in a short period of time. According to the police authority, the estimated number of this 'old' type of illegal workers was about 17,000 in With the importation of foreign labourers, those who ran away from their contacts became the "new' type of illegal workers. By October 1999, there were 6,000 run-away workers who had not been apprehended and deported. The total estimated number of illegal workers from Southeast Asia is about 23,000. At the same time, the irregular labour migration from China continues to exist. The workers are usually transported in fishing boats by smugglers to cross the Taiwan Strait. In the administrative system, different agencies are responsible for different types of migration flows to Taiwan. Consequently, the sources of migration data spread are around in many government authorities. As will be shown in the next section, the major agencies include the Police Administration Headquarters, the Council of. Labour Affairs, and the Bureau of Immigration (formally known as Bureau of Entry and Exit Controls or Bureau of Port Controls). The Police Administration Headquarters keeps important records of all foreign residents legally staying in Taiwan, including the imported contract workers. The Council of Labour Affairs maintains detailed information on the contract workers relating to their jobs, employers, personal characteristics and health conditions. The Bureau of Immigration is in charge of the in- and out-migration of nationals. In addition, the Bureau of Immigration has some data on the apprehension of illegal migrants from China Estimate of smuggled workers from China As mentioncd earlier, illegal migrant workers from China became aparent in the middle 1980s when Taiwan entered an era of labour shortage. It is well known that the workers are mostly smuggled in fishing boats to cross the Taiwan Strait. However, 90

97 no one is clear about the actual volume of this migration flow and the corresponding stock. The following analyses and estimation will be based on the information gathered from the cases of those who. were apprehended, especially those who were arrested after June 1992 when the data set became more complete. Both the aggregate statistics and the original records of the arrested migrants, provided by the Bureau of Immigration, were utilized. As shown in Table 1 1.1, the number of apprehensions increased from several hundred to over three thousand in the last three years of the 1980s. It increased quickly to 5,629 in 1990 and then decreased significantly before reaching the peak of 5,944 in After that, the inflow shrank remarkably, The lowest number is 1,177 for For the first eleven months of 1999, 1,622 apprehensions were carried out. The total number of apprehensions in the past 13 years is 38,626. It should be stressed that the number of apprehensions reflects not only the actual number of attempts of illegal migration but also the effect of border patrol activity. Among the arrested migrants, the deportation rate is as high as 96 percent for the past 13 years as a whole. As revealed in Table 11.1, however, the deportation rate fluctuates greatly from year to year. The substantial variation in deportation rate suggests significant time lags between the apprehensions and the deportations. As a result, the Taiwan authority claimed that it has paid out US$ 30 million to feed, house and yard the captured illegal migrants from China (Flannery, 1999). As a matter of fact, the efficiency of deportation is affected by many factors including the technical problems in arranging and executing the deportation process as well as the extent of political tension between the two sides of the Taiwan Strait3. It is indeed an extremely complicated and delicate issue for both the labour sending and receiving countries. As discussed in Borjas, Freeman and Lang (1991), it is always difficult, if not impossible, to try to measure any illegal activity. The issue of illegal migration has even been regarded as inaccessible to accurate measurement. In responding to the problem of inaccessibility of illegal migrants, Borjas, Freeman and Lang (1991) examined several different data sets and made strong assumptions in order to measure the volume of undocumented Mexican-bom workers in the United States. The data sets include the 1980 Census of Population, the Immigration and Naturalization Service records, the Vital Statistics, the Apprehension Statistics and a sample survey of 289 illegal Mexican male aiiens. They reached a consistent estimate of 1.8 million illegal Mexican-born migrants in the 1980s. They also found that this population has grown rapidly over the decade, but at a rate far below the growth of apprehensions. In the case of illegal Chinese migrant workers in Taiwan, no existing data sources are comparable to the ones used in the study on Mexican workers discussed above. The only relevant information is the proportion of the apprehended cases in the total number of illegal migrants. Given the sensitivity of irregular migration from China to Taiwan, it is understandable that all the captured migrants were investigated thoroughly on their motivation and process of migration. One of the major purposes of the investigation is to ascertain the organization of the smugglers and the operational format of organized crime. For this purpose, each apprehended migrant * The author was grateful to the Bureau of Immigration for providing the valuable data. Nominally, the deportation and acceptance of the arrested Chinese workers are carried out by the two National Red-Cross Associations. 91

98 was questioned in several different ways as to the size of the group in which he or she was smuggled. Based on the results of in-depth interviews described above, it was estimated that, in the migration groups which have been apprehended, about 25 percent of the total migrants have not been arrested (Kwan, 1999). Furthermore, it remains unclear what proportion of the vessels carrying illegal migrants have been seized. Given the significance of this issue, this paper assumes that 30 percent of the total number of smuggling boats which have arrived in Taiwan have never been apprehended, and that this percentage has not varied greatly over time. It should be further assumed that there is little difference in the number of Chinese migrants on board between the arrested and the never-arrested vessels. With these assumptions it is estimated, on the basis of the 38,626 apprehensions, that the total number of illegal workers who have been smuggled from China to Taiwan during the past 13 years is about 73,500. Close to 40,000 of them have been apprehended (Table ll.l), and the remaining 33,500 migrants have succeeded in relocating themselves to Taiwan. If 40 percent of them have returned home after realizing their migration expectations, it can be concluded that an estimated 20,000 illegal workers from China are currently hiding in the labour market of Taiwan. According to Table 11.2, the majority (79%) of the apprehended migrants were arrested on land. The proportion being captured at sea and on the coast is 14 and 7 percent, respectively. There is no difference in these figures between males and females. The data further indicates that 61 percent of the apprehensions occurred in the northern region of Formosa Island, followed by 25 percent in the central region and 12 percent in the southern region. This fact is most likely due to the geographic proximity between the northern region of Taiwan and the most common place of origin of the migrants, the Ping-Tan area in the Fu-Chien Province of China Characteristics of Chinese migrant workers The demographic and socioeconomic characteristics of the apprehended migrant workers from China will be discussed with data presented in Tables 11.3 to The data in Table 11.3 reveal that the migrants are predominantly males (94.4%), especially in the older age groups. The female migrant population is apparently younger than that of males. AS expected, the migrants are mostly within the working ages With regard to educational attainment, Table 4 indicates a rather low level for the migrants. About two thirds of them were educated to the primary level of education or less, while 28 percent graduated from junior high schools. The educational level clearly decreases with age except for the first group (0-14). Females have received slightly more education than males. The data in Table 11.5 describes the occupational structure of the migrants in their places of origin. A fifth of them were unemployed while the others were labourers, farmers and boat crews. This finding reflects the labour market structure and the general economic condition in the source area of the migrants. The proportion with no job decreases with age for both males and females, while the percentage is much higher in the latter group. The figures suggest that the place of origin is a typical agrarian society. 92

99 For the migrants who were arrested on land, Table 11.6 gives information on their current occupation at apprehension. Not surprisingly, the proportion without a job is much smaller (4.7%), as compared to the pre-departure cases (20%). With the illegal status and limited educational level, all the migrants perform their jobs as labourers. The largest of two groups are construction workers (45%) and factory workers (39%), followed by restaurant workers (5.5%). Others working in households, farms, nursing homes, or unidentified places account for a trivial proportion of the total. The two percent of the arrested migrants engaged in the sex industry are presumably females. According to local news reports, this percentage is probably an underestimate for this particular occupation. It is likely that at least some of the females employed in restaurants or other kinds of workplaces are actually engaged in the sex industry. There are also females coming to be sex entertainers in Taiwan through feigned marriages or by travelling with false documents. The issue of prostitution definitely complicates the case of irregular migration of Chinese workers to Taiwan Summary and conclusions In the past few decades, Taiwan has experienced rapid changes in many aspects of society. The transformation has been particularly dramatic since the mid-1980s when the economy began to face challenges in the international market and problems of labour shortages at home. As a result migrant workers, including the clandestine migration and the imported labour from Southeast Asia, made up the most important inflows of population to Taiwan. There are also workers who have been transported illegally from China. The purpose of this paper is to examine the trends and characteristics of the labour flows mentioned above by using data obtained from such major source organizations as the Council of Labour Affairs, the Police Administration Headquarters, and the Bureau of Immigration. The irregular migrant workers from China are mostly smuggled in fishing boats from the less developed area of Ping-tan in Fu-Chien Province. Some estimates and analyses were made based on the limited information gathered from the apprehended cases. The estimated total number of irregular migrants who have been smuggled from China in the past 13 years is 73,500. Close to 40,000 of them have been arrested and the remaining 33,500 migrants have succeeded in gaining work in Taiwan. If 40 percent of them have returned home, there are 20,000 illegal migrants from China living in Taiwan. In total, Taiwan currently has 51,000 illegal migrant workers, mainly from Southeast Asia and China. Most of the workers from China are males within the primary working ages. They are characterized by a low level of educational attainment and little or no job experience except for being labourers. With this background and their illegal status, all the migrants were labourers of various types at the time of apprehension. This paper has critically examined the data, trends and characteristics of the major migration flows of labourers to Taiwan. They are important to the host country in supplying the needed human resources for household and domestic care services, infrastructure construction projects, as well as industrial restructuring and development. From the point of view of a national strategy, however, it is crucial for a labour receiving country to investigate the consequences and outcomes of migration. 93

100 It is important to be able to regulate migation flows efficiently and to manage all kinds of migrant workers properly. This challenge clearly indicates the directions for future research. References Abella, Manolo I Asian Labour Migration: Past, Present, and Future. ASEAN Economic Bulletin, 12(2): Abella, Manolo and Hiromi Mori Structural Change and Labour Migration in East Asia. pp in Development Strategy, Employment and Migration: Country fiperiences (edited by David O Connor and Leila Farsakh). Paris: Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development. Athukorala, Prema-chandra. 1993a. International Labour Migration in the Asian-Pacific Region: Patterns, Policies and Economic Implications. Asian-Pacific Economic Literature, 7(2), Athukorala, Prema-chandra. 1993b. Statistics on Asian Labour Migration: Review of Source, Methods and Problems. pp in International Labour Migration Statistics and Information Networking in Asia, Geneva: IL0 Asian Regional Team for Employment Promotion (ARTEP). Borjas, George, Richard Freeman and Kevin Lang Undocumented Mexican-born Workers in the United States: How Many, How Permanent? pp in Immigration, Trade, and the Labor Market (edited by John M. Abowd and Richard B. Freeman). Chicago and London: The University of Chicago Press, Chiswick, Bany R Illegal Aliens: Their Employment and Employers. Kalamazoo, MI: Upjohn Institute for Employment Research. Flannery, Russell Move Across the Taiwan Strait Ends in Limbo for Immigrants. The Wall Sh-eet Journal, November 11,1999. Hupet, Jerrold W Future of Intemational Migration within Asia. Asia and Pacific Migration Journal, l(2): Hugo, Graeme The Demographic Underpinnings of Current and Future International Migration in Asian. Asian and Pacific Migration Journal, 7(1): Kwan, Chen-lung A Study on the Problem Negotiation and Management of Illegal Migrants from Chinese Mainland. (in Chinese) Unpublished M.A. Thesies. Taipei: Institute of Chinese Mainland Studies, Tamkang University. Martin, Philip L., Andrew Mason and Ching-lung Tsay (Guest Editors) 1995a. Labour Migration in Asian (Special Issue of ASEAN Economic Bulletin 12(2)). Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies. Martin, Philip L., Andrew Mason and Ching-lung Tsay. 1995b. Overview. ASEAN Economic Bulletin 12(2): Skeldon, Ronald International Migration within and from the East and Southeast Asian Region: a Review Essay. Asian and Pacific Migration Journal, 1 (1): Tsay, Ching-lung Clandestine Labor Migration to Taiwan. Asian and Pacijïc Migration Journal, l(3-4): Tsay, Ching-lung Industrial Restructuring and International Competition in Taiwan. Environment and Planning A, 25( 1): I Tsay, Ching-lung. 1995a. Data on International Migration form Taiwan. Asian and Pacific Migration Journal, 4(4): Tsay, Ching-lung. 1995b Taiwan: Labour Importer. ASEAN Economic Bulletin, 12(2): Tsay, Ching-lung. 1995c Taiwan: Labour Shortage. pp (Chapter 8) in Asian NIES and the Global Economy: Industrial Restructuring and Corporate Strategy in the 1990s (edited by Gordon Clark and Won Bae Kim). Baltimore and London: The Johns Hopkins University Press,

101 Tsay, Ching-lung and Ji-ping Lin, Labour Importation and Unemployment of Local Workers in Taiwan. Asian and Pacific Migration Journal lo(3-4):

102 Table 11.1 Apprehensions and deportations of illegal migrants from China, Year Apprehension Deportation Deportation Rate (%) ,260 1, ,384 3, ,626 5, ,998 4, ,446 3, ,944 5, ,216 4, , , , 1, , * 1,622 1,427 2,250 1,216 1,121 1, Total 38,626 37, Source: Bureau of Immigration. The fust eleven months. 96

103 - y?c?zd or-

104 Table 11.3 Apprehended illegal migrants from China by agc and sex Age Total Male Female % Male Number All Ages 26,274 24,794 1, ,982 1, ,035 4, ,004 5, ,071 4, ,240 6, ,860 1, Ape Structure Cohl All Ages o Source: Originai records of the apprehended cases. 98

105 Table 11.4 Educational composition of apprehended illegal migrants from China by age and sex Number Educational Composifion (77) Age o/ All High School Junior Primary Persons Levels and Over High and Less Both Sexes All Ages 13, , , , , , All Ages All Ages , ,193 2,963 3,122 2,474 2, ' Males Females Source: Original records of the apprehended cases. 99

106 Table 11.5 Apprehended illegal migrants from China by predeparture occupation, sex and age Age All Ages All Ages All Ages Number of Occupational Composiíion (%) Persons Labour Farmer Crew Others No Both Sexes 14, , , , , , ,l , ,206 2,994 3,171 2,503 2, Source : Original records of the apprehended cases Female I O0

107 Table 11.6 Illegal migrants from China apprehended on land by current occupation Occuaation Number* % Total Construction worker Factory worker Restaurant worker Household maid Health care worker Farm worker Sex Entertainer Casual Worker 13,137 5,846 5, No Job Source: Kwang(1999), Table 5. *Only apprehensions between July 1992 and March 1999 are included. 101

108 CHAPTER 12 MIGRATION AND POVERTY IN KOREA IIye-kyung Lee 12.1 Introduction Poverty per se is an almost forgotten word in Korea these days. Because Korea has expcrienced a so-called miracle economic growth, poverty has apparently been eradicated. Since the 1960s the Korean Government has followed a Development First, Distribution Later policy. Koreans today tend to run forward, ignoring people under the shadow. Since the end of the 198Os, Korea has also experienced an influx of migrant workers. While their economic and social situations have improved since the middle of the 199Os, migrant workers earnings are higher than the lowest minimum wage of Koreans. Therefore, although some human rights violations and exploitation of migrant workers have been reported by the mass media and NGOs, most Koreans tend to think that migrants earn more in Korea than in their home countries Very few Koreans would be classified as living in poverty under the international criterion of poverty, and the eamings of migrant workers these days are higher than the minimum wages and the poverty line, no matter what poverty threshold is used - the national or the international poverty line. However, as a society becomes affluent, not just absolute or subsistence poverty, but relative poverty should be considered for nationals as well as for migrants. After a brief overview of poverty in Korea, this paper examines 0 who migrates to Korea and who remains behind; 0 Who are the most vulnerable groups in terms of employment conditions and relative deprivation. 0 Finally, this paper suggests what interventions are needed to reduce this vulnerability. Korea and Poverty Like other newly industrialized economies (NIES) in Asia, Korea has experienced rapid and high economic growth over the past four decades. The average increase in GDP was 8.09 percent between 1961 and 1996, one of the highest rates in Asia. The GNP per capita has increased from US$1,322 in 1960 to US$10,972 in 1998 (Table 12. i). The accompanying improvement in educational opportunities and in the quality of life has virtually abolished extreme poverty in Korea. For example, the proportion of people under the national poverty line has decreased from 41.1 percent in 1965 to 9.6 percent in 1996 (Quibria, 2002). Because the poverty line is varied by years as This work was supported by Pai Chai University Grant, The poverty rate among urban households was 20.4 percent in 1975 and 7.4 percent in

109 well as by countries, if we use the intemational criterion of one US dollar per day, only 2 percent of Koreans fitted the international criterion of poverty in Table 12.1 Economic growth, poverty, and inequalities in Korea 1960 ' GNP per capita (Constant 1995 US$)" 1,322 2,171 3,686 7,960 10, GNI per capita (Current US$)b ,598 5,886 10,823 9,628 6,823 Unemployment Rates' 8.1(63) Below US I$ per day" Below US 4$ per day" - 8.6(97) (99) Below Nat.Poverty Line' 41.1 (65) (84) - 9.6(96) 19.0 Gini Coefficient" '.32' Source: a: Quibria (2002: 8, 9,ll); b: Korea National Statistical Office (2001: 561); c: Korea National Statistical Office (2000: 236), Korean Labor Institute (1995: 17; ); d: World Bank (1999) However, the economic crisis of 1997 and the restructuring process thereafter has increased the numbers of unemployed people and the proportion of people belowthe national poverty line, although this has not altered the 2% below the international ~ritenon.~ The unemployment rates peaked at 6.8 percent in 1998, up from the average 2.3 percent in The number of unemployed people in 1998 was about 1.5 million. Meanwhile, the percentage of Koreans below the national poverty line (234,000 Won per person per month) reached a peak of about 19 percent in This was more than double the 9 percent of In other words, the number of the poor increased from about 3 million in 1997 to more than 6 million in 1998 (The Korea Herald, 13/12/99). Since the middle of 1998 the Korean economy has been recovering from the crisis. Many statistics reveal the quantitative improvement or recovery from the economic crisis (Table 12.1). The quality of such improvement, however, needs more careful analysis. In other words, the quality of employment and the situation with respect to inequality have deteriorated. For example, although employment rates have returned to pre-economic crisis levels, most of newly expanded employment opportunities are irregular or temporary. In other words, most of those who have found jobs since the ' After the economic crisis, there are disputes about the size of poverty people in Korea. While World Bank (1999) reported that the percentage of people below 4 US dollars per day was 8.6 percents in 1997 but became 19.2 percent in and while ango reported that the size of people in poverty rose to over 10 millions based on the 'minimum living costs' in 1999, there is no consensus what is proper criteria for a poverty line in Korea. 103

110 crisis are temporary workers. The overall unemployment rate has decreased since 1998, however, youth' unemployment is still very high, and the number of disappointed women who have given up searching for jobs has not declined.' The economic crisis has accelerated the social and economic polarization in Korea. In other words, the economic crisis has widened the gaps between the rich and the poor, allowing many Koreans to suffer relative deprivation? Migrant workers and poveriy Since the end of the 1980s, Korea has experienced an influx of foreign workers from neighboring Asian countries. The total number of migrant workers was 42,000 in 1991, and rose to 350,000 in early 2002 (Josun Ilbo, 2002). The proportion of migrant workers in the Korean labor force is now 2%. The important sending countries were China and Philippines in the early 1990s but were diversified since 1994, when the Korean Government began to utilize the 'Industrial Training Program' and to bring trainees from 14 neighboring Asian countries, Nowadays, China is still the main supply of workers to Korea, followed by the Philippines, Vietnam, and Indonesia. However, on an average industrial complex, construction site and in other service sectors in Korea you wil find migrant workers from almost all Asian countries. The labor migration and relocation of labor-intensive firms overseas (or FDI) are highly interrelated phenomena to cope with the labor shortages in 3D jobs. The major countries that have sent their workers to Korea are those in which Korean companies have established their businesses. This provides a unique opportunity to compare the individual and employment characteristics of five ethnic groups in Korean firms in Korea and in their home countries. Using two questionnaire surveys, one for migrant workers in Korea, and the other for non-migrant workers in their home Countries, this paper examines: Who migrates to Korea and who remains? Which groups of migrants are the most vulnerable groups in Korea and why? ' Despite the high level of unemployment and increase of poor people during the economic crisis, these Koreans could not take up the so-called 3D jobs. Migrant workers were the ones who worked at these jobs. ' The increasing gap between the rich and the poor after the financial crisis is due to the economic recession. On the one hand, the massive firing of employees at government offices, corporate, and banking sectors produced an unprecedented number of jobless. The incomplete social security net has left many of these people without livelihood protection. On the other hand, however, the rich earned more thanks to the high interest rates, currency rates, and the suspension of the global taxation of financial incomes in 1998 (The Koreon Herald, 13/12/99), Both questionnaire surveys were conducted by the Korean Migration Research Network (KMRN) Team, of which the author is a member. The survey for migrant workers in Korea was conducted during July and August 1998, and that for non-migrant workers in China. Vietnam, Philippines, and Indonesia was done during January and February o4